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Wind Onshore AuctionsCurrent Developments in Europe
AURES wind onshore
stakeholder workshop
March, 15th 2016
Berlin
Agenda
14:00 Welcome by the project coordinator and quick overview of the AURES project
14:10-15:30 International experiences with wind auctions
• Experiences from the Netherlands (Paul Noothout, Ecofys)
• Experiences from the UK (Bridget Woodman, University of Exeter)
• Experiences from Spain (Pablo del Rio, CSIC and Hugo Lucas, Factor CO2)
• Considerations in the planned German scheme (Fabian Wigand, Ecofys)
15:30-15:45 Coffee Break
15:45-16:50 Discussion: What lessons can be learnt for wind energy auction design?
16:50-17:00 Wrap-up and conclusion
SHORTLY ABOUT THE PROJECT
3
Background for AURES
AURES: AUctions for Renewable Energy Support
The new EC State Aid Guidelines1
From January 2017, Member States shall set up competitive auctions (also calledtenders) to grant support to all new installations (with only very few exceptions).
Limited experience with auctions in Europe Only some Member States have undertaken RES auctions (e.g. the UK, Ireland,
Portugal, France, Denmark and the Netherlands) – and with mixed results
Need for analysis and coordination Which auction types and designs are specifically applicable for RES-E support?
What effects (desired or undesired) do different design options have under differentmarket conditions?
What are lessons learnt and best practices for implementing auctions in Europe?
1Guidelines on State aid for environmental
protection and energy 2014-2020, C(2014)2322
Who we are
A coordination and support action under the EU Horizon2020
programme
Project runs from January 2015 to December 2017
Eight partners from seven EU countries
Cooperation with policy makers, market participants and other
stakeholders.
AURES project at a glance
AURES combines
Target-oriented analysisempirical analysis
interviews with stakeholders
lessons from other industries
auction experiments
simulations in energy models
Capacity building activitiesworkshops
webinars
case cooperations
bi- and multilateral meetings
interactive website
…find more information on:
auresproject.eu
ACHIEVEMENTS UNTIL NOW
7
Project activities at a glance
Finalised: Framing and conceptual aspects
Identification of auction types and formats suitable for RES support
Description of appropriate design elements for RES support
Empirical analysis of past and ongoing auction implementations
Ongoing: Case cooperation with policy makers on auction implementations
Analysis on alternatives to auctions
Cash-flow type model for individual investors
Starting / Upcoming: Game theoretic, agent-based model for simulation of auctions in energy systems
Auction experiments in the lab
Online policy support tool for best practice auction design
Continuous: Dissemination and stakeholder contact in webinars, workshops, media actions
Empirical analysis of past and ongoing auction implementationsPAST AUCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS
Germany
Pilot auction for ground-mounted PV (2015)
California
Renewable Auction Mechanism (multi-technology)
(2011-2015)
Denmark
Single-site offshore wind auctions (2004-2015)
Italy
Lowest Bid Auctions* (2012-2015)
China
Onshore wind auctions* (2003-2007)
France
Small scale PV auctions* (2011-2014)
Plus three more cases upcoming*
ONGOING / FUTURE AUCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS
Spain
Wind and biomass auction (January 2016)
Poland
New RES Act auctions (multi-technology) (from
July 2016)
Slovakia
Case study on future implementation possibilities
Croatia
Auctions for RES and high efficiency Co-
generation (2016 / 2017 onwards)
Netherlands – Denmark
Hypothetical cooperation case for open onshore
wind auctions
*Publication on project homepage pending
Experiences from different European countries
• Experiences from the Netherlands (Paul Noothout, Ecofys)
• Experiences from the UK (Oscar Fitch Roy, University of
Exeter)
• Experiences from Spain (Pablo del Rio, CSIC and Hugo Lucas,
Factor CO2)
• Considerations in the planned German scheme (Fabian
Wigand, Ecofys)
International Experienceswith wind auctions in theNetherlands
Paul Noothout
Ecofys
The Netherlands – SDE+
SDE+ in a nutshell:
• Sliding feed-in premium scheme introduced in 2011;
• SDE+ is a reverse auctioning scheme, including a large variety of
technologies covering Electricity, Heat and Gas;
• SDE+ scheme is technology neutral aiming to deploy renewable energy
at the lowest possible cost;
• Since 2016, the SDE+ consists of two rounds (Mar-Apr and Oct) with four
phases each;
• Each phase the maximum premium for which SDE+ can be applied
increases;
• Each round has a budget of €4 billion;
Introduction of SDE+Basics and rules
• SDE+ in 2016:
• Two rounds, each with a budget of €4 billion;
• Each round consist of four phases;
• In each phase, the maximum premium increases up to 150 €/MWh.
• For each technology a maximum basisbedrag is determined, reflecting the
maximum premium for each technology:
• Technologies can never obtain a higher premium than the maximum basisbedrag;
• By applying in the “free category” project developers can apply for a lower premium;
• Since 2016, project developers are free to choose their premium in the “free category”.
• The maximum premium is determined annually:
• ECN publishes the calculations and draft premiums (SDE+ basisbedragen);
• After market consultation, ECN publishes their final advice;
• The Ministry of Economic Affairs decides on the final premiums.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
SD
E+
basis
bedra
gIntroduction of SDE+Competitive feed-in premium
Four phases, each phase the maximum
basisbedrag increases
0.09
€/kWh
0.11
€/kWh
0.13
€/kWh
0.15
€/kWh
22 Mar 2016
29 Mar 2016
04 Apr 2016
11 Apr 2016
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
SD
E+
basis
bedra
g
Wind onshore >= 7.0 m/s
Geothermal
Various biomass options
Wind onshore <7.0 m/s
Solar thermal
Solar-PV
Wind in lake
Biomass co-firing
Ocean energy
Mono digestion
Introduction of SDE+Competitive feed-in premium
Depending on the remaining budget, project
developers will optimise their budget
claim or their chances of obtaining SDE+
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
SD
E+
basis
bedra
g
Premium for SDE+ application
Introduction of SDE+Example: Solar-PV project
Solar-PV project
Max basisbedrag: 128€/MWh
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
SD
E+
basis
bedra
g
Premium for SDE+ application
Introduction of SDE+Example: Solar-PV project
To increase chances of receiving SDE+,
project developers can apply for lower
basisbedrag in the ‘free category’
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
SD
E+
basis
bedra
g
Premium for SDE+ application
Introduction of SDE+Example: Solar-PV project
In the “free category”, project developers
can choose own basisbedrag
EfficiencyResults 2012-2015
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014 2015 2015 2015
Budget
cla
im (€
mln
)
Afvalverbranding Geothermie Waterkracht
Thermische conversie AWZI/RWZI thermische drukhydrolyse Wind op land
Allesvergisting Ketel biomassa Mest covergisting
Groen gas Bij- en meestook Mest monovergisting
Zon-PV Zonthermie
SDE+ budget claim
Awarded
Rejected
EfficiencyResults 2012-2015
• Budget cap increases
competition between
categories;
• More expensive
options such as solar-
PV can obtain SDE+ in
free category;
• Expensive categories
(e.g. ocean energy) are
not applying for SDE+.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2012 2013 2014 2015
Cost
pri
ce r
ation (
M€/P
J)
SD
E+
aw
ard
ed (€
mln
)
Wind op land Afvalverbranding Bij- en meestook
Allesvergisting Mest covergisting Mest monovergisting
Thermische conversie Ketel biomassa AWZI/RWZI thermische drukhydrolyse
Groen gas Waterkracht Geothermie
Zon-PV Zonthermie Cost price ration (M€/PJ)
EffectivenessResults 2012-2015: Realisation of awarded projects
SDE+ categoryProject realisation period
(based on SDE+)
Realisation rate
Wind 4 years 70%
Solar-PV 3 years 70%
Digestion 4 years 50%
Biomass boilers 4 years 70%
Thermal conversion 4 years 70%
Geothermal 4 years 30%
• For some categories realisation rates are low, because:
• Projects were not financially feasible with awarded SDE+;
• Projects were withdrawn.
• Penalties for not realising within realisation period:
• Exclusion from SDE+ for three years;
• Financial pernalty of 10% project value for projects >400M€.
EffectivenessResults 2012-2015: Realisation of SDE+ budget
• Significant share of SDE+ budget has not been spent (on average 20%);
• Unused budget has been returned to SDE+ budget for future years, used
for instance to fund budget increases.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
€m
illio
n
Source: Ecofys, Rijksjaarverslag 2014 xiii Economische Zaken
Utilised Not utilised
2009 2010 201320122011 2014
EffectivenessSDE+ budget claim vs. spending
Cost-
pri
ce
Grey electricity
Renewable
electricity
Base energy price
SDE+ basisbedrag
Max SDE+ >> used for budget claim calculation
Cost-
pri
ce
SDE+
Grey electricity
Renewable
electricity
Base energy price
SDE+ basisbedrag
EffectivenessSDE+ budget claim vs. spending
Cost-
pri
ce
SDE+
Grey electricity
Renewable
electricity
Base energy price
SDE+ basisbedrag
EffectivenessSDE+ budget claim vs. spending
Cost-
pri
ce
SDE+
Grey electricity
Renewable
electricity
Base energy price
SDE+ basisbedrag
EffectivenessSDE+ budget claim vs. spending
Lessons learnt
• SDE+ is effective in bringing down cost for renewable energy;
• Important to ensure that projects remain financially feasible;
• Expensive technologies are hardly deployed under SDE+:
• Ocean energy;
• Wind offshore >> separate tender;
• About 20% of the budget is not being spend, because of:
• Awarded projects not being realised;
• SDE+ budgeting.
• SDE+ budgets have been increasing over the years
• €1.7 billion in 2011 to €8 billion in 2016.
• However…the Netherlands are lagging behind on achieving their 2020
targets and are likely not going to achieve it.
AppendixCorrectiebedragen SDE+
SDE+ category Unit 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*
Wind onshore €/kWh 0.048 0.050 0.054 0.048 0.038 0.038
* Estimated correctiebedrag
More information:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2015-38490.html
International Experiences with wind auctionsUK case study
Bridget Woodman and Oscar
Fitch-Roy
University of Exeter
UK overview
• RED target: 15% by 2020, ~30% electricity
• 2014: 7% of final energy consumption, electricity 17.8%
• Erosion of broader renewables policy since the Conservative Government elected in May 2015
• Onshore wind and large (5MW) pv
• Offshore wind
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Renewables capacity (MW)
Onshore wind Offshore wind
Marine energy (wave and tidal stream) Solar photovoltaics
Small scale hydro Large scale hydro
Landfill gas Sewage sludge digestion
Energy from waste Animal Biomass (non-AD)
Anaerobic digestion Plant Biomass
Progress against the
RED
Key features: technology pots
• Technologies are divided into 3 Pots
• Established, less established and biomass conversion
• Maximum strike prices set for each of the technologies (Administrative Strike Prices – ASPs)
• Annual funds set out for the Pots• Maximum available funding for each
of the Pots in each of the delivery years
Administrative strike price (£/MWh) 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19
Pot 1 (established)
Onshore Wind (>5 MW) 95 95 95 90 90
Solar Photo-Voltaic (>5MW) 120 120 115 110 100
Energy from Waste (with CHP) 80 80 80 80 80
Hydro (>5 MW and <50MW) 100 100 100 100 100
Landfill Gas 55 55 55 55 55
Sewage Gas 75 75 75 75 75
Pot 2 (less established)
Offshore Wind 155 155 150 140 140
Tidal Stream 305 305 305 305 305
Wave 305 305 305 305 305
Advanced Conversion Technologies
(with or without CHP)
155 155 150 140 140
Anaerobic Digestion (with or without
CHP) (>5MW)
150 150 150 140 140
Dedicated Biomass (with CHP) 125 125 125 125 125
Geothermal (with or without CHP) 145 145 145 140 140
Pot 3
Biomass Conversion 105 105 105 105 105
Budget (£million)Delivery Year
2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21
Pot 1 (established) 50 65 65 65 65 65
Pot 2 (less established) - 155 260 260 260 260
Total 50 230 325 325 325 325
Key features: auction process
• Bids are stacked according to price (rather than technology or delivery year)
• Cheapest strike price bid selected first
• Projects rejected if costs will exceed the budget in any of the relevant allocation years
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/302725/af_event__9_april_slides.pdf
Efficiency
= Cost-effective support through competition
• Final strike prices lower than ASPs
• But ... emphasis on offshore wind – the most expensive option
EfW with CHP, 94.75
Onshore wind, 688.55
Solar pv, 38.67ACT, 62
Offshore wind, 1162
CfD contracts signed (MW)
Pot 1 technologiesPot 2 technologies
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
On
sho
re w
ind
(p
ot
1)
Sola
r P
V (
po
t 1
)
On
sho
re W
ind
(p
ot
1)
AC
T (p
ot
2)
Off
sho
re w
ind
(p
ot
2)
EfW
wit
h C
HP
(p
ot
1)
On
sho
re w
ind
(p
ot
1)
AC
T (p
ot
2)
Off
sho
re w
ind
(p
ot
2)
2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Strike price
ASP
Effectiveness
• Available budget underspent in all years
• PV suffered ... and following policy changes has no choice about participating in the CfD process (rather than the RO)
• Financial/contractual milestones at the end of March 2016 – will be able to judge progress towards delivery
• May be three more allocation rounds before 2020
• At least one for just Pot 2?
-£50,000,000
£-
£50,000,000
£100,000,000
£150,000,000
£200,000,000
£250,000,000
£300,000,000
£350,000,000
2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21
Budget Total Spend
Lessons learnt
• The auction was at least as political as it was technical/economic
• ‘Effectiveness’ depends on allocation to pots
• ‘Success’ depends on who you ask:
• DECC pleased that there’s lots of capacity
• … so are offshore wind developers
• Small generators (especially pv) are not so happy
• Blue print …?
• Banding to reflect technology development, rather than pots?
• But a generic blue print is pretty meaningless?
International Experiences with wind auctionsSpain
Pablo del Río
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Científicas (CSIC)
Spain
Quick overview
• Year of introduction: 2015.
• Key country specifics:
• Macroeconomics: deep recession, high unemployment rates.
• Particular features of the electricity system:
• Overcapacity
• Virtually an energy island (interconnection 6,300 MW, 5.8%).
• Tariff deficit.
• Retail prices for households above EU average (below average for industrial consumers). Both increased two-fold in the last decade.
• Decreasing wholesale prices.
• Diversified electricity generation mix: coal (16.6%), fuel (2.4%), CCGT (9.2%), nuclear (20.5%), wind (18.6%), solar (5%), hydro (12.8%), rest of renewables (4.5%), cogeneration (10.5%).
Spain
Quick overview
• 2020 target: 20% of gross final energy consumption.
• Compliance with Directive targets (on track):
• RES-share in 2013: 15.4%
• Interim target 2013/2014: 12.1%.
• Technology focus to achieve the RES target: wind, hydro, solar PV, CSP (NREAP, Plan for the Development of the Electricity Transport grid).
• Support policy
• 1998-2012: FIT, FIP.
• 2010: Cost containment regulations.
• 2012: Moratorium + generation tax
• 2013-2014: new regulatory package.
Spain
Quick overview
• New regulation:
• Abolishment of FITs and FIPs
• Replaced by a sum to be allocated based on the plant’s installed capacity to compensate for investment-related outlays.
• RES operators are guaranteed a reasonable rate of return (RRR): 7.5%. It can be revised every 6 years.
• Support for the difference between Pw and RRR
• Each installation receives the market price plus the specific remuneration of the plant type:
• Remuneration for the investment (Rinv): a payment per kW that allows installations to recover those investment costs which cannot be recovered by the sales of electricity in the market.
• The specific remuneration for the operation (Ro): a payment per kWh for those technologies whose operational costs are above the average wholesale electricity price.
What are the most important functions and design elements of the scheme and what were the background considerations?
• What makes its design specific...
• Bidders bid on a discount on the standard value of the initial investment of the reference standard plant (RSP).
• No schedule on future auctions.
• Volume: 500 MW wind.
• Static, sealed bid, price-only, uniform pricing.
• Multi-item: No project-specific, no location-specific auctions.
• Price limits: 0-100% discounts.
• Lax prequalification criteria: economic guarantees (20€/kW)
• Deadline: 4 years.
• Administrative costs: covered by successful bidders (0.17€/kW).
• No actor, size or geographical diversity requirements.
Results of the auction
Results of the auction
Efficiency / support costs
• Support costs minimised.
• Low support levels likely lead to low-cost
projects.
Effectiveness
• All volume auctioned has been allocated.
• 2.5 GW submitted (10GW in the pipeline...).
• Too early to tell whether the auction will be effective.
• Very low bids leading to non-realisation of projects?
• Reasons for low bids: moratoria leading to many MWs
in the pipeline, Kamikazes?, expectations on non-zero
cut-off point.
• Concerns on concentration on outsiders.
• Will the auction scheme contribute to compliance with
Directive targets?
Other criteria
• Dynamic efficiency:
• Solar PV, CSP, small hydro and biomass not included in the scheme.
• Impact on innovation? small market creation, uncertainty (6-year revisions) and low profit
margins. High competition between equipment suppliers.
• Low impact on supply chain for the technologies?
• Actor diversity and social acceptability.
• Winners being mostly small actors, outsiders to the wind energy sector.
• Limited participation of foreign firms.
• Unknown geographical diversity.
• Social acceptibility: low support costs vs. low deployment??
• Compatibility with market principles and integration
• Winning bidders participate in the wholesale market.
• Distributional effects
• Winners and losers:
Lessons learnt
• Too early to tell on consequences??
• Context-specific conditions: large pipeline due to the
moratoria, overcapacity, tariff deficit, energy island…
• Participation of small actors.
• Low volumes being auctioned + lax prequalifiquation
requirements encouraged
• competition.
• the participation of outsiders. Kamikazes?
effectiveness at risk?
• Lack of an auction schedule: uncertainty for investors.
International Experiences with wind auctionsGermany
Fabian Wigand
Senior Consultant
Ecofys
Germany: Considerations on the planned German wind auctions
Process overview
• Part of the overall reform process of the Renewable Energy Act
(EEG 2016)
• Design has been consulted in summer 2015 and subsequently
reworked; latest draft was published early 2016
• Law is planned to be ratified by summer 2016; first auction in
May 2017
Key design elements
• Technology-specific (separate auctions for PV and offshore
wind)
• Pay-as-bid pricing rule, multiple-item static auction
• Maximum price
• 3-4 auction rounds per year
7 8+4
Realisierungsfrist
2 3
Permit
1 65
Payment 20 a
Effectiveness: auction late in planning process to ensure project realization
BImSchG
Award
Planning Constr. Operation
Realization deadline2 a
Prequalification
Source: Ecofys 2015 based on FA Wind 2014
Advantages Disadvantages
+ Few project risks after BImSchG
+ Credit-rating of bidder has smaller
impact than on bid-bonds
+ Easier to monitor target fulfillment
+ Accepted by industry
− High (sunk) costs for long and risky pre-
development
− Could be prohibitive and reduce the level
of competition
Year
High material prequalification criterion to ensure high realization rate &
target fulfillment: Permit notification under Immission Control Act (BImSchG)
Realization rate is increased through 30€/kW bid bond
Realization period
> Projects need to be realized within 24 months, otherwise gradual penalty
> After six months the full penalty needs to be paid; grace period can be
prolonged if delays are due to lawsuits against the BImSch permit
Expulsion from
auction
Return of bid-
bond
Return of bid-bond and
start of support payments
Partial penalty
Full penalty
Ensuring intention to realize Ensuring realization rate
Ensuring likeliness that projects are realized
Awarded
bid?
Realization on
time?
Delayed
realization
Bid-bond
submitted?
Wind auction volume set depending on build-up of other technologies
• Auctioned wind volume depends on EEG formula: onshore wind used as
a gap filler to reach target of 45% RES by 2025
• Wind volume will depend on build-up of other technologies
• In the first year ~ 2.900 MW (gross) / year might be auctioned
• Min. volume of 2 GW guaranteed to ensure investor security
Question for discussion: How can project developers react to seasonal
variations in auction volume and project development and adapt their
project pipeline?
Efficiency – effect of the reference yield model (REM, „Referenzertragsmodell“)
Aim of reference yield model
• Reduce windfall profits of
projects with better wind
conditions
• Ensure (to a limited extent) that
projects will be regionally
distributed over Germany to limit
transmission expansion needs
and ensure steady wind
production
Site quality in % of the reference yield
EEG tariff w/o
REM
Pro
duction
costs
ct/kW
h
80% 100% 130%
IRR EEG tariff with
REM
80% 100% 130%
The reference yield model in the EEG 2014
Efficiency - changed role of referenceyield model in auction
Adaptation of reference yield model for the auction scheme:
• Reference yield model defines minimum bid per yield class
• Bidders bid on 100% reference site, irrespective of their actual wind
conditions (so bids based on IRR expectations, development costs etc.)
• Final tariff is then determined with correction factor based on local wind
conditions
• Thereby competitive site locations with different wind conditions are
homogenized
Correction
factor
Reference yield based
on wind conditions
Actor diversity is a political goal in Germany, right balance is complex
Importance of actor diversity in Germany
• Actor diversity is a political goal for the acceptance of energy transition.
• Effectiveness and efficiency: avoiding market concentration to ensure
competition, easier pre-development of sites through local engagement
Difficulties for small actors in auctions
• Production costs are structurally different, but the result is comparable.
• Risk of not being successful and uncertainty on strike price problematic:
limited capacity to spread risks in small project portfolio.
Principles in auction design
• Tackling actor diversity through simple and transparent auction design
• Preferential treatment for small actors should be limited (no impact on
rest of auction design, avoid misuse)
Preferential treatment for citizen cooperatives
• In Germany preferential treatment in auction scheme (no exemption from
auction as in other countries)
• Pref. treatment only for citizen cooperatives1
• Pref. treatment with lower mat. prequalification req.: No BImSch
permit but proof of secured site, wind measurement. Split of bind bond2
• For other small actors new business models and cooperation may provide
alternatives for preferential treatments, e.g.
• Large and small project developers cooperate - large actors can
spread risk better over portfolio. small actors have access to sites
• Component manufacturers offer their creditworthiness for bid bonds
to smaller actors as a new service
• Project developers sell pre-developed project earlier, i.e. before
the participation in the auction
1. Citizen cooperatives = at least 10 local natural persons with together 51% of voting rights, max 1 project per year.
2. Bid-bond: 15 EUR/kW when submitting bid, 15EUR/kW two years after receiving permit)
Lessons learnt so far
• Finding the right balance btw. policy goals such as target fulfillment,
competitive setting of support tariffs, and actor diversity is complex
• High degree of stakeholder involvement from the beginning
• Constant learning between actors: during the debate, relative
importance of certain issues shifted (e.g. role of prequalification
requirements in comparison to pricing rule)
• Pilot scheme of ground-mounted PV helped prepare the Ministry, the
auctioning authority and associations for functioning of the new scheme
• Ongoing debate on actor diversity, regional quotas, and how to set the
auction volume
Back-up: Options for preferential treatment of particularactors
Supporting measures outside of the auction
Partial compensation for development costs in case
of lost bids
Consultation and quality control of bids before
submission
Preferential treatment within the auction
Different prequalification criteria
Quota or bonus
Different pricing rule (uniform pricing for small
actors)
Exception from the normal auction
Administrative support tariff
Non-competitive segment with access to the strike
price
Options for preferential treatment
Thank you!
Communication and web:
Michael Minter
Head of Secretariat
Kattesundet 4, 3rd floor
DK-1458 København K
+ 45 26 16 64 14
Project coordination:
Lena Kitzing
Researcher
Frederiksborgvej 399
DK-4000 Roskilde
+45 24 65 90 64
Poul Erik Morthorst
Professor
Frederiksborgvej 399
DK-4000 Roskilde
+45 46 77 51 06
Visit our website:
www.auresproject.eu
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@AURESproject