william iii and the emergence of a mediterranean naval policy, 1692-4

William III and the Emergence of a Mediterranean Naval Policy, 1692-4Author(s): John EhrmanSource: Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1949), pp. 269-292Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020760 .

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II. WILLIAM III AND THE EMERGENCE OF A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, I692-41

BY JOHN EHRMAN

NI9 May i692,2 the English and Dutch fleets decisively defeated the Q } French fleet off Barfleur, and followed up their advantage the next day by destroying fifteen of its ships in the bay of La Hougue. Despite the

comparatively small material losses, the battle marked, and was recognized as marking, the turning point in the war at sea.. It removed in dramatic form the fear of invasion which had been present, and at times had seemed real, since the French had defeated the allies off Beachy Head in i690, and offered in its place, and for the first time, the prospect of an offensive unhindered by a superior enemy fleet. The fruits of victory, however, soon turned sour, for its very completeness had set a problem which seemed insoluble. The logical sequence of Barfleur, as was recognized at the time, was a large-scale landing on the northern coast of France; but when this was tried in the summer of I692 the attempt ended in a public fiasco, with the admirals arguing against the generals and the ministers arguing with both. The I4,000 troops who had been put aboard the transports had to be dispersed, and the only result of the campaign was to secure the dismissal of Admiral Edward Russell as commander-in-chief of the fleet and of his rival Nottingham as the Secretary of State in charge of naval affairs.3 At the end of the year the future success of large-scale combined operations seemed improbable; but with the French fleet unlikely to seek an encounter in i693 there was no alternative employ- ment for the English fleet. Accordingly, before he left for Holland in the winter of I692 William decided to resume where the previous campaign had left off, and to stage a combined land and sea attack on Brest. By the middle of January the prpparations were under way,5 and towards the end of February the troops were selected for the service.6 In April, William ordered them to

1 J must thank the Trustees of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, for permission to cite the manuscripts of the Bibliotheca Phillippica now in their possession, and Major J. R. Hanbury and the Historical Manuscripts Commission for the use of the transcript of the Finch manuscripts at present on loan to the Commission.

2 Except where otherwise stated, dates are given in old style throughout, but with the year beginning on i January and not 25 March.

Neither Secretary of State was officially responsible for naval affairs, but Nottingham had in effect been managing them since I689. His removal from their unofficial charge was effected by transferring them to his recently appointed colleague and enemy, Sir John Trenchard.

4 [British Museum] Add. MSS. 3799I, f. z6v. The minutes of the conferences where the matter was discussed between the King, the inner Council and the Admiralty at Whitehall, are given in P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice] Adm. I/5248. It is difficult to tell exactly when the decision was taken, but it was probably during December.

P.R.O. Adm. 1/5248, 8 and I5 Jan. 6 Ibid. 29 Feb.



270 JOHN EHRMAN be distributed in camps along the coast of Hampshire and Sussex, so as to waste no time in embarking.7 By the end of that month, the Transport Com- missioners had already spent ?33,000 on the preparations, and the expendi- ture of a further /22,I25 by midsummer was authorized.8 But in the event the money was laid out to no purpose, for no attack, and indeed no embtarka- tion, ever took place.

The reason for its abandonment lay in the diversion of the fleet to a project which had originally been intended to occupy a single squadron, and which was to prove in the end the only alternative to the bankrupt strategy of a direct attack. In the summer of I692 it had been agreed that some ships ought at some time to be sent into the Mediterranean, to escort the trade which had been denied the chance of sailing for the Levant for a year.9 Lengthy negotia- tions had gone on between the English and the Dutch over the size of the squadroin, the length of its stay in those waters and the date on which it should sail; 10 but the complications of supplying the main fleet left little opportunity to organize any subsidiary expedition, and although a squadron of two third rates, three fourths, one fifth and one fireship was assigned to a 'convoy for Turkey'," and the arrangements reached the point where its sailing orders were drawn up with the assistance of the Turkey Company,12 the winter arrived without any serious effort having been made to put it to sea. On his return to England, however, William insisted that the escort was to be given a high priority to enable it to sail early in i693,13 and in January Rooke was appointed in command.14 In February the merchants were informed publicly, as their representatives had been told in private in December, that a convoy would definitely be leaving for the Straits in the spring,15 and on the zoth of that month Rooke was given his sailing orders and directed to appoint a rendezvous for a squadron of three third rates, five fourths and seven fifths, with two fireships, a bomb vessel, a brigantine and a storeship.16 On i6 March, he was ordered to leave at the first opportunity,17 but-much to the disgust of the merchants 18-various administrative delays held him at Spithead until 30 May. On that day, with almost four hundred merchant vessels of both nations in company, he weighed anchor from St Helens.19

7Add. MSS. 3799I, f. 6v. 8 Ibid. f. z6v. 9 P.R.O. Adm. 3/6, 22 May and 24 Aug. 10 Add. MSS. 3799I, ff. II, I2V; Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem

Bentinck (ed. N. Japikse, I927-37), I, 369-72. - P.R.O. Adm. 8/3, I Aug. and I Oct. 12 P.R.O. Adm. 3/7, 23 Oct. 13 P.R.O. Adm. I/5248, 4 and II Dec. 14 Ibid. II Dec. and 8 Jan. 15 P.R.O. Adm. 3/7, II Jan.; 3/8, i8 Dec.; 2/383, Secretary of Admiralty to Turkey Com-

pany, Feb. I693. 16 P.R.O. Adm. 3/8, 20 Feb.; [Manuscripts of the] H[ouse] of L[ords], N[ew] S[eries],

I, I07-9. 17 H. of L., N.S. i, IIO. 18 The Dutch calculated that they had lost 70% of the capital invested in their ships for the

voyage, on account of the demurrage which this delay cost them (Add. MSS. 37992, f. 4). 19 H. of L., N.S. I, I29. The delays were caused mostly by weather and shortage of victuals



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, I692-4 27I

The news that a large convoy would be sailing for the Mediterranean was naturally soon known to the French, and at the end of April the Brest fleet under Tourville and the Toulon fleet under d'Estrees were ordered to concen- trate in Lagos Bay to intercept.20 By the middle of May William in Flanders had wind of this move,21 and was urging that the convoy should leave immediately. The Cabinet in reply inquired whether the escort should not be strengthened, but, as the King informed it with some asperity, this would be unnecessary provided that the convoy sailed without further delay.22 Rooke, however, still seemed unable to get away, and on the igth the main fleet, which was now concentrated at St Helens ready to cruise in his support in the Soundings before making its attack upon Brest,23 was ordered to escort him 'so far as you [the joint admirals] shall think requisite .24 Accordingly, when the squadron sailed eleven days later, it was with the allied fleet of I02 Ships in company.25

- ~~~~~II It will have been noticed, in this brief account of the preparations for the Mediterranean convoy, that William himself took an active part in them; and, indeed, the winter of I692-3 and the following spring are remarkable princi- pally for the detailed interest which, for the first time, he displayed in naval affairs. There is little direct evidence of this before the end of April I693, for until that time the King was in England, and no correspondence therefore exists in which his influence may be traced. But from the tenor of the letters which began on his arrival on the continent, it is clear that this had been direct and considerable for some months beforehand. This was partly due to the fact that no competent naval authority existed after the simultaneous disappear- ance from the naval scene of Russell and Nottingham. His original naval con- fidants had now gone, and the emphasis which, thanks to Nottingham, had been placed upon thee Secretary of State in naval affairs produced a disappointing result when the Secretary was not qualified to control them. Trenchard, who had been put into office' as the least offensive of the Whig candidates for a post that could not be refused them, had neither political stature nor experience- of sea warfare. The ministry itself was 'incompetent to decide one day what the House of Commons would do the next ,26 and the Board of Admiralty was no more qualified than usual to replace or assist its superiors.

20 Charles de la Ronciere, Histoire de la Marine fran,caise (i899- ), VI, I40-I. 21 There had been earlier rumours of it in England (Cal[endar of] S[tate] P[apers] Dom[estic],

1693, pp. 32, 52), but the allied espionage service, centred at Rotterdam, could not confirm them ([Public Record Office] S[tate] P[apers] For[eign], 84/22, ff. I75-80).

22 Add. MSS. 3799I, f. 27; 37992, ff. 8, I2V. 23 Add. MSS. 3799I, f. 29; Cal. S.P. Dom. 1693, I02-5. 24 H. of L., N.S. I, I29. Three admirals, Killigrew, Delavall and Shovell, had been ap-

pointed in joint command of the fleet for the year on the dismissal of Russell. 25 [J.] Burchett, [Memoirs of Transactions at Sea during the War with France] (I703), p. I78. 26 Sir James Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland (I77I-3), ii, Appendix to

Pt. II, p. 50.



272 JOHN EHRMAN The Commission which had been in existence during the quarrels of I692 was a weak one, and it was replaced in April I693 by a still weaker body from which Richard Onslow, one of the more important members of the previous Board, was omitted,27 while the colourless Cornwallis was replaced as nominal head by the unamiable and ineffective Falkland.28 Such a Commission was of no account, and far from replacing Trenchard in questions of policy, it did not even replace him in administrative business. Although two of the three joint admirals were Commissioners of the Admiralty, and although Trenchard was not a particularly powerful figure, the same detailed correspondence was conducted between the secretary and the fleet as Nottingham had conducted with Russell,29 and the Admiralty was limited to sending formal orders which had been largely decided elsewhere, and information on supplies and victualling arrangements.30 It is, indeed, difficult at this time to see what function the Commission served.31 Its control of naval movements had been removed by the Secretary of State, and the Navy Board could have informed the fleet of the rest of its work. With none of the recognized authorities, therefore, capable of handling naval affairs, William himself descended into the arena.

The reason, however, for his emphasis on the Mediterranean was not merely negative, but positive; not simply the result of the inadequacy of the naval authorities, but also of his own interest in the area. This may be seen in the contrast between the attention which he paid to events there and to those in home waters; for the latter, although greater in I693 and I694 than it had been in earlier years, was still slight compared with the former. The Mediter- ranean, indeed, to judge from the scanty evidence of his initial dispositions in January I689 and from the terms of the naval convention with the Dutch of the same year, had been William's objective for the allied navies from the time he invaded England. From I689 to June I692, however, little opportunity had offered for any effective action in the south. A small squadron had been sent to the Straits in March i690, and had cruised for three months east of Gibraltar, with considerable effect upon the Barbary states ;32 and in December of that year a slightly larger force had gone out, which stayed to convoy the

27 Narcissus Luttrell. Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs (I85 ), III, 54. He had ceased to attend Board meetings on I I Mar. (P.R.O. Adm. 3/8, I I Mar.).

28 Patent Rolls. Cornwallis probably resigned in January (Camden Miscellany, ii, i88; Add. MSS. I7677, NN, f. 38).

29 It may be seen partly in Catalogue of Naval Manuscripts in the Library of the United Ser- vice Institution, pp. 67-74 (compiled by H. Garbett, n.d.), and partly in Cal. S.P. Dom. 1693. The arrangement of the material in H. of L., N.S. I, I07-87 makes it difficult to follow the correspondence included there.

30 Trenchard on occasion even interfered with the latter, to the open annoyance of the Admiralty (e.g. P.R.O. Adm. 3/8, I4 July).

31 Sir Richard Haddock, the experienced Comptroller of the Navy, evidently had a low opinion of its importance in Mar. I693, when, on being sounded on the possibility of his joining the new Commission, he declined on the ground that 'I know well I am capable of doeing his Majty far greater service as I am, then if I were at that bord' (British Museum. Egerton 252I, f. 75).

32 Burchett, pp. 36-44.



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, I692-4 273

trade home in October I69I. In one sense the squadron proposed for I692 was their successor, but the aftermath of Barfleur placed it in a new setting. It is significant that the first mention of it was made by the King immediately after that victory; and if uninterrupted concentration on one objective is the mark of a policy, then William's conscious Mediterranean policy may be said to date from that time. The greatest authority on this subject has remarked that 'it was not till the fifth year of the war that a radical- change in Louis's strategy opened William's eyes to his real power. Then there was something Napoleonic in the rapidity and completeness with which he grasped the new idea and changed his front' to the Mediterranean; and he places the moment of the change in May i694.33 But this theory cannot stand on the evidence of the correspondence which William conducted, through his secretary Blath- wayt, with his Secretaries of State in I692 and I693.

On the very morrow of Barfleur, in his first letter to Nottingham after the news had reached the King, Blathwayt wrote that His Majesty wished the inner Council to consider the possibility of sending a squadron to the Medi- terranean.34 Nottingham was unable to see the point of the suggestion,35 and reported to Blathwayt that the Council was against any such move, and that Russell was 'absolutely against it'.3 William, however, persisted in the idea, and the rare letters that he sent to England referred hardly at all to the events which were taking place in the Channel at the time, and which were so agitat- ing the ministers, but almost entirely to the advantage of having a force of allied ships in the Straits before the winter.37 In his later letters, the reason for this was given as the protection of the convoy for the Levant, which had been proposed and agreed to late in June. But, as Nottingham remarked earlier, when William first suggested the plan no convoy for the Mediterranean was intended; 38 and it would seem possible, although no reason for his proposal was given at this stage, that the King had in mind the diplomatic and strategic advantages of the move as much as any support of trade. In one of his letters in July,'indeed, Blathwayt gave some indication of his master's intentions, using the cover that William often employed when he wished to sound the ground; the Dutch, he wrote, were eager to send a strong squadron to the Mediterranean to help force the Turks make peace with the-Emperor.39 He stressed this again at the end of July, when it had become clear that the authorities at home could not control two sets of arrangements at the same time, and that the Levant convoy was going to prove impossible that autumn.

33 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean (1904), II, 145-6, 158. 34 Add. MSS. 37991, f. 87. 3 [Public Record Office] Finch Transcr[ipts], Nottingham to Russell, I I June. 36 Ibid. 14 June. 37 Add. MSS. 3799I, ff. 95, 103, io6. See also Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau,

3rd series (ed. F. J. L. Kriimer, 1907-9), I, 284. 38 Finch Transcr. Nottingham to Russell, i I June. 39 Add. MSS. 37991, f. II; letter of 7 July.



274 JOHN EHRMAN

Even so, he asked, would it not be possible for the English to fall in with the Dutch plan and send a squadron on its own in November.40 By the middle of August, when the Council at last, and without much hope of success, turned its attention to the Mediterranean, William was getting somewhat impatient. He was particularly anxious, wrote Blathwayt on the i4th, that a squadron should be sent, and requested 'that ships for the purpose be found by any means '.41 A few days later, however, Nottingham reported that the Ad- miralty could promise a force of six third and fourth rates only, for the rest were engaged either in refitting or in convoying and cruising in home waters; 42 and on the 23rd he inquired privately of the King's secretary what exactly the squadron was to do when it reached the Mediterranean.43 On i September, after a few more letters had been received from England stressing the inability of the navy to produce a larger force for the purpose,44 William repeated to Nottingham that he was most anxious for the Admiralty to find the ships, and as soon as possible;45 but in the end he had to give way as the complete muddle of the autumn was revealed. It was, therefore, with particular vigour that he superintended the preparations for Rooke's squadron early in the following year.

Exactly what William had in mind for the Mediterranean in the late summer of I 692 cannot be said for certain. He revealed his preoccupation with interests other than trade only when trade had failed him, and then he gave no clue to his real intentions. We must infer these largely from his attitude a few months later, when the situation was still much the same but when he himself was more explicit. Undoubtedly one reason for his plan lay in the diplomatic pressure which he hoped to exert upon the Turks, for he referred to this again in i693 ; 46 but it is probable that he also had in mind its effect upon the Spanish court, which he knew by experience responded to a show of naval force.47 In the summer of I692, it seemed high time to remind it of the existence of allied sea power, for it was beginning to inconvenience the English merchant vessels which made the passage to Bilbao, removing some of their men for the galleys and refusing to supply the ships themselves with stores.48 The trouble, wrote the ambassador at Madrid, lay in the uninterrupted cruises of the Toulon fleet, which were having a bad effect on the Spanish king and enabling the Francophiles at court and in the sea ports to get their own way. The consul at Cadiz confirmed and added detail to these reports.49 At the same time, William may have been influenced by the idea of supporting the unreliable Victor Amadeus of Savoy, who had recently made an unsuccessful

40 Ibid. f. I2IV. 41 Ibid. f. 140. 42 Finch Transcr. i9 Aug. 43 Ibid. 23 Aug. 44 Ibid. Nottingham to Blathwayt, 27 Aug. (two letters), 30 Aug. 4 Add. MSS. 37991, f. 153. 46 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 33. 47 S.P. For. 94/73, Stanhope to Nottingham, I7 Jan. and 7 Mar. I69I. 48 Ibid. Stanhope to Nottingham, 2 Apr. and 25 Mapy to 4 June I692. 49 Ibid. Howell Gwynne's report of i8 Apr. I692.




attempt to invade France from the south-east and who, without some tangible proof of allied power, was always liable either to stop fighting or to raise his terms.

The extent to which the King hoped to fulfil these intentions,'and the de- gree to which he was attached to each of them, may not have been clear at this time even to himself; but he had every cause towards the end of I692 to look in their direction. His was a European problem, and the balance of the war was shifting towards the southern flank in Europe. The year had gone badly in Flanders and, after the initial success, at sea; there seemed little hope, as he himself told his friends at the close of the campaign, of invading France with any success in the north, and he was eve-n inclining towards the idea of a nego- tiated peace.50 The strategy of direct attack was proving bankrupt, and its bankruptcy might soon affect the attitude of the allies in the south upon whom the burden of an alternative flanking attack would fall. From his vantage point at the head of the alliance, with his varied sources of information of which he alone knew the sum, and with his European interests which separated him from all his English ministers and of which he alone had always been acknow- ledged to be the judge, William looke.d at the Mediterranean with a different eye from that of the authorities at home. To him, it was now the one point at which allied sea power impinged upon'allied strategy. But to the Cabinet in England, which had not hitherto been concerned with allied strategy or with the diplomatic complications in which that was involved, a Mediterranean squadron represented no diplomatic agency designed to support a failing alliance, but simply an unavoidable commitment from time to time to protect one Qf the most powerful and lucrative of national trades. Towards the end of I692, therefore, William's European interests met English domestic interests for the first time on their own ground; and the divergence between his ministers and himself in the autumn of that year, unimportant as it seemed in its contemporary setting, was the prelude to a major struggle over the distribu- tion of naval power, in which their different attitudes were complicated by the fact that William could not inform the ministers of all the purposes for which he required the Mediterranean force, and the ministers could not fully com- prehend a policy which affected them in this one instance but which they were not normally called upon to debate. At this stage, only a squadron was involved, and not yet a fleet. But the squadron was now no longer, as it had been, an appendage to be considered on its own, but rather the prelude to a fleet. And the importance of the events of I693 lay in the way in which they introduced the latter to a policy which until then had been only half-formed, and confronted William with consequences of which hitherto he had probably not been fully aware, so that by the spring of I694 there existed the founda- tions for a Mediterranean policy.

50 G. N. Clark, The Later Stuarts (I934), p. I64.

CHJIX i8



276 JOHN EHRMAN

III During the winter of I692-3, some idea could be gained of the role which the projected squadron was designed to play. According to its orders, besides escorting the convoy it was to pay a visit to the Barbary states to induce them, if possible, to abandon the activities in support of France in which they had been intermittently indulging over the past year, and then to join the Spanish fleet to protect its coast and cover the movements of its shipping from America.5' To this end, a convention had been signed with Spain which laid down the relative strength of the squadrons and the precedence of their com- manders. As Blathwayt put it later, on William's instructions, the orders for the squadron were intended 'for the countenancing our allies in the Mediter- ranean, the preserving the Spanish Fleet from being destroyed and their towns from being attack'd by the French.. ., the giving Occasion to the Turks to make peace with the Emperor, and the keeping those of Algier, Tunis and Tripoli in awe... .'52 There was, in fact, explicitly a diplomatic side to the expedition, which had only been hinted at the year before. Its most important purpose, however, was not mentioned in the orders, and was not known to the Admiralty or to most of the ministers themselves; for in May, in one of his letters to Nottingham, now secretary for the southern department, Blathwayt referred to some papers that 'his Majesty would have Your Lordship show onely to my Lord President and such as your Lordship shall think fit to trust with the Secret-I mean the design of the Duke of Savoy to enter into France as soon as he shall have the Countenance of our Squadron'.53

It was therefore with the keenest interest and annoyance that William from Flanders watched the weeks slip by without the convoy setting sail. When it finally did so, his annoyance was greater than ever and further sharpened by fear. For on 3 I May, the day after the armada had finally cleared the Isle of Wight, a copy reached him of the council of war which had been held aboard the fleet on the zznd to decide how far it should accompany the escort to the south.54 Its contents were indeed disturbing, and William was not alone in fearing their outcome; the Admiralty, which had great difficulty in extracting the minutes of the meeting from the joint admirals, also remarked on the inadequacy of the plan which they proposed.55 The council was of the opinion that the Toulon fleet had by this time left the Straits and had very probably put into Brest, and it therefore decided that the fleet should stay with the convoy until both reached a position thirty leagues south-west of Ushant. The fleet would then return towards the north.56 William, who by now knew for certain that, so far from being at Brest, d'Estrees was cruising off the eastern coast of Spain. informed the ministers at once of his strong disapproval of this

51 H. of L., N.S. I, 107-9. 52 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 33- 53 Ibid. f. 7, 15 May. 5 Ibid. f. 30. 55 P.R.O. Adm. 3/8, 22 and 26 May. 56 Catalogue of... Manuscripts... Royal United Service Institution, pp. 76-7.




plan,57 but the admirals were already out of reach. They sailed past Brest without making any serious attempt to find out what in fact was inside, and arrived at the original point of departure on 4 June, where they held another council of war and decided, in view of their ignorance of the enemy's movements, to carry on for another twenty leagues. Nine days later, at the farther position, they left the convoy and the escort.58 This news reached William on the igth, after a disquieting week in which he had been re-reading the minutes of the two earlier councils, both of which had now reached him, and complaining to Trenchard of their inadequacy.59 Its arrival, wrote Blathwayt, 'exceedingly encreased his Majesty's greif and unspeakable concern for the Mediterranean Squadron and Merchantmen . It was not surprising that it did so; for he had just learnt that the main French fleet from Brest had been seen standing off Cadiz.61

For the next few weeks, the Admiralty, the ministers and above all the King waited for the half-expected news of the destruction of the escort and the scattering of the convoy.62 William was so worried that he neglected his other business, for, as Blathwayt informed Nottingham in excuse, 'he finds it not easy to think of anything but the danger to our Mediterranean Fleet'*63 His concern was increased early in July when he learnt 'with great surprise' that the main fleet, which was already almost out of victuals, had returned to Tor- bay, so that there seemed little chance of avenging the probable catastrophe.64 When on I5 July he was told of the French attack off the Spanish coast, and of the scattering of the convoy with the immediate loss of twelve large ships, he was 'under the greatest Affliction imaginable, but not under any Surprise '.65

The damage to the convoy was more serious than the first figures showed. Fortunately, Rooke had been given a day's warning of the presence of the French and, although his scouts were not certain whether it was only a squadron or indeed the battle fleet which they had sighted, had ordered the merchantmen to run for the coast while he fought a skilful and obstinate defensive action on their tail.66 But, nevertheless, ninety-two merchantvessels, with cargoes estimated at over ri,ooo,ooo, were sunk, burnt or captured, while the rest lay in Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malaga, unable to move for the French men- of-war cruising up and down the coasts and waiting outside the harbours. The outcry in England was naturally tremendous.67 After waiting for a convoy for almost two years, and incurring considerable expense while it hung for over

Add. MSS. 37992, f. 30- 58 Catalogue of... Manuscripts... Royal United Service Institution, pp. 77-8. 59 Add. MSS. 37992, ff. 33, 34v, 35. 60 Ibid. f. 35. 61 Ibid. 62 H[istorical] M[anuscripts] C[ommission] Rutland MSS. II, I40. 63 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 14V 64 Ibid. f. 37. 65 Ibid. f. 37v. 66 The various accounts and reports of the action may be seen in H. of L., N.S. I, zoo-6,

2ZI5-27. An account from a merchant ship is given in H.M.C. Portland MSS. III, 529-34. This was possibly the last occasion on which an admiral thought of taking merchantmen into his line of battle in an emergency.

67 Ibid. III, 534-5; H.M.C. Hastings MSS. ii, z30-I.

I8 2



278 JOHN EHRMAN two months on the south coast, the Levant and Turkey companies, and the Italian merchants, had suffered the greatest single loss of their careers,68 and those ships which had not been captured were faced with a hazardous and probably expensive wait in harbour. The disaster of the Smyrna fleet, as it was known, threatened to provide the material for the most dangerous political attack on the naval administration that there had yet been. The immediate concern of the authorities, therefore, was to bring the French to action as soon as possible. All thought of a descent upon Brest was abandoned, and the fleet was immediately ordered to stay at sea off the north Atlantic ports, and to force the enemy to battle on his return.69

Tourville, however, had no intention of returning for the time being, and instead, after pausing to attack the allied shipping in Malaga, he proceeded up the Mediterranean, displaying his strength as William had intended to display the strength of the allies. D'Estrees, meanwhile, returned to the Catalonian coast to support the French siege of Rosas, which was then under way and which resulted in an early surrender after his arrival. It was some time before the news of these exploits reached England, and the ministers were meanwhile unaware that the French fleet did not mean to come north again immediately. 70

William, however, with his acute interest in a Mecfiterranean campaign and his appreciation of the diplomatic issues involved, guessed at once that his opponents would do what he would have liked to do, and that Tourville would remain in the south to take advantage of an unopposed show of force in that area rather than sail tamely back to Brest to face a possible engagement. As soon as he received confirmation from Trenchard that the fleet had been ordered to cruise off Ushant, and even before he had any definite information that the French were not returning, he replied that such a plan was -not of the slightest use, and that it was essential for the main fleet to sail at once for the coast of Portugal to give close cover to the remainder of the convoy in its passage through the Straits.7' This was the first time that the idea of sending the fleet itself out of home waters had been suggested, and it was most unwelcome to all the authorities in England. With only three weeks of the normal campaigning season left, a voyage of that nature was unheard of, and Trenchard wrote immediately that the great ships could not possibly make such a passage, or the medium rates either, without risking a winter in the Spanish ports, where they could not be refitted for the spring.72 William, when he replied, saw no reason to change his opinion, which had indeed been strengthened in the interval by two letters from his ambassador at Madrid: the first with the news of the Spaniards' alarm at the activities of the French fleet off Catalonia, and of their disgust with the English; and the second informing him that the

68 A. C. Wood, History of the Levant Company (0935), pp. IIO-I2. 69 N[ational] M[aritime] M[useum, acquisitions from the] Bibl[iotheca] Phill[ippica], vi,

ff. 39-40. 70 Ibid. ff. 57-8. 71 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 38v, 7 Aug. 72 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. vi, ff. 65-6.



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, i692-4 279

Spanish flota was on its way over from America, with large cargoes in which the English merchants had an interest, and that the court expected some protection for it to be sent from England.73 The King therefore repeated his demand that the Queen and the ministers should send the fleet to Spain without delay.74

Meanwhile, however, a meeting had been held at Whitehall on I8 August of the Queen, the Cabinet, the Boards of Admiralty and Navy, and a selected number of experienced captains and pilots, to discuss the practicability of this plan; and as a result Trenchard was able to report their unanimous agreement that the first and second rates could not stay out beyond the end of the month, that they could not be careened at Cadiz without hulks and stores being sent after them, and that there was no dock on the coast of Portugal or the western coast of Spain which was suitable for the biggest ships. Twelve days before, an allied council of war in the fleet had reached the same conclusions. The Queen, therefore, proposed ordering the first and second rates into harbour in the next few days unless news came that the French after all were on their way back to Brest, while the thirds and fourths would be revictualled and ordered to cruise in the Soundings. The fleet itself, added the secretary as a final discouragement, had once more run out of food and was back reprovision- ing in Torbay.75

William still refused to give up his plan, and in a last attempt to enforce it used his habitual cover of the Dutch who, he wrote, were anxious to keep their big ships out all winter and were making their arrangements accordingly.76 But the ministers, while recognizing only toNo well the concern of the already exasperated merchant interest in the Spanish flota, submitted that the plan was impossible. So far from embarking on a foreign voyage, announced Tren- chard, it was time that the ships had a rest, for some of the thirds and fourths had not been overhauled for three and four years and were becoming slower and more unseaworthy every month.77 On receipt of this letter at the beginning of September, William finally yielded. He had in any case heard in the past few days that the Brest fleet was at last on its way out of the Straits and bound for the north. Apparently uninterested in any prospect of an engagement off the French coast, he approved the Queen's orders for the first two rates to be laid up and directed the ministers to settle a squadron to proceed to Cadiz for the protection of the flota, adding that if a fleet could not go he thought it absolutely necessary that a force of some kind should be sent.78 The inner Council readily agreed to this more modest and famili'ar demand. A squadron of sixteen English third rates, seven fourths, one fifth, six fireships, two bomb vessels, a hospital ship and a storeship, with a small Dutch quota,

73 S.P. For. 94/73, Stanhope to the King, 25 July; Add. MSS. 37992, f. 4I. 74 Ibid. f. 42v. 5 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. vi, ff. 69-70. 76 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 44. 7 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. vi, ff. 77-80. 78 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 44v. And see Ronciere, op. cit. VI, I48.



280 JOHN EHRMAN was prepared,719 and, after some delay, the King appointed Shovell in com- .mand.80 For some reason, however, this appointment was changed the next month, and Sir Francis Wheeler, whose experience as a flag officer during the war had so far been entirely in the West Indies,81 was chosen instead. The opportunity was taken to send a small convoy with him, to give the merchants a chance to recoup some of their losses, and on 29 November it sailed. It was a disappointing coda to the theme of the summer; but the significance of the campaign had lain less in its disappointments, great though these had been, than in the way in which they had brought to light the obstacles to a Mediter- ranean policy, and thus defined a policy for the following year which had to take them into consideration. They left the whole work to be done again, but with a clearer appreciation on William's part of what such work involved. The 'Napoleonic' decision of I694 was no flash of strategic genius, but the result of the sad experience of I693.

IV Tourville's return to Brest in the autumn of I693 had been made solely to re- lieve the excessive pressure of a fleet of ninety-three sail, as he and d'Estrees amounted to, upon the facilities of Toulon dockyard, and it was not unlikely that the next year he would try to follow up the impression which he had made in the Mediterranean.82 To prevent a repetition of the recent disaster, therefore, the French must not be allowed to leave Brest, and as large a convoy as possible must be sent south before the campaigning season began. The latter precaution was taken when Wheeler sailed for the Straits at the end of Novem- ber I693, with instructions to make straight for Cadiz, to wait there for a month to cover the return of the Spanish flota if that had not already arrived, and then to see his convoy into the Mediterranean while a detachment from his escort took charge of the homeward-bound trade. On his return to the Straits he was to co-operate with the Spaniards for the defence of their coasts.83 But the success at least of the last part of these instructions, and of any similar expeditions which might be called for later in the year, depended entirely upon French intentions; and accordingly, the Cabinet fell back during the winter on the plan of the year before, to attack Brest by land and sea in the spring before the French fleet could put out. From the end of the year, William supervised the arrangements himself. On 29 December, the inner Council determined the size of the fleet, amounting to ninety-two sail excluding fireships and auxiliaries,84 and two days later the King ordered a weekly state of its progress to be submitted to him every Sunday until he left for Holland. 85 The preparations went ahead as usual, although some additional work was involved on many of the third and fourth rates, which were feeling the effects of long and

Burchett, p. .2oi. 80 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 48. 81 Burchett, p. 204. 82 Ronciere, op. cit. VI, I48. 83 Burchett, pp. 20I-3. 84 P.R.O. Adm. I1/5248, 29 Dec.; 2/1I74, f. 6i. 85 P.R.O. Adm. I/5248, 3I Dec. The results may be seen in P.R.O. Adm. 8/3.



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, I6o2-4 z8I

uninterrupted service.86 The rendezvous was fixed for I March in the Downs,87 but it was the third week of April before all the ships had assembled for the passage to Spithead.88 By that time, the original plans had been qualified to meet a confused situation in the Mediterranean.

For in December, on arrival at Cadiz, Wheeler had found that the western Mediterranean was alive with French privateers and cruisers. On reporting the fact, he had been ordered to stay in port- until the Spanish fleet was ready to strengthen the escort; but the Spaniards were as dilatory as ever,89 and after another month the convoy was instructed to return to England. Before these orders reached him, however, Wheeler had sailed for the Straits, with the intention of fighting his way up the Mediterranean. On I8 February he was caught in the narrows between the Spanish and African shores by one of the sudden and violent gales which affect that area, and in the course of the next two days six of his squadron were sunk or had grounded with the loss of over 800 lives, including his own. Six merchant vessels were also lost, the rest of the convoy and its escort was damaged in various degrees, and several ran ashore in Gibraltar bay.90 There most of them stayed until the beginning of May, open to the attack of any French fleet that might approach from Toulon or the north. Fortunately, all managed to leave soon after the main fleet set sail from Brest.

For almost a month beforehand, rumours of this had been current, and on 24 April the English fleet had received instructions accordingly. The original idea of an attack upon the harbour was now modified to take into account the possibility of the enemy already having left. If they were still in port, the fleet was to stage a direct attack; if they had disappeared to sea, it was to search for them as far south as Cape Finisterre, but no farther; but if reliable information were received of their having passed Finisterre, it was to follow them south and attack. 'The Admiral', ended the instructions, 'is not to wait for further orders but is to report from time to time to a Secretary of State and the Admiralty.'91 The initiative had, in fact, passed entirely to the French, and the orders to their opponents for the campaign were in effect simply to follow their movements, and made no attempt to reconcile the implications of the alternatives which were suggested.

The admiral to whom these orders were addressed was not the man to accept them without complaint. On 7 November Russell was appointed Ad- miral of the Fleet for the coming season. His year of enforced leisure had ad- vanced his fortunes considerably, giving him the opportunity to develop his political power without fear of an immediate interruption, and to take advantage of the progress of the Whig cause which came so markedly in the latter

86 P.R.O. Adm. 319, I9 Jan. The details of the preparations may be seen in H. of L., N.S. 1, 458-74.

87 P.R.O. Adm. 1/5248, ii Feb. 88 Burchett, P. 204. 89 S.P. For. 94/73, Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 24 Jan. I694. 90 Burchett, pp. 209-I1. 91 H. of L., N.S. I, 459.



282 JOHN EHRMAN half of the year. By November, according to Sir Charles Hatton, 'Ld. Keeper, Admiral Russell, and ye Secretary are ye governing men ',92 and it was as a leader of the party that he was consulted by its members on the name of the new Secretary of State to replace his old rival.93 From the middle of Novem- ber he seems to have attended meetings of the Cabinet,94 and on 24 April I694 his return to power was officially recognized by his appointment to the head of a new Commission of Admiralty.95 When he went to sea in I694, therefore, it was as first Lord of the Admiralty and a member of the Cabinet, as well as a commander of reputation, and it is not surprising that he expressed himself with freedom and authority upon his orders as commander-in-chief.

By May 1694, moreover, the Admiralty and the Cabinet were filled with Russell's friends. At the Admiralty, Falkland and the two violent Tories Killi- grew and Delavall had disappeared with the new Commission,96 and although the nominal head of the Admiralty Commission in Russell's absence was the Tory Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven, he was now of little account and was in any case a moderate party man. The three remaining old members of the Board, Priestman, Austen and Rich, were all favourably disposed towards the admiral, Priestman, indeed, having been nominated originally on his recom- mendation. There were only two new members of the Commission, Sir John Houblon and Sir George Rooke. The former was certainly no Tory, and was soon to be connected with Russell by financial ties when he became governor of the Bank of England, to which the admiral was one of the most substantial of the original subscribers;97 while the latter, although often described as a Tory, might perhaps be described rather as not a Whig. Unlike Killigrew and Delavall, he was not active or notorious in party warfare, but tried to keep aloof from politics and simply do his job. His was, in fact, just the character to attract William, and it was as the King's personal choice that he entered the Commission. He had already received the mark of royal favour immediately after the loss of his convoy when, to the resentment of the joint admirals, he was promoted to Admiral of the Blue, 98 and he was on good terms with Russell, whose subordinate he had been in I692.99 During the latter's absence, there-

92 Camden Miscellany, II, I98. 93 W. Coxe, Correspondence of the Earl of Shrewsbury (i8zI), p. 24. The emergence of the

'first Ministry' of I693, and Russell's part in it, are discussed by Macaulay, History (ed. C. H. Firth, I9I3-I5), V, 2386-94. Russell took part in the important meeting of the Whig leaders at Althorp in August (Keith Feiling, History of the Tory Party, 1603-1714 (I924),

P. 295). 9 P.R.O. Adm. I/5248, I1 Nov. et seq. This authority is concerned only with naval affairs;

but it has been generally accepted that Russell was a regular member of the Cabinet from about that time (Feiling, op. cit. p. 289).

95 Cal. S.P. Dom. 1694-5, p. II4. The patent was dated z May. 96 They had all actually ceased to act by the end of January: Falkland after being attacked in

the Commons on a charge of corruption (Anchitell Grey: Debates of the House of Commons (I763), X, 356; H[ouse of] C[ommons] J[ournals], XI, 22, 98), the admirals after being suspended from their duties at the Board during the debates on their conduct of the previous campaign.

97 Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England (I944), I, 273-4. 98 Cal. S.P. Dom. 1693, p. 283. 99 Finch Transcr. Russell to Nottingham, 29 July.




fore, the weight of influence on the Board was in his own interest, and he experienced no trouble from it. In the Cabinet, also, his political associates were well represented. Nottingham had finally been made to resign office as a Secretary of State in November I693, as the result of attacks in the Commons, while, on the other hand, Somers and Montagu had joined Trenchard in I693, and in March I694 Shrewsbury was persuaded, after considerable difficulty, to accept the seals as Secretary of State for the north.100 By the summer, only Russell's old enemy Carmarthen (created Duke of Leeds in April) and Sir John Lowther of Lowther remained from the Tory phalanx of a year before, and the former was virtually out of power after the scandal of the East India Company's accounts in the spring. For the first time, therefore, the admiral found himself with a sympathetic and even complaisant Cabinet behind him, and-even more important-with a Secretary of State with whom he was on the best of terms. For, although Trenchard still dealt with naval affairs, within the ministry, and for all official purposes, as Bonnet remarked in January I694, 'avait le departement de la flotte',101 Russell revealed his thoughts mainly to Shrewsbury, who had for some years been his closest political friend and whose appointment he had done his best to secure; and as the campaign became more complicated, and the admiral's attitude more equivocal, William used this relationship increasingly to persuade Russell to carry out his orders, and Shrewsbury found himself acting on occasions without the intervention of his colleague, in an unofficial but decisive capacity as the admiral's counsellor and friend.

This role was soon thrust upon him, for as soon as he received his orders of 24 April Russell had his misgivings about them. As intelligence was received towards the end of the month of French preparations in Brest, and as Tour- ville put out a strong screen of cruisers to discourage the inquisitive English scouts, he became increasingly certain that the enemy was bound for the Medi- terranean, and in his view, which Shrewsbury shared, the project of a descent on Brest was incompatible with a chase to the south.102 The preparations for the former were still far from complete; troops and stores had not yet arrived at Portsmouth, many of the ships themselves were not paid, and Russell, who was genuinely concerned for his men, refused to leave until they had received

100 Trenchard moved to the southern department on Nottingham's resignation. 101 L. von Ranke, History of England, Mainly in the Seventeenth Century (I878), VI, 233.

In the three main sources for the secretaries' official activity in naval affairs, Trenchard's signature alone appears on the letters for this period. All the letters of the spring and early summer of I694 in P.R.O. Adm. I/4080, ff. I03I-II83 (In-Letters, Secretaries of State) are signed by him, as are all those in S.P. Dom. 204/44, ff. 73-I02 for letters from Apr. I693 to Apr. I695, and S.P. Dom. 204/45, if. i-i8i for those from 29 Mar. I693 to 9 Dec. I694 (both State Papers Domestic, Entry Books (naval)). Russell corresponded with Trenchard on every subject, but did not always fully state his mind. His letters are largely contained in S.P. Dom. 43/3, and Trenchard's replies in N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. vol. I.

102 Coxe, op. cit. pp. I92-3; H.M.C. Buccleugh (Montagu House) MSS. II, pt. I, pp. 65-6.



284 JOHN EHRMAN some satisfaction.103 No large-scale attempt was possible for some time, while the French were obviously getting ready to put to sea. In the first week of May, therefore, he made the best of a depressing situation, and sailed on a re- connaissance with a line of thirty-five English and Dutch, which were all he could spare from the pay table. To his surprise and fury he found Brest prac- tically defenceless, with only a few companies of regular troops and the local militia in the neighbourhood, an easy prey if only it could be quickly assaulted; but, as he wrote to Shrewsbury on his return on the 23rd, the chance had been thrown away, thanks to the procrastination of the Treasury and 'that driveller, the general of the ordnance'.104 Inside the harbour, however, there was no sign of the French fleet; and it had, indeed, sailed on 27 April for the Straits.

This news reached William soon after Russell had left the English coast, and on I4 May he wrote that the fleet should lose no time in the pursuit. Knowing the admiral's temper, however, and aware by experience of the con- sternation which any mention of the fleet in connexion with the Mediter- ranean aroused in the Cabinet, he supplemented his instructions to Trenchard105 by asking Shrewsbury to use his influence to hasten Russell's departure; 106 and he repeated his request on the 2znd.107 Shrewsbury himself, however, had already urged the same course at the inner Council before the receipt of the first letter,108 and on its arrival he wrote at once to Russell that both the King in Flanders 'and all that are concerned with the government here' expected him to lose no time in making for the Straits.109 He sent Wil- liam's second letter on to the admiral on the 26th, but Russell, who was 'as impatient to be gone as the King can be to have me',110 was already getting under way.111 He took with him the whole fleet and the troop transports for Brest, with the intention of dropping off the latter as he passed, with a strong squadron under Lord Berkley to make the attack and subsequently to act as

103 'I could not bring myself to carry ships to sea, and the men unpaid, when hundred of poor women was waiting for their husbands' money, to support their children and families' (ibid. ii, pt. i, p. 64).

104 Coxe, op. cit. p. I95. 105 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. vi, f. 22I. 106 Coxe, op. cit. p. 33. This is the letter which Corbett (op. cit. p. I58) calls 'one of the

leading documents of British naval history'. The relevant passage reads: 'There can be no longer any doubt that the squadron which left Brest on the 7th of this month [i.e. N.S.] has sailed for the Mediterranean, after joining the ships from Rochfort, so that admiral Russell has no time to lose in following them; and although it is not in your department, I am well assured that you will use all your endeavours to hasten his departure, and persuade him to leave the squadron, which remains in these parts, the execution of the attempt on Brest.... " I cannot see that this says anything that had not been said the year before, or anything that the ministers themselves were not saying independently.

107 Coxe, op. cit. p. 39. 108 On the I4th (H.M.C. Buccleugh MSS. ii, pt. i, p. 66). 109 Coxe, op. cit. p. I94. He followed this up with a second letter a few days later in which

he quoted the king verbatim (H.M.C. Buccleugh MSS. II, pt. I, pp. 69-70). 110 Coxe, op. cit. p. I96; see also Cal. S.P. Domn. 1693-4, pp. I47-8. "' H.M.C. Buccleugh MSS. II, pt. I, p. 70.




the Channel fleet until his return.112 On 2 June he finally sailed, and on the 6th he parted company with the detachment for Brest. Almost a month later, on i July, the main allied fleet, with sixty-three men-of-war excluding auxiliaries, entered the Straits for the first time in English naval history.

V While Russell was on his way south to the Straits, the French had been con- centrating their two fleets on the north-east coast of Spain, where an army under Noailles was attempting to reduce the chain of fortresses between the frontier and Barcelona; and by i July, when he passed into the Mediterranean, the situation was critical. The Spanish forces opposing Noailles had been decisively beaten in May and Palamos and Gerona had fallen, so that only the small fortress of Hostalrich still stood between the French and Barcelona, and in June Tourville was already blockading the city.113 It was generally recognized that nothing could save it but the English fleet, and since the middle of June the Spanish court had been pestering Stanhope at Madrid for news of its progress.114 They had good reason to do so, for the French themselves, favourably situated as they were so long as the fleet was outside the Straits, were prepared to abandon the blockade of Spain as soon as it appeared in the Mediterranean, and on the news of its approach Tourville left his station before Barcelona and retreated with the whole of both French fleets to Toulon, where he set about fortifying the approaches in the expectation of an English attack.115 The army came to a halt along the coast, and for the next few weeks a curious calm fell upon the Mediterranean campaign, as its participants waited to see what Russell would do.

Throughout July there was little that he could do, for a long spell of north- easterly winds kept him from his objective of Barcelona, where he expected to find the French fleet.116 It was not until the beginning of August that he arrived there, and by then both provisions and time were running short. For despite his command of the sea and the sudden shift in the balance of power

112 Cal. S.P. Dom. 1693-4, p. I57. The attack was a disaster. For accounts of it from the naval point of view, see Marquis of Caermarthen, Journal of the Brest Expedition (I695), and Burchett, pp. 2I5-24.

113 Corbett, op. cit. pp. i6I-2. 114 S.P. For. 94/73, Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 6 and 27 June. See also Add. MSS. 37992,

f. 52. 115 Corbett, op. cit. p. I64. 116 Burchett, pp. 239-4I. We possess two authoritative and largely first-hand accounts

of the operations of July-November I694 in the Mediterranean, by Russell's secretary and by his first captain aboard the Britannia. The secretary was Burchett, whose account is incorpor- ated in his Transactions At Sea, pp. 239-63; the first captain was Byng, later Lord Torring- ton, whose narrative-possibly supplemented by a later hand-is in Memoirs Relating to the Lord Torrington (ed. J. K. Laughton, I889), pp. 67-7I. A third account, which adds nothing to either of these, exists in the propagandist pamphlet, An Exact Journal of the Victorious Expedition of the Confederate Fleet, the last year, under the Command of Admiral Russell... (I695).



286 JOHN EHRMAN which his presence occasioned in the western Mediterranean, Russell felt his position to be precarious. With only four weeks to go before his big ships should be taken into harbour, he was over sixteen hundred miles from home and with a hard passage ahead of him. A shift of wind to the west for a week and he was caught inside the Mediterranean with no major base and with the Atlantic and the autumn between himself and Portsmouth. Unsatisfactory as the French position was, his own was becoming dangerous. As early as i July, on the very day on which he passed the Straits, he had voiced his fears to Shrewsbury and Trejchard,117 and a month later he stated the position more explicitly. He wrote to Shrewsbury:118

I wish I were able to give any hopes of success in these seas, as you desire; but the French will not let me see them, and I dare not venture to attack them at Toulon; by what I can inform myself, the place is too strong; and a mortification or repulse would be of very ill-consequence. With probable hopes of success, I would venture a great deal; but the time of the year obliges me not to spend much time: besides, the dutch have provision only for the month of September.

He therefore intended to leave Barcelona within a few days, and retrace his steps towards the Straits. At the same time, after a council of war aboard the Britannia, he informed the Spanish viceroy of Catalonia that while he remained in the area his assistance must be limited to supporting the Spanish forces in the immediate neighbourhood, as he could neither land any troops himself, for none had been brought, nor pursue the French any farther, 'the fleet having now no more provisions than are absolutely necessary for their passage hence to England'.119

Meanwhile, however, events were moving fast at home. Since the beginning of July, the Cabinet had been requesting William to inform it as soon as possible when the fleet was to return, but for most of the month he would give no definite answer.120 On the 23rd, to the anxiety of the ministers, he still had no orders to give,121 but four days later he came to a decision. In his letter to Trenchard of that day 122 Blathwayt wrote: 'His Majesty has now declared his Pleasure concerneing Admiral Russell's return home and Commands me to lett you know that he is Inclined that the Fleet should remain in the Medi- terranean as long as may consist with its safety, and that upon Admirall Rus- sell's coming away, he leave as considerable a Squadron as may be convenient in those parts.' To this end, he wished the Cabinet to send 'Such Orders in relation to the time of his stay in those parts and the Force he shall leave behind him during this Winter as well as the Station of such a Squadron, as shall be thought most advisable in England' 123

These instructions were not in themselves very startling. They left the

117 Coxe, op. cit. pp. I97-8; Cal. S.P. Dom. 1694-5, p. 207. 118 Coxe, op. cit. pp. I98-9. 119 Cal. S.P. Dom. i694-5, pp. 249-50. 120 Add. MSS. 37992, ff. 55, 55v, 56, 57; Blathwayt to Trenchard, 2-Ig July. 121 Ibid. f. 57. 122 Dated 6 Aug. (new style). 123 Ibid. f. 58.



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, i692-4 287 ministers free to decide how long the main fleet should stay abroad, and their only positive order was to provide for a winter squadron in the Mediterraneah. That the Cabinet viewed the letter in this light was shown by Trenchard's reply.124 The Committee,125 he reported, had met several times to debate the King's letter, and was of the opinion that if he wanted Russell to come home at any time during the winter, he should order him to do so at once before the weather became too dangerous for the big ships; it also thought that the admiral himself was the man best qualified to appoint the squadron to be left behind and the stations which it should occupy. On the other hand, in view of the French Mediterranean policy, it had considered the possibility of the fleet's wintering abroad, and for this purpose had consulted the Admiralty and the Navy Board on the practicability of re-storing it at a Spanish port. The Admiralty had replied that the stores would have to be sent from England, and the Navy Board had given an assurance that, provided the orders were given at once, they could be ready in two months' time, and the gear for careening in one month. Accordingly, in case the King decided to keep the fleet abroad, the Cabinet had already sent the necessary orders to the Admiralty to go ahead with these preparations. Trenchard then developed the arguments against wintering the main fleet in Spain, pointing out that such a course presupposed that the Spaniards would allow it the freedom of their ports and that the Dutch were willing to let their main strength remain abroad; that it meant most if not all of the material for a fleet refit being sent from England, for Spain was quite unable to provide it; and that the difficulties of supplying Russell on a large scale and at all regularly across the Bay of Biscay in midwinter were going to be enormous. All sorts of obstacles, diplomatic, material and possibly strategic, were likely to arise in that case over the next few months, and only the man on the spot, particularly since he had himself sat in Cabinet and was head of the Admiralty Board, could satisfactorily decide what was best to be done. The ministers recommended, therefore, that if the King be inclined to have Mr Russell remain in the Straights his Orders should not be to [sic] positive, but that he may have liberty to return, if upon notice of what supplyes he may expect from England, or upon other consideration of the state of the fleet under his command, he shall judge it not practicable to refit it at Cadiz in due time.126

This report reached William on the 6th. In itself, it was perhaps as much as could be hoped for when the situation was so novel, the consequences-for the

124 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. I, ff. 207-I3, dated 2 Aug. According to Corbett, 'towards the end of July, the Cabinet was startled by receiving from him [William] a proposal that Russell should remain out all the winter' (op. cit. p. I65). The first time such a course of action was mentioned by William was on 6 Aug. (old style), after he had received Trenchard's reply which had fully considered the arguments for and against it, and which itself asked for his orders on this question (see text pp. 287-9 infra).

125 This probably indicated that the Queen had not been present at that meeting of the inner Council.

126 Ibid. f. 2I2.



288 JOHN EHRMAN nation and for those responsible for the decision-so momentous, and the prospects of success so uncertain.127 But it did not provide the unambiguous support which the King would have liked in embarking on such a venture, and, moreover, he received by the same post two private letters, one from the Queen and one from Shrewsbury, the second of which at least gave him some cause for anxiety.128 According to Shrewsbury,129 at the meetings of the inner Council, Somers, Pembroke, Trenchard and Romney had, like himself,130 been in favour of the fleet's wintering in Spain; but Devonshire and Dorset had stayed away, Normanby had changed his mind after the first meeting and had ended by violently opposing the idea, and Carmarthen refused to give an opinion. 'Everybody', however, 'agreed the decision ought to be left to Mr Russell.' 131 William, who could not have expected very much, nevertheless was annoyed that the matter had not been settled more decisively. He had not liked to issue any positive orders, he wrote to Shrewsbury on the 6th,132 until he learnt the opinions of his ministers, and particularly before he could judge of the prospects of refitting the ships abroad; but the terms of Trenchard's letter seemed to him ambiguous, as if 'the committee are of opinion, that admiral Russell should winter at Cadiz, but dare not declare that opinion, through fear of being responsible for the event'. He continued:

I do wish that they had spoken more clearly on this occasion, and indeed they ought to have done so, to prevent my being exposed to the supposition of acting solely from my own opinion; but as there is no time to deliberate, I am reduced to the necessity of coming to some determination, and I have accordingly resolved to order admiral Russell to winter, with his whole squadron, at Cadiz.

The same day he ordered the ministers to meet 'and prepare such Orders to Admirall Russell as they shall think necessary for the signifying to him Their Majesty' Directions for the stay of the whole Fleet under his command in those parts this Winter, which are to be transmitted to him in the best Manner from England'.133

Before this letter was sent, the Cabinet on the 4th had already made out provisional instructions for Russell, designed to meet the fleet if it was on its way home. These informed him that he would be required to winter in Spain, but left it to him to decide whether to return there if he had already covered a

127 Corbett's description of the ministers' opinion at this stage as 'pusillanimous trifling' (op. cit. p. i69) seems to me unwarranted. In view of the attitude to less dangerous ventures the year before it is remarkably favourable to the plan, and a testimony to the significant effect of the events of i693 and the first seven months of i694. But Corbett, of course, was not aware of the arguments of the previous two years.

128 Mary's letter seems to have disappeared. It is mentioned in Blathwayt's reply to Tren- chard's letter, in Add. MSS. 37992, f. 56v. Judging by what Shrewsbury had to say about her attitude in his letter, it was probably much the same as his own.

129 Coxe, op. cit. pp. 65-8. 130 He had expressed his hopes that the fleet could stay abroad at the end of July (ibid.

pp. 63-4). 131 Ibid. p. 66. The same letter is reproduced in Cal. S.P. Dom. 1694-5, pp. 250-I. 132 Ibid. p. 68. 133 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 56v.



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY. i6z2-4 z8Q

large part of the voyage by the time he received the orders.134 Their tenor re- flected the uncertainty which the ministers felt initially about restricting the admiral's freedom of action too closely, and in these circumstances it seemed possible-although it could not yet be said for certain-that William's letter of the 6th, which left the task of framing the final orders to the Cabinet, might, despite its terms, be followed by just the sort of indefinite instructions which he wished to avoid. On the 7th, therefore, he proceeded to draft his own orders independently of his ministers, instructing Russell to 'continue in those seas with Our... Fleet and ... pursue, and endeavour to annoy the Enemy for so long time as you may do it with safety during this season, whereupon you are to cause Our said Fleet to Winter in the Port of Cadiz ', for which purpose the necessary orders had been given in England and would at once be given in Holland, and the final directions for which would be sent him by the Queen and the Committee. 'You are nevertheless', continued the orders, 'to use this caution, that if the French Fleet or any of it now in the Mediterranean pass the Straights in Order to come into the Northern Seas, You do in that case send after them att least an equal Force to engage them or in default thereof to come to England for the Strengthning Our Fleet there.' 135 The same night, apprehensive lest Russell might have already left for England, and unwilling to await the result of the Cabinet's deliberations, the King made his own arrangements to send these orders to the Mediterranean.136 The utmost care was taken to see that they reached their destination. Two copies were sent off at midnight, one by special messenger to go by the packet to Spain, the other 'by Dr Charree a Spanish Courier under cover to Mr Kirk', the English consul at Genoa; 137 and three days later a duplicate was despatched by special messenger, to go through Frankfurt, Berne, and Piedmont to Genoa, and thence by local tartan to the fleet, where the packet was to be delivered per- sonally to Russell.138

As Blathwayt.wrote to Trenchard, -in enclosing the orders themselves, it would be observed that they left Russell with no latitude to return unless it were to follow the French, 'least it bring [him] under doubts and uncer- taintys'. In the event of 'any very extraordinary and Dressing reasons', the

134 Corbett gives the sequence of events here in reverse. In the first place, he ascribes William's letter to Shrewsbury of 6 Aug. to the 2nd; and secondly, he ascribes the instructions to Russell of the 4th to the 6th, following a minute of the Privy Council for the latter day (op. cit. p. i69). It is this which leads him to remark that 'even then [i.e. after receipt of William's letter to Shrewsbury] the nervous ministers could not harden their hearts to send the Admiral a positive order to remain'. In fact, when the Cabinet's provisional instructions were drafted, William had not yet written his letter of the 6th, nor indeed received Trenchard's reply of the and; and when they were sent, on the 6th, his letter of that date had not yet been received in London.

13 The original draft of these orders, with corrections in Blathwayt's hand, and dated from Mons 7-17 Aug. is contained in N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. I, ff. 243-4.

36 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 59. 137 Endorsements on the orders, N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. I, f. 246. 138 Orders to Peter Tom, the messenger; ibid. ff. 283-4. For William's anxiety over the

timely arrival of his ofders, see Corbett, op. cit. p. 170.



200 TOHN EHRMAN

King did not doubt that the admiral would behave as he thought best for the safety of the fleet, which was always an overriding consideration; but that was understood, and need not affect the rest of the instructions.139 The ministers, however, although the main decision had already been taken for them, could not agree entirely with this restriction, and their own instructions,- which followed on the I4th, contained the proviso 'that if it appear to you impracticable to refit our fleet in those parts, so that it may be timely serviceable the next year, you do then return with the. same .to England; but you are not to make use of this liberty except in case of very great necessity'.140 As. Trenchard wrote to Blathwayt the same day, in their view this was a necessary precaution to save them from attack if the preparations broke down during the winter; but it was not designed to run counter to the King's instructions, and he would inform Russell privately that it meant what it said by the phrase 'except in case of very great necessity '.141 On the next day, accordingly, he wrote to the admiral, explaining that although he would receive two sets of orders from separate authorities, which would not be exactly the same, the difference between them was not intended to absolve him of his duty to stay abroad, which overrode all but the most pressing considerations.142 The same day, the Cabinet's instructions were sent to him in duplicate, one copy going by the packet to Corunna, and the second by the first of the supply convoys which was by that time assembling at Portsmouth.143 The ministers were now com- mitted, with whatever qualifications, to an experiment which a year before they had considered impossible.

The King's anxiety that the Cabinet might allow Russell too much latitude to return arose not only from his mistrust of their attitude over the principle of a Mediterranean expedition, but also from his experience of Russell; and the admiral's reaction to the news was indeed much what might have been expected. Towards the end of July the idea of wintering in Spain had first been suggested to him, by 'a Noble Lord' who was probably Galway; 144 but he replied that not only was there no port, except Port Mahon, which could

139 Add. MSS. 37992, f. 59. 140 Article 7 of the Queen's Instructions to Russell (Cal. S.P. Dom. 1694-5, p. 264). 141 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. I, f. 279. 142 Ibid. ff. 287-8. The pr6cis of this letter given in Cal. S.P. Dom. 1694-5, pp. 266-7, is

unsatisfactory. Mary was not entirely satisfied that the Cabinet's orders were strict enough for the King's purpose, but after a further meeting the ministers decided that they could not modify them (ibid. p. z80).

143 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. i, f. 295. 144 The phrase is Burchett's (p. 243). Corbett calls him "'a noble lord" in the fleet' (op.

cit. p. i66), but Burchett does not say this, and in fact it seems more likely that he was not in the fleet. A copy of Russell's reply to him exists in N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. i, ff. Igg-zoz, endorsed 'copie de la lettre que l'admira[1] Russell m'a escrive'. The first sentence begins, ' I wish I and the Fleet could come on the coast of Savoy so as to correspond with you more frequently'. This, with the endorsement in French, strongly suggests Galway, then commanding the troops in Savoy. On 3 Aug., also, Russell wrote to Trenchard, ' I have had no letter from the King; from Lord Galway I have received one, but there is nothing in it, except a wish that I would come upon that coast' (Cal. S.P. Dom. 1694-5, p. 252).



A MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY, I692-4 29I

take his numbers, nor any local facilities for refitting or even re-storing, but that in any case he could see no strategic advantage in the move. "Tis impossible', he wrote, 'for any assistance the Allyes can give them [i.e. the Spaniards] to prevent the Country's being in the French hands in September at farthest.' Spain, with no money, virtually no army, and suffering from an administrative chaos that staggered even a Commissioner of the Admiralty, could not help herself enough for her friends to help her. 'As to what you say in the last Paragraph of your Letter', he concluded, 'namely, the Fleet's wintering in these Seas, if the King pleases to command it, it must be obeyed, but I should be far from advising it.' 145 In August, he dilated to Shrewsbury on his weariness and personal misfortune in commanding such an unprofitable expedition,146 and it was not surprising that on the receipt of his first orders to winter abroad he should have protested strongly.147 William at once wrote to Shrewsbury to use his influence in persuading the admiral to stay where he was,148 and indeed the duke had already been doing his best. On 4 August, when he sent Russell the news of the Cabinet's provisional instructions, which he assured him were 'of the greatest moment to yourself and England, of any that perhaps ever came to your hand', he had urged 'that .., you will take care to lay aside all the partiality that is natural to a man's returning home, after being so long absent, and so full of the spleen, as your's of the first of July shows you to be'.149 On the I4th and again on the 26th, he had repeated his advice, the more strongly in the latter case because, as he said, 'though by your letter of the 3rd150 I find you are not in a very good humour, I doubt the orders you have received since will put you in a worse'. 'Dear Mr Russell', he wound up, 'let a man that truly loves and values you, prevail upon you to practise patience and submission; and if his majesty is in the wrong in his commands, do you represent what you please; but then obey them, with a prudence you can be master of, if you please.' 151 And in the event, as always, Russell took his advice. Although he grumbled vehemently both to Shrews- bury and the Council, and forecast that by the spring 'there will be an end of an old story and an old admiral',152 he in fact acted not merely on the letter but the spirit of his orders. On their receipt he was at Malaga on his way out of the Straits, and he immediately called a council of war at which, despite the protests of the Dutch rear-admiral, who was for carrying on to Cadiz, it was decided to remain in the western Mediterranean for the time being, Russell himself announcing his intention of not going to Cadiz until October unless the French definitely disarmed their ships before then. The fleet accordingly stayed off the south-east coast of Spain during September, for most of the time under the command of Vice-Admiral Aylmer, since Russell had gone

145 N.M.M. Bibl. Phill. i, ff. I99-202. 146 Coxe, op. cit. pp. I98-9. 147 Ibid. p. 71. 148 Ibid. pp. 70-I. 149 Ibid. p. zoo. 150 See n. I46 supra. 151 Coxe, op. cit. pp. zoo-z. 152 Ibid. p. 203. For his letter to the secretary of the Council, see Corbett, op. cit. pp.

I72-3.

CHJIX I9



202 JOHN EHRMAN down with dysentery. When he recovered at the end of the month, information was coming in that the French were laying up at Toulon. As soon as he received reliable confirmation of this, therefore, he turned the fleet towards Cadiz, and on 8 October he came to anchor in the bay and immediately set about making arrangements to refit his ships. That refit was to provide, in the administrative problems which it raised that winter and in its strategic consequences in the following year, the basis for a Mediterranean naval policy which, although perforce abandoned during the last two years of William's war, was again undertaken, and with more success, in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession.



william iii and the emergence of a mediterranean naval policy, 1692-4

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