will you take a nuclear weaponwith those fries?
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Towards a Nuclear Weapons Peace Framework: with more countries thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities are they becoming a dangerous commodity?TRANSCRIPT
Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE POLICY SERIES
Keywords: Main belief systems> ideologies> global governance> ethics> war strategies> missile threats and responses> geopolitics> intelligence> mutual assured destruction (MAD)> nuclear and weapons technology> Cold War> disarmament and deterrence> terrorism and counter-terrorism> national and international security> international cooperation.30 MINUTES
Towards a Nuclear Weapons Peace Framework: with more countries thinking of acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities are they becoming a dangerous commodity?
Report includes conclusions on the:
NON PROLIFERATION
REVIEW CONFERENCE.
U.N. NEW YORK, MAY 2010
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Introduction
The national security paradigm for nuclear weapons was developed during the Cold War. Its underlying assumptions were the foundation of thought on the nuclear issue and are still prevalent in much current thinking on the topic. They can be seen, both in the framework controlling and monitoring proliferation and nuclear progression, and in the way nuclear weapons and material are thought about both militarily and in a wider sense. Considering the changes that have taken place in the world over the past 20 years, this thinking and its consequent actions, no longer make total sense either within a security framework or a control framework. The hypothesis is that the effect of these inconsistencies serves to drive proliferation and increase the danger of the nuclear issue rather than reduce it. The article considers this from two directions. Firstly, holistically from a bird’s eye view. In this respect, the article considers the variety of the current threat and the differences in its reality to certain outmoded security paradigms, concluding that current threats are fundamentally outside the scope of previous conceptions’ solutions. From this perspective it also analyses the current non-proliferation framework and its underlying thought, concluding that it is neither aligned with the current nuclear reality nor with current nuclear dangers. Secondly, it considers the machinations from within the issue as a bottom up consideration of the factors that may provide momentum for future change. In this respect, it considers recent developments in the context of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation, particularly considering subtle but potentially important changes in U.S. and Russian stances and considers what repercussions they could have for the wider model and the position and role of nuclear weapons in the world.
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The Nuclear ThreatNuclear weapons as well as other forms of nuclear material have the
potential to cause massive damage and potentially even more serious long
term consequences. To compound this, the nature of a nuclear weapon or
fissile material used as a weapon, strategically and militarily speaking, mean
that its use for effect would most likely be against a city or populated area.
They are potential weapons of genocide and are intrinsically dangerous.
However, until twenty years ago the time in which they have developed and
had a paradigm built around them, cast them not only in the role of military
devices but also political tools. Not only as weapons of destruction, but as
threshold weapons, also weapons which were touted as diverting politics and
states from militaristic decision making. Throughout the time of the Cold
War, a relatively simple model surrounded the building and existence of
nuclear weapons, and the threat of nuclear material was essentially summed
up by the idea of deterrence and mutual assured destruction. Although there
was a massive build up during this period and a nuclear capability was
developed by a range of states, the sparsity of main actors and the similarity
of logic behind the build up in arsenals and their potential use, coupled with
the arguably simpler military and political dynamic of the two superpowers,
made the nuclear equation easier to calculate. The aim of this article is
not to question the logic of past actions that have founded our current
predicament, but it must be pointed out that with the relative simplicity of
the equation and the arguable predictability of outcome and of logic, came
a form of threat manageability (at least on the part of the few actors playing
key roles at that time).
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the developments of the last twenty
years there have been considerable changes to the global picture in all
respects. With these changes however, the power of the weapons and their
equally powerful political and strategic associations, built over 40 years of
Cold War politics, has not diminished.
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Mikhail Gorbachev, with Ronald Reagan and George Bush. Gorbachev’s accession to power helped bring to an end the Cold War.
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During the Cold War a consideration of the international dynamic led to a theory paradigm around nuclear weapons which in turn led to this being the relevant
mode of behaviour on the part of states. Thought and behaviour then served to reinforce each other. However following the end of the Cold War, a new international
dynamic developed whilst the thought and behaviour around nuclear weapons remained largely unchanged - a form of historical inertia. Thus while they now continue
NEW INTERNATIONAL DYNAMIC POST COLD WAR BYPASSED
Old Cold War and international relations inertia ruling nuclear thought theory
International Dynamic
Thought theory on nuclear issues
State behaviour
- 2 superpowers- States singular actors
COLD WAR POST COLLAPSE SOVIET UNION
2010 2020
- National Security - Deterrence- Second strike- MAD
- Nuclear posturing - Unwillingness to disarm- New states seek weapons
- Build up by nuclear powers - Alliances
- New states with nuclear weapons arrive on scene- Non state actors acquire nuclear capability- Some states with nuclear capability fail
- Deterrence Fails- Still unable to use arsenals
- Need for a new nuclear doctrine/strategy
- Inertia from Cold War- National security - Deterrence
to reinforce each other, their key link to the reality of the international situation is not present and a key part of the logic chain is missing.
- New dynamic - Globalisation
- Non state actors join scene
Coupled with this the spread of fissile material and nuclear technology
geographically and in terms of understanding and the fact that non-military
and military uses for the technology essentially share a very similar base,
means that the availability and ability to manipulate material has never been
so difficult to control or monitor.
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StatesThe changes over the last twenty years and the phenomenon of globalisation
in particular, have arguably altered the consistency and meaning of the idea of
the state, and whilst ties between nations have arguably never been so varied
and strong, developments have occurred at increasingly breakneck speed. They
have occurred at different speeds in different places, and have had different
impacts on different social models. The unpredictability of these changes has
created an international environment which, on the one hand has never been
so homogeneous, but on the other, an environment in which the fluidity and
range of ideas, reasoning and actors have never been so varied. The newly
shaped playing field has given rise to new niches in which nuclear weapons
can form a threat. Niches in which the safeguards of the past perhaps play
no role. Considering the balancing of a nuclear equation for a major nuclear
power is now far more complex and must take into account many more factors,
taking place on far more fronts. This becomes more difficult still as more states
consider developing nuclear capabilities.
Thus the threat of the use of nuclear weapons between states is arguably
higher now than even during the Cold War. The actors to which globalisation
has given a voice are now far greater in number, although nothing has yet
replaced the state as the key reference point for security or political action on
an international stage. Coupled with the above factors of the proliferation of
knowledge and materials and the fact that nuclear weapons still have a strategic
voice in politics and war, one can see that the factors fuelling the thinking of
weapons acquisition in the Cold War, for states seeking the means nuclear
weapons provide, are still present. In regard to states, in principle the number
of actors with nuclear weapons or the ease of their availability does in itself not
preclude deterrence from being an operable principle. Indeed, there are many
who argue that more nuclear weapons and not less would be the safest way to
ensure a lasting nuclear peace. Argued ad infinitum and put rather succinctly,
“a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ would be a world in which the United
States, Russia, Israel, China, and dozen other countries would have hair-trigger
mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer
delivery systems...The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first
few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world.”
A sovereign state (commonly simply referred to as a state) is a political association with effective internal and external sovereignty over a geographic area and population which is not dependent on, or subject to any other power or state.
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However, original deterrence principles, extrapolations of which seem to be
followed in security circles today, were built on balance, an understanding
(and implied agreement) of what strategic purpose the weapons were to be
used for, the understanding of the thresholds they represented and a reciprocal
predictability to the logic leading to their use. Thus in the current climate
certain actors, particularly rogue or pariah states have the chance and the
motivation to acquire these weapons, but do not fit into the original deterrence
model. The difference in model, ideology and leadership in states such as Iran
and North Korea (including associated non state actors and proxis) and their
consistent violations of international norms and accepted state behaviour raises
certain questions about the predictability of their actions, which the principle
of deterrence relies on. Should it be assumed that the decisions of these states
rely on logic, albeit a foreign concept of logic (and the argument has been made
that it is not impossible to rule out that an illogical, rash or unmotivated act
could take place), one is still faced with the problem that the differences in
make-up of these states, their leadership or their decision making processes
unquestionably make a consideration of this logic in reference to thresholds
based on past or standard international frameworks inadequate. The same
is true of evaluations of decisions leading to the use of weapons. Likewise,
demonstrated indifference to implied state behaviour and their fringe status in
the international community unquestionably makes their view of the potential
and acceptable use of nuclear force, or the arenas in which it may be brought
to bear, politically as well as militarily, reliant on a different equation, and thus
one interminably difficult to predict or counter.
Deterrence is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer great damage as a result of an aggressive action. Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions, or any combination of these can be used as deterrents. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a form of this strategy, which came to prominence during the Cold War when it was used by the US to characterise relations between the United States and Soviet Union. Both nations were prepared to fight a full scale nuclear and conventional war, but were not willing to risk the carnage of a full scale nuclear war.
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Finally, if the lessons of the last twenty years have taught us anything, it is
that the international realm is an unpredictable and uncertain place and
that the actors, motivations and relationships are constantly reinventing
themselves. Admittedly, despite the above argument, state use of nuclear
weapons is the least likely form of nuclear threat, but for the above reasons,
and possibly others that have not come into being yet, that will not
certainly always be the case. This is particularly true considering the idea
that proliferation begets proliferation. For the very same reason a nuclear
capability would be developed in one state, without the guarantee that it
will be used within defined and predictable parameters (and arguably even
the attempt to gain a weapons capability in the current international climate
shows evidence of an unpredictable environment and could be construed as
a demonstration of unpredictable intent) it would very possibly lead to the
belief that the strategic necessity existed for other actors in an area to acquire
a capability themselves. Whilst the progress of nuclear arming has in fact
happened at a very slow rate up to now (currently only 8 (perhaps/probably
9) states are in possession of weapons) this may also not always necessarily
be the case especially considering the proliferation of nuclear latent states.
Example: should Iran gaina weapons capability, owing to the balance of power shift it would represent and the consequences that would stem from it, it would be likely that other states in the region would very quickly begin their own programs in the interests of their own security.
Iranian soldiers march during a military parade marking the annual National Army Day in Tehran on April 18, 2010.
Shahab 3 missiles displayed by Iran in the military parade of April 2010.
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Al-Qaeda is a militant Islamist group founded sometime between August 1988 and late 1989 by its current leader Osama bin Laden. It operates as a network comprising both a multinational, stateless arm and a fundamentalist Sunni movement calling for global Jihad. It is widely considered a terrorist organisation.
Non State ActorsFar more likely is the threat that has manifested in the form of global terror
networks. Although there have been terrorist groups since the Second World
War and even before, they have for different reasons, up until recently, been
unlikely to have wanted to or been able to realise the possibility of manifesting
a nuclear threat. Owing to a confluence of developments this is probably no
longer the case. Developments of the last twenty years, culturally, economically,
politically and technologically have come together to create networks of
increased numbers, support, sophistication, means and aim. Events over the last
10 years reinforce this in terms of the complexity of destructive acts that have
been brought to bear as well as the response of states to them. Some states no
longer seem to know whether it is even possible to classify them as terrorist
groups or armies, or where the difference lies. In fact, it has been argued that in
the age of global linkage and military hegemony, these groups form the basis of
a new paradigm in warfare. Ironically, although they form the most likely threat,
they are also the group against which the possession of nuclear weapons can
have no deterrent effect.
The motivation to obtain and use a nuclear device is present. Previous formats
of groups with more local aims may have found their use counter-productive
compared to the sweeping aims of certain of today’s networks. Osama bin
Laden, for example, has already claimed it as a religious duty to secure a
nuclear device and there have already been documented attempts to buy
Uranium by terrorist organisations. The attacks that have already taken place as
well as constantly growing evidence suggest that the rhetoric cannot be taken
lightly. Indeed, the strategic abilities of a bomb would fit with the actions of
certain groups targeting densely populated civilian places seen so far, and the
effects would follow the declared mode and aim of their warfare. Should the
threat materialise in the form of possession of a bomb, needless to say, the lack
of alignment of these groups with any international protocols or demands on
states will reduce the use of the device to a logistics and aim calculation.
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With nuclear knowledge and material proliferation, both peaceful and military,
the possible access points to material and information have grown in variety
and type whilst the potential use for nuclear material has also increased. Apart
from the possibility of a direct attack on a nuclear facility releasing quantities
of radiation, there are three potential manifestations of this threat. 1. The theft
and detonation of an intact weapon, 2. the acquisition of fissile material and the
consequent construction of an improvised nuclear device and 3. the acquisition
of radioactive materials leading to the construction of a radiological dispersion
device (a dirty bomb) or a radiation dispersion device. The first two options
would be the hardest to carry out and would result in the most damage, and
yet each step to their completion could now be theoretically fulfilled by a
sophisticated network. The fact that there are unstable states such as Pakistan
with nuclear weapons is a concern as far as the theft of an intact nuclear
device is concerned, whilst the volatile transitions under-way in the ex-Soviet
Union states left and leave questions of security and documentation around
weapons stockpiles. Even easier would be the acquisition of the highly enriched
uranium (HEU) or plutonium necessary for the fabrication of an improvised
nuclear device. Indeed a Congressional Research Service report, suggests how
possible the theft of HEU, in particular, really is (indeed there have already
been documented instances of theft of nuclear material as well as the discovery
of a nuclear smuggling ring involving top scientists in Pakistan). It is used in
various forms of civilian commerce, for example research reactors which are
common all around the world and which are very sparsely guarded.—A very
small quantity is all that would be required for an improvised device. According
to many nuclear scientists, following the acquisition of the material, the science
to fabricate a crude device would be within a sophisticated group’s ability.
Finally, a dirty bomb could be made using a range of radioactive sources in
common use in medicine, industry and research (many of which have fallen
outside regulatory control) and would require little more than a knowledge of
high explosives (although it must be mentioned that the damage evaluations for
dirty bombs almost preclude them being mentioned in the same breath as the
other two possibilities).
Again recently, terrorists have once again shown that the security protocols
are not water tight and with the quantity of trade and private traffic currently,
should a weapon be acquired, the probability of it being stopped on delivery
will probably never be 100 per cent.
Uranium is a silvery-white metallic chemical element in the actinide series of the periodic table with atomic number 92. It is assigned the chemical symbol U. Uranium has the second highest atomic weight of the naturally occurring elements, lighter only than plutonium-244.
International Frameworks, Control Mechanisms and Theory
The existence of such technology and weapons automatically creates the
potential for their misuse. However, there is an international system in place
for the control of fissile material and the normalisation of nuclear weapons
designed specifically to counter the possibility of their misuse and dangerous
proliferation. Does the fact that up to now there have been only two non-test
uses of nuclear weapons, and that there are still not more than 9 states with
a nuclear weapons capability mean this system is working? To evaluate this
we must consider what this system is, its flaws and how applicable it is in the
contemporary world and to contemporary threats.
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsCounter-terrorism efforts aside, which focus rather more on the logistics
of prevention of a special form of terrorist attack than on the overarching
mechanism for the control of weapons, the system is based on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is complimented by other bi and multilateral
agreements such as the SALT and START treaties (aimed at reductions in
weapons stockpiles in the US and the Soviet Union/Russia), international
conventions such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and an Additional
Protocol aimed at strengthening the classical safeguards system. The treaty is
essentially split into three pillars: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to
promote co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology and to further
the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Opened for signing in 1968, the
treaty is now in force indefinitely following a review conference in 1995. There
are 189 parties to the treaty, which recognises five as nuclear powers. There are
four sovereign states not party to the treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan and North
Korea (although the legality of the withdrawal by North Korea is questioned).
Under the treaty, Nuclear Weapon States agree not to transfer weapons to
other states and not to assist Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the construction
of a nuclear device, and Non-Nuclear States agree not to construct or receive
such devices. The treaty demands states to comply with IAEA safeguards
which include methods for keeping track of fissile material. It allows nuclear
research for peaceful purposes and encourages inter-state co-operation for its
development toward peaceful ends. It demands that negotiations are pursued
toward disarmament (although the wording of article VI is ambiguous). The
possibility to leave the treaty is provided in article X after 3 months notice and
provided “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”.
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT) is a treaty to limit the spread (proliferation) of nuclear weapons. The treaty came into force on 5 March 1970, and currently there are 189 states party to the treaty, five of which are recognised as Nuclear Weapon States.
Four non-parties to the treaty are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess
nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons program. North Korea acceded to the treaty, violated it, and in 2003 withdrew from it.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PUTTING THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE
Explosive power at the disposal of nuclear weapons states in 1984. Each dot represents the total amount of explosives used in World War II.
Dots in circle enclosing 9 megatons represents the weapons on just one Poseidon submarine. Equal to the firepower of three World War II’s.
One dot. Firepower of World War II: 3 megatons.
Just two squares on this chart (300 megatons) represent enough firepower to destroy all the large- and medium-size cities in the entire world.
Just one Trident sub 24 megatons with the firepower of eight World War II’s - enough to destroy every city in the northern hemisphere. All other dots in chart
represent the world’s present nuclear weaponry which equals 6,000 World War II’s or 18,000 megatons.
Source: Harold Willens. The Trimtab Factor. 1984.
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Problems with the TreatyThis structure looks excellent on paper, but deeper analysis reveals flaws
when considering the efficacy and contemporary relevance of the framework.
Politically the treaty suffers from the same problems that affect all international
legal implements. International law in general suffers from a lack of consensus
on meaning and efficacy which leads to gaps in cogency and a lack of
enforcement mechanisms. At the same time, as the key building block is
still the state, particularly in terms of security, parochial interests are likely
to override international law should they be deemed beneficial enough or
pressing enough. Parochial interests can also influence its interpretation to
the point of contradiction or meaninglessness. This manifests in this case
in various ways. Firstly, the framework suffers from a lack of legitimacy that
comes about as the treaty is not fully international. As mentioned above, there
are four states with nuclear weapons who are not party to the treaty, meaning
they are not bound by its obligations and call into question the very essence
of it as an international agreement. Iran has raised the argument that it would
theoretically be better off outside the treaty as regards its nuclear program,
as the freedom enjoyed by states such as India and Israel seems to come
with little drawbacks to their nuclear programs (regardless of the intentions
behind the Iranian program the argument holds weight). An argument used
by India, to justify their absence, about the lopsidedness of the treaty and
how it is biased toward the named nuclear powers serves to illustrate another
flaw. The argument has not abated since it was said that the nuclear powers
‘basically, did whatever they wanted to do before the introduction of NPT and
then devised it to prevent others from doing what they had themselves been
doing before’. Compounding this is the debate over the obligation to disarm.
Whilst such stockpiles of weapons still exist and weapons research, purchase
and maintenance continues to take place in the Nuclear Weapon States, Non-
Nuclear States have also raised the question as to the level of commitment to
their disarmament obligations and thus to the obligation to honour the treaty
generally. Although the point is often made by the US and Russia that they have
massively reduced their arsenals, the truth remains, even considering the noises
the Obama administration has made toward disarmament, that the stockpiles
are still huge and are being replenished and certain weapons programs and
groups still seem to be following the Cold War thinking and patterns.
The US - India nuclear deal undermines the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by making a special exception for India that runs contrary to a delicate global bargain that all but four of the world’s countries have accepted.
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The treaty cannot be viewed as a globally recognised tool if only some
parties are obliged to fulfil their obligations. Although the argument of
the nuclear powers that the wording of the disarmament article is vague
and that the treaty is predominantly about non-proliferation rather than
disarmament, the difference in interpretation in itself is another hole in the
cogency of the framework. Finally, the lack of an enforcement mechanism
in the treaty means that, depending on the circumstances, states straying
from it have no specific recourse to fear.
Although not a flaw in itself, coupled with other factors, the principle
of peaceful proliferation and advancement of nuclear technology and
the principle of dual use technology lays the foundations for weapons
acquisition and the danger of fast widespread proliferation. ElBaradei,
former Director General of the IAEA estimated that 35 to 42 states now
have latent nuclear weapons capabilities. The fear is that it will be through
this dual use technology that Iran may gain its weapon.
deployed, including those on reserve status or scheduled for dismantlement. Stockpile totals do not necessarily reflect nuclear
United States and USSR/Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, 1945-2006. These numbers include warheads not actively
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
United States
USSR / Russia
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
capabilities since they ignore size, range, type and delivery mode.
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Problems with the FrameworkOn a philosophical level, much of the current framework and the paradigms
supporting it were conceived during the Cold War. During this time a different
dynamic existed, out of it came a paradigm which is arguably maintained in
much of the framework, and yet no longer fits the realities of the modern world.
Primarily problematic is the emphasis put on outmoded models of the state
and national security. As can be seen above, within the last 20 years, new threats
have come into being. In the first instance, this has created a situation in which
the primary focus of the control mechanisms is to prevent states using weapons
against one another, whereas as can be seen, this is not the most pressing
danger. Secondly, it puts too much weight on national security as the dynamic
of international relations. Whilst it is still a vitally important reference point,
it is not necessarily the only reference point and perhaps is not as important
as it once was. This has the knock on effect of creating the basis for discourses
and for the definition of terms which, due to the far more complex relationships
that now exist, inevitably culminate in inappropriate responses and actions.
For example, the discourse centring on why states decide to build nuclear
weapons largely revolves around the idea that they are always built for security
aims as a founding fact, whereas the reality is probably much more complex.
As is suggested by Sagan, a mixture of thinking and reasoning could lead to
the decision to embark on a weapons program. In this sense, the true causes
of proliferation could well be overlooked. Another example would be how the
definition of how a nuclear device fits into a grander scheme as a political tool
or weapon also seems to be overlooked. In a more linked and complex world,
nuclear weapons gain reference points and associations by being tools in a
wider sphere, as does everything else. The logic of the current framework seems
to put nuclear weapons in a national security pigeon hole. This separates them
theoretically from the role they play in the real world and isolates them from
issues they now have a direct bearing on in reality. One can see the dilemma
in North Korea’s use of Nuclear Weapons as political bargaining tools as a
threatened state, or in the discourse between Nuclear Weapon States and the
Non-Aligned Movement. Finally, an underlying concern with this model is
that thought, in terms of national security and its principles, can never stop
proliferation, but only slow it down. Indeed in some ways it is amazing it has
succeeded so well so far. The formulation relies on holding back on agreement,
a progression which eventually would come naturally considering national
security as a bedrock principle.
Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro professor of Political Science at Stanford University and co-director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is known for his research on the organisations managing nuclear weapons and has published on the subject in The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. He also is one of the leading pessimist scholars about nuclear proliferation.
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TH NK DIFFERENTLY
Recent Developments - A Changein Thinking?The above points illustrate a holistic birds eye consideration of the
development of the thinking, frameworks and their consequences that are
possibly misaligned with the fact of the nuclear threat as it exists and serves to
make moves toward effective disarmament and non-proliferation more unlikely.
However, in order to consider the issue more fully there must be a
consideration of developments specific to the field that may alter development
of the issue in the future. Obviously, the entrenchment and mythology that
make nuclear weapons a key tool in international relations are not readily
changeable, however, in the last year there have been interesting developments
in stance by key trend-setting nuclear powers (Russia and the U.S.A.) on the
issue. On the one hand, it is impossible to evaluate what practical results
these developments will have, and it is easy to compare them to prior stances
as further targeted rhetoric without intention backing them up. On the other
hand, there are distinct (although subtle) alterations to lines of approach to the
issue that appear to recognise the significance and track the developments of
the past 20 years more accurately than priorly and potentially provide first steps
toward realigning approaches to fit the current nuclear threat.
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Nuclear Posture ReviewThe release of the Nuclear Posture Review (the U.S. policy document
charting the state’s nuclear position), uniquely limits potential U.S. use of
nuclear weapons for the first time. States which have no weapons and are not
attempting to gain them now (according to the Review) now have nothing to
fear from the U.S. Nuclear arsenal. Concurrently, states attempting to develop
nuclear capabilities or who are acting outside their nuclear obligations are still
subject to the full range of sanctions and use. This suggests an understanding
that the threat in this context comes from rogue states and signifies a step
away from handed down concepts such as deterrence and MAD. Secondly, the
document realises the terrorist nuclear threat as growing and likely in a way
that previous policy documents have failed to do. This approach appears to be
progressive. It acknowledges new threats and is attempting to move toward a
modern structure for consideration of how to deal with the nuclear issue. More
importantly perhaps, it also points toward a recognition of the alteration of the
international environment both in terms of interstate relations and of the role of
nuclear weapons in a wider context.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during a joint news briefing on the new Nuclear Posture Review at the Pentagon April 6. The Obama administration, kicking off an intensive week of nuclear diplomacy, unveiled a revamped policy restricting U.S. use of its atomic weapons stockpile.
New STARTSimilar positive trends can be pulled from the renewal of the weapons
limitation treaties between the U.S. and Russia. The challenge of the expiration
of the old START treaty in December 2009 was met in April as the U.S. and
Russia signed a (New) START follow on treaty in April 2010. The noises made
by both sides were overwhelmingly pro non-proliferation and disarmament,
whilst cooperation between the two sides took major leaps forward after
the various Bush European missile systems fiascos. The treaty itself contains
reduction clauses that would reduce stockpiles to levels unseen since the 1950s
and further monitoring and transparency clauses increase trust and improve
safety. Further, preliminary discussion of the treaty signing has shown a certain
openness to the consideration of the role of nuclear weapons in defence
strategy and in the world in general that has not always been detectable in the
past. As Senate Republican Conference Chairman Lamar Alexander said: ‘there
is an openness to considering the treaty’ (within the Republican Conference),
‘The treaty itself is modest’. Whilst not indicative of a sea-change, this has been
seen to be indicative of a spreading understanding of the need to consider
alterations to the nuclear paradigm, even amongst the more conservative
elements of the key powers.
18 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Governance at the speed of light!
Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev have signed a nuclear arms-cutting pact in Prague (April 8, 2010). They’ve agreed to cut their nuclear arsenals by a third while cutting the number of bombers, submarines and missiles that carry the nukes in half.
The new START treaty is the successor to the START I and II treaties. The START III negotiating process was not successful.The development of the agreement commenced in April 2009 immediately after the meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama in London. Preliminary talks were already held in Rome.
19 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
Unfortunately, there are also potential negatives and steps backward to be taken
from the progression of the treaty which cast shadows over the advances it
appears to make. Firstly, the talks took much longer than expected to conclude.
There were a number of reasons suggested for this, the most concerning
suggestion for which was that there was still a quantity of mistrust remaining
from the Cold War that had not dissipated. Secondly, the treaty is still not multi-
lateral (although Russia has been pushing for the next round of talks to go
this way). Thirdly, both sides will still possess massive weapons stockpiles and
deployments capabilities still so much so that the reductions (1550 warheads;
800 deployed and non deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments) in fact compared to 1. the
capabilities of other countries and 2. what could possibly be necessary to retain
an effective deterrent, are minimal. Fourthly, the treaty has not been ratified
and this is a major issue. Whilst the Duma appears much more responsive to
the executive branch this may not be so in the U.S. Senate. Mentioned above,
there is openness to considering the treaty and whilst many previous reduction
treaties have been met with bipartisan support, the senate is currently heavily
polarised on the back of domestic arguments and these may well carry through
into the consideration of the ratification of this treaty. Lastly, the treaty does
face opposition from those who feel it would limit U.S. Defensive capability
(amongst other things). Coupled with the mechanisms in the U.S. Senate that
would allow individual senators to slow or block action on the treaty, the
outspoken objections of certain senators, both on and off the Foreign Relations
Committee (the committee with jurisdiction over treaties) such as Senator James
Inhofe begins to look menacing: “New START faces a hard battle in the Senate,
and I’ll lead the opposition to it”.
20 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
Overall the key developments over the last year represent tentative and slow
moves in the right direction. The thinking behind them is progressive and
appreciates and incorporates certain developments (often absent in the
alignment of frameworks and philosophy with fact) into thinking on nuclear
weapons. However they are only first steps. They do not rectify key problematic
issues and it remains to be seen how they will impact on thinking in a wider
sphere. Firstly, as regards other states and thinking on the nuclear issue in an
international context, and secondly, whether over time they provide the impetus
for further moves toward non-proliferation and disarmament. In this context
tangible manifestation is key and the manoeuvrings and actions of the Obama
regime in particular, will be subject to massive scrutiny for their validity and
alignment with the rhetoric.
That they are only first steps (or slow progressions) however is perhaps not a
negative thing. Firstly, the fact that they have found the space and ability to come
into existence at all is a positive sign. Secondly, in relation to nuclear questions
many states take their cues from Russian U.S. relations and that they appear
to be founding the correct thinking probably means that it will filter through
in some way across the board (of course this comes with the caveat that the
developments must have
more than just pleasant
sound bites behind them).
Thirdly, the longest journey
begins with the first step
and due to the complexity
of issues involved, especially
considering the integral role
nuclear weapons have come
to play in various aspects
of international relations,
as pointed out above, mean
that sweeping change would
have been 1. impossible and
2. may in fact have produced
more dangerous results than
benefits.
NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND TREATY LIMITS
Launchers
1,600
1,400
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
New STARTlimit (2010)
STARTlimit (1991)
US Russia
Warheads*
6,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
New STARTlimit (2010)
STARTlimit (1991)
US Russia
Moscow Treaty limit (2002)
* Additional warheads in reserve / awaiting dismantlement: US 6,700, Russia 8,150
SOURCE: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
21 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
NPT Review Conference 2010As a measure of the potential of the above mentioned developments, the five
yearly review conference of the NPT, which concluded on May 28th 2010 has
been encouraging. Not only has the final declaration been largely well received
across the board, but the fact that a final declaration was adopted (after the
failure to adopt a final declaration 5 years ago) shows signs of progress in co-
operation on the issue if nothing else. Throughout the conference the language
of the majority of participants also reflected much of the progressive thinking
highlighted above. Finally, the content of the final declaration includes more
concrete moves toward long discussed issues of disarmament and nuclear
control, including commitments from the nuclear powers toward disarmament,
the set up of talks for 2012 aimed at the creation of a Middle East Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ), and the return of North Korea to the six
party talks regarding its nuclear presence.
However, whilst the majority of the rhetoric has been positive, there are
issues that may negate the effect of the results of the conference. Apart from
general problems with the efficacy of the developments of the conference and
international law in general, it remains to be seen whether progressive language
can be translated into progressive action. Taking key issues as reflective of the
intentions and probable translation of rhetoric into fact is illuminating in
this regard. Whilst there has been a commitment toward disarmament by the
nuclear powers, it was impossible (partially due to U.S. objection) to conclude
a time-scale for this. Secondly, on key issues such as the MENWFZ, although
progressive steps appear to have been taken, key problems still remain. Whilst
there have been moves toward talks in 2012, the trust necessary for these to
be effectively implemented is still lacking. For example, while Iran received
no particular mention in the final declaration, the U.S. was particularly
disappointed at Israel’s singling out and suggested this could be a major
stumbling block on the road to a MENWFZ and words encouraging North
Korea to rejoin the six party talks are neither innovative nor binding. A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone, or NWFZ is defined by the United Nations as an agreement which a group of states has freely established by treaty or convention, that bans the use, development, or deployment of nuclear weapons in a given area, that has mechanisms of verification and control to
enforce its obligations, and that is recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations.NWFZs have a similar purpose to, but are distinct from, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to which all countries except for four nuclear weapons states are party.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free ZonesNW statesNuclear sharingNeither, but NPT
22 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
In essence, the result of the conference has been positive (and to have
expected more may have been mere wishful thinking, and indeed not
aligned with the strength and efficacy of the developments mentioned
above), demonstrating developments in the streamlining and progressiveness
of rhetoric and (also seemingly) in intention that indicate a change in
thinking may be finding ground on which to stand. However, as with all
issues in the international sphere, it remains to be seen whether the rhetoric
has the swell behind it to carry it past the obstacles that will certainly be
presented when it comes into contact with other aims and necessities.
23 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
ConclusionConsidered from an aerial perspective, nuclear weapons and material are
now a strategic liability. They retain their power and yet exist in a different
world from that of their inception.
With the new dynamic that has grown over the last twenty years, the issues
which produced certain behaviour in relation to nuclear issues either disappeared
or took new forms. Thinking about these issues has not followed pace,
consequently leaving a solution from the past to deal with issues of the present.
Thus it is with the rise of a new global dynamic and international landscape that
the risk of interstate use of nuclear force has escalated. Other issues have arisen
since this time which could not have been considered then, but which now form
a firm reality. It is from here that nuclear weapons and material constitute a very
real terrorist threat, whilst serving no purpose in its alleviation or prevention.
In turn, their entity is controlled by a framework that is driven forward with
outmoded thought and on outmoded presumptions (although this may be
changing). In a general way, this is what fractures and weakens the international
agreements on the subject. In a more specific way, the direction these ideas lead,
when put into practise in the modern environment can be contrary to expectations.
Finally, due to this lack of adaptability the framework does not provide the safety
mechanisms that it ought against the realities of the nuclear threat.
To compound the danger they now present, the above issues must be viewed
against a background of consistent development and geographical spread of
technologies and material.
24 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
However, when one considers movements within the system there are
signs of potential changes in thinking, and therefore the possibility for
change in the construction of the model around nuclear weapons and
their conceived place in the world. This is primarily obvious through the
perspective of U.S. and Russian stances. Although there are issues behind
all the manifestations of these developments, their practical effect is as yet
uncertain. It is encouraging and indicative that they have found the space
to exist at all.
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Dara Hallinan, Research Fellow of Gold Mercury International, contributed to this paper.
25 GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Will you take a nuclear weapon with those fries?
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