will to fight: returning to the human fundamentals …(1941) germany’s operation barbarossa will...
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C O R P O R A T I O N
B R I E F
RETURNING TO
THE HUMAN
FUNDAMENTALS
OF WAR
RETURNING TO
THE HUMAN
FUNDAMENTALS
OF WAR
“ The use of force demands
that we should understand
our own natures,
for the most basic and the
most complicated
weapon system is man.” — B R I G A D I E R G E N E R A L S H E L F O R D B I D W E L L ,
Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories —1973
IN 2018, RAND PUBLISHED TWO REPORTS FOR THE
U.S. ARMY DESCRIBING WILL TO FIGHT. ARGUABLY,
WILL TO FIGHT IS THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT
FACTOR IN WAR. WILL TO FIGHT IS THE DISPOSITION
AND DECISION TO FIGHT, TO KEEP FIGHTING, AND
TO WIN. THE BEST TECHNOLOGY IN THE WORLD IS
USELESS WITHOUT THE FORCE OF WILL TO USE
IT AND TO KEEP USING IT EVEN AS CASUALTIES
MOUNT AND UNEXPECTED CALAMITIES ARISE. WILL
TO FIGHT REPRESENTS THE INDELIBLY HUMAN
NATURE OF WARFARE.
With very few exceptions, all wars and almost all battles are decided by matters of human will:
Breaking the enemy’s will to fight while sustaining one’s own will to fight is the key to success in battle.
But as focus on technology increases, the essentially human nature of war is all but ignored. Lack of
focus on will to fight has created a dangerous gap in American military practice.
WE MUST IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WILL TO FIGHT.
On the surface, the American military officially adopts the view of war as a contest of opposing,
independent, and irreconcilable wills. But when it comes to practice—planning for and fighting wars—
these theories often amount to little more than lip service. The integration of will to fight concepts
into military education, training, planning, assessments, international engagement, and operations is
glaringly sparse. In most cases, American and allied military professionals view war through the lens of
technology and physical effects.
1.
War is a human endeavor—a fundamentally human clash of wills often fought among populations. It is not a mechanical process that can be controlled precisely, or even mostly, by machines, statistics, or laws that cover operations in carefully controlled and predictable environments. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior.
— U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, 2017
2.
THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOGNIZED THIS GAP.
In 2016 the U.S. Joint Staff identified a yawning gap in the understanding of partner and adversary will
to fight:
Recent failure to translate military gains into strategic success reflects, to some extent, the Joint Force’s tendency to focus primarily on affecting the material capabilities—including hardware and personnel—of adversaries and friends, rather than their will to develop and employ capabilities. . . . A failure to grasp human aspects can, and often
will, result in a prolonged struggle and an inability to achieve strategic goals.
Improving understanding of will to fight might not be a panacea; war is not won by silver bullets. But if
will to fight is the most important factor in war—or just a very important factor that is routinely overlooked
or misunderstood—then improvement is absolutely necessary. Ignoring will to fight can contribute to
tactical or even strategic defeat.
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps—the ground combat forces of the American military—have alternatively embraced and
ignored the concept of will to fight for over a century. It has no stable, central place in doctrine or practice, and it is often
defined in vague and impractical terms. The consequences of this erratic ebb and flow stand testament to the pressing need to improve and normalize the study of will to fight in American military practice and to make its lessons useful.
THE EBB AND FLOW OF WILL TO FIGHT
• A major war occurs and Western militaries slowly incorporate
some aspects of will to fight into doctrine, while some aspects
are completely ignored.
• Gradually, the most painful lessons of war fade as combat
veterans retire.
• A new war erupts, painful lessons are briefly and only partly
relearned, and then are again gradually forgotten.
There is a pattern in the wavering emphasis on
will to fight in military doctrine.
GAPS IN MIL ITARY DOCTRINE
Effectively no inclusion of will to fight
Will to fight is most or very important
Less
More
1890 1900 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1990 2000 2010
1895 Organization and Tactics
1939 Field Service Regulations
1989 Warfighting
1993 FM 100-5
2016 ADP 3-0
1923 Field Service Regulations
1940 Small Wars Manual
1944 Field Service Regulations
1982 Air-Land Battle
1914 Field Service Regulations
1976–77 FM 100-5
2001 FM 100-5
2011–12 ADPs
Field Manual (FM) 100-5 series
WWI WWII Korean Persian GulfVietnam War on Terror
1910 19801970
3.
IMPACT OF WILL-TO-FIGHT ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS FAILURES
Whatever the cause—from the lack of credible assessment methods or even a widely agreed-on
definition of will to fight—the military, political, economic, and social costs of a dissonance between
accepted will-to-fight theory and practice have been extraordinary. The RAND reports on both the
military and national will to fight offer historical cases that demonstrate the impact of will-to-fight
misjudgment. A few historical examples:
• Failed assessment of Arab will to fight leading up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War resulted in strategic
surprise, nearly leading to Israel’s defeat and pushing the United States and the Soviet Union to the
brink of war.
• The Central Intelligence Agency’s analyses of Vietnamese will to fight—on both sides—from 1954
to 1974 were often accurate but essentially ignored by policymakers. The United States failed to
break the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (DRV’s) will to fight, lost its own political will to fight,
and withdrew from Vietnam having lost nearly 60,000 Americans.
• Failure to understand potential vulnerabilities in the Iraqi Army’s will to fight in 2011
contributed to its defeat at the hands of the Islamic State in 2014, after which the
U.S. Secretary of Defense stated, “The Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight.”
The chart below provides examples stretching from World War I to the present in which failure to accurately assess will to fight had serious consequences:
WILL TO FIGHT IN HISTORY
CONFLICT (DATE) ASSESSMENT REALITY CONSEQUENCE
WW I (1916)
The French will break under fire at Verdun
The French continued to fight France helped defeat Germany in 1918
WW II (1941)
Germany’s Operation Barbarossa will destroy the Red Army
The Soviets retreated to Moscow but continued to fight
The Allies defeated Nazi Germany in 1945
First Indochina War (1946–1954)
The Viet Minh have a limit and will surrender
The Viet Minh mobilized tens of thou-sands from the population to help surround the French in Dien Bien Phu
The Viet Minh defeated France in 1954
Korean War (1950–1953)
The United States will liberate North Korea
North Korean and Chinese forces fought hard in the Third Phase Offensive at 38th Parallel
Stalemate between North and South Korea
India-Pakistan War (1965)
Indian soldiers will quickly retreat and reopen negotiations for Kashmir
India expanded the war International actors forced a return to the pre-war status quo
Vietnam War (1965–1975)
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) will break in 1967
The DRV persisted The DRV won in 1975, and the United States was strategically defeated
First Chechen War (1994–1996)
Russian forces will take Grozny
Chechen rebels continued resistance
Stalemate between Russia and Chechen rebels through 1999
Islamic State incursions (2011–2014)
The Iraqi Army is ready to fight
The Islamic State defeated the Iraqi Army
A U.S. partner was soundly de-feated; U.S. troops still deployed
Afghanistan conflict (2009–present)
The Taliban can be broken by 2011
The Taliban persisted against the Afghan government
U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan in 2019
Yemen Civil War (2015–present)
The Yemeni government can defend Sana’a
Houthi rebels defeated the Yemeni government
A U.S. partner was defeated
4.
‣ 1970 Hanoi still considers that it has the will and basic strengths to prevail. . . . Despite Hanoi’s obvious concerns with its problems, the Communists almost certainly believe that they enjoy some basic strengths and advantages which will ultimately
prove to be decisive.
‣ 1974 Hanoi continues to demonstrate its determination to impose Communist control on the South. There has been no apparent curtailment in Hanoi’s support for [the war]. . . . Finally, even if there is not a major offensive during the next year, it is clear that at some point Hanoi will shift back to major warfare in its effort to gain control of South Vietnam.
The case of the Vietnam War shows that even accurate
intelligence analyses of will to fight are meaningless if
they are ignored by decisionmakers.
CIA-provided assessments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV):
“ The life or death of a hundred, a thousand, tens of thousands of human beings, even our compatriots, means little. . . . Westmoreland was wrong to count on his superior firepower to grind us down.”
— P R E S I D E N T H O C H I M I N H ,
Democratic Republic of Vietnam — 1969
WILL-TO-FIGHT CASE STUDY: VIETNAM WAR
Despite the straightforward analytic conclusions that the DRV had a deep reservoir of will to fight, without a definition or model of will to fight the CIA assess- ments came across as subjective. As a result—despite persistent warning to policymakers—the United States and General William Westmoreland sought to break the will of DRV leaders through measured escalation and by inflicting casualties.
By 1968, U.S. troop levels began to plummet—from ~520,000 to only ~200 advisers by 1972—and the DRV conquered the Republic of Vietnam (South) by 1975.
Jul 7, 1965, 28 B-52s dropped over 540 tons of 750 and 1,000-pound bombs on a Viet Cong staging and training area known as Zone “D.”
5.
w
HOW CAN WE ANALYZE WILL TO F IGHT?
Literature review
Understanding will to fight at any level is hard, but
much can be done.
‣ Why does an individual soldier, a military unit, a military organization, a national leader, or an entire nation fight or not fight?
‣ What is the value of will in comparison to the quantity and quality of military equipment, or the application of tactics or strategy?
There is no way to accurately quantify will to fight or
delineate its precise value. But will to fight can be more
clearly understood and practicably applied. RAND’s
research offers a starting point.
R A N D’S R ES E A RCH A PPROACH:
A nine-part multimethod effort
As a first step to understand will to fight, the RAND team
undertook a literature review of more than 200 published
works, reviewed U.S. and allied military doctrine, conducted
68 subject-matter expert (SME) interviews, and analyzed
historical cases, war- gaming, and simulation.
Game + simulation literature
Game + simulation analysis
Coded case studies
Interviews with SMEs
Mil. assessment literature
Simulation experiment
Vietnam case study
Russia case study
202 Scholarly journals, books, histories,
memoirs
169 Professional
articles
77 Coded, 20 used
as testbed
15 Historical cases
68 Across fields and
disciplines
3 Vietnam, Afghanistan,
and Iraq
‣
7,640 Simulation runs; 2,640 analyzed
68 Red and blue; both
tactical and national
3 Analyses of national
will to flight
The 303rd Psychological Operations Company dropped leaflets in 2013 over Afghanistan in support of operations to defeat insurgency influence in the area.
6.
w
RESEARCH STEPS TO FILL THE GAP
‣
The RAND team found that there is no generally accepted American or allied definition,
explanation, or model of will to fight. This means that the U.S. military and its allies have no central point
of reference for understanding what is, according to joint doctrine, the most important factor in warfare.
The team’s research took several steps to start the process of filing these gaps.
Definitions don’t necessarily solve problems, but they are a useful and necessary starting point for
mutual understanding. RAND offers definitions for both military and national will to fight.
MIL ITA RY U N IT A N D O RG A NIZ AT I O N A L WILL TO F IG H T:
Soldiers and the units they form develop the disposition to fight or not fight, and to act or not to act, when
fearing death. Disposition is essentially likelihood: Soldiers are more or less likely to fight or run, to fight
aggressively or passively, to follow orders or break, run, or surrender. Influenced by this disposition, soldiers
make critical decisions on the frontline, or even while far removed from the battlefield, where dedication to
the mission can be in question.
Military unit and organizational will to fight is defined as:
the disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed
The purposes of the military will to fight report and the military unit-organizational model are to improve
understanding of disposition to fight. While we cannot predict human behavior or decisions, we can
significantly improve our understanding of will to fight by assessing and analyzing disposition, which
allows for an estimation of overall military unit effectiveness and forecasting of behavior.
N AT I O N A L D ECIS I O NM A K ER WILL TO F IG H T:
Wars rarely end simply because one military destroys another. Government leaders determine how
and when wars end, and they may have to decide many times during a conflict whether their country
should continue enduring risk and sacrifice or whether it is time to stop fighting. Tangible factors,
such as remaining numbers of weapons and troops, are obviously part of the decision calculus,
but it is often less-tangible political and economic variables that ultimately determine what might be called
national will to fight.
National will to fight is defined in this study as:
the determination of a national government to conduct sustained military and other operations for some objective, even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases
Although the range of actors relevant to national will includes citizens, military leaders, media, and
foreign officials, we focused on governments and, in the process, accounted for the interplay of these
and other actors. Ultimately, governments make the decisions about war. Their will is reflected in the
political decisions they make during a conflict to either continue or stop fighting. At the national level,
we define fighting to include not only military force but also the use of all aspects of national power to
achieve particular political objectives.
STEP 1. ADOP T UNIVERSAL DEFIN IT IONS
‣
7.
RESEARCH STEPS TO FILL THE GAP
‣
STEP 2. MODELING WILL TO F IGHT
Explanatory–exploratory–portable models provide a common starting point
The nine-part multimethod research effort provided the foundation to develop two will-to-fight models that
are explanatory, exploratory, and portable. They can explain and help forecast will to fight. They can be used
to explore various aspects of will to fight, and in turn be improved through new learning. Portability means
that the models must be applied using a unique approach for each case, providing for flexibility.
The will-to-fight models—described in more depth on pages 10–13—are a starting point to provide military
and civilian leaders, planners, advisers, and intelligence analysts with a common starting point for deeper
understanding of military and national will to fight. The models are essentially a tool to open the door
for better planning, operations, advising, intelligence, wargaming, simulation, and, with further research,
improved training and education of U.S. and allied military forces.
T H E U N IT A N D N AT I O N A L WILL-TO - F IG H T M O D EL S CA N:
• help explain why a unit or nation is more or less likely to fight, and how it will fight
• identify weak and strong points in a military unit that can be shored up or exploited
• improve military training and education to help reduce risk and improve warfighting
STEP 3. INTEGR ATING WILL TO F IGHT IN S IMUL ATION Computer simulation, tabletop exercises, and wargames can help bring clarity to complex issues and
concepts, such as will to fight. Results from our analysis of 62 existing wargames and simulations,
interviews with designers and program managers, and game and simulation testing showed that will to fight
is inadequately represented in official military models. If will to fight is one of the most important factors in
war, and if it is absent or poorly represented in military gaming and simulation, then there is a dangerous
gap in existing military games and simulations.
It is possible that results from official military games and simulations are misleading, and have been for quite
some time. Existing commercial examples, experimental models, and the new RAND Arroyo Center model
can help fill the gap in short order.
A D D ING WILL TO F IG H T CH A N G ES CO MBAT S IMU L AT I O N O U TCO MES
The team integrated the RAND military unit will-to-fight model and a trait-state psychological behavioral
model into the U.S. Army’s Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS) to give the computer simulated
“supersoldiers” human traits. Instead of always obeying orders, and never feeling fear, hiding, or running,
the supersoldiers now could experience anxiety, anger, and visceral reactions to gunfire.
The results were unsurprising. Sometimes soldiers fought hard, but sometimes they took cover or ran
away. Adding will to fight in the simulations changed the odds of combat victory by at least 10%, and by as
much as 1,100%. Human behavior went from unfailingly predictable to uncertain, bringing the simulation
one step closer to reality.
Results from RAND’s force-on-force combat simulation experiments suggest that adding a will-to-fight component always, and sometimes significantly, changes outcomes
‣
8.
Integrating the Wil l-to-Fight Model in Simulations
Using IWARS, a military force-on-force simulation used to model soldier and small unit operations in contested environments, the RAND team was able to integrate the baseline will-to-fight model and use outcomes to help define and improve the model. The simulations also illuminated that any military game or simulation seeking to represent realistic force-on-force combat should include will to fight.
T H E R A N D - IWA R S S IMU L AT I O N RU N S
‣ 7,840 simulated combat runs showed major changes to outcomes when simulated soldiers, or “agents,” had their also-simulated will to fight put to the test.
‣ In the below screenshot, two platoons face off in mirror-image skirmish lines. Trait-state behavioral modifications to both sides while under a direct fire stressor were applied. More than 1 in 10 soldiers exhibited flight behavior that would not have appeared in a “supersoldier” simulation.
‣ The graph below is an example simulation run depicting the state changes to a squad leader’s traits when one or more stressors (e.g., continuous indirect fire or reduced visibility) were introduced. Marked increases in anxiety and anger, and fluctuations in stability, collectively resulted in behavioral changes over time.
Flight
Dead
Standing
Soldiers Reacting to Suppression in IWARS
Simulation run time
Squad Leader State Change Triggers Flight
Anger state
Anxiety stateFlight event
Stressors cause state changes, resulting in behavior change
MILITARY UNIT ORG ANIZ ATIONAL MODE L
U N I T
OR
GA
NIZ
ATIO
N
S TATE
SOC
IET
YIN
D IVID
UA L
Discipline
Coercion
Persuasion
Trust
Corruption
CapabilitiesRelevanceSufficiencySustainment
SufficiencyTimeliness
Character
Competence
Effectiveness
Appropriateness
Suffi
cien
cyTi
mel
ines
sChar
acte
rCo
mpe
tenc
e
Cla
rity
Effe
ctiv
enes
s
Corruption
Trust
FunctionalityAppropriateness
Dis
cipl
ine
Pers
uasi
onCo
erci
onSo
cial v
ertic
al
Task
Socia
l hor
izont
al
SkillsTraining
Performance
CompetenceCharacterSu
fficie
ncy
Timeli
ness
UnitSocialSociety
State
Personal
Organization
Skills
Relevance
Sustainability
SufficiencyFitness
Resilience
Social skillsPsych. traits
EducationA
daptability
Consistency
Ethnicity
Corruptio
n
Trus
t
History
Efficiency
Ideology
Mot
ivat
ions Capabilities
Culture
Capabilities
Culture
Capabilities Culture
Cap
abili
ties
Culture
Capabilities
REVENGE
IDEOLOGY
ECONOMICS
IDENTIT Y
DESPERATION
COH
ESIO
N
EX
PEC
TATI
ON
ESPR
IT D
E C
ORP
S
CO
NTR
OL
LEADERSHIPSUPPORT
COMPETENCE
ESPRIT DE CORPS
INTEGRIT Y
CONTROL
SUPPORT
TR AINING
LEADERSHIP
DOCTRINE
LEA
DER
SHIP
STR
ATE
GY
SUPP
ORT
CIV-MIL RELATIO
NS
INTEG
RIT
Y
IDENTIT Y
SUPPORT
INTEGRIT
Y
CO
MPE
TENC
E
QU
ALITY
WILL-TO-FIGHT MODEL
5 levels of analysis
1) Individual 2) Unit 3) Organization 4) State 5) Society
3 categories of factors 29 major factors
“The influencers”
61 sub-factors 3 durability ratings
L E V E L S
The purpose of the military unit model is to inform understanding of will to fight from the squad through the division-levels.
How can the United States and its allies break adversary will? How can the will to fight of partners be strengthened?
D I S P O S I T I O N T O F I G H T
FAC TORS Sub-factors LO W
H I G H
M I D
Motivations
Capabilities
Culture
10.
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
‣ War is a human endeavor, treat it as such
Currently the American military treats war primarily as a contest of opposing gear. War is a funda-mentally human endeavor, thus humans should be the central focus of warfare.
There is no calculation or formula that will explain will to fight; we will never have perfect knowledge. But there is ample evidence to show that we can significantly improve our understanding of will to fight.
Any simulation of force-on-force combat should represent soldiers as humans, not supersoldiers. This is currently a major flaw in American and allied combat simulation, and also wargaming.
‣ Understanding will to fight is hard but possible
‣ War simulations require human behavior
Combat almost always ends when one side quits. Even total annihilation suggests extraordinary will on the part of the defeated foe. Will to fight always matters in combat. Winning at the tactical level hinges on will to fight.
‣ Successful military tactics center on human will
This model is a guide for analysis.
Until there is a broadly accepted physiological,
psychological, neurological, and cultural model of
humans, the best a model can do is to help reduce
uncertainty, improve understanding, and identify
strengths and weaknesses, surfaces and gaps.
The model can and should be used as a military analysis
tool, whether as a quick-turn application by a military
advisor in the field or a year-long intelligence effort by
a team of analysts to understand adversary and allied
disposition to fight.
KEY FINDINGS UNIT WILL-TO-FIGHT MODEL
To understand the disposition to fight, analyze the
models factors.
The unit-organizational will-to-fight model identifies
29 major factors and 61 sub-factors derived from
empirical research. Factors are major influences
on will to fight, while sub-factors provide further
points of examination for portable assessment
and analysis. Applying the model requires each
factor and sub-factor to be considered for each
case, then either explored in greater detail, set
aside for future analysis, or discarded.
The unit will to fight model factors are broken down
into three categories:
Motivations are drivers of
will to fight that help form individual disposition.
Capabilities are the compe-
tencies and physical assets available to soldiers
and the support they receive from the unit level
through the societal level of assessment.
Culture includes behavioral
norms, control measures, and influences that
affect individual and unit disposition and deci-
sions to fight.
The three durability ratings, ranging from low to
high, describe the degree to which the factor is
likely to change during combat:
Highly vulnerable to change.
Vulnerable to change.
Changes gradually for reasons
other than enemy action or immediate impact.
LOW
Motivations
Capabilities
Culture
1)
2)
3)
H I G H
M I D
1)
2) 3)
11.
Indoctrination
N AT I O N A L M O D E L
WILL-TO-FIGHT MODEL
What are the political, economic, and military variables that may strengthen or weaken national will to fight, and which are most important?
The model “focal points” that can be influenced during conflict
Gov
’t ty
pe
Resilience
Conflict duration
National identity
ALL
IES
ECON
. LEVER
AG
E
STAKESPOPULAR SUPPORT
CAPABILITIES
CO
HES
ION
CIV
IL-MIL RELATIO
NS
STA
TE
M I L ITA RY
NATION
INTE
RN
AT
ION
AL
C E N T E R S O F G R A V I T Y
Factors
Mechanisms
Contexts
Indoctrination
Messaging /
Cas
ualties
Economic pre
ssur
es
POLITICAL ECONOMIC MILITARYVARIABLE CATEGORIES:
StakesCohesionCivil-military relationsPopular supportAllies
Leverage Capabilities
Government typeNational identity Resilience Conflict duration
Diplomacy/EngagementIndoctrination/Messaging Pressures Casualties
N AT I O N A L W I L L T O F I G H T
Diplom
acy/Engagement
Each variable is organized under a category
12.
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
‣ Will to fight is poorly analyzed and least understood
aspect of war
Comprehensive, rigorous analysis is lacking.
‣ Context plays an underlying but important role
Fully totalitarian or democratic governments often show the strongest will to fight. National identity can have strong influence but can also be manipulated.
‣ Strong will-to-fight factors improve chances of victory
‣ Influence of economic variables on national will depends
on alliances and engagement
‣ Effective use of engagement and indoctrination/messaging
improves chances of victory
‣ Capabilities + casualty infliction + will to fight = victory
Strengths of factors can vary during conflict. Analysts should evaluate factors at the alliance level (e.g., WWI, WWII).
Supportive alliances and skillful engagement can overcome an adversary’s economic pressures.
Use of these mechanisms can be decisive before conflict begins.
When will to fight is evenly matched, capabilities and casualties may determine a war’s outcome. Casualties may also weaken or strengthen an adversary’s national will to fight.
Will to fight is complex, dynamic, and difficult to predict.
At the national level, this means that leaders must focus
on understanding the variables that drive their wartime
decisionmaking and that of their allies and adversaries while
also remaining sensitive to war’s horrific costs.
The RAND national model is portable and exploratory: Each of
the 15 variables can be applied to a wide range of historical and
future conflict scenarios. Some variables will be more relevant
than others, depending on the particular scenario, and how the
variables are tailored for the circumstances will vary, but this
model provides a useful starting point for discussion and can
drive a much-needed dialogue among analysts conducting threat
assessments, contingency plans, wargames, and other efforts
requiring conflict evaluation.
KEY FINDINGS NATIONAL WILL-TO-FIGHT MODEL
To understand the variables that strengthen
or weaken national will to fight, explore the
model’s factors, contexts, and mechanisms
that—in concert—shape a partner or
adversary’s decisions during conflicts.
The variables and categories:
There are 15 variables—seven factors, four
contexts, and four mechanisms— to consider
when applying the national will-to-fight model.
As with the unit organizational model, there
is no single overriding variable that is most
important in the national model.
The factors shape will-to-
fight policy decisions and are essential to
understanding the determination of a national
leader to continue to fight in the face of
increasing pressures.
The contexts are existing
or emerging conditions that affect will to fight,
such as government type, national identity,
and conflict duration.
The mechanisms are used
by leaders on both sides of a conflict to influ-
ence national will to fight. Each of the factors, contexts, and mechanisms
are aligned with 3 variable categories: political,
economic, and military.
Mechanisms
Contexts
Factors
13.
RECOMMENDED STEPS FOR THE U.S. ARMY AND JOINT FORCE
Will to fight has across-the-board importance in war. It is essential to building effective military teams,
to designing effective tactics and strategies, to planning effective military operations, to assessing
and engaging allies, to analyzing adversaries, to reducing risk, and to carrying out successful
military operations. It matters most for force-on-force combat, but it also matters for routine military
activities and national policy. The human will to fight, to act, and to drive through adversity is the
central factor in war.
Recommendations:
‣ Develop and adopt a universal will-to-fight definition and model.
‣ Modify and use the model for adviser assessment of partner or allied military forces and for intelligence analyses of adversary forces.
‣ Integrate will to fight into doctrine and application manuals; holistic estimates of combat effectiveness, and wargames and simulations of combat.
ONGOING RESEARCH
RAND continues to improve on the foundational will-to-fight reports. Ongoing research for the U.S.
military focuses on human behavior modeling, wargaming, simulations, case studies of Vietnam, Iraq,
and the Islamic State, and analysis of will to fight in irregular warfare. Building from the models, the
RAND team is developing a set of practical assessment tools to help make will to fight a more digestible
and useful concept.
NEX T STEPS
RB-10040-A (2019)
This brief describes work done in the RAND Arroyo Center documented in Will to Fight: Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units, by Ben Connable, Michael J. McNerney, William Marcellino, Aaron Frank, Henry Hargrove, Marek N. Posard, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Jasen J. Castillo, and James Sladden, RR2341-A, 2019 (available at www.rand.org/t/RR2341), and National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don’t, by Michael J. McNerney, Ben Connable, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek N. Posard, Jasen J. Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, In Hyo Seol, Christopher Paul, and Andrew Parasiliti, RR-2477-A, 2019 (available at www.rand.org/t/RR2477). To view this brief online, visit www.rand.org/t/RB10040. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights: This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. Image sources: Cover: Flikr Creative Commons/Tony Webster; USARMY/Spc. Stephen Malone | IFC: Lithuanian Land Forces | Page 2: USARMY, Sgt. Arturo Guzman | Page 5: Department of Defense Photo; Larry Burrows/LIFE,1968 | Page 6: USMC/Sgt. Demetrius Munnerlyn | Page 8: IWARS/NSRDEC; USMC/Staff Sgt. Marcin Platek | Page 11: USMARFOR/Cpl. Justin T. Updegraff | Page 13: Karen Roe/Flikr Creative Commons | Back Cover: Diane Baldwin/RAND
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L O O K I N G A H E A D In light of growing tensions with countries such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, it seems prudent to open a rigorous dialogue within the United States and with U.S. allies to better understand and influence the human factors in war. Incorporating the concept of will to fight in the analysis of potential future conflicts will help leaders, strategic thinkers, planners, combat advisers, and analysts improve their assessments of what may happen in various conflict scenarios and what to do about it.
The models presented in these reports provide a guide to assessment and analysis, not a mathematical formula. With our models and reports, we hope to stimulate the dialogue necessary to develop the concept of will to fight further and incorporate it into strategic decisionmaking and planning.