Battle of Prokhorovka

The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought on 12 July 1943near Prokhorovka, 87 kilometres (54 mi) southeast ofKursk, in the Soviet Union, during the Second WorldWar. Taking place on the Eastern Front, the ghting waspart of the wider Battle of Kursk, and occurred when the5th Guards Tank Army of the Soviet Red Army attackedthe II SS-Panzer Corps of the German Wehrmacht in oneof the largest tank battles in military history.[lower-alpha 10]

On 5 July 1943, the German high command launchedOperation Citadel with the aim of enveloping and de-stroying the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The Soviethigh command, Stavka, had been forewarned of the Ger-man intentions, and employed a defence in depth strategy,preparing a series of defensive lines along the routes ofthe planned German attack. The German oensive wasconducted by three armies. In the southern side, the 4thPanzer Army, with Army Detachment Kempf on its east-ern ank, attacked the Soviet defences of the VoronezhFront. The Soviets also massed several armies as theSteppe Front, which included the 5th Guards Tank Army,deep behind their defences, which they intended to useto launch their own counteroensives once the Germanstrength had dissipated.A week into the German oensive, the Soviets launchedpowerful counterattacks against the attackers. In thesouth at Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army at-tacked the II SS-Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army,resulting in a large clash of armour just outside the set-tlement on 12 July 1943. The 5th Guards Tank Armywas decimated in the attack, but succeeded in prevent-ing the Germans from capturing Prokhorovka and break-ing through the third defensive belt to achieve operationalfreedom. Subsequently, the German oensive was can-celled and their forces withdrawn. The Red Army wenton a general oensive and seized the strategic initiativeon the Eastern Front, which it was to hold for the rest ofthe war.

1 BackgroundSee also: Battle of KurskAs the spring rasputitsa season came to an end in 1943,

both the German and Soviet commands considered theirplans for future operations. Stalin and some senior So-viet ocers wanted to seize the initiative and attack theGerman forces inside the Soviet Union, but they wereconvinced by a number of key commanders, includingthe Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, to as-

Tomarovka

Belgorod4th PANZER ARMY (Hoth)

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The German advance to Prokhorovka

sume a defensive posture instead. This would allow theGermans to weaken themselves in attacking prepared po-sitions, after which the Soviet forces would be able toreposture and go on the oensive.[9][10] A similar strat-egy discussion occurred on the German side, with FieldMarshal Erich von Manstein, arguing for a mobile de-fence that would give up terrain and allow the Soviets toadvance, while the Germans launched a series of sharpcounterattacks against their anks to inict heavy attri-tion. For political reasons Hitler insisted that the Germanforces go on the oensive, choosing the Kursk salient forthe attack.[11]

The German oensive plan, called Unternehmen Zi-tadelle (Operation Citadel), envisioned an assault atthe base of the Kursk salient from both the north andsouth, with the intent of enveloping and destroying theSoviet forces in the salient.[12][13] The two spearheadswere to meet near Kursk. From the south, the XLVIIIPanzer Corps and General Paul Hausser's II SS PanzerCorps, forming the left and right wings of the 4th PanzerArmy commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth,would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of ArmyDetachment Kempf was to protect Hoths right ankfrom counterattack by the Soviet strategic reserves knownto be located just east of the salient. The 4th PanzerArmy and Army Detachment Kempf were under ArmyGroup South, commanded by Manstein; and their air sup-port was provided by Colonel General Otto Deloch'sLuftotte 4.[14][15][16]

Multiple delays by the Germans allowed the Soviets agreat deal of time to prepare their defences. Employ-ing defence in depth, they constructed a series of de-fensive lines to wear down the attacking panzer forma-

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

tions. Six belts made up of extensive mineelds, anti-tank ditches, and anti-tank gun emplacements were cre-ated, although the last three belts were mostly unoccupiedand less fortied than the rst three.[17][18] The Sovietforces in the salient were organised into two fronts. TheVoronezh Front, commanded by General Nikolai Vatutin,was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient.The Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General IvanKonev, included Lieutenant General Alexei Zhadov's 5thGuards Army and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's5th Guards Tank Army, and formed the strategic reserveforce to be held behind the front until it was needed forthe counteroensive.[19][20]

1.1 German advance leading up toProkhorovka

Main article: Operation CitadelThe Germans launched their attack on the morning of 5

A column of Panzer III tanks at Kursk

July 1943 and were met with heavy resistance.[21] Thedensity of Soviet anti-tank guns, mineelds, anti-tankditches and large numbers of Soviet tanks were all muchgreater than had been anticipated, and made a break-through far more dicult to achieve.[22] By the end of6 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced through the rstdefensive belt and reached the second.[23] But its advancewas greatly behind schedule, as according to the Citadelplan it should have penetrated the rst two belts and beenon its way to the third by the end of the rst day.[24]The corps beneted from close air support provided bythe Luftotte 4s VIII Fliegerkorps,[25] commanded byGeneral Hans Seidemann,[26] whose aircraft helped de-stroy Soviet strong points and artillery positions. To thesoutheast, III Panzer Corps had great diculty crossingthe Northern Donets River on 5 July.[27] They eventuallyformed a bridgehead across by the morning of 6 July,[27]but stubborn Soviet resistance meant they were unableto protect the east ank of the II SS-Panzer Corps.[21]On 8 July, the Soviets launched powerful counterattacksagainst the II SS-Panzer Corps with several tank corps.These failed to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps as hoped,but succeeded in slowing its progress.[28][29]

By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advancedabout 29 kilometres (18 mi) and broken through the rstand second defensive belts.[30][31][32][33] However, slowprogress by the XLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth toshift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps to the westto help the panzer corps regain its momentum towardsOboyan. On 10 July the full eort of the II SS-PanzerCorps was shifted back to its own forward progress, awayfrom Oboyan due north, to the northeast toward the townof Prokhorovka.[34] Hoth had discussed this move withManstein in early May, and it had been part of the plansince the outset of the oensive,[35][36][37] although theplan originally envisioned the III Panzer Corps and ele-ments of XLVIII Panzer Corps joining in the attack to-wards Prokhorovka, but this could not be realized.[37]

Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July in-dicated that defensive works were being constructed byGerman infantry all along the anks of 4th Panzer Armyand that German armoured formations could not be spot-ted on the anks despite armoured counterattacks thatshould have provoked their appearance.[38] The VoronezhFront headquarters concluded that the Germans werereaching their limit, and hence it decided on a majorcounteroensive as the next course of action.[38]

A Tiger I of a Waen-SS unit res at a target during OperationCitadel.

While the German attack was in progress, the 5thGuards Tank and the 5th Guards Armies of the SteppeFront had been moving up from their reserve posi-tion since the evening of 6 July, travelling at night toavoid detection.[39] The 5th Guards Tank Army cov-ered the 390 kilometres (240 mi) over three nights,and arrived at the Prokhorovka area on the night of 9July,[40] and the 5th Guards Armys 33rd Guards RieCorps arrived on the night of 10 July.[41] Throughout 11July, the 5th Guards Tank Army organized itself aroundProkhorovka in preparation for the forthcoming massivecounteroensive.[42]

On morning of 11 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps contin-ued its attack toward Prokhorovka. In the ensuing at-tacks, its 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division LeibstandarteSS Adolf Hitler had the most success, penetrating the So-viet defences manned by the 2nd Tank Corps, and re-

2.2 Soviet plans for 12 July 3

inforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and 301stAnti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd GuardsRie Corps.[43][44] They cleared Soviet resistance at theOctober state farm (Russian: ),crossed a 15-foot (4.6 m)-deep antitank ditch at the baseof Hill 252.2 and seized the hill itself after a brief butbloody battle.[45][46][47] North of Leibstandarte, the 3rdSS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf failed to expandtheir bridgehead across the Psel River nor capture Hill226.6, which were defended by the 31st Tank Corps,the 33rd Guards Rie Corps 95th Guards Rie Divi-sion,[48][49][47] and the 10th Tank Corps 11th MotorizedRie Brigade.[50] To the south, the 2nd Guards TankCorps and the 48th Rie Corps 183rd Rie Division re-pelled the attack of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier DivisionDas Reich.[47] By days end on 11 July Leibstandarte hadadvanced deep into the Soviet third defensive belt andwas only 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) from Prokhorovka,[46][51]but its anks were exposed, as there was a 5-kilometre(3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf,[52] and Das Reichlagged behind by 4 kilometres (2.5 mi).[47] Leibstandartedisrupted the 5th Guards Tank Armys preparations forits forthcoming counterattack, by capturing its plannedartillery positions and assembly areas, forcing Rotmistrovto hastily revise his plans and select new positions.[53][54]

2 Planning

2.1 German plans for 12 July

Late on the evening of 11 July, General Paul Hausser, thecommander of the II SS-Panzer Corps, issued orders fora classic manoeuvre battle for the following days advanceon Prokhorovka. It was known that the Soviets had dug inmany anti-tank guns on the west slopes of Prokhorovka,making a direct attack by Leibstandarte very dicult.The plan was for Totenkopf to capture Hill 226.6,[55] andadvance northeast along the Psel river to the Kartashvka-Prokhorovka road, and then strike southeast into theank and rear of Soviet forces at Prokhorovka.[56][55]Leibstandarte was ordered to nudge forward and secureStorozhevoe just outside Prokhorovka,[55] then it and DasReich were to wait until Totenkopf ' s attack had dis-rupted the Soviet positions, after which Leibstandartewas to attack the main Soviet defences on the west slopeof Prokhorovka. To Leibstandarte ' s right, Das Reichwas to advance eastward to the high ground south ofProkhorovka, then turn south away from Prokhorovkato roll up the Soviet defences and force a gap.[56] TheVIII Fliegerkorps was to make their main eort in sup-port of the advance of the II SS-Panzer Corps, with theXLVIII Panzer Corps to the west assigned limited airresources.[57]

Unbeknownst to Hausser, on the night of 11 July Rot-mistrov had moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to anassembly area just south of Prokhorovka in preparation

Paul Hausser, commanding ocer of the II SS Panzer Corps

for a massive armoured attack the following day.[58][59]Throughout the night, German frontline troops could hearthe ominous sounds of Soviet tank engines to the east asthe 18th and 29th Tank Corps moved into their assemblyareas.[60][61]

2.2 Soviet plans for 12 July

Pavel Rotmistrov, left, commander of 5th Guards Tank Army

The 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army ofthe Steppe Front had been brought up from reserveand reassigned to the Voronezh Front on 8 and 11 Julyrespectively.[62] On 11 July Vatutin ordered that the fol-lowing day the armies of the Voronezh Front were to go

4 3 OPPOSING FORCES

over onto the oensive along the entire front of the south-ern salient.[63] This counterattack was planned to be inconcert with the Soviet Operation Kutuzov in the north-ern side of the Kursk Salient.[64] Vatutin ordered Rot-mistrov to destroy the German forces near Prokhorovkawith his 5th Guards Tank Army, without allowing theGermans to withdraw southwards.[65] Rotmistrov orderedhis tanks to move forward at speed to engage the Germanarmour in order to nullify the advantages the Tiger tankshad in the range and repower of their 88 mm guns. Hebelieved the more manoeuvrable T-34 would be able toquickly close and obtain eective anking shots againstthe German heavy tanks.[56][66] In fact, Soviet intelligencehad greatly overestimated the numbers of Ferdinands andTigers possessed by the II SS-Panzer Corps.[lower-alpha 11]In actuality there were no Ferdinands with the 4th PanzerArmy, as they were all deployed in the northern side ofthe Kursk salient with the 9th Army.[67]

Late on the night of 12 July, the III Panzer Corpscrossed the Northern Donets at Rzhawes (also known asRzhavets). This jeopardised Rotmistrovs entire plan bythreatening the ank of the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68][60]Early on 12 July, Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to send re-inforcements to the Soviet 7th Guards and 69th Armiesfacing the III Panzer Corps.[68][36][60] He organised a taskforce under the command of his deputy, General KuzmaGrigorevich Trufanov, which consisted of the 26th TankBrigade from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the 11th and12th Guards Mechanized Brigades from the 5th GuardsMechanized Corps, and the 53rd Guards Tank Regimentfrom the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68] Other units fromthe reserve also were attached to the group on its waysouth.[68] In doing so Rotmistrov had committed over halfof his reserves to an essential ad-hoc advance before theBattle of Prokhorovka began.[60]

Soviet air support in the southern side of the salientwas provided by the 2nd Air Army and the 17th AirArmy,[69] commanded by Lieutenant General StepanKrasovsky and Lieutenant General Vladimir Sudets,respectively.[70][71] However, the bulk of the air sup-port was committed in support of Soviet units attackingXLVIII Panzer Corps to the west of Prokhorovka and theIII Panzer Corps to the southeast, and only limited num-bers of aircraft were available to support 5th Guards TankArmys attack.[69]

3 Opposing forcesSee also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

3.1 German

The German forces involved in the Battle of Prokhorovkawere from the three Waen-SS divisions of the II

German forces in the southern Kursk salient during OperationCitadel

SS-Panzer Corps: Leibstandarte, Das Reich, andTotenkopf.[72] On the evening of 11 July, the service-able armour strength of the II SS-Panzer Corps was294 tanks and assault guns, which included 15 Tigers.The armoured strength of Leibstandarte, Das Reich, andTotenkopf were 77, 95, and 122 tanks and assault gunsrespectively.[67] Ten of the Tigers were to the north of thePsel river with Totenkopf, four were with Leibstandarte,and Das Reich had just one.[73][66]

Of the three divisions, Leibstandarte had advanced themost deeply towards Prokhorovka and was situated inthe centre of the German position. A railway line ranthrough the Leibstandarte positions, heading northeast toProkhorovka. The railbed was about 30 feet high anddivided the area of the Leibstandarte division north andsouth. The bulk of the division was positioned to thenorth of the rail line, including the divisions panzer reg-iment, its 2nd Panzergrenadier regiment, and the divi-sions reconnaissance, artillery and command units. Tothe south of the rail line was Leibstandarte ' s 1st Panz-ergrenadier regiment, along with the divisions Panzer-jaeger battalion.[74] To the southeast of Leibstandartestood Das Reich, which protected the southern ank.[75]

To the northwest of Leibstandarte was Totenkopf. Thedivisions panzer regiment had largely crossed over theriver Psel in preparation for the assault. Leibstandarteplaced its lightly armed reconnaissance battalion in the5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf, to-gether with the divisions four remaining Tigers, whichwere commanded by SS-Second Lieutenant MichaelWittmann, to provide some ank protection.[76][77]

3.2 Soviet

The main Soviet armoured formation involved in the bat-tle was the 5th Guards Tank Army, which controlledve corps by 12 July: the 2nd Guards, 2nd, 5th GuardsMechanized, 18th and 29th Tank Corps.[78][79][80] All to-gether they elded 793 tanks and 37 to 57 self-propelledguns for a total of approximately 840 armoured ghtingvehicles.[81][82][83] About two-thirds of these tanks were

5T-34s, while the remainder were T-70 light tanks,[84]with some 31 to 35 Churchill heavy tanks as well.[85][86]Not all of the 5th Guards Tank Army was present inthe Prokhorovka area during the battle, as part of theformation had been sent south to check the advanceof the III Panzer Corps.[68] The Soviet armour of the5th Guards Tank Army including the newly attached2nd Guards[lower-alpha 3] and 2nd[lower-alpha 2] Tank Corps,as well as the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps[lower-alpha 4]held in reserve facing the II SS Panzer Corps on 12 Julywas about 616 tanks and self-propelled guns.[87][88] In ad-dition, ve artillery regiments, one artillery brigade, andone anti-aircraft artillery division were attached to the 5thGuards Tank Army for the assault.[89]

The main attack of the the 5th Guards Tank Army wasconducted against Leibstandarte by its fresh 29th and 18thTank Corps that had been brought up from the Sovietstrategic reserve.[90][91] These two Soviet tank formationstogether provided the greatest number of tanks in theattack,[92] with the 18th Tank Corps elding 190 tanksand self-propelled guns, and the 29th Tank Corps eld-ing 212 tanks and self-propelled guns.[91][93] Infantry sup-port to the 18th and 29th Tank Corps was provided bythe 9th Guards Airborne Division.[91] A portion of the18th Tank Corps was directed against the eastern ank ofTotenkopf ' s Regiment Eicke.[91] On the southeasternwing of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Rotmistrov deployedthe remaining forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps thatwere not sent south, which numbered about 80 tanks.[92]The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, supported by the remnantsof the 2nd Tank Corps, was to attack Das Reich.[36][94]Their infantry support was provided by the 183rd RieDivision.[95] The northwestern ank of the 5th GuardsTank Army, which faced Totenkpf, was defended by the33rd Guards Rie Corps 42nd and 95th Guards RieDivisions,[96][97] supported by the remnants of the 31stTank Corps and the heavily depleted 23rd Guards Ri-e Corps 52nd Guards Rie Division.[98][97] The forcesof the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps that were not sentsouth were held as reserve north of Prokhorovka,[89][92]and they numbered about 113 tanks and self-propelledguns.[93]

Despite having suered signicant losses over the previ-ous weeks ghting, on 12 July the 2nd Air Army stillhad some 472 aircraft operational, while the 17th AirArmy had 300 remaining operational aircraft; however,only a few of these were made available to support the5th Guards Tank Army.[69]

4 BattleAt 05:45 on 12 July, Leibstandarte ' s headquarters startedreceiving reports of the sound of a great number of tankengines as the Soviet tanks prepared for their advance.[99]At around 06:50 , elements of Leibstandarte ' s 1st SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment nudged forward and drove the

Soviet infantry out of Storozhevoe,[100][101][102] while thebulk of Leibstandarte waited to commence their maintask for the day.[103] The Soviets began a preparatory ar-tillery barrage at around 08:00,[104][101][105] and as thelast shells fell at 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed the codewords Stal! Stal! Stal!" (Steel, Steel, Steel!") theorder to commence the attack.[106][105] With that the So-viet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army began theiradvance.[66][107][102]

German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack

Down o the west slopes before Prokhorovka chargedthe massed Soviet armour of ve tank brigades of the18th and 29th Tank Corps, ineectually ring as theycame at Leibstandarte ' s positions.[108] As the Soviet tanksrolled down the slopes, they carried the men of the 9thGuards Airborne Division on their hulls.[107] In total,about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th GuardsTank Army attacked the positions of the II SS PanzerCorps,[107] doing so in two massive waves, with 430 tanksin the rst echelon and 70 more in the second.[109][89]

Exhausted from the previous weeks ghting, the troopsof Leibstandarte were just starting their day at the out-set of the attack and were largely taken by surprise.[110]As the Soviet armour appeared, several German outpostsbegan ring purple warning ares signaling a tank attack.Obersturmfhrer Rudolf von Ribbentrop of the 1st SS-Panzer Regiments 2nd Battalion stated later that he knewat once a major attack was underway.[66] He ordered hiscompany of seven Panzer IVs to follow him over a bridgeacross the tank ditch. Crossing the bridge they fanned outon the lower slope of Hill 252.2. Above them, on the crestof the hill, Joachim Peiper's 2nd SS-Panzergrenadiersand their armoured half-tracks were being overrun. AsRibbentrops tanks spread out he looked up the hillsideand was suddenly confronted by the wave of Soviet tanks:In front of me appeared fteen, then twenty, then thirty,then forty tanks. Finally there were too many of them tocount. The T-34s were rolling toward us at speed, andcarrying mounted infantry.[111]

As the Soviet armour charged down the west slope of Hill252.2 a hotly contested tank battle ensued. A Panzer IVto Ribbentrops right was set ablaze.[111] Soon the com-pany was swamped by the Soviet tanks coming down the

6 5 FOLLOWING THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT

hill. The Soviet tanks were ring on the move. Rot-mistrovs tactic to close at speed disrupted the controland co-ordination of the Soviet tank formations and alsogreatly reduced their accuracy.[36]

The advance of Soviet armour was held up at the baseof the Hill 252.2 when they reached the anti-tank ditch.Some vehicles crashed into the 15-foot ditch while othersmoved along the edge looking for a way to cross. Heavyring occurred between the Soviet armour and the twoother companies of the 1st SS-Panzer Battalion on the op-posite side of the ditch, while the Soviet tanks searchedfor a route across.[112] Meanwhile, with the passage ofthe rst waves of Soviet tanks Peipers surviving panzer-grenadiers emerged from trench lines to engage the So-viet paratroopers and attack the Soviet tanks with mag-netic anti-tank grenades. Twenty of the battalions half-tracks were lost in the ghting, some of which were de-stroyed when they attempted to ram the much heavier So-viet tanks in an eort to stop them.[113]

A weary ocer lights the cigarette of his NCO in the southernsalient.

The 2nd and 17th Air Armies ew 893 sorties comparedto the VIII Fliegerkorpss 654 sorties over the southernpart of the salient. Of note, most of the Soviet sor-ties own that day were own against the XLVIII PanzerCorps to the west and the III Panzer Corps to the south.Low clouds in the morning and thunderstorms in the af-ternoon inhibited air operations in Prokhorovka by bothsides.[114] Over the Prokhorovka battleeld the Luftwaegained control of the air. Formations of Stukas, includ-ing a small number of experimental 3.7-centimetre (1.5in) BK 37 cannon-equipped G-2 variants, commandedby Staelkapitan Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Fw 190 ghter-bombers and Hs 129 ground-attack aircraft equippedwith 3-centimetre (1.2 in) anti-tank cannon attacked theSoviet formations.[109] The 31st Tank Brigade reported:We suered heavy losses in tanks through enemy ar-tillery and aircraft. At 10:30 our tanks reached the Kom-somolets State Farm, but due to continuous air attacks,they were unable to advance any further and shifted tothe defence.[102] The tank brigade also reported: ourown air cover was fully absent until 13:00.[115] The 5thGuards Tank Army reported: the enemys aircraft lit-erally hung above our combat formations throughout the

entire battle, while our own aircraft, and particularly theghter aviation, was totally insucient.[115]

By the end of the day, Leibstandarte still held Hill 252.2and had lost no signicant ground,[116] but was exhaustedby the struggle turning back the ve brigades of the twotank corps.[36][117] To its left, Totenkopf had succeededin capturing Hill 226.6 and its panzer group had ad-vanced along the north bank of the Psel to reach theKarteschevka-Prokhorovka road, 8 kilometres (5.0 mi)northwest of Prokhorovka.[118] Of the three SS-Panzerdivisions, it had been on the oensive the most and itspanzer regiment had suered the heaviest losses. Thoughits hold on the forward ground was tenuous, it was in po-sition to outank the Soviet forces at Prokhorovka.[119]Das Reich had been forced onto the defensive by the2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps,[120][95]along with the Soviet infantry of the 183rd Rie Divi-sion, which precluded its own planned attack.[95]

On the Soviet side, 5th Guards Tank Army and all tankunits under Rotmistrov involved in the battle sueredheavy losses.[121] The Soviet attack had been repelledand Rotmistrov was forced to shift his tank army over todefence.[122] Despite this, German intelligence reportedto the German command that the forces opposing theII SS-Panzer Corps still had over 300 tanks available.The Germans knew that the Soviet forces opposing themwere still considerable and a clear decision had yet to bereached.

5 Following the main engagement

On the night of 12 July, Vatutin ordered the Sovietforces facing the II SS-Panzer Corps to take a defen-sive stance.[123] Orders issued by the Germans for 13July instructed Totenkopf to consolidate its gains of theprevious day and then attack into the ank and rear ofthe Soviet forces around Prokhorovka.[124] Leibstandartewas to strengthen its front line and co-ordinate its attackon Prokhorovka from the south with Totenkopf ' s attackfrom the northwest.[124] Das Reich was to consolidate andstrengthen its front line and prepare for an oensive op-eration to link up with the III Panzer Corps.[125]

On the morning of 13 July, the 5th Guards MechanizedCorps and the 33rd Guards Rie Corps launched at-tacks against Totenkopf ' s left ank.[126] By afternoonthese Soviet attacks had been beaten o, but they didprevent Totenkopf from attacking to the south towardProkhorovka.[126] Around noon, Leibstandarte was or-dered to attack northward toward the Psel River to con-solidate its front line with Totenkopf ' s position.[126] Thisattack confronted the defensive positions held by the 33rdGuards Rie Corps, which had been supplemented bythe remaining armour of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps.Leibstandarte ' s attack was unsuccessful.[126] That after-noon, Totenkopf was ordered to abandon their positions

7northwest of Prokhorovka and return to a more defend-able positions along the north bank of the Psel River.[127]Soviet attempts to sever the salient were unsuccessful, andthe unit completed its withdrawal by nightfall.[127]

5.1 AftermathOn 13 July Adolf Hitler summoned Manstein and FieldMarshal Gnther von Kluge to his headquarters, theWolfsschanze in East Prussia.[128][129] The Allied invasionof Sicily on the night of 910 July combined with the So-viet counteroensive of Operation Kutuzov against theank and rear of Models 9th Army on 12 July and theviolent attacks by strong Soviet forces at Prokhorovka thesame day had caused him to stop the oensive and shiftforces to the west.[129][130] He ordered his generals to ter-minate Operation Citadel.[130][131][132][133]

Kluge welcomed the decision, as he was already in theprocess of withdrawing units of the 9th Army from theKursk salient to deal with Soviet attacks on his ank.[132]Manstein was greatly disappointed. He argued that hisforces were now on the verge of achieving a major break-through. As he saw it, with his III Panzer Corps aboutto link up with the II SS-Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka,and with the XXIV Panzer Corps available as his oper-ational reserve, they would be halting the oensive justat the moment when victory was in hand. With an eyetoward the west, Hitler was unwilling to continue theoensive.[130][134][135] Manstein persisted, proposing thathis forces should at least destroy the Soviet reserves in thesouthern Kursk salient before Citadel was nally termi-nated, so the Soviet ghting capacity in the sector wouldbe depleted for the rest of the summer.[134][135] Hitleragreed to continue oensive operations in the southernsalient until Mansteins goal was achieved.[134][135]

5.2 Operation RolandManstein hastily put together the plans for OperationRoland, realizing that he only had a few days to conductthe operation before he lost the SS-Panzer Corps.[136]The plan called for Das Reich to attack east and southand link up with III Panzer Corps, which would attackto the northwest. Leibstandarte and Totenkopf were toanchor the left and northern anks of Das Reich. Oncethe link was achieved and the Soviet forces encircled, theSoviet defence would be crippled and Prokhorovka wouldlikely fall shortly thereafter.[136] The goal of the operationwas to destroy the Soviet armoured reserve massed in thesouthern sector of the Kursk salient, and thereby checkSoviet oensives for the rest of the summer.[135][137]

The orders for Operation Roland were issued in theclosing hours of 13 July 1943.[138][139] However, fol-lowing Hitlers meeting with Manstein, Hitler counter-manded the XXIV Panzer Corps deployment to theKursk salient, sending them on 14 July to support the

1st Panzer Army to the south.[140] The assault began at0400 on 14 July.[138][141][142] Following a brief artillerybarrage, the Der Fuhrer Panzergrenadier Regiment ofDas Reich struck out for the high ground south-west ofPravorot, evicting the remnants of the 2nd Guards TankCorps from the village of Belenikhino following violenthouse-to-house and hand-to-hand ghting. The panzerregiment of the division fought o a series of counterat-tacks, destroying a number of T-34s in the process, andforced the Soviets to withdraw to the east. A new line wastaken, and Zhukov ordered elements of the 10th GuardsMechanized Brigade out of reserve to reinforce the po-sition. To the south, the 7th Panzer Division made con-tact with Das Reich, but Trufanov, commanding the So-viet forces in the gap, was aware of the threat and con-ducted a ghting withdrawal. Though the Soviets hadto abandon a substantial number of anti-tank guns, thelink-up failed to entrap many Soviet forces.[143] Opera-tion Roland failed to produce a decisive result,[144] andTotenkopf began withdrawing from its positions north ofthe Psel, following orders issued late on 15 July, as the IISS-Panzer Corps assumed a defensive stance.[145][146]

On 17 July the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Frontslaunched a major oensive across the Mius and DonetsRivers against the southern wing of Army Group South,pressing upon the 6th and 1st Panzer Armies.[147][148] Inthe early afternoon of 17 July, Operation Roland wasterminated with an order for the II SS-Panzer Corps tobegin withdrawing from the Prokhorovka sector back toBelgorod.[149][145] The 4th Panzer Army and Army De-tachment Kempf anticipated the order and began execut-ing it as early as the evening of 16 July.[150][151] Leib-standarte ' s tanks were distributed between Das Reichand Totenkopf and the division was hastily redeployed toItaly,[152][153] while Das Reich and Totenkopf were dis-patched south to meet the new Soviet oensives.[154][155]

6 Casualties and lossesLosses are dicult to establish for either combatant.Tank losses attributed to the Germans vary,[156] in partdue to the Wehrmachts methodology for counting and re-porting equipment losses. Only equipment that could notbe repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted aslosses, but damaged equipment that could be recoveredand repaired were simply listed as such.[157][158] Like-wise, reliable gures for tank and personnel casualties forthe Soviets in the battle of Prokhorovka are dicult toestablish.[159]

6.1 German

The II SS Panzer Corps reported 842 men killed,wounded, or missing for 12 July.[160] Since the Germanscontrolled the Prokhorovka battleeld until 17 July, they

8 7 OUTCOME

were able to recover most of their disabled armouredvehicles.[157] German historian Karl Frieser has attributedbetween three and ve permanent tank losses to the II SSPanzer Corps.[161][162]

Archival data of the II SS Panzer Corps shows that thecorps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on theevening of 11 July[67] and 251 on the evening of 13July.[163][67] Allowing for the possibility that some re-paired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, thesenumbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault gunsbecame inoperable during the battle of Prokharovka,which includes all 10 Tigers belonging to Totenkopf andone belonging to Leibstandarte. However, all of the inop-erable Tiger tanks were repairable, and none were write-os.[163] An estimated total of between 60 and 80 ofII SS-Panzer Corps armoured vehicles were damagedor destroyed in combat on 12 July.[164][165] By the endof 16 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had 292 serviceabletanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had atthe beginning of the battle on 12 July.[166] On 12 July,Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the VIII Fliegerkorps and its at-tached squadron of Stukas reported eleven aircraft dam-aged, of which six were total write-os, all by Sovietak.[115]

6.2 Soviet

Destroyed Soviet T-34 in the southern salient

Exact Soviet losses for 12 July are not known, but havebeen estimated by military historians. Personnel lossesat Prokhorovka were estimated by the historian Chris-ter Bergstrm to have been as high as 5,500 men.[115]For equipment damaged or destroyed, David Glantz andJonathan House estimate that the 5th Guards Tank Armylost at least 400 tanks in its attacks on 12 July.[167] GeorgeNipe puts the losses in armour as between 600 and 650tanks.[168] 5th Guards Tank Army losses were estimatedby the Soviet historians Grigoriy Koltunov and BorisSoloviev to have been about 300 tanks and self-propelledguns.[115][169]

A document prepared on 17 July 1943 by the 5th GuardsTank Army Headquarters summarised the combat lossesincurred by the formation from 12 to 16 July inclusive

for all of its ve corps, as well smaller units directly sub-ordinated to the army headquarters.[170] The documentreported the following irrecoverable losses: 222 T-34s,89 T-70s, 12 Churchill tanks, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and240 support vehicles.[170] The document reported dam-aged vehicles still under repair as 143 T-34s, 56 T-70s,7 Churchill tanks, 3 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and no guresfor support vehicles.[170] The document reported person-nel casualties as 2,940 killed in action, 3,510 wounded inaction, and 1,157 missing in action.[170] This adds up to atotal of 334 irrevocable losses in tanks and self-propelledguns,[159] with another 212 tanks and self-propelled gunsunder repair, and 7,607 casualties.

7 Outcome

Prokhorovka battleeld memorial

Debate exists over the signicance and outcome ofthe battle. The Germans destroyed many Soviet tanksand temporarily degraded the striking power of the5th Guards Tank Army, but they were unable to takeProkhorovka or break through into open ground.[36] Forthe Soviets, the massive armoured attack of 12 July failedto destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps or throw it onto thedefensive, but succeeded in exhausting the Germans andeventually contributed to checking their advance.[171][172]

8.2 Citations 9

Thus, neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the IISS-Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives for theday.[172][173] While the battle is generally considered atactical success for the Germans due to the high numbersof Soviet tanks destroyed,[174][175] ultimately there was noGerman breakthrough at Prokhorovka, and with the endof Operation Citadel the strategic initiative permanentlyswung over to the Red Army.[176]

8 References

8.1 Notes[1] The 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the con-

trol of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 11July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327) All of its subordinatecorps as of 12 July are listed below;(Zetterling & Frank-son 2000, p. 48) the divisions, regiments and battalionsdirectly subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are notlisted below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327)

[2] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the con-trol of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July,and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July.(Glantz& House 2004, p. 318)

[3] The 2nd Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5thGuards Tank Army, but was transferred from the con-trol of the Southwestern Front to the 5th Guards TankArmy on 11 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 321) Due toearlier combat, by 12 July the 2nd Tank Corps had fewtanks left, many of which were locked in combat else-where outside the battleeld of Prokhorovka and out ofcontact with their parent headquarters. Therefore it wasreinforced with the 10th Antitank Brigade and relegatedto a supportive role in Prokhorovka.(Zetterling & Frank-son 2000, p. 106; Glantz & House 2004, p. 179,181)

[4] Two of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps four brigades the 10th, 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized, and the24th Guards Tank Brigades were sent south to blockthe III Panzer Corps, leaving its 10th Guards Mechanizedand 24th Guards Tank Brigades near Prokhorovka on 12July.(Clark 2012, p. 379; Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p.101; Glantz & House 2004, p. 321)

[5] The 5th Guards Army was transferred from the control ofthe Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 8 July.(Glantz& House 2004, p. 323) Only one of its two corpswere present on the battleeld of Prokhorovka the 33rdGuards Rie Corps.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167) Theother corps the 32nd Guards Rie Corps was de-ployed further west, near Oboyan.(Clark 2012, p. 230)The divisions, regiments and other smaller units directlysubordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not listedbelow.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 323)

[6] The 10th Tank Corps was transferred from the control of5th Guards Army to the Voronezh Front on 7 July andto the 1st Tank Army on 8 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p.

324) Only its 11th Motorized Rie Brigade was in the bat-tleeld of Prokhorovka on 12 July.(Glantz & House 2004,p. 166,195,417) It is not uncommon for this formation tobe portrayed as part of the 5th Guards Army during theBattle of Prokhorovka, but that is a metachronistic error.

[7] The 6th Guards Army bore the brunt of the German oen-sive from the very opening hours of it; therefore, its sub-ordinate units present at the Battle of Prokhorovka werealready heavily depleted.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167)

[8] These are only for the II SS Panzer Corps.

[9] These are for the whole 5th Guards Tank Army.

[10] See also: Battle of Brody (1941), Battle of Raseiniai,Operation Goodwood, Battle for Golan Heights (1973),and others.

[11] A Soviet General Sta report estimated that the II SS-Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps had 100 Tigers andFerdinands on 12 July.(Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 222)

8.2 Citations[1] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... a local, tactical

German victory..

[2] Clark 2012, p. 408, Excerpt reads: Even though IISS-Panzer Corps could claim to have won a tactical vic-tory in the monumental armoured clash at Prokhorovka ...Haussers men did not do enough to change the course ofthe operation..

[3] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: The Waen-SSwon a tactical victory on July 12..

[4] Nipe 2012, p. 86, Excerpt reads: The small expansion ofthe Psel bridgehead by Totenkopf and the advances of DasReich around the southern edges of Prochorovka were tac-tical victories at best and not decisive by any denition..

[5] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: Operationally,however, the palm rests with the Red Army..

[6] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 561, The counterattackdid not achieve its basic goal. The enemy [II SS-Panzer Corps] was not routed, but the further advance ofthe II SS-Panzer Corps beyond Prokhorovka was nallyhalted..

[7] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... the clash was,when set against the much wider strategic backdrop of theoensive, no more than a local, tactical German victory.It was of no consequence or signicance in helping to re-alise any of the wider oensive objectives of OperationZitadelle, which was in any case by this date already afailure..

[8] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108, If we take a lookat how the front lines changed during these ve days onecould interpret it as some sort of success for the Germans... However, if we compare the outcome with the Germanorders for the battle, which stated that Prokhorovka wasthe target, it is clear that the Germans fell short of theirgoals. The Red Army had hoped to push the II SS-Panzer

10 8 REFERENCES

Corps back and crush it. This failed completely, but atleast the 5th Guards Tank Army prevented the Germansfrom taking Prokhorovka..

[9] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829].

[10] Clark 2012, p. 189.

[11] Healy 2008, p. 43.

[12] Clark 2012, p. 187.

[13] Glantz 1986, p. 2325.

[14] Clark 2012, pp. 194,196197.

[15] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 5153.

[16] Glantz 2013, p. 184.

[17] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 6365.

[18] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 41, 49.

[19] Glantz 2013, p. 195.

[20] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 34.

[21] Clark 2012, p. 407.

[22] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 269272.

[23] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 112.

[24] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 8990.

[25] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 101.

[26] VIII. Fliegerkorps.

[27] Clark 2012, pp. 256260.

[28] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 134135.

[29] Clark 2012, pp. 297299.

[30] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 1820miles.

[31] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 1820miles.

[32] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 90, this places it at 28 kmat the end of 7 July.

[33] Bauman 1998, pp. 8-5 to 8-6, this places it at 23 km.

[34] Glantz & House 2004, p. 146147.

[35] Newton 2002, p. 6.

[36] Brand 2003.

[37] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 2933.

[38] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 258260.

[39] Glantz & House 2004, p. 138139.

[40] Healy 2008, p. 296.

[41] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166167.

[42] Clark 2012, pp. 350.

[43] Clark 2012, pp. 350353.

[44] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 169, 171.

[45] Glantz & House 2004, p. 172.

[46] Clark 2012, pp. 352353.

[47] Nipe 2012, p. 315.

[48] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 95.

[49] Clark 2012, p. 352.

[50] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166.

[51] Dunn 1997, p. 153.

[52] Glantz & House 2004, p. 173.

[53] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 176.

[54] Clark 2012, p. 356.

[55] Glantz & House 2004, p. 178.

[56] Nipe 2010, p. 310.

[57] Bergstrm 2007, p. 79.

[58] Nipe 2010, p. 276.

[59] Bergstrm 2007, p. 77.

[60] Nipe 2010, p. 315.

[61] Healy 2008, p. 330.

[62] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 323, 326.

[63] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 178, 198.

[64] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 227.

[65] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 179.

[66] Clark 2012, p. 364.

[67] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103.

[68] Glantz & House 2004, p. 202.

[69] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7881.

[70] 17th Air Army.

[71] Glantz & House 2004, p. 317,321.

[72] Dunn 1997, p. 154.

[73] Nipe 2010, p. 309.

[74] Nipe 2012, p. 326.

[75] Healy 2008, p. 320.

[76] Healy 2008, p. 333.

[77] Clark 2012, p. 368.

[78] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 48, 101.

[79] Glantz & House 2004, p. 151.

[80] Nipe 2012, p. 39.

8.2 Citations 11

[81] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 48, 105106, 793 tanksand 57 self-propelled guns.

[82] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 151, 328, 793 tanks and 37self-propelled guns.

[83] Nipe 2012, p. 39, 850 tanks.

[84] Healy 2008, pp. 171172.

[85] Healy 2008, pp. 171172, 35 Churchill tanks.

[86] Glantz & House 2004, p. 328, 31 Churchill tanks.

[87] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 106-107.

[88] Clark 2012, p. 362.

[89] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 181.

[90] Licari 2004.

[91] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180.

[92] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 106107.

[93] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 107.

[94] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180181.

[95] Glantz & House 2004, p. 192.

[96] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 96.

[97] Glantz & House 2004, p. 184.

[98] Clark 2012, p. 378.

[99] Clark 2012, p. 363.

[100] Glantz & House 2004, p. 182.

[101] Barbier 2002, p. 139.

[102] Bergstrm 2007, p. 80.

[103] Brand 2003, p. 8.

[104] Glantz & House 2004, p. 187, in Moscow time.

[105] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 349.

[106] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188, in Moscow time.

[107] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188.

[108] Nipe 2010, p. 317.

[109] Bergstrm 2007, p. 7980.

[110] Nipe 2010, p. 316317.

[111] Nipe 2010, p. 320.

[112] Nipe 2010, p. 321.

[113] Nipe 2010, p. 322.

[114] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7981.

[115] Bergstrm 2007, p. 81.

[116] Showalter 2013, p. 212.

[117] Nipe 2010, p. 335.

[118] Showalter 2013, p. 216.

[119] Clark 2012, pp. 388389.

[120] Clark 2012, pp. 381, 389.

[121] Nipe 2012, pp. 48, 52.

[122] Clark 2012, pp. 390391.

[123] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208.

[124] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209210.

[125] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209, 216.

[126] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 212215.

[127] Clark 2012, p. 394.

[128] Molony et al. 2004, pp. 5565.

[129] Clark 2012, p. 397.

[130] Nipe 2012, p. 71.

[131] Barbier 2002, p. 153.

[132] Clark 2012, pp. 395397.

[133] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208, Kutuzov and allied land-ings had an eect on the German High Command.

[134] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 217218.

[135] Clark 2012, pp. 397398.

[136] Healy 2010, p. 358.

[137] Glantz & House 2004, p. 218.

[138] Glantz & House 2004, p. 219.

[139] Barbier 2002, p. 163.

[140] Healy 2010, p. 356.

[141] Clark 2012, pp. 398.

[142] Healy 2010, p. 359, States 15 July in error.

[143] Healy 2010, p. 359.

[144] Clark 2012, pp. 401402.

[145] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 98.

[146] Nipe 2012, p. 70.

[147] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 204, 223.

[148] Newton 2002, p. 24.

[149] Glantz & House 2004, p. 223.

[150] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 514515.

[151] Barbier 2002, p. 164.

[152] Nipe 2012, p. 72.

[153] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 139, 218.

12 8 REFERENCES

[154] Glantz & House 2004, p. 245.

[155] Nipe 2012, p. 87.

[156] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531532, outlines variousgures proposed by various historians over the last threedecades.

[157] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531532.

[158] Bauman 1998, pp. 5-14.

[159] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108.

[160] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 105, 110, 247.

[161] Frieser 2007, p. 130, gives 3 losses.

[162] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 513, 598, attributes velosses to a claim by Frieser made in 1993.

[163] Healy 2010, pp. 346.

[164] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 212.

[165] Nipe 2012, pp. 6061.

[166] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103, 105.

[167] Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.

[168] Nipe 2012, pp. 8586.

[169] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 102.

[170] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 536538.

[171] Overy 1997, p. 208.

[172] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 108109.

[173] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 553.

[174] Clark 2012, p. 408.

[175] Nipe 2012, p. 86.

[176] Glantz & House 1995, p. 166.

8.3 Bibliography Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Great-est Tank Battle, 1943. London; New York: ZenithImprint. ISBN 978-0-7603-1254-4.

Bauman, Walter (1998). Kursk Operation Simula-tion and Validation Exercise Phase II (KOSAVEII) (PDF). Maryland: US Army Concepts Analy-sis Agency. A study of the southern sector ofthe Battle of Kursk conducted by the US ArmyConcepts Analysis Agency and directed by Wal-ter J. Bauman, using data collected from militaryarchives in Germany and Russia by The Dupuy In-stitute (TDI).

Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Kursk The Air Bat-tle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN978-1-903223-88-8.

Brand, Dieter (2003). Vor 60 Jahren: Pro-chorowka (Teil II)". sterreichische MilitrischeZeitschrift (in German) (Bundesministerium frLandesverteidigung und Sport) (6).

Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle:Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline PublishingGroup. ISBN 978-0-7553-3639-5.

Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitlers Gamble, 1943.Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-275-95733-9.

Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Schmider, Klaus; Schnherr,Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard; Ungvry, Kristin; Weg-ner, Bernd (2007). Das Deutsche Reich und derZweite Weltkrieg Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44 Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten(in German). Mnchen: Deutsche Verlags-AnstaltMnchen. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.

Glantz, David M. (September 1986). Soviet De-fensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 (PDF). USArmy Command and General Sta College (Ft.Belvoir). Soviet Army Studies Oce CombinedArms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI ReportNo. 11). OCLC 320412485.

Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathon (1995). WhenTitans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7.

Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1999). TheBattle of Kursk. Lawrence: University Press ofKansas. ISBN 978-0-70060-978-9.

Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2004)[1999]. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: UniversityPress of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1335-9.

Glantz, David (2013). Soviet Military Intelligencein War. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis (Routledge).ISBN 978-1-136-28934-7.

Glantz, David M.; Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). TheBattle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General StaStudy. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass).ISBN 0-7146-4933-3. This report, commis-sioned by the Soviet General Sta in 1944, was de-signed to educate the Red Army on how to con-duct war operations. It was classied secret untilits declassication in 1964, and was subsequentlytranslated to English and edited by Orenstein andGlantz. Its original title was Collection of materi-als for the study of war experience, no. 11 (Russian: - 11, Sbornik materi-alov po izucheniiu opyta Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 11)

13

Healy, Mark (2008). Zitadelle: The German Of-fensive Against the Kursk Salient 417 July 1943.Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.

Healy, Mark (2010) [2008]. Zitadelle: The GermanOensive Against the Kursk Salient 417 July 1943.Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5716-1.

Molony, C.J.C.; Flynn, F.C.; Davies, H.L. &Gleave, T.P. (2004) [1973]. Butler, Sir James, ed.The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V: TheCampaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944. History ofthe Second World War, United Kingdom MilitarySeries. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84574-069-6.

Licari, Michael J. (2004). The Battle of Kursk:Myths and Reality. Cedar Falls: University ofNorthern Iowa. Archived from the original on 11September 2014. Retrieved 1 November 2014.

Newton, Steven (2002). Kursk: The German View:Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the Ger-man Commanders. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.ISBN 0-306-81150-2.

Nipe, George (2010). Blood, Steel, and Myth: TheII.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka.Southbury; Newbury: RZM; Casemate (distribu-tor). ISBN 978-0-9748389-4-6.

Nipe, George (2012). Decision in the Ukraine: Ger-man Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Sum-mer 1943. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.ISBN 978-0-8117-1162-3.

Overy, Richard (1997). Russias War: A History ofthe Soviet Eort. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN0-14-027169-4.

Showalter, Dennis E. (2013). Armor and Blood:The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point ofWorldWarII. New York: Random House.

Zamulin, Valeriy; Britton, Stuart (2011). Demol-ishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka,Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative. Soli-hull: Helion & Company. ISBN 1-906033-89-7.

Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the So-viet (Russian) Study of War. London: Taylor &Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-5052-8.

VIII. Fliegerkorps. Retrieved 11 July 2015.

17th Air Army. Retrieved 11 July 2015.

9 Further reading Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russiain the Second World War. London: Pan. ISBN 978-0-330-48808-2.

Evans, Richard (2010). The Third Reich at War.New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-311671-4.

Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet OperationalArt: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland,OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-4077-8.

Glantz, David (December 1991). From the Don tothe Dnepr: Soviet Oensive Operations, December1942 August 1943. London: Taylor & Francis(Frank Cass). ISBN 978-0-7146-3350-3.

Guderian, Heinz (1996) [1937]. Achtung-Panzer:The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tac-tics and Operational Potential. London: Arms andArmour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-282-3.

Guderian, Heinz (1952). Panzer Leader. New York:Da Capo. ISBN 0-306-81101-4.

Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in theEast. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.

Kasdorf, Bruno (2000). The Battle of Kursk An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles(PDF). Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War Col-lege. OCLC 44584575.

von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories. St.Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-76032-054-9.

von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles.Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 1-56852-578-8.

Moorhouse, Roger (2011). Berlin at War: Life andDeath in Hitlers Capital, 193945. London: Vin-tage. ISBN 978-0-09-955189-8.

Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategiesof Adolf Hitler. Jeerson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN978-0-7864-2054-4.

Smith, J.R. (1966). Aircraft in Prole No.69 TheHenschel Hs 129. UK: Prole Publications. OCLC42473519.

Willmott, Hedley Paul (1990). The Great Crusade:A New Complete History of the Second World War.New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-934715-7.

14 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

, (2006). - [Prokhorovka- the unknown battle of the Great War] (in Rus-sian). : X. ISBN 5-17-039548-5. Comprehensive description of Soviet and Ger-many troop movement based on Soviet and Germanarchives

10 External links Prokhorovka battle (July 1943)" [

( 1943)] (in Russian). 1998. Re-trieved 17 July 2015.

Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943.Retrieved 17 July 2015.

Nipe, George. ""Kursk Reconsidered: GermanysLost Victory"". Retrieved 17 July 2015.

Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis". Re-trieved 17 July 2015.

Wilson, Alan. Kursk and Prokhorovka, July 1943(maps)". Retrieved 19 June 2013.

15

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses11.1 Text

Battle of Prokhorovka Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Prokhorovka?oldid=672067946 Contributors: Pigsonthewing,Altenmann, Wwoods, Itpastorn, Ezhiki, RivGuySC, Comatose51, Phe, Piotrus, Mzajac, Irpen, Ularsen, KNewman, Alsadius, Skorpionas,Art LaPella, LtNOWIS, Trainik, Hohum, Shoey, Ghirlandajo, Larry Dunn, Pierre Aronax, Woohookitty, Camw, Tabletop, Graeme-Leggett, Ketiltrout, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Toby Douglass, Leo44, Ansbachdragoner, RussBot, Bleakcomb, Xihr, Alex Bakharev, Hawkeye7,Grakm fr, Merrybrit, Fastboy, Nick-D, Groyolo, SmackBot, DMorpheus, Flamarande, Squiddy, Chris the speller, Elagatis, EncMstr, Frap,OrphanBot, MarshallBagramyan, Ctifumdope, Andreas1968, The PIPE, Ilvar, Noblige, Andrei Stroe, Ohconfucius, John, Minna Sora noShita, Illythr, Volker89, Mr Stephen, Andrwsc, Hellkt~enwiki, Clarityend, Marysunshine, FairuseBot, Karloman2, GeraldH, ThreeBlind-Mice, TheCheeseManCan, Philippe, Sensemaker, Dr. Blofeld, Goldenrowley, Darklilac, Tigga, RebelRobot, WolfmanSF, Dodo19~enwiki,Askari Mark, Buckshot06, Bernd vdB~enwiki, MetsBot, Dapi89, Rabidcentipede, CommonsDelinker, Geonarva, Andygx, Bad Night,Johnadam789, Mrg3105, Tatrgel, MisterBee1966, Bogdan~enwiki, RabbitKing, W. B. Wilson, Andrein, Koalorka, WereSpielChequers,Brozozo, Dormcat3, Faradayplank, Carpasian, Afernand74, Jaan, MBK004, Mild Bill Hiccup, Socrates2008, Arjayay, Sturmvogel 66,Sholokhov, Deineka, Addbot, Caden, Groundsquirrel13, Tobi, Fryed-peach, Oleggem~enwiki, Legobot II, Shore3, AnomieBOT, SenorFreebie, Tavrian, Christiangamer7, LilHelpa, Amore Mio, Anotherclown, Zumalabe, Crestar1, A Quest For Knowledge, AustralianRupert,TungstenCarbide, Alexandre loichon, HROThomas, Thehelpfulbot, StoneProphet, FrescoBot, Darkstar8799, Kwiki, DrilBot, Decem-ber21st2012Freak, White Shadows, DocYako, FlameHorse, Diannaa, John of Reading, Grottenolm42, Blablaaa, TuHan-Bot, Demi-urge1000, Igor Piryazev, Terraorin, FeatherPluma, Gunbirddriver, ClueBot NG, Observerq, Helpful Pixie Bot, Mohamed CJ, Frze,DerKrieger, Hamish59, Choy4311, ChrisGualtieri, Khazar2, Irondome, Zatron100, 0wner170, EyeTruth, Ruby Murray, Melonkelon, Sto-ryEpic, Arthur goes shopping, Somchai Sun, DannyKalb, Monkbot, GeneralizationsAreBad and Anonymous: 103

11.2 Images File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2950-15A,_Russland,_Panzer_im_Einsatz.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/

commons/2/2f/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-022-2950-15A%2C_Russland%2C_Panzer_im_Einsatz.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 deContrib-utors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperationproject. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. thedigitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Wol/Altvater

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-10,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Soldat_mit_Zigarette.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/72/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-10%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%2C_Soldat_mit_Zigarette.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the GermanFederal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authenticrepresentation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital ImageArchive. Original artist: Koch

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16,_Russland,_bei_Pokrowka,_Kradschtzen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0553A-16%2C_Russland%2C_bei_Pokrowka%2C_Kradsch%C3%BCtzen.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive(Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only usingthe originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist:Koch

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0562A-06,_Russland,_Kolonne_mit_Panzer_III.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0562A-06%2C_Russland%2C_Kolonne_mit_Panzer_III.jpg License: CCBY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negativeand/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Scheer

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0596-12,_Russland,_Panzer_IV_und_Schtzenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f9/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-219-0596-12%2C_Russland%2C_Panzer_IV_und_Sch%C3%BCtzenpanzer_in_Fahrt.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by theGerman Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authenticrepresentation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital ImageArchive. Original artist: Dieck

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-220-0630-02A,_Russland,_zerstrter_russischer_Panzer.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c7/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-220-0630-02A%2C_Russland%2C_zerst%C3%B6rter_russischer_Panzer.jpgLicense: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (DeutschesBundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals(negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A,_Schlacht_um_Kursk,_Panzer_VI_(Tiger_I).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5e/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101III-Groenert-019-23A%2C_Schlacht_um_Kursk%2C_Panzer_VI_%28Tiger_I%29.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by theGerman Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authenticrepresentation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital ImageArchive. Original artist: Grnert

File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1973-122-16,_Paul_Hausser.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/60/Bundesarchiv_Bild_146-1973-122-16%2C_Paul_Hausser.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided toWikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German FederalArchive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originalsas provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

16 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Originalartist: ?

File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax

File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag ofthe Soviet Union.svg.

File:General_Rotmistrov_,commander_of_the_7.Tank_corps.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b6/General_Rotmistrov_%2Ccommander_of_the_7.Tank_corps.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: scan da 'Soviet tanks in combat1941-1945' di S.J.Zaloga et al., Concord 1997 Original artist: fotoreporter sovietico sconosciuto

File:Kursk_south.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Kursk_south.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Con-tributors: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Kursk_south.svg Original artist: Andrei nacu

File:ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg License:CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: ru:User:Voyagerim

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11.3 Content license Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

Background German advance leading up to Prokhorovka

Planning German plans for 12 July Soviet plans for 12 July

Opposing forces German Soviet

Battle Following the main engagement Aftermath Operation Roland

Casualties and losses German Soviet

Outcome References NotesCitationsBibliography

Further reading External links Text and image sources, contributors, and licensesTextImagesContent license