why opec isn't illegal

8/13/2019 Why OPEC Isn't Illegal

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OPEC as a Cartel: Can U.S. Antitrust Laws Be Applied Extraterritorially?

by Emma Ukpanah

ABSTRACT:

U.S. Antitrust Laws have been successfully applied to anti-competitive behaviourwhich takes place abroad but have an effect within the United States. Under Antitrust

Laws, cartels are regarded as illegal and there has been a clamour for the OPEC Cartel

to be prosecuted for antitrust violations. However, OPEC is an intergovernmental

organisation that views its activities as essential to the stability of the oil industry.

This paper assesses OPEC activities in the light of the Sherman Act and identifies the

legal and jurisprudential barriers, which limit the exercise of the extraterritorial

jurisdiction by the U.S. The issues involved are controversial and should be resolved

through diplomatic means and not through the Judiciary. However, the lack of

international consensus on competition law and enforcement reduces the possibility of

such enforcement.

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFI Court of First Instance

EC European Community

ECJ European Court of Justice

ECMR European Community Merger RegulationEU European Union

FSIA Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

FTC Federal Trade Commission

MOC Multinational Oil Companies

NOPEC No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act

OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentUN United Nations

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

US United States

WHO World Health Organisation

WTO World Trade Organisation

1. INTRODUCTION


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OPEC was formed on 14 September 1960 at a meeting in Baghdad, Iraq mainly as a

reaction to unilateral actions by the Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs) who at the

time controlled all oil operations within the host countries. Another motivating factor

was their desire for direct participation in the industry with a view to taking control ofthe rate at which their natural resources were being exploited and also getting an

equitable share of the revenue derived therefrom. The creation of the Organisation

thus signified the first collective act of sovereignty on the part of the oil exporters.1

The OPEC Cartel, as it is commonly referred to, is an intergovernmental organisation

and aims to influence and maintain the price of oil through the control of production

levels to generate revenue, which goes towards meeting the development needs of itsmembers.2Although OPEC does not regard its activities as being either illegal or anti-

competitive, there has been clamour in the US3for the cartel to be prosecuted for US

antitrust violations. Even if the enforcement of US antitrust laws against cartels

operating within its territory has never been in doubt, its extraterritorial application to

actions carried out abroad but which have an effect within America remains a

controversial issue. It is interesting to note that case law appears to suggest that its

extraterritorial effect is settled law and recent decisions within the EU lend support tothis notion albeit from a different perspective.

This paper will assess the activities of OPEC in the light of the Sherman Act and

identify what makes the cartel so unique. A consideration of the extraterritorial

jurisdiction of US antitrust laws is central to this paper especially in light of the

growing condemnation of cartels and the general consensus on their negative effect on

competition. According to the OECD, cartels are an increasingly internationalphenomenon and they thwart the gains that should follow from global market

liberalisation.4 However, a successful enforcement of US antitrust laws against

OPEC remains doubtful based on the principles of international law and especially as

there is yet no internationally recognised competition law regime binding on all

Nations.

The author recognises that this topic is a very broad one and that many of the issuesare quite comprehensive. Due to the limited scope of this paper, many issues cannot


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be addressed in detail but there is no attempt to sacrifice substance on the altar of

being concise. Reference will be made to judicial decisions taken in both America and

in the EU on cartel behaviour, control of mergers and extraterritoriality of competition

law, with emphasis on US antitrust laws.

2. COMPETITION LAW AND ANTI COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR

Competition laws - which in the past tended to be focused on either natural

monopolies or the preserve of the State - are now being applied to almost every facet

of life, including the energy sector.5 Underlying them, however, is a growing

consensus that, on the whole, markets deliver better outcomes than state planning; andcentral to the idea of a market is the process of competition.6 The gains of

competition range from innovation, wider range of choices and better prices for goods

and services. Competition law aims to prevent cartel behaviour and control mergers,

in order to avoid emergence of monopolies. Such anti-competitive practices will be

the primary focus of this paper.

2.1 U.S. Antitrust Laws

Although there are a number of Federal Antitrust laws in America, the Sherman Act

of 1890 is undoubtedly at the centre of US antitrust law.7

The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of

economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as

the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction ofcompetitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic

resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material

progress8

Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies

in restraint of trade on the one hand while Section 2 prohibits attempts at

monopolisation of a product or service.

9

Thus, the Sherman Act has as its aim the


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preservation of competition, in the interest of consumers for higher efficiency and

better prices for goods and services.

In 1909, Standard Oil, which was largely a monopoly, was found guilty by the FederalCourt of restraining trade through the granting of rebates and predatory pricing, in

violation of the Sherman Act.10 Introducing the Rule of Reason principle, Justice

White held that acts in restraint of trade, which were prohibited, were those which

were unreasonable or contrary to public policy.

Though competition policies in general condemn horizontal price fixing, under US

Law, they are treated as per se infringements of the Sherman Act. They may alsoattract prison sentences because they are deemed criminal offences.11 Historically,

courts have considered price-fixing activities under either theper seillegal or the rule

of reason approaches. Theper se rule is used when a court characterises an activity as

one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition.12

Therefore, it is understandable why the activities of OPEC are strongly condemned by

the U.S. The Organisations activities of limiting output and influencing the price ofoil are considered to be infringements of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However,

being Sovereign nations, OPEC members do not quite fall into the category

anticipated by the provisions of the Sherman Act due to a number of legal issues

which will be discussed in later chapters.

3. OPEC AS A CARTEL

3.1 History of the OPEC Cartel

Events that led to the formation of OPEC are closely linked to the practise of profit

sharing, which obtained in Venezuela in the mid-1940s and substantially reduced the

profits of the MOCs. Thus, exploration for oil in Venezuela became less attractive to

the MOCs and this led to a shift in operations to countries without the practice.13

However by 1950, based on the advice of Venezuelan experts, other countries that


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were oil producers in the Persian Gulf pushed for a change in the contractual

arrangement with the MOCs to include the equal profit split.14

In 1959, the oil companies unilaterally reduced the posted price for Venezuelan crudeby about 10%, and also that of the Middle East. This led to the First Arab Petroleum

Congress in Cairo, where the nations affected resolved that they wanted to be

consulted by the oil companies subsequently on all decisions taken on the price of

oil.15

The posted price of crude oil in the Middle East was again reduced in August 1960

and the Government of Iraq called on the Governments of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabiaand Venezuela to discuss this action.16The Conference held in Baghdad between 10

and 14 September 1960 led to the establishment of OPEC as a permanent

Intergovernmental Organisation. All the countries involved had decided to stand as a

united front against any unilateral action taken by MOCs.

The countries present at the meeting in Baghdad were the founding members of OPEC

but the Organisation now consists of 11 member countries on the whole includingIndonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Libya. Although

OPECs influence in the oil markets has significantly diminished when compared to

the 1970s, the Organisation still supplies about 40% of world oil output and about

70% of world petroleum reserves are located within OPEC nations.17

3.2 Cartelisation of the oil markets

Prior to the formation of OPEC, the world petroleum market had been characterised

by co-operative arrangements among producers, starting with the cartel of major

international oil companies, to oil producers in the United States.18The 1914 Red-

Line Agreement establishing the international corporate cartel specified that all

middle eastern reserves would be controlled by the Turkish Petroleum Company

which was wholly owned by BP, Royal Dutch Shell and the French Compagnie

Franaise des Ptroles. The As-Is Agreement divided the sale of oil in world marketsbetween what is now BP, Shell and Exxon.19Also, other oil companies were worked


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into the agreement through the 1930s and the major MOCs dominated the industry for

a period that can be said to span from 1914 to about 1955.

The second cartel type arrangement was created and maintained from1935 to 1970 by several state governments in the US which adopted the

market demand pro rationing system with the object of limiting

production.20

Finally, as previously mentioned, OPEC was established in 1960 by five leading

exporters after a series of disagreements with the MOCs over the issue of the price of

oil and revenue accruing to the owners of the resources.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that cartels have featured quite strongly

throughout the history of the oil industry and the practise of limiting output is in no

way peculiar to OPEC.

3.3 Cartel Problem and OPEC

A distinguishing factor of cartels is that they tend to substitute co-operation for

competition and this may be done through the use of measures ranging from mergers

to price fixing.21By entering into agreements to act in concert to either fix prices or

limit output, cartels prevent consumers from benefiting from the gains of competition,

which include lower prices. OPEC member countries have co-operated in a number of

instances to cut back on production in a bid to maintain prices especially in

instances where the prices were considered to be low.

In recent years, the oil industry has witnessed high levels of concentration as seen in

mergers like those of Exxon/Mobil and BP/Amoco.22It remains debatable whether or

not competition should be given free reign in the industry as the history of petroleum

markets have shown how such competition can be destructive rather than

constructive.23


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Member states of OPEC view its activities as being essential towards the stabilisation

of oil prices and extremely important for the economic development of their

respective Nations. Oil prices that are either too high or too low, it is reasoned, do not

benefit either the producer or consumers.

OPECs imposition of quotas on its members is usually effective in maintaining a

balance between supply and demand in the industry. However, the Organisation like

every other cartel faces the challenge of cheating within its ranks. This factor in

addition to supply of oil by non-OPEC producers has occasionally led to oversupply

of the market, which in turn drives the price of oil downwards. It is in a bid to check

this downward trend that OPEC calls on its members and non-OPEC members aliketo cut back on production.

OPEC tries to ensure that the market is neither under-supplied with oil, forcing prices

to go excessively high, nor over-supplied so that prices go too low. However, it is

important to point out that placing limits on production is at a cost to OPEC members.

This has led to the loss of not only market share to non-OPEC producers who may

refuse to co-operate with the Cartel but also potential revenue.

4. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS

A States right to exercise jurisdiction over conducts which take place within its

territory and the behaviour of its nationals abroad, including companies incorporated

under its law is generally accepted under international law.24 However, what has

remained controversial especially in the field of economic regulation is whether anti-trust authorities may exercise jurisdiction over conduct or agreements, which were

entered into abroad but have an effect in a different State.25The US position on the

above appears to be in the affirmative and as will be gathered later in the paper, the

European Union seems to be leaning towards the same position.

The effects doctrine can be traced to the decision in United States v. Aluminium Co

of America case (Alcoa)

26

.In this case, an aluminium cartel sought to limit productionthrough quotas it imposed on its members. These measures though taken abroad, had


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an adverse effect on the production of aluminium imported into the US. The question

was whether the Sherman Act could be applied to this cartel, and Judge Learned Hand

held that the extraterritorial application of US antitrust was settled law. 27

Previously, this notion of its extraterritorial jurisdiction had been rejected in the

American Banana v. United fruits28case, but after theAlcoajudgement, that position

was reiterated in the Timberlane29case. It is worth mentioning here that it was on the

notion of international comity principles that the Court in Timberlanerefrained from

applying the effects doctrine. However, the more recent Supreme Court judgement

on extraterritoriality is Hartford Fire Insurance Co v. California,30where the court

repeated that jurisdiction could be taken over foreign conduct that was meant toproduce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.

In the United States v. Nippon Paper Ind. Co,31 price fixing charges were levelled

against a Japanese company and the wide application of the effects doctrine was

again confirmed by the US First Circuit of Appeals, signally a victory for US Antitrust

Authorities.32These assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the US have drawn a

lot of negative reaction from different countries. On this basis, a number of BlockingStatutes were enacted in response to counter this assertion of extraterritorial

jurisdiction.33

However, from the foregoing, it may be deduced that despite the controversy

surrounding its actions, the United States has gone ahead to assert extraterritorial

jurisdiction in antitrust matters. It is difficult to reconcile some of the US decisions to

principles of public international law, which appear incapable of addressing this issue.Perhaps, however, they may be explained on the basis that they were developed with

physical rather than economic conduct in mind.34

4.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of EC Competition Law

The ECJ has not expressly acknowledged the effects doctrine under EC law but based

on the implementation doctrine has arrived at similar results as would the effectsdoctrine.35


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In theDyestuff case,36a number of firms were accused of acting in concert to effect

increase in prices on most products and this action clearly restricted competition

within the common market. The Court clearly avoided making any pronouncement onthe position of EC law as regards the effects doctrine. It took the view that even

though there were non-EC parent companies involved, by participating through EC-

based subsidiaries which they controlled, jurisdiction could be exercised.37

The extraterritorial reach of EC law on the basis of the effects doctrine is more

evident in the application of the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR) in the case of Gencor

v. Commission.

38

The EU prevented a merger between two South African MiningCompanies which would have left GencorandLonrhowith control of 30-35 percent

of world production. On appeal, the CFI asserted that the application of ECMR is

justified where it is foreseeable that the proposed concentration will have an

immediate and substantial effect in the community.39

Bringing this into perspective, although South Africa did not resist the jurisdiction of

the EC, difficulties could arise together with issues of enforcement where the oppositewas the case. Other than among the members of the European Union, there is no

international law of antitrust.40This raises a crucial issue of what would happen were

OPEC to call the bluff of the West arguing that they were not under any obligation to

be guided by either US or EU antitrust laws.

Even among the countries with well-entrenched competition laws, conflicts are still

inevitable on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The blocking of the G.E-Honeywell merger and the initial objection to that of Boeing McDonnell Douglasby

the EU almost led to diplomatic rift with America whose Federal Trade Commission

(FTC) had previously approved both mergers. The circumstances of the Boeing

merger are interesting because almost like in the Gencor case, the merger would lead

to a reduction from 3 firms to 2 in that industry and they would be positioned to

capture two thirds of the business, in the European market.41


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The EU rejected the GE-Honeywell merger because it would have severely

reduced competition in the aerospace industry and resulted ultimately in higher prices

for customers, particularly airlines.42In addition to behaviour which affects imports

into America, the US also asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction where US companies areprevented by anti-competitive behaviour from gaining access to foreign markets.43

Many countries are opening up their economies to competition and the perceived

gains of trade liberalisation. Therefore, it stands to reason that any country that

promotes the interest of its companies to gain access to foreign markets must refrain

from taking steps in turn, which would prevent or restrict foreign companies from

gaining access to its market. In the words of Ralph Nader:

If the United States bends the antitrust laws for Boeing, because it is an

important U.S. exporter, the United States will undermine its ability to

seek better antitrust enforcement abroad. U.S. efforts to develop global

antitrust enforcement regulations will appear hypocritical if there is no

antitrust enforcement in the United States in a merger involving the

extremely high levels of market concentration in the Boeing-McDonnellDouglas case.44

4.2 Challenges for U.S. Antitrust Authorities

There are a number of legal and political constraints that prevent competition law

authorities from tackling the OPEC oil cartel.45The Act of State doctrine is a basic

rule under international law and requires that one State should not enquire about thesovereign act of another within its own territory. The US Supreme Court recognised

this limit placed on the exercise of jurisdiction in the case on Underhill v.

Hernandez.46

Closely related to the above is the notion of comity of Nations, which was propounded

by the Supreme Court inHilton v. Guyot. Justice Gray explained its legal foundation

thus:


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Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on

the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is

a recognition with which one nation allows within its territory to the

legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regardto international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens

or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.47

Lastly, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity doctrine was formulated in the Schooner

Exchange v. McFaddon case,48 based on the perfect equality and absolute

independence of sovereigns.

49

The US Congress later codified this in the passing ofthe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).50 It provides that the only instance

where a sovereign State would be immune from the jurisdiction of US courts would

be where its activities were governmental as opposed to being commercial. This raises

the question of whether OPECs actions are commercial or not.

The answer was clearly spelt out in 1979 in the Supreme Courts decision in

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC

51

and in thisauthors opinion the same argument still holds true today. The antitrust action was

brought against OPEC on the grounds that OPECs price fixing activities violated the

Sherman Act and had led to the payment of high prices for gasoline by the plaintiffs.

Central to the courts decision was the fact that the establishment by a Sovereign State

of the terms and conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource to wit, crude

oil from its territory is essentially a governmental function.52Admittedly, the divide

between commercial and governmental activity may not be clear-cut in manyinstances as recognised by the Justice DepartmentsAnti-trust Guide for International

Operations53, but it is obvious that ones position will depend on individual

perspective.

By parity of reasoning, it appears that the main obstacles in the way of US Antitrust

Authorities and the successful prosecution of OPEC for antitrust violations are the Act

of State doctrine, and FSIA and the notion of sovereignty recognised underinternational law. OPECs position is further strengthened by the UN General


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Assembly on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the UN Charter of

Economic Rights and Duties of States Resolution, which provides that:

All States have the right to associate in organisations of primarycommodity producers in order to develop their national economies, to

achieve stable financing for their development and, in pursuance of their

aims, to assist in the promotion of sustained growth of the world economy,

in particular accelerating the development of developing countries.

Correspondingly, all States have the duty to respect that right by refraining

from applying economic and political measures that would limit it. 54

In a bid to curb OPECs anti-competitive behaviour, an option open to antitrust

authorities would be to institute actions against MOCs operating in OPEC countries as

suggested in some quarters.55However, the unfairness of such antitrust suits against

MOCs carrying on business in OPEC countries and often in collaboration with State

Oil companies would be raised. It does not appear to this author that the MOCs have

much of a choice when instructed to limit production in compliance with OPEC

quotas. Sovereign nations have the right to control, for whatever reason, the rate andmanner in which their natural resources are being depleted through exploration

activities. It would be unacceptable for the MOCs in this scenario to be made

answerable for actions they apparently have no control over.

Another issue is as regards jurisdiction over parent companies and their subsidiaries

especially where the MOCs are required under the laws of host countries to be

incorporated there.

U.S. assertions of jurisdiction based upon the control exercised by an

American parent over a subsidiary incorporated and operating abroad are

not accepted as valid under international law by a number of nations ()

under international law, nationality is properly determined by place of

incorporation.56


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So, strictly speaking, it could be argued that these MOCs operating in OPEC countries

were outside the reach of the Sherman Act, as the parent company and its subsidiary

were different entities in this scenario. However, it is arguable whether this position is

not going in the way of the principle of international comity. The Supreme Courtobserved inHartford Fire,that the growth of international comity in the anti-trust

sphere had been stunted by the Supreme courts decision.57

As already noted, though heavily criticised, the Supreme Court in the Dyestuffs case

disregarded the separate personality principle of a parent and subsidiary company. The

US courts may thus be ready to adopt the same position.

4.3 Can U.S. Antitrust Laws Be Enforced against OPEC?

Recent events seem to suggest that there is some debate about the possibility of

piercing the cloud of sovereign immunity58 if the No Oil Producing and Exporting

Cartels Act of 2000 (NOPEC) is passed. OPEC rejected the bill through an official

statement noting that there was nothing wrong with the Organisation acting in concert

as sovereign states to protect their interest.

59

In principle, this may not be different from actions taken by the US Government in the

past to close US market to foreign uranium producers, which later resulted in an

antitrust suit against the uranium cartel.60 In reaction to this, foreign governments

subsequently closed about 70% of the market by forming a cartel which placed limits

on production and sales outside the US.61 Ironically, America brought an action

against the cartel for taking what could be argued to be a protectionist stance likeAmerica had itself done in the first instance. It is important to point out here that the

then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division later described this

action by the US as anti-competitive.62 In the same light, Americas recent

imposition of high tariffs on steel has drawn a lot of reaction from a number of

countries and some trade experts argue that the US move may undermine efforts to

liberalise world trade as agreed at the WTO meeting.63


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From the foregoing, OPEC, which does not consider its activities as being illegal,

could take a protectionist stance and argue that OPEC countries too have a right to

protect their industry - which is key to their economic growth - from oversupply.

Each nation, including the United States, reserves the right to deviate from the normsof competition when it perceives that such action is in its own self interest.64 As

observed by a Canadian Official,

Where a transnational antitrust issue is really a manifestation of a policy

conflict between national governments, it should be recognised that there

may be no applicable international law to resolve the conflict. In such

cases resolution should be sought through the normal methods ofconsultation and negotiation. For one government to seek to resolve the

conflict in its favour by invoking its national law before its domestic

tribunals is not the rule of law but an application, in judicial guise, of the

principle that economic might is right.65

A total disregard and departure from the comity of nations would indeed be ill

advised. Though not binding, it still has a role to play in todays world. This is a keyprinciple, which has formed the basis of many co-operation agreements among nations

and will still be relevant in the search for a truly International Competition Law

framework which will be acceptable to all.

Just as trade depends on market access, inter-governmental

understanding and co-operation depends to a great extent on the

international comity of nations. This may be particularly relevant whenconsidering what international rules should regulate the activities of

governments with respect to trade and competition.66

All this notwithstanding, the U.S. lodged a complaint against OPEC for its price

fixing activities at the Dispute Settlement Panel of WTO. It is interesting to observe

that the EU refrained from taking any position on this issue on the grounds that the


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WTO, in its opinion was not the appropriate platform on which to bring such an

action.67

Prior to this action, Prewitt Enterprises won a civil antitrust case against OPEC in

an Alabama court and obtained a one-year injunction banning the Organisation from

price fixing.68 The injunction was condemned by the Organisation, and the

Venezuelan Energy and Mines Minister Alvaro Silva Calderon affirmed that OPEC

would defend itself against what he called juridical absurdity.69On appeal, OPEC

won a stay on the ruling.

For now, it remains doubtful whether US antitrust laws can be successfully applied

extraterritorially to OPEC and it is debatable whether at all the U.S. should sit in

judgement of OPEC. Such an action by the Executive would surely lead to a

diplomatic row. Without the co-operation of OPEC nations, the carrying out of

investigations aimed at establishing proof and enforcement of decisions would be

nearly impossible.

In the absence of an International Competition Law regime binding on all, which

would be neutral and impartial towards all, the case against OPEC cannot be made.

The search for an international framework is on, although under what auspices it

should fall under remains unknown with possibilities including the OECD, UNCTAD

and the WTO.

A direct reference has not been made on the issue of OPEC although there appears to

be a consensus on the need to zero in on cartels. Maybe such an international regime

would eventually make pronouncements that may have some effect on the future of

OPEC. In the long run, international consensus on enforceable standards may resolve

many of the present disagreements. However, all indications are that the achievement

of such consensus is a long way off.70


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19

Id.20

Ibid.21

Ibid at 51.22

Love, J.,Antitrust Considerations in the petroleum industry29 March

(last visited on 14/03/02).

23Yergin, D., supra note 1 at 32-33.24

Brownlie, I., Principles of Public and International Law (5th

Ed. Ch. XV).25

Id 311.26

148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).27

Udin, A.C., supra note 8 at 1339.28

213 U.S. 347 (1909).29

549 F.2d 597 (9th

Cir. 1976).30

509 U.S. 764 (1993).31

F.3d (1stCir. 1997).

32Reynolds/Sicillian/Wellman:Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: [1998] ECLR

154.33

Brownlie, I., supra note 24 at 311.34

Whish, R. supra note 4 at 393-394.35Id.36

[1969] CMLR D23.37

Corah, V., Cases and Materials on EC Competition Law (2nd

Ed., Hart Publishing 2001) p. 269.38

(T-102/96) [1999] ECR II 753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971.39

Whish, R., supra note 4 at 403.40

Griffin, J.P.,Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction[1998] ECLR 64.41

Case Study: The Boeing-McDonnel Merger

(last visited on 25/03/02).42

GE and Honeywell fail to tie the knot


Whish, R., supra note 4 at 397.44

Nader, R.,Letter on Boeing McDonnell Douglas Merger

(last visited on 25/04/02).45Whish, R., supra note 4 at 391.

46168 U.S. 250 (1897).

47Rueda, A., supra note 14 at Ch. V.

4811 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

49Rueda, A., supra note 14.

50Udin, A. C., supra note 8 at 1349.

51477 F. Supp.at 553, 559-60.

52Udin, A.C., supra note 8 at 1358.

53Id at 355.

54Griffin, supra note 40 at 65.

55 (last visited on 21/04/02).

56Griffin, supra note 40 at 69.

57Id.58

Barrett, T Bill will allow antitrust suits against OPEC


OPEC rejects US Bill Against Oil Price Fixing


In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation617 F.2d at 1256.61

Id.62

Griffin, supra note 40 at 70.63

Three more countries join dispute over US steel tariff


Griffin, supra note 40 at 65.65

Id at 72.66

Marsden, P:A WTO Rule of Reason? [1998] ECLR 535.67EU Not to Join US in OPEC PriceDispute,

(last visited on 09/04/02).


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68

Id.69

Supra note 59.70

Griffin, supra note 40 at 66.

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

United States v. Aluminium Co of America148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945)

American Banana v. United Fruits213 U.S. 347 (1909)

Timberlane549 F.2d 597 (9thCir.1976)

Hartford Fire Insurance Co v. California509 U.S.764 (1993)

United States v. Nippon Paper Industry CoF.3d (1stCir. 1997)

Dyestuff (Re Cartel in Aniline Dyes)[1969] CMLR D23

Gencor v. Commission (T-102/96) [1999] ECR II 753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971

Underhill v. Hernandez168 U.S. 250 (1897)

Schooner Exchange v. Mc Faddon11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace workers v. OPEC 477 F.

Supp. at 553, 559-60

In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation617 F.2d at 1256

Secondary Sources:

Books:

Brownlie, I., Principles of Public and International Law (5th Ed. Clarendon University

Press, Oxford 1998)

Corah, V., Cases and Materials on EC Competition Law (2nd Ed. Hart Publishing,

2001)

Danielsen, A., The Evolution of OPEC (Harcourt Brace Javanovich Publishers 1982)

Whish, R., Competition Law (Butterworths, 2001)

Yergin, D., The Prize:The Epic Quest for Oil,Money and Power (Pocket Books, 1997)


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Articles:

Bolze, R.S., Pierce, J.C., Walsh, L.L., Antitrust Law Regulation: A new focus for

competitive energy industry2000 Energy Law Journal vol. 21

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(1981) ECLR 439

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