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Smismans, Stijn 2018. EU citizens' rights post Brexit: why direct effect beyond the EU is not

enough. European Constitutional Law Review 14 (3) , pp. 443-474. 10.1017/S1574019618000317 file

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EUcitizens’rightspostBrexit:whydirecteffectbeyondtheEUisnot

enough

(forthcominginEuropeanConstitutionalLawReview2018)

StijnSmismans∗

Brexit–EUcitizens’rights–directeffectbeyondtheEU–theWithdrawal

Agreementdoesnotprotectcitizensproperly–copyingsubstantiveprovisions

ofEUlawandpartsoftheEU’ssupranationalfeatures,suchasdirecteffect,does

notprovideequalprotectionforEUcitizensonceacountryisnolongerpartof

theEU–UK-specificimplementationmeasurestobesetoutinWithdrawal

AgreementorProtocol-guaranteesalsotobesetoutinprimarylegislation–the

UKGovernmentintendstoacttoagreatextentviasecondarylegislation–the

relationshipbetweentheWithdrawalActandtheWithdrawalAgreementand

ImplementationBill.

INTRODUCTION

OneofthekeyprioritiesoftheBrexitnegotiationshasbeentheprotectionofthe

3.5millionEUcitizensalreadyresidingintheUKandthemorethan1million

BritishcitizensresidingintheEU.Muchofthedebatehasfocusedonthe

materialscopeoftherightstheywillholdafterBrexit.ThedraftWithdrawal

Agreement1providesforastatusthatwouldcomeclosetotheircurrentstatus,

althoughthesecitizenswouldbedeprivedofsomeoftherightstheycurrently

hold,inparticularinrelationtofamilyreunionandtheincreasedriskofbeing

deportedonthebasisofcriminalityforactscommittedafterBrexit,whilethe

freemovementrightsofBritishcitizensresidingintheEUareonlyguaranteedin

thecountryinwhichtheyarecurrentlyresiding.Themainchallenge,however,

remainsinensuringthatEUcitizensintheUKandBritishcitizensintheEUcan

haveaccesstothisnewstatus;aswellasguaranteeingproperimplementationof

theWithdrawalAgreement.ThischallengeisespeciallydifficultforEUcitizens

intheUK,asthecountrywillnolongerbepartoftheEU,andwillthusfalloutof

thecomprehensivejudicialprotectionprovidedbyEUlaw.Therefore,this

articlefocusesonthelegalstatusofEUcitizensintheUK,ratherthanthatofthe

BritishcitizensintheEU.Inparticular,itwillanalysetheprocedural

mechanismsneededtoguaranteetheirrights,ratherthandebatethematerial

scopeoftheirstatus.2

∗ProfessorofEUlawandDirectoroftheCentreforEuropeanLawandGovernanceatCardiff

University.IwouldliketothankMoniqueHawkins,LukePiper,LaurentPech,JoelleGroganand

threeanonymousreviewersforusefulcommentsonanearlierversionofthispaper.1DraftAgreementonthewithdrawaloftheUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthern

IrelandfromtheEuropeanUnionandtheEuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunityhighlightingthe

progressmade(colouredversion)inthenegotiationroundwiththeUKof16-19March2018,

TF50(2018)35–CommissiontoEU27,19March2018.2InthisarticleIdonotaddresstheconceptofEUcitizenship.Surprisingly,theconceptual

debateonEUcitizenshipinthecontextofBrexithasparticularlyfocusedontheideaof‘associate

Anxietyaboutthefateofthe3.5millionEUcitizensintheUKhasincreasedin

thelightoftheUK’sapproachtoimmigration,whichisbothdraconianand

notoriousforahighimplementationerrorratebytheHomeOffice(Ministryof

internalaffairs).InApril2018,thethenHomeSecretary(Ministerofinternal

affairs)AmberRuddresignedasaconsequenceofthe‘Windrush’scandal,3

whichbroughttolighthowpeoplefromCaribbeanorigin,whohadlivedlegally

intheUKfordecades,weresuddenlydeprivedofallentitlements,detainedand

sometimesdeported,becausetheirlegalentryintothecountrydecadesearlier

wassuddenlycontested.SuchtreatmentisnotuniquetotheWindrush

generation,anditiseasytoseetheparallelswiththepositionEUcitizensmight

findthemselvesinafterBrexitastheywereneveraskedforanyproofoftheir

statusuntilnow.

ItisnosurprisethenthattheEUhassoughttoensurethatEUcitizenswouldstill

beabletoprofitfromacertainlevelof‘supranationalprotection’afterBrexit.

Indeed,thedraftWithdrawalAgreementstatesthatitssectiononcitizens’rights

willhavedirecteffectintheUK,andthepreliminaryrulingsprocedureshould

remainavailablefor8yearsafterBrexit.Fromaninternationallawandnational

sovereigntyperspective,thissupranationalprotectionappearsextraordinary.

NeverhavethesesupranationalfeaturesofEUlawreachedbeyondtheEU.

However,itwouldbewrongtoassumethatEUcitizensintheUKnowhave

extraordinaryprotection.Besidethefactthatthepromised‘settledstatus’is

inferiortotherightstheycurrentlyenjoy,themainproblemisthatmanyremain

atriskoffailingtoproveentitlementtothisstatus,whiletoolsformonitoring

andenforcementareweak.InthisarticleIarguethattheEU,andinparticular

theEuropeanCommission,hasbeentoocomplacentandhastakenaformalistic

approachtothenegotiations,ignoringtheparticularchallengesof

implementationintheUKasacountryoutsideoftheEU.TheEU’sapproachto

citizens’rightsinthewithdrawalnegotiationsisbasedonadoubleflaw.Ittakes

acut-and-pasteapproachto,respectively,EUsupranationalprinciples(suchas

directeffect)andsubstantiveEUlawprovisions(suchastheCitizens’Directive

2004/38/EC),andpretendsthattheliteraltransferoftheseprinciplesand

provisionswouldofferthesamelevelofprotectiontoEUcitizensevenina

countrythatwillnolongerbeamemberoftheEU.Unfortunatelythisfailsto

takeintoaccounttheparticularchallengesEUcitizensfaceintheUK,whichis

duebothtothelegacyofhowtheUKhasdealtwithEUimmigrationinthepast

andtothelimitationsofEUoversightwhentheUKisoutoftheEU.Asaresult,

citizenship’,promotedbyGuyVerhofstadt,whichwouldguaranteeEUcitizenshiprightsfor

BritishnationalsevenifnotyetresidingintheEU.Ontheprofoundconceptualandlegal

problemsofthatproposal,seeM.vandenBrinkandD.Kochenov,‘Acriticalperspectiveon

associateEUcitizenshipafterBrexit’,DCUBrexitInstituteWorkingPaper(2018)No.5;at

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175318.Forotherinteresting

contributionsonEUcitizenshippost-BrexitseeP.Mindus(2017),Europeancitizenshipafter

Brexit(Palgrave2017);andS.Reynolds,‘(De)constructingtheroadtoBrexit:Pavingthewayto

furtherlimitationstothefreemovementandequaltreatment?’,inDanielThym(ed),Questioning

EUCitizenship:JudgesandtheLimitsofFreeMovementandSolidarityintheEU’,(Hart2017),p.57.

WhilemuchremainstobesaidonEUcitizenshipconceptuallyinthelightofrecent

developments,thefocusofthispaperisonidentifyingtheproceduralmechanismsneededto

protectEUcitizensintheUKproperly.3TheWeek,‘WhoaretheWindrushGenerationandhowhasthescandalunfolded’,availableat

http://www.theweek.co.uk/92944/who-are-the-windrush-generation-and-why-are-they-facing-

deportation.

anddespitethe‘extraordinary’referencetodirecteffectandpreliminaryrulings,

theWithdrawalAgreementleavesEUcitizensinaveryvulnerableposition.

InthefirstsectionIanalysethekeysubstantiveflawoftheWithdrawal

Agreement,whichconsistsincopyingintotheWithdrawalAgreementthesame

levelofdiscretionforimplementationthatisbuiltintotheCitizensDirective

2004/38/EC.WhilesuchdiscretionmaybeappropriateforMemberStates

withintheEU,ithasverydifferentconsequenceswhenacountryisnolonger

partoftheEU.Thecombinationofintroducingaconstitutiveinsteadof

declaratoryregistrationsystem,theUK’s‘hostileenvironment’immigration

policyandtheweaksupranationalguaranteeswhenoutoftheEU,meansthat

manyEUcitizensriskimmediatelossofallentitlementstowork,healthcare,

benefits,andultimatelyfacedeportation.Iarguethattheonlywaytoguarantee

thisdoesnothappenisbysettingoutadetailedprocedurewithinthe

WithdrawalAgreement,orinaseparateProtocolattachedtoit,onhowtheUK

willorganisetheregistrationofEUcitizens.

Insection2,IanalysethemainproceduralflawoftheWithdrawalAgreement,

namelytheassumptionthatasimplerequirementtoapplydirecteffectto

citizens’rightswouldprovidesufficientprotectionforEUcitizenstoretaintheir

currentstatus.Iwillfirstanalysetheproceduralimplementationmechanisms

describedintheJointReport.TheJointReportwasadoptedbytheUKandtheEU

inDecember2017tosetoutthepoliticalagreementonwhatwouldbewrittenin

theWithdrawalAgreement.TheJointReportseemstotakeintoaccountthe

particularchallengesofimplementationinanon-EUcountrybysuggestinga

doubleguarantee,namelydirecteffectandthefullincorporationofcitizens’

rightsintoprimarylegislation.However,theWithdrawalAgreementisless

detailedregardinghowtheUKshouldimplementtheAgreement.Itappearsto

assumethatbysimplycopyingtheprincipleofdirecteffect,EUcitizenswouldbe

properlyprotected.However,thisunderestimatesthedifficultiesof

implementingthesupranationalfeaturesofEUlawinanon-EUcountry.Iwill

arguewhysuchadoubleguarantee,namelydirecteffectandcitizens’rights

provisionsinprimarylegislation,isindeedhighlydesirable.

HavinganalysedthetwomainflawsoftheWithdrawalAgreement,inthefinal

sectionIwillanalysehowthisinteractswiththelegalframeworktheUKis

settinguptotakeitselfoutoftheEUandimplementtheWithdrawalAgreement,

inparticularinrelationtotheimplementationofcitizens’rights.Thisframework

isconstitutedoftheEuropeanUnionWithdrawalAct(bywhichtheUKtakes

itselfoutoftheEU,butretainsexistingEUlawuntilrevisionbyfutureUKlaw)

(furtherreferredtoasWithdrawalAct),4theWithdrawalAgreementand

ImplementationBill(furtherreferredtoasImplementationBill),andthe

proposedregistrationsystem(assetoutintheStatementofIntentregardingthe

EUSettlementScheme).5Theproposedlegalframeworksuggeststhe

GovernmentwillhaveconsiderableleewaytoimplementEUcitizens’rights.In

theabsenceofpropersupranationalprotectionandclearguaranteessetoutin

primarylegislation,theresidencestatusofmanyEUcitizensisatrisk,

4EuropeanUnion(Withdrawal)Act2018c.16,26.06.2018.5HomeOffice,EUSettlementScheme:StatementofIntent,21.06.2018.

particularlywhenalsotakingintoaccountthesubstantiveflawofthe

WithdrawalAgreement.

IconcludethattheEUshouldsetasideitsformalisticapproach,and

acknowledgethatcopyingpartsoftheEU’ssupranationalprinciplessuchas

directeffectandsubstantiveprovisionsofEUlawisnotthesameasmaintaining

thecurrentprotectionofEUcitizens.Unlikewhatmayappearatfirstsight,the

inclusionofdirecteffectandpreliminaryreferenceprocedureintheWithdrawal

Agreementdoesnotprovide‘extraordinary’protectiontoEUcitizens.Itisnot

extraordinaryasthereareseriouslimitstothe‘supranationality’provided;and

itisdefinitelynotextraordinaryinguaranteeingthatEUcitizensintheUKwill

notbedeprivedoftheircurrentrights.Inordertoavoidthelatter,theEUshould

takeintoaccounttheparticularfeaturesoftheUKlegalsystemasacountryno

longerpartoftheEU,andadjustguaranteesintheWithdrawalAgreement

accordingly.ThiscanbedonebyadoptingaseparateProtocolattachedtothe

WithdrawalAgreementinwhichtheUKwouldsetoutitsregistrationsystem

(therebyovercomingtheriskofthediscretionprovidedbytheCitizens’

Directive),andbyincludingintotheWithdrawalAgreementaclearrequirement

tosetoutintoprimarylegislationnotonlytheprincipleofdirecteffectbutalso

thesubstantivecitizens’rightsprovisions.

THESUBSTANTIVEFLAWOFTHEWITHDRAWALAGREEMENT

Whycopy-and-pasteisnotthesameasmaintainingcurrentprotection

TheWithdrawalAgreementcopiesmostofthesubstantiverightsprovidedby

theEUCitizens’Directive2004/38/EC,6theprofessionalqualificationsDirective7

andthefreemovementofworkersandsocialsecurityRegulations.8EUcitizens

intheUKwouldthusbeabletorelyonmostoftheserightsofresidence,and

non-discriminationagainstnationalsinrelationtotherighttowork,providing

services,accesstohealthcareandbenefits.Somerightswerestronglydisputed

inthenegotiationsandthepublicdebate;andEUcitizenshavetogiveupsome

oftheirrightsintheWithdrawalAgreement.E.g.underEUlaw,anEUcitizenhas

morerightsthanaBritishcitizentobringinathirdcountryspouse,whichwas

unacceptablefortheBritishnegotiators.Anotherproblemwastherightto

returntotheUK.UnderEUlaw,acitizencanlosetheirpermanentresidence

aftertwoyearsofabsence,butcanstillrelyonEUfreemovementrulestoreturn.

6Directive2004/38/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof29April2004onthe

rightofcitizensoftheUnionandtheirfamilymemberstomoveandresidefreelywithinthe

territoryoftheMemberStatesamendingRegulation(EEC)No1612/68andrepealingDirectives

64/221/EEC,68/360/EEC,72/194/EEC,73/148/EEC,75/34/EEC,75/35/EEC,90/364/EEC,

90/365/EECand93/96/EEC(OJL158,30.4.2004,p.77).7Directive2005/36/ECoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof7September2005on

therecognitionofprofessionalqualifications(OJL255,30.9.2005,p.22).8Regulation(EU)No492/2011oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof5April2011on

freedomofmovementforworkerswithintheUnion(OJL141,27.5.2011,p.1).Regulation(EC)

No883/2004oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof29April2004onthecoordination

ofsocialsecuritysystems(OJL166,30.4.2004,p.1);andRegulation(EC)No987/2009ofthe

EuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof16September2009layingdowntheprocedurefor

implementingRegulation(EC)No883/2004onthecoordinationofsocialsecuritysystems(OJ

L284,30.10.2009,p.1).

AfterBrexit,thelatteroptionwouldfallaway;unlessEUcitizensweregivenan

unconditionalrighttoreturn.ThedraftWithdrawalAgreementsettledfora

compromiseforarighttoreturnforfiveyears.Mostproblematically,theEUhas

acceptedthattheUKcandeporteventhosewithpermanentresidencefor

criminalconductafterBrexit.Ratherthanstickingtotherestrictivegroundsof

deportationsetoutintheCitizens’Directive,theUKwillbeallowedtosetoutits

owndefinitionofcriminalconductliabletodeportation.

Allthesetopics,inwhichthematerialscopeofthenewstatuswoulddifferfrom

thatoftheCitizens’Directive,haveattractedstrongdebateandtheEuropean

Parliamentinparticularisstillsettofightforensuringalltheserightstothefull.

Thisislaudablefromtheperspectivethatthesecitizenshavebuiltuptheirlifein

thelegitimateexpectationthattheywereprotectedbyEUcitizenship,andthere

ismuchtobesaidforconsideringtheserightsasacquiredrights.9

Atthesametime,thefocusinthenegotiationsonthematerialscopeofthenew

status-called‘settledstatus’intheUK,althoughtheWithdrawalAgreementuses

theconcept‘permanentresidence’-10hasovershadoweddiscussiononwhocan

obtainthisstatus,andhowtheycandoso.

TheEUhastakenaformalisticapproachandsimplycopiedthepersonalscope

andburdenofproofrequirementssetoutintheCitizens’Directive,assuming

thiswouldguaranteeEUcitizensthesamerightsastheyholdnow.

Unfortunately,thisfailstotakeintoaccounttheparticularchallengesofapplying

thesecriteriaintheUKonceitisnolongerpartoftheEU.

Inanutshell,inordertoobtaintheresidencerightsprovidedbytheEUCitizens’

Directive,oneneedstobeinwork(orhavebeeninwork),ordemonstrate

havingsufficientresourcesandcomprehensivesicknessinsurance.Thereisa

levelofdiscretionfortheMemberStatesonwhetherandtowhatextentthey

imposeandcontrolthesecriteria.Onecandiscusswhetherthesystemsetupby

theDirectiveprovidesthebestbalancebetweenfacilitatingfreemovement(and

protectingthosewhomadeuseofit)andallowingMemberStatessomescopeto

imposerestrictionsinordertoensureviabilityoftheirwelfaresystem.Itisnot

theplaceheretorepeatthatdebate.11Rather,whileassumingthesystem

9Theconceptof‘acquiredrights’astraditionallyusedininternationallawhaslimitedscopeto

protectalltherightsprovidedbyEUcitizenship.SeeHouseofLords,EuropeanUnion

Committee,‘Brexit:AcquiredRights’,10threportofsession2016-17,HLPaper82,14December

2016.Yet,inareportfortheEuropeanParliament,VolkerRoebenetal.developtheargumentof

‘continuity’onthebasisofEUcitizenship.SeeV.Roeben,J.Snell,P.Minnerop,P.TellesandK.

BushQC,ThefeasibilityofassociateEUcitizenshipforUKcitizenspost-Brexit,AstudyforJillEvans

MEP,July2017.Idonotagreewiththeauthorsthatsuchcontinuityispossibleforthosewho

haveneverexercisedthefreemovementrights,buttheargumentmeritselaborationforthose

whohave;whichis,though,beyondthescopeofthispaper.10ThroughoutthenegotiationstheEUhasalwaysreferredtoitsexistingconceptof‘permanent

residence’,whiletheUKnegotiatorsusedtheconceptof‘settledstatus’instead,whichisalsothe

conceptusedintheGovernment’sproposalonhowitwillimplementtheregistrationsystem.

SeeHomeOffice,EUSettlementScheme:StatementofIntent,21.06.2018.‘Settledstatus’is

sometimesusedinterchangeablywith‘indefiniteleavetoremain’whichisakeyconceptofUK

immigrationlaw.11S.Giubboni,‘FreemovementofpersonsandEuropeansolidarity,13EuropeanLawJournal,

(2007)p.360;D.Thym,Theelusivelimitsofsolidarity:residencerightsofandsocialbenefitsfor

economicallyinactiveunioncitizens,52CommonMarketLawReview(2015),p.17;E.Spaventa,

‘EarnedCitizenship:UnderstandingUnionCitizenshipThroughitsScope’inD.Kochenov(ed)EU

providesforamoreorlessfairbalance,onehastorealiseitsproperfunctioning

sofarappearstohavebeendependentonasetofconditions,noneofwhichis

realisedinthecontextofBrexit:

1) TheDirectiveallowstheMemberStatestointroducearegistration

systemwhichrequiresEUcitizenstoregistersoonafterarrival.Itequally

providesthatEUcitizenshaveacquiredpermanentresidenceoncethey

havelegallyresidedforfiveyearsinthecountryonthebasisofthe

conditionsoftheDirective.MemberStatesarerequiredtoprovidea

procedureallowingthesecitizens,iftheydesireso,toreceivea

permanentresidencedocumentthatconfirmsthatstatus.MostMember

Stateshaveintroducedanobligatoryinitialregistrationsystem.Asa

resultpeoplehavesomeproofoftheirresidencestatusfromarrival,

whichfacilitatesacquiringapermanentresidencedocumentiftheydesire

toobtainoneafterfiveyears.Yet,peoplewillrarelyapplyforsucha

permanentresidencedocumentsincetheinitialregistrationismostoften

sufficienttoprofitfromthefullprotectionofrightsprovidedbyEU

citizenship,andabsenceofthepermanentresidencedocumentdoesnot

necessarilyimplyyouhavenotacquiredpermanentresidence.

TheUK,instead,hasneverintroducedacompulsoryregistrationsystem

onarrival;whichechoestheUK’soveralllackofageneralpopulation

registeroruseofIDcards.EUcitizensweregivenalltherightsprovided

bytheCitizens’Directivewithoutaregistrationsystem,requiringthem

simplytopresentaEuropeanIDorpassportwhenaccessingservices.

Theywerenotaskedtoprovideproofofbeinginworkorhaving

sufficientresourcesandcomprehensivesicknessinsurance.Asaresult,

peoplealsodidnotfeeltheneedtoaskforapermanentresidencecard

oncetheywerefiveyearsinthecountry.Brexitputsthissystemonits

head.TheUKwouldnowintroduceacompulsoryregistration,notonly

onarrivalbutevenforpermanentresidence.Moreover,thisrequirement

wouldnowretroactivelybeappliedtothosealreadyinthecountry.

Suddenlyrequiringproofinrelationtoentitlementthatisbasedon

conditionsthatmaygobackyearsordecadesishighlyproblematicas

peoplemightfailtoprovideevidenceofinitialarrivalandcompliance.It

iseasyheretoseetheriskofapotentialrepeatoftheWindrushscandal

inwhichpeoplewereequallyaskedtoprovideproofofentitlementfor

situationsyearsanddecadesago,whiletheyhadbeenconsideredtobe

livingintheUKlegallyallthattime.

2) TheDirective’ssystemofregistrationforpermanentresidenceis

declaratory,soabsenceofthedocumentdoesnotmeanyouarenot

entitled.Furthermore,peopleonlyrisklosingentitlementswhentheState

hasreasonabledoubtthattheyareaburdenontheirwelfaresystem,

ratherthantheStatebeingabletoapplycheckssystematically.12

CitizenshipandFederalism:theRoleofRights,(CambridgeUniversityPress2017)p.204;D.Thym

(ed)QuestioningEUCitizenshipJudgesandtheLimitsofFreeMovementandSolidarityintheEU

(Hart2017);F.PenningsandM.Seeleib-Kaiser(eds)EUCitizenshipandSocialRightsEntitlements

andImpedimentstoAccessingWelfare(Elgar2018).12Article14Directive2004/38/EC.

Instead,theregistrationsystemthattheUKwillintroduceafterBrexit

willbeconstitutiveinnature.AttherequestoftheUK,theWithdrawal

Agreementgivestheoptiontosetupeitheraconstitutiveregistration

system,13orkeeptheexistingdeclaratorysystem.14Unlikeina

declaratorysystem,inaconstitutivesystemonehastosuccessfullyapply

inordertoobtainthestatus.Incaseoneisrejectedorhasnotmadean

application,onelosesallentitlementsandfacesdeportation.The

consequencesofnotholdinga‘settledstatus’documentarethusmuch

harder-hittingthanwhenonedoesnotholdapermanentresidence

documentunderEUlaw.Inthelatterdeclaratorysystem,absenceofthe

documentdoesnotmeanyouarenotentitled.Evenifyourapplicationis

rejectedyoumightstillbeabletostayonatemporarybasis,ormightbe

abletoreturnunderfreemovementprovisions.IntheUKpost-Brexit

instead,thereisnosuch‘fall-backprotection’ofgeneralfreemovement

provisionsifyoufailyoursettledstatusapplication.Moreover,

theconsequencesofaconstitutiveregistrationsystemcanbeparticularly

direifcombinedwiththeUK’sso-called‘hostileenvironment’policyto

immigration.15PriortobecomingPrimeMinister,TheresaMayasHome

Secretaryintroducedapolicyshedeliberatelycalled‘thehostile

environment’toillegalimmigration.The‘hostileenvironment’forcesall

sortsofpublicandprivateactors,fromhospitalstobanksandschools,to

activelycheckforcitizensnothavingtherequiredpapers.Once

identified,peopleloseallentitlements;theywon’thaveaccessto

healthcareandbenefits(andmaybeaskedtopaybackwhateverthey

havereceivedovermanyyears),theywilllosetheirjob(astheir

employerwillbefinedotherwise),theirbankaccountisfrozen;andthey

areaskedtoleavethecountry;failureofwhichleadstoforced

deportation,whichcanhappenpriortoanyrecoursetoappeal.Whileitis

nottheplaceheretodiscusswhetherthisisanappropriatewaytodeal

with‘illegalimmigrants’,thekeyissueisthattheUKhasappliedsuch

‘hostileenvironment’measureseventopeoplewhoarelegallyentitledto

staybutstruggledtoprovetheirentitlement.Thisismainlyduetothe

factthattheUKhasnopropersystemofregistrationandidentitycards,

whiletheHomeOfficehasaremarkablyhighadministrativeerrorrate16

13Article17(1)to(3)WithdrawalAgreement.14Article17(4)WithdrawalAgreement.15IndependentChiefInspectorofBordersandImmigration,‘InspectionReportofthehostile

environment’(October2016),availableat

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/inspection-report-of-hostile-environment-

measures-october-2016;andK.McDonald,‘WhatisHostileEnvironment,TheresaMay’spolicy

thatledtotheWindrushscandalandotherproblems’,NewsTheEssentialDailyBriefing(April

17th2018),athttps://inews.co.uk/news/politics/what-is-hostile-environment-theresa-may-

windrush-eu-citizens-legal-immigrants/.

16ReportsbytheParliamentaryandHealthServiceOmbudsmanshowthattheHomeOfficeis

oneofthemaindepartmentsreceivingcomplaintsandhasthehighestupholdrate.Inthesecond

quarterof2017,47%ofthe14,170determinedappealsagainstHomeOfficeimmigration

decisionsweregranted.SeeHouseofCommonsHomeAffairsCommittee,‘ImmigrationPolicy:

basisforbuildingconsensus’,SecondReportof2017-2019,HC500,10,January2018,paragraph

43.

andappliesKafkaesqueburdenofproofrequirements.Thedramatic

consequencesofthisapproachhavebeenclearlyillustratedbythe

Windrushscandal.Peoplewhohadbeenlivinglegallyinthecountryfor

decadessuddenlylosttheirentitlementtocancertreatment,wereasked

topaybackyearsofsocialbenefits,weresackedbytheiremployer,were

refusedre-entryintothecountryafterashorttripabroadandtherebycut

offfromtheirfamily,weredetainedindeportationcentresandremoved.

3) TheDirectiveisimplementedwithinthecontextofthejudicialoversight

andtheremediesprovidedbyEUlaw.EUcitizenscanrelyondirecteffect

andsupremacy,whiletheyhaveaccesstothepreliminaryreference

procedure.Moreover,theinfringementprocedureensurestop-down

controloverMemberStates’implementationofEUlaw.OncetheUK

leavestheEU,thiscomprehensivesystemisnolongerinplace.AsIwill

argueinmoredetailbelow,therearesomedoubtsabouttowhatextent

‘directeffect’aspromisedintheWithdrawalAgreementwillbeensured.

Equally,itisuncertaintowhatextentUKjudgeswillmakeuseofthe

optiontoreferapreliminaryrulingtotheCJEU.Moreover,the

WithdrawalAgreementnolongerofferstheinfringementprocedureasa

waytocontrolrespectofEUlaw.

Hence,whiletheEUpretendstheWithdrawalAgreementwilloffer(nearly)the

sameprotectiontoEUcitizensastherightstheycurrentlyholdunderthe

Citizens’Directive,theacceptanceofaconstitutivesystem,combinedwithpast

andcurrentUKimmigrationlegacymeansthatacopy-and-pasteoftheCitizens’

Directivecanhavedramaticconsequencesoncethecountryisnolongerpartof

theEU.

ThiscanbestbeillustratedbytakingintoaccountthewaytheUKhasuntilnow

implementedtheregistrationforpermanentresidenceundertheCitizens’

Directive.AsthatsystemisdeclaratorynotmanyEUcitizenshavefelttheneed

toapplyforapermanentresidencecard,althoughapplicationsincreasedafter

theBrexitreferendumaspeoplehopedpermanentresidencewouldgivethem

moreprotection.17Manywhohaveapplieddidsoinordertosubsequentlyapply

forBritishcitizenship18sincesuccessfulregistrationofpermanentresidencehas

becomeapreconditionforcitizenshipin2015.19

However,whileapplicationtoobtainapermanentresidencecardwasnot

compulsory,thesystemhasbeenparticularlycomplicatedintermsofrequiring

proofofresidence.EUcitizenshavetoapplyviaa85pagelongapplication

document,withpoorguidelines,andhavetoprovideextensivedocumentation

17295.000EUcitizensweregrantedPRstatusintheperiod2004to2017.58%ofthosewerein

2016and2017.SeeTheMigrationObservatory,‘UnsettledStatus.WhichEUcitizensareatrisk

offailingtosecuretheirrightsafterBrexit?,12April2018,at

http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/unsettled-status-which-eu-citizens-

are-at-risk-of-failing-to-secure-their-rights-after-brexit/18Intheperiod2004to2017,148.000EUcitizensobtainedBritishcitizenship.Ibid.footnote16.19ApplicationsbyEUcitizenswentupslightlyafterintroducingthisrequirement,butwentup

dramaticallyaftertheBrexitreferendum,seedatainP.DuncanandL.O’Carroll,‘Sharprisein

numberofEUnationalsapplyingforUKcitizenship’,TheGuardian,14March2018,at

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/14/sharp-rise-in-number-of-eu-nationals-

applying-for-uk-citizenship

(inoriginalorcertifieddocuments)toshowtheyhavecompliedwiththe

Citizens’Directives’requirementsofbeingeitherinwork(orhavingbeenin

work)orhavingsufficientresourcesandcomprehensivesicknessinsurance.The

applicationprocesshasbeensocomplicatedthat28%ofEUcitizensapplyingfor

itfailedtheirapplication.20

IftheUK’sregistrationsystemfor‘settledstatus’post-Brexitisbasedona

similarburdenofproofrequirement,theconsequenceswouldbedramatic.

UnlikeforthedeclaratoryPRsystem,all3.5millionEUcitizenswillbeobligedto

registerunderthenewconstitutivesystem,andfailureoftheapplicationwill

meanimmediatelybeingfacedwithalltheconsequencesofthe‘hostile

environment’,losingallentitlementsandfacingdeportation.A28%rejection

undertheseconditionswouldbeanightmare.

Yet,thereislittleinthedraftWithdrawalAgreementthatwouldpreventtheUK

fromintroducingaregistrationsystemnearlyasdemandingintermsofburden

ofproofasitspreviouspermanentresidencesystem,becausetheWithdrawal

AgreementmainlycopiesthecriteriaanddiscretionavailabletotheMember

StatesintheCitizens’Directive.Article17(1)oftheWithdrawalAgreement

doestrytosetsomelimitstoavoidthattheUK’sburdensomepermanent

residenceprocedurewouldbecopiedintoaconstitutiveregistrationsystemfor

settledstatus.Forinstance,itshouldbepossiblethatsupportingdocuments,

otherthanidentitydocumentsmaybesubmittedincopy(art.17(1)j).Itrequires

thattheapplicationprocessshouldbe‘smooth,transparentandsimple’,‘any

unnecessaryadministrativeburdenshavetobeavoided’(art.17(1)e);and

applicationformshavetobe‘short,simpleanduser-friendly’(art.17(1)f).

However,muchofthisremainsopentointerpretation,particularlyinthe

absenceofestablishedcaselawanduncertaintyabouthowmuchasaytheCourt

ofJusticewillgetonthismatter.Mostimportantly,itdoesnotalterthemain

qualifyingcriteria,basedonbeinginworkorhavingsufficientresources,andthe

difficultyofprovingtheseretrospectively.

TheUKcouldstillaskforahighnumberofdocumentstoproveworkstatusor

havingsufficientresources,eventoprovesituationsseveraldecadesago.Itmay

equallystillrequirethosenotinworktoprovetheyhaveacomprehensive

sicknessinsurance.Thelatterrequirementhasbeenparticularlyproblematicin

theUK,sincetheUKhasnotacceptedthathavingaccesstotheNationalHealth

Service(NHS)fulfilstherequirementofhavingcomprehensivesickness

insurance.AllEUcitizensresidingintheUKhavebeengivenaccesstotheNHS,

sohardlyany(andparticularlynotthosewhoarenotinwork)havetakena

privatehealthinsurance.Itisevenquestionablethat,giventhebroadreliance

ontheNHS,anyoftheexistingprivateinsuranceschemescouldevenbe

consideredtobe‘comprehensive’.21Hence,requiringacomprehensivesickness

20ReissEdwards,ImmigrationLawyersLondon,‘HomeOfficeRejectsover28%Permanent

ResidencyApplications–Report’athttps://immigrationlawyers-london.com/blog/high-

permanent-residence-rejection-rates.php21A.Herbeć,‘ThescandalofCSI,thelittle-knownloopholeusedtodenyEUcitizenspermanent

residency’,availableat:http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/03/17/disheartened-and-

disappointed-the-government-and-universities-have-failed-eu-citizens-over-comprehensive-

sickness-insurance/

insuranceandnotconsideringNHSaccessascomplyingwiththatrequirement

wouldvirtuallyautomaticallyexcludeallthosewhoarenotinwork.The

EuropeanCommissionhascriticisedtheUKonthispoint22,butnevertaken

enforcementactionontheissue.Iftherewerealreadyproblemswiththewayin

whichtheUKimplementedtheCitizens’DirectivewhilestillintheEU,itwill

becomeevenmorechallengingwhentheWithdrawalAgreementappliesthe

samecriteriafortheUKwhensupranationalsupervisionwillbeevenweaker,

andtheregistrationisnotadeclaratorybutaconstitutiveone,suddenly

applyingto3.5millionpeople.

Frompoliticalstatementstolegalcommitments

TheUKisfullyawarethatapplyingasimilarsystemasitspermanentresidence

applicationprocedurewouldconstituteanadministrative,socialandpolitical

disaster.Registering3.5millioncitizensviaaproceduresimilartothe

permanentresidenceapplicationwouldrequirehugeadministrativeresources

andtakedecades.Atthesametime,deportingover28%ofthe3.5millionEU

citizensisnotdesirablepolitically,economicallyorsocially.SotheUKhassigned

uptosomeprocedurallimitationstotheconstitutiveregistrationsystemasset

outinArticle17oftheWithdrawalAgreement,asdiscussedabove.Additionally,

theUKhaspromisedpoliticallytointroduceasimpleregistrationprocedure

basedonlyonproofoflegalresidence,identityandcriminalitycheck.Thishas

beentranslatedintoa‘StatementofIntent’,announcingaproposalforthe

registrationsystem.23

TheGovernmenthasexplicitlystatedthatitwouldnotapplytherequirementsof

comprehensivesicknessinsuranceandbeingin‘genuineandeffectivework’.24

Intheory,thelatterwouldimplythattheUKwouldnotcheckonbeinginworkat

all,andthatnomeanstestingwouldbeappliedeither.UnderEUlawmeans

testingisonlyapplicableifoneisnotin‘genuineandeffectivework’,anditisthe

latterdefinitionbywhichtheCJEUhassetouttheparametersofwhatcanbe

askedintermsofproofofbeinginwork.Yet,thepreciseintentionsofthe

Governmentremainunclear.Ithassaiditwillintroduceanonlineregistration

procedure,25basedonidentityanddeclarationofresidenceandwhetheronehas

acriminalrecord.TheGovernmentwillthencheckwhetherthisisconfirmedby

existingdatabases,particularlyfromthetaxofficeHMRCandDepartmentfor

WorkandPensions.Thisraisesthequestionofwhatproofwillberequiredof

peoplewhoarenot(sufficiently)inthesedatabases.Willthosepeoplestillbe

requiredtoshowproofofbeinginworkorhavingsufficientresources?Thelist

22http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en.htm23HomeOffice,EUSettlementScheme:StatementofIntent,21.06.2018.Thiswilltaketheformof

anamendmentoftheImmigrationRules;seediscussionbelow.24HMGovernment,‘TechnicalNote.Citizens’rights-AdministrativeproceduresintheUK’,7

November2017,paragraph11;athttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-

rights-administrative-procedures-in-the-uk;andHomeOffice,EUSettlementScheme:Statement

ofIntent,21.06.2018.25HMGovernment,‘TechnicalNote.Citizens’rights-AdministrativeproceduresintheUK’,7

November2017,paragraph6;athttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-

administrative-procedures-in-the-uk

ofacceptabledocumentsofprooflistedintheStatementofIntent26suggeststhat

somepeoplemightbeabletoprovidesufficientproofevenifnotinworkor

withoutsufficientresources,buttheinsistencethattheevidenceshouldneatly

coverthecontinuityofresidenceduringfiveyearsmightprovedifficultforthose

notinwork.Moreover,thisissofaronlyastatementofintent;andevenif

turnedintolaw,theconditionsmightbeeasilyamenable.

ThebasicfindingremainsthattheWithdrawalAgreementstillleavestheUKthe

nearlyfulldiscretionoftheCitizens’Directive;soitsrequirementscangofrom

askingasingledocumentshowingresidencepriortoBrexitwhichwouldallow

nearlyEUcitizenstoobtainsettledstatus,toaburdensomeprocesssimilartoits

permanentresidenceregistrationsystem,whichcouldleadtoover28%getting

alettertoleavethecountry.Moreover,asIwillshowbelow,theWithdrawal

Agreementdoesnotprovideguaranteesthatthesecriteriawouldbesetoutin

primarylegislation,thusmakingthesecriteriaopentoadjustmentsbyexecutive

actionandEUcitizensatriskofagradualunderminingoftheirstatus.

SowhyhastheEUnotmademoreefforttoensuretheUK’spoliticalstatements

wouldbeturnedintolegalcommitmentsandavoidsomanyofitscitizensrisk

deportation?

TheEuropeanCommissionhastakenaformalisticapproacharguingthatEU

citizensretainthesameentitlementsasundertheEUCitizens’Directive,and

thuspretendingtheyarenotatrisk.However,thatfailstoacknowledgethat

thesecriteriacannotoperateinthesamewaywhentheyareappliedinacountry

thatneverhadregistrationandwillintroduceaconstitutiveregistrationsystem

whenitisnolongeraMemberoftheEU.Therefusaltoacceptthisreasoning

seemstobeinspiredbythefearthatwritingmoredetailsintotheWithdrawal

AgreementonasimplerregistrationsystemintheUKwouldputtheother27

MemberStatesunderpressuretoapplyasimilarprocedure,andthusdefacto

underminethediscretionallowedbytheCitizens’Directive.However,the

WithdrawalAgreementisaninternationaltreaty.Itcansetparticularprovisions

fortheUK(as,infact,itdoesonotherissues),27andthisapproachwouldbe

justifiedbythefactthatthelegalsituationinacountryoutoftheEUisnot

identicaltothatofcountriesintheEU.Hence,legallythiscanbedonewithinthe

WithdrawalAgreementwithoutimposingnewrequirementsontheother27

MemberStates.Nevertheless,ifthereispoliticalreluctancebytheremaining

MemberStates,analternativesolutionistosetouttheUK’spoliticalstatements

regardingasimpleregistrationbasedmerelyonresidence,IDandcriminality

checkintoaProtocolattachedtotheWithdrawalAgreement.SuchaProtocol

wouldbeabindingcommitmentbytheUKonhowitwillimplementthe

WithdrawalAgreement.28

26AnnexAtotheStatementofIntent.27E.g.Article4WithdrawalAgreementaddressesparticularlyhowtheUKshouldimplementthe

WithdrawalAgreement;Article151makesthepreliminaryreferenceprocedureapplicabletothe

UK,whileArticle152requiresthecreationofindependentauthoritytomonitorimplementation

oftheWithdrawalAgreementonlyintheUK.28ForadetailedproposalonwhatsuchaProtocolcouldlooklike,seeS.Smismans,‘Brexitand

EUCitizens’Rights:AproposalforaProtocol’,12June2018,at

http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/06/brexit-and-eu27-citizens-rights.html.

GiventhattheBrexitwithdrawalnegotiationsarebasedontheprinciple‘nothing

isagreeduntileverythingisagreed’,sucharevisionoftheWithdrawal

AgreementortheinclusionofaProtocolspecificfortheUKisstillpossible.

Whetherthisispoliticallyachievabledependsonseveralfactors.Itisnotclearto

whatextenttheformalisticapproachoftheEuropeanCommissionwasreally

inspiredbysubstantiveresistancefromtheMemberStates.Althoughthe

EuropeanCouncilandtheCouncilhavedefinedguidelinesfortheBrexit

negotiation,theprocesshasbeenstronglydrivenbytheEuropeanCommission,

withinaveryshorttimeframe,leavingtheMemberStateslittletimetoget

throughthenitty-grittycomplexcitizens’rightsprovisionsoftheWithdrawal

Agreement.29WhethertheUKisreadytoagreetosucharevisionofthe

WithdrawalAgreementortosigninguptoaseparateProtocoldependson

bargainingpowerinthenegotiations.Fromitsperspective,itcomesdownto

settingoutlegallyacommitmentithadalreadymadepolitically,butitmightbe

veryreluctanttodosoataninternationallevel.Yet,theUKgovernmentmightbe

willingtodosoiftheEUofferedfreedomofmovementthroughouttheentireEU

fortheBritishalreadyresidinginEurope,whichremainsthebiggestweaknessof

theWithdrawalAgreementforthisgroup.TheEuropeanParliamentmightbe

theultimatedealmakeronthisissue.Ithaspresenteditselfasthebigdefender

ofcitizens’rightsintheBrexitnegotiationsandhasrepeatedlystateditwillnot

approvetheWithdrawalAgreementifithasnoguaranteesontheirprotection.

Yet,todefendEUcitizensproperlyithastorealisethatthekeyissueisnot

whethertheWithdrawalAgreementcopiesallrightsofthecitizens’Directive,

includingtherightofresidenceforathirdcountryspouse,butwhetherit

providesproceduralguaranteesontheregistrationsystemthattakeintoaccount

theparticularchallengesoftheUKpost-Brexit.

THEPROCEDURALFLAWOFTHEWITHDRAWALAGREEMENT

Howtoensuredirecteffect:fromJointReporttoWithdrawalAgreement

ThereisnodoubtthattheJointReportagreedbytheEUandtheUKinDecember

2017isaimedatgivingcitizens’rightsstrongprotection.Thekeyrelevant

provisionsoftheJointReportreadasfollows:

34.BothPartiesagreethattheWithdrawalAgreementshouldprovidefor

thelegaleffectsofthecitizens'rightsPartbothintheUKandintheUnion.

UKdomesticlegislationshouldalsobeenactedtothiseffect.

35.TheprovisionintheAgreementshouldenablecitizenstorelydirectly

ontheirrightsassetoutinthecitizens'rightsPartoftheAgreementand

shouldspecifythatinconsistentorincompatiblerulesandprovisionswill

bedisapplied.

29E.g.theEuropeanCommissionpublisheditsdraftWithdrawalAgreementon28February

2018,afterwhichitnegotiatedwiththeUK,andpresentedanUK-EUdraftWithdrawal

Agreementon19March.TheMemberStateshadthenjustabitmorethanaweektoconsider

theycouldagreewiththatattheEuropeanCouncilmeetingof22and23March.

36.TheUKGovernmentwillbringforwardaBill,theWithdrawal

Agreement&ImplementationBill,specificallytoimplementthe

Agreement.ThisBillwillmakeexpressreferencetotheAgreementand

willfullyincorporatethecitizens'rightsPartintoUKlaw.OncethisBill

hasbeenadopted,theprovisionsofthecitizens'rightsPartwillhave

effectinprimarylegislationandwillprevailoverinconsistentor

incompatiblelegislation,unlessParliamentexpresslyrepealsthisActin

future.TheWithdrawalAgreementwillbebindingupontheinstitutions

oftheUnionandonitsMemberStatesfromitsentryintoforcepursuant

toArticle216(2)TFEU.

TheJointReportthusclearlycommitstoensuringthecontinuing‘supranational’

characterofcitizens’rightsbyrequiringdirecteffectandprimacyofthese

provisions.Paragraph36providesfurtherdetailonhowtheUKhasto

implementtheprotectionprovidedbytheWithdrawalAgreement.More

precisely,itclearlystatesthishastobedoneviaaWithdrawalAgreementand

ImplementationBill().

Paragraph36mightseemambiguousatfirstsight.30Ontheonehand,it

requiresthattheImplementationBill‘willfullyincorporatethecitizens’rights

PartintoUKlaw’.Thiscouldbereadasrequiringthatallcitizens’rights

provisionsoftheWithdrawalAgreementneedtobecopiedintothe

ImplementationBill(inordertohaveeffect).

Ontheotherhand,theUKandEUagreedthattheWithdrawalAgreementwill

providefordirecteffectandsupremacyoftheseprovisions(para.35).TheUK

Governmenthadinitiallymadeconfusingstatementsonhowitwouldensure

directeffect.TheSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEuropeanUnion,DavidDavis,

suggestedwhenreferringto‘directeffect,ifyoulike’,thatthemere

incorporationofWithdrawalAgreementcitizens’rightsprovisionsinnational

primarylegislationwouldassuchguaranteedirecteffect.31However,that

wouldnotallowcitizenstorelydirectlyontheWithdrawalAgreementinthe

caseofcontradictionbetweennationallawandtheAgreement.Toensuredirect

effectoneneedsaprovisionintheImplementationBillthatrecognisesthe

supranationalfeaturesofcitizens’rights,inasimilarwayastheEuropean

CommunitiesActrecognisesthesupranationalfeaturesofEuropeanlaw.

30SeeM.Elliot,‘TheBrexitAgreementandcitizens’rights.CanParliamentdeliverwhatthe

Governmenthaspromised?’,11December2017,at

https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/12/11/the-brexit-agreement-and-citizens-rights-can-

parliament-deliver-what-the-government-has-promised/31ThisstatementappearedtobemerecoveringupoftheinitialUKnegotiationpositionthatthey

wouldnotacceptdirecteffect,asstatedinparagraph3ofthe‘TechnicalNote:Implementingthe

WithdrawalAgreement”(13July2017):“Itwouldbebothinappropriateandunnecessaryforthe

agreementtorequiretheUKtobringtheEUconceptofdirecteffectintoitsdomesticlaw.The

samesubstantiveresultcanbeachievediftheWithdrawalAgreementrequirestheUKtogive

citizensspecifiedrights,andtheUKenactsdomesticlegislationwhoseeffectistobestowthose

rights.NotonlywillEUcitizensbeabletoenforcethoserightsthroughtheUK’sdomesticlegal

system,buttheUK’scompliancewithitsinternationalobligationscanalsobeenforcedusing

whatevermechanismstheagreementincludesfortheresolutionofdisputes”;at

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/technical-note-on-implementing-the-

withdrawal-agreement

Thequestionisthenwhether,ifdirecteffectisguaranteedviaaspecific

provisioninprimarylegislation,itisstillrequiredorusefultocopythecitizens’

rightsprovisionsfullyintoprimarylegislation?FromaEUlawperspectivethere

isnorequirementinthatsense.AbouthalfoftheEUMemberStates,for

instance,transposeEUDirectivesmainlyviasecondaryratherthanprimary

legislation,32whichdoesnotimpedethatsomeprovisionsoftheseDirectives

havedirecteffect.However,wearenotdealingherewiththeimplementationof

aDirectivewhenacountryispartoftheEU,buttheimplementationofan

internationalagreementinacountrynolongerpartoftheEU.Iwillargue

belowthatinsuchacontextitisimportanttoensurebothdirecteffectandthe

incorporationofcitizensrightsinprimarylegislationinordertoprotectEU

citizensproperly.Itisnotaquestionofeitheradirecteffectprovision,orthefull

copyingofcitizens’rightsintoprimarylegislation.Thetwoguaranteescanbe

combined.

However,comparedtotheJointReport,theWithdrawalAgreementappears

moresynopticinitswordingonhowtheUKshouldensuredirecteffectand

properimplementationofcitizens’rights.TheJointReportexpressedpolitical

agreementbuthadtobetranslatedintoaproperlegaltext.Thiswasdoneatthe

initiativeoftheEuropeanCommissionandsubsequentlyamendedinnegotiation

withtheUK.On19March2018,theUKandEUpresentedtheirjointdrafttextof

theWithdrawalAgreement.Muchofthiswascolouredingreen,indicating

agreementbetweenthetwoparties,althoughevenforthose“green”provisions

theEUstickstotheprinciplethat‘nothingisagreeduntileverythingisagreed’.

Article4(1)oftheWithdrawalAgreement(colouredgreen)statesthefollowing:

“1.WherethisAgreementprovidesfortheapplicationofUnionlawinthe

UnitedKingdom,itshallproduceinrespectofandintheUnitedKingdom

thesamelegaleffectsasthosewhichitproduceswithintheUnionandits

MemberStates.

Inparticular,UnioncitizensandUnitedKingdomnationalsshallbeable

torelydirectlyontheprovisionscontainedorreferredtoinPartTwo.

AnyprovisionsinconsistentorincompatiblewiththatPartshallbe

disapplied.”

Thisclearlyconfirmstheprincipleofdirecteffectandsupremacyinrelationto

citizens’rights,33aswaspromisedinparagraph35oftheJointReport.

WhileArticle4(1)WithdrawalAgreementiscolouredgreen,andtheprincipleof

directeffectandsupremacyofcitizens’rightsisthusagreed,thewayinwhich

32EuropeanParliament,DirectorateGeneralInternalPoliciesoftheUnion,‘ComparativeStudyof

TranspositionofEClawintheMemberStates’,June2007,PE378.294.33ThefirstparagraphoftheArticlealsoraisesthequestionofwhetherprovisionsinthe

WithdrawalAgreementotherthanthoseofthecitizens’rightspartcanhavedirecteffect.This

wouldfollowfromthebroadrequirementthattheUKhastogivethesamelegaleffecttoUnion

lawreferredtointheWithdrawalAgreementasitproduceswithintheUnion.Atthesametime,

itisonlyinrelationtocitizens’rightsthattheWithdrawalAgreementclearlywantedtoavoid

anydoubtonthematter.

theUKissupposedtoimplementthisappearsfarlesssettled.Article4(2)

WithdrawalAgreementisrudimentaryinthisregard:

“TheUnitedKingdomshallensurecompliancewithparagraph1,

includingasregardstherequiredpowersofitsjudicialandadministrative

authorities,throughdomesticprimarylegislation.”

Moreover,thisparagraphhasnotbeencolouredgreen,indicatingthereisno

agreementonhowtheUKshouldguaranteethe‘supranationalcharacter’of

citizens'rights.ComparedtothecommitmentoftheJointReport,the

WithdrawalAgreementshowsthreeparticularweaknessesrelatingtohowthe

UKshouldimplementcitizens’rights.

Firstly,theJointReportprovidedastrongdefinitionofhowsupremacyshouldbe

ensured,requiringthatonlyexpressrepealoftheImplementationBill(andthus

alsoitsprovisionsondirecteffectandsupremacy)wouldallowfornationallaw

tooverridetheWithdrawalAgreementprovisionsoncitizens’rights.Such

expressrepealwouldblowuptheentireBrexitWithdrawalAgreement,sothe

UKwouldhaveastrongincentivenottounderminecitizens’rights.Thereis

doubt,though,onwhetherUKpubliclawallowssuchastronglegislative

entrenchment.34TheexperienceoftheEuropeanCommunitiesAct,andcaselaw

suchasJackson,35Thoburn,36HS237andMiller38suggestthattheImplementation

Billcouldbemadehighly,butnotnecessarilyabsolutely,resistanttoimplied

repeal.However,muchdependsontheprecisewordingoftheImplementation

Billinthisregard(and,thepoliticalfeasibilityoflivinguptosuchhighlevelof

legislativeentrenchmentpromisedintheJointReportisquestionable,tosaythe

least).AsMarkElliotargues,39intheend,evenifParliamentcommitstosuch

strongtermsintheImplementationBill,onewillhavetowaittoseehowthe

judiciarysetsthefinaltermsofthis.

Giventheuncertaintyabouttheextenttowhichlegislativeentrenchmentis

possibleundertheUKConstitution,onemayunderstandthattheWithdrawal

Agreement(whichisalegallybindingtext)islessexplicitonthisthantheJoint

Report(whichisamerepoliticalagreement).TheWithdrawalAgreementdoes

notexplicitlymentionthatonlyexpressrepealcouldbringanendtothe

supremacyofthesenorms.AlthoughtherequirementofArticle4(1)that‘any

provisionsinconsistentorincompatiblewiththatPartshallbedisapplied’canbe

consideredasanunconditionalstatementofthesupremacyprinciple,the

genericwayinwhichitsimplementationisdefinedinArticle4(2)islikelytogive

moreleewaytotheBritishlegislatortoprovideadefinitionthatwouldimpose

fewerlimitsonitsfutureactionthanonethatonlyallowsexpressrepeal.The

WithdrawalAgreement’smore‘neutral’wordingseemsmoreinlinewiththe

34SeeM.Elliott,seeabovefootnote23;and,morepositively,M.Gordon,‘Parliamentary

SovereigntyandtheImplementationoftheEUWithdrawalAgreement’(17January2018)

https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/01/17/mike-gordon-parliamentary-sovereignty-and-the-

implementation-of-the-eu-withdrawal-agreement-part-i/35R.(Jackson)v.AttorneyGeneral[2005]UKHL56.36ThoburnvSunderlandCityCouncil[2003]QB151(DivCt)37R(HS2ActionAllianceLtd)vSecretaryofStateforTransport[2014]UKSC338R(Miller)vSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEuropeanUnion[2017]UKSC539Ibid.

EU’sconstitutionaldialoguetraditionwithitsMemberStates.Thatbeingsaid,

forEUcitizensitmeanslessprotectionthanwhattheJointReportproposed.

Secondly,theWithdrawalAgreementdoesnotrefertotheImplementationBill,

butsimplyrequiresforthecitizens’rightsstatustobeensuredviaprimary

legislation.Thiscouldmeanthattheserightscouldbedealtwithinmorethan

oneactofprimarylegislation,andthattheycould,forinstance,bepartially

coveredinaseparatepieceofprimarylegislationdealingwithimmigrationlaw.

Thiswoulddetractfromtheparticularstatusoftheserightsasguaranteedbythe

WithdrawalAgreement,andmakeitmorelikelythattheyareinterpretedinthe

lightofprovisionsandprinciplesofimmigrationlaw.

Thirdly,andmostimportantly,thetextdoesnotrefertothefullincorporationof

thecitizens’rightsprovisionsintheImplementationBill,orevenprimary

legislation.Article4(2)WithdrawalAgreementrequiresprimarylegislationto

ensuredirecteffectandsupremacyofthecitizens’rightsprovisions.However,

thiscouldbemetbysettingoutinprimarylegislationaspecificprovisiontothat

effect,inasimilarwayastheEuropeanCommunitiesActdoestoday.Having

donethat,thedraftversionoftheWithdrawalAgreementdoesnotpreventthe

UKfromimplementingthecitizens’partoftheWithdrawalAgreementvia

secondarylegislation.Theprinciplesofdirecteffectandsupremacycouldbeset

outintheImplementationBill,probablytogetherwithprovisionsthatrequire

futurecoordinationwiththeEU,suchasonsocialsecurityentitlementsbuiltup

indifferentcountries.However,theGovernmentmightbeinclinedtosetout

muchofthecitizens’rightsprovisions,suchasthecriteriaforregistration,in

secondarylegislation.

TheWithdrawalAgreementappearsthusbuiltontheassumptionthatby

transferringtheconceptofdirecteffectintoaninternationalagreement

applicabletoanon-EUcountry,EUcitizenswouldbeproperlyprotectedasif

theywerewithintheEU.Unfortunately,Iwillargueinthefollowingsection

thatthisfailstotakeintoaccounttheparticularchallengesofimplementationin

anon-EUcountry,aswellasthesubstantiveflawoftheWithdrawalAgreement.

Whycitizens’rightsneedtobesetoutinprimarylegislation(despitethe

directeffectoftheWithdrawalAgreement)

Theaddedvalueofhavingallprovisionsinonetext.

TheWithdrawalAgreementisacomplextext,withmultiplereferencestoother

EUtexts,suchastheCitizens’DirectiveandtheSocialSecurityCoordination

Regulations.Althoughitprovidesindividualrights,itiswrittenasdirectedto

theUKandthe27MemberStates.Someoftheseprovisionsalsoleavealevelof

discretionastohowtheUKandEU27willachievetheobjectivesset.

Implementationbynationaladministrationsandcourtswillbestrongly

facilitatediftherightssetoutintheWithdrawalAgreementarecopiedinthe

ImplementationBill,togetherwiththetranspositionmeasuresthatallowsome

discretionfortheUK.RespectoftheWithdrawalAgreementcanthenmost

oftenbeassuredsimplybyrelyingondirecteffectestablishingacontradiction

betweentheImplementationBillandtheAgreementratherthanhavingtorely

ondirecteffectinrelationtoamultitudeof(secondarylegislative)acts.Inthe

absenceofaImplementationBillthatincorporatestherightssetoutinthe

WithdrawalAgreementascomprehensivelyaspossible,EUcitizenswould,for

someaspects,havetorelydirectlyontheWithdrawalAgreement(whichthen

referstootherEUlaw),whileforotheraspectspotentiallyonseveralactsof

primarylegislation(e.g,ontheImplementationBillforissuesoffuturesocial

securitycoordinationwiththeEU;oronanewimmigrationbillforissues

concerningregistration),andmostlikely,onmanyactsofsecondarylegislation.

Onecanavoidsuchcomplexitybycomprehensivelysettingoutthecitizens’

rightsprovisionswithintheImplementationBill.Theriskthatcourts,butin

particularnationaladministrationsandprivateactorssuchasbanksor

landlords,failtoidentifytheproperrulesapplicabletoEUcitizensisthus

reduced.Atthesametime,asIwillargueinmoredetailbelow,havingall

provisionsinonesingletextfacilitatesmonitoringbytheEUonwhethertheUK

islivinguptoitspromises.

Theaddedvalueofhavingthecitizens’rightsprovisionssetoutindetailinanact

ofprimarylegislation

Whatistheaddedvalueofsettingoutindetailcitizens’rightsinprimary

legislationifdirecteffectisalreadyensuredviaaspecificprovisioninsuch

legislation?

Firstly,toputtheWithdrawalAgreementintopractice,furtherimplementation

measureswillneedtobetaken,whichgobeyondensuringdirecteffect,oreven

beyondliterallycopyingAgreementprovisionsintoprimarylegislation.For

instance,asexplainedabove,theWithdrawalAgreementleavesconsiderable

discretionregardingtheregistrationprocedureandtherequirementstoobtain

permanentresidence,suchasbeinginworkorhavingsufficientresources.The

Governmenthaspromisednotapplyingcriteriasuchascomprehensivesickness

insuranceand‘genuineandeffectivework’.However,ifthesepromisesarenot

setoutintoprimarylegislation,simpleministerialinterventionorchanging

administrativepracticecouldsubstantiallyunderminetherightsofEUcitizensat

anytime.Theseimplementationdecisionswillaffectthemostfundamental

rightsofresidence,familylife,healthcareetc.ofthousandsofpeoplewhohave

alreadyheldtheserightsforyearsanddecades.Itcouldnotbejustlefttothe

GovernmentoraMinistertodecideandamendtheserights.Theywillneedtobe

enshrinedbyParliamentintoprimarylegislation.

ItistruethatsecondarylegislationintheUKisnotentirelyfreefrom

parliamentaryscrutiny.Therearetwomainscrutinyproceduresforsuch

secondarylegislation.40Inthenegativeprocedure,thestatutoryinstrument

wouldbemadeandcomeintoforcewithoutparliamentaryactionbutcouldbe

annulled,onamotionofeitherHouse.Intheaffirmativeprocedure,thestatutory

instrumentwouldbedebated(usuallybyadelegatedlegislationcommitteein

40R.Kelly,‘TheEuropeanUnion(Withdrawal)Bill:scrutinyofsecondarylegislation(Schedule

7)’,HouseofCommonsLibraryBriefingPaperNumber08172,7December2017,p.8.

theHouseofCommons,andintheChamberintheHouseofLords)andcould

onlybemadeafterbeingapprovedbybothHousesofParliament.However,such

scrutinydoesnotgiveParliamentanyopportunitytoamendtheregulations

broughtforwardbytheGovernment,whichmeansthatinmostcasesParliament

willhavenoimpactonsuchsecondarylegislation.Itrequiresfindingamajority

inParliamentthatsoradicallydisagreeswiththemeasurethatitprefersits

annulmenttogoingahead,whichishighlyunlikelyasGovernmentwillfeel

comfortableaboutitsmajorityinParliament.Inpractice,blockingoreven

debatingRegulationsalmostneverhappens.41Hence,itisessentialthatthe

politicalcommitmentstheUKhasalreadymadeabouttheimplementationofthe

WithdrawalAgreementaresetoutinprimarylegislation.Withoutsuchlegal

entrenchmentthepromisesaboutasimpleregistrationsystembasedon

residenceratherthanbeinginworkcouldbequicklyorgraduallyundermined

byadministrativeactionattheexpenseofmanypeople.

Secondly,enshriningnormsintoprimarylegislationensuresstabilityand

visibility,andfacilitatesenforcementandmonitoring.Thismakesiteasierto

showifadministrativepracticebreachesprimarylegislationthanhavingtorely

oninternationalnorms.Atthesametimeitiseasiertomonitortherespectof

keylegislativeactsagainstinternationalnormsthanhavingtomonitorrespectof

thelatterbyacontinuousscreeningofeverchangingnormsofsecondary

legislationandadministrativepractice.UKimmigrationlawinparticularis

infamousforcontinuingministerialinterventionandamendments,42creating

uncertaintyforthoseinvolved.Fromthisperspectiveitisnotonlyusefultoset

outinprimarylegislationtheimplementationchoicesoverwhichtheUKhas

discretion,butequallytoincorporatefullythecitizens’rightsprovisionsofthe

WithdrawalAgreement.Thisisparticularlythecaseastherearesome

limitationsto,anddoubtsaboutthe‘supranationalfeatures’oftheWithdrawal

Agreement.Thecombination‘secondarylegislation+directeffect’mightwork

whenacountryispartoftheEUandfulljudicialcontrolunderEUlawis

guaranteed.However,thatisnolongerthecase.

AfterBrexit,EUcitizenswillnolongerprofitfromtheinfringementprocedure.

Instead,Article152oftheWithdrawalAgreementrequirestheUKtosetupan

‘IndependentAuthority’tomonitortheimplementationoftheAgreement.

However,sucharrangementbywhichtheUKisaskedtomonitoritselfisfar

fromthesupranationalenforcementthatisguaranteedviatheinfringement

procedure.43

Non-respectoftheWithdrawalAgreementcanalsobedealtwithinthe

arbitrationmechanismsetupbyit.Article162ofthedraftWithdrawal

Agreementevenprovidesthatfailureofarbitrationcouldleadtooneofthe

41Ibid.42Between2012and2018alone,UKimmigrationruleshavebeenchanged57timesinsecondary

legislation.https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/archive-immigration-rules43Ihavearguedelsewherethattheonlywaytoensureaproperlyindependentandfunctioning

monitoringauthorityisbyestablishingaUK-EUJointAuthority.S.Smismans,‘EUcitizensinthe

UKareinaparticularlyweakpositionandneedanindependentauthoritytomonitortheir

rights’,LSEBrexitBlog,21stApril2018,http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/eu-citizens-in-

the-uk-are-in-a-particularly-weak-position-and-need-an-independent-authority-to-monitor-

their-rights/

partiestakingtheissuetotheCJEUforfinaldecision(althoughthispartofthe

draftWithdrawalAgreementremainsunderdiscussion).However,such

arbitration,evenifultimatelyleadingtoaCJEUdecision,startsasamore

politicalprocess,andcannotbetriggeredbyindividualaction.Itremainstobe

seentowhatextentsuchpoliticalmonitoringcankeeptrackofeverchanging

normsofsecondarylegislationandadministrativepractice.Instead,theUKwill

beverymuchinthespotlightoftheEUwhenitadoptsitsImplementationBill.

Bysettingoutcitizens’rightsprovisionsindetailintheImplementationBill,the

EUcouldmonitorrespectoftheWithdrawalAgreementbeforethelimelightis

dimming.

Intheabsenceofstrongmonitoringmechanisms,EUcitizenswillhavetorelyon

directeffectandcourtactiontotestthevalidityofnationalnormsagainstthe

WithdrawalAgreement.Thiscanbecomehighlychallengingifthesenormsare

continuouslychanginginsecondarylegislationandadministrativepractice.The

problemisfurtherexacerbatedbythelimitstoanddoubtsaboutthe

effectivenessofthe‘supranationalcharacter’ofcitizens’rightsoftheWithdrawal

Agreement.

Asmentionedabove,thereisstillsomeambiguityonhowtheUKwillensure

directeffect,andtowhatextenttheprimacyofcitizens’rightscanbeentrenched.

Moreover,inadditiontolegalentrenchment,theissueisalsooneofpractical

implementationofsupranationalprinciplesindailyjudicialpracticewhenthe

UKisnolongeraMemberoftheEU.ThesupranationalfeaturesofEUlaw(such

asdirecteffect,supremacy,andoptiontorefertotheCJEU)haveworkedtothe

extentthatthejudiciaryconsidersitselftobepartoftheEUjudicialorder.As

theUKwillhavelefttheEU,itremainstobeseentowhatextentthejudiciary

feelscommittedtorelyingontheseprinciplesandtools,applicablejustfor

citizens’rightsundertheWithdrawalAgreement.Theremightbeareluctance

toapplydirecteffect;atleastuntiltheSupremeCourthasclearlyspokenouton

it.Evenmoresoonecanquestionwhetherjudgeswillmakeanyuseofthe

potentialtorefertotheCJEU,forwhichtheyhaveconsiderablediscretion.44UK

courtshavetraditionallyalreadybeenmorereluctantthanjudgesinmanyother

EUcountriestomakeuseofthepreliminaryreferenceprocedure.45Brexitwill

onlyincreasethatreluctance.

Therearealsodoubtstowhatextentcitizenswillstillhavethepossibilityto

claimFrancovichdamages46(currentlyalsoapplicableincaseoffailureto

complywithEUlawbyanationalcourtinfinalappeal,Köbler).47

44Onthebehavioralfactorsinfluencingthewillingnessofnationaljudgestorefer,seeM.Broberg

andN.Fenger,PreliminaryreferencestotheEuropeanCourtofJustice,(OxfordUniversityPress

2014,2nded)p.49.45T.Tridimas,‘Knockingonheaven’sdoor:fragmentation,efficiencyanddefianceinthe

preliminaryreferenceprocedure’,CommonMarketLawReview(2003),p.9atp.38.46TheWithdrawalAgreementisnotexplicitonthis.Article4(1)oftheAgreementstatesthat

wheretheAgreementprovidesfortheapplicationofUnionlaw,itshouldproduce‘thesamelegal

effectsasthosewhichitproduceswithintheUnionanditsMemberStates’.‘Thesamelegal

effects’wouldimplytheopportunitytoclaimFrancovichdamages.However,aspectsofthe

WithdrawalAgreement,suchasArticle17(1)definingtheconstitutiveregistrationsystem,are

notUnionlawtowhichtheWithdrawalAgreementrefers,butnewprovisionssetbythe

Agreementitself.Itcanbequestionedwhether‘samelegaleffects’canbeextendedtosuch

provisions;whichwouldmaketheentireAgreementUnionlaw,whichseemscontradictoryto

theintentionofArticle4(1).47CJEU,CaseC-224/01.GerhardKöblervRepublicofAustria.

Hence,themoredoubtsthatremainabouttheproperrespectforthe

supranationalcharacterofcitizens'rights,themoreimportantitistoensure

theserightsarealsosetoutinprimarylegislation.Thiswillnotprotectagainst

futurelegislativeaction,butitwillatleastprotectagainstthepotentialgradual

underminingoftheserightsviasecondarylegislation,whileitallowstheEUto

monitorUKimplementationwhentheImplementationBillisinthespotlight,

ratherthanhavingtolookatafluidityofnormssetoutinacontextwhere

‘supranationalsupervision’cannolongerbewhatitoncewas.

ItisworthnotinginthisregardthattheEUCitizens’Directivehasbeen

implementedintheUKbywayofRegulations,whichissecondarylegislation.

However,itwouldbewrongtodeducethatitwouldthereforeberighttoalso

implementthecitizens’rightsprovisionsoftheWithdrawalAgreementvia

Regulations.ADirectiveisembeddedintheprotectionoftheEU’ssupranational

judicialsystem.IfnationallawdoesnotrespecttheDirective,thelattercanbe

reliedupondirectly.Doubtsonitsinterpretationcanbesettledviapreliminary

rulingsoftheCJEU.FailureofaMemberStatetocomplycanleadtoenforcement

actionandfinancialsanctioningbytheCJEU,ordamagesviathenationalcourt.

Asjustanalysed,thiscomprehensivesystemisnotavailablefornon-compliance

withthecitizens’rightsprovisionsoftheWithdrawalAgreement.The

‘supranationalcharacter’ofitscitizens’rightsislimited,andobjectof

considerableuncertaintyregardingitsapplication.Intheabsenceofproper

supranationalsupervision,EUcitizensneedadualguarantee;directeffectonthe

onehand,andlegislativeprotectionagainstadministrativeunderminingoftheir

rightsontheotherhand.

Theaddedvalueofhavingcitizens’rightssetoutintheImplementationBilland

notinanotheractofprimarylegislation.

Settingoutcitizens’rightsintheImplementationBillratherthananyotheractof

primarylegislationstrengthensthevisibilityofthespecificstatusoftheserights

asprotectedbytheWithdrawalAgreement.Thiswouldavoidtheriskthatsome

oftherights,suchasthoserequiringfuturecoordinationwiththeEU(e.g.on

socialsecurityentitlements)wouldbesetoutintheImplementationBill,while

others,suchasthoserelatedtotheregistrationprocedure,wouldbesetoutin

immigrationlaw.Besidestheissueofdecreasedclarityasrightswouldbe

dispersedindifferenttexts,theinclusionofEUcitizens'rightsinimmigration

lawwouldincreasinglypushinterpretationoftheserightsintothegeneral

approachofUKimmigrationlawandfurtherawayfromEUlawandthe

guaranteesprovidedbytheWithdrawalAgreement.

Onecanconcludethattherearegoodreasonstocombinedirecteffectwitha

requirementtosetoutindetailcitizens’rightsintheImplementationBill.

Unfortunately,theWithdrawalAgreementisonlyexplicitlyrequiringthefirst.

Intheabsenceofthelatter,EUcitizensremaininaweakspot,giventhe

limitationstothe‘supranationalcharacter’ofprotectionwhenacountryisno

longeramemberoftheEU.TheEUshouldthereforeabandonitscomplacent

stanceinthenegotiationsandrealisethatjustcopyingdirecteffectisnot

sufficienttofacetheuniqueimplementationchallengesintheUK.The

WithdrawalAgreementshouldrequirethatitscitizens’rightsprovisions,aswell

asspecificcommitmentsbytheUKregardingtheregistrationsystemsetoutina

Protocol,willneedtobecopiedintoprimarylegislation.

Withoutsucharequirement,theUKislikelytoimplementmuchofthecitizens’

rightsprovisionsviasecondarylegislation,asIwillexplaininthenextsection.

THEUK’SLEGALFRAMEWORKTOIMPLEMENTTHEWITHDRAWAL

AGREEMENTANDCITIZENS’RIGHTS

TherelationshipbetweenWithdrawalActandImplementationBill

WhiletheUKhasbeennegotiatingwiththeEUoverthetermsoftheWithdrawal

Agreement,ithasadoptedtheWithdrawalActtorepealtheEuropean

CommunitiesActanddecidetherulesonhowitwilldealwiththelegacyofthe

acquiscommunautaire.However,theActdoesnotdealwiththespecificcategory

ofcitizens’rightsprotectedbytheWithdrawalAgreement.Ontheonehand,this

makessenseastheWithdrawalAgreementstillhastobeadopted.Ontheother

hand,itisalsooddsincetheActseemstobeaimedatacomprehensivedefinition

ofhowEUlawwillberetainedornotafterBrexit.Thespecificsuigenerisnature

ofcitizens’rightsisnotaccountedfor.Theyconstituteasortof‘super-retained

EUlaw’astheyalsoretainpartoftheirsupranationalnature.Unlikeanynormof

EU-derivedorretainedlawundertheWithdrawalAct,thecitizens’rights

provisionsshould,accordingtotheWithdrawalAgreement,havedirecteffect

andsupremacy,andprofitfromthetemporaryprotectionoftheCJEUvia

preliminaryreferences,aswellasfromtheinternationalarbitrationmechanism

setupintheWithdrawalAgreement.

SincetheWithdrawalActdoesnotdealwithcitizens’rights,thecommitments

madeintheWithdrawalAgreementregardingtheirspecialstatuswillneedtobe

translatedintonationallawbywayoftheWithdrawalAgreementand

ImplementationBill(ImplementationBill).

TounderstandtheroleoftheImplementationBillitisusefultoremindherefirst

thedifferencebetweenapprovalandimplementationofaninternationaltreaty

underUKlaw.TheGovernmenthasannounceditwillpresenttheWithdrawal

AgreementforapprovalbywayofaResolutiontobeadoptedinthetwo

Houses.48TheSupremeCourtnotedinMiller49inJanuary2017thatsucha

resolutiondoesnothaveanylegislativeeffect,butisnevertheless“animportant

politicalact”.50Inadditiontothisvote,theConstitutionalReformand

GovernanceAct2010allowsfortheHouseofCommonstoblockratificationof

aninternationalagreement.IftheHousesadopttheResolutiontoapprovethe

WithdrawalAgreementandratificationisnotblocked,theAgreementwillthen

48ProceduresfortheApprovalandImplementationofEUExitAgreements:Writtenstatement-

HCWS342,13December2017.

49R(Miller)vSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEuropeanUnion[2017]UKSC5.50J.SimsonCaird,‘ParliamentandtheWithdrawalAgreement:The“MeaningfulVote”’,U.K.

Const.L.Blog(9thFeb.2018)(availableathttps://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)

needtobeimplementedbyanActofParliament.IntheUK’sdualistsystemsuch

anActisrequiredforinternationalnormstocomeintoforceintonationallaw.

TheGovernmenthasannouncedthatitwillintroducetheImplementationBillto

thateffect.51

Atthestageofwritingthisarticle,theGovernmenthasmadenotpublicany

indicationsonwhattheImplementationBillwilllooklike.Thisleavesmany

questionsonhowcitizens’rightswillbedealtwithintheBill;moreparticularly:

1) howwilldirecteffectbedefined?

2) towhatextentwillthecitizens’rightsprovisionsoftheWithdrawal

AgreementbecopiedintotheBill?

3) TowhatextentwillimplementationchoicesforwhichtheWithdrawal

AgreementleavesdiscretionbesettledbytheBill,e.g.inrelationtothe

substantiverequirementstoobtainsettledstatus?

4) TowhatextentwilltheBillprovideadelegationtotheGovernmentto

implementtheWithdrawalAgreementviasecondarylegislationand

administrativeaction?

Asanalysedabove,theWithdrawalAgreementisonlyexplicitregardingthefirst

oftheseissues,namelytherequirementtosetoutdirecteffectintoprimary

legislation(andstillonthisissuethereisdoubtonwhethertheBillwillandcan

liveuptothepromiseof‘expressrepeal’setoutintheJointReport).Atthesame

time,whetherprovisionswillbecopiedintotheBill,whethersubstantive

implementationchoiceswillbesetoutbyit,andwhichdelegationto

Governmentisprovided,allareissueswhichcanprofoundlyaffectthelegal

statusofEUcitizens.

Unfortunately,whilewestilldonotknowwhattheBillwilllooklike,two

initiativesoftheGovernmentsuggestitisstronglyinclinedtodealwithEU

citizens’rightsextensivelyviasecondarylegislationratherthansafeguarding

theserightsintheImplementationBill.Firstly,theGovernmenthastriedinthe

WithdrawalActtogiveitselfpowerstoimplementtheWithdrawalAgreement,

ratherthanleavingsuchimplementationtoParliament.Secondly,the

Governmentintendstopre-emptthelegislativespacebyadopting

‘implementationmeasures’oftheWithdrawalAgreementevenpriortothe

Agreementbeingadopted.

TheWithdrawalAct:definingthefutureroleofParliamentin

implementingtheWithdrawalAgreement

TheWithdrawalActdoesnotdealwithcitizens’rightsdirectly,butitdoesso

indirectlybydefiningtherespectiveroleofGovernmentandParliamentinthe

implementationoftheWithdrawalAgreement.WhentheGovernment

introducedtheWithdrawalActinParliamentinJuly2017itprovidedsweeping

powersfortheGovernmenttoimplementtheWithdrawalAgreement.

Article9(1)stated:

51ProceduresfortheApprovalandImplementationofEUExitAgreements:Writtenstatement-

HCWS342,13December2017.

AMinisteroftheCrownmaybyregulationsmakesuchprovisionasthe

Ministerconsidersappropriateforthepurposesofimplementingthe

withdrawalagreementiftheMinisterconsidersthatsuchprovision

shouldbeinforceonorbeforeexitday.52

Suchpowerswouldbeextensiveas,accordingtoArticle9(2)‘regulationsunder

thissectionmaymakeanyprovisionthatcouldbemadebyanActof

Parliament’.53TheWithdrawalActdoessetsomelimitsontheiruse.Most

importantly,thesepowerscannotbeusedafterexitday,andtheActdefines

somemattersinwhichtheycannotbeused.Suchgovernmentactionwould,in

theory,alsonotentirelyavoidparliamentaryscrutiny,assuchsecondary

legislationwouldbesubjecttoeitherthepositiveornegativescrutinyprocedure.

However,asestablishedabove,thesescrutinyprocedureshardlyeverleadto

Parliamentdiscussingorblockingsecondarylegislation.

Notsurprisingly,Article9washotlydebatedinParliament.Anamendmentwas

introduced(attheinitiativeofDominicGrieveMP)whichmadethepowersto

implementtheWithdrawalAgreementviaregulations

“subjecttothepriorenactmentofastatutebyParliamentapprovingthe

finaltermsofwithdrawaloftheUnitedKingdomfromtheEuropean

Union.”54

Theamendmentwasnotbornoutofaconcernwithcitizens’rights.Rather,it

wasseenasawayforParliamenttogetafootinthedooronthedecisionand

directionofBrexit.TheGovernmenthaslongbeenreluctanttogiveParliamenta

definitivesayonBrexit.TheGrieveamendmentdoessetsomelegallybinding

commitmentonthisissue,butitsimpactintermsofallowingParliamentto

shapethedirectionofBrexitislikelytobelimited.Thepowergivento

ParliamentistoapprovetheWithdrawalAgreement;butitdoesnotaffordita

roleinthenegotiations.ItspotentialimpactontheGovernmentnegotiation

positionbythreateningnon-approvalisalsolikelytobelimitedsince,duetothe

timetablesetbytheArticle50TEUprocedure,non-approvalwouldprobably

leadtotheUKfallingintothelegallimboofanodealBrexit.

Yet,whiletheGrieveamendmentmayhavelittleimpactonthedirectionof

Brexit,ithasanimportantconsequenceindefiningtheroleofParliamentinthe

implementationoftheWithdrawalAgreement.Theexecutivepowersprovided

inArticle9canonlybeusedafterParliamenthasapprovedtheWithdrawal

Agreementbystatute.ThismeansthepoliticalapprovalviaResolutionisnot

sufficienttotriggerthesepowers,andtheGovernmentwillonlybeabletoacton

thisbasisafteradoptionoftheImplementationBill.ThisgivesParliamentthe

firstsayregardingtheimplementationoftheWithdrawalAgreement.

52TheEuropeanUnion(Withdrawal)Bill(HCBill5)asintroduced,13.07.2017,availableat

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/cbill_2017-

20190005_en_1.htm53TheinitialversionoftheWithdrawalActasintroducedevengavethepowerforsuch

RegulationtoamendtheWithdrawalActitself.54EuropeanUnion(Withdrawal)Bill(HLBill79),asintroducedinHouseofLords,18.01.2018,at

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2017-2019/0079/lbill_2017-

20190079_en_1.htm

Ofcourse,Parliament’sroomformanoeuvreinimplementationisconstrainedby

thetermsoftheWithdrawalAgreement.Yet,particularlyoncitizens’rights,the

WithdrawalAgreementleavesconsiderablediscretiontotheUK(andremaining

MemberStates)regardingdifferentoptionsofimplementation,forinstance,in

relationtothecriteriaandburdenofprooftoobtainsettledstatus.Thanksto

theGrieveamendment,theseimportantimplementationchoicescanbemadeby

Parliament,ratherthanjustbesetoutintosecondarylegislation.

ThequestioniswhetherParliamentwilltakeupthisrole.Obviously,theBillwill

beintroducedbytheGovernment.Givenitsclearpreferencetoholdwide

powerstoimplementtheWithdrawalAgreement,itisstilllikely,despitethe

Grieveamendment,itwillprefertoimplementcitizens’rightsmainlyvia

secondarylegislation.Itcanattempttodothisintwoways.Itmayintroduce

anImplementationBillthatprovideslittledetailoncitizens’rights,whileatthe

sametimepreparingRegulationswithfurtherimplementationmeasures,which

willbepresentedassecondarylegislationimmediatelyafteradoptionoftheBill

onthebasisofArticle9oftheWithdrawalAct.Alternatively,itsimplycan

introduceanImplementationBillwithlittledetailbutwhichincludesabroad

delegationfortheGovernmenttotakefurtherimplementationmeasures.The

latterstrategyismorelikelythantheformerbecausesuchdelegationextends

beyondexitday,unlikeArticle9powers.55

Inbothcases,ParliamenthasthechancetodisagreewiththeGovernment’s

‘minimalapproach’totheImplementationBillandcaninsist,viaamendments,

thattheBillitselfsetsoutmoredetailoncitizens’rights.However,itremainsto

beseentowhatextenttheParliamentwilltakeupthisrole.Asexplainedabove,

theWithdrawalAgreementdoesnotrequireParliamenttodoanythingelsethan

ensuringdirecteffect.Moreover,whilethedebateontheWithdrawalActshows

thatParliamenthasbeenkeentocarveitselfaroleinthedecisionanddirection

ofBrexit,itisnotobviousitisparticularlypreoccupiedwithprotectingthe

statusofEUcitizens.Finally,andmostproblematically,Iwillshowinthe

followingsectionthattheGovernmentisalreadyattemptingtopre-emptthe

regulatoryspaceonEUcitizens’rights,evenpriortodebatingthe

ImplementationBill.

Pre-emptingthelegislativespaceviasecondarylegislation

Asarguedabove,theUKintendstosetupaconstitutiveregistrationsystem

throughwhichallEUcitizensresidingintheUKbeforetheendofthetransition

periodwillhavetoapplytoobtainsettledstatus.TheGovernmentplansfirstto

setupa‘voluntaryregistration’system,priortoexitday56andsubsequentlyan

obligatoryregistrationprocedure,meaningthatallEUcitizenswillneedtobe

registeredbytheendofthe‘graceperiod’(whichlastssixmonthsaftertheend

55Fromthisperspective,theGrieveamendmenthaslargelyreducedtheusefulnessofArticle9

powers,althoughtheyremainavailable(priortoexit)forasfarastheImplementationBilldoes

notprovidecleardelegationpowers.56HMGovernment,“TechnicalNote.Citizens’rights-AdministrativeproceduresintheUK”,7

November2017,paragraph4;athttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-

administrative-procedures-in-the-uk

ofthetransitionperiod).57Theintroductionofavoluntaryregistrationpriorto

Brexitisremarkableassuchregistrationisaimedatconferringastatusthatstill

hastobedefinedintheWithdrawalAgreement.Theintentionistodetachthe

initialregistrationfromthecomingintoforceofthefulllegalstatusitwill

eventuallyconfer.Peopleapplyingduringthevoluntaryregistrationperiodwill

firstobtain‘indefiniteleavetoremain’,whichisastatusunderimmigrationlaw.

AfterexitandtheWithdrawalAgreementcomingintoforce,theImplementation

Billwouldneedtoensurethatthesepeoplealsoholdtheextrarightsthatthe

WithdrawalAgreementprovides.Interestinglyenough,thoseapplyingafterexit

arestillsaidtoobtain‘indefiniteleavetoremain’,withsomeextraadd-ons

providedbytheWithdrawalAgreement.SotheStatementofIntentmakesclear

thatEUcitizenswillprimarilyprovidedwithanexistingstatusofimmigration

law.DuringthetransitionperiodEUcitizenswillalsostillbeabletoasserttheir

freemovementrights,eveniftheyfailtheregistrationprocedure.58Aperson

refusedstatusundertheschemebeforetheendoftransitioncanstillmakeanew

applicationuntiltheendofthegraceperiod.59However,thisdoesnotmeanthat

(voluntary)registrationiswithoutrisk.Althoughtheproposedregistration

systemdoesnotcheckallconditionsrequiredtoqualifyunderfreemovement,

theproceduremaybesufficienttoascertainthatonedoesnot.Sopeoplewho

wronglyassumedbeinglegallyintheUKunderEUlaw,orwhoare,butfailedto

proveso,mightstillbeaskedtoleavewithinthelimitsprovidedbyEUlaw.

ByintroducingaregistrationsystempriortotheadoptionoftheWithdrawal

AgreementandbyassigningEUcitizensastatusofimmigrationlaw,the

Governmentappearsclearlyintentonbypassingtheconstraintsofthe

WithdrawalActintermsofparliamentaryscrutiny.FromthestartoftheBrexit

negotiations,theGovernmenthasbeenkeentostressthatthenewstatuswould

beoneofUKimmigrationlaw,insistingthattheconceptof‘settledstatus’

familiartoimmigrationlawwouldbeused,ratherthantheEUlawconceptof

‘permanentresidence’.60ThisleavesconsiderablescopetobypassParliamentas

immigrationlawrelieswidelyonexecutiveaction,andasfarasParliamentary

involvementisconcerneditoftenreliessimplyonthenegativeresolution

procedure,whichdoesnotrequireexpressapprovalfromParliament.

Immigrationlawisthereforetypicallycriticisedforside-liningParliamentas

substantivechangesmayoftennotbedebated,consideredorscrutinisedby

Parliament.61TheStatementofIntentisnotexplicitonwhetherthenegativeor

positivescrutinyprocedurewillbeused,butthereisnodoubtthatitintendsto

57Thetransitionperiodrunsfromfirstdayafterexitday(29March2019)until31December

2020,andensuresthefullapplicationoftheEUlawintheUK,includingallthosearrivingpriorto

thatdatecanstillapplyresidencestatus.Inthesubsequentsixmonthsthereisanadditional

‘graceperiod’,duringwhichpeoplewhoarrivedpriorto31December2020canstillregister.58HomeOffice,EUSettlementScheme:StatementofIntent,21.06.2018,p.22,indent5.20.59Ibid,p.22,indent5.18.60TheStatementofIntentrepeatedlyusestheconcept‘indefiniteleavetoremain’

interchangeablywith‘settledstatus’.Thisishighlyconfusingbecauseindefiniteleavetoremain

isawellestablishedconceptofimmigrationlaw,whichisaninferiorstatustotherightssetout

intheWithdrawalAgreement,whichtheStatementofIntentproclaimstorespect.61JointCouncilfortheWelfareofImmigrants,‘HowImmigrationrulesevadedemocracy’,22

December2010,http://www.jcwi.org.uk/2010/12/22/how-immigration-rules-evade-

democracy

introducethesettledstatusschemeviasecondarylegislationunderImmigration

RulespriortotheadoptionoftheImplementationBill.

Thisleavesseveralunansweredquestionsabouttheextenttowhichcitizens’

rightswillbeprotectedbytheImplementationBill.Asarguedabove,theBill

needstoincludeaprovisionondirecteffect.TheStatementofIntentalso

clarifiesthatthecreationoftheindependentauthorityandthecreationofaright

toappealfortheschemewillhavetobesetoutinprimarylegislation,62which

couldbetheImplementationBill.TheBillwillalsoneedtoincludeamechanism

thatensuresthatallthosewhosuccessfullyapply(priororpostexit)profitfrom

alltherightsprovidedintheWithdrawalAgreementandnotsimplytheinferior

statusofindefiniteleavetoremain.However,theStatementofIntentisnot

explicitaboutthisandrefusestorefertoastatusspecifictoEUcitizens.63The

Government’sintentionisclearlytodefinetheEUcitizens’statusasindefinite

leavetoremainunderimmigrationlawviasecondarylegislation.Moreover,the

procedureandconditionstoobtainthatstatuswillbesetoutinsecondary

legislation.Thismakestheirstatusveryvulnerabletofuturechangesby

secondarylegislation,aswellastointerpretationviaimmigrationlawconcepts

andcaselaw.

ItisquestionablewhethertheGovernment’sintentiontoadoptthesettledstatus

schemeviaImmigrationRulesrespectstherequirementofArticle9ofthe

WithdrawalActthatimplementationoftheWithdrawalAgreementvia

secondarylegislationisonlypossibleaftertheImplementationBillhasbeen

adopted.Fromanimmigrationlawperspectiveitisindeedpossibletointroduce

thesettledstatusschemeviasecondarylegislation.However,itisdifficultto

arguethatthisscheme,whichdefinesprofoundlytherightsthatEUcitizenswill

holdandsetsoutfullytheconditionsunderwhichtheycanobtainit,isnotan

implementationoftheWithdrawalAgreement.Hence,fromthatperspectiveitis

difficulttoseehowthisrespectstheWithdrawalAct’srequirementofArticle9

thatimplementationoftheWithdrawalActneedsfirsttopassthroughanactof

Parliamentbeforesecondarylegislationcanbeadopted.

TheGovernmentislikelyto‘legalise’itsprematureinterventionbyseekingits

confirmationintheImplementationBill.Itwillarguethatthesystemisalready

(substantially)inplace,andwillproposeabroaddelegationofpowersallowing

itinthefuturetocontinuedealingwithEUcitizens’rightsmainlyviasecondary

legislation.Bysettingouttheschemeunderimmigrationlawfirstand

subsequentlyproposinga‘minimal’ImplementationBill,theGovernmentthus

pre-emptstheregulatoryspace.ThequestioniswhetherParliamentwantsto

re-enterthatregulatoryspace.SofarParliamenthasnotshownaparticular

concernfortheprotectionofEUcitizens’rightsorthebeliefthatthereisaneed

forguaranteesinprimarylegislation,anditmightbehappysimplyto

62HomeOffice,EUSettlementScheme:StatementofIntent,21.06.2018,p.6,indent1.9andp.22,

indent5.19.63TheStatementofIntentonlystatesthatthe‘practicalarrangement’ofthe

schemewill,inthefuture,havetoreflectinfulltheagreementoncitizens’rights

reachedwiththeEU.Ibid.p.6,indent1.8,

rubberstampasolutiontheGovernmenthasalreadysetupandwantstoprotract

viasecondarylegislation.

AsIhavearguedabove,suchasolution,inwhichmuchofthestatusofEU

citizensissetoutinsecondarylegislationwouldprofoundlyweakentheir

position.AstheWindrushscandalhasillustrated,beingatthemercyofchanging

secondarylegislationandimplementationrulesofUKimmigrationlawisnota

comfortablepositiontobein.UnliketheWindrushgeneration,EUcitizenswill

stillbeabletorelyondirecteffect;but,asanalysedabove,giventhelimitations

tothesupranationalfeaturesoftheWithdrawalAgreement,thatwillnotoffera

similarprotectionoftheirrightsastheyhavetoday.

CONCLUSION

DespitepromisesfromboththeUKandtheEUthatEUcitizensresidinginthe

UKandBritishcitizensresidingintheEUwouldbefullyprotectedafterBrexit,

theproposedlegalframeworkdoesnotliveuptothatexpectation.TheEUhas

rightlyinsistedthatcitizens’rightsrequireaparticularprotection,andthe

introductionofdirecteffectandsupremacyfortheseprovisionsinthe

WithdrawalAgreementcanbeconsideredanimportantachievement,givenin

particulartheUK’sinitialrefusalandtheuniquecharacterofapplyingthese

mechanismsoutsidetheEU.Atthesametime,theEU(andparticularlythe

EuropeanCommission)hasbeentoocomplacentandformalisticinitsapproach.

OnecannottakeforgrantedthatbycopyingsubstantiveprovisionsofEUlaw

(suchastheCitizens’Directive),andproceduralmechanisms(suchasdirect

effect)intoacountrythatisnolongerfullypartoftheEUjudicialsystem,

citizenswouldbeequallyprotectedaswhenthatcountrywasstillpartoftheEU.

ThesubstantiveflawoftheWithdrawalAgreementisthatitfailstorecognise

thatapplyingtheCitizens’Directivemaincriteriahasverydifferent

consequenceswhenitisdonewithadeclaratorysystemwithinanEUMember

Statethanwhenitisappliedtoaconstitutivesysteminanon-EUcountry

(particularlyasthelatterneverappliedaregistrationsystem).Theconsequence

isthatmanyEUcitizensmayfailtoprovetheirentitlementandwill

automaticallybefacedwiththeharshconsequencesoftheUK’s‘hostile

environment’approachtoimmigrationpolicy.

TheproceduralflawoftheWithdrawalAgreementistheassumptionthatby

simplycopyingdirecteffect,EUcitizenswillbeproperlyprotected,evenwhen

theUKisnolongerpartoftheEU.Yet,directeffectisonlyoneaspectoftheEU’s

judicialframework.Intheabsenceofothersupranationalguaranteessuchasthe

infringementprocedureandFrancovichdamages,butequallyinthecontextof

doubtsabouthowtheUKwillputintopracticedirecteffect,therequirementto

setoutcitizens’rightsprovisionsintoprimarylegislationprovidesawelcome

complementaryguarantee.Unfortunately,theWithdrawalAgreementremains

evasiveonsucharequirement.

TheWithdrawalActalsoleavesconsiderablescopeforimportantaspectsofEU

citizens'rightsprovisionstobeimplementedviasecondarylegislation,andthe

Government’sintentiontointroduceavoluntaryregistrationschemepriorto

Brexitmayfunctionasastrongimpetustopre-emptfurtherparliamentary

debateandguaranteesoncitizens’rights.

Inordertoprotectitscitizensproperly,theEUshouldabandonitsformalistic

approachandtakeintoaccountthattheparticularchallengesofimplementation

intheUKoutsideoftheEUrequireparticularguaranteesthatgobeyonda

simplecopyandpasteofsubstantiveEUlawnormsandEUprocedural

principles.Suchguaranteescanbeprovidedbyspecificprovisionsinthe

WithdrawalAgreementonhowtheUKwillimplementasimpleregistration

system,andbyaclearerrequirementthattheWithdrawalAgreementcitizens’

rightsprovisionsshouldbesetoutinprimarylegislation.Alternatively,such

guaranteescouldbewritteninaProtocoltotheWithdrawalAgreement,in

whichtheUKwouldsetoutindetailhowitwillimplementtheAgreement.This

wouldtakeintoaccounttheparticularimplementationchallengesintheUK,and

maketheUK’spromiseslegallybindinginternationally,withouthavingtoreopen

theagreementreachedonthedraftWithdrawalAgreement.64SuchaProtocol

couldsubsequentlybetranslatedintoprimarylegislation,togetherwiththe

WithdrawalAgreement.

IntheabsenceoffurtherguaranteesinthefinalWithdrawalAgreementoran

attachedProtocol,itisuptotheUKParliamenttotakeupitsresponsibility.The

ImplementationBillshouldsetoutclearguaranteesforEUcitizens’rights,both

byensuringasoliddefinitionofdirecteffectandsettingoutrightsindetailinthe

Billitself,leavinglittleleewayfordiscretionforGovernmentactiontodecideon

themostfundamentalrightstoreside,workandaccesstoservicesforpeople

whohavealreadybeenresidinginthecountrylegallyforyears.

64Ihavearguedelsewherehowthecitizens’rightsprovisionsshouldbe‘ring-fenced’fromother

withdrawalnegotiationtopics,sothattheserightswouldbeguaranteedeveniftherestofthe

WithdrawalAgreementfails,seeS.Smismans,“Brexit:aseparatecitizens’rightsagreement

underArticle50TEU”,availableatEutopialawblog,16June2017,

https://eutopialaw.com/2017/06/16/brexit-a-separate-citizens-rights-agreement-under-

article-50-teu/