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Why be Moral?

Unit 2 C. J. Fraser

PHIL1034 Ethics and Politics, East and West: An Introduction to Philosophy

Introduction

• Reading 1-2: Philosophical method—logic and argumentation

- Why apply such methods? Seeking what’s true or right

‣ Beliefs, actions that are justified by good reasons are more likely to be

true or right.

• Without good reasons, no reason to think they’re true or right

• No better grounds for accepting or doing them than not

‣ Arguments, critical thinking, and conceptual analysis are means of identifying well-justified beliefs and actions

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Introduction (cont.)

• Our subject: Ethics and politics—social and political life

- What’s ethically or morally right or justified is what’s supported by the

strongest ethical or moral reasons.

- What’s politically right or justified is what’s supported by political principles

that are themselves morally justified.

• What are moral reasons?

- Reasons justifiable from the moral standpoint or moral point of view

- Consistent with or follow from general moral principles or other

fundamental criteria of morality

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What is the moral standpoint?

• What is the moral standpoint or moral point of view?

- Consider a paradigm case of immorality: Self-interested act that benefits

Andy by harming Betty against her will (example: elderly tycoon forcing employee to donate organs)

‣ Andy acts on self-interested reasons and ignores reasons for not

harming Betty

‣ Andy’s action is not impartially or objectively justified

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What is the moral standpoint? (cont.)

- Minimal conception of morality: 
“The attempt to act on the best justified reasons, as determined by impartially evaluating all relevant reasons, taking into consideration the standpoint of each person likely to be directly affected.”

‣ “Minimal” because we’re trying not to specify content of these reasons

or what counts as strongest justification.

‣ Impartiality, equal consideration of everyone: keys to universal or

objective status of morality

‣ (Still controversial, though!)

- We adopt the moral point of view when we commit to acting on such reasons.

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Why be Moral?

• Our issue: Why adopt the moral standpoint? Why be moral?

- “Easy” answer: Equivalent to asking, “Why do what’s best justified?”

Obvious reply: Because it’s best justified!

‣ A tautological answer (a statement that’s necessarily true because of its

logical form)

‣ A misunderstanding: The question is rather, “What reasons do we have

to commit to the impartial, moral conception of justification?”

‣ Concerned with justification, not motivation

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Why be Moral? (cont.)

- Historically, this general question has been conceived of in various ways

‣ Ancient Greek ( ) thought: Why be a virtuous person? (focus on

morally good character vs. doing morally right actions, justified by best reasons)

‣ Chinese thought: Why follow dào ? (or why follow the “right” dào rather than some other dào?)

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Is morality “subjective”?

• People often claim that morality is “subjective” ( ).

- People may have different opinions about moral right/wrong.

- We may be unconvinced of others’ opinions or unable to convince them of

our opinions.

- Differences of opinion may not cause either side to change their mind.

- So is morality “subjective”?

• If morality is “subjective,” then perhaps there are no objective moral norms.

- “Objective” norms are those that are objectively or impartially justified.

- So if morality is subjective, maybe there is no such thing as a moral

standpoint, as we’ve defined it.

- Or maybe the moral standpoint is just whatever different individuals decide

is justified, according to their personal standards.

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Is morality “subjective”? (cont.)

• “Subjective” ( ) means “of or relating to a subject ( ),” an entity that thinks and acts (an agent) (the word “subject” can also mean “topic” ( ))

• Three senses in which something can be “subjective” (different types of relations to a subject) (there are other senses too):

1. Causally or conceptually dependent on a subject: All mental states are

subjective in that they are caused or possessed by a subject (e.g., pains vs. rocks) (there can be objective truths about these subjective states)

2. Attitudes of a subject whose content purports to indicate how things actually are independent of those attitudes (e.g., belief that earth is flat) (can be objectively true/right or false/wrong)

3. Attitudes of a subject that do not purport to indicate how things actually are independent of themselves (preferences, tastes) (no objective right/wrong)

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Is morality “subjective”? (cont.)

• “Morality is subjective” = “What’s morally right/wrong is determined by the individual subject” = “subjective” in sense #3

- Claim: Morality is similar to a preference or taste

- “People each have their own moral opinion” ≠ “Morality is subjective”

- People have own opinions about many objective questions (e.g., Does life

exist on other planets?) (subjective in sense #2, not #3)

• But morality is not subjective in sense #3—not like a preference or taste

- Unlike subjective preferences, moral judgments (actions, etc.) must be supported by reasons we can defend to others

- Compare: “I’m eating pizza for dinner.” “Why?” “I just feel like it.” 
vs. “I’m giving you an ‘F’ for this course.” “Why?” “I just feel like it.”

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Plan for this unit

Survey some traditional answers, Western and Chinese

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Western thinkers

- Divine command theory ( )

- Self-interest ( )

- Happiness ( ) / flourishing /

realization of our nature () (Plato, Aristotle)

- Sympathy ( ) (Mill)

- Rationality (Foot)

- Morality is an error! (Nietzsche)

!

!

!Chinese thinkers

- Enlightened self-interest (Xúnzǐ )

- People’s nature (xìng )(Mencius / Mèngzǐ )

- Commitment to morality a fact of human psychology (Mòzǐ )

- Forget about morality! (Daoism )

!

Divine Command Theory ( , )

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• “Right and wrong are determined by God’s command.”

- Why be moral? — God commands it (and punishes disobedience)

• Epistemological problem: How do we know what God commands?

- Can we be sure religious teachers or traditions correctly report God’s will?

• Conceptual problem: Socrates’s ( ) argument (Euthyphro)

- More fundamental difficulty

Divine Command Theory (cont.)

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Socrates’s argument

• Euthyphro’s explanation: Piety ( ) is what’s dear to the gods

- Socrates: Dear to them because it’s pious/holy, or pious/holy because

dear to them?

- If dear to them because pious/holy, then “dear to/loved by gods” and

“pious/holy” are two different things, and the one can’t explain the other

Divine Command Theory (cont.)

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Socrates’s argument

• Revised version of Euthyphro’s claim: “What’s right or wrong is so because of God’s command”

• Revised version of Socrates’s argument: Does God have reasons for his commands?

- Yes? Then what’s right/wrong is so because of those reasons, not because

God commands it

- No? Then there is no reason to believe God’s commands 


are morally right (and God might just be a tyrant )

• Conclusion: God’s command cannot explain why 


what’s right is right

Divine Command Theory (cont.)

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• Related problems arise in taking divine command to answer Why Be Moral?

- Respect for God? Then if God is morally good, reason for being moral is

actually respect for the good; if God is not good, then not a justification for being moral after all

‣ Divine command might be helpful in identifying what’s right but doesn’t

explain why we should do what’s right

- Fear of punishment? Then reason for being moral is self-interest, not

God’s command

- Conclusion: Divine command doesn’t answer Why Be Moral?

Self-Interest

• It’s in our own interest to be moral, because morality promotes welfare of all

- Avoid retribution for mistreatment of others

- Enable cooperation and coordination that are beneficial to all

• Historically, this view is linked to the social contract theory of morality () (Hobbes , 1588–1679)

- Moral right/wrong are determined by rules that rational, self-interested agents would agree to follow for mutual benefit, provided everyone else also follows them

- Problem: The theory can’t explain why, for example, 
it’s morally wrong to torture animals for fun—animals 
can’t form a contract with us

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Hobbes

Self-Interest (cont.)

• Problems with self-interest as explanation of Why be moral?

- Not clear that my being moral really is in my self-interest as an individual

‣ Other people’s being moral is often in my self-interest, but my being

moral might be in my self-interest only part of the time

- Self-interest justifies at most only a partial commitment to morality—be

immoral whenever it’s in my self-interest (undetected theft, etc.)

‣ Free rider problem ( )

• Another approach: Perhaps morality is in our 
self-interest in the sense that it’s necessary 
for a good, happy, or flourishing life

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Morality, Happiness, and Flourishing

• Be moral because only the moral life can be a happy or flourishing one

- Happiness: eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία), or human flourishing, versus

subjective feeling of pleasure

- Aristotle ( ): moral virtue fulfills the natural function (ergon, ἔργον) of human beings

- Kant ( ): The end of human existence is to employ reason to determine our will, such that it is good in itself; a good will is one that acts out of respect for moral law

- Aristotle and Kant will be discussed in Lecture 3

- This time we will focus on Plato

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Plato

• Plato ( , 427–347 BCE) (Republic )

• Claim: The moral or just ( ) person has a better, happier life than the unjust

or immoral one (justice = dikaiosune, δικαιοσύνη)

- Everything has an end or function (ergon, ἔργον)

- Things perform their function well if they have relevant virtue/excellence

(arete, ἀρετή) ( ), badly if they have associated vice ( )

- Function of soul is “superintend and command and deliberate” and “life”

‣ Justice: virtue appropriate to the soul (injustice the vice)

‣ So just person lives well (or better than the unjust)

- Living well is being happy, so the just person is happier than the unjust

• Plato’s reason for these claims lies in his theory of the soul (psyche, ψυχή)

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Plato’s Theory of the Soul

• Soul has three parts or aspects: reason/intellect, spirit/will, and appetite/emotion.

- Reason—thinking part; judges what’s real or true, applies wisdom to

rational decisions that guide life; considers needs of whole person, including all three parts, and finds harmony between them

- Spirit—active or motivating part; carries out the commands of reason, applies courage to do what reason determines best

- Appetite—part responsible for feelings and desires; directly seeks pleasure; must be controlled by reason and spirit to achieve moderation

• Republic, Book 9: Image of human with three parts inside, a large “many-headed monster,” smaller lion, and still smaller person

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Plato’s Theory of the Soul (cont.)

• Republic presents a famous analogy between the three parts of the soul and three parts of society

- Rulers (“Guardians,” philosopher-kings)—apply wisdom to decide how

society will be governed

- Soldiers—apply courage to carry out rulers’ commands

- Farmers, merchants, others—apply moderation to own desires so as to

obey rulers

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Plato’s Theory of the Soul (cont.)

• Justice for Plato lies in harmonious, cooperative functioning of the three parts for the good of the whole

- Different parts of society—sociopolitical justice

- Different parts of the person—individual morality

• So why is justice better than injustice? Why be moral?

- Being moral or just is like being healthy—whole person functions properly

because of harmonious cooperation between reason, spirit, and appetite

‣ Immoral person is unhealthy, his parts fighting each other

- When we’re moral, the “noble” and “divine” in us rules the ignoble beast not vice versa

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Problems for Plato’s approach

• Why is justice (or morality) the virtue associated with proper functioning of the soul?

- Plato: To function well, need harmonious cooperation between its parts

- Does this beg the question? ( ) !

• Could an unjust person’s soul function well by intelligently, courageously, and harmoniously pursuing self-interest or treating other people badly?

• Plato: Reason must rule, and the wise or reasonable thing to do is to be moral

- Why is it more harmonious for reason to rule than to share power with

spirit and appetite?

- Why is being moral the wise thing to do? (Need a fuller answer than that it

harmonizes the soul)

• Answer to Why Be Moral? probably needs to appeal to our relations with

others, not only our relations with ourselves

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Xúnzǐ —Dào , Desires, and Good Order

• Xúnzǐ’s (3rd century BCE) concern: 
Not morality, but dào , specifically the “rituals and 
duties” (lǐ-yì ) established by the “former kings” 
(the rulers of the Zhōu dynasty )

• Xúnzǐ’s position resembles self-interest view and 
Plato’s view in different respects

- Self-interest: Following dào is only reliable way to 


pursue our own welfare

‣ If everyone conforms to “rituals and duties,” goods will be distributed

so as to satisfy people’s desires to a greater degree than otherwise

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Xúnzǐ (cont.)

- Live a well-ordered (zhì ), “beautiful” (měi ) life

‣ No three-part division of soul or person

‣ Use know-how or wisdom (zhī ) of the heart (xīn ) to moderate (jié

) responses of our constitution/affections (qíng ) and inborn nature (xìng ), thus achieving order ( ) and beauty ( )

‣ Training in ritual and duty makes us “beautiful” and “a complete person” (chéng rén )

• Problems for Xúnzǐ: Might there be other, equally effective ways to fulfill our desires? Might some other dào be as orderly or beautiful?

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Morality as Our Nature

• Mencius (Mèngzǐ , late 4th century BCE) famously argued that people’s inborn nature (xìng ) is good.

- An exaggeration: He does not mean people are inherently good, but that

they have the capacity ( ) to be good

‣ Xìng refers to what we tend do spontaneously, without effort, as part

of our normal functioning, much like our health—e.g., it’s people’s xìng to grow hair

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Morality as Our Nature (cont.)

- People have inherent dispositions that are “starting points” (duān ) of virtues; to become morally good, we need only “concentrate/think” ( ) or “seek” ( ) these within

‣ Sympathy/compassion —kindness, benevolence (rén )

‣ Contempt/disdain —rightness, duty (yì )

‣ Deference/courtesy —propriety, ritual (lǐ )

‣ Approval/disapproval —wisdom, knowledge (zhì )

- The four “starting points” or “tips” ( ) show we’re able ( ) to become virtuous (Mencius doesn’t claim they justify becoming virtuous)

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Morality as Our Nature (cont.)

- Failure to develop these innate “starting points” is failure to develop the “greater” part ( ) of ourselves

‣ Not to be morally good is to neglect or harm our “greater” ( ) or

“nobler” ( ) part

• Implicit claim: By nurturing our “greater” part, we can also nurture

our other parts

‣ The “greater” part is the heart ( ), which through “concentrating” ( )

can let our inherent, natural ( ) dispositions develop and guide action appropriately

• Other organs (ears, eyes) don’t think and are easily “fixated” or

“blinkered” (bì ) by things and “led” astray by them ( )

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Morality as Our Nature (cont.)

• Comparison with Plato

- Similarities:

‣ Nobler/lower parts

‣ Ideal of healthy, flourishing life

- Differences:

‣ Heart avoiding “fixation” vs. reason

‣ Mencius emphasizes sympathy/compassion

‣ Lower parts are not parts of soul, but “blinkered” sense organs

‣ Mencius doesn’t argue that virtuous person is “happier”

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Morality as Our Nature (cont.)

• Questions:

- Do we really have the moral “starting points”?

- Is the heart really “greater” or “more noble” than our other parts?

- Is the heart free of “fixations” or “blind spots”?

- Does the heart, when followed or developed, reliably lead us to be good?

‣ Don’t we have “starting points” for selfishness, greed, stubbornness,

prejudice, and other vices too?

‣ Isn’t Mencius just defining our “heart” as motives in line with morality

and all other motives as not the heart?

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Sympathy

• “We should be moral because it is a fact about us, or at least most of us, that we feel sympathy for others and so want to be moral.”

• David Hume ( , 1711–76): Morality founded on sentiment ( ), not reason ( )

- Reason is “the slave of the passions” ( )

‣ Political metaphor opposite of Plato’s, in 


which reason governs appetite

• Virtues and vices in others cause us to feel approval and 


disapproval as disinterested observers (when self-interest 
is not involved)

- These feelings arise from our natural sympathy for others of our kind

• Through communication with others, these feelings are extended into a general “sentiment of humanity,” grounded in a common point of view, which is the foundation of morality

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Hume

Sympathy (cont.)

• John Stuart Mill ( , 1806–73)

- Conscience ( ) lies in a painful feeling caused by 


violation of our duty

‣ Moral feelings acquired, not innate ( ); but 


natural for us to acquire them

• Morality is grounded in a “powerful natural sentiment”

- People have strong social feelings and see themselves 
as members of communities.

- This leads to consideration of welfare of others and to identifying our feelings with their good, until the good of all becomes part of each person’s good.

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Mill

Sympathy (cont.)

• Comments:

- Hume and Mill are surely right that sympathy is a powerful motivation (

) for morality. But is it a sufficient justification?

‣ Some strong sentiments don’t justify action—racism, jealousy, hatred of

enemies, etc. What about sympathy gives it justificatory power?

‣ “Misplaced” sympathy doesn’t justify action: Someone who had more

sympathy for rats than humans wouldn’t be justified in treating rats well at humans’ expense.

- If some feature associated with sympathy answers these questions about justification, then answer to Why be moral? lies in that feature, not sympathy itself.

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Foot on Morality as Practical Rationality

• Rejects idea that sympathy or other attitudes explain 
why we should be moral

- Someone who lacks these attitudes might then 


have no reason to be moral

- Rejects idea that reason to be moral is contingent 


on agent’s subjective attitudes

• Rejects “non-cognitivism” ( ), view that 


besides content that can be true or false, content of 
value judgments includes speaker’s feelings, attitudes, etc.

- Humean approach: morality is practical, guides action

- Reason alone does not guide action: need desire, sentiment, etc.

- Facts sharply distinguished from values

- So rationality can’t explain why we should be moral, because

rationality concerns only truth-conditional content�34

Philippa Foot

Foot’s proposal: Morality required by practical rationality

• “Goodness of the will” is basis for practical rationality: rational only if acting on good will

• Reasons can directly motivate action, without sympathy or desire

• So moral reasons can lead to action even without our desiring moral ends or feeling

(Foot’s smoking example)

• Rationality is acting well with respect to reasons = recognizing and acting on morally

relevant factors

• Why be rational and moral, in Foot’s sense? Because of “facts of human life”

- Every species has standards of good/bad functioning (goodness in sight, memory) (like 32 teeth)

- Goodness of will, good working of practical reasoning are part of normal functioning of human life

- Nature of human life entails reasons to be honest, fair, unselfish, helpful, etc., because we are social creatures who must cooperate to live well

- Fact/value distinction collapses; moral evaluation concern facts about normal, flourishing human life

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Problems for Foot’s “Natural Goodness”

• Is morality really a foundation of rationality?

- Does rationality require that we act on all of the good reasons available to

us or give priority to “normality”?

- Might agents give different weights to different reasons without being

irrational? (Is smoking “irrational”?)

• Is the “normal” life of our species clear or fixed enough to support Foot’s

claims about moral evaluation?

- “Normal” features of human life haven been offered as grounds for slavery,

racism, sexism, etc.

- What grounds make (e.g.) fairness a good reason and manliness not

- Is it defensible to assume an “evaluative” conception of human nature, so

that the typical life of our species defines normative standards of conduct? (Is this defensible even for other species, such as cats and dogs?)

‣ What if different individuals might be constituted differently?

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Reason, Sentiment, and Moral Realism ( )

• Are reason (intellect, cognition) and sentiment (feeling, desire) as distinct as Plato and Hume assume? Ruler and slave? Or cooperating partners?

- Sentiments can be reasonable or unreasonable

‣ Normal or justified to act on any strong sentiment? (rats again, counting

stones)

• Sentiment alone doesn’t provide good reason to do something

‣ Sentiments on which we usually act depend on recognition of good, valuable, right

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Reason, Sentiment, and Moral Realism (cont.)

- Recognition, understanding of good, valuable, right involves a positive sentiment

‣ Part of being good, valuable, right is being desirable or worth pursuing

- Response to Hume & Mill (& Mencius ): Our sympathy for others is intertwined with recognition of value

‣ Recognition of value and sympathy jointly justify and motivate morality

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- Why be moral? ...Because it is an appropriate response to real features of the world

‣ Recognize and respond to value and welfare of others

‣ Not all value we recognize is value for me (self-interested reasons are

simply not the only ones we normally recognize)

‣ Why be moral? analogous to Why believe what’s true?

• Answers surveyed above may all contribute sometimes: self-interest, proper functioning, because we care about others or what’s right

• But fundamental answer comes from content of morality itself: if we aren’t moral (or don’t believe what’s true), we’re getting things wrong

‣ Nothing compels me to be moral, just as nothing compels me to believe what’s true

• But sometimes, at least, failure to do so will create problems for me

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Reason, Sentiment, and Moral Realism (cont.) An Anthropological Fact?

• Mòzǐ’s (5th century BCE) position: distinct from those considered so far

• No claims about people’s inherent nature, self-interest, or sympathy

• Anthropological observation: People generally just do have views about

what’s right (yì ) and are strongly motivated to act on them

- Ashamed to have others regard their acts as not right ( )

- Agree that some unified conception of morality needed to prevent conflict

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An Anthropological Fact? (cont.)

• People typically understand that models/standards (fǎ ) are needed in any activity

- Morality is (among other things) a standard for maintaining proper social

order (zhì ), something people are generally committed to

• Mòzǐ doesn’t recognize the question of Why be moral? but only that of What

standards should we adopt?

- Doesn’t claim people spontaneously get any moral standards right (unlike

Mencius), only that they are generally committed to some standards

- Too optimistic? Defensible anthropological generalization?

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Is Morality Itself a Good Thing?

• Nietzsche ( ) (1844–1900) rejected the view that 
morality is an essential part of who we are as humans.

- To him, the prevailing morality of Europe during his 


time (and ours)—morality associated with Christianity, 
Kant ( ), and utilitarianism ( )—
was against nature and prevented human flourishing.

- What he called “herd” ( ) morality might be 
“the danger of dangers,” because its effects 
on culture benefit “lowest men” while preventing 
“higher men” from achieving “the highest 
power and splendor possible to the type man.”

- (Compare Foot’s view of “normal”
human life)

�42Kant

Nietzsche

Is Morality Itself a Good Thing? (cont.)

• Question value of moral values (can’t just assume they’re correct)

- Perhaps other values might be more important

• “Genealogy of morals” ( )—Under what conditions did values such as morally “good” and “evil” develop and how have they evolved?

- Master morality: proud, noble, creates values; good person = noble,

powerful (feared); bad person = despicable

- Slave morality: seeks utility (alleviate suffering), liberty; grounded in

ressentiment ( ); good person = safe, “nice guy”; evil person = powerful, dangerous (feared)

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Is Morality Itself a Good Thing? (cont.)

• Herd morality based on false assumptions about human agency

- People have free will ( ) and so are responsible for their actions

- People’s motives for action are clearly identifiable and so open to moral

evaluation

- People are the same type and so a universal norm applies to them all

• Ridiculous to say humans ought to be such-and-such—fact is that they just are what they are (many types of people, our type determines how we act)

- Humans are not the result of any special purpose, will, end, nor the objects

of some ideal of humanity, happiness, morality

- “We have invented the concept of ‘end’: in reality there is no end”

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Is Morality Itself a Good Thing? (cont.)

• Herd morality

- Approves: Happiness, altruism ( ), equality, compassion—

Nietzsche: These have no intrinsic value ( )

- Disapproves: Suffering, self-interest, inequality, indifference to suffering—

Nietzsche: These can have extrinsic ( ) value, value as means ( )

• Higher type of person

- Solitary, pursues a unifying project, healthy, life-affirming, concerned with oneself, creative; may undergo suffering but is indifferent about it, has a sense of hierarchy, difference from others

- Examples: Goethe, Beethoven, Nietzsche

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“Forget Morality” ( )

• Classical Daoist texts contend that the “moral” dào—the dào of rén (moral goodness, benevolence) and yì (moral rightness, duty, “righteousness”) taught by the Rú (“erudites,” Confucians) and Mò (Mohists)—prevents us from smoothly following the genuine dào of nature.

• Dàodéjīng

- Idea of morality arises only when dào is “lost” (

); morality useless in recovering it

- Abandon morality ( ), embrace “simplicity” ( )

• Zhuāngzǐ

- Morality analogous to mutilation ( )—damages our natural

features or capacities

‣ No explicit, fixed dào is universally or consistently correct; the attempt

to follow an explicit dào interferes with our capacity to respond flexibly to changing conditions

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“Forget Morality” (cont.)

- Natural world presents us with various natural patterns
—simply apply “virtuosity” and follow dào ( ) (Why?)

‣ . . . . “And why this urgency


in pushing rén and yì. . . . Sir, you disorder people’s nature.”

‣ “Forget” rén , yì , ritual propriety (lǐ ), and even one’s own self;

identify with the “great connection” ( )

‣ “The

springs dry, the fish dwell together on land, spewing each other with moisture and wetting each other with spit. It would be better to forget each other in rivers and lakes.”

�47—End—