Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1990 223

DISCUSSION ARTICLE

Whose Life is it Anyway?

JENNIFER TRUSTED

ABSTRACT This paper addresses a current confusion in debates on the morality of experimentation on human pre-embryos: the confusion that arises from ambiguity in the sense of ‘human being’. We may quite legitimately decide to apply the term ‘human being’ to all entities with human DNA but in that case we should not then imply that all human beings are as much objects of moral concern as the fetus or a post-parturate human being. It is argued that whatever classifjing terms we use, potential entities need to be distinguished f iom actual entities and that the very notion of potentiality rests on this distinction. The paper does not offer an argument in favour of experimentation, rather it appeals for clear thought. Moral attitudes to experimentation on pre-embryos are varied and attempts to analyse issues through implicit appeal to emotionally ambiguous terms do not help the moral debate.

In his paper ‘A Fortnight of my Life is Missing’ [l] Alan Holland argues against the view that a pre-embryo is not a human being and that therefore experimentation on pre-embryos is of little moral consequence.

He starts by conceding “the fact that something will develop into a human being does not imply that it is a human being. (What it implies, if anything, is that it is not (yet) a human being)” [2]. But for Holland this is not the end of the matter and he withdraws his concession: “the fact that something is a human embryo certainly seems to imply that it is an embryonic human being” [3]. (In keeping with his argument he should have referred to ‘pre-embryo’ and ‘pre-embryonic human being’ but perhaps this is not an important point.) He says that since the term ‘embryo’ (and, presumably, ‘pre-embryo’) “belongs to a restricted range of developmental concepts” [4] it can be concluded that an embryonic human being (and presumably a pre-embryonic human being) is a human being.

Thus Holland’s response to the question of whether “human life from the moment of conception, constitutes a human being” [5] is “Yes it does”. It follows therefore that experimentation on pre-embryos is experimentation on human beings and arguments based on the contention that pre-embryos are of little moral consequence, because they are not human beings are based on a false premise. Hence the conclusion, namely that such experimentation is of little moral consequence, has not been demonstrated.

I suggest that all Holland’s analysis shows is that we need to be more careful with our use of the term ‘human being’ and that he has not in any way undermined the position of those who make a moral distinction between pre-embryos and embryos, let alone between pre-embryos and human beings after parturition.

Of course, if we decide that by ‘human being’ we mean an entity with human DNA then human pre-embryos, embryos, infants and adults are all human beings. Such a

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decision can be quite legitimate, but it is not legitimate to use a decision on denotation to try to establish that a potential entity is an actual entity. As we saw (see my second paragraph, p. 249) Holland withdraws the distinction between potentiality and actual- ity in relation to embryos and post-parturate human beings on what are essentially linguistic grounds. Such a manoeuvre is not new; thus, in a letter to The Times on 13 December 1989 we have:

. . . the difference between the day-old or hour-old embryo and the human adult is one of degree of maturity only, not of essential nature; the adult is a mature member of the species, whereas the embryo is a human person whose characteristic human powers and potentialities have only just begun to be developed and actualized, but that is no reason to deny that the human embryo is a fully human being-an actual human being, not a potential one.

Holland is aware of this type of extension [7] but he does not seem to be aware of its full significance. If we wish to use the term ‘human being’ for all entities with human DNA his assertion that experimentation on human embryos (and pre-embryos) is experimentation on human beings cannot be denied. But the distinction which the pro- experimenters make (in suggesting that the term ‘human being’ should not be used for pre-embryos) arises from their view that we do not have the same moral responsibili- ties for human pre-embryos as we have for human embryos and, a fortiori for post- parmrate humans. A decision that the denotation of ‘human being’ should be based solely on DNA and so should apply to all those entities is irrelevant.

I am sure that anyone reading Holland’s interesting and informative account of embryonic development will realise that he appreciates the importance of the concep- tual distinction between pre-embryos, embryos and post-parturate human beings but his final sentence:

We must not hide from ourselves (what I believe to be) the fact that when we experiment on human embryos we experiment on human beings. [8]

clearly reveals that he is caught up with the emotive overtones of the words ‘human being’ and overlooks that on the connotation he has argued for those words do not necessarily have such emotional (and moral) weight as is implied by the sentence quoted above. We may note that the same emotional overtones and ambiguity are in the very title of his paper ‘A Fortnight of My Life is Missing’. The implication is that during the first two weeks after conception the potential individual is capable of experiences; it is implied that this first fortnight is a part of the life of an individual in the same way as is a period of unconsciousness during a general anaesthetic, or of concussion after a severe blow (or comatose sleep after imbibing alcohol!). But the analogy does not hold. These latter periods can be regarded as ‘missing’ from an individual’s life partly because they might have been consciously experienced, but were not, and more importantly, because experiences subsequent to regaining consciousness can be related to those prior to the loss of consciousness. But there is no nervous tissue in a pre-embryo and so it can have no experiences in its fortnight of existence. A fortiori there can be no experiences prior to conception. Thus, the first two weeks of biological life are not two weeks of or from the life of an experiencing individual-a ‘me’ or a ‘you’, a ‘her’ or a ‘him’.

Elsewhere it has been argued that the common-sense concept of a person existing through time needs profound qualification [9]. This is not the place to criticize Parfit’s discussion but whether we agree or disagree with his analysis of post-parturate human

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beings it is clear that we cannot compare an actual ego, and its notion of self-hood, with a potential ego, having no such notion, even though we may decide to call both human beings. Therefore, if ‘human being’ is to signify all tissues incorporating a certain genetic code a human being is not necessarily a ‘self’ and it is not necessarily immoral to carry out experiments on human beings. Discussion about the morality of experimenting on tissue cultures with a human genetic code should not be side-tracked by ambiguities that are based on suspect emotional appeals. What we have to consider is what moral responsibility we have towards an entity that is potentially an individual with thoughts and aspirations. This is of very great importance but we must accept that potentiality is not actuality.

Aristotle used the notions of potentiality and actuality to explain change, not to deny it. We live in a world where everything changes; not only all living things but also non- living natural objects such as the stars in the sky, mountain ranges and clouds, and artefacts such as pictures and light bulbs. Some of these appear to change in an instant, others relatively slowly and others seem unchanged throughout our life. Some are easier to observe than others and, if the new state of affairs strikes us as happening suddenly (as when the light goes on) we think of it occurring at a definite moment which is in no way a matter of arbitrary decision. Yet this merely reflects our human psychological assessment of time and therefore of rates of change. If we could appreciate much smaller intervals of time the light bulb might go through a phase of semi-activity before it began to shine; if we lived for millenia we might barely appreciate the passing of a decade, but we might be able to observe the changing pattern of the stars in the sky, and mountain ranges might seem as fluid as clouds do now.

We have limited powers to note the passing of time and also we have limited powers of discriminating appearances. Is there any difference between a grain of sand and a heap of sand if we can take away from the heap a grain at a time and fail to appreciate any change? The plain fact is that there is a difference and though, because of our limited powers, we cannot detect the different stages in a slow and/or gradual change, it does not follow that there are not changes, and very fundamental changes too. She who denies any change because she cannot detect change would have to say that there was no difference between the ocean and a drop of water and, no difference between a burning cigarette end and a forest fire. She would have to say not only that there was no difference between an acorn and an oak or between an embryo and an adult but that there was no difference between a well-fed person and one who is starving. For no one can give the moment when a person ceases to be adequately nourished or when he or she starts to starve.

A potential human individual is no more an actual individual than an acorn (a potential oak tree) is an actual oak. No one denies this in relation to acorns: tree conservationists do not campaign to preserve acorns and are happy that acorns should lie on the ground in oak forests. The fact that there will be an intermediate sapling phase which some might wish to protect and others to cull does not in the least affect their attitude to acorns.

Well-perhaps cases of maturing human embryos are different from other cases? But why? Is it because, as humans, we have a special attitude to human embryos or would we take the same attitude to any embryo of a sentient species, though not of non-sentient species such as oaks and other plants? But then if this is conceded Holland’s argument will not do for he implies [ 101 that the argument for classification by DNA applies to all species; hence, the fact that human embryos are human in this sense is irrelevant.

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Arguments showing that experimentation with pre-embryos is wrong must be directed to showing that there is something special about the human species (and other sentient species?) that precludes any interference with their potential to develop ‘naturally’. Though perhaps this is going too far since from time immemorial we have not hesitated to interfere with natural processes if we thought development would be helped. It might be better to suggest that anti-interference arguments must yield conclusions that allow interference for the benefit of an individual (prevention of a genetic disorder for instance) but not for what is seen as likely to harm her or (more commonly) him.

All morality does, at the last, depend on emotions and the anxiety we feel about experimenting on the human species (and possibly other species) at any stage after conception is not to be lightly dismissed as ‘mere’ sentiment. The possibility has arisen only recently and we have not yet worked out an ethical code; there is no accepted norm as there is for our current moral attitudes to, say, slavery, cannibalism or infanticide (all of which have been, or are, morally acceptable in certain societies).

If we are to contemplate legalising experiments on human pre-embryos we have also to decide the age at which we shall rule that they acquire nervous sensibility and the possibility of having experiences. It is here that the empirical facts become relevant. In addition, although the actual breaking of any law does not directly bear on the morality of the law itself, we have to bear in mind that the time limit might be covertly and illegally extended and/or that there may well be pressure to alter the law so as to extend any permitted time limit. This point was made by Professor Marshall in The Times on 1 1 December [ l l ] . Professor Marshall was also worried that embryo experimentation, along with fewer restrictions on abortions, would lead to “a gradual whittling away at respect for human life” [12].

As to this last, I am not sure that he is right. In the early years of the nineteenth century contraception was considered wicked but many people countenanced children working a 14-hour day in coal mines and factories. In Victorian times abortion was morally abhorrent but the use of the cat-of-nine tails was accepted as reasonable punishment for insubordination and there were doctors who argued that women should not be given anaesthetics in child-birth, not because there might be harm to the baby but because they had to atone for the sin of Eve. Of course, any number of wrongs do not make a right and it does not follow that because some Victorian (and earlier) values are not now respected that all earlier values are worthless. But we can say that on the evidence available there is little ground for the assertion that those in past times had more concern for human life and human dignity than is shown today.

There are arguments that would give positive support to the view that experiments on pre-embryos and, indeed, embryos, with the purpose of discovering how to enable sterile couples to have children and how to remove physical and psychological disabilities could increase respect for human life. There are arguments to support the view that campaigns to allow women to decide for themselves whether they do or do not bear a child will increase respect for all human beings and for women in particular. I do not say that such arguments are conclusive; these matters are of great concern and much more clear thought and discussion are needed. I do suggest that clear thought is hampered and rational discussion reduced to polemics by introducing emotive ambigu- ities.

Jennifer Trusted, IS Victoria Park Road, Exeter, Devon EX2 4NT, United Kingdom.

Whose Life is it Anyway? 227

NOTES

[ l ] ALAN HOLLAND (1990) A fortnight of my life is missing: a discussion of the status of the human ‘pre-

[2] Op. cit., p. 25. [3] Ibid. [4] Op. cit., p. 26. [5] Ibid. [6] F. J. FITZPATRICK & AGNETA SUITON, letter in The Times, 13 December 1989, p. 16. [7] HOLLAND, op. cit., p. 27. [8] Op. cit., p. 36. [9] DEREK PARFIT (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Oxford University Press), Part Three, pp.

embryo’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 7, pp. 25-37.

199-347. [lo] HOLLAND, op. cit., p. 28. [ 111 JOHN MARSHALL, Believe in life . . , or believe in nothing, The Times, 11 December 1989, p. 17. [12] Ibid.