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Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Whistle-Blowing Wrongdoing Behavior Yin Xu Department of Accounting College of Business and Public Administration Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529 Tel: (757) 683-3554 E-mail: [email protected] Douglas E. Ziegenfuss Department of Accounting College of Business and Public Administration Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529 Tel: (757) 683-3514 E-mail: [email protected] June 2003

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Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Whistle-Blowing Wrongdoing Behavior

Yin Xu Department of Accounting

College of Business and Public Administration Old Dominion University

Norfolk, VA 23529 Tel: (757) 683-3554

E-mail: [email protected]

Douglas E. Ziegenfuss Department of Accounting

College of Business and Public Administration Old Dominion University

Norfolk, VA 23529 Tel: (757) 683-3514

E-mail: [email protected]

June 2003

Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’ Reporting Wrongdoing Behavior

Abstract

This study investigates the issue of whistle-blowing arising from known company wrongdoing in the process of preparing financial information. An experiment was conducted to examine whether reward systems such as cash incentives or employment contracts have an impact on auditors’ whistle-blowing behavior. The results indicate that internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing to higher authorities when cash rewards or continuing employment contracts are provided, suggesting reward systems have a positive effect on disclosing company’s wrongdoing or even fraud. In addition, the result reveals that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning are more sensitive to cash reward incentives.

1

Reward Systems, Moral Reasoning, and Internal Auditors’

Reporting Wrongdoing Behavior

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to investigate the issue of whistle-blowing arising

from known company wrongdoing in the process of preparing financial information. The

basic question to be addressed is whether certain reward systems and individual moral

reasoning on the part of auditors have an impact on disclosing company wrongdoing or

fraud. The reliability of financial information is always a legitimate concern in financial

reporting. Highly publicized audit failures lead to close examination of the role and

behavior of auditors. Previous research suggests that whistle-blowing can be used as a

preventive mechanism for possible wrongdoing (Hooks, Kaplan, and Schultz 1994).

Studies indicate that the nature and extent of the retaliations have a negative impact on

the prospective whistle-blower’s decision in the disclosure of company wrongdoing (e.g.

Near and Miceli 1986; Arnold and Ponemon 1991). Issues have been raised about the

effect of significant monetary rewards or long-term employment contract as an incentive

for reporting organizational wrongdoing to mitigate the negative consequences of

retaliation on the whistle-blower (Ponemon 1994). However, little study has attempted to

empirically examine such an effect.

The results in this study indicate that auditors are more likely to report

wrongdoing to higher authorities when cash rewards or continuing employment contracts

are provided, suggesting reward systems have a positive effect on disclosing company’s

wrongdoing or even fraud. In addition, the result reveals that, to some extent, auditors

2

with lower levels of moral reasoning are more sensitive to cash reward incentives or more

willing to blow the whistle when cash incentives are provided.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a

brief overview of the basic research in the area and a development of hypotheses. Then

the research method and the results are described. The final section discusses the

implications and limitations of the study.

BACKGROUND

The psychology of moral reasoning is based on Piaget’ theory (1932, 1966). The

theory assumes that cognitive and moral development proceeds hand in hand, and that the

cognitive schema and structure are innate, invariant, hierarchical and culturally universal.

In his research Piaget used the “clinical interview” technique to top the child’s underlying

cognitive-structural capacities, rather than merely measure observable surface

performance in behavioral terms. In contrast to emphasis on education and development

as adult influence on children, Piaget’s cognitive-structural approach attempted to show

how social-moral knowledge developed out of a background of authority and constraint

and then moved in a direction of autonomous cooperation and equality. In Piaget’s

scheme, once the child resolved some of the difficulties inherent in distinguishing his

own reality from the givens in external reality, a more or less natural process of gradually

unfolding moral development would occur (Rich and Devitis 1994).

Kohlberg (1969) made enormously important contributions to the moral

development theory by continuing what Piaget’s theory had left unfinished. Kohlberg

not only shared Piaget’s assumption but was also concerned with the principle of justice

3

rather than simple cooperation and equity. Kohlberg’s research showed culturally

universal stages of moral development. He advanced a stage-sequence model that

defined a series of cognitive levels and stages somewhat akin to the rungs of a ladder.

Within each of the three levels of ethical judgment are two developmental stages, thus

producing a total of six discrete states as follows.

Pre-conventional Level: Stage 1: Obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical

harm. Stage 2: Serving one’s own or other’s needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete

exchange. Conventional Level: Stage 3: Playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about the other people and their

feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.

Stage 4: Doing one’s duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society or the group.

Post-conventional Level: Stage 5: Upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when

they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group. Stage 6: Assuming guidance by universal ethical principles that all humanity should

follow (Kohlberg 1981). To the pre-conventional person, resolution of an ethical dilemma is simply based upon

the immediate cost and/or benefit of ethical action. To the conventional person,

resolution is based upon the avoidance of harm to others belonging to one’s social

institution. The post-conventional person frames an ethical judgment based upon an

internalized and self-chosen set of principles.

What is important in Kohlberg’s theory is that stages are organized system of

thought and they represent invariant developmental sequences. All movement is forward

and does not omit steps. The stages come one after another and in the same order, even

though children move through the sages at varying speeds. The stages are hierarchical

4

insofar as thinking at a higher stage comprehends within it thinking at a lower stage.

Based on longitudinal, cross-sectional, and cross-cultural studies carried out in Chicago

area, Turkey, Britain, Canada, India, Israel, Honduras, Taiwan, and Yucatan, Kohlberg’s

model has been widely influential (Rich and DeVitis 1994).

Ethical reasoning research in the accounting and auditing profession is important

because the concept of professional ethics is more than an external measure by which the

profession maintains a virtuous image (Ponemon and Gabhart 1994). For many

practitioners, it is a concept that implies a reasoning capability that permits the individual

to render judgement unaltered by self-interest that could impair his or her professional

responsibility. The ethical reasoning process is part of the individual’s overall moral

consciousness from which he or she deals with difficult conflict or dilemmas in every day

practice. It is this personal dimension of the moral universe in the auditing profession

that attracted attention of researchers. Since the mid-1980s, an increasing number of

studies have addressed the ethical issues in accounting and auditing from the perspective

of moral development theory (see Louwer, Ponemon, and Radtke 1997).

One aspect of these studies that relates most closely to the present study is the

relationship between moral reasoning and the whistle-blowing phenomenon. Whistle-

blowing is defined as the “disclosure by organizational members (former and current) of

illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons

or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near and Miceli 1985, p.4).

Research in the whistle-blowing phenomenon has been pursued in various aspects

including accounting and auditing (see Hooks et. al, 1994). Many factors may influence

whistle-blowing behavior, among which the factor of retaliation against whistle blowers

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is “perhaps the most significant determinant to behavior” (Arnold and Ponemon 1991).

Evidence suggests that retaliation is part of rational and planned process initiated by

authority not only to eliminate the whistle blower as a witness but also to suppress future

whistle-blowing decisions (e.g. Near and Miceli 1985, 1986). In retaliating against the

whistle blowers, management tries to signal to others that confronting authority has high

risk and can ruin one’s career (Glazer and Glazer 1989).

Arnold and Ponemon (1991) conduct an experiment examining the effect of moral

reasoning, retaliation, and the position of individuals on internal auditors’ perceptions of

whistle-blowing. More specifically, the study examines the internal auditors’ perceptions

about whistle-blowing in the context of three variables: (1) the level of moral reasoning

of the individuals, (2) the possible retaliation imposed by management or co-workers

against the whistle-blower, and (3) the position of the whistle-blower in an organization

(internal auditors, external auditors, or marketing analysts). The experiment asked 106

internal auditors to predict the likelihood of another person disclosing wrongdoing under

two different manipulated conditions: (1) the nature of retaliation posed against the

whistle-blower (2) the position of the individual discovering wrongdoing. Findings of

this work show that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning were unlikely

to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, and this effect was particularly pronounced under the

condition of retaliation by the organization. Findings also reveal that the position of the

prospective whistle-blower has a significant influence on whistle-blower’s behavior.

Arnold and Ponemon’s (1991) study is consistent with other findings (e.g. Near

and Miceli 1986) indicating that the extent of retaliation reduces the likelihood of

reporting wrongdoing. Moreover, Near and Miceli (1985), applying reinforcement theory

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(Skinner 1953), point out that when similar wrongdoing is consistently tolerated or

encouraged while whistle-blowing act is followed by retaliation, “the wrong doing setting

serves to signal ‘don’t act’” (Near and Miceli 1985, p.6). At the same time, they have

argued that when similar wrongdoing is consistently followed by successful opposition

and by positive management reaction, the wrongdoing serves as a stimulus for action.

This point has important implications, but little empirical research has been done to test

how the wrongdoing setting may become stimulus for whistle-blowing act. An obvious

issue raised here is whether offers of significant incentives can result in an increase in

disclosing wrongdoing.

Based on the same framework of reinforcement theory, this study suggests that

people are motivated to engage in certain behavior because of past rewards associated

with those behaviors. If wrongdoing is reported by an individual, and if the individual

who blew the whistle has been rewarded, the wrongdoing setting serves to send the signal

that whistle-blowing behavior will be encouraged. While an organization may provide

different types of incentives, monetary rewards may be considered one of the most salient

economic resources.

As evidenced by the previous studies, job termination is one of the most common

forms of retaliation against whistle blowers (e.g. Glazer and Glazer 1989). It seems that

individuals often put themselves at very substantial risk of losing their jobs eventually if

they blow the whistle on organizations’ wrongdoing, the situation is probably more

notable in private organizations than in public organizations (Alford 2001). One way to

offset these negative consequences of retaliation and to curb management power in the

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event of whistle blowing situations is to develop some control structure by offering long-

term employment contracts to individuals who disclose wrongdoing (Ponemon 1994).

Based on the previous studies and the above discussion, it is expected that

individuals will be less likely to disclose and report wrongdoing even when they think

they should. However, individuals will tend to disclose and report wrongdoing when a

substantial amount of cash reward is offered after whistle blowing acts. Similarly,

individuals will be likely to blow the whistle when continuing employment contract is

guaranteed after whistle blowing acts. Accordingly, H1 and H2 summarize these

expectations.

H1: Internal auditors are more likely to feel they should report wrongdoing than they would report.

H2a: It is more likely that auditors will report or disclose wrongdoing when a substantial amount of cash reward is offered. H2b: It is more likely that auditors will report or disclose wrongdoing when a continuing employment contract is guaranteed.

As discussed earlier, the experiment conducted by Arnold and Ponemon (1991)

demonstrates that internal auditors with relatively low levels of moral reasoning are less

likely to blow the whistle, and this is especially true when the potential retaliation exists.

This finding is supported by Kohlberg stage theory (1969, 1981) that individuals with

lower levels of moral reasoning will make the decision to do right to avoid punishment

(stage 1) or to serve one’s own interest (stage 2). By the same token, it is expected that

individuals with lower levels of moral reasoning will be more sensitive to incentives such

as cash rewards and continuing employment contracts. Accordingly, H3 summarizes this

expectation.

8

H3a: Individual levels of moral reasoning will influence the likelihood of reporting or disclosing wrongdoing when cash rewards are offered. H3b: Individual levels of moral reasoning will influence the likelihood of reporting or disclosing wrongdoing when a continuing employment contract is guaranteed.

METHOD

General Design

A mixed ANOVA research design with repeated measures and between-group

independent variables is used in the study. The primary reason of using the repeated

measure design is that it provides good precision for comparing manipulations because

all sources of variability between participants are excluded from the experimental error.

Only variation within subjects enters the experimental error, since any two manipulations

can be compared directly for each subject (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman

1996).

Participants

A list of members of two regional internal auditor chapters was obtained and the

decision cases and questionnaire were mailed with a cover letter to each auditor. Due to

institutional constraints and the relatively high response rate, a single mailing was used.

Of the 570 surveys mailed, 26 were returned as undeliverable, leaving 544 available to

participants. 201 internal auditors returned the questionnaire. The response rate was

37%.

9

Procedures

All participating subjects are provided with five pages of a research instrument.

The first page consists of a case involving a situation of an internal auditor discovering

wrongdoing in an organization. It provides descriptive information about the wrongdoing

setting. The internal auditor recently completed an audit of the company’s billing

system. The billings had been audited before and no major problems were identified.

During the present audit, however, the internal auditor discovered a series of inflated or

falsified invoices to customer that had already been paid. He reported this finding to the

director of internal audit. The director said that he would report it to authorities within

the company. But a few days later, the director changed his mind. The scenario is

adapted from the previous work of Arnold and Ponemon (1991). After reading the case,

subjects are asked to indicate that the internal auditor described in the case should report

wrongdoing to higher authorities on a 9-point scale (1 = definitely shouldn't, 9 =

definitely should). Subjects are then required to give a prediction that the internal auditor

would report wrongdoing to higher authorities on a 9-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 9 =

very likely). The task is presented in the third-person to reduce potential self-reporting

bias that frequently go with studies of moral issues (see Arnold and Ponemon 1991).

Then subjects are given two manipulated situations assuming that the reward systems are

provided by the organization and asked to provide a prediction again about the auditor’s

whistle-blowing act after each manipulation. The two manipulated situations are as

follows:

Assume that the company has a policy that encourages the communication of organizational wrongdoing by guaranteeing continuing employment to the employee for truthful disclosure.

10

Assume that the company rewards a substantial amount of cash (instead of guaranteeing continuing employment) to the employee for such reporting.

The procedure is taken to minimize the potential order effect, which is connected with the

position in the manipulation order. The order of manipulation presentations are balanced

by using a half of the instruments in the order of (1) employment and (2) cash, and the

other half in the order of (1) cash and (2) employment.

The next three pages of instruments consist of the measure of moral reasoning via

a three-story version of the Defining Issues Test (Rest 1979). The final page contains

questions regarding subject demographic information. The DIT is a well-known and

widely utilized measurement instrument. It provides a surrogate measure of an

individual’s ethical reasoning and judgement. The DIT is basically a self-administered

questionnaire that contains a series of hypothetical moral conflicts. For each dilemma,

the subjects are asked to select and rank order those issues or items which they consider

have most significant influence on the resolution of each conflict. The issues represent

the most typical mode of thinking in terms of the underlying cognitive-developmental

theory. The various stages of moral judgment are exemplified in the issues, and the

assumption is that a subject’s developmental level will influence how he or she rates and

ranks the issues. The P score is calculated from the sum of the weighted total of four

most important ranked issues. The score is expressed in term of a percentage ranging

from 0 to 100%.

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RESULTS

Sixteen responses were dropped from the analysis due to incompleteness or

failure to satisfy the consistency check in the DIT. Thus the final useable responses were

185. Table 1 presents participants’ demographic information. On average they have 21

years of work experience and 12 years of audit experience. They supervise an average of

12 individuals. It appears that the sample meets the experience characteristics desired for

the study.

Insert Table 1 about here

The results show that the mean and the median DIT P scores are 32.67 and 33.33,

respectively. The DIT P scores were then post-stratified into high (n = 58, mean =

51.15), mid (n = 56, mean = 33.51), and low (n = 71, mean = 16.90) DIT P score groups,

corresponding to Kohlberg’s (1969) post-conventional, conventional, and pre-

conventional levels of moral reasoning development discussed earlier. We used P scores

of 27 and 41 cut-off value, based on the previous studies (Rest 1979; Windsor and

Ashkanasy 1995), to define these three groups. Mean dependent variable scores (the

perceptions regarding the likelihood of the whistle-blowing behavior) for the three groups

are displayed in Table 2. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of mean scores and

standard deviations for variables in the study.

Insert Table 2 about here

H1 predicates that, when an observed wrongdoing occurs, internal auditors are

more likely to feel they should report wrongdoing than they would report. A two-way

12

ANOVA with repeated measures was used to examine the hypothesis. No significant

interaction exists between the levels of moral reasoning and reporting behaviors, F (1,

183) = 0.09, p = 0.769; but the main effect on the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing

behavior was significant F (1, 183) = 147.03, p < 0.0001. The means are displayed in

Table 3, which show that the mean likelihood scores of the whistle-blowing behavior

were significantly higher when auditors believe that they should report wrongdoing

(mean = 7.87) than when they believe that they would (mean = 4.65). Thus, H1 is

supported. This result suggests that individuals will be, regardless of their levels of moral

reasoning, less likely to report wrongdoing even when they think they should.

Insert Table 3 about here

As expected, when the reward systems are present (under both guaranteed

employment and cash reward conditions), the likelihood of reporting wrongdoing

behavior is higher than that when no reward systems exist. A one-way analysis of

variance (ANOVA), repeated-measure design, was used in the analysis of subject

predictions of the whistle-blowing behavior. This analysis revealed a significant effect

for the manipulation, F (2, 368) = 145.36; p < 0.0001.

H2 predict that the auditors will be more likely to blow the whistle on wrongdoing

under the conditions of cash rewards and employment contracts, respectively. The

contrast analysis was performed to examine the mean differences between the control

group (would report) and each of the two manipulated groups, which directly tests the

two hypotheses (H2a and H2b). The results of contrast analysis indicate that the mean

likelihood of the whistle-blowing behavior in the control group (would report) (mean =

13

4.65) is significantly lower than the mean likelihood in the continuing employment group

(mean = 6.79), F (1, 184) = 220.81; p < 0.0001. As predicted, the mean likelihood of the

whistle-blowing behavior in the control group (mean = 4.65) is also significantly lower

than the mean likelihood in the cash reward group (mean = 6.78), F (1, 184) = 182.74; p

< 0.0001. The results demonstrate that the auditors are more likely to communicate or

report wrongdoing to higher authorities when the reward systems in the form of either

guaranteed employment or cash reward are implemented in the organization. Therefore,

both H2a and H2b are supported. The evidence suggests that providing some types of

incentives may in fact increase reporting wrongdoing behavior in an organization.

H3 predicts that individual levels of moral reasoning will influence the likelihood

of whistle-blowing behavior when cash rewards and employment contracts are offered.

A two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor was used to test the

hypotheses. Table 4 presents the ANOVA summary table. As shown in Table 4, the

interaction of incentive manipulations and levels of moral reasoning on the likelihood of

the whistle-blowing behavior was significant, F (2, 366) = 4.74, p < 0.01, indicating that

the auditors’ prediction of whistle-blowing behavior was influenced by their levels of

moral reasoning.

Insert Table 4 about here

Tests for simple effects were then used to compare the mean differences for

guaranteed employment and cash reward manipulations among the three DIT P score

groups. The results showed that the mean likelihood of whistle-blowing behavior under

the guaranteed employment condition displayed no significant differences among the

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three levels of moral reasoning groups, F (2, 182) = 0.86, p < 0.42. The findings suggest

that the auditors with low, mid or high levels of moral reasoning measured by the DIT P

scores do not influence their perceptions regarding the likelihood of the whistle-blowing

behavior under the condition of guaranteed employment incentives. Thus H3b is not

supported. However, the mean likelihood of whistle-blowing behavior under the cash

reward condition did indicate a marginally significant difference among the three levels

of moral reasoning groups, F (2, 182) = 2.65, p < 0.07. The findings indicate that the

auditors with different levels of moral reasoning measured by DIT scores influence

auditors’ perceptions regarding the likelihood of the whistle-blowing behavior under the

condition of cash rewards. A post hoc test shows that the auditors in the low DIT group

(mean = 7.17) are more likely to report wrongdoing under the incentive of cash rewards

than the auditors in the high DIT group (mean = 6.36), p > 0.02. Therefore, H3a is

supported. The results suggest that internal auditors with relatively low levels of moral

reasoning will be more sensitive to incentives of cash rewards and more willing to blow

the whistle as a means for disclosing wrongdoing when monetary incentives are

provided.

DISCUSSION

This study attempts to explore the impact of reward systems and individual moral

reasoning on the prediction of whistle-blowing behavior. Findings support the notion

that reward systems such as cash incentives or guaranteed employment contracts have a

significant influence on the likelihood of whistle-blowing behavior. Although we

designed this study to integrate findings from previous research, our work is different

15

from previous efforts in some ways. One aspect in which this study differs most from

prior research is that we directly examined what motivate auditors to report or disclose

wrongdoing or fraud. The whistle-blowing decision on any types of organizational

wrongdoing or fraud is never a casual matter. This study shows that, under the

experimental condition, the availability of monetary incentives and employment

protections will encourage people to do a “right thing.” Such an effect may not only

offset the negative effects of observable or unobservable retaliations imposed by the

organization on the whistle-blower but also help foster a positive moral environment that

increases the probability of the whistle-blowing behavior in organizations.

Further, findings also demonstrate that individuals with relatively low levels of

moral reasoning are more likely affected by the cash incentive than individuals with

relatively high levels of moral reasoning. This result is consistent with the findings that

auditors with lower moral reasoning are more sensitive to retaliation (Arnold and

Ponemon 1991). While the previous research shows that highly moral individuals are

more likely to blow the whistle because their moral disposition does not permit inaction,

the current study indicates that low moral individuals are more likely to blow the whistle

because the reward of a substantial amount of cash is provided. The findings can be

readily explained by Kohlberg’s stage theory (1969,1981). Individuals with lower levels

of moral reasoning (at the pre-conventional or at the conventional levels) will focus more

on self-interest and relationships with others in organizations. Accordingly, they would

blow the whistle only when the perceived personal benefits such as monetary rewards

prevail.

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Many issues and concerns have been raised regarding how to prevent future

financial fraud and misconduct. One of the issues is the responsibility of corporate

leaders. Practitioners and academics have called corporate leaders to take steps to

“decrease the probability that managers will become either victimized or otherwise

involved in such frauds” (Gangossy and Kanter 2002). It is not entirely clear how and

why corporate leaders may be motivated to make efforts to reduce or eliminate

wrongdoing or fraud in their own organizations, since they are often implicated directly

or indirectly in, and financially gained from, such behavior. Assuming the top corporate

leaders are willing to run their organizations with highest ethical standards, there is an

important issue of the role and behavior of accountants, auditors, and other members of

organizations who are involved in preparing and disclosing financial information. That is,

how and why employees may be motivated to report wrongdoing or fraud within

organizations when retaliation against whistle blowers is often a lived reality.

The implications of this study suggest that economic incentives are one of the

crucial factors to motivate individuals to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in

organizations. This is true regardless of individual levels of moral reasoning. The issue

may be raised regarding motivated versus unmotivated whistle blowers (Ponemon,1994).

It is argued that the motivated communication of wrongdoing may provide or report less

reliable information of wrongdoing than the unmotivated communication because the

motivated whistle blower chooses to act for the purpose of personal welfare. The

scenario presented in this study, however, assumes that all the information reported

regarding financial wrongdoing or fraud would be true and verifiable. Moreover, the

critical issue in the present business world and in the financial reporting aspect in

17

particular is that people simply fear of blowing the whistle on any wrongdoing or fraud as

few whistle blowers’ stories end happily (Glazer and Glazer 1989; Alford 2001).

Some limitations exist in the current study. The data were collected using a short

hypothetical case and with a sample of convenience. The study was conducted under the

experimental condition, which may limit the ability to generalize to the population.

Therefore, care should be exercised when extrapolating the results to other situations and

contexts. Nevertheless, the findings of this study provide initial evidence that

organizations can develop some internal control structure to encourage employees to

report or dislose wrongdoing. Further research may investigate whether organizational

management tends to implement economic incentives and what would motivate them to

do so. We hope that the present study will stimulate other researchers to pursue these

issues.

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Reference

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Arnold, D., and L. Ponemon. 1991. Internal auditors’ perceptions of whistle-blowing and

the influence of moral reasoning: an experiment. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 10, No. 2: 1-15.

Gandossy, B., and R. Kanter. 2002. "See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" -- Leaders

must respond to employee concerns about wrongdoing. Business and Society Review, Vol. 107, No. 4: 415-422.

Glazer, M., and P. Glazer. 1989. The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in

Government and Industry. New York: Basic Books. Hooks, K., S. Kaplan, and J. Schultz. 1994. Enhancing communication to assist in fraud

prevention and detection. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 13, No.2: 86-117.

Kohlberg, L. 1969. Stage and sequences: the cognitive developmental approach to

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_________. 1981. Essays on Moral Development. Volume I. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice. New York: Harper and Row. Louwers, T., L. Ponemon, and R. Radtke. 1997. Examining accountants’ ethical

behavior: A review and implications for future research in V. Arnold and S. Sutton (eds), Behavioral Accounting Research: Foundations and Frontiers (pp188-221). Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association.

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Statistical Models. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. Piaget, J. 1932, reprint 1966. The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: Free Press. Ponemon, L. 1994. Whistle-blowing as an internal control mechanism: individual and

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., and D. Gabhart. 1994. Ethical reasoning research in the accounting and

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Table 1: Participant Demographics

Demographic Variable Number of Participants Male 108

Female 77

Mean Years of work experience 21 Years of work experience as auditor 12 Number of individuals supervised 12

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Table 2: Mean Scores on Prediction of Whistle-Blowing behavior by Experimental and DIT Groups

Should report / Would report /

DIT Groups No Reward No Reward Cash Employment Low DIT 7.69 4.46 7.17 6.76 Mid DIT 7.92 4.85 6.73 7.07 High DIT 8.05 4.69 6.36 6.57

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Table 3: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on Prediction of Whistle-Blowing behavior

Standard Variables Mean deviation Should report / no reward 7.88 1.97

Would report / no reward 4.65 2.24

Continuing employment 6.79 2.05 Cash reward 7.78 2.06

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Table 4: Analysis of Variance on Prediction of Whistle-Blowing behavior by Incentive Manipulation and DIT Groups

Source df SS F-value p-value Between-subjects

Level of DIT (A) 1 5.74 0.61 0.437 Error between 183 1729.93 Within-subjects Incentives (B) 2 339.25 89.49 0.0001 A x B Interaction 2 17.98 4.74 0.0093 Error within 366 693.76 Total 554 2786.66