which patient do i treat? economists and physicians in the lab
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Which Patient do I treat? Economists and Physicians in the Lab. Marlies Ahlert University Halle-Wittenberg Stefan Felder Universities of Duisburg-Essen and Basel Bodo VogtUniversity of Magdeburg. Research questions. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Which Patient do I treat?Economists and Physicians in the Lab
Marlies Ahlert University Halle-WittenbergStefan Felder Universities of Duisburg-Essen and BaselBodo Vogt University of Magdeburg
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Research questions
• Elicitation of social preferences of indi-viduals deciding in allocation problems
• Choices more in line with utilitarian prin-ciples or more with some egalitarian rules?
• Framing effects (med vs. neutral)?• Professional effects (physicians vs. economists)?
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Overview
1. The allocation problem and possible solutions
2. Classification of distributors
3. Framing and professional effects
4. Who is being served and how much do they receive?
5. Conclusion
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• Economist / physician i = 0
• Endowment: ECU / time R
• 7 recipients / patients i = 1,...,7
• Recipients are differentiated acc. to- minimal needs mi
- productivity / effectivity pi
1. Allocation problem
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Payoff of recipient i
The allocator decides about the ration of the resources each of the recipients i receives: ri
0, if
if i i
ii i i i
r m
r p r m
ii
r R
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t: participation rate of the recipients‘ payoffs (20%)
c: Fine for every recipient with zero payoff (50 ECU)
„Induced“ preferences
Payoff of the allocator:
00i
ii i
t c
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Examples for allocation problems (3 out of 10)Ressource Endowments R{1000, 1600}
Person1 2 3 4 5 6 7
300 50 150 50 100 300 100 1050
4 3 3 2 3 5 4
200 100 10 50 50 10 100 520
4 2 1 2 3 2 3
300 200 500 100 100 200 300 1700
4 2 1 2 3 4 1
ii
m
im
ip
im
ip
im
ip
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Own payoff maximizer: Typ S (OPMA)Maximizes his own payoff, acts according to the induced
preferences
WS (0 , 1 ,...,n) = 0
Be i the most productive person, person k is being served if
t mk pk > t mk pi - c .
Residual endowment goes to the most productive individual
2. Classification of allocators(ideal types)
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Modified dominance criterion for serving k:
0 1 2 0, , ,..., U n ii
W
11 1k k kt m p t m p c
Hurdle is higher
Utilitarian: Typ U (UA)
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maximizes
Priorization acc. to minimal need serves to overcome
i=0
If the residual endowment is not sufficient to serve a
further person, the allocator is indifferent as to which
person is being served and who receives the residual.
Number maximizer: Typ N (NMA)
0 1 2
0, if 0, , ,..., with
1, if 0i
N n i ii i
W N N
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Priorization according ot minimal need (like NMA)
Allocates the residual resources according to the leximin-criterion
He serves persons with low mi pi within the set of recipients
Rawlsian: Typ R (RA)
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Experimental design /1
• 10 treatments• 1 distributor• 7 potential recipients
• 10 x 7 choices for each distributor
1000,1600R
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Experimental design /2
17 Sessions with 136 students in total 2 different „framings“: neutral, medical
22 advanced medical students(8 in the neutral, 14 in the medical frame )
36 students in economics(21 in the neutral, 15 in the medical frame )
MaXLab Magdeburg, elfe Essen
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2. Classification of allocators
FramingEconomists
neutral med. Physicians
neutral med.
S Max payoff 6 2 8 1 1 2
1 2 3 1 1 2
NMax number 10 6 16 2 4 6
0 2 2 2 3 5
RRawls 2 1 3 3 4 7
not classified 2 2 4 0 1 1
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• Type of allocators are more clearly revealed unter familiar conditions:
- Economist in the neutral frame, Types S and N
- Physicians in the medical frame, types N uad R
• in both frames, physician more clearly deviate from the induced direction (toward altruistic behavior)
• Economist deviate more from the induced direction in the neutral frame
General observations tested for
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3. Framing and professional effects
Type OPMA NMA RA
Faculty Framing effect (medical vs. neutral setting)
Economists 1.45*** 1.26* 1.10 Physicians (1/1.29)** (1/1.20) (1/1.08)
Faculty effect (physicians vs. economists)
1.28** 1.12 (1/1.19)**
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Hypothesis set 1• All allocators prioritize persons with low minimal
need• Typ S has a strong positive interest to serve
persons with high productivity
5. Who is being served and by how much?
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logit-model for positive payoffs of the recipients
• The endowment has a positive effect on the likelihood of being served
• All allocator serve those persons more likely who have a low minimial need (holds for types N and R)
• All allocator serve those persons more likely who have a high productivity (holds for types S and N
5. Who is being served and by how much?
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5. Who is being served and by how much?
Hypotheses set 2
• Typ S und Typ N will serve those recipient
extra, who show a high productivity
• Rawlsian will increase the extra ration for those,
who have a long initial payoff
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Size of allocation, given the payoff is positive
Variables Coefficient Std. err.
Constant -49.81 *** 15.68
OPMA -161.24 *** 27.03
NMA -52.12 ** 20.53
RA -6.12 17.07
Endowment 14.99 10.60
Minimum need -0.02 0.02
Productivity 60.12 *** 4.61
OPMA . productivity 53.85 *** 8.73
NMA . productivity 2.84 6.47
RA . productivity . minimum need -0.08 *** 0.01
Number of observations = 2,973 Number of Groups = 58
R²: within = 0.169 R²: between = 0.279 R²: overall = 0.175
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• We are able to identify types, who systematically differ
from each other
• Distributive norms show up more clearly under
conditions familiar to the allocators (oec,oec; med,med)
• Productivity (+) und minimal need (-) influence the
probability of being served
Conclusion