WHETHER THE THEORY OF FAMILY RESEMBLANCESSOLVES THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

MR. BAMBROUGH'S claim (Proc. Ariel. Soc., 1960) that the Theory ofFamily Resemblances solves the Problem of Universals is, I think,extremely unsound, for it is based upon misunderstandings of boththe Theory of Family Resemblances and the Problem of Universalsas it has traditionally been undertaken.

I

Bambrough's argument is this:(i) Wittgenstein's remarks about family resemblances can be

paraphrased into a doctrine which can be set out in general termsand can be related to the traditional theories (Nominalism andRealism) and which can then be shown to supersede the traditionaltheories.

(ii) Nominalists held that, e.g. games have in common only thatthey are called games.

(iii) Realists held that, e.g. games have in common somethingmore than that they are called games, to wit, subsistent forms oruniversals.

(iv) The Theory of Family Resemblances shows that, e.g. gamesdo not have any common features over and above the fact thatthey are games, but rather they have resemblances which tie theminto a Family. The only thing that games have in common isthat they are games, just as the only thing that two shades of redhave in common is that they are red, and the only thing that brothershave in common is that they are brothers (for to say that they have incommon that they are male siblings is the same thing as to say thatthey have in common that they are brothers).

(v) Thus the Nominalists were right to reject the idea that e.g.games have subsistent forms in common, but in this rejection theywent too far and suggested that games have in common only thatthey are called games. The truth is that games have in commonalso and chiefly that they are games.

(vi) The Realists were right to reject the idea that, e.g. gameshave in common only that they are called games, but in this re-jection they went too far and suggested that games have in commonsubsistent forms or universals. The truth is that games have incommon only that they are games.

nBambrough has gone wrong in his understanding of the Problem

of Universals as the medieval schools of Nominalism and Realismundertook it. The problem as they saw it was not " is there anyjustification for the use of universal terms?" but " what is the onticdignity of that to which a universal term refers?" The Nominalists

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held not that there is no criterion for the application of a universalterm to a series of individuals where such a term is applied, butrather that there is a criterion—the criterion of a common featureor common features—but that the universal term is a name referringto a merely derived conceptual entity. For the Nominalist, in-dividuals were ontically fundamental and their features onticallydependent. Therefore the concepts to which such universal termsrefer aTe abstract constructions with low ontic dignity. Aristotletried to be a Nominalist.

The Realists held not merely that there is some criterion for theapplication of a universal term to a series of individuals where sucha term is applied, but also that the universal term designated anentity of high ontic dignity which " preceded " and founded theindividual thing, which was therefore dependent and of lower onticdignity. Plato was a Realist.

The conflicting views described by Bambrough are not those ofNominalism and Realism, but something like those of subjectivismor emotivism and objectivism in ethics. But while the latterrestrict their inquiry to why we call good what we do call good, Bam-brough's schools broaden the enquiry to cover all universal terms.They might be called Arbitrarians and Objectivists. (What I hereterm Arbitrarianism is an extreme form of Nominalism which mayhave been held by one important medieval philosopher, Roscellinus,but oui only evidence for this possibility is the testimony of hisadversaries.)

One can understand how he confuses Nominalists with Arbitrar-ians: Nominalists ascribed low ontic dignity—dependent status—to what is denoted by a universal term; Bambrough takes this tomean that they ascribed it no ontic dignity, that they ascribed non-existence to what is denoted by a universal term, and hence that theythought there to be NO CRITERION for the use of such a term, nothingto which it might apply. But something which is mere machinationof the human brain is nonetheless something.

And his debilitated notion of the Realist claim is generated byopposition to his exaggerated notion of the Nominalist claim.

mIt seems also that Bambrough has gone wrong in his interpretation

of the Theory of Family Resemblances. For surely Wittgenstein isnot telling us merely that all individuals called games or calledbrothers are in a family (and hence called by the family-name), butalso that they deserve to be in a family (and hence deserve to becalled by the family name). And the grounds of this desert areresemblances in respect of features. Wittgenstein says: "if youlook at (games) you will not see something that is common to all,but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.. . . "Game3 have in common more than that they are games, to wit,the grounds for desert to be in the family of games.

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THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS 569

What then of the family red? What is common between a lightred and a dark red? Simply that they are red, Bambrough infers.But he takes the seeming fact that some families are " unanalysable"(no ground can be found for their inclusion in the family beyondthe fact that they do belong to it) to imply that all families areunanalysable. That is a fault in logic. But there is another erroras well, and I am not sure whether it is to be imputed to Wittgen-stein or to Bambrough, to wit, the very idea that some familiesare unanalysable. Behind this erroneous idea there lurks, in theexample, a confusion between two senses of " red "—(1) the rangeof red in the spectrum, and (2) pure red. The question " what iscommon between a light red and a dark red?" employs sense (2)and the answer " simply that they are red " employs sense (1).Observe that we would have been substantially less discomfitedhad the question been: what is common between carmine and puce?and the answer: that they are both red. Now the important point isthat we do have an idea of pure red—sense (2). We are accustomedto say meaningfully " this red is tinctured with yellow", or" there is a touch of blue in the red ". Whether the choice of sevenpoints on the spectrum to be our " pure " colours is merely arbitrary,or is owing to some innate purity in the colours themselves, or tothe nature of our perceptual faculties, I am not competent to say.What is clear is that all the various shades of red do have a commonfeature, to wit, some proportion of pure red. And to ask whetherthe family of pure reds is not an unanalysable one seems to me anonsense question: it is a family with only one member, and thus,I suspect, not a family at all.

What then of the family brothers^ What have brothers in commonexcept that they are brothers?—for to say that they are male siblingsis the same thing as to say that they are brothers. Well, the twoare the same in denotation at least, but there must be some useful-ness in definition or why should we ever do it at all? While it maynot import much to be told tha t" brothers " means " male siblings ",it may be of help to be told that " struthious " means " ostrich-like ", and it certainly is of help to know that " tomato " means" seed-bearing envelope of the tomato plant" when it comes toknowing why tomatoes are fruits and not vegetables (althoughsweet peas and cauliflowers are vegetables and pineapples are fruits:the fruit/vegetable business is a good illustration of family resem-blances). To define a thing is not to say, as Bambrough objects,something over and above the thing, but rather something under andbeneath—something underpropping and explaining the fact thatthat thing is whatever it is. Brothers have in common somethingslightly more telling than simply that they are brothers: that theyare male and that they are siblings.

Thus neither in the case of perplexing universal terms like " games",nor in the case of simple universal terms like " red ", nor in the caseof straightforward universal terms like " brothers " is Wittgenstein

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to be read as saying that family members have in common onlythat they are members of the family—they have in common alsogrounds for desert to be members of the family and called by thefamily name.

IV

To sum and conclude, while it is true that, e.g. games have incommon that they are games, it is not true and. not a correct infer-ence from the Theory of Family Kesemblances that they have incommon only that they are games. In showing that games havein common that they are games Bambrough deflates the Arbitrarianposition that games have in common only that they are called games—a position which it is not likely that anyone ever held. Indeedby deflating this one position which, if correct, would make nonsenseof the Problem of Universals, Bambrough far from solving theproblem as he claims, merely confirms its status as a problem.

Trent University J. W. THORP

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