where you stand depends on where you sit: participation and reactions to change

NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, vol. 19, no. 2, Winter 2008 © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 243Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/nml.217

CASE STUDY

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

Participation and Reactions to Change

Nancy Winemiller Basinger, Jessica Romine Peterson

Although a considerable body of research on strategic planning,organizational decision making, and organizational change hasemphasized the importance of participation by key stakeholdersfor the successful management of organizational change, fewempirical studies have produced in-depth understanding of thediffering perspectives of stakeholder groups according to theirlevel of involvement in decisions about major change. This casestudy examines the differing perspectives and perceptions of stake-holders leading into and during the merger of two nonprofit artsorganizations. It refines and enriches existing empirical researchon the effects of participation on the implementation of change.

ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR face increasing com-petition as greater numbers of nonprofit organizations enterthe market without a comparable expansion in resources

flowing into the sector (Weisbrod, 1998; Weitzman and others, 2002;Barman, 2002). This crowding leads many nonprofits to considerstrategic restructuring, especially in the form of mergers (Hiland,2003; Kohm and La Piana, 2003; Singer and Yankey, 1991; Swarden,1996). A merger is “the result of a decision by two or more organiza-tions to combine their operations in a permanent relationship”(Golensky and DeRuiter, 2002, p. 170). For this study, we deal withmergers as one form of major organizational change (Allaire andFirsirotu, 1985; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984). As such, the findings maybe selectively applicable to other types of major change.

Note: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meetingof the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action.We thank Steve Ott for his invaluable assistance, as well as Mary Tschirhart forher helpful comments on the earlier version. In addition, our thanks go to RogerLohmann and three anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

The views of management dominate in nearly all published stud-ies on mergers regardless of sector (Risberg, 2001). Mergers, how-ever, have an impact on nearly everyone associated with theorganization, and many stakeholders affect the process and successof major change initiatives, including mergers (Bennis, 2000). Stake-holders, among them employees and volunteers, corporate and foun-dation funders, individual donors, clients and patrons, boardmembers, and members of the public, all influence the managementof a nonprofit organization (Tschirhart, 1996) and often representthe most challenging aspects of managing during mergers (Bryce, 2000; Golensky and DeRuiter, 1999; Toepler, Seitchek, andCameron, 2004). These challenges often include decreased employeemorale, staff turnover, loss of organizational identity, lack of boardor staff support, and clashes between organizational cultures (Golen-sky and DeRuiter, 1999; Kotter, 1996; Kohm and La Piana, 2003;Kohm, La Piana, and Gowdy, 2000). Thus the success of mergersoften hinges on the careful handling of myriad human concernsacross stakeholder groups (Giffords and Dina, 2003; Voss, Cable, andVoss, 2000). Leaders must communicate constantly with key stake-holders during change in order to assess the potential effects ofplanned changes on critical relationships if they are to anticipate bar-riers to change (Hiland, 2003; Kohm and La Piana, 2003; Kotter,1996). Existing research, however, has not analyzed the perspectivesof stakeholders who have been excluded from the decision processesand the repercussions of such exclusion.

This case study of the merger between the Utah Symphony andthe Utah Opera in July 2002 reaffirms the adage “Where you standdepends on where you sit.” In other words, your “stand” or viewpointmay be determined by your participation in, or exclusion from, aprocess or decision. We examine the perspectives of many stakehold-ers as they reflect on the processes and the effects of a merger betweentwo large nonprofit performing arts organizations. By capturing theperspectives of individuals who represent a variety of stakeholdergroups, we expected to document the multiplicity of understandingspresent in a merger. We found, however, that two perspectives domi-nated the understandings of nearly all stakeholders.

Our analysis reveals that direct access to information, or the lackthereof, dramatically affected how various stakeholders experiencedthe processes and viewed the outcomes of the merger. The mergerwas completed and the merged organization is still serving the com-munity five years later. For some, this is the definition of success. Forothers, however, a successful merger process and outcome would bevery different. This case is in many ways a cautionary tale for non-profit managers who conduct secret deliberations to lead major orga-nizational change. It highlights potential problems arising fromexclusive and secret leadership of major organizational change andsome of the implications for the resulting organization.

244 BA S I N G E R, PE T E R S O N

Nonprofit Management & Leadership DOI: 10.1002/nml

For this study, we deal with

mergers as oneform of majororganizational

change. As such,the findings may

be selectivelyapplicable toother types ofmajor change.

Secrecy Versus Openness and Inclusion DuringOrganizational Change

It seems that nearly everyone who has ever studied or been involvedin major organizational change advocates for open communicationsand full participation (Arsenault, 1998; Cascio, 2005; Giffords andDina, 2003; Golensky and DeRuiter, 1999, 2002; Singer and Yankey,1991; Toepler, Seitchek, and Cameron, 2004). Openness is said toincrease access to information and influence (Kettl and Fesler, 2005)and maximize support among stakeholder groups (Stone, 1988),which can lead to more support for the outcomes of the change.Inclusion of key stakeholders increases buy-in and leads to broadersuccess (Risberg, 2001). Although the board of trustees (or board ofdirectors) is an important stakeholder group, it is not an adequateproxy for all key stakeholder groups. Other perspectives and con-cerns typically exist. For example, resistance to change by employ-ees and volunteers is often motivated by ethical concerns (Modiglianiand Rochat, 1995) or a desire to protect the organization (Ashford,Rothbard, Piderit, and Dutton, 1998). Participation helps employeesprepare cognitively for change (Bartlem and Locke, 1981) and thusmay lead to better implementation and outcomes. Excluding employ-ees and other key stakeholders may lead to disastrous consequences(Bryson, 2004; Nutt, 2002).

Yet financial stability and organizational efficiency often becomethe primary concerns for trustees and executives as the planning andnegotiating for a merger or other major organizational change pro-gresses (Voss, Cable, and Voss, 2000). The tendency toward secrecyand exclusion of other viewpoints almost inevitably grows (Janis,1996). The inclusion of a variety of stakeholders increases availableinformation, but it can also slow the process, decrease efficiency, andrisk public leaks that could be damaging to negotiations and plans(Kettl and Fesler, 2005). Organizational leaders may become less recep-tive to alternative plans or arguments that reflect different values, suchas advancement of the organization’s charitable or artistic mission orthe well-being of employees or clients (Mintzberg, 1983; Niskanen,1971; Simon, 1976). Decisions are made behind closed doors.

MethodologyPrimary data were gathered through twenty interviews conducted in2005 with stakeholder group representatives from both of the mergedorganizations, including current and former staff (full-time and con-tractors), management, trustees, musicians and performers, volun-teers, patrons, and donors. We used a rolling (or “snowball sampling”)selection process to select interviewees, beginning with recommen-dations from the CEO of the merged organization and asking for addi-tional recommendations from each stakeholder we interviewed.

PA RT I C I PAT I O N A N D RE A C T I O N S T O CH A N G E 245


This case is inmany ways a

cautionary talefor nonprofit

managers whoconduct secret

deliberations tolead major

organizationalchange.

A semistructured interview format was used to collect primarydata. The confidentiality of the interviewees was protected. All quotedcomments in this article are taken from the interview transcripts. Secondary data included internal documents created during the plan-ning and evaluation phases of the merger: “Ombudsman’s Report tothe Boards of Directors” (Utah Symphony and Opera, 2002b), “MergerReport to the Boards of Directors” (Utah Symphony and Opera,2002a), and “Financial Recovery Plan” (Utah Symphony and Opera, 2005). We also reviewed more than fifty news stories and op-edletters published in the two local newspapers from 2002 to 2005.

Background Leading to the MergerAfter two decades of unprecedented growth from the 1960s throughthe 1980s, the nonprofit performing arts industry in the United Statesencountered a funding crisis (Scheff and Kotler, 1996). By the late1990s, performing arts organizations faced shrinking audiences andrising debts. The situation became worse as government, corporate,and foundation support shrank in the economic downturn followingSeptember 11, 2001. Managers and trustees scrambled to find waysto save the arts in their communities, including various forms ofstrategic restructuring and mergers. Mergers among symphonyorchestras and opera companies, however, have been rare. Only threesuccessful mergers of this kind have occurred in the United States,and one has since dissolved.

The Utah Symphony and the Utah Opera have been integralparts of the Salt Lake City community for decades and remain closelyassociated with their longtime leaders. The symphony was a muchlarger organization, with year-round performances and unionizedmusicians, but its financial problems were an open secret for severalyears prior to initiation of the merger plans. The opera gave four per-formances a year using contracted performers. Although a smallerorganization, the opera maintained a reputation for strong manage-ment and financial stability. It concluded a successful capital cam-paign shortly before the merger.

Merger TimelineThe merger was accomplished surprisingly quickly. (A detailed time-line can be examined at http://www.cppa.utah.edu/basinger.) Afterthe symphony CEO resigned in the winter of 2002, a small group ofsymphony trustees began to consider the benefits, costs, and feasi-bility of a merger with the opera. They approached the leaders of theopera trustees and formed a joint task force, which began work secretlyin February 2002. The task force presented its preliminary findings tothe full symphony and opera boards on March 14, 2002, which led to a public announcement that a merger was being consideredand that the two boards would vote on May 15, 2002. (The date of



the final vote was ultimately delayed to July 8.) The public responsewas initially positive (Baker, 2002c), but sentiment quickly turnednegative as several key figures spoke against the plan (Abravanel,2002; Bryson, 2002). The task force engaged an ombudsman to collectopinions about the merger during a two-week period (Utah Symphonyand Opera, 2002b). More than one hundred individuals contactedthe ombudsman, mostly expressing opinions against the merger(Baker, 2002a, 2002b).

An outside consultant selected by the joint task force submitteda detailed merger proposal to the two boards in June 2002, and it wasreleased to the public ten days later (Utah Symphony and Opera,2002a). The two boards met separately on July 8, 2002, and bothvoted overwhelmingly in favor of the merger. Almost immediately,the new Utah Symphony and Opera (US&O) began to operate. TheCEO of the Utah Opera was hired as CEO of the new organization.The work of the task force guided early strategic decisions; for exam-ple, a new board of trustees was formed with members from the twoformer boards. New infrastructure, including systems and personnel,was needed to support the larger and more diverse merged organiza-tion. Some operating divisions were streamlined; other new positionswere created. Clashes of organizational cultures occurred at the boardand staff levels. In September 2002, the new symphony season began, and opera performances began shortly thereafter with US&Osymphony musicians in the pit.

FindingsTwo findings we had expected from the interviews did not material-ize. First, we expected that stakeholders with different organizationalaffiliations would have differing perspectives. Second, we expectedthe perspectives of various stakeholder groups to vary with the stagein the merger process. To our surprise, only two perspectivesemerged across all stakeholder groups at all stages of the merger andwithout regard for prior organizational affiliation. One perspectivecame from interviewees whose stakeholder groups were directlyinvolved in the merger decision-making process (“insiders”). The sec-ond perspective was that of stakeholders whose groups were excludedfrom the process (“outsiders”).1 Insiders were members of stakeholdergroups that had participated directly and actively in the decisionsleading to and guiding the merger. The insiders were primarily thosewho participated on the joint task force. Later, though, every trusteefor both the opera and the symphony participated in the decision tomerge. In this comprehensive insider group, not everyone favoredthe merger; several trustees voted against it. The overwhelmingmajority of trustees and management, however, held strikingly sim-ilar views on the merger process and results. Likewise, the vastmajority of those who had no stakeholder group representation at themerger planning table (administrative staff, artistic staff, volunteers,



patrons, and donors) and no vote in the ultimate merger decisionviewed the merger negatively. Table 1 identifies the stakeholdergroups that participated in the decision process and those that wereexcluded.

Table 2 summarizes the widely divergent perspectives of insid-ers and outsiders on selected key themes, from the equity of themerger process to satisfaction with the outcomes. There is incrediblediversity among the stakeholder groups, whose members rangedfrom local corporate leaders to artistic performers to committed vol-unteers. Despite this diversity, one striking theme emerges. The pri-mary difference in perspectives across these stakeholder groups wastheir participation or exclusion from participation in the decision-making process. We stated earlier:



Table 1. Stakeholder Groups Interviewed and Insider/Outsider Perspective

Stakeholder Group Perspective

Board member, opera InsiderBoard member, symphony InsiderManagement InsiderAdministrative staff, symphony OutsiderAdministrative staff, opera OutsiderArtistic staff, symphony OutsiderArtistic staff, opera OutsiderVolunteer OutsiderPatron and donor Outsider

Table 2. Varying Perspectives of Merger Discussed by Interviewees

Major Themes Insider Perspective Outsider Perspective

Organizational change Difficult but embraced opportunity Preferred status quo; felt changeunnecessary; did not agree withmission shift

Process used to guide change When possible used open process; Closed process without opportu-invited opinions and involvement nities for involvement; misinfor-of key stakeholders mation

Secrecy maintained around Necessary to protect integrity of Not necessary, and unfair to merger merger; followed for-profit model those not able to be involved

Financial challenges Financial problems worse than Financial condition not as bad known prior to merger; merger as insiders suggest; symphony preserved integrity of both financial problems harming symphony and opera during operaeconomic downturn

Organizational culture conflicts Problem Problem

It seems that nearly everyone who has ever studied or beeninvolved in major organizational change advocates for opencommunications and full participation. . . . Openness is saidto increase access to information and influence . . . and max-imize support among stakeholder groups . . . which can leadto more support for the outcomes of the change. . . . Partic-ipation helps employees prepare cognitively for change . . .and thus may lead to better implementation and outcomes.Excluding employees and other key stakeholders may leadto disastrous consequences. . . .

It may seem obvious that the perspectives of insiders andoutsiders differ. Those involved in a decision will nearly alwaysunderstand it differently from those who were only observers. Whatis surprising in this study is that the perspectives differ so dramati-cally. Outsiders, the nonparticipants, zealously disagree with the wis-dom of the merger. Insiders, the participants, proclaim withconviction that the merger saved the arts in Salt Lake City. In otherwords, we fully expected to find differing perspectives between insid-ers and outsiders—but the dramatic, unequivocal evidence of theeffects of participation on perceptions that we encountered in thisstudy was unexpected.

The Insider PerspectiveEven in hindsight, the insiders remained secure in their decision tokeep the merger proposal completely secret during its initial consid-eration. They agreed that this was a necessary component of thework and pointed to both for-profit and nonprofit merger failures asevidence of the necessity for secrecy. Insider interviewees oftenexpressed that they knew the merger was the best thing for the orga-nizations and the community and did not understand contrary opin-ions. For example: “Boards on both sides felt that this would be awin-win situation that would allow us to maintain the cultural ben-efits and improve the business aspects,” and “[We were] shocked bythe aggressive campaign against the merger . . . the [media] attackswere public, personal, and vicious.”

Insiders were accepting of the change and excited about theopportunities it would bring: “The merger was easier for people com-fortable with change. Personality was key to dealing with the merger.It was a challenge/stretch for some board members and patrons—some were more visionary than others.” Although insiders attributedthe contrast between their perspective and that of the outsiders to adifference in personalities, our analysis suggests that the divergenceis explained almost entirely by participation. When stakeholders haddirect access to the decision-making process, they were better ableto understand and value the “opportunities it would bring.”

The insiders worked extensively to realize the potential benefitsthey felt would come from the merger. Having devoted a great deal



We fully expectedto find differing

perspectivesbetween insidersand outsiders—

but the dramatic,unequivocal

evidence of theeffects of

participation onperceptions was

unexpected.

of time and energy, they were disappointed by negative reactions.One insider put it this way: “The merger was a lot of work. [We]took a beating by the press and the musicians, but felt like it was theright thing to do.” Another insider had a similar perspective: “[Wehad] many board meetings to discuss the merger, lots of discussionsbetween the two boards, lots of interviews with lots of differentpeople. The investigation process took an organized, responsibledirection with reasonable amount of input for decision making.”

Although outsiders consistently reported not having any accu-rate information, insiders had a completely different experience. Oneinsider described the process in this way: “Communication duringthe merger was very open. . . . Between the two boards there musthave been sixty to seventy people involved, and much of the infor-mation was public because it was reported in the press. There wereopportunities to dissent, and there was a full examination of finan-cial issues and a thorough legal analysis.” Insiders often noted thatthe consultant who studied the merger included in her report sup-port from key funders. The importance of congruence with funders’perspectives was quite important for the insiders. As we said earlier,this likely contributed to the closed-system preferences of the orga-nization’s leaders (Thomas, Clark, and Gioia, 1993).

Insiders uniformly asserted that the symphony’s financial strug-gles and the general economic downturn precipitated the need for themerger and that outsiders have never understood the severity of thesefiscal challenges. Insiders feared for the longevity of the art they loved:“We could tell that the downturn in the economy and 9/11 were tak-ing a toll. It was obvious that it was becoming more difficult to raisefunds. Art is wonderful, but it is a less immediate need for mostdonors in a crisis response.” Another insider stated, “The US&Omerger was a victim of the economic climate—this climate hadalready begun and was affecting the symphony prior to the merger.”

Insiders pointed to organizational culture conflicts as a hurdlethat was at times worse than anticipated. They experienced backlashfrom the clashes among employees, as well as board members, vol-unteers, and patrons. Although insiders reported that they knew ofthe differences in the two organizational cultures, they feared theeffects on employees and did not anticipate the clashes among otherstakeholders:

The merger resulted in an identity crisis. The opera feels thatit has been sucked up and the symphony feels a loss of prestige—that it is no longer “king.” The staff on the sym-phony side and opera side often felt like “them” and “us.”[It is a] challenge to go from a “them” versus “us” mentalityto a “we” mentality. It’s like a marriage: [you have to learn howto] keep separate, distinct identities while being one union.

[The] symphony was more business-like and lesscollegial [than the opera] and had a completely different



schedule [fifty-two weeks versus four performances peryear]. [As a result we] lost more staff than anticipated.

Also, [there were] different labor environments at theopera and the symphony. There is no union for the opera.

The opera [board] was more open, more experimental,more innovative. . . . Experimental things are risky and don’talways succeed but are considered important for the effort.The symphony was very traditional, less experimental, lessinnovative. . . . They do not seem to want to grow, and thishas led to a bit of a clash.

Insiders assert that the benefits expected from the merger havebeen realized for the most part. Although financial stability has not been achieved, they are confident that it soon will: “Financialefficiencies are a major benefit. [They allowed us to] maintain artis-tic value and quality for the community.” Several insiders commentedthat Salt Lake City might not have been able to maintain a fifty-two-week unionized orchestra, and the quality that comes with it, if themerger had not occurred. Insiders also often mentioned the benefitsto both organizations that resulted from the artistic synergies of themerger: “You could do these things if you were not merged, but itwould rarely happen because there would not be one vision to guidethe collaborations.”

The Outsider PerspectiveOutsider stakeholders from both the opera and the symphonyreported they were happy with the status quo prior to the merger andwere shocked and confused by the public announcement of themerger talks in March 2002:

The merger was confusing. The stability of the prior organi-zation was lost and the change was led by rumors ratherthan information.

There was not an aura of transparency and accountabil-ity as there should be in nonprofits.

We were really naïve. [Patrons] didn’t know what wasgoing on much of the time. The process was not open to thepublic.

Outsiders frequently perceived a lack of information during theconsideration of the merger. In addition, perhaps because they didnot have someone whom they felt represented their interests involvedin the decision-making process, outsiders deemed the informationthey did receive from insiders to be unreliable. For example, one out-sider said, “We all [staff] wanted to know more about the process andquickly. We met every [week] during the study period . . . but fewanswers were given.” Another outsider described the process thisway: “We just wanted the truth but we did not get it. . . . Eventually



we [staff] began to refer to the meetings as ‘Lies and Donuts,’ becausethat is what we got!” Yet another outsider described the communi-cation pattern as nonexistent: “Those in the know [did not take intoaccount] the orchestra, product, music, art form. What really mat-tered—the people involved—were not taken into consideration.There was NO communication.”

Outsiders frequently commented they did not agree with the wayinsiders managed the change process and felt the insiders were“building something with no consensus” that has, the outsidersassert, decreased allegiance to the merged organization.

Due to Salt Lake City’s small, tightly knit community, thepublic passion bubbles up even more intensely. That passionmay have been underestimated. . . . Lack of consultationwith the community seems to be at play.

Loss of identity creates confusion about who we are andwhat our mission is. . . . The merger created a crisis of con-fidence.

The timeframe imposed by the executive leadership of the boards was insufficient for thorough examination ofpotential problems. The worst-case scenario projection wasused as propaganda for the merger.

Outsiders acknowledged that not all of the problems with themerger were caused by the process or decisions made by the insiders.Some outsiders acknowledged the efforts of management to reduce thelevel of stress for employees during consideration of the merger and the transition of employees who were retained in the postmergerorganization: “[They had] a staff retreat and a behavioral/organizationaltherapist you could talk to in confidence, you could call the ombuds-man, and they rewrote the long-range plans, but people did not alwaysutilize these measures and did not draw comfort or security fromthem.” Outsiders, like insiders, also pointed to the difficulties causedby differences in the organizational cultures: “The two organizationswere surprisingly dissimilar” in both pace and leadership style.

Although the depth of their convictions varied, all outsiders agreedthat the merger was not beneficial. The vast majority of outsider inter-viewees were unable to identify a single benefit created by the merger.They continued to worry that the merger had harmed the quality ofthe art and to mourn the loss of the separate organizations. Many out-siders’ comments are represented by this quotation: “There are NOongoing benefits. [The] financial solvency [promised as a by-productof the merger] has not materialized.” Another outsider gave this assess-ment of the costs and benefits of the merger: “Although some coordi-nation benefits may exist, they do not outweigh the problems.”

Outsiders did not agree when discussing the quality of the artsproduced under the merged organization. Although some patrons feltthe artistic benefits had all accrued to the symphony, others felt that



enhancements such as using visual arts and voices to enhance sym-phonic productions had detracted from the symphony. Likewise,whereas some patrons pointed to improved quality of the pit orches-tra (symphony musicians now play in the opera pit as part of theircontract), others felt the music from the pit remained the same bothpre- and postmerger (because in both cases symphony musiciansplayed in the pit; only the contract changed).

The quality remains intact. [The music] is as good as [it’s]ever been, if not better, but that’s not because of the merger.

Quality . . . has slipped because there is no money. . . . [The]merger shifted priorities.

DiscussionThe Utah Symphony and the Utah Opera were among the most elitenonprofits in the Salt Lake City area. Their boards of trusteesincluded some of the most prominent business and foundation lead-ers in the community. In interviews, these insiders attributed theneed for secrecy to their for-profit business experiences. One insideralso noted the need for secrecy on the basis of a nonprofit merger thathad been proposed but not carried out, in their estimation, because ofa “press leak.” These insiders were adamant that a secretive approachto the merger planning was absolutely necessary. This may have led tothe distinct insider-outsider split detailed here.

The seven-member joint task force made all of the merger deci-sions. They explicitly chose to include only those trustees and the highest echelon of management in the process. The task forceincluded representatives of both boards and the new CEO, but thesewere the only stakeholders included in decisions. All other stake-holders were excluded because it was a commonly held belief amongthe task force members that, in order to accomplish their goal, thework needed to be done expeditiously and in secret. They reportedon their activities only when they felt that others needed to know.Key stakeholders, including some important funders and staff,received periodic reports on activities during the merger studyperiod. None of these reports included the opportunity to commentor contribute to decision making. Insiders described this process as“good communication.” They assert that the benefits realized by themerger have (or will) save these art forms in the community. Inclu-sion of key stakeholders in organizational decisions increases theirapproval of decisions (Risberg, 2001), while exclusion can lead toresistance to change (Coch and French, 1948). It is less clear whateffect these reactions have on outcomes.

In this case, insiders felt that problems encountered during themerger were caused by stakeholders who refused to understand andadapt to change. They pointed to special interests and personalities



as the primary cause of problems: “The influence of special interestsis hurting the merger.” “Some employees, patrons, and donors wereunable to accept the merger.”

Outsiders who were not included in the merger process continuedto experience frustration after the merger. Three years later, outsiderinterviewees were still unable to identify benefits from the merger. Noone representing outsider stakeholder groups was involved and ableto report back to them and solicit feedback and support as the changewas occurring. They were not given the opportunity to buy into the process through direct or indirect involvement. They resisted thechanges as they were presented, fully formed by the task force, andthey continue to resist fully supporting the merged organization.

It is difficult to imagine how the perspectives of the outsiders andthe insiders could diverge more around the process and outcomes of this merger. Despite all the complexities, only one factor was relatedto the difference in perspectives: participation. Although some non-profits may assume that the board of trustees brings the communityinto the decision-making process of the organization, the Utah Sym-phony and Opera merger experience demonstrates otherwise. The per-spectives of the organization’s leaders did not represent the multiplicityof perspectives present among those with a stake in the organization.In addition, no liaisons were used to facilitate two-way communica-tion. Clearly, efficiency concerns in working to accomplish the desiredresult prohibit universal participation, but focusing exclusively on effi-ciency and result to the exclusion of all else has costs.

ConclusionThe problems that resulted from excluding some stakeholder groupsfrom the organizational change process have continued. Althoughoutsiders claim that both organizations would have actually been bet-ter off without merging, insiders speculate that the symphony mighthave ceased to exist as a fifty-two-week-per-year performing orches-tra with quality professional musicians. Our study cannot supply aresolution, but it does reveal unequivocally that participation in deci-sion making affects stakeholder perspectives on the processes andoutcomes guiding major organizational change. Nonprofit leadersmust consider the ongoing importance of stakeholders to their orga-nizations and choose carefully whether or not to include key stake-holder groups in major organizational change decisions.

Note1. It is important to note that these classifications are distinct from internal and

external stakeholders. The insider and outsider categories refer only to their inclu-sion or exclusion from the planning and decision-making processes. Many stake-holders (for example, employees) who would typically be included as internalstakeholders are actually “outsiders” in this case.



Despite all thecomplexities, only

one factor wasrelated to thedifference inperspectives:participation.

NANCY WINEMILLER BASINGER is an assistant professor in the Departmentof Political Science at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City.

JESSICA ROMINE PETERSON is development specialist/membership coordi-nator at the Utah Museum of Fine Arts in Salt Lake City.

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