When  Nuclear  Plants  Close:A  Regional  Forum  

on  Nuclear  Waste  Storage  and  Decommissioning

Highly  Radioactive  Irradiated  Nuclear  Fuel:  Need  for  Hardened  On-‐Site  Storage;  Risks  of  Off-‐Site  Transport

Kevin  Kamps,  Radioactive  Waste  Specialist,  Beyond  NuclearGarrison,  NYJune  9,  2017

Irradiated  Nuclear  Fuel  Transfer,from  Pools  to  Casks

Indoor  “Wet”  Storage  Pool    à Outdoor  Dry  Casks

Pools  are  outside  robust  containment

Close  call  with  catastrophe

Fukushima  Daiichi  Unit  4Japanese  Prime  Minister  Naoto  Kan

Risks  of  Pool  Storage,  Transfers

• IP’s  long  term  (~early  1990s-‐present)  pool  leakage  of  radioactivity  into  soil,  groundwater,  Hudson  River  (tritium,  Sr-‐90,  radioactive  cesium,  cobalt,  nickel)

• Heavy  load  drop  risk  of  pool  drain  down,  zirconium  fire  (Point  Beach,  MN  &  Palisades,  MI  transfer  cask  crane  dangles;  Vermont  Yankee  crane  slip)

Crane  Risks

Independent  Spent  Fuel  Storage  Installation  (ISFSI)  Configurations

Vertical Horizontal

ISFSIs

Vertical Horizontal

Need  for  Robust,  or  Hardened  On-‐Site  Storage  (HOSS)

Dr.  Arjun Makhijani,  IEER Dr.  Gordon  Thompson,  IRSS

Statement  of  Principles  for  Safeguarding  Nuclear  Waste  at  Reactors  (HOSS)—2006;  2010

• Require  a  low-‐density,  open-‐frame  layout  for  fuel  pools  (to  provide  convection  air  current  cooling);

• Establish  hardened  on-‐site  storage  (retrievability;   real-‐time  monitoring  for  radiation,  temperature,  pressure;  as  close  as  possible,  as  safely  as  possible,  to  point  of  generation);

• Protect  fuel  pools;• Require  periodic  review  of  HOSS  facilities  and  fuel  pools;

• Dedicate  funding  to  local  and  state  governments  to  independently  monitor  the  sites;

• Prohibit  reprocessing.

Statement  of  Principles  for  Safeguarding  Nuclear  Waste  at  Reactors  (HOSS)—2006;  2010

• http://ieer.org/wp/wp-‐content/uploads/2010/03/HOSS_PRINCIPLES_3-‐23-‐10x.pdf

• Many  hundreds  of  public  interest  and  environmental  organizations,  representing  all  50  states,  including  from  NY  State:  

Coalition  on  West  Valley  Nuclear  Wastes;  Center  for  Health,  Environment,  and  Justice;  For  a  Clean  Tonawanda  Site  (FACTS);  Citizen’s  Environmental  Coalition;  Riverkeeper;  Central  New  York  Citizens  Awareness  Network;  IPSEC  (Indian  Point  Safe  Energy  Coalition);  Public  Health  and  Sustainable  Energy  (PHASE);  Council  on  Intelligent  Energy  &  Conservation  Policy  (CIECP).

Dispersed/Concealed  HOSS v.  Plain  View/Clustered  Configuration

“Bowling  Pins”Graphic  from  “Robust  Storage”  by  Dr.  Gordon  Thompson,  Jan.  2003

Cask/Canister  Integrity  (Or  Lack  Thereof)

Holtecs at  D.C.  Cook,  MI Quality  Assurance  violations

Summary  of  Whistle-‐blower  Allegations  of  Holtec QA  Violations

• Faulty  welds• Unqualified  fabrication  materials• Defective  neutron  shielding  material• Failure  to  perform  coupon  testing,  Post-‐Weld  Heat  Treatment• Bypassing  of  hundreds  of  non-‐conforming  conditions,  without  re-‐

analysis  of  structural  integrity• Improper,  uncertified  design  decisions  and  changes  on  the  fly• No  root  cause  investigation  of  epidemic  of  QA  vioaltions• Interference  with  QA  audit,  falsification  of  QA  documentation• NRC  incompetence,  or  worse—collusion,  complicity

Holtec Whistle-‐BlowersOscar  Shirani,  Commonwealth  Edison/Exelon  QA  inspector

• Holtec casks  are  “nothing  but  garbage  cans”  if  they  are  not  made  in  accordance  with  government  specifications;

• Questions  Holtec casks’  structural  integrity  sitting  still,  at  0  mph,  let  alone  going  60  mph  (accident  forces)

Dr.  Ross  Landsman,  NRC  Region  3  dry  cask  storage  inspector

• Compared  NRC/Holtecdecision  making  to  NASA’s  that  led  to  “Space  Shuttles  hitting  the  ground”

Need  for  Emergency  Cask-‐to-‐Cask  Transfer  Capability

• Empty  irradiated  nuclear  fuel  from  vulnerable  and  leaking  storage  pools  into  HOSS,  but…

• Maintain  operability  of  empty  pool,  in  order  to  have  cask-‐to-‐cask  transfer  capability

• Science  fiction  of  NRC’s  on-‐site  or  away-‐from-‐reactor  “Dry  Transfer  Systems”

Risks  of  Off-‐Site  Transport

• Severe  accidents• Attacks• Mobile  X-‐Ray  Machines  That  

Can’t  Be  Turned  Off

Mock  Nuke  Waste  Cask  Tours

High  Burn-‐Up  makes  everything  worse  (thermal  heat,  radioactivity)

Consolidated  Interim  Storage  FacilitiesWaste  Control  Specialists,  LLC,Andrews  County,  Texas  (WCS)

Eddy-‐Lea  [Counties]  Energy  Alliance,  New  Mexico  (ELEA)

Yucca  Mountain,  Nevada;  Geologic  Repository  (Permanent  Burial)

Routes:  Yucca  Mountain,  NV-‐bound

Yucca-‐bound  routes

WCS,  TX-‐bound  routes

WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS LLC CHAPTER 2 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT

Page 2-74 Revision 0

WCS,  TX-‐bound  routes

Highly  Radioactive  LIQUID  Waste  Truck  Shipments?!

Highly  Radioactive  Liquid  Waste  Truck  Shipments

Barge  ShipmentsBarge Shipments of High-Level Radioactive Waste on the Waters of NJ, NY, and CT

Surrounding New York City Proposed by U.S. Dept. of Energy under its Yucca Mountain Plan

Map taken from Figure J-9, Routes analyzed for barge transportation from sites to nearby railheads, page J-78 and J-81.

Nuclear Reactor Location # of Shipments Proposed Barges offloaded at: Oyster Creek Forked River, NJ Up to 111, along NJ shore Port of Newark, NJ Indian Point Buchanan, NY Up to 58, down Hudson River Port of Jersey City, NJ CT Yankee Haddam Neck, CT Up to 42, on Long Is. Sound Port of New Haven, CT

Total Up to 211 Table taken from Table J-27, Barge shipments and ports, page J-83. Map and table taken from U.S. Department of Energy, “Final Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain,” Appendix J (“Transportation”), Feb. 2002.

Roads  and  Rails  Routes

Road  and  Rail  Routes

• http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2017/pdf/States_Affected.pdf

Or  Heavy-‐Haul  Truck?

Risk:  Underwater  Submersion

Risk:  High-‐Temperature,  Long-‐Duration  Fire

Risk:  Attack

Risk:  Attack

Risk:  Attack

Where  the  Radioactive  Poisons  Go

Mobile  X-‐Ray  MachinesThat  Can’t  Be  Turned  Off

Block  bad  decisions,  promote  good  ones