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System Frameworks #WWDC16

Session 706

What’s New in Security

Lucia Ballard Secure Transports Engineering ManagerSimon Cooper Trusted Execution Engineering Manager

What’s New in Security?


Network Security


Network Security Cryptography APIs


Network Security Cryptography APIs Platform Security on macOS

What’s New in Network Security

Lucia Ballard Secure Transports Engineering Manager

Secure Communications


HTTPS is the new HTTP• Confidentiality• Data integrity


HTTPS is the new HTTP• Confidentiality• Data integrity

Not all HTTPS is created equal

Current standardsApp Transport Security


For NSURLSession and NSURLConnection APIs


For NSURLSession and NSURLConnection APIs• TLS v1.2


For NSURLSession and NSURLConnection APIs• TLS v1.2• Strong crypto—AES-128 and SHA-2


For NSURLSession and NSURLConnection APIs• TLS v1.2• Strong crypto—AES-128 and SHA-2• Forward secrecy—ECDHE


For NSURLSession and NSURLConnection APIs• TLS v1.2• Strong crypto—AES-128 and SHA-2• Forward secrecy—ECDHE

Exceptions—global or for particular domains

App Transport Security Enforcement


Enforced at the end of 2016


Enforced at the end of 2016Reasonable justification required for most exceptions• NSAllowsArbitraryLoads• NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads• NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion


Enforced at the end of 2016Reasonable justification required for most exceptions• NSAllowsArbitraryLoads• NSExceptionAllowsInsecureHTTPLoads• NSExceptionMinimumTLSVersion

Example—Communicating with a specific third-party server


New exceptions to make it easier


New exceptions to make it easier• Streaming media using AVFoundation


New exceptions to make it easier• Streaming media using AVFoundation• Web content using WKWebView

NSAppTransportSecurity : Dictionary {

NSAllowsArbitraryLoads : Boolean

NSAllowsArbitraryLoadsInWebContent : Boolean

}


New exceptions to make it easier• Streaming media using AVFoundation• Web content using WKWebView

Deprecation of older algorithmsEvolving Standards


RC4 disabled by default


RC4 disabled by defaultSSLv3 disabled in SecureTransport


RC4 disabled by defaultSSLv3 disabled in SecureTransportOther algorithms showing their age• SHA-1• 3DES


RC4 disabled by defaultSSLv3 disabled in SecureTransportOther algorithms showing their age• SHA-1• 3DES

Now is the time to upgrade your servers

Certificates

Certificates

Strong TLS is not enough

Certificates

Strong TLS is not enoughCertificate ensures that you’re talking to the right server

Certificates Today

Certificates Today

Certificate Authority

Server Client

What could go wrong?Certificates Today



Server Client


Attacker’s Server


Server Client

Certificate Transparency


Public verifiable logs of issued certificates


Public verifiable logs of issued certificatesAnyone can submit a certificate to a log


Public verifiable logs of issued certificatesAnyone can submit a certificate to a logClient checks for proof that certificate has been logged• In the certificate itself• In a TLS extension• Delivered via OCSP stapling

How it worksCertificate Transparency



Server Client


LogCertificate Authority

Server Client

Makes attacks more difficultCertificate Transparency

Attacker’s Server


Server Client


Attacker’s Server


Server Client

Certificate rejected by client


Attacker’s Server


Server Client

Log


Attacker’s Server


Server Client

Log

Publicly visible

How to try it outCertificate Transparency


You can require Certificate Transparency through App Transport Security



NSAppTransportSecurity {

NSExceptionDomains {

example.com : {

NSRequiresCertificateTransparency : YES

}

}

}



NSAppTransportSecurity {

NSExceptionDomains {

example.com : {

NSRequiresCertificateTransparency : YES

}

}

}

Proofs required from at least two logsMore information at certificate-transparency.org

Best practicesRevocation


Certificate Transparency does not replace revocation


Certificate Transparency does not replace revocationRecommended practice—OCSP stapling• Enhancement to the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)

OCSP


Server Client

OCSP


Server Client

?

OCSP Stapling


Server Client

OCSP Stapling


Server Client

?

Benefits of OCSP Stapling


Reliable, quick revocation information


Reliable, quick revocation informationProtects your users’ privacy


Reliable, quick revocation informationProtects your users’ privacyDeliver certificate transparency proofs as well


Reliable, quick revocation informationProtects your users’ privacyDeliver certificate transparency proofs as wellWidely supported and backwards-compatible• Now fully supported on all Apple platforms

Network securitySummary


Move forward to secure algorithms and ciphers—TLS v1.2, forward secrecy, and SHA-2 certificates


Move forward to secure algorithms and ciphers—TLS v1.2, forward secrecy, and SHA-2 certificatesAdd your certificates to certificate transparency logs


Move forward to secure algorithms and ciphers—TLS v1.2, forward secrecy, and SHA-2 certificatesAdd your certificates to certificate transparency logsEnable OCSP stapling

SecKey and smart cardsCryptographic Improvements

SecKey Improvements

SecKey Improvements

API for asymmetric keys• Unification of macOS and iOS APIs• Support for common operations

SecKey Improvements


Replacement for deprecated CDSA calls

SecKey Improvements


Replacement for deprecated CDSA callsReplacement for asymmetric SecTransforms

CryptoTokenKit

CryptoTokenKit

System support for cryptographic devices• Smart cards, USB cryptographic tokens

CryptoTokenKit


Out-of-the-box integration with system services• Token content accessible through keychain• Token cryptographic operations available using SecKey API

CryptoTokenKit


Out-of-the-box integration with system services• Token content accessible through keychain• Token cryptographic operations available using SecKey API

More information in Security Labs

What’s New in Platform Security

Simon Cooper Trusted Execution Engineering Manager


How Software is Delivered


How Software is DeliveredDeveloper ID


How Software is DeliveredDeveloper IDGatekeeper


How Software is DeliveredDeveloper IDGatekeeperSoftware Packaging

How Software is Delivered

Software Delivery for iOS


App Store


App StoreXcode


App StoreXcodeEnterprise programs

Software Delivery for macOS


Mac App Store


Mac App StoreDeveloper ID


Mac App StoreDeveloper IDXcode

Developer ID

What is Developer ID?


Deliver apps outside of the App Store


Deliver apps outside of the App StoreUsually downloaded


Deliver apps outside of the App StoreUsually downloadedDeveloper ID Signing Identity


Deliver apps outside of the App StoreUsually downloadedDeveloper ID Signing IdentityDeveloper ID Signed Apps treated specially

iCloud for Developer ID NEW

iCloud for Developer ID

Developer ID can now use iCloud features• iCloud Drive• iCloud Keychain• Push Notifications• VPN

NEW


Deliver iCloud-enabled Apps outside of the App Store


Deliver iCloud-enabled Apps outside of the App StoreDeveloper ID apps can now share data with iCloud iOS apps


Deliver iCloud-enabled Apps outside of the App StoreDeveloper ID apps can now share data with iCloud iOS appsDeploy back to macOS 10.9


iCloud Development testing today


iCloud Development testing todayiCloud Deployment • Testing in upcoming seeds• Distribution using GM tools

Export a Developer ID-signed ApplicationSave a copy of the application signed with your Developer ID.

Gatekeeper

What is Gatekeeper?

What is Gatekeeper?

Controls what software is allowed to run on your Mac• Mac App Store• Mac App Store and identified developers• Anywhere

What is Gatekeeper?

Controls what software is allowed to run on your Mac• Mac App Store• Mac App Store and identified developers• Anywhere

Prompts user before first run

Changes to Gatekeeper


Changing the default options• Mac App Store• Mac App Store and identified Developers• Can still open anyway


Repackaging problemGatekeeper enhancement

Repackaging Problem

Container: Zip, DMG, ISO

Correctly Signed App

Code or Code equivalentLibraries, plugins, HTML, Lua, Python, etc.

App

External Resources

Repackaging Problem

Correctly Signed App


App

External Resources

Repackaging Problem


App

External Resources

Repackaging Problem

App External Resources

Repackaging Problem

AppExternal

Resources

Repackaging Problem

External Resources

App

Repackaging Problem

Malicious ContentApp

Repackaging Problem

Repackaging Problem

Not affected• From the Mac App Store• In a signed Apple Installer package

Repackaging Problem

Repackaging Problem

Affected • ZIP• Disk Images (DMGs)• ISO Images• Other archive formats

Repackaging Problem

Affected • ZIP• Disk Images (DMGs)• ISO Images• Other archive formats

Maybe affected• 3rd-party installers

Repackaging Problem

Repackaging Problem

Need your help

Repackaging Problem

Need your help We need to protect customers

ZIP, DMG, ISOContainers

AppExternal

Resources

Signing Disk Images

AppExternal

Resources

Signing Disk Images

Using macOS 10.11.5 or later

AppExternal

Resources

Signing Disk Images

Using macOS 10.11.5 or laterUse the “codesign” tool

AppExternal

Resources

Signing Disk Images

Using macOS 10.11.5 or laterUse the “codesign” toolSignatures are embedded App

External Resources

Signing Disk Images

Using macOS 10.11.5 or laterUse the “codesign” toolSignatures are embeddedBackwards-compatible with older OS releases

AppExternal

Resources

Signing Disk Images

Using macOS 10.11.5 or laterUse the “codesign” toolSignatures are embeddedBackwards-compatible with older OS releasesFor assistance, come to the Security Labs

AppExternal

Resources

App

Do thesePackaging Advice

Avoid the problem• Put resources inside App Bundle

App


Avoid the problem• Put resources inside App Bundle

Internal Resources


Distributing an App Bundle?• Deliver via the Mac App Store• Sign the App

- Package in a Zip Archive- Verify signature before release

• Signed Apple Installer package


For a container with Apps and resources• Signed Disk Image

• Sign any content in the container• Sign the disk image

• Verify signatures before release

AppExternal

Resources

Packaging Advice

Packaging Advice

Do TheseAdding personalization or licensing information• Use extended attribute on

bundle root—see TN2206• Sign a personalized

Disk Image

Packaging Advice

Do Not Do ThisModify your app after signing

Deliver an app with a broken signature

Use an ISO image

Do TheseAdding personalization or licensing information• Use extended attribute on

bundle root—see TN2206• Sign a personalized

Disk Image

Protecting customers Gatekeeper Enhancement

NEW

Gatekeeper Path Randomization NEW

Gatekeeper Path Randomization

Supplements existing Gatekeeper protections

NEW



No change for Mac App Store apps

NEW



No change for Mac App Store appsNo change for previously run apps

NEW




Applies to newly downloaded apps

NEW




Applies to newly downloaded appsApplies to apps on unsigned Disk Images

NEW

In a folder or Disk ImageGatekeeper Path Randomization

Your App Extra Resources

Gatekeeper Path RandomizationWhen app is running

Your App

When app is runningGatekeeper Path Randomization

Your App

When app is runningGatekeeper Path Randomization

Your App

?

Does not applyGatekeeper Path Randomization


User moves just the app bundle • Must only move a single app bundle



Signed Disk Images



Signed Disk ImagesSigned Apple installer package



Signed Disk ImagesSigned Apple installer packageApps from the Mac App Store

Summary

Sign what you deliverCheck the signatures are valid

More Information

https://developer.apple.com/wwdc16/706

Labs

Security & Privacy Lab 1 Frameworks Lab C Wednesday 9:00AM

Security & Privacy Lab 2 Frameworks Lab B Thursday 9:00AM

what’s new in security - apple inc.€¦ · what’s new in security lucia ballard secure...

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