what is to be done: about italian communism?

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What Is to Be Done: About Italian Communism?Author(s): Peter LangeSource: Foreign Policy, No. 21 (Winter, 1975-1976), pp. 224-240Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148063 .

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WHAT IS TO BE DONE- ABOUT ITALIAN COMMUNISM?

by Peter Lange

A specter is haunting U.S. foreign policy in Western Europe-the specter of Commu- nism. While attention has been focused on Portugal, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has broken out of the stagnant political position in which it had been mired for two decades and is today, in Italy, con- sidered a possible governmental partner by parties which only recently dismissed all discussion of such a coalition. This presents a new problem for U.S. foreign policy: Can the United States live with Communists as coalition partners in a NATO government?

Certainly, based on the habits and "rules of the game" of Cold War bloc politics, the instinctive response of many Americans is "no." Thus, a high-level adviser to the secretary of state asks a group of American scholars which of the policies used to fight Communism in the late 1940s might once again be employed. The president and the secretary of state bemoan the publicity re- ceived by the CIA because it inhibits the util- ization of that agency in situations such as that in Portugal. And the Department of State prohibits the issuance of visas to Ital- ian Communists invited to the United States by a number of universities.'

The rise of the PCI is not surprising; it is the product of profound social changes and resultant large shifts in public senti- ment. Any U.S. policy wholly designed to prevent Communist accession to government in Italy may not only prove futile but may also preclude the undertaking of policies which could minimize the damage to Amer- ican interests of such a political change. We

'See the Washington Dateline, "A Little Visa Prob- lem," by Richard Holbrooke in this issue.

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need, and I hope to encourage, discussion of this issue both by the foreign policy bu- reaucracy and by concerned citizens. The absence of such debate to date encourages the retention of old and perhaps outmoded policies instead of the search for new ones which can contend with a changing reality.

Two forms of Communist participation are likely in Italy in the next few years. The first is PCI parliamentary support for a government in which it has no ministry; what is known in Italy as entrance into the "governmental area." The second is full governmental participation in a multiparty coalition in which the Communists would hold ministries, though probably not those of greatest sensitivity to foreign governments. Currently, the PCI is moving very cautious- ly. Little differentiation between these out- comes has been made in the United States, and there has been much fear expressed about the rather unlikely prospect of a "Commu- nist government."

Communism Italian Style

For most of the postwar period, the PCI accepted the fact that it would have to seek power within the framework of Italy's democratic institutions. This premise had two important implications. First, it meant that the Party would have to concentrate on ex- panding its electoral and political influence rather than seeking to build a tightly or- ganized revolutionary political vanguard. The decision to build a mass party was made in 1944. Today there are more than 1.7 million PCI members. Second, the need to seek power through democratic means re- quired that the PCI seek alliances with social groups and political parties which were far removed from the partners traditionally sought by Communist parties. If the party were to have a chance to govern, it would have to build bridges to its traditional foe, the Catholic Christian Democracy (DC). The latter had mass support in all social classes, dominated the political system, and led the anti-Communist forces. Without

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penetrating the Catholic electorate, the PCI could not hope to establish an alliance with the DC, and without such an alliance it could not hope to come to power.

Until recent years this strategy paid few dividends at the national level. Although the PcI had a massive membership and the support of about one quarter of the electorate, it was not viewed as a potential governmental partner either by a majority of the electorate or by the DC and its sometime ally, the Socialist Party (psI). Despite the enormous social changes in postwar Italy, PCI strength had grown very gradually: From 1953 to 1972, its electorate expanded by only 4.9 per cent. Furthermore, these gains had come at the expense of the PSI, the total vote for the Left remaining almost stable for two decades. Clearly, the Party had not made the breakthrough to the critical non-Marxist electorate.

The Referendum and the June Elections

In the last 18 months, this situation has changed markedly. The first sign was the referendum on divorce in the spring of 1974. Despite a virulent campaign by the Church and the DC to have the four-year- old divorce law revoked, almost 60 per cent of the voters chose to retain the law. The vote suggested that the hold of the Church on the electorate might be weakening. Anti- divorce forces lost even in traditional Cath- olic strongholds. The DC had run its campaign not only against divorce but against the PCI as well, suggesting that a vote for divorce was a vote for the Communists. The failure of this ploy indicated that not only Catholicism but also anti-Communism might be an ineffective electoral appeal.

The administrative elections of June 1975 dramatically confirmed that this was the case. Comparing the returns for the re- gional elections with those for Parliament in 1972, we find that the pcI gained 4.9 per cent, raising its total support to 32.4 per cent-its largest increase and largest total in the postwar period. The Socialists' gains

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were considerably less-2.4 per cent, raising their total support to 12.1 per cent. In con- trast, the DC lost 3.1 per cent, its total support falling to 35.6 per cent. Two of the three smaller parties of the center also suf- fered defeats.

The impact of this electoral tremor has been great, both in terms of its immediate political effects and in terms of its implications for the PCI, the Italian government, and U.S. foreign policy. The Communists have vastly expanded the number of subnational governments in which they participate: among these are all the principal cities north of Rome-including Milan, Turin, Florence, and Venice-as well as five re- gional governments. Also, in a large number of other cities, provinces, and regions, the governing coalitions, while not including the PCI, have sought the Party's cooperation in developing programs and have commit- ted themselves to remaining "open to the Left." Thus the Communists have greatly increased their opportunities to display their capacities for good, effective government, at the same time strengthening their ties with the Socialists and developing new ones with local elites of other parties, including the DC.

At the national level, the June elections provoked a realignment of the Socialists' relationships with the DC and the PCI. Hav- ing learned from bitter experience that participation in governments with the DC was electorally costly, the Socialists had refused to enter cabinets for a considerable period, although they continued to support governments in Parliament. Subsequent to the elections, however, the PSI adopted the position that in the future it would not participate in any government coalition which was not "open" to the Communists and which did not have some measure of PCI support. At the same time, the Socialists have entered into subnational coalitions with the Com- munists wherever possible and have signed a joint declaration with the PCI on the political situation in Portugal. The era of the popular front has not returned, but the PSI

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has made clear that it is no longer available for participation in governments which are closed to the PCI.

Of even greater significance is the effect of the elections on the DC. The referendum on divorce, a number of governmental scandals, innumerable signs of the party's incapacity to govern effectively in a period of severe economic crisis, and the June returns have sharply aggravated an already incipient crisis within the Catholic party. While there is enormous inertia and open resistance to a change in party policy, it is evident that much of the leadership feels that if the party is to maintain its pivotal role in the political system, it will have to establish a new, more open relationship with the Com- munists. Such a relationship does not nec- essarily imply governmental cooperation, though the position of the PSI encourages this possibility, but it does mean that the days of the DC as the core of a virulent anti- Communist coalition are probably past.

Whatever one's personal value judgments about the propriety of direct U.S. interference in the domestic politics of another country, the huge American role and likely U.S. desire to continue to influence Italian politics require that we consider our policy choices. If the shift to the Left can be relatively easily reversed, the choice for U.S. policy-makers will undoubtedly be easier than if the new Communist strength is the

beginning of a continuing trend.

The Shift to the Left

The decline in the electoral strength of the DC and the rise in that of the PCI appear to have been the product of long-term factors." Looking at the processes contributing to the DC's electoral decline, two are of par- ticular importance. The first is the failure of the DC to govern the nation effectively and

efficiently. In the last decade, the social costs

* The discussion which follows draws heavily on the analysis of Giacomo Sani in "Secular Trends and Party Realignments in Italy : The 1975 Elections," a paper presented at the American Political Science Association convention, September 1975.

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and tensions created by the rapid and un- balanced growth known as Italy's "economic miracle" have become more and more severe. Strikes have become constant, bomb- ings and kidnapings commonplace, and governmental scandals unending. In the face of these, DC-dominated governments have demonstrated an almost total incapacity to formulate and execute the necessary reforms. Furthermore, as Suzanne Berger has recently written, this governmental incapacity has become increasingly damaging.3 Changes in its political/economic system have made it impossible for Italy to escape its present economic crisis without some governmental reforms.

Governmental incapacity is perhaps a failing which the DC might remedy, but the weakening of the party's traditional Cath- olic support is unlikely to be reversed. In recent years, there has been a sharp decline in the religiosity of Italians. A survey showed that weekly church attendance had fallen from 51.6 per cent in 1969 to 40.1 per cent in 1974, a rate of decline far more rapid than that of the previous decade. And this decline is likely to be enduring, for the fall in church attendance is greatest among the young. In addition, the institutions of the Catholic subculture, which had provided the party with an active capillary organizational structure enabling it to shield much of its electorate from Communist penetration, have recently disengaged from the DC. For example, until the 1970s, the clergy was a central element in DC electoral strategy. Priests could be counted on to give pro-party sermons and to mobilize their parishioners. In the past few years, however, it has become clear that the local priests were no longer playing this role. And in the 1975 elections, few clergymen were speaking pub- licly or working actively for the DC.

The PCI has been able to exploit the vul- nerability of the Dc. A study reporting survey results from 1970 to 1974 makes clear '

Berger, "Italy," a paper prepared for the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, September 1975.

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that the PCI's image has clearly been im- proving rapidly in recent years: While in 1970, 44.8 per cent of those surveyed still saw the Communists as a "serious danger for [our] freedom," the figure had fallen to 26.2 per cent in 1974. Conversely, while in 1970, 21.3 per cent of those surveyed thought it would be useful or necessary to have Communist participation in government for Italy to be well governed, that figure had risen to 35.9 per cent in 1974.

Four factors appear to have contributed to this trend. First, the Party has been able to convince large numbers of people and political elites that there is an "Italian road to Socialism" that will be paved, on the one hand, with democratic institutions and civil liberties and, on the other hand, with independence from the Soviet Union and a rejection of the Soviet Socialist model. The battle for credibility has been a long one, dating back to Togliatti's re-entrance into Italy in 1944 and his declaration of the principle of "polycentrism" in the international Communist movement in 1956. It has involved making considerable compro- mises with traditional Leninist doctrine (the compatibility of Socialism and the institutions of "bourgeois" democracy, and the need to build enduring alliances with the various strata of the middle class), acceptance of a number of Western "capitalist" institutions (the Common Market, Europ- ean Parliament, and, more recently, NATO), and, perhaps most significantly, open dis- agreements with the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues (criticism of the So- viet intervention in Czechoslovakia, of So- viet policy toward dissidence, and of the behavior of the Portuguese Communist Party in the spring of 1975).4 Barring a marked reversal of the party line pursued for the last 20 years, the PCI's democratic credibility will continue to grow.

On the international positions of the PCI see Donald Blackmer, "The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party" in The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France (Center for In- ternational Affairs, Harvard University, 1975).

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The second factor contributing to the Communist Party's growing legitimacy is its image as a party capable of delivering good, honest public administration. The PCI has, for a number of years, had a fine reputation for its administration of Bologna and other cities and regions in which it is in control. These successes have grown in the public's eyes in comparison with the DC's increasing incapacity to deal with It- aly's social and economic crisis. Once more, there seems little likelihood that this will wane. The Christian Democrats' incompe- tence and corruption are deeply ingrained.

The third factor is a decline in the number of people who see Communism and Catholicism as antithetical. In 1953, 67 per cent of respondents to a survey said that one could not be "a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time"; in 1970, the percentage had fallen to 44 per cent, and by 1972 it had further fallen to 34 per cent. The root causes of this phenomenon are complex. Communist policy throughout the postwar period has been to seek accommo- dation with Catholics and the DC, and in the last few years, the Party's willingness to compromise with Catholicism has been thrust to center-stage by the PcI's call for an "historic compromise" with the DC. There is little question that this slogan and the subsequent debate further eroded the remaining barriers between Catholics and the PcI, making it easier for voters disgusted with the DC to vote for the Communist Party. And the Communists have shown no inclination, despite their electoral victories, to abandon their search for an alliance with the DC. There may be little the Catholic party can do to counter the effects of this Communist openness.

The final factor in understanding the PCI's increasing legitimacy is the change in the non-Communist Italian press. Long known for their neglect of Communist affairs, except when Party behavior reinforced negative images, many dailies and weeklies have recently become a channel through

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which the Party can reach the non-Left public. Not only have they given far greater coverage than in the past to Communist leaders and positions, but they have begun to treat the Party as a possible partner in

government, worthy of serious analysis. It is also important to note that the

weakness of the DC and the strength of the PCI is greater among the younger strata of the electorate. A 1974 survey, for instance, clearly showed that the PCI had far greater support among younger respondents than did the DC and that the opposite was the case among older ones. Similarly, an analysis of the 1975 elections (when people between the ages of 18 and 21 were allowed to vote for the first time) has suggested that

approximately 55 per cent of those voting for the first time gave their preferences to the

parties of the Left. It seems likely, therefore, that support for the pcI, or at least for the Left, will accelerate as older citizens die and the electorate becomes increasingly dominated by a secularized citizenry which has not lived through the rigors of the Cold War but rather has been nurtured on the "hot au- tumn," Vietnam, detente, and the "historic

compromise."

The Costs of Intransigence

Barring direct intervention of an overt or covert nature, there is little that the United States can do to prevent the Communist

Party from assuming some sort of role in

Italy's national government within the not- too-distant future. The changes currently going on in the DC and the PSI are not the result of a "loss of nerve" in the face of a

momentary Communist surge but rather

represent attempts to find a new strategy in order to protect their basic interests as political parties. External pressures even from so great a power as the United States are

unlikely to block these domestic processes. The United States faces a key question,

then: Should we abandon our posture of intransigence toward the PCI and the Party's possible participation in national govern-

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ment? Certainly, any weakening of our stance against Communism in Italy would add fuel to the fire of those in the United States (the AFL-CIO is a prime example) who will use any Communist participation in the government as another weapon against general East-West detente. They will argue that anything less than total intransigence toward the rise of the PCI would be "ca- pitulation" in advance and would make it appear that we had abandoned our traditional Italian allies before the game was up, thereby signaling our supporters in other countries that they cannot count on Amer- ican backing. And such behavior might con- ceivably encourage Soviet initiatives in our traditional sphere of influence. At a mini- mum, might there not be considerable symbolic value for the United States in opposing the PCI's entrance into the Italian government until the moment that it actually oc- curs? There is some merit in these attitudes. A PCI entrance into the government would probably have unpleasant repercussions for the United States and for the policies of Kis- singer both at home and abroad. It would be wise to seek to minimize these. And a policy of intransigence would probably achieve that in the short run. But the longer run is also of concern, and it would seem unwise to pursue an approach which would reduce our ability to sway Communist behavior once the Party is a governmental partner. Rather, nurturing forces capable of continuing to influence the PCI in a direction favorable to fundamental U.S. interests would appear necessary.

It is important to remember that in the last two decades, the PCI's strategy and behavior have been marked by two fundamental constraints. The first is the presence of Italy within the American sphere of influence. From this flowed the decision to seek power within the Italian constitutional framework and to avoid appearing to be a direct threat to Italy's participation in the North Atlantic alliance. Any other course was subject to the threat of direct Amer-

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ican intervention. Further, it has meant that the party had to appeal to a general public and to elites which are largely pro-Amer- ican and anti-Soviet. The second constraint derives from the fact that the PCI has had to place building alliances with non-Marxist social groups and with the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties at the center of its strategy. The pcI has been in what Black- mer has called a position of "strategic in- feriority" in which the parties with which the Communists hoped to ally themselves could demand extensive concessions before even having to consider the PCI as a potential governmental partner.5 However, the ef- fectiveness of these constraints will continue to depend partly upon U.S. behavior. The Communists cannot govern without allies and extensive public support, and the Unit- ed States could create enormous difficulties, should it choose to do so, for any Italian government, including the PCI.

It is in this context that the costs of American intransigence toward a PCI role in the Italian government become clear. First, such a policy would require the United States to support the most anti-Communist elements within the DC. But those leaders and factions are, for the most part, the same ones which want to block reform of the corrupt, clientelistic, and inefficient practices which have so greatly contributed to the party's current crisis and to the rise of the Communists. Weaker at the polls and perhaps losing its plurality position, the DC would become a less effective constraint on the Communists in a coalition government or might end up being excluded from government, as the parties of the Left attained a sufficiently large parliamentary majority to rule without it." Finally, such a party would be less capable than a reformed one to ex-

" Blackmer, "Italian Communism: "Strategy for the 1970's," Problems of Communism, May-June 1972.

6 The PCI is extremely loath to participate in a government without Catholic, and preferably DC, support because it would lack the broad consensus which the Party views as necessary to its success.

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ploit any weaknesses which the PCI might develop once in the government. None of these prospects should give great comfort to U.S. policy-makers.

The second cost of intransigence is that it may well alienate sectors of Italian public and elite opinion which in the past have been pro-American and which today, though they may be open to some form of Com- munist governmental role, represent the critical social support for the forces in the PSI and the DC which are most capable of pro- viding real balance to the strength of the Communists. The extent of this alienation is difficult to measure, but it certainly exists. In September 1975, for instance, the Amer- ican ambassador, John Volpe, released an interview in which he clearly expressed opposition to Communist governmental participation. La Stampa, a prestigious news- paper owned by Fiat, labeled the statements an unwarranted interference in Italian internal affairs and questioned whether Volpe was an appropriate representative of the United States to Italy. The significance of the incident itself is small, but it raises the question of whether an intransigent position will not place the United States on the opposite side of much of the most influential opinion in Italy. Such a U.S. policy, with its implications of ignorance of Italian realities and lack of respect for Italy's democratic process, will make sectors of the public and elites less pro-American and more willing to support this kind of independent Europe as a "third force"-a foreign policy which the PCI is likely to press for.

The third cost of intransigence toward the PCI is more subtle but perhaps most important. The Communists have developed considerable autonomy from the Soviet Union in recent years. They have adopted positions which sharply differ from Soviet theoretical doctrine, have openly criticized Soviet foreign policy initiatives, and have refused to sanction Soviet actions or propo- sals which suggest that the Soviet Union can dictate policy to other Communist Par-

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ties. In the last year, for instance, the PCI refused to support Soviet plans for an international conference of European Communist parties unless such a conference were for discussion only and did not seek to impose positions on the individual participant parties. This behavior by the pcI should please the United States, for it has contributed to the divisions in the once solid "international Communist movement."'

To achieve such autonomy, the PCI has had to override considerable resistance in its own ranks and to undertake a massive internal education campaign to change members' conceptions of "proletarian internation- alism." For Communist members steeped in the movement's traditions and in the at- mosphere of the Cold War, it has been difficult to accept the possibility that one could criticize the Soviet Union without "join- ing the other camp, that of the capitalist imperialists." The PCI has been able to suggest that there is an alternative course- a strong, relatively unified, and independent Europe which would contribute to the slow process of the bilateral dismantling of the Cold War military and political blocs. Such a European alternative is probably the only way the PCI could escape the polarized logic of U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its extremely damaging consequences for the Par- ty's domestic strategy and internal disci- pline. It is also the light in which one can best understand the Communists' strong support for European institutions and detente and its willingness to accept continued Italian participation in NATO.

Should we appear to be unwilling to accept a PCI role in government on such terms, the effect might well be to weaken the Par- ty's ability to maintain autonomy from the Soviet Union. American intransigence would strengthen the hand of those in Moscow and in the PCI who look with alarm at the democratic and internationally autonomous version of Socialism which the Italian Com- munists are proposing. The result of such a policy, in other words, would be to harm

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our real interests while strengthening hard- liners in every sector--exactly the opposite of the intended goal.

Realistic Policy Goals

Abandoning total intransigence to the PCI's participation in a national government, however, does not mean forsaking all attempts to use conventional diplomatic means to influence the policies of such a government. To the contrary. It means developing new policies based on new realities.

First, the United States should open re- lations with the PCI. This could start at the very lowest levels, involving no more than permitting Italian Communists to visit the United States.7 In time, however, the State Department itself should seek contacts with the Communist leadership, at first merely discussing the character of U.S. hesitations about a PCI role in government. Such contacts would open channels which would later permit more effective diplomacy and show that the U.S. government was willing to recognize the character and trends of the changes sweeping Italy and to deal with these in order best to promote the long-run interests of the United States.

Second, the United States should encourage rapid reform of the DC. Besides recog- nition of the PCI, which, as I have indicated, will probably work in this direction, the United States should show it is willing, should it be asked to do so, to aid the re- formist efforts of Italian governments led by progressive leaders in the DC such as Aldo Moro, even if such governments seek the external (nonministerial) cooperation of the Communists. If, in the coming years, the DC is to be an effective balance to the pcI in a coalition government and/or the leader of an opposition which can forcefully chal- lenge a government of the Left, it must become able to project the image of a party ' It should be noted that an elegant way to at least partially defuse the consequences of such a change would be to put it in the context of a general change in U.S. visa policy in order to conform to the Hel- sinki Agreements.

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willing and able to guide the process of economic and social reform which Italy so clearly requires. Today, many Italians think the PCI is the most willing and able.

Finally, the United States should make clear the fundamental criteria by which it will evaluate the performance of an Italian government with PCI support or participation. Such criteria would represent the stan- dards by which the United States would determine whether or not to exercise the formidable political and economic sanctions at its disposal. These sanctions would in- clude restriction of the availability of international credit and loans and encourage- ment of capital flows out of Italy. If the conditions under which sanctions would not be applied are viewed as reasonable, the threat of sanctions will be an extremely powerful constraint on PCI behavior.

Democratic procedures are at the heart of the system of constraints that can best guar- antee that Italy's foreign policy will not veer sharply away from its traditional com- mitments and toward the Soviet camp once the PCI assumes a governmental role. As long as the Communist Party must seek alliances with parties like the DC and PSI and as long as it must test its support through the free electoral process, dramatic changes in Italy's international position are unlikely.

There is, of course, another side to the U.S. demand that the PCI continue to respect the democratic process. The United States must do so as well. We cannot be- have as we did in Chile and expect others to play by more democratic rules. Such interference in Italian internal affairs would tend to work in the Communists' favor. Even if American support should enable anti-Communist forces to overthrow the government, the extent of Communist support is such that the resistance to such a "counter- revolution" would be widespread and long- lasting. An American-supported Chilean- style regime in the middle of Europe would be disastrous for the United States' stand- ing with its European allies.

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Naturally, the United States could not

support Italy if it took any action which would fundamentally enfeeble the NATO alliance-for example, the banning of allied ships from Italian ports (effectively a with- drawal from the alliance) or offering port- ing or other rights to Soviet-bloc military vessels. What must be recognized, however, is that if the conditions under which the United States would recognize a Communist government in Italy become so severe that they effectively remove from the Italians all

capacity to exercise an independent foreign policy, it is quite probable that those conditions would not be acceptable to the PCI's coalition partners, much less to the Party itself. It is clear that here too there is a quid pro quo: the U.S. military in Italy must not be used to threaten the government.

In short, if American policy-makers make clear what they will accept and what lim- itations they will place on themselves, and if this is done within the context of a new understanding of the political situation in Italy, we will be the main beneficiaries. When the Communists finally enter the government, we will be better able to tolerate, if not welcome, such an outcome.

Probable Changes in Italian Foreign Policy

What can the United States expect from Italian foreign policy should the approach to Communist participation in Italian government recommended above be pursued? Although such a discussion must remain speculative, some hypotheses can be offered.

At the most general level, one should not expect great changes. Italy will not with- draw from NATO to join the Soviet camp. Nor is Italy likely suddenly to try to im- plement an aggressive foreign policy, though some greater initiative from the Italian government is probable. The PcI will want to show that it is contributing to a more active pursuit of Italian interests internationally, but its chief concerns will be domestic.

Within this general framework of con- tinuity, however, there are certain changes

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which one might expect. First, it is unlikely that Italian bases will be available for Amer- ican activity should there be a new Middle Eastern war. However, these bases were not available in 1973. Oil policy seems as strong a predictor of Italian policy in this area as Communist governmental participation. Sec- ond, on European policy, the PCI is likely to press for more independence and a greater weight for European institutions. Final- ly, on the thorny question of how the PCI in government would respond to Soviet attempts to regain control of Yugoslavia, the past record of the party suggests that it would be highly critical not only because of the party's domestic alliances, but also because of its close ties with the Yugoslav party and Marshal Tito. Criticism of such Soviet interventions is a direct expression of the Italian Communists' need to maintain their own autonomy and the principle of autonomy among Communist parties.

None of these policies would be fundamentally damaging to U.S. strategic interests, though they might disturb the status quo. It is safe to say that these changes in Italy's policy are greatly to be preferred to the major and damaging changes that could take place if the United States persists in futile railing against the PCI or moves to direct intervention to block the Communists' access to national power. Such an uncompromising U.S. policy would impair the ability of the United States and of forces inside Italy to hold the PCI to the policy positions developed in recent years and to influence its future conduct. Long-term strategic concerns would be sacrificed for short- term symbolic payoffs with dubious long- range values. We would create another en- emy and force everyone concerned into stances as uncompromising and unproduc- tive as ours. Recent history demonstrates the bankruptcy of shortsighted views of U.S. interests; there is nothing in the Italian case to suggest that the results would be dif- ferent.

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what is to be done: about italian communism?

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