WhatDefinesASuccessfulPeacekeepingMission:AnAnalysisoftheUnitedNationsProtectionForce(UNPROFOR)InBosnia

andHerzegovina

By:AllisonPinskiPoliticalScienceUndergraduateThesis

Advisor:ProfessorJingChenHartwickCollegeSpring2017

Pinski1

Introduction

Peacekeepingwasdevelopedasatechniquetoresolveandcontrolarmed

conflictinthepost-WorldWarIIera,andismostnotablyutilizedbytheUnited

Nations(UN)(Goulding1993).AccordingtotheDepartmentforPeacekeeping

Operations(DPKO),peacekeepingisdefinedasanyformaloperationincorporating

anyone,orcombinationof,thefollowingfivepeaceandsecurityactivities:conflict

prevention,peacemakingthroughdiplomaticmeasures,peacekeepingthrough

militarymeasures,peaceenforcementthroughmilitaryactions,andpeacebuilding

(BellamyandWilliams2010,15).

Peacekeepingmissionshavefacedlargestructuralandorganizational

changessincetheUN’sfoundingin1945.Withaparticularemphasisonpeace

operationsinthepost-ColdWarera,boththeUNandglobalcommunityhave

witnessedanincreaseinthedeploymentofmissions.Thepoliticalglobal

atmospheretodayisincreasinglypronetoarmedconflictandintrastateviolence.As

aresult,theUNandotherinternationalorganizationsmustworkhardtodeploy

newoperationstoadequatelyaddresstheseconflictsastheyarise.

Studyingpeaceoperationsandtheirrespectivesuccessorfailureisvitalfor

understandingthesourceofarmedconflict,theelementsthatcompriseasuccessful

mission,andworkingtowardamorestableandsecureglobalsociety.Asnotedby

PaulSzasz,apoliticalscientistspecializinginpeacekeepingoperations,“AllUnited

Nations‘peacekeeping’missionsaredifferent.Thus,theactivitiescarriedoutbythe

UnitedNationsinBosniaandHerzegovinaareverydifferentfromanythatthe

Organizationhasundertakenelsewhere,eventheotheroperationsintheformer

Pinski2

Yugoslavia”(Szasz1995,685).Asaresult,peacekeepingmissionsarecomplexand

difficulttocategorize.

ThisthesisseekstobetterunderstandtheeventsoftheUnitedNations

ProtectionForce’s(UNPROFOR)missiontoBosnia-Herzegovina.Inthisthesis,Iwill

analyzethemissiontodeterminewhetheritwasafailureorsuccessbasedonaset

ofcriteriacollectedfromtheLiteratureReview.Ifthemissionisdeemedafailureby

thesestandards,thisthesiswillseektodeterminewhatspecificelementsofthe

operationledtothatfailure.Itisimportanttodeterminewhetherthemissionwasa

successorfailuretohelpimprovefuturepeaceoperationsandidentifythespecific

eventsoftheBosnianWartobetterunderstandtheeffectivenessofUNintervention.

Background

ThissectionwillbrieflydiscussthehistoryoftheBosnianWarand

UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinatoestablishabasisforunderstandingthe

conflict.TheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SFRYugoslavia)(Map1,Page

50),wasformedafterWorldWarIIandencompassedsixBalkanrepublics;Bosnia-

Herzegovina,Croatia,Slovenia,Montenegro,Serbia,andtheFormerYugoslav

RepublicofMacedonia.Inthecontextofthisthesis,theFederalYugoslavRepublicof

MacedoniawillbereferredtoasMacedonia.Eachrepubliccontaineditsownethnic

groupandpoliticalorganization,butwasunitedunderoneoverarching

government.Politicalrelationsbetweenthedifferentethnicitiesweretense,most

notablytheconflictbetweenSerbsandCroats.Ethnicrelationsweretheleast

strainedinBosnia-Herzegovinabetweenthecountry’sthreeethnicmajorities;

Bosniaks(alsoreferredtoasBosnianMuslims),BosnianSerbs,andBosnianCroats

Pinski3

(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”;seealso“FormerYugoslavia–

UNPROFOR”1996).

Relationsbetweenethnicgroupsthroughoutthecountrybetteredunderthe

dictatorshipofPresidentJosipBrozTito.Despitetheirstaunchdifferences,Tito

unitedthesixrepublicsbyassertingstrongmilitarydominanceandutilizingtherise

ofYugoslavia’sCommunistParty.Yugoslavia’sCommunistPartywasmultinational,

andwasastrongadvocateforaunifiedrepublicandnationalequality.TheParty

gainedmomentumbyalienatingotherextremistpartiesandappealingto

nationalists.UnderCommunistrule,Titowasabletocontrolthecountryandsubdue

hostilitiesbyappealingtonewYugoslavidentitiesemergingafterWorldWarII

(Djilas1995).

TitoruledYugoslaviafrom1943untilhisdeathin1980.Yugoslaviagrew

politicallyunstableafterTito’sdeathasoldethnictensionsreappeared.AfterTito’s

death,eachrepublicsoughttocontrolitsownsovereigntyasanindependentstate,

withtheexceptionoftheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(FRYugoslavia),composed

oftheSerbianandMontenegrinrepublics.Itisworthnotingthedifferencebetween

SFRYugoslavia,whichincludedallsixrepublics,andFRYugoslavia,whichonly

includedSerbiaandMontenegro.WithpersistencefromSerbia,FRYugoslavia

hopedtokeeptheYugoslavrepublicsfromgainingtheirindependence.DespiteFR

Yugoslavia’seffortstocontrolthefourroguerepublics,SFRYugoslaviacollapsedin

1991whenSloveniaandCroatiadeclaredtheirindependence(“TheBosnianWar

andSrebrenicaGenocide”).

Pinski4

Afterthecollapse,Croatia,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Slovenia,andMacedonia

formedtheirownrespectiveindependentstates.Map2(Page51)illustratesthe

bordersandcitiesofpresent-dayBosnia-Herzegovina.In1991,theultra-nationalist

SerbianPresidentSlobodanMiloševićbeganmobilizingSerbminoritiesinthenewly

createdcountries.HespreadpropagandaandfakenewsstoriesofSerbsbeing

attackedbyotherethnicgroupstoexploitthealreadytenserelationshipbetween

SerbsandCroats.UndertheguiseofprotectingSerbminorities,Miloševićdeclared

waronCroatia,Bosnia-Herzegovina,Macedonia,andSlovenia.Withsomemilitary

backingfromFRYugoslavia,MiloševićandhisSerbianarmyattackedCroatiaand

SloveniainJune1991(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”).

In1992,MiloševićturnedhisattentiontoBosnia-Herzegovinabymobilizing

theBosnianSerbstoprotectthemselvesagainstthecountry’sCroatandMuslim

populations.Inresponse,CroatianPresidentFranjoTudjmanmobilizedtheBosnian

CroatstodefendthemselvesagainsttheBosnianSerbs.Inthiscontext,Bosnia-

HerzegovinawasusedasaproxywarforethniccleansingbetweenSerbiaand

Croatia(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”).

Amidfearsofescalatedviolence,theUNbeganitsinterventionintheBalkans

in1991throughUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)Resolution721.Thisresolutionwas

createdinresponsetoaNovembermeetingbetweentheSecretary-General(UNSG)

PersonalEnvoy,Milošević,Tudjman,theSecretaryofStateforNationalDefenseof

FRYugoslavia,andLordCarringtonoftheUnitedKingdom.EachYugoslavparty

voicedtheirsupportforthedeploymentofapeacekeepingoperationintheregion

topreventfurtherviolence.Althoughaceasefirewasestablished,itwasalmost

Pinski5

immediatelybrokenshortlyafterwhenBosnianSerbsbeganmasskillingsof

BosnianCroatsandMuslims.Itisworthnotingthekillingsoccurringduringthewar

werenotforthesakeofethniccleansing,butrathertocreateethnically

homogeneouscities.

AstheconflictbegantoescalateandMiloševićturnedhisattentionfrom

CroatiaandSloveniatoBosnia-Herzegovina,theUNSCcreatedResolution749

(1992),aresponsetotherequestfromBosnianPresidentAlijaIzetbegovićtodeploy

moreUNPROFORpeacekeepersintoBosnia-Herzegovina.From1992to1993,the

operationmandateofUNPROFORtroopsextendedtoCroatia,Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Serbia,Macedonia,andMontenegro,withapresenceinSlovenia.Themissionwould

concludeinMarch1995,tobereplacedbytheUnitedNationsConfidence

RestorationOperationinCroatia(UNCRO),theUnitedNationsPreventive

DeploymentForce(UNPREDEP),andtheUnitedNationsPeaceForces(UNPF)

stationedinZagreb,Croatia(“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR”1996).

TheBosnianWarbeganin1992afterBosnia-Herzegovinadeclared

independencefromFRYugoslavia.Thenewstatewassooninvadedbythemajority-

SerbYugoslavPeople’sArmy,whobackedtheBosnianSerbs,andtheCroatian

Army,whobackedtheBosnianCroats.InApril,theUNbeganitspresenceinthe

countrybysending40militaryobserverstoMostar.TheUNSGandUNPROFOR

pressuredtheregiontonegotiateapermanentcease-firebetweenthewarring

parties.WithconstraintsfromCroatiaandSerbia,theUNwasforcedtowithdraw

someofitspeacekeepingforcesinBosnia-Herzegovina,andwasonlypermittedto

deliverhumanitarianaid(“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR”1996).

Pinski6

InAprilandMay1993,theUNcreatedsix“safezones”throughUNSecurity

Council(UNSC)Resolutions819and824.ThecitiesincludedSrebrenica,Sarajevo

(themostethnically-integratedcity),Žepa,Goražde,Tuzla,andBihać.Alsodeemed

“safe”cities,the“safezones”werecontrolledbyUNtroopstobetterprotectcivilians

andnoncombatantsfromthewar.However,theUNcouldnotprovidetheresources

ormandatestoeffectivelyprotectthesafezones,thuslyallowingsomeofthemost

detrimentalmassacrestooccurinEuropesinceWWII(“TheBosnianWarand

SrebrenicaGenocide”).

ThemassacreatSrebrenicaisconsideredtheworstmasskillingofthe

BosnianWarandthelargestinEuropeaftertheHolocaust.InJuly1995,theSerb

GeneralRatkoMladicbombedandinfiltratedthecitydespitethepresenceof

UNPROFOR.TheSerbstargetedSrebrenicabecauseitwaspredominantlyBosnian

CroatandMuslim,andwaslocatedinamajoritySerbianterritory.Thisterritoryis

laterdictatedtheRepublikaSrpskabytheDaytonAccords.Mladicandhisarmyof

BosnianSerbswereabletogainaccesstothecitybecauseUNtroopswere

prohibitedfromusingforceagainsttheapproachingarmy.TheUN’sinabilitytoact

allowedMladicandhisforcestocaptureandkillmorethan8,000Croatsand

MuslimsinthefieldsoutsideSrebrenica.Theirbodieswereburiedintwomass

graves.Asidefromthisestimate,therearefewreportsdetailingtheeventsofthe

massacre(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”).

AstheYugoslavWarsreachedanend,theDaytonAccordswerenegotiatedin

November1995betweenFRYugoslavia(specificallySerbia),Bosnia-Herzegovina,

andCroatia.TheAccordsestablishedalong-termceasefireintheregionbetween

Pinski7

signatoriesMilošević,Tudjman,Izetbegović,andtheBosnianForeignMinister

MuhamedSaćirbeg.RepresentativesoftheUnitedStates,France,theUnited

Kingdom,Germany,Russia,andtheEuropeanUnion(EU)facilitatedthe

negotiations(“SummaryoftheDaytonPeaceAgreementonBosnia-Herzegovina”

1995).

TheAccordskeptBosnia-Herzegovinaunitedasonenation,butestablished

“twosemi-autonomousentities”topreventfutureconflict;theFederationofBosnia-

HerzegovinafortheBosnianMuslimsandCroats,andtheRepublikaSrpskaforthe

BosnianSerbs.Eachentitywaspermittedtoorganizetheirownseparatepolitical

structures,educationalsystems,andeconomies.However,theFederationand

RepublikaSrpskawererequiredtonationallyorganizeintoasingle,centralized

governmenttoensurethecountryoperatedsmoothly.Whilethiswastheintention

oftheAccords,realisticallythecountryhassincestruggledtofunctionefficiently

underatripartitepresidency(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide”;seealso

“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR”1996).

Anestimated100,000peoplewerekilled,mostofthemBosnianCroatsand

Muslims.Morethan200UNPROFORpeacekeepersanduniformedpersonnelwere

alsokilled.ItisdifficulttostudytheBosnianWarbecausetherearefewreportsand

statisticsdetailingtheeventsoftheconflict(“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenica

Genocide”).

LiteratureReview

Thefollowingliteraturereviewisdividedintofoursectionsrepresentingthe

fourmajorthemesemergingfrompreviousresearch;1)TheUNusedhumanitarian

Pinski8

assistancewithoutmilitaryinterventioninBosnia-Herzegovina,2)Risingglobal

skepticisminUNpeacekeepingmissionsduringthe1990s,3)TheUN’sneglectof

risingnationalismandtheimpactofinfluentialregionalactors,and4)TheUN’s

delayedadoptionoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)doctrineandinternational

accountability.

I.TheUnitedNationsfavoredhumanitarianassistanceovermilitaryoperationsinBosnia-Herzegovina.

Thecontextofpeacekeepingoperationsisasimportantastheorganization

ofthemission.TheUNwaspermittedbythegovernmentsofBosnia-Herzegovina,

Croatia,andSerbiatodeployUNPROFORintoBosnia-Herzegovinatoaddressthe

country’sescalatingcivilwarasahumanitarianeffortandinternationalobserver.

PaulSzaszaddressedthischaracteristicinhis1995analysisonUNPROFORin

Bosnia-Herzegovina,publishedintheCornellInternationalLawJournal.According

toSzasz,UNPROFORwasdeployedinBosnia-Herzegovinatosupporthumanitarian

effortsby,“keepingopenairports(especiallySarajevo),escortingandotherwise

facilitatingthemovementofconvoys,andperformingotherrelatedtaskssuchasthe

repairofpower,water,andsewagesystems”(Szasz1995,687).Underthisspecific

guise,“strictlymilitaryfunctions”aresecondaryconcerns(Szasz1995,687).

UNPROFORtroopsweregreatlylimitedintheirperformance,astheyhada

lackofadequateequipmentandaninsufficientnumberofpersonneltoensureUN

mandates(Szasz1995,687).ThesemandatesincludedtheprotectionofUN-

mandated“safezones”andmonitoringtheno-flyzoneissuedinpartsofthecountry

bytheUNSC(Szasz1995,687).TheUNsuccessfullydeliveredhumanitarian

Pinski9

assistancetoat-riskpopulations,butwasnotpermittedtofurtherprotectthese

populationsfromtheeffectsoftheon-goingwarwithmilitaryaction.

Szaszcontinuedtocriticizetheoperationbyadding,“Onlybyhelpingthe

partiesimplementtheseunfortunatelyshort-livedcease-firesdoesUNPROFOR

occasionally,briefly,andlocallyperformwhatmightbeconsideredclassic

peacekeepingoperations”(Szasz1995,687).Hisreferenceto“classicpeacekeeping

operations”referredtoUNPROFOR’slimitedabilitytomarklinesofconfrontation,

facilitatediscussionsbetweenopposinggroups,controljointmilitarycommissions,

controltheuseofheavyweaponryinhigh-conflictareas,andoccasionally

“interposebetweenarmedunits”(Szasz1995,687).AccordingtoSzasz’sanalysis,

theUNPROFORoperationinBosnia-Herzegovinawasafailurebecauseitcouldnot

utilizemilitarycomponents,throughthefaultoftheUNoralackofconsentfrom

otherpartiesinvolved.

AbookreleasedbyMichaelDoyleandNicholasSambanis,entitledMaking

WarandBuildingPeace:UnitedNationsPeaceOperations,reaffirmedSzasz’s

argument.AccordingtoDoyleandSambanis,“Stoppingcivilwarshasneverbeen

moreimportant…Internal(civilorintrastate)warhasreplacedinterstatewaras

theparamountconcernfororganizationschargedwithmaintaininginternational

peaceandsecurity”(DoyleandSambanis2006,3).Civilwarshavealargeimpacton

thesecurityandeconomicstandingofacountry,andholdthepotentialto

destabilizeanentireregion(DoyleandSambanis2006,3).Thisistrueofthe

BosnianWar,wheretheinternationalcommunityfearedthewarcouldfurther

destabilizetheregionandcreateapowervacuumintheBalkans.

Pinski10

DoyleandSambanisstated,“Civilwarshaveregionalcontagionordiffusion

effects,antheyreduceratesofeconomicgrowthinboththedirectlyaffected

countriesandtheirneighbors”(DoyleandSambanis2006,3).TheUNwasunableto

easetheeffectsofcivilwarinBosnia-Herzegovinabecausetheycouldonlyprovide

humanitarianassistancetothecountry,asopposedtoprovidingbothaidand

militarydirectives.Thecombinedapproachofhumanitarianassistanceandmilitary

interventionwouldhaveprovidedtheUNwiththebestopportunitytode-escalate

theconflictandlimitciviliancasualties.

II.RisingglobalskepticismofUnitedNationspeacekeepingmissionsinthepost-ColdWareraandthewithdrawnsupportfromspecificstateactorsallowedtheBosnianconflicttoescalate. Inthepost-ColdWarera,referringtotheperiodbetweenthelate-1980sand

mid-1990s,thenatureofUNpeacekeepingmissionstransformedtobetteradaptto

newconflicts.Thisplacedaglobalfocusonintrastateconflict,likecivilwars,as

opposedtointerstateconflict.IntheirbookUnderstandingPeacekeeping,Alex

BellamyandPaulWilliamsnotedthistransformationusheredinsomehesitanceand

skepticismfromUNmemberstates.Skepticismespeciallygrewamongglobal

powers,liketheU.S.andWesternEurope,asthenumberofUNpeacekeeping

deploymentsdrasticallyincreasedtoaccommodatethechangingpolitical

atmosphere(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).

Thisskepticismdevelopedintowithdrawnsupportfromactivepeacekeeping

missions.Srebrenicaisanexampleofthis.WhiletheUNSCvotedinfavorofnaming

Srebrenicaa“safezone”toprotectcivilianlives,thezonewasseverelyunderstaffed,

underresourced,andlackedmeaningfuldirection(BellamyandWilliams2010,

Pinski11

109).Atthebeginningoftheconflictin1992,DutchpeacekeepersinSrebrenica

werenotissuedclearmandatestoprotectthe“safezone”withforce.Inaddition,

theywerenotprovidedwithenoughtroops,equipment,orsuppliestoadequately

protectthemajorityBosnianCroatandMuslimciviliansinsidefromtheadvancing

YugoslavPeople’sArmy(BellamyandWilliams2010,109,117).Bellamyand

Williamsexplainedthat,“Thepoliticalwillofmemberstatestomandateand

contributetoUNpeaceoperationsisrelatedtotheoperationaleffectivenessofthe

organizationsitself”(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).Therefore,itisunsurprising

thatthe,“repeatedfailureofpeaceoperationsbetween1992and1995encouraged

memberstatestocurbtheirenthusiasmandlimittheircommitment,”toUNPROFOR

(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).

Consequently,somestateschosetowithdrawtheirsupportfortheUN

missiontoinsteadassistpeacekeepingeffortswiththeNorthAtlanticTreaty

Organization(NATO).BellamyandWilliamsexplainedthatthiswithdrawnsupport

forcedsingle-stateactorstoleadpeaceeffortsastheUNwasunabletomake

negotiationstoprovidetheresourcesandfundingnecessarytofulfillUNobligations

inBosnia-Herzegovina(BellamyandWilliams2010,109).Laterin1995,theU.S.led

theDaytonAccordsinOhiobetweenthepresidentsofBosnia-Herzegovina,Croatia,

andSerbiainanattempttoendtheregionalconflict(BellamyandWilliams2010,

109).

MarrackGouldingprovidedgreatercontextforBellamyandWilliam’s

conclusionswithhis1993publicationtotheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs.

Gouldingbelievedtherewasastigmaassociatedwithpeacekeepingmissionsduring

Pinski12

thepost-ColdWarera,ultimatelybecausetheywerespecificallyUnitedNations

missions(Goulding1993,453).Hewrotetheir“UnitedNationsness”wasderived

fromthreedifferentfactors:“Theywereestablishedbyoneofthelegislativeorgans

oftheUnitedNations…,theywereunderthecommandandcontroloftheSecretary-

General…,andtheircostsweremetcollectivelybythememberstatesas‘expenses

oftheOrganization’underArticle17oftheChapter”(Goulding1993,453-4).

Asaresultofthesefactors,manystateswerecriticalofwhereandfrom

whomauthorityinpeacekeepingmissionsderivedfrom.Intheyearsleadingupto

1993,theUNhadnevercommandedanenforcementoperation,andinstead

authorizedspecificmemberstatestouseforceasneededtoassurecompliancewith

itsdecisions(Goulding1993,463).AccordingtoGoulding,“Thisarrangementmay

raisequestionsabouttheextenttowhichtheoperationis–orisperceivedtobe–

reallyundertheUnitedNationsandnotcontrolledinrealitybythememberstates

contributingtothebulkofitstroops”(Goulding1993,463).Withinthisdiscussion,

GouldingperceivedtheUN’sweaknesstobeitslackofpersonalizedauthority,

whichmayhavecontributedtoitspoorperformanceinBosnia-Herzegovina.

AnotherauthorwhoanalyzedtheUNinBosnia-Herzegovina,JaneBoulden,

specificallydiscussedtheeffectstheinternationalcommunity’swithdrawnsupport

hadontheescalationofviolence.Initially,UNPROFORcommanderinBosnia-

Herzegovina,GeneralPhilippeMorillon,“plantedhimself[inSrebrenica]and

announcedthatheintendedtostayinSrebrenicauntiltheBosnianSerbsiegeofthe

cityended”(Boulden2001,92).Morillon’sdedicationtoprotectingtheUN-

sanctionedsafezoneinSrebrenicareceived,“mixedreviewswithintheUN

Pinski13

hierarchy,”andwasshort-lived(Boulden2001,92).TheUNonlyprovidedenough

fundingandresourcesforMorillonandhistroopstoremaintheSrebrenicauntil

humanitarianaidwasdelivered(Boulden2001,92).Morillonwasforcedtoleave

shortlyafter,andtheBosnianSerbassaultontheCroatandMuslimpopulations

continued(Boulden2001,92).

InhisownpublicationfortheWorldBankEconomicReviewin2008,Nicholas

SambanisdrewfromhispreviousworkwithMichaelDoyletosuggesttheUN

providemoreattentiontomilitaryoperationsandlong-termnation-buildingand

development,asopposedtosolelyshort-termhumanitarianassistance(Sambanis

2008).HenotedthattheeffectsofUNpeacekeepingmissionsarenotlong-lasting,

becausetheUNisunabletodevotetheresourcesandfundingrequiredto

permanentlyinterveneinlong-termconflicts.Intheabstracttohisarticle,hewrote,

“Peacekeepingoperationscontributemoretothequalityofthepeace…thantoits

duration,becausetheeffectsofsuchoperationsdissipateovertime”(Sambanis

2008).SambanissuggestedtheUNadaptstrategiestoincorporateastronger

militarypresenceinsomecountriestohelp,“developinstitutionsandpoliciesthat

generateeconomicgrowth”(Sambanis2008).

Finally,manyinternationalactorshavequestionedhowtoidentify

peacekeepingoperationsassuccessesorfailures.Thisisdifficultaseachoperation

isdifferentfromtheonesbefore,andmanymayinvolvedifferentmeanstode-

escalateandpreventconflict.AfterreviewingandanalyzingapublicationfromPaul

Diehl,RobertJohansenidentifiedtwomajorcriteriaforassessingthesuccessofa

UNpeacekeepingmission;bylimitingarmedconflictandpromotingconflict

Pinski14

resolution.WhileJohansenacknowledgestheimportanceofthesefactors,healso

notestheyhavethepotentialtoleadtomisunderstanding.Hediscussedthe

influenceoutsidefactorshaveonthesuccessofamission,likethereceptivenessof

thehostcountryandactiveparticipationofotherpartiesinvolved.TheUNcannot

beheldfullyresponsibleifamission“fails”(Johansen1994,307).

However,JohansendoesacknowledgeDiehl’sconclusionsthatpeace

operationsarethemostsuccessfulunderthefollowingconditions:activeconsentto

apeacekeepingmissionfromthehoststateandallpartiesinvolvedintheconflict,

peacekeepersare“lightlyarmedanddonotfireexceptinself-defense,”

peacekeepingforcesremainneutralintheconflict,themissionaddressesinterstate

conflictsoverintrastateconflicts,andthe“geographiccontextenablespeacekeepers

tobedeployedinrelativelyinvulnerablesettingsinwhichtheycaneasilydetect

violationsandcompletelyseparatethecombatants”(Johansen1994,307-8).Most

internationalorganizationsandpeacekeepingscholarshavedevelopedtheirown

criteriaforassessingthesuccessofapeacekeepingoperation,althoughJohansen

believedDiehloffersoneofthemostapplicableapproaches.

III.TheUnitedNationsdidnotaddresstheescalationandexploitationofethnicidentitiesandtheriseofnationalismfromregionalactors. Bosnia-Herzegovinaishistoricallycomprisedofthreeprominentethnic

groups;Muslims,Serbs,andCroats.In1995,afterthemajorityoftheconflictinthe

countryended,Muslimsconstituted45%ofthepopulation,Serbs35%,andCroats

16%(Szasz1995,690-1).InhisanalysisofUNPROFOR,PaulSzaszdiscussedthe

impactthecountry’sdemographicshadonitspoliticaldestabilization.While

Pinski15

Bosnia-Herzegovinawasdividedintothreedistinctethnicgroups,thegroupswere

relativelyintermingledthroughoutthecountry.Hewrotethereweresomeareas

withahigherconcentrationofonegroupcomparedtotheothers,butthese

concentrationswere,“rarelymarkedandareevenmorerarelygeographically

extensiveorcoherent”(Szasz1995,691).Thisinterminglingmadeitdifficultto

characterizeanyofthenation’sregionsasbelongingtoonegroupovertheothers.

Szasznotedthatthedistinctionsbetweenthethreeethnicgroupshave

existedforcenturiesundertheOttomanandHabsburgEmpires,althoughtension

wasneverasprevalentasitwasafterthefallofSFRYugoslavia(Szasz1995,691).

EvenunderTito,thecountryexperiencedverylittleconflict(Szasz1995,691).

FurtherelaboratingonSzasz’sanalysis,BenLiebermanexplainedthe

exploitationofethnicidentitiesinhis2006articlefortheJournalofGenocide

Research.Liebermanwrote,“Shockingviolencebyneighborsemergesasamajor

themeinnumerousaccountsofwarandethniccleansinginBosniaand

Herzegovina,butatthesametimemanystudies…revealcordialandamicable

relationsbetweenBosnianMuslims,Serbs,andCroats”(Lieberman2006,298).

Liebermanusedinterviewsfromawell-cited1990survey,whererespondentsfrom

Bosnia-HerzegovinadescribedethnicrelationsinSFRYugoslaviaas,“goodor

satisfactory”(Lieberman2006,298).Beforethewarbegan,therewerevirtuallyno

significantpolitical,social,oreconomicdistinctionsbetweenethnicgroups.

Thefollowingquotesfromrespondentsduringtheirinterviewforthesurvey

supportthisidea;“AlthoughsomeofuswereMuslimandsomewereSerbs,weall

thoughtofourselvesasYugoslavs.IknowIdidn’tlookatfriend…anydifferently

Pinski16

becausetheywereSerbs,”“Weweresoclosetoeachother,”and“Ididn’t[know]of

themwhowasMuslim,whowasSerb.Allmyfriendswerethesameforme”

(Lieberman2006,298).

Inhisanalysis,Liebermanexplainedthesuddenescalationofethnic-based

conflictresultedfromnewarisingnationalnarratives.Hewrote,

“Accounts of close relations between neighbors

typicallyrecallscenesofeverydaylife,ofindividualsas

friends, classmates, and colleagues. Stories of ethnic

rivalry,on theotherhand,presentnarratives inwhich

the same individuals function as members of enemy

nations.Thissameparadoxofa friendlyneighborwho

kills can be described with the concept of cognitive

frames or ‘a mental structure which situates and

connects events, people and groups into ameaningful

narrative’”(Lieberman2006,299).

AccordingtoLieberman,itwasimportanttounderstandthesignificanceofthis

context,especiallyinregardstoUNandNATOinterventionsinBosnia-Herzegovina.

TheUNdidnotprovideUNPROFORpeacekeepersinthecountrywiththe

informationorresourcestheyneededtoadequatelyaddressthenewandquickly

spreadingnationalnarratives(Lieberman2006,299).

Distinctionsbetweentheethnicgroupsweremoreideologicalthanphysical,

althoughsomekeycharacteristicseasilyallowedeachgrouptoidentifyoneanother.

InTonyBarber’sarticlefortheIndependent,writteninZagrebin1992,Barber

Pinski17

emphasizestheunderlyingsocietal,linguistic,andreligioustensionsthroughout

SFRYugoslavia.Eachethnicgrouphaditsowndistincthistory,language,and

religion,andwhiledailyinteractionswerepleasant,asdescribedbyLieberman,the

overarchingsocietalinteractionsweremorehostile.SerbsandCroatsspokesimilar

languages,bututilizeddifferentalphabets.SerbsweremajorityOrthodoxChristian,

CroatswerepredominantlyCatholic,andBosniakswereMuslim.Thesekey

ideologicaldifferencesallowedSerbstomobilizeandjoinotherradicalizedSerbsin

protectingSerb-majorityBosniantownsandcities,andidentifywhowasCroatand

Muslim(Barber1992).

Thefirst-handaccountsofinvestigativejournalistDavidRohdehelpsupport

Lieberman’sconclusions.Inhisnovel,Endgame:TheBetrayalandofSrebrenica,

Europe’sWorstMassacreSinceWorldWarII,Rohdeusedhisskillsasajournalistto

studythecontextofthemassacresinSrebrenicaandinterviewseveral

peacekeepers,formerSerbianArmysoldiers,andsurvivors(Rohde2012).He

explainedthatthethreeethnicgroupswereraciallyidentical,andBosnia-

HerzegovinawasSFRYugoslavia’smostethnicallyintegratedrepublic(Rohde

2012).Theoverarchingquestioninhisintroductiontothegenocidewashowthe

coexistingethnicgroupswereradicalizedtoexterminateoneanother.

RohdebelievedoutsideinfluencefromSerbianPresidentSlobodanMilošević

andCroatianPresidentFranjoTudjmanplayedalargeroleinfuelingthewar.

Miloševićwasmaniacallybrilliantinhisuseofstate-controlledviolenceto,“whipup

nationalismandplayonpeople’sfearsthatpastSerbsufferingmightberepeated,”

andexpressanurgencythatSerbsneededtoprotectthemselvesbypersecuting

Pinski18

MuslimsandCroats(Rohde2012).Underthiscontext,“pastSerbsuffering”refersto

propagandautilizedbyMiloševićtodiscussviolenceagainstSerbsbyCroatiaand

MuslimsundertheOttomanEmpireandduringWorldWarsIandII(Rohde2012;

seealsoBarber1992).Tudjmanusedsimilartacticsandpropagandatomobilize

Bosnia-Herzegovina’sCroatpopulation,providingfundingtotheBosnianCroatsto

combattheSerbian-backedBosnianSerbs.ThislefttheMuslimswithnooutside

backers,andnoresourcestoprotectthemselvesfromSerbianattacks(Rohde2012).

Inthissense,Bosnia-HerzegovinawasexploitedasaproxywarforMilošević

andTudjmantodividethecountryintoaGreaterSerbiaforFRYugoslaviaanda

GreaterCroatiaforCroatia(Rohde2012).RohdedescribedBosnia-Herzegovinaas

veryreactiveandexplosive,asitwasclearbothpresidentswerepromotingviolence

againsttheotherethnicgroup(Rohde2012).

RohdealsodiscussedhisdisappointmentintheUN’sinabilitytoseverthe

influenceMiloševićandTudjmanhadinthewar.Intheprefacetohisbook,he

wrote,“Allsidesinthebrutalwar–includingmanyWesternandUNofficials–have

resolutelyconvincedthemselvesthattheyareblamelessandtheothersideisguilty”

(Rohde2012).Rohde’sbiggestgrievancewasthelackofaccountabilitythe

internationalcommunitydisplayedtowardthewarinBosnia-Herzegovina,and

theirsubsequentinabilitytoassistthecountryasitnowattemptstomovebeyond

thewar(Rohde2012).Thisgrievancewillbefurtherdiscussedinthenexttheme

below.

IV.TheUnitedNationandinternationalcommunitydelayedtheirrecognitionofthevitalroletheyplayinpreventingmasskillingsandotheratrocities.

Pinski19

Failedpeacekeepingmissionsduringthe1990sinBosnia-Herzegovina,

Somalia,andRwandapromptednecessarychangestotheUN’sstructureand

behavior.Toaddressthevaguenessandconfusionassociatedwiththe

responsibilitiesoftheinternationalcommunity,andtoensuregloballeaders

continuedtosupportUNeffortsinthefuture,RameshThakurdiscussedtheUN’s

developmentoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)doctrineinhis2006book.The

adoptionofR2PandsimilarglobalaccountabilitymeasuresallowedtheUNtotakea

firmstanceagainstmassatrocities,andenforcea,“collectiveglobalresponsibility

alongsidepreventingandrepellingarmedaggressionagainststates”(Thakur2006,

1).WhileThakurapplaudedthisvitalstepinpreventingfuturemasskillings,the

actionwastakentoolateforstateslikeBosnia-Herzegovina(Thakur2006,1).

LisaHultman,JacobKathman,andMeganShannonalsoaddressedtheUN’s

acknowledgementoftheroletheinternationalcommunitymustplayinpreventing

globalconflictsfromescalating.IntheirarticlefortheAmericanJournalofPolitical

Science,HultmanandhercolleaguesnotedtheUN’sunanimousadoptionofR2P

requiredtheinternationalcommunitytotakegreaterresponsibilitytoprotect

civiliansagainstviolence(Hultmanetal2013,875).Intheiranalysis,Hultmanand

herteamalsofound,“increasingthenumberofUNtroopsandpolicesignificantly

decreasesviolenceagainstciviliansbybothgovernmentsandrebels.Peacekeeping

successfullyreducesciviliansufferingiftheUNcommitslargernumbersof

appropriatelytaskedpersonneltoaconflict”(Hultmanetal2013,876).Whenthe

UNcombinesmilitaryactionwithhumanitarianassistanceandnation-building

Pinski20

measures,itsmissionsshouldbemoresuccessfulinensuringthelong-termpolitical

stabilityofthehostcountry.

Howwillthisthesiscontributetotheexistingresearchdiscussedabove?

TheoveralltoneoftheresearcharguesUNPROFORfailedbecauseitwas

ineffectiveinpreventingthewarfromescalating.Thefindingsofthisthesiswill

seektoidentifyotherfactorsimpactingtheUN’scapabilitiesinBosnia-Herzegovina

andtheBalkanregion.Thisthesiswillspecificallyexaminetheinfluenceregional

actorsplayedinthewar,asmanyofthepublicationsabovedisregardtheimpact

SerbiaandCroatiahadonthewarandUNPROFORactions.

ThisthesisaimstocontributeagreatercontexttoUNpeacekeepingmissions,

specificallyUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.Understandingthesupposedfailure

ofthispeacekeepingmissionisimportantindeterminingwhatfactorshelpfacilitate

asuccessfulone.

Hypothesis

ThefollowinghypothesiswillanalyzeUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinato

determineitssuccessatmeetingthecriteriaforpeacekeepingmissionsaccordingto

priorresearchcollectedintheliteraturereview.CompilingcriteriafromRobert

Johansen’sanalysisofPaulDiehl’sconclusions,andtheanalysesfromAlexBellamy

andPaulWilliams,Idevelopedfourcriteriaforassessingthesuccessofthe

UNPROFORmissiontoBosnia-Herzegovina:consentfromtheinvolvedparties,

peacekeepermilitaryinvolvementandtheuseofforce,peacekeeperimpartiality

Pinski21

andconduct,andpromotingconflictresolutionattheconclusionofthemission.The

hypothesisbelowreferencesthesefourcriteria:

Hypothesis:TheUNPROFORpeacekeepingoperationinBosnia-Herzegovinadoesnotmeetthecriterianecessaryforasuccessfulmission,andisthereforeafailedoperation.

MeasurementandResearchDesign

Thisthesiswillutilizequalitativeandquantitativedatatodetermineif

UNPROFORmeetsallfourcriterialistedabove,andifnot,whatcriteriathemission

failedtoincorporate.Basedonthesefourcriteria,Icreatedaquestionnaire

(AppendixA,Page49)tocollect,organize,andassessdifferentaspectsof

UNPROFOR.

Thesheetwillconvertqualitativedataintoquantitativedata(asdetailed

below),andwillrelyondifferentsourcesforcollection.Measurement1refersto

hostconsentandthereceptivenessofeachinvolvedpartytoapeacekeeping

mission.Forthepurposeofthisthesis,consentisdefinedastheexplicit,active

permissionofeveryactorandpartyinvolvedintheconflicttoUNPROFOR.Iwill

collectdataforthismeasurementfroma1996casestudyfromChristineGrayfor

DukeUniversity,entitled“Host-StateConsentandUnitedNationsPeacekeepingin

Yugoslavia.”

Consentisthemostimportantcriteriatoobtainwhenplanningasuccessful

peacekeepingmissionbecauseitensurestheinvolvedpartiesunderstandthevital

roletheUNwillplayinfacilitatingtheconflict.Consentalsoensurestheinvolved

partiesarereceptivetoacceptingthird-partyassistanceinendingtheconflictand

workingtowardapost-conflictplantostabilizetheaffectedcountries.

Pinski22

AfterreviewingGray’scasestudy,Iidentifiedthefollowingthreeactors

involvedintheconflict:thegovernmentsofBosnia-Herzegovina,FRYugoslavia,and

Croatia.Forthepurposesofthismeasurement,FRYugoslaviawillprimarilyreferto

theactionsofSerbiaunderMilošević.Usinganordinal-levelscaleof1-5,Iwill

measurethereceptivenessofeachgovernmentincomplyingwithUNmandates,

where1referstonoconsentandnosupportgiventotheUN,and5refersto

completeconsentandfullsupportgiventotheUN.Iwillcollectdataontheconsent

ofthesestatesfromthreedifferenttimeperiodstobetteraccommodatethecomplex

andchangingattitudesduringtheBosnianWar:beforethebeginningofthewar

(1991),duringthewar(1992-1994),andattheendofthewar(1995).

Ideally,eachgovernmentshouldscore4or5foreachtimeperiodtosignify

theirfullsupportofandconsenttoUNPROFOR.However,basedontheinformation

providedintheBackgroundsection,Iexpectthegovernments’consentand

compliancewiththemissiontoweakenduringthesecondandthirdtimeperiods.

Underthiscontext,UNPROFORwillhavefailedtomaintainconsentoftheoperation

fromthehostcountryandinvolvedparties.

Measurement2willdeterminetheextentmilitaryforcewasusedby

peacekeepers.Inthecontextofthisthesis,forceisdefinedastheuseofarmed

militaryinterventionbypeacekeepersduringthemission.Thisincludesfiringon

combatantsorcommittingviolenceagainstmembersoftheinvolvedparties,but

doesnotincludetheuseofforceforself-defense.Thismeasurementisconditional,

assomeconflictsmayrequirepeacekeeperstousesomelevelofforcetoprotect

themselvesorensureUNmandatesaremet.

Pinski23

UsingtheanalysisofarmedpeacekeepersinBosnia-Herzegovinaduringthe

BosnianWarfromRobertBaumann,GeorgeGawrych,andWalterKretchik,this

measurementwilluseanordinal-levelscaletodeterminethefrequencyofarmed

interventionfromUNpeacekeeperstocontroltheconflict.Iwillcollectqualitative

datafromthestudyandratethepeacekeepingforceswithascoreof1-5in

accordancewiththeUNpeacekeepingprinciples,with1referringtonouseofforce

oranappropriateuseofforceand5referringtoaconsistentandinappropriateuse

offorce.

Ideally,UNPROFORshouldearnascoreof1or2becausetheUN

peacekeepingprinciplesprohibitpeacekeepersfromusingforceorarmed

interventionunlessspecificallypermitted.Thismethodwillbedifficulttomeasure

becausethereisnoprecedentformeasuringUNpeacekeepingforceandthedatais

subjective.ThereportfromBaumannandhiscolleaguesoffersthebestanalysisof

peacekeeperconductduringtheUNPROFORmission,andIbelieveitisthemost

unbiased.Iwillusetheiranalysis,inadditiontonewsarticles,toassigntherating

forthismeasurement.

Measurement3willdeterminetheimpartialityandconductofpeacekeepers

duringUNPROFORbecausetheUNemphasizestheimportanceofneutralityand

appropriatebehaviorduringongoingmissions.Inthisthesis,impartialityreferstoa

peacekeeper’sabilitytowithholdfromunwarrantedsocial,economic,military,or

diplomaticinterventionoutsideofUNmandates,andtoavoidmisconduct.Inthis

context,misconductreferstoanyobservedinstancesofcorruption,exploitation,

inappropriatebehavior,orabusesofpowerandauthority.

Pinski24

SimilartoMeasurement2,Measurement3involvessubjectivequalitative

data.Thisquestionwillbedifficulttoresearchbecausethereisnodatabase

collectingallspecificinstancesofUNscandalsormisconductduringmissions.Asa

result,IamverylimitedinwhatdataIhaveaccessto.Iwillrelyonthesamereport

fromBaumannandhisteamusedinMeasurement2,reportsfromtheUN,andnews

coverageofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinatodeterminetheimpartialityand

conductofthepeacekeepers.

Iwilluseanordinal-levelscaleof1-5tomeasuretheseverityofthe

peacekeeper’simpartialityandconductduringthemission,with1referringtoan

entirelyunbiasedanduncorruptedforce,and5referringtoanentirelybiasedforce

withmanyinstancesofmisconduct.Ideally,thepeacekeepersdeployedinBosnia-

HerzegovinaduringtheBosnianWarshouldscorea1or2,signifyinganimpartial

peacekeepingforcecomplacenttotheUNcodeofconduct.

Lastly,Measurement4willdeterminehowUNPROFORconcludeditsmission

in1995.ThismeasurementisbasedononeofJohansenandDiehl’s

recommendationsforassessingthesuccessofaUNpeacekeepingmission.Iwilluse

UNreportstodeterminewhatstepstheytooktoconcludeUNPROFOR,howthey

removedtroopsfromBosnia-Herzegovina,andanyactionstheytooktohelp

facilitatepeaceinthecountry.

Inaddition,IwillalsoconsiderthereflectionsofthreeSecretary-Generalsto

determinetheirconclusionsofUNPROFOR:BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,theUNSGfrom

1992-1996;KofiAnnan,theUNSGfrom1997to2006;andBan-KiMoon,thecurrent

Pinski25

UNSG.Ibelievethesereflectionswillallowmetobestassigntheconclusionand

successofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.

Similartotheotherthreemeasures,IwillrateUNPROFOR’sfinalactionsand

theprogramstheUNemployedinBosnia-Herzegovinatoreplaceit(ifany)onan

ordinal-levelscaleof1-5.1willrefertoasuccessfulpost-conflictfacilitationand

removalofUNPROFORtroops,and5willrefertonopost-conflictfacilitationanda

poorremovalofUNPROFORtroops.

AnidealscoreforUNPROFORwillbea1or2,asthisindicatestheleast

intrusiveandmostconstructivemethodsforconcludingtheoperation.Ascoreof4

or5willindicateanunsuccessfulpost-conflictfacilitationwhereUNtroopswere

eitherunabletoleaveBosnia-Herzegovinawithoutseriouspoliticalrepercussions,

orweremetwithsignificantinternationalbacklash.

Results

Thissectionwillbrieflydiscussthefindingsofthequestionnaireandidentify

anytrendsinthedatacollected.TheDiscussionsectionbelowwillofferamore

extensiveanalysis,andexplanationsforthescoresofeachmeasurement.

Table1(Page52)illustratesmyfindingsforMeasurement1,which

determinestheconsentfortheUNPROFORoperationfromthegovernmentsof

Bosnia-Herzegovina,FRYugoslavia,andCroatia.Inthecontextofthistableand

discussion,thegovernmentofFRYugoslaviarepresentsMiloševićandtheSerbian

government.IutilizedChristineGray’spublicationfocusingonconsentduringthe

UNPROFORmission,andappropriateUNSCresolutions,todeterminethe

receptivenessoftheinvolvedgovernmentstothemission.

Pinski26

ThefirstcolumnofTable1showsstrongconsentforUNPROFORinthestate

ofBosnia-Herzegovinabeforetheoperation’sformaldeploymentin1991.Both

governmentsfromBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviareceived5’sfortheir

receptivenesstotheproposedoperation.Croatiareceiveda4becauseTudjmandid

notprovidefullsupporttotheUNonbehalfofCroatiatothesameextentasthe

governmentsofBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslavia.

Thereisanobservedtrendamongeachgovernmentwhereconsentand

receptivenesstothemissiondecreasesastheBosnianWarprogresses.In1991,the

governmentsweremostlyinsupportofthemission,earning4’sand5’s.Between

1992and1994,consenttothemissionsignificantlydecreased,althoughno

governmententirelywithdrewitsconsenttotheoperation.Bosnia-Herzegovina

wasthemostcooperativegovernmentthroughoutthedurationofthewar,with

CroatiaandFRYugoslaviashowingincreasinglylessreceptivenesstoUNPROFOR.

By1995,CroatiaofficiallywithdrewitsconsenttothemissionandtheBosnian

governmentbecamemoreskeptical.TherewasnochangeinratingforFR

Yusoglavia.

Measurement2receivesascoreof3,signifyinglittleuseofforceby

UNPROFORpeacekeepers,eventhoughthereshouldhavebeensomeuseofforceto

fulfillsomeUNmandates.Table2(Page52)illustratesthreefactorsIcollected

informationonfromthereportbyBaumann,Gawrych,andKretchik,andfromTable

3(Page53).ThesefactorsarethesizeoftheUNPROFORpeacekeepingforce,the

necessityforuseofforceduringthemission,andUNmandateleniency.Despitethe

lackofaneffectiveprotocolorthepreventionofallviolenceduringthewar,theUN

Pinski27

partiallyfulfilleditsprotocolbypermittingverylittleuseofforcethroughoutthe

operation,asshowninTable2.

Measurement2didnotreceiveanacceptablescoreasindicatedintheDesign

section.207peacekeeperswerekilledthroughoutthedurationoftheoperation.

Thisisthehighestnumberofdeathsinanypeacekeepingmissionbetween1990

and2015,accordingtoTable3.Inaddition,peacekeeperswereunabletoprevent

massacresin“safecities”likeSrebrenicabecausetheywereprohibitedfromusing

anyforceagainstanymilitarizedgroup.

Measurement3receivesascoreof3basedontheinformationrepresentedin

Table4(Page54).ThistableorganizesinformationcollectedfromanarticleforThe

GuardianbyOwenBowcott,areportonUNpeacekeepermisconductfromthe

JordanAmbassadortotheUN,andthesamereportonpeacekeepersinBosnia-

HerzegovinausedinscoringMeasurement2fromBaumann,Gawrych,andKretchik.

ThetableisorganizedintodifferentsectionsrelatingtotheUN’sofficialprotocolfor

identifyingandaddressinginstancesofmisconduct.Thisisfurtherexplainedinthe

Discussionsectionbelow.

IfoundthepeacekeepingforceactedrelativelyunbiasedinfulfillingUN

mandates,althoughthemostpressingissueforpeacekeeperimpartialitywasthe

contextofthewar.AsUNPROFORpeacekeepersweregiventheresponsibilityto

protecthigh-risk,majorityBosnianCroatandMuslim“safe”cities,BosnianSerb

combatantsmisconstruedtheseprotectionsasinterventiononbehalfoftheBosnian

CroatsandMuslims.ThisisexpressedinthefirstrowofTable4.

Pinski28

Inregardstopeacekeepermisconduct,therewerelittletonorecorded

instancesofdisrespectfulbehavior,indicatedinthesecondrowofthefirstcolumn

ofTable4.However,peacekeepersinBosnia-Herzegovinawerechargedwith

engaginginsextraffickingandsolicitingsexatbrothels.Whiletherewerefew

instancesofsexualmisconduct,thepresenceofsuchactionsinfluencedmetoscore

theoverallimpartialityandconductoftheUNPROFORpeacekeeperswitha3.

Measurement4receivesascoreof2,representingthestrongandresponsive

roletheUNundertookaftertheconclusionoftheinitialUNPROFORmissionin

March1995.Table5(Page54)representsdataonthreefactorsIidentifiedfromUN

reportsandrelevantnewsarticles.Thefirstrowliststhereplacementsforthe

conclusionofUNPROFOR,mostimportantlytherestructuredUNPROFOR(lasting

from1995-1996),andthereplacementofIFORwithamultinationalStabilization

Force(SFOR).

Row2ofTable5specificallynotestwoUNmissionsinBosnia-Herzegovina

thathelpedfacilitatepeaceandcontinuedtopromotepoliticalstabilityafterthe

initialUNPROFORmissionwascompleted;therestructuredUNPROFOR(1995-

1996)andtheUnitedNationsMissioninBosnia-Herzegovina.Thesetwooperations

willbefurtherdiscussedintheDiscussionssection.

ThemostinterestingdatarepresentedinTable5isthereflectionsfrom

formerUNSecretary-GeneralsBoutrosBoutros-Ghali,KofiAnnan,andBan-KiMoon.

WhileeachUNSGbelievedUNPROFORwasunsuccessfulinBosnia-Herzegovina,

theyattributeitssupposedfailuretodifferentcharacteristics.Ifoundthisaspectof

thetablethemosthelpfulindeterminingthescoreforMeasurement4,asinsight

Pinski29

fromSecretary-GeneralsisanintegralpartofassessingUNactions.

Discussion

Thissectionisorganizedintotwosubsectionstodiscussthesignificanceof

thequestionnaireandrelateitsfindingstotheHypothesis;TheUNPROFOR

peacekeepingoperationinBosnia-Herzegovinadoesnotmeetthecriterianecessary

forasuccessfulmission,andisthereforeafailedoperation.

Thefirstsubsectiondiscussesthecalculationofeachmeasurementfromthe

Resultssection.Thesecondsubsectiondiscussesthecollectivesignificanceofthe

questionnaire,anditsrelationtotheHypothesis.

I.AnExplanationoftheMeasurementScores

Measurement1:Consent

Table1illustratesmyfindingsforMeasurement1.Focusingonthefirst

columnratinggovernmentconsentin1991,Idecidedtoprovidethegovernmentsof

Bosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviawith5’sbecausebothprovidedexplicit

supportforthedeploymentoftheUNPROFORmission.Inameetingbetweenthe

UNSGandtheUNSCinNovember1991,theUNSGreadaletterfromMiloševićtothe

CouncilonbehalfofSerbia.Theletterstated,“Ihavebeeninstructedbymy

governmenttorequesttheestablishmentofapeacekeepingoperationinYugoslavia

whichreflectsatthesametimetheexpresseddesireoftheprincipalpartiestothe

presentconflict”(Gray1996,246).

InresponsetoMilošević’sletter,theUNSCcreatedResolution721(1991),

whichstated;

Pinski30

“ConsideringtherequestbytheGovernmentof[Serbia]

for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in

[SFR]Yugoslavia,[and]Consideringfurtherthefactthat

each one of the Yugoslav participants in the meeting

withthePersonalEnvoyoftheSecretary-Generalstated

that they wanted to see the deployment of a UN

peacekeeping operation as soon as possible” (Gray

1996,246).

Thesetwodocumentsprovidedmewiththebasisformyratingofthegovernment

ofBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviafor1991.

WhileCroatiawasincludedinResolution721’sreferencetoSFRYugoslavia,

CroatiareceivedalowerratingthantheothertwogovernmentsbecauseTudjman

showedsomereluctanceinconsentingtotheUNPROFORoperation.Hewantedto

preserveCroatia’snewfoundindependence,andwashesitantinprovidingtheUN

withpoliticalandmilitaryaccesstotheregion.Despitethishesitation,Tudjman

ultimatelyprovidedconsenttothemissioninneighboringBosnia-Herzegovina,

earningCroatiaascoreof4(Gray1996,246).

ThesecondcolumninTable1representstheperiodbetween1992and1994,

andprovedmorecomplicatedformeasuringgovernmentconsent.Thegovernment

ofBosnia-HerzegovinaformallyrequestedthepresenceofUNpeacekeepersinthe

countryin1992afterSerbiainvadedCroatiaandSlovenia(Gray1996,247-8).While

Bosnia-HerzegovinawasthemostwillingpartytoacceptUNpeacekeepers,italso

“demanded”theUN,“surrendersomefacilitiesitalreadyoccupied[inBosnia-

Pinski31

Herzegovina],payforothernewfacilities,andreopennegotiationsonthetermsof

employmentforlocalstaff”(Gray1996,253).

Despitethesedemands,Bosnia-Herzegovinawastheonlygovernmentto

completetheStatusofForcesAgreements(SOFA)mandatedbytheUN.The

completionofSOFAswasimportantforUNPROFORforseveralreasons.Itheld

“symbolic”importanceinassuringthecommitmentoftheinvolvedstatesin

cooperatingwiththeoperation(Gray1996,253).Italsoestablishedaprecedentfor

actionstheUNcouldtakewhennegotiatingwiththegovernments,andimproved

the“bargainingpositionoftheUNforcesindemandingcooperationfromthe…

state”(Gray1996,253).IdecidedtoassigntheBosniangovernmentascoreof4to

reflecttheirgrowingreluctancetocomplywithUNprotocol,butrelative

receptivenesstothemission.

In1992,thegovernmentofFRYugoslaviagrewdissatisfiedwithUN

interventioninBosnia-Herzegovina.FRYugoslaviadidnotagreetheUNneededto

protecttheBosnianCroatsandMuslimsfromthemobilized(andSerbian-backed)

BosnianSerbs.Inadditiontorefusingtohostpeacekeepingforcesoraccommodate

UNPROFOR,SerbiarefusedtosubmitanySOFAs.Later,theUNSCpassedResolution

947(1994)requiringbothCroatiaandFRYugoslaviatocompletetheirSOFAs.

Neithercountrymetthisrequirement(Gray1996,253).

IprovidedFRYugoslaviawithascoreof2foritslackofcooperationwiththe

peacekeepingoperation.FRYugoslaviadidnotearnascoreof1becauseitdidnot

formallywithdrawitsconsentfromthemission.

Pinski32

InregardstoCroatia,TudjmanwasmostlyconcernedtheUNwouldinfringe

onCroatiansovereignty.InresponsetoaletterfromTudjman,theUNSCissued

Resolution740(1992),whichdictatedthefollowing;

“Takenote that the letterofPresidentFranjoTudjman

of 6 February 1992, in which he accepts fully the

Secretary-General’sconceptandplanwhichdefinesthe

conditions and areas where the UN force would be

deployed, removes a further obstacle in that respect…

[but] expresses its concern that the UN peacekeeping

plan has not yet [been] fully and unconditionally

acceptedbyall inYugoslaviaonwhosecooperation its

successdepends”(Gray1996,247).

ThisResolutionacknowledgedareluctantletterfromTudjmantotheUNSC,where

heacceptedtheUNSG’stermsforUNPROFOR,butexpressedsomehesitationsatthe

“technical”detailsoftheoperation.TheUNSGeventuallymanagedtogainapproval

fromCroatiatostationpeacekeepersatSarajevoInternationalAirport,butthey

weregrantedlimitedpowers(Gray1996,248).

InadditiontodefyingUNSCResolution947in1994,CroatiachargedtheUN

$8.6millioninfueltaxesand$2.5millioninairporttaxesbetweenJulyand

December.Thesechargesweredeemed“inconsistentnotonlywiththeUNModel

SOFA,butalsowiththe1946ConventionofthePrivilegesandImmunitiesofthe

UnitedNations”(Gray1996,254).Croatiabecamedifficulttoaccommodate,placing

furtherstrainsonUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.Asaresult,IprovidedCroatia

Pinski33

withascoreof2foritscircumstantialconsenttoUNPROFORbetween1992and

1994.

ThelastcolumninTable1measuresgovernmentconsentthroughout1995

beforeUNPROFORwasconcluded.Bosnia-Herzegovinawastheonlystateto

expresscompleteconsenttothecreationofasecondaryUNpeacekeepingforce,the

RapidReactionForce(RRF).TheUNestablishedRRFsinJune1995tohelpdelegate

UNPROFORpower,butnotexpandoraddtoit.ThecreationofRRFswas

controversial,asit“ledtofurtherproblemsovertheconclusionofSOFAswiththe

hoststates”(Gray1996,263).SomeformerYugoslavgovernmentsargued,“theRRF

wasanewforceseparatefromUNPROFORanddemandedthenegotiationofanew

SOFA”(Gray1996,263).IdecidedtoprovidetheBosniangovernmentwithascore

of3,becauseitwasgrowingskepticalofUNPROFORafterthemassacrein

Srebrenica,butwasnotasuncooperativeasthegovernmentsofFRYugoslaviaor

Croatia.

ThegovernmentofFRYugoslaviamaintainedahostileattitudetoward

UNPROFOR,butdidnotwithdrawitsconsenttothemission.Asaresult,IscoredFR

Yugoslaviawitha2foritscontinueddefianceofUNresolutionsandmandates.

TheUNSGbecame“openlycriticalofCroatia’sfailuretoconcludeaSOFA

withregardtothe[UNConfidenceRestorationOperationinCroatia(UNCRO)],the

forcethathadreplacedUNPROFOR”(Gray1996,254).Croatiaformallywithdrewits

consenttotheUNPROFORmissioninJanuary1995(Gray1996,266).This

withdrawalwarrantedCroatiawithascoreof1,althoughitisworthnotingCroatia

Pinski34

continuedtopushforanendtotheBosnianWarevenafterseveringtieswith

UNPROFOR.

Measurement2:UseofForce

WhendeterminingthescoreforUNPROFORpeacekeepers’useofforce

duringtheoperationinMeasurement2,IusedthefollowingfactorsshowninTable

2tobasemydecision;thesizeofthepeacekeepingforce,thenecessityfortheuseof

force,andUNmandateleniencyonpeacekeeperauthority.Ichosethesefactors

fromemergingthemesinBaumann’sreport.

BasedonTable3,theaveragetroopsizeforUNPROFORinSFRYugoslavia

consistedof27,632UNpeacekeepersanduniformedUNpersonnel.Bosnia-

Herzegovinaentertainedbetween7,000-38,000peacekeepersanduniformedUN

personnel,significantlymorethantheaveragenumberofpeacekeepersthroughout

thedurationofthelargermission(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,27,37).

Inaddition,UNPROFORrequiredsignificantlymoretroopsinBosnia-Herzegovina

thananyotherpeacekeepingoperationbetween1990and2015.Forcontext,the

second-largestpeacekeepingmissioninTable3totheDemocraticPeople’sRepublic

oftheCongothroughMONUSCOonlyrequired19,881peacekeepers(asof2015).

Baumannandhisteamsuggestedapotentialcorrelationbetweentroopsizeandthe

escalationofviolenceinBosnia-Herzegovina,althoughthereisnotenoughdata

availablefromthewartotestthisbelief(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,

27).

BasedonthereportfromBaumannandhisteam,Iconcludedtherewasa

necessityforsomeforceininstancesofviolenceagainstpeacekeepers,toenforce

Pinski35

UNmandates,andtoprotectUN“safecities.”AccordingtoBaumann,“The

[UNPROFOR]forcewaslargelyineffectiveastheUNpeacekeeperspossessedvery

restrictiverulesof[engagement]despitethemushroomingethnicconflictaround

them”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,27).

Thisfactorwasmeasuredbyhowmanypeacekeeperswerekilledduring

UNPROFOR.AccordingtoTable3,UNPROFORentailedthehighestnumberofUN

peacekeeperanduniformedpersonneldeaths;207.Canada’sdirectorof

PeacekeepingPolicyfrom1996to1999,ColonelHatton,offeredsomeexplanation

forthisdeathtoll.AccordingtoHatton,“Theproblemlaynotonlywiththeflawed

mandatebutwiththefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytoprovideall

necessaryresources,especiallysoldiers,tosupportmissionrequirements”

(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,44).HattonbelievedtheUNmandates

neededmoreclarificationfordefininginstanceswhereself-defensewas

appropriate.Hypothetically,thiscouldhavepreventedsomeofthedeaths.

AnUNPROFORpost-operationassessmentclaimedthattorestoreorderand

peaceinBosnia-Herzegovina,peacekeepersneededtheresourcesandauthorityto;

“1)crediblydemonstrateitsresolve;2)mountacredibleshowofforce;and3)have

themeanstoeffectivelyprotectthoseithasbeentaskedtoprotectagainstforces

equippedwithtanksandartillery”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,40-1).

TheUN’sinabilitytopermitsomeuseofforceininstancesofviolenceagainst

peacekeepersandinenforcingUNmandatesgreatlyaffectedtheabilityof

UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.

Pinski36

UNresolutionsstrictlyprohibitedtheuseofforcethroughouttheUNPROFOR

mission.UNmandatesdeniedpeacekeeperswiththe“righttousemilitaryforceina

proactivemannerinsupportofinternationalobjectives”(Baumann,Gawrych,and

Kretchik2004,40).Asaresult,UNPROFOR“lackedtheleverage”toenforcepeace,

andwere“subjecttoinnumerableindignities–harassmentbysnipers,seizureas

hostages,andgeneralabuse”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,40).Baumann

identifiedUNmandatesasthemaintroubleforUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina,

asidefromthehostileandcomplexethnicrelations.

In1993,theUNSCpassedResolution819,whichestablished“safezones”in

sixBosniancities.Thezonesofferedrefugetociviliansfromarmedattacksand

otherhostilities,andallowedUNtroopstodeliverhumanitarianassistancetothose

inneed(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,45).Initially,thisresolution

prohibitedanyuseofforcebypeacekeepingtroops.

Afterpeacekeepersbecametherepeatedtargetsofattackfromcombatants,

UNSCResolution836(1993)waspassedtobetterdefineUNPROFORduties.The

resolutionclaimedUNPROFORneededto,“deterattacksagainsttheareas…monitor

thecease-fire…promotethewithdrawalofmilitaryorparamilitaryunitsotherthan

thoseoftheBosniangovernmentand…occupysomekeypointontheground”

(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,45).ThroughResolution836,UNPROFOR

wasofferedlimitedpowerto,“takeallnecessarydefensivemeasures,includingthe

useofforceinresponsetobombardments,armedincursion,ordeliberate

obstructionoffreedom”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,45).WhiletheUN

permittedsomeuseofforce,mandateswerestillstrictinwhatconstitutedasan

Pinski37

attackorobstructionoffreedom.UNPROFORtroopslackedtheresourcesand

claritytoappropriatelyutilizeResolution836toitsfullpotentialwhileprotecting

the“safe”cities.

Whenratingthismeasurement,Ialsoconsideredacomparisonofthe

militaryactionsofUNPROFORtotheactionsofanAmerican-ledmissionafterthe

warended,theDaytonImplementationForce(IFOR).IFORisconsideredamore

successfulmissionbecauseitorganizeditselfaroundmorelenientand

circumstantialmandates.Itwasalsoheadedbyasinglecountry,asopposedtothe

UN,andthuslyhadlessaccountabilitytointernationalprotocol.InregardstoIFOR,

Baumannwrote,

“To Americans…UNPROFOR’s principal relevancewas

that it demonstrated exactly how not to conduct a

military intervention in the midst of civil war and

humanitarian crisis. Although UNPROFOR strength in

Bosnia-Herzegovina reached 38,000 in 1994, it was

weaker than even its inadequate numbers implied. Its

largest combat elements were battalions, and each of

these answered to different a national chain of

command. Moreover, UNPROFOR lacked the authority

and all too often the firepower to use force in a

proactive manner” (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik

2004,37).

Pinski38

BasedonthiscomparisontoIFORandtheinformationprovidedinTables2and3,I

decidedtoscoreUNPROFORwitha3forlimiteduseofforceduringthe

peacekeepingmission,althoughsomeuseofforcewasneeded.

Measurement3:ImpartialityandConduct

Measurement3collectedinformationfromthe“ComprehensiveReviewof

theWholeQuestionofPeacekeepingOperationsinAllTheirAspects”bytheJordan

AmbassadortotheUNPrinceZeidRa’adZeidal-Hussein,anarticlefromThe

GuardiandiscussingUNpeacekeeperabuses,andthereportonpeacekeepingin

Bosnia-HerzegovinafromBaumann,Gawrych,andKretchik.Fromthesereports,I

sortedtheinformationintoTable4asinvolvingeitherpeacekeepingimpartialityor

peacekeepingmisconduct.

Baumannandhiscolleaguesoutlinedseveralinstancesofmisunderstanding

relatedtopeacekeepingimpartialityduringtheUNPROFORmission.While

peacekeeperswerepresentasneutralpartiesintheoperation,onlypermittedto

protectnoncombatantsin“safe”cities,someSerbiancombatantsinterpreted

UNPROFORactionasprovidingexcessiveprotectiontoBosnianCroatsandMuslims

becauseoftheirethnicidentities.

OneoftheseinstanceswasdiscussedinaDecember1994reportfromthe

UNSGtotheUNSC.Inthisreport,theUNSG,

“Not only acknowledged widespread difficulties

experienced by UNPROFOR in securing the safe areas,

but also offered a substantive analysis and tentative

conclusions…As demonstrated in the case of Gorazde,

Pinski39

thepresenceofmanyMuslimfighters inthepresumed

sanctuaries jeopardized the perceived impartiality of

UNPROFOR peacekeepers. As noted in the Secretary-

General’s report, ‘After the first use of air power at

Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs regarded UNPROFOR as

having intervened on behalf of their opponents.’ This

circumstance resulted in increased obstruction of

humanitarian relief convoys by the besieging Serb

forces, a formof retaliation that struck at the heart of

the UNPROFOR mandate. In addition, it was proof

positiveofUNPROFOR’slackofleveragewiththearmed

factions…During an uneasy cease-fire in a 3-kilometer

exclusion zone aroundGorazde, UNPROFORpersonnel

found theirmovement restricted by both sides (Serbs

andMuslims)andwerefrequentlythetargetsofsniper

fire”(Baumann,Gawrych,andKretchik2004,46).

ThisreportoutlinedtheperceptionsfromsomeBosnianSerbcombatantsthat

UNPROFORintervenedinthewarinfavoroftheBosnianCroatsandMuslims.This

wasevidentlyuntrue,aspeacekeeperswerechargedwithprotectedtheUN-

mandated“safe”cities,manyofwhichhappenedtohostmajorityBosnianCroatand

Muslimcivilianresidents.

Overall,UNPROFORmostlyexemplifiedtheUNcodeofconduct,which

requirespeacekeepersfollowthesethreestandards;1)Respectlocallaws,customs,

Pinski40

andpractices,2)Treatthehostcountry’sinhabitantswithrespect,courtesy,and

consideration,and3)Actwithimpartiality,integrity,andtact(“UnitedNations

Peacekeeping:ConductandDiscipline”).Whilepeacekeepersmostlyupheldthese

standards,UNPROFORwasineffectiveinpreventingpeacekeepersfrompartakingin

thesexualexploitationoftraffickedwomenandchildren.

A2005reportfromPrinceZeidprovidedclarificationforhowtheUNshould

recognizeandcombatsexualexploitationandabusebypeacekeepers.PrinceZeid

definedsexualexploitationas“anyactualorattemptedabuseofapositionof

vulnerability,differentialpower,ortrust,forsexualpurposes,including,butnot

limitedto,profitingmonetarily,socially,orpoliticallyfromthesexualexploitationof

another”(“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionofPeacekeeping

OperationsinAllTheirAspects”2005,7).Healsodefinedsexualabuseas“actualor

threatenedphysicalintrusionofasexualnature,whetherbyforceorunderunequal

orcoerciveconditions”(“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionof

PeacekeepingOperationsinAllTheirAspects”2005,7-8).Thisreportdiscussedthe

alarmingprevalenceofsexualexploitationandabuseoccurringalongsideUN

peacekeepingmissions,includingtheUNPROFORoperationinBosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFORisoneofthefirstUNpeacekeepingmissionstoreceivebacklash

fromtheglobalcommunityforpeacekeepermisconduct.Duringthe1990s,

investigatorsfoundsomepeacekeepersvisitedbrothelsinBosnia-Herzegovinaand

Kosovotoengageinsexualactswithwomenforcedintoprostitution(Bowcott

2005).Onbehalfoftheinternationalcommunity,BowcottwroteforTheGuardian,

“TheembarrassmentcausedbythemisconductofUNforcesindevastated

Pinski41

communitiesaroundtheworld–includingHaiti,SierraLeone,Bosnia,Cambodia,

EastTimor,andtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo–hasbecomeanincreasingly

highprofile,politicalproblem”(Bowcott2005).

WhileIfoundinformationtosuggestbothpeacekeeperbias(perceivedby

theBosnianSerbs)andmisconduct(sexualexploitationandabuse),Iwouldnot

deemUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinaasexplicitlycorruptorimmoral.Ichoseto

scoreMeasurement3witha3becausepeacekeeperswereabletomaintaina

neutralposition,evenifsomecombatantsdidnotperceiveitassuch.Whilethe

existenceofanyactsofsexualexploitationfrompeacekeepersduringamissionis

unacceptable,theseactsdidnotdirectlyimpacttheoperation.

Measurement4:Post-WarTransition

AfterthewarendedinOctober2015,remainingUNPROFORofficials

monitoredthecease-firebetweenCroatia,FRYugoslavia,andBosnia-Herzegovina

inDayton,Ohio.InsigningtheDaytonAccords,alsoreferredtoasthePeace

Accords,thethreeBalkannationsagreedto,“conducttheirrelationsinaccordance

withtheUnitedNationsCharter,fullyrespectthe‘sovereignequalityofone

another,’settledisputesbypeacefulmeans,and‘refrainfromanyactionagainstthe

territorialintegrityofpoliticalindependenceofBosnia-Herzegovinaoranyother

state”(“UNMIBH:Background”).ThesigningoftheAccordswasconsideredalarge

success,asitendedtheconflictandforcedBosnia-HerzegovinaandFRYugoslaviato

recognizeoneanotherasindependentnationswithintheirowninternational

borders(“UNMIBH:Background”).

InreferencetothefirstrowofTable5,theUNSCrestructuredUNPROFORin

Pinski42

Bosnia-HerzegovinainMarch1995,endingtheinitialUNPROFORoperationinSFR

Yugoslaviadeployedin1992.UNPROFORwasreplacedwiththreeseparatebut

“interlinked”peacekeepingmissionsoverseenbytheUnitedNationsPeaceForces

(UNPF).ThesemissionswereUNCRO(1995-1996)inCroatia,arestructured

UNPROFOR(1995-1996)presentthroughouttheBalkans,andtheUnitedNations

PreventiveDeploymentForce(UNPREDEP)inMacedonia(“SummaryofAG-061”).

TheAmerican-ledIFORwasreplacedwithSFOR,amultinationalforcecomprisedof

UNmemberstates(“UNMIBH:Background”).

ThemostimportantinitiativetheUNimplementedinBosnia-Herzegovina

aftertheconflictendedwastheestablishmentofUNMIBHfrom1996toDecember

2002.MentionedinthesecondrowofTable5,UNMIBHwasheadedbyboththe

SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General(SRSG)andtheCoordinatorof

UnitedNationsOperationsinBosnia-Herzegovina.Thesetwoofficialswerecharged

withcoordinatingallUNactivitiesinBosnia-Herzegovina,includingthenewly

createdUNInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF),theresultofUNSCResolution

1035(1995).ThemaincomponentsofUNMIBHweretheCriminalJusticeAdvisory

Unit,theCivilAffairsUnit,theIPTF,theHumanRightsOffice,theOfficeofPublic

Affairs,andotheradministrativeofficesworkingwithinthecountryfortheUN.

UNMIBHwaseventuallyreplacedwiththeEuropeanUnionPoliceMission(EUPM)

inJanuary2003throughtheestablishmentofUNSCResolution1423(2002)

(“SummaryofAG-061”;seealso“UNMIBH:Background”).

Table5alsoaccountedforthereflectionsfromSecretary-Generals,whichare

importantindicatorsinthesuccessandconclusionofapeacekeepingmission.The

Pinski43

attitudesofthreeUNSGsareincludedinthethirdrowofTable5.BoutrosBoutros-

GhalioversawthedurationofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina,ashewasacting

UNSGfrom1992to1996.Boutros-GhalibelievedtheUNshouldhavedevotedmore

resourcesandpeacekeepingtroopstoBosnia-Herzegovina.Heinitiallywanted

35,000troopssenttothewarringnation,butwasdisappointedtoonlyreceive

permissionfor8,000bymemberstates(McFadden2016).

InhisfarewelladdresstotheUNin1996,Boutros-Ghali,“chidedmember

states[especiallytheU.S.]forfailingtodealwithdisastersinSomalia,Rwanda,and

Bosnia.”Hestated,“Theconceptofpeacekeepingwasturnedonitsheadand

worsenedbytheseriousgapbetweenmandatesandresources”(McFadden2016).

KofiAnnan,Boutros-Ghali’ssuccessor,alsodealtwiththerepercussionsof

UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina.InOctober1999atamemorialceremonyin

Sarajevo,AnnancalledtheBosnianwar,“Oneofthemostdifficultandpainful

[missions]”inthehistoryoftheUN(“UNBosniaExperienceOneofMost‘Difficult

andPainful’initsHistory”1999).IncontrastwithBoutros-Ghali,Annanbelieved

theUNandtheinternationalcommunityhadaresponsibilitytointerveneinthe

conflict,abeliefreiteratedbymanyofthesourcesintheliteraturereview.

Heconcluded,“WewillneverforgetthatBosniawasasmuchamoralcause

asamilitaryconflict.ThetragedyofSrebrenicawillhauntourhistoryforever”(“UN

BosniaExperienceOneofMost‘DifficultandPainful’initsHistory”1999).

BanKi-MoonsharedsimilarremorseforUNPROFORasAnnan.Inarecent

interviewwithErolAvdovic,Ki-Moonreflectedonhisvisittoamemorialsitein

Srebrenicain2012.Hestated,

Pinski44

“My most immediate reflection was connected to our

collectivefailure,asinternationalcommunity,toprotect

the innocent victims from what the International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

laterqualifiedasgenocide.In1995wefailedtoprovide

protectiontomanypeoplewhoneededoursupport.We

mustnever forget the lessonsof Srebrenica, especially

in the context of today’s crises: from Syria to South

Sudan,peoplearestill facingunspeakableviolenceand

terror. The international community must do much

moretoprotectthosewhoturntousforhelp.Letusnot

turnourbackswhenpeople turn tous.Thisshouldbe

ourpromisetothevictimsofSrebrenica”(Avdovic).

Ki-Moonbelievestheinternationalcommunityhasaresponsibilitytoprotectother

countrieslikeSyriaandSouthSudanfromfacingsimilareventsasBosnia-

Herzegovina(Avdovic).

II.TheCollectiveSignificanceandFindingsoftheQuestionnaire BasedontheresearchandpublicationsdiscussedintheLiteratureReview

andResultssections,itisunderstoodasuccessfulpeacekeepingoperationmust

meetallfourcriteriaIidentifiedfromtheworksofJohansen,Diehl,Bellamy,and

Williams.Anoperation’sinabilitytofulfillanyofthesecriteriacompromisesthe

UN’sreputationandunderminesthesuccessofthepeacekeepingmission.According

Pinski45

totheseconclusions,UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinaisafailedoperation

becauseitwasunabletofullyincorporatethreeofthefourcriteria.

First,theUNwasunabletomaintainconsentfromtheinvolvedparties

throughoutthedurationofthemission.Thisisthemostimportantcriteriafor

buildingasuccessfulmission,asitwilldeterminehowreceptivetheinvolved

partiesaretode-escalatingaconflict.Whiletherearemanydifferentfactors

impactingthewillingnessofthedifferentgovernmentstofulfillUNobjectives,the

mostimportantfactorwasthelackofcooperationbetweentheparties(Gray1996,

251).ThehistoricallyingrainedresentmentbetweentheCroatsofCroatiaandthe

SerbsofFRYugoslaviawastoostrongfortheUNtofacilitateagreements,asitwas

reinforcedthroughcenturiesofpoliticalandsocioeconomicevents.

IntheLiteratureReview,PaulSzaszattributedUNPROFORasafailure

becauseitwasnotauthorizedtousemilitaryactionbytheinvolvedparties.

ChristineGray’sreportfurtherreiteratedthisweakness,discussingthelimitations

placedonUNactioninBosnia-HerzegovinabyCroatiaandFRYugoslavia.Atrendof

thegrowingunwillingnessofCroatiaandFRYugoslaviatoparticipateinUNPROFOR

between1992and1995isobservedinTable1.Bothgovernmentsfailedtomeet

importantUNobjectives,liketheSOFAs,toensuredemilitarizationofrivalforcesin

Bosnia-Herzegovina.Asaresult,UNPROFORcouldnotmeetthiscriteria.

Second,UNPROFORfailedtoremainimpartialandactinaccordancewiththe

UNcodeofconduct.WhileUNmandatesandresolutionsdictatedthe

responsibilitiesofpeacekeepersandpreventedthemfromengagingindirect

militaryactions,someBosnianSerbcombatantgroupsperceivedtheUN-controlled

Pinski46

“safezones”asharboringBosniakandBosnian-Croatmilitants.Althoughthese

townsandcitiesweremajorityBosnianMuslimandCroat,thismisconception

furthermobilizedBosnianSerbstotargetandshootatpeacekeepers.

Investigationsofthemissionalsofoundsomepeacekeepersengagingin

sexualmisconductandexploitation.Whetherintentionalornot,thisabuseofpower

placedastrainontherelationshipbetweentheUNandBosniancivilians.Inthe

“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionofPeacekeepingOperationsinAll

TheirAspects,PrinceZeidofJordandiscussedtheeffectsthisweakened

relationshiphadonUNaccountabilityandmemberstates’receptivenessto

participatinginfuturemissions.Instancesofpeacekeepermisconductovershadow

thesuccessesandcredibilityoftheUN.Forthesereasons,UNPROFORfailedtomeet

thiscriteria.

Third,UNPROFORonlypartiallyfulfilledthecriteriainvolvingpeacekeeper

useofforce.BasedonthescaledesignedtotestMeasurement2,UNPROFOR

receivedascoreindicatingitincorporatedthiscriteriatosomeextent.However,

duetothenatureoftheBosnianWarandtheUNmandates’emphasisonprotecting

civilian“safezones”fromviolence,UNPROFORdidnotadequatelymeetthiscriteria.

UNmandatesshouldhavepermittedsomeuseofforcetoprotectUN“safezones”

andpeacekeepersfromthewar.Thismayalsobeattributedtotheinabilityofthe

involvedpartiestofullyconsenttoUNPROFOR.

InhisanalysisofUNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovina,Szasznotedone

weaknessofthemissionwerethelimitationsplacedonpeacekeepersfromstrictUN

mandates(Szasz1995,687).Forinstance,thepeacekeepingforceswerepermitted

Pinski47

toestablish“safezones”freeofviolencefornoncombatants,butwerenotgiventhe

appropriatemilitarydirectivestoprotectthesezones.Thisinflexibilityallowedfor

massacreslikethoseinSrebrenicatooccurinUN-protectedcities.Morethan200

peacekeepersandUNuniformedpersonnelsenttoBosnia-Herzegovinato

participateinUNPROFORwerekilledbycombatantsduringthemission.Forthese

reasons,UNPROFORdidnotadequatelyfulfillthiscriteria.

TheonlycriteriaUNPROFORfullyincorporatedwasMeasurement4,

indicatingasuccessfulconclusiontothemission.Anarticlediscussedinthe

LiteratureReviewwrittenbyLisaHultman,JacobKathman,andMeganShannon,

notedtheUN’sacknowledgementofthevitalroletheinternationalcommunityplays

inpreventingtheescalationofglobalorregionalconflicts(Hultmanetal2013).

WhiletheinitialUNPROFORmissionwasconcludedinmid-1995,theUNcreated

severalforcesandmissionstoreplaceandensurethesuccessfultransitionof

Bosnia-HerzegovinafromawarringnationtoapeacefuloneundertheDayton

Accords.UNPROFORinBosnia-Herzegovinawasreplacedbyasecondary

UNPROFORmission(1995-1996),UNPREDEP,andUNMIBHtoupholdalong-term

ceasefireandprotectthecountryfromengaginginanotherethnicwar.Whilethe

threeUNSGsdiscussedintheResultssectionaboveandoutlinedinTable5

perceivedUNPROFORasafailedoperation,itisworthnotingnonewerecriticalof

UNactionsaftertheconclusionofUNPROFOR.

AlthoughUNPROFORdidnotmeetallfourcriteria,itisnotsolelytoblame

forthefailureofthemission.TheunwillingnessofCroatiaandFRYugoslaviaplayed

alargeroleinthesubsequentfailureofthemission.Asneithergovernmentwasable

Pinski48

orentirelywillingtodemilitarizetheirrespectiveethnicgroupsinBosnia-

Herzegovina,theUNwasgreatlylimitedinitsabilitytofacilitateanendtothe

conflict.

Conclusion

WhiletheUNPROFORpeacekeepingmissioninBosnia-Herzegovinais

regardedasafailedoperation,itsdeploymenthassincehelpedensurethe

importantroletheUNplaysinfacilitatingconflicts.Thelessonslearnedbythe

internationalcommunityfromUNPROFORillustratetheimportanceofsupporting

UNmissions,andensuringacountry’sreceptivenesstohostinganoperation.The

UNshouldnotberegardedasameanstoendallglobalarmedconflict,butratheras

atoolthatcanbeusedinreachingnegotiationstoprotectinternationalsecurity.

UNPROFOR’slegacywillhelpdeterminetheroletheUNandinternational

communitymustplayinfacilitatingaconflict.ThenatureofUNpeacekeepingisnot

toactivelypreventorstopaconflict,butratherhelptheinvolvedpartiesreach

negotiationsandassistintheenforcementoftheagreementswhenappropriate.

Thisroleisdifficulttounderstandandevenmoredifficulttopractice,butitis

strengthenedwiththeconclusionofeverypeacekeepingoperation.Itisimportant

tounderstandtheroletheUNplayedinBosnia-Herzegovinatobestunderstandthe

roleofitsauthorityinfuturemissions.UNPROFORmayhavefailedtomeetUN

objectives,butitsucceededinshowingtheglobalcommunitythenecessityof

peacekeepingoperations.

Pinski49

Appendices

AppendixAQuestionnaire:HowsuccessfulwastheUNPROFORmissiontoBosnia-HerzegovinaaccordingtothecriteriafromJohansen,Diehl,Bellamy,andWilliams?

1. Consent:WhatweretheinvolvedpartiesanddidtheymaintainconsentfortheUNPROFORMissionatthebeforetheBosnianWar(1991),duringthewar(1992-1994),andattheendofthewar(1995)?(1-5rating)

2. MilitaryIntervention:DidUNPeacekeepersuseforce?(1-5rating)

3. Impartiality:Werepeacekeepersimpartial?Werethereinstancesof

misconductduringthemission?(1-5rating)

4. UNPROFORConclusion:HowdidtheUNconcludetheUNPROFORmissiontoBosnia-Herzegovina?WeretherereplacementsforUNPROFOR?WhatarethereflectionsoftheUNSecretary-GeneralsonUNPROFOR?(1-5rating)

Pinski50

Maps

Map1:TheSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(1945–1991)

(Source:“MapShowingtheRegionsofYugoslaviafrom1945to1991”)

Pinski51

Map2:Post-ConflictBosnia-Herzegovina,DividedBetweentheRepublikaSrpskaandtheFederationofBosnia-HerzegovinaAsOutlinedInthe1995DaytonAccords

(Source:“Bosnia-HerzegovinaPoliticalMap–BlackandWhite”)

Pinski52

Tables

Table1:ConsentForUNPROFOR’sOperationinBosnia-HerzegovinaThroughouttheDurationoftheBosnianWar Beforethe

BosnianWar(1991)

DuringtheBosnianWar(1992-1994)

BeforetheDaytonAccords(1995)

TheGovernmentofBosnia-Herzegovina

5;Explicitconsentgiven

4;Consentgivenwithsomereservations

3;Someconsentgivenwithmanyreservations

TheGovernmentofFRYugoslavia

5;Explicitconsentgiven

2;Littleconsentgivenwithmanyreservations

2;Littleconsentgivenwithmanyreservations

TheGovernmentofCroatia

4;Consentgivenwithsomereservations

2;Littleconsentgivenwithmanyreservations

1;Consentwithdrawn

Table2:TheFactorsImpactingPeacekeeper’sUseofForceDuringtheUNPROFORMissionSizeoftheUNPROFORforceinBosnia-Herzegovina

7,000-38,000peacekeepers

Necessityforuseofforce1.Peacekeeperdeaths

207deaths

UNmandateleniency Strict;didnotallowforforceexceptforinstancesofself-defense

Score:3

Pinski53

Table3:FatalitiesAmongUnitedNationsPeacekeepersandUniformedPersonnelinPeacekeepingOperations,1990-2015

(Source:VanDerLijnandSmit2015)

Pinski54

Table4:InstancesofPeacekeeperImpartialityandMisconductDuringtheUNPROFORMissioninBosnia-HerzegovinaActwithimpartiality,integrity,andtact

UNpeacekeeperactionstoprotectnoncombatantswasskewedasethnicbiasbySerbiancombatants

Misconduct1.Sexualexploitation/abuse........2.Disrespecttolocallaws,customs,orpractices..............................3.Disrespectfultreatmentofhostcountrycivilianpopulation(abuseofauthority)...............................

SomeinvolvementinexploitingvictimsofsextraffickingandforcedprostitutionFewornonerecorded.Fewornonerecorded.

Score:3

Table5:TheConclusionofUNPROFORinBosnia-HerzegovinaandUNActioninthePost-ConflictCountry

ConclusionsofUNPROFOR RestructuredandreplacedwithUNCRO,UNPROFOR(1995-96),andUNPREDEP;SFORreplacesIFOR

UNinvolvementinpost-conflictBosnia-Herzegovina

Yes;-UNPROFOR(1995-1996)-UNMIBH(1996-2002)

UNSecretary-GeneralreflectionsonUNPROFOR:1.BoutrosBoutros-Ghali(1992-1996)....................................2.KofiAnnan(1997-2006)..........3.BanKi-Moon(2007-Present)......

Failed;moreresourcesshouldhavebeengiventoUNPROFOR.Failed;Bosnia-HerzegovinawillhauntUNhistoryforever.Failed;internationalcommunitymustcometogethertopreventfuturemassacreslikeBosnia-Herzegovina

Score:2

Pinski55

Bibliography

“Bosnia-HerzegovinaPoliticalMap–BlackandWhite.”E-MapsWorld.Web.8Apr.2017.

“TheBosnianWarandSrebrenicaGenocide.”UnitedtoEndGenocide.Web.14Mar.

2017.“ComprehensiveReviewoftheWholeQuestionofPeacekeepingOperationsinAll

TheirAspects.”2005.UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly.ReportbyPrinceZeidRa’adZeidal-Hussein.Web.31Mar.2017.

“FormerYugoslavia–UNPROFOR.”1996.UnitedNationsPeacekeepingOperations.

UnitedNations.Web.27Mar.2017.“MapShowingtheRegionsofYugoslaviafrom1945to1991.”UniversityofBath.

Web.9Apr.2017.“PrinciplesofUNPeacekeeping.”UnitedNations.Web.27Mar.2017.“SummaryofAG-061:UnitedNationsProtectionForce(UNPROFOR)(1992-1995)–

UnitedNationsPeaceForces(UNPF)(1995-1996).”UnitedNationsArchivesandRecordsManagementSection.UnitedNations.Web.3Apr.2017.

“SummaryoftheDaytonPeaceAgreementonBosnia-Herzegovina.”1995.University

ofMinnesotaHumanRightsLibrary.UniversityofMinnesota.Web.1Apr.2017.

“UNBosniaExperienceOneofMost‘DifficultandPainful’initsHistory,Says

Secretary-GeneraltoMemorialCeremonyinSarajevo.”1999.UnitedNations.Web.3Apr.2017.

“UnitedNationsPeacekeeping:ConductandDiscipline.”UnitedNations.Web.1Apr.

2017.“UNMIBH:Background.”UnitedNations.Web.2Apr.2017.Avdovic,Erol.“BanKi-Moon:NoApologyCouldRectifytheFactWeFailedtoProtect

Srebrenica.”Interview.Web.UnitedNations.3Apr.2017.Barber,Tony.1992.“TheBosnianCrisis:Serbs,Croats,andMuslims:WhoHates

WhoandWhy:TonyBarberinZagrebTracestheAncientRootsofaCultureClashThatHasShatteredWhatWasYugoslaviaintoWarringPieces.”Independent.Web.24Apr.2017.

Pinski56

Baumann,RobertF.,GeorgeW.Gawrych,andWalterE.Kretchik.2004.“ArmedPeacekeepersinBosnia.”CombatStudiesInstitutePress.LibraryofCongress.Web.27Mar.2017.

Bellamy,AlexJ.andPaulD.Williams.2010.UnderstandingPeacekeeping.2nd

edition.Print.27Feb.2017.Boulden,Jane.2001.PeaceEnforcement:TheUnitedNationsExperienceinCongo,

Somalia,andBosnia.Print.28Feb,2017.Bowcott,Owen.2005.“ReportRevealsShameofUNPeacekeepers.”TheGuardian.

Web.1Apr.2017.Djilas,Aleksa.1995.“Tito’sLastSecret:HowDidHeKeeptheYugoslavsTogether?”

ForeignAffairs.Web.27Mar.2017.Doyle,MichaelW.andNicholasSambanis.2006.MakingWarandBuildingPeace:

UnitedNationsPeaceOperations.Introduction.Print.28Feb.2017.Goulding,Marrack.1993.“TheEvolutionofUnitedNationsPeacekeeping.”Royal

InstituteofInternationalAffairs.69:3.p.451-464.Print.19Feb.2017.Gray,Christine.1996.“CaseStudy:Host-StateConsentandUnitedNations

PeacekeepinginYugoslavia.”DukeJournalofComparative&InternationalLaw.7:1.p.241-270.DukeUniversity.Web.27Mar.2017.

Hultman,Lisa,JacobKathman,andMeganShannon.2013.“UnitedNations

PeacekeepingandCivilianProtectioninCivilWar.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience.57:4.p.875-891.Web.27Feb.2017.

Johansen,RobertC.1994.“Review:UNPeacekeeping:HowShouldWeMeasure

Success?”ReviewedWork:“InternationalPeacekeeping”byPaulF.Diehl.MershonInternationalStudiesReview.38:2.p.307-310.Web.29Mar.2017.

Lieberman,Ben.2006.“NationalistNarratives,ViolenceBetweenNeighbours,and

EthnicCleansinginBosnia-Hercegovina:ACaseofCognitiveDissonance?”JournalofGenocideResearch.8:3.p.295-309.Print.27Feb.2017.

McFadden,RobertD.2016.“BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,FormerUNSecretary-General,

Diesat93.”TheNewYorkTimes.Web.3Apr.2017.Rohde,David.2012.Endgame:TheBetrayalandFallofSrebrenica,Europe’sWorst

MassacreSinceWorldWarII.Preface.Print.19Feb.2017.Sambanis,Nicholas.2008.“Short-andLong-TermEffectsofUnitedNationsPeace

Operations.”WorldBankEconomicReview.22:1.Abstract.Web.28Feb.2017.

Pinski57

Szasz,PaulC.1995.“PeacekeepinginOperation:AConflictStudyofBosnia.”Cornell

InternationalLawJournal.28:3.p.685-699.Print.20Feb.2017.Thakur,Ramesh.2006.TheUnitedNations,Peace,andSecurity:FromCollective

SecuritytotheResponsibilitytoProtect.Introduction.Print.27Feb.2017.VanDerLijn,Jair,andTimoSmit.2015.“PeacekeepersUnderThreat?Fatality

TrendsinUNPeaceOperations.”ETHZurich.Web.2Apr.2017.