westgate blog piece
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/27/2019 Westgate Blog Piece
1/2
The attacks on Westgate mall in Nairobi provide a number of insights into the decision
making cycle of a terrorist organisation, some of which we tend to pay insufficient attention
to. The targeting of a shopping mall was as much a decision about base line tactical and
operational aspects of the attack as it was about symbolism and the media attention that the
targeting would achieve. While a shopping mall or similar facility offers a number of tacticalbenefits such as a delimited and defendable operating environment and a contained target
population, in this particular instance it also offered communicative value. As a
representation of the burgeoning middle class in Kenya, and Africa more broadly, frequented
as much by foreigners and specifically, Westerners, as it was by locals, the shopping mall
also served as a representation of the claimed Western influence on African society. t also
provided a relatable target for engaging a Western audience. The broader target audience is
thus deemed able to imagine themselves at a shopping mall, and thus by relating to the locale,
the intended fear and terror is more easily transmittable.
Adding to this dynamic was the demographic makeup of the customers at the shopping mall.!y targeting a location that was guaranteed to have Westerners present, Al "habaab was able
to ensure Western media coverage of the attack. The last decade of terrorist activity has made
Western media audiences somewhat desensitised to conventional terrorist violence and as last
month#s attack, and the $%%& 'umbai attacks demonstrate, there is a need for more
spectacular or specifically targeted attacks to garner the kind of media attention that terrorist
groups require. !y utilising these tactics the terrorists were able to prolong the incident, and
in turn, prolong the media interest and media coverage. !y targeting affluent locations they
are also able to capitalise on the likelihood of citi(en generated content, as witnessed by the
proliferation of )ouTube user generated content. *iven the centrality of the communicative
dynamic to terrorist actions, these considerations are likely to have been central to the
planning of the incident. Additionally, A" was able to tweet the incident live, providing blow
by blow updates on their long standing twitter account.
This siege tactic utilised in Nairobi was pioneered by +ashkareToiba in -akistan and was at
the core of the 'umbai attacks. utside of its historical development in Kashmir, this tactic
has thankfully not been deployed more frequently in the West, although it continues to be
utilised in Kashmir and across Afghanistan and -akistan. Known asfidayeen attacks, these
tactics were refined by +eT and deployed initially against military and law enforcement
installations in Kashmir. The advantages of this style of attack are multiple. The subsequentdamage that was inflicted on the installations was one aspect of their success. 'ost
importantly however, unlike a conventional suicide attack,fidayeen attacks provided an
opportunity for defensive actions by the terrorists involved, removing the /suicide# aspect of
implicit in a suicide bombing. This has been deemed to be more religiously permissible and
thus more broadly tolerable to the wider community. This tactic, and its deployment in
'umbai, and at Westgate, demonstrates the clear consideration of the communications
aspects of a terrorist attack, and the importance to terrorist groups of perception amongst a
number of different audiences.
The final, yet crucially important dynamic of this operation was the preoperational planningand intelligence that facilitated the duration and success of the operation. n eerie similarities
-
7/27/2019 Westgate Blog Piece
2/2
to the crucial preoperational intelligence gathered in 'umbai by 0avid 1eadley, reports
have suggested that A" went as far as to rent property inside the mall, facilitating the planting
of weaponry and the provisioning of detailed intelligence on the facility. An operational
understanding of key choke points, entry and e2it points and other crucial planning
information will have greatly assisted the attackers in achieving the siege duration theydesired.
This serves as a reminder of an often forgotten aspect of terrorist actions and terrorist
campaigns, namely that terrorist violence is, in and of itself, an instrumental act. That is to
say that it is a means rather than an end. Whether we are discussing terrorist or insurgent
behaviour, it remains crucial to retain the understanding that overwhelmingly, these acts are
communicative and are desired to deliver a message rather than to solely inflict kinetic
damage for its own sake.
3inally, and as 0avid Kilcullen recently4argued, and e2pands on in his new book, urbanised
environments, such as 'umbai or Nairobi, represent potential sites for future terrorist
incidents. 5rban environments have long offered attractive propositions for terrorist groups
and insurgents. While A" was not able to overwhelm Nairobi to the same e2tent as +eT was
able to cripple 'umbai, the implications for Africa#s ma6or urban centres are substantial.
Africa is facing a growing challenge in confronting a diversity of nonstate terrorist entities
who, if the attack in Nairobi, and the oil facility siege in Algeria are any indication, have an
increasing capability to deploy smart, effective tactics against vulnerable targets.
7ompounding these problems is the broader operating environment that Africa presents for
these groups. As was recently written in The Atlantic,
8Africa#s slamists are able to take advantage of the fact that many of the continents
countries have pourous borders9 weak and corrupt central governments9 undertrained
and underequipped militaries9 flourishing drug trades that provide a steady source of
income9 and vast, lawless spaces...:$
When these broader facilitating factors are combined with the structural advantages that an
urban environment presents to a terrorist cell, Africa, and specifically Africa#s growing
urbanised centres will need to think deeply on the approach they want to take in relation to
countering these types of threats, and compromises they are prepared to make in seeking to
ensure the security of both the local population, but the growing foreign presence in this partof the world.
4
http;