westgate blog piece

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    The attacks on Westgate mall in Nairobi provide a number of insights into the decision

    making cycle of a terrorist organisation, some of which we tend to pay insufficient attention

    to. The targeting of a shopping mall was as much a decision about base line tactical and

    operational aspects of the attack as it was about symbolism and the media attention that the

    targeting would achieve. While a shopping mall or similar facility offers a number of tacticalbenefits such as a delimited and defendable operating environment and a contained target

    population, in this particular instance it also offered communicative value. As a

    representation of the burgeoning middle class in Kenya, and Africa more broadly, frequented

    as much by foreigners and specifically, Westerners, as it was by locals, the shopping mall

    also served as a representation of the claimed Western influence on African society. t also

    provided a relatable target for engaging a Western audience. The broader target audience is

    thus deemed able to imagine themselves at a shopping mall, and thus by relating to the locale,

    the intended fear and terror is more easily transmittable.

    Adding to this dynamic was the demographic makeup of the customers at the shopping mall.!y targeting a location that was guaranteed to have Westerners present, Al "habaab was able

    to ensure Western media coverage of the attack. The last decade of terrorist activity has made

    Western media audiences somewhat desensitised to conventional terrorist violence and as last

    month#s attack, and the $%%& 'umbai attacks demonstrate, there is a need for more

    spectacular or specifically targeted attacks to garner the kind of media attention that terrorist

    groups require. !y utilising these tactics the terrorists were able to prolong the incident, and

    in turn, prolong the media interest and media coverage. !y targeting affluent locations they

    are also able to capitalise on the likelihood of citi(en generated content, as witnessed by the

    proliferation of )ouTube user generated content. *iven the centrality of the communicative

    dynamic to terrorist actions, these considerations are likely to have been central to the

    planning of the incident. Additionally, A" was able to tweet the incident live, providing blow

    by blow updates on their long standing twitter account.

    This siege tactic utilised in Nairobi was pioneered by +ashkareToiba in -akistan and was at

    the core of the 'umbai attacks. utside of its historical development in Kashmir, this tactic

    has thankfully not been deployed more frequently in the West, although it continues to be

    utilised in Kashmir and across Afghanistan and -akistan. Known asfidayeen attacks, these

    tactics were refined by +eT and deployed initially against military and law enforcement

    installations in Kashmir. The advantages of this style of attack are multiple. The subsequentdamage that was inflicted on the installations was one aspect of their success. 'ost

    importantly however, unlike a conventional suicide attack,fidayeen attacks provided an

    opportunity for defensive actions by the terrorists involved, removing the /suicide# aspect of

    implicit in a suicide bombing. This has been deemed to be more religiously permissible and

    thus more broadly tolerable to the wider community. This tactic, and its deployment in

    'umbai, and at Westgate, demonstrates the clear consideration of the communications

    aspects of a terrorist attack, and the importance to terrorist groups of perception amongst a

    number of different audiences.

    The final, yet crucially important dynamic of this operation was the preoperational planningand intelligence that facilitated the duration and success of the operation. n eerie similarities

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    to the crucial preoperational intelligence gathered in 'umbai by 0avid 1eadley, reports

    have suggested that A" went as far as to rent property inside the mall, facilitating the planting

    of weaponry and the provisioning of detailed intelligence on the facility. An operational

    understanding of key choke points, entry and e2it points and other crucial planning

    information will have greatly assisted the attackers in achieving the siege duration theydesired.

    This serves as a reminder of an often forgotten aspect of terrorist actions and terrorist

    campaigns, namely that terrorist violence is, in and of itself, an instrumental act. That is to

    say that it is a means rather than an end. Whether we are discussing terrorist or insurgent

    behaviour, it remains crucial to retain the understanding that overwhelmingly, these acts are

    communicative and are desired to deliver a message rather than to solely inflict kinetic

    damage for its own sake.

    3inally, and as 0avid Kilcullen recently4argued, and e2pands on in his new book, urbanised

    environments, such as 'umbai or Nairobi, represent potential sites for future terrorist

    incidents. 5rban environments have long offered attractive propositions for terrorist groups

    and insurgents. While A" was not able to overwhelm Nairobi to the same e2tent as +eT was

    able to cripple 'umbai, the implications for Africa#s ma6or urban centres are substantial.

    Africa is facing a growing challenge in confronting a diversity of nonstate terrorist entities

    who, if the attack in Nairobi, and the oil facility siege in Algeria are any indication, have an

    increasing capability to deploy smart, effective tactics against vulnerable targets.

    7ompounding these problems is the broader operating environment that Africa presents for

    these groups. As was recently written in The Atlantic,

    8Africa#s slamists are able to take advantage of the fact that many of the continents

    countries have pourous borders9 weak and corrupt central governments9 undertrained

    and underequipped militaries9 flourishing drug trades that provide a steady source of

    income9 and vast, lawless spaces...:$

    When these broader facilitating factors are combined with the structural advantages that an

    urban environment presents to a terrorist cell, Africa, and specifically Africa#s growing

    urbanised centres will need to think deeply on the approach they want to take in relation to

    countering these types of threats, and compromises they are prepared to make in seeking to

    ensure the security of both the local population, but the growing foreign presence in this partof the world.

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