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3.4 M i s s i o n R e v i e w s

Western Balkans

T he Western Balkans have been a testing-ground for a huge range of political missions since the early 1990s. These have ranged from light-weight civilian monitoring missions meant to help contain the Yugoslav wars to long-serving presences tasked with promoting good governance, fair elections, minority rights and economic rehabilitation.

These long-term presences were usually deployed to support or replace peacekeepers. The large military forces that stabilized the region have now downsized, while some international civilian missions are likely to remain in place for a considerable time.

Today, two organizations have prominent political missions in the Balkans. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) maintains field presences in Albania and all the for-mer constituent parts of Yugoslavia except Slovenia (its presence in Croatia, however, is now an office in Zagreb and will not be discussed here).

Some of these presences remain sizeable. The OSCE is mandated to keep 199 international civil-ian staff in Kosovo – 10% more than the UN has deployed across Iraq.

The second major institutional player is the European Union. The EU has peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and policemen in Kosovo, where European troops also provide the bulk of NATO’s military presence (KFOR). The European Commission has established an extremely significant presence – and financial leverage – across the region.

The EU has also appointed Special Repre-sentatives (EUSRs) to BiH, the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo. Each of these figures also has responsibility for some sort of field presence, although these are not straightforward European political missions. The EUSR in BiH also serves as the Interna-tional High Representative, answering to a Peace Implementation Council of fifty-five countries and organizations.1 The EUSR in Kosovo is similarly double-hatted as the International Civilian Repre-sentative (ICR, answering to a Steering Group of 28 countries that recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty). The EUSR in FYROM has also acted as the head of the European Commission’s delegation there since late 2005.

In addition to the OSCE and EU, the UN has a residual presence in the Western Balkans. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), having had executive authority and a large civilian police arm from 1999 to 2008, has an increasingly reduced profile.

Although UNMIK is still formally a peacekeeping operation, UN officials in Pristina often refer to it as a de facto political mission. The UN also maintains an office in Belgrade (UNOB), technically part of UNMIK but also following wider regional affairs.

It has long been recognized that this patch-work of overlapping mandates and missions could be rationalized. From 2002 onwards (when the IHR in Sarajevo, Paddy Ashdown, was double-hatted as EUSR) it was commonplace to argue that the region’s future would be defined by its gradual absorption into the EU. In this context, OSCE missions were partially oriented towards helping the former Yugoslav states meet EU standards.

66 | Mission Reviews

in BiH have delayed the changeover to EU over-sight. The lack of international consensus on Kosovo’s status has meant that UNMIK remains in place and has complicated the efforts of the ICR/EUSR to play a role in Serb-majority north Kosovo.

These political complications have not pre-vented political missions across the region from devolving increasing responsibilities to national authorities. The EU is reconfiguring its own pres-ence in the region as it consolidates its foreign presences in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. The mandate for the EUSR in FYROM will, for exam-ple, end next year but the EU Delegation in Skopje will continue to play an influential role. There is talk of a new EU super-envoy in Sarajevo to cut through the political impasse there. Yet the ratio-nalization of the international political presence in the Western Balkans is incomplete.

BOSNIA ANd HerzeGOvINA

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OSCE Mission in BiH were launched following the 1995 Day-ton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian war. Under Dayton, the High Representative is man-dated to give guidance to the civilian components of the international presence (including the OSCE and UN agencies) but does not have direct author-ity over them. Although only answerable to the Peace Implementation Council, the High Repre-sentative is mandated to report to the UN Security Council, the European Union, the US, Russia and other interested parties.

Both missions have operated alongside successive military operations (led by NATO from 1995 to 2004 and then by the EU) and police mis-sions (led by the UN from 1995 to 2003 and the EU thereafter). In 1997, the Peace Implementa-tion Council granted the High Representative powers – known as the Bonn powers – to remove Bosnian officials and impose legislation without referring to national officials. In 2002, the fourth High Representative, the United Kingdom’s Paddy Ashdown, was double-hatted as the EUSR with the task of coordinating the EU’s various policy tools in BiH more effectively. This did not, how-ever, give him command of the EU’s police and military missions.2

Successive high representatives in Sarajevo sug-gested that the EU take responsibility for Bosnian affairs, and UNMIK officials declared that Kosovo’s future lay with the Union.

These transitional processes have suffered a series of set-backs in recent years. Political tensions

Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, visits the OHR in Sarajevo, February 2010.

OH

R

EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina/Office of the High Representative (OHR)

Authorization Date 11March2002(2002/211/CFSP)Start Date June2002Head of Mission ValentinInzko(Austria)Budget EUSR:$3.1million

(1March2010-31August2010)OHR:fundedbythePeaceImplementationCouncil(PIC),whosebudgetisabout$12.6million(2010-2011)

Strength as of InternationalStaff:24July 2010 (OHR) LocalStaff:144

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE-BiH)

Authorization 8December1995and Start Date (MC(5).DEC/1)Head of Mission AmbassadorGaryD.Robbins

(UnitedStates)Budget $19.9million

(1January2010-31December2010)Strength as of InternationalStaff:691 August 2010 LocalStaff:439 For detailed mission information see p. 236


Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who aimed for a lower profile and argued that OHR should be phased out, affirming the EUSR as the top international figure in BiH.

During Schwarz-Schilling’s tenure, there was uneven progress on police and security sector reforms. Although the BiH government agreed to a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in December 2007, Republika Srpska’s leaders continued to talk about secession. Having previously agreed to roll up OHR by June 2008, the Peace Implementation Council reversed its decision in February 2008. Schwarz-Schilling’s successor Miroslav Lajcak publicly complained that a “positive, constructive atmosphere, which led to the initialing of the SAA” had deteriorated rapidly, and that “the political leadership once again took up diametrically opposed and maximalist positions.”3

In mid-2010, OHR remains in place – Lajcak was replaced by an Austrian diplomat, Valentin

Since its foundation, OHR has been engaged with issues ranging from refugee return to economic reconstruction. Over the last decade, the over-arch-ing challenge has been political: to persuade BiH’s two post-Dayton components, the Bosnian-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, to help build up national-level institutions, especially in the area of policing and justice. This consolidation is necessary both to overcome the de facto division of the coun-try into two halves – which fuels talk of secession among top politicians in Republika Srpska – and is a precondition for progress towards inclusion in the EU.

Ashdown, who used the Bonn powers far more extensively than his predecessors, is widely credited for having created momentum for the consolidation of BiH as a state (although critics argued that he disenfranchised local leaders to a dangerous extent). In 2006, Ashdown was replaced as both High Representative and EUSR by German politician


gradually reduced this role. In 2002, BiH authori-ties ran national elections on their own, with the OSCE monitoring the process. The OSCE contin-ues to publish needs assessments before all Bosnian polls and reviews the processes. In July 2010 it rec-ommended that OSCE personnel observe national polls the following October.

The OSCE also runs a variety of technical projects aimed at improving parliamentary prac-tices. Perhaps reflecting the tendentious nature of politics in Sarajevo – and leveraging its field net-work – the OSCE has launched a series of projects promoting municipal-level democratization across BiH. These have included a “beacon” scheme, aimed at highlighting particularly successful mayors and other local officials. A 2009 “Local First” scheme aims to combine support to the municipal authori-ties with work with civil society organizations, consolidating the OSCE’s range of local activities.

Other OSCE activities are focused on promoting compliance with the organization’s standards in areas like civilian oversight of security affairs. None-theless, there are limits to what the organization can achieve through legislative advice and techni-cal assistance. A BiH-wide education law passed in 2003 on the basis of OSCE advice has helped modernize teaching, but has not ended political manipulation of teaching in some areas.

Overall, the persistence of deep political differences within BiH continues to present major obstacles to both OHR and the OSCE, if in very different ways at different levels. It remains to be seen whether a tougher line by the EU might break down these obstacles.

KOSOvO

Despite the challenges they face, the OHR and OSCE have a fairly clear division of labor in BiH. The former focuses on high politics while the latter maintains a greater field presence. This is partially replicated in Kosovo, but is constrained by political factors.

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 complicated the efforts of the EU, OSCE and UN. Between 1999 and 2008, the three organizations had worked closely within the frame-work provided by UNMIK. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) had made up one of UNMIK’s pillars, dealing primarily with democratization,

Inzko, in early 2009. It is a relatively small pres-ence, with 24 international staff and 144 national staff as of July 2010. While double-hatting extends beyond the High Representative/EUSR himself to his cabinet, political unit, legal unit and press office, the Deputy High Representative – an American diplomat – is not double-hatted. Security sector and economic issues, too, are dealt with by OHR officials who lack an extra EU identity (there are also separate OHR and EUSR administration support units).

Tensions have persisted with Republika Srpska. In 2009, Inzko used the Bonn powers (which neither Schwarz-Schilling nor Lajcak had utilized) to over-ride proposals by the Bosnian Serb assembly to take back powers they had ceded to the national level. Some regional experts even questioned whether BiH might find itself on the road to renewed con-flict. These concerns may have been exaggerated, but in the summer of 2010 the outgoing Deputy High Representative, Raffi Gregorian, complained that the international community lacked the will to face down the Bosnian Serb leaders.

There have been reports the EU will attempt to break this deadlock in the near future. The EUSR’s mandate was extended for another year by Euro-pean governments in July 2010. However, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, is said to have considered cre-ating a stronger envoy in Sarajevo – with the EU taking over OHR’s responsibilities and authority, and possibly gaining extra powers such as the right to place sanctions on individual politicians. The softer approach adopted by Schwarz-Schilling may soon be replaced by greater EU assertiveness.

While OHR maintains four offices outside Sarajevo, its field presence has always been limited relative to that of the OSCE, which has fourteen regional offices, sixty-nine international staff and nearly 440 local personnel. The mission’s man-date is wide-ranging covering (among other issues) democratization, security issues, human rights, social and economic issues, education and commu-nity-level political engagement.

The mission’s profile was highest in the immediate post-Dayton period, when it was tasked with supervising the first national elections. In this period, the OSCE helped put in place the basic ele-ments of a democratic process, down to offering political parties office space and computers. It has


While ICO planners had been based in Pristina before February 2008, and had already been work-ing closely with Kosovo’s government, they could hardly adopt a neutral posture as their designated purpose was to help build up an independent state. ICO thus proceeded on the basis of the Ahtisaari Plan. This complicated the position of the ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith, as a minority of EU members refused to recognize Kosovo.4

Through much of 2008, the elements of the international presence in Kosovo appeared adrift. UNMIK focused on finding a modus vivendi that would let the EU deploy its rule of law mis-sion (EULEX). The OSCE angered the Kosovar authorities by publishing a critical study of the administration of justice since the declaration of independence. ICO set up an office in Serb-major-ity north Kosovo, but was pressured to leave.

In late 2008, the combined efforts of the EU and UN resulted in a deal by which the EU deployed its EULEX mission on a “status neutral” basis – UNMIK shrank rapidly, moving its headquarters to a logistics base on the edge of Pristina. Since then, the various international missions in Kosovo have maintained differing views on its status.

While UNMIK keeps officials in north Kosovo working with Serb communities, its duties are now largely political. UN officials have, for example, accompanied Kosovo’s representatives to regional forums from which they would otherwise be barred. Kosovo’s leaders chafed at this. In March 2010, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci attended an informal EU-Balkans summit in Slovenia – Serbia refused to participate because Kosovo was represented as a state rather than a UN protectorate. In June, both sides attended an EU summit in Sarajevo, but this was organized so as to minimize the status issue.5

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Lamberto Zannier, continues to speak out on ethnic tensions in Kosovo and maintain links with the Kosovo Serbs. The UN Office in Belgrade (UNOB), a satellite of UNMIK, facilitates these contacts, although the US and EU members prefer to discuss Kosovo directly with the Serbs.

The primary international interlocutor with Kosovo’s government is now the ICR/EUSR. ICO’s initial list of priorities focused on helping the government build institutions – such as the consti-tutional court and a diplomatic service – that had not existed under UNMIK. Following the Ahtisaari

parliamentary and municipal affairs – although a quirk in the initial planning phase meant that it also set up Kosovo’s police school. The EU provided the economic pillar of UNMIK, but had passed on most of its functions to Kosovo’s authorities by 2008.

In 2007, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari laid out proposals for “supervised independence” for Kosovo, involving the UN’s withdrawal but con-tinuing roles for the OSCE and EU (NATO would also maintain a peacekeeping function). The EU planned to take over policing and jus-tice duties from UNMIK while an International Civilian Office (ICO) would take responsibility for political support to the government. Ahti-saari recommended that the International Civilian Representative (ICR) heading ICO should dou-ble as EUSR. The OSCE would “assist in the monitoring” of the settlement.

This carefully-crafted plan foundered on Serbia’s refusal to countenance Kosovo’s indepen-dence as well as the lack of consensus in the Security Council on the issue. Kosovo declared itself inde-pendent in February 2008, sparking short-lived but significant violence in the Serb-majority northern region. UNMIK and OMiK announced that they would operate on a “status neutral” basis according to their pre-existing mandate.

OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)

Authorization and 1July1999Start Date (PC.DEC/305)Head of Mission AmbassadorWernerAlmhofer

(Austria)Budget $30.3million (1January2010-

31December2010)Strength as of InternationalStaff:1661 August 2010 LocalStaff:485 For detailed mission information see p. 228

EUSR in Kosovo/International Civilian Office (ICO)

Authorization and 4February2008Start Date (2008/123/CFSP)Head of Mission PieterFeith(Netherlands)Budget EUSR:$2.2million (1March2010-31August2010)


As the leaked paper stated, one goal of this pro-gram was to minimize Belgrade’s influence over the region. ICO’s proposals were coordinated with an increase in the EULEX presence in the north and plans by the European Commission to fund new projects in the region, which is still reliant on subsi-dies from Serbia. The EU House opened in March 2010 and is overseen by the EU’s Official Repre-sentative for Northern Kosovo, Italian ambassador Michael Louis Giffoni. There have yet to be any elections in North Mitrovica, however, and the city saw another spell of violent protests in the summer of 2010.

ICO’s future relations with both Kosovo’s government and the Serb minority thus remain uncertain. The mission’s own future may be affected by the rationalization of EU representations under the Lisbon Treaty. By early 2010, many ICO offi-cials predicted that the Office could be phased out to make way for a consolidated EU presence under the EUSR. However, this is complicated by the objections of those EU members that do not recognize Kosovo. In July 2010, European govern-ments postponed a decision on whether to renew Feith’s mandate as EUSR due to differences over ICO’s activities.

Status issues also continue to affect OMiK, the OSCE’s largest mission. With four regional centers in addition to its head office in Pristina, the OSCE has prioritized maintaining visibility across Kosovo. In April 2009, the mission published an article underlining that the OSCE would continue to act as the “the eyes and ears of the international com-munity” while UNMIK shrank and the EU focused on direct support to the authorities.7 This role includes monitoring of the legal system and “pro-active monitoring” of municipal authorities, which the OSCE helped to develop before 2008.

Nonetheless, the OSCE has faced a recurring dilemma: how can it genuinely support elements of the emerging Kosovar state without endorsing it? This does not affect all of its activities: since Febru-ary 2008, OMiK has worked on problems including trafficking, minority education and transport rights that do not necessarily affect status issues. The OSCE now provides extensive planning support to Kosovo’s Central Electoral Commission, but it no longer oversees and certifies results as it did in the UNMIK era.

The OSCE had a significant role in promoting decentralization in the UNMIK period, and con-tinues to work closely with municipal authorities.

Plan, it was also tasked with assisting a decentral-ization process to create six new municipalities to give Serb communities increased self-governance.

Officials recognized that the window of opportunity to influence Kosovo’s government was limited. ICO scored an important success in late 2009 by facilitat-ing an agreement between Kosovo and FYROM on their border. This opened the way for Macedonian recognition of Kosovo. ICO and Kosovo’s govern-ment also succeeded in laying the groundwork for four of the six planned new municipalities in time for local elections in mid-November 2009. Elections were held in a fifth in July 2010. ICO officials have been satisfied with progress in many aspects of insti-tution-building but serious challenges remain. One is endemic corruption. The other is relations with the Serb-majority north.

The corruption issue has gained prominence in 2010. In 2008-9, officials expressed concern that ICO was not working closely enough with the EU’s “status neutral” rule of law officials. This year, however, the ICR has taken a tough line with the government, telling the European Parliament that “weak governance, widespread corruption and breaches in the rule of law” were holding Kosovo back.6 Underlining the problem, EULEX police have arrested senior government officials including the President of the Central Bank.

Pieter Feith has also pressed the government on media freedoms, an issue that falls within his purview as EUSR. In June 2010, another dispute emerged with the government over the use of Kosovo’s public pension fund. ICO has final con-trol over this money, which is invested abroad, and has refused to let the government repatriate it. The sums involved – with over €300 million abroad – are likely to ensure that this remains a sore point.

ICO’s relations with north Kosovo also remain tense. In January 2010, the ICR took steps to cre-ate a new municipality in North Mitrovica – the sixth of those proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan and the most contentious. Mitrovica, divided into Serb and Albanian halves, has been the center of sig-nificant acts of violence since the declaration of independence. While Feith appointed a fourteen-person Municipality Preparation Team, Serbs reacted angrily to a leaked document laying out ICO’s plans for northern Kosovo. These included new arrangements to bring the two halves of Mitro-vica closer, the closure of the UNMIK office in the city (often seen as pro-Serb) and a new “EU House” in the north.


Socialist party decided to boycott parliament after controversial elections in mid-2009. The boycott ended in May after the European Commission and European Parliament offered to mediate. The dispute remains unsettled.

In FYROM, the EU and OSCE continue to oversee the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed by the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian leaders in 2001. The OSCE’s Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje predates the Ohrid agreement by almost a decade – the first monitors were deployed in 1992, “spilling over” from Yugoslavia.

OSCE officials, especially those who enjoy good relations with Serb communities, have performed useful roles in quietly facilitating communications over tense issues since February 2008. One area in which ICO and the OSCE share clear common concerns is the politicization of the media, which OMiK has also raised publicly.

OMiK has thus played a version of the broad monitoring role foreseen in the Ahtisaari propos-als, although in far more constrained circumstances. The broader question facing ICO, OMiK and UNMIK is whether they can continue to maintain cordial working relations with Kosovo’s government while also holding it to account over corruption. The International Court of Justice’s July 2010 deci-sion that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal will have emboldened those politicians who would like to govern the nascent state with less international interference – or no interference at all.

OtHer mISSIONS IN tHe reGION

Although the international presence in the West-ern Balkans remains centered on BiH and Kosovo, there are significant political missions in Albania, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia. The OSCE Presence in Albania – with nearly 100 staffers and four offices in addition to its headquarters in Tirana – is primarily focused on direct support to government ministries and municipal authorities. It is involved in technical projects ranging from environmental affairs to border management. Some of the projects are on a considerable scale, such as the creation of a new national registration system costing over €2 million. In the last two years the OSCE has also assisted the government initiate a program to destroy large quan-tities of ammunition and rocket fuel left over from the Communist era – although a political mission, the OSCE Presence thus also draws on the organiza-tion’s expertise in conventional military affairs, built up following the Cold War.

There is no EUSR or EU security mission in Albania, but the OSCE has worked alongside a sizeable European Commission presence, which has dealt not only with political issues but also with police reform. Albania’s connection to Euro- Atlantic security structures deepened further in 2009 when it became a member of NATO. Con-cerns were raised, however, when the opposition

OSCE Presence in Albania

Authorization and 27March1997Start Date (PC.DEC/160)Head of Mission AmbassadorRobertBosch

(Netherlands)Budget $4.4million (1January2010-


EUSR for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Authorization and 29June2001Start Date (2001/492/CFSP)Head of Mission ErwanFouéré(Ireland)Budget $.4million (1April2010-31August2010)

OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje

Authorization Date 14August1992(15-CSO/JournalNo.2,Annex1)

Start Date September1992Head of Mission AmbassadorJose-LuisHerrero

(Spain)Budget $11.0million (1January2010-



frequent turf-wars between the EU police mission and European Commission officials. In 2005 it was decided to double-hat the EUSR as the head of the Commission delegation, and in 2006 the EU’s police training activities were transferred to the Commis-sion. The EU’s presence in FYROM morphed into something close to an integrated political mission.

Both the EUSR and OSCE Head of Mission are members of a “principals committee,” which also includes the US ambassador and NATO’s head-quarters in Skopje, left in place after the transfer of peacekeeping duties to the EU in 2003. The com-mittee, chaired by the EUSR, makes frequent joint statements on FYROM’s affairs. In April 2010, the committee members warned of widespread “talk of separatism, conflict, abandonment of the Ohrid Framework Agreement” and a weakening of politi-cal dialogue, reflecting a growing sense of renewed inter-ethnic unease.8 This was exacerbated in May after the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia upheld a 12-year prison sentence for a Macedonian policeman involved in the 2001 conflict. The OSCE has also raised concerns about Macedonian policy towards minority education, and the government’s relations with opposition par-ties of all ethnic backgrounds are strained.

In August, the EU, OSCE, NATO and US released a more conciliatory statement on the ninth anniversary of the Ohrid Agreement, but still emphasized the need to ensure “further measures in the fields of equitable representation, decentral-ization and education.”9 With elections slated for 2012, FYROM may well experience further ten-sions. It has been decided that the EUSR’s mandate will end in February 2011, but the EU Delegation and OSCE will still have a challenging role to play ensuring stability.

The OSCE’s missions in Montenegro and Serbia were originally one operation, founded in 2001, but split in two when the countries divided in 2006. They are also unusual for OSCE missions in the region in that they were not launched to pre-vent a war or restore peace in a post-conflict setting. Instead, the original mission’s main goal was to help Serbia and Montenegro consolidate democracy after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic.

The mission was expanded significantly after the Ohrid Agreement was devised to end the low-level Albanian-Macedonian conflict. NATO deployed peacekeepers, while the OSCE’s imme-diate task was to manage the redeployment of police into Albanian areas and to train 1,000 new “non-majority” officers. It completed this process in 2003, when the EU deployed a police monitor-ing mission to FYROM, also taking over military duties from NATO. Nonetheless, tensions over policing in Albanian areas did not subside com-pletely, and the OSCE continues to support police training and rule of law reform.

While the EU’s military and police deploy-ments in 2003 were early tests of the organization’s peacekeeping potential, it had already appointed a EUSR for FYROM during the Ohrid negotiations. In the immediate post-Ohrid period, there were

OSCE Mission to Serbia

Authorization Date 11January2001(PC.DEC/401,astheOSCEMissiontotheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia)

Start Date 29June2006 RenamedtheOSCEMission toSerbia(PC.DEC/733)Head of Mission AmbassadorDimitriosKypreos

(Greece)Budget $10.6million (1January2010-

31December2010)Strength as of InternationalStaff:341 August 2010 LocalStaff: 124 For detailed mission information see p. 261

OSCE Mission to Montenegro

Authorization and 29June2006Start Date (PC.DEC/732)Head of Mission AmbassadorParaschivaBadescu

(Romania)Budget $3.2million (1January2010-



potential focus for any future ethnic tensions. The mission in Montenegro is relatively small (with 13 international staff compared to 34 in Serbia) but works in similar areas. It is also involved in a police training school, and supports rule of law initiatives and democratization. Significant challenges remain, especially in combating Montenegro’s organized crime networks.

CONCLUSION

International political missions remain a signifi-cant element in the governance of countries in the region. They are also involved in cross-regional initiatives on problems such as remaining refugee communities. How long will this last? Some Balkan governments believe that they will not be able to move towards EU membership while still hosting OSCE presences. However, the region’s progress towards the EU is likely to remain uncertain – only Croatia is on track for membership in the Union in the near term.

Moreover, tensions in BiH, FYROM and north Kosovo have convinced many outside policy-makers that it would be a mistake to cut back the interna-tional presence in the region too soon. It is possible that the EU’s ongoing overhaul of its institutional presence across the Balkans will create a new frame-work for stability. Regardless, much work remains.

The mission in Belgrade has also become heav-ily involved in reforming Serbia’s police, and it has a number of offices around the country focused on this task. Since 2006, it has been intimately involved in the creation of a new basic policy training school in Sremska Kamenica, and plays a role in efforts to combat organized crime, working both with the Serbian authorities and NGOs. The mission has also supported the government conduct war crimes trials, an initiative coordinated with similar OSCE activities across the region (the OSCE Office in Zagreb, which replaced a much more extensive mis-sion to Croatia, has monitoring war crimes cases as it residual priority).

The Mission to Serbia also maintains an office in the Sandjak, a Bosniak-majority area of south Serbia, which has sometimes been cited as a

Men wave EU and Macedonian flags in front of the Macedonian government building in Skopje, 14 October 2009.

Ogn

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1 The Peace Implementation Council is charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement.

2 The heads of these missions report directly to Brussels, although the EUSR is mandated to give them political guidance.

3 Miroslav Lajčák, “Press conference by the High Representative Miroslav Lajčák following the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board session in Brussels,” 27 February 2008, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressb/default.asp?content_id=41353.

4 The non-recognizing members of the EU are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

5 The conference followed the EU’s “gymnich” format, which involves private meetings and no final statement approved by all participants.

6 “Kosovo bank leader arrested in corruption probe.” CNN, 23 July 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/07/23/kosovo.corruption.arrest/index.html.


7 “OSCE Mission in Kosovo steers steady course in changing environment.” OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 7 April 2009, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/item_2_37167.html.

8 “Joint statement by the Heads of Mission of the EU, NATO, OSCE and the United States in Skopje.” OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, 27 April 2010, http://www.osce.org/skopje/item_1_43658.html.

9 “Joint statement by the EU Special Representative, the NATO HQ Skopje Commander, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje and the US Ambassador.” OSCE Website, 12 August 2010, http://www.osce.org/item/45757.html.

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