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Ashok M i t r a

Since Kerala will not be electing a new State legislature at the coming General Elections, the elec-tions in West Bengal would be the most interesting from the psephological point of view.

The emergence of the Swatantra Party may, of course, create important shifts in the pattern of voting in a number of States, but here a survey of past data cannot be of any help : one will have to wait for the results of the current elections to be able to assess the impact of the new party.

By and large' in most of the other States, the Congress performance vis-a-vis that of the opposition in both the General Elections was so overwhelming1 that, detailed analysis of the results is hardly worthwhile-

In West Bengal, however, the opposition to the Congress has been relatively sustained and coherent.

The Communist Party of India claims to have its greatest concentration of strength, next to Kerala, in this State, and an electoral alliance dominated by the Party has given a call for dislodging the Congress In the current elections and for setting up an "alternative Government".

This note presents an analysis of the General Elections in West Bengal in 1952 and 1957 and tries to examine the major trends. The results of mid-term bye-elections have not been considered in the analysis. Similarly, in reviewing party alignments, no allowance has been made for the fact that a number of individu­als changed their affiliations subsequent to both the elections.

IN the f irst General Elections in 1952, West Bengal elected 238

embers to the State Legis la t ive As-mblv and sent 34 Members to the Lok Sabha. In the second General .selections, since the d i s t r i c t of Puru-i had in the meanwhile been trans-Ted to the State the membership

the Assembly went up to 252, d the representation of the State

the Lok Sabha was increased to In most of what fol lows, the

sec tora l shifts in P u r u l i a have not en taken in to account.2

In 1952, the Congress set up indidates for 237 seats in the As-mbly elections the except ion be­ar a constituency in Calcutta. Of se, one was elected without a

. The opposi t ion to the Con-ess was severally d i v i d e d . There re two left ist combinat ions, nei-er of w h i c h , however, was s t rong enough to contest a l l the seats. The

of these combinat ions presented candidates at near ly 150 consti tu-cies, and included the C P I . the v o l u t i o n a r y Socialist Par ty , the w a r d Bloc ( M a r x i s t ) ' the Social

pub l i can Par ty , and the Bolshe-Par ty o f I n d i a . The other a l i -

ce consisted of the R u i k a r w i n g

his was not true for Bombay in 1957, at with the constitution of Maharash-ra as a separate State, the special conditions which ratified the electoral berrations in that year have by now eased to exist. 11 figures quoted in this note are de-ved from the 'Reports' on the First and Second General Elections in India issued by the Election Commission, New Delhi.

of the F o r w a r d Bloc, the Social is t Par ty , one fact ion of the Revolu­t i ona ry Communis t Pa r ty together w i t h a few other spl inter groups, and had nearly 80 candidates. In addi -tion the Kisan-Mazdoor Par ty con­tested about 100 seats, w h i l e the Jan Sangh and the H i n d u Maha-sabha between them offered candi­dates for another 100 seats. There was also a large number of inde­pendent candidates t u r n i n g West Bengal in to an impressive electoral jungle. The total number of candi ­dates was as h igh as 1.458, or an average of 6.2 per constituency,

Congress Success Precarious

The Congress succeeded in re turn­ing 149 candidates f r o m the con­tested constituencies. Part of the reason for i ts runaway success was the wide dispersion of votes ob ta in­ed by the opposi t ion groups. As a matter of fact, in on ly 53 of the constituencies, was a clear m a j o r i t y of the votes cast in favour of the Congress (see Table 1) . That is to say, a l though it won about 63 per cent of the seats in the State As­sembly, only 22 per cent were won on a p l u r a l i t y of votes. One Cong­ress candidate was elected w i t h less than 20 per cent of the votes cast. 11 w i t h less than 30 per cent. 30 w i t h less than 35 per cent, and 60 w i t h less than 40 per cent.

For the whole of West Bengal , the Congress received 38.9 per cent of the votes pol led. In on ly 'four of the 15 dis t r ic ts , a m a j o r i t y of the votes went to the Congress (see

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Table V ) , bu t i t could s t i l l capture a m a j o r i t y of the seats in a l l bu t three distr icts . The somewhat pre­carious nature of Congress successes in many constituencies can be gauged f r o m the estimates of V u l ­nc r ab i l i t y ' presented in Table III, For example, i f . of the total votes cast, an add i t iona l two per cent had been cast against the (Congress and in favour of the major oppos­i n g candidate in each case, the Congress w o u l d have lost 23 out of the 149 seats i t won and would there­fore have been wi thou t a m a j o r i t y in the Assembly. A shif t of three per cent of the same nature would have led to a loss of 32 seats, a shif t of fou r per cent to the loss of 45 seats, and so on .

Opposit ion Equal ly Vulnerable To be f a i r , this thinness of the

Congress successes was matched by an almost equal degree of vu lne rab i ­l i ty o f the seats captured by non-Congress candidates. Of the 87 seats won by the lat ter in contests against the Congress. 35 were w o n w i t h less than 40 per cent of the votes cast3 (see Table I I I . I f on ly the Congress could swing in its favour a fu r the r two per cent of the votes cast in these constituen­cies it would have been able to

' One can work this out in terms of a riddle: in 1952. 40 percent of the members—both Congress and non-Congress— of the West Bengal Legisla­tive. Assembly won on the basis of less than 40 per cent of the votes cast: in the case of the Congress, 60 out of 237 contested seats, in the ease of non-Congress parties 35 out of 87.

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secure 22 addi t ional seats, as can be seen f rom Table I V . A five per cent shift would have meant a gain of 40 seats for the Congress,

Thus, even though the Congress posi t ion, in terms of votes cast, was not par t icu lar ly comfortable in 1952 and its performance was lacking in what may he called a " m a r g i n of safety1', the forces opposing the Congress were hard ly better placed. For one th ing , even if at the "mar­g i n " two per cent of the total votes

cast had gone against the Congress, and it ended up w i t h a mino r i t y of seats i n the Assembly, it would s t i l l have remained very much the major par ty since the seats lost would have been divided between the two leftist combinations4 , the K M P, the Jan Sangh. the H i n d u Mahasabha and the independents. There can be l i t t l e doubt that the Congress wou ld sti l l have constituted the adminis-t ra t ion in the State,

Jungle Thins Out

The most noticeable scenic change in the second General Elections was the reduction in the number of con­testing candidates. Despite the fact that electable seats in the West Bengal Assembly were increased f rom 238 to 252, the total number of candidates declined to 1,053, so that the average per constituency was only a l i t t l e higher than four.

The Congress. had candidates Tor every one of the 252 seats, one of

whom was elected uncontested' The main opposi t ion was provided by an alliance of left ist parties name'

lv , the C PI the Praja-Socialist Party", the Forward Bloc6 , the Mar­xis t F o r w a r d Bloc, the Revolution­ary Socialist Party and the Socialist

U n i t y Centre. This 'un i ted f ront ' o f leftists d i d not set up candidates fo r a l l the constituencies but decid­ed to contest 218 seats. The strength of the Jan Sangh and the H i n d u

It is interesting to note that the second leftist combination led by the Ruikar group of the Forward Bloc could regis­ter only one success, namely, in Asan-sol, where its candidate was actively supported by the alliance organised by the C P I . The P S P was formed by the merger of the K M P and the Socialist Party; the Ruikar group of the Forward Bloc had also joined it by 1957. The group known as Forward Bloc (Marxist) in 1952 had subsequently split into two factions—Forward Bloc and Marxist Forward Bloc. Both were included in the alliance.

Mahasabha had declined consider­ably between 1952 and 1957, and these parties put up candidates fo r only a l imi t ed number of constitu­encies. In a number of districts, however, the Congress had to con­tend w i t h opposi t ion f r o m local dis­sident groups7 .

The weeding out of independent candidates and the evaporation of the r igh t -wing parties meant a pola-risation of votes between the candi­dates of the Congress and those of the leftist alliance in most constitu­encies. Th i s was reflected in the fact that the Congress could actual ly raise its percentage share of the total votes cast in the State to 46 .1 , which was an improvement of the order of 18 per cent compared to its performance in 1952. I t would seem that the major accession of strength for the Congress was l i n k ­ed w i t h the decline of the Jan Sangh and the H i n d u Mahasabha. The Jan Sangh had obtained 6.1 per cent of the votes in 1952, but i ts share of the total p o l l dwind led to less than one per cent in 1957, The r ight-w i n g strength in 1952 was mostly

located in Midnapore , Bankura, Burdwan, B i r b h u m , and Nabadwip ,

and Table V shows how in each of these districts the propor t ion of votes going to the Congress increas­ed sharply in 1957. The on ly other dis t r ic t to show a substantial i n . crease in the Congress share of the total pol l was Hooghly, where a special factor was at w o r k ' .

Polarisation of Votes : Its Effect One result of the relat ive po la r i ­

sation of the votes was to add to the 'depth ' of the Congress successes. Of the 151 seats w h i c h the Congress won in contested elections, only 16 — o r a l i t t l e more than 10 per cent —were won w i t h less than 40 per cent of the votes cast, and 8 2 — a l ­most one-third of the total number of seats in the Assembly — were rap tured w i t h clear majorit ies (see Table I ) ; the contrast w i t h 1952 could ha rd ly be sharper. Also, as Table I I I w i l l hear out, the vulner-7 For example, in Purulia, the Lok Se-

vak Sangh, consisting of elements which had broken away from the Congress on the issue of language, was particularly strong.

8 A very important individual, enjoying great influence in the district, who was elected as an independent member in 1952, joined the Congress in 1954. greatly increasing the organisational strength of the party.

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By and large therefore, the second General Elections merely carried forward the process of. con­solidation of electoral attitudes. The Congress succeeded in adding to its core of supporters several right-wing elements, and could command the allegiance of roughly 45 per cent of the electorate. The combined leftist opposition as i t existed in 1957 succeeded in attracting a l i t t t l e more than 35 per cent of the votes. It follows that as of 1957, at least 15 per cent of the West Bengal elec­t o a t e was without any alignments, and wai t ing to be wooed.

Two further observations are pos­sible f rom a study of the pattern of voting. Although the Congress has always been uxable to make much headway in Darjeeling9, the other four districts in North Bengal — Jalpaiguri, Cooch Behar, West Dinajpur, and Maldah — have been regarded as areas where the Congress is strongly entrenched. But the figures in Table V show that in each of, these districts, the proportion of votes cast for the Congress declined in 1957; in some cases, the decline is of a considerable order. True, they returned almost as many Con­gress candidates in 1957 as in 1952; but the decline in votes, if continued in the current elections, could change the position.

Congress Losing Muslim Support ?

An inference can also be hazard­ed regarding the direction of Mus­l im votes in West Bengal. Data provided in the '1951 Census Report on West Bengal' have been used in 9 The Gurkha League, the most import­

ant political force in Darjeeling, re­turned most candidates from the dis­trict in both the elections'

Table VI to rank the districts ac­cording to the proportion of Mus­l i m population. The other two columns rank the districts according to the proportion of the total votes cast obtained by the Congress in 1952 and 1957. It is significant that while in 1952 as many as five of the seven districts w i t h the highest concentration of Mus l im population were also among the seven districts w i th the highest proportion of Congress votes, in 1957 only two districts wi th heavy concentration of Muslims ranked as major 'Congress' districts. This would suggest that

1957. For example, a shift of 0.5 per cent would have meant a loss of only one seat (as against eight in 1952), that of one per cent a loss

of five seats (as against 11 in 1952), that of two per cent a loss of 21 seats (23 in 1952), and that of four per cent a loss of 38 seats (45 in 1952).

At the other end, the leftist parties also registered advances. The C P I increased its vote f rom 10.8 per cent of the aggregate in 1952 to 17.8 per cent in 1957 — an im­provement of nearly 65 per cent. The leftist alliance as a whole se­cured 36.8 per cent of the votes in 1957 as against 27.5 per cent of the total votes that were cast for the several left-wing parties in the first General Elections. This again represents a proportionate increase

of about 34 per cent. One may therefore be tempted to conclude I hat, at the margin, the accession of strength was greater for the left, wing opposition than for the Cong­ress.

But such a judgment needs to be qualified. Advances from a compa­ratively narrow base always look more impressive on a percentage basis: it may thus not be altogether fair to the Congress to compare its gains wi th the increase in left-wing votes. It is also perhaps true that a fair majority of the votes which were cast for independent candi­dates in the first General Elections was in the nature of "protest"

votes, and that, in the absence of such candidates, a larger proportion of these votes went to the leftist candidates in 1957. Although super­ficially they appear as marginal ac­cretion of strength to the opposition, the "protest" votes, it could be ar­gued, were already a part of the opposition in 1952.

Right-wing Elements Bolster Congress

A study of the "depth" of the non-. Congress successes in 1957 does not yield any clear-cut conclusion. Sixty-two out of the 100 seats cap­tured by non-Congress candidates were won by a p lura l i ty of votes cast, and only 15 seats were won on the strength of less than 40 per cent of the votes (see Table I I ) . Surprisingly, however most of the non-Congress seats continued to be as acutely vulnerable as in 1952' (see Table I V ) .

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the Musl ims have started m o v i n g away f r o m the Congress.10

I t may be interesting to review br ief ly the results of the L o k Sabha elections f rom West Bengal and see whether the pat tern departs signifi-cant ly f r o m the results of the As­sembly elections. One difference wh ich immediately attracts at tent ion is the lesser number of candidates for the Par l iamentary seats. In 1952, there were altogether 148 candidates for the 34 Lok Sabha seats f rom West Bengal — an ave­rage of 4.3 as against the average of 6.1 for an Assembly seat. In 1957 the number of candidates was as Flow as 98 for the 36 seats — again an average of only 2.7 per seat as against the average of 4.2 for an Assembly seat. The reasons for the lesser a t t rac t ion of a L o k Sabha seat are obvious: fewer people can afford on their o w n to meet the campaign-ing expenses for a Parl iamentary constituency, so that independent candidates tend to be less numerous. Also , candidates who want to enter the legislature to represent " l o c a l " issues are not interested in election to the Lok Sabha.

CIo'e Fight for Lok Sabha Seal '

In 1952. the Congress had a clear m a j o r i t y in only nine out of the 24 Lok Sabha constituencies where i t emerged vic tor ious and in as many as eight constituencies its w i n n i n g candidate secured less than 40 per cent of the votes, (see Table I X ) ' Table V I I shows that a four per cent shif t of votes would have brought down the number of Congress successes to a bare 16 less than a m a j o r i t y of the West Bengal seats.13

In contrast, of the 10 non-Con­gress candidates who won in 1952. on ly two were elected w i t h less than 40 per cent of the votes, and six obtained a p lu ra l i t y of votes (see Table X ) . But again, ha l f o f these 10 seats w o u l d have been lost to the Congress if four per cent of the

10 This is admittedly a tenuous argu­ment, but there are no data to sup­port more refined argument unless one is prepared to go through the electoral roll for each constituency and separate the voters according to religious and caste denominations.

11 However, this compares favourably with the Congress position in the 1952 Assembly elections, where only a two per cent shift, of votes would have wrecked the Congress majority,

electorate had shifted the i r prefer-ences. (see Table V I I I ) .

In the second General Elections, the Congress could elect 23 candi­dates to the L o k Sabha—one less than in 1952—, al though the man­ner of v ic tory was much more im­pressive, No w i n n i n g Congress candidate received less than 40 per cent of the votes polled, and 16 ob­tained a ma jo r i ty . 1 2 However, the " m a r g i n of safety" for the Congress d i d not increase at a l l : the Par ty once more wou ld have lost eight seats — and, therefore, lost the m a j o r i t y — w i t h a four per cent shif t in electoral op in ion .

Non-Congress candidates captured 13 Lok Sabha seats in 1957, and had a ma jo r i ty of votes in nine, (see Table X ) . Only one non-Congress w i n n i n g candidate secured less than 40 per cent of the votes. The nar­row spread between the votes of the Congress and the major non-Con­gress candidates is confirmed by the figures h i Table V I I I . which show that seven of the 13 non-Congress seats wou ld have been lost to the Congress w i t h a four per cent swing in votes.

In the f i rs t General Elections the Congress obtained a l i t t l e above 42 per cent of the votes in the Lok Sabha elections and claimed 70 per cent of the seats. In 1957, the Con­gress share of the to ta l votes polled was s l ight ly more than 48 per cent — a proport ionate increase of 15 per cent13 over the 1952 p o l l — b u t it could capture on ly about 63 per cent of the seats. Clearly, the d i f ­ferent ia l advantage f rom the reduc­t ion in the number of candidates per constituency was in this instance reaped bv the opposi t ion.

C P I Less Broadly Organised . . . The l u m p i n g of all non-Congress

candidates and votes, as has been done above, has one par t icular dis­advantage: it sheds no l igh t on the pa t te rn of evolut ion of the vo t ing strength of the C P I in the State. Stilly f r o m the discussion so far it

12 This confirms what was apparent from the survey of the 1957 Assem­bly elections, namely, that the decline in the number of candidates resulted in a corresponding increase in the proportion of votes for the major candidates.

13 This is comparable to the propor­tionate increase of 18 per cent for the Assembly elections.

is clear that the C P I is very much less broadly organised in West Ben­gal compared to the Congress: the Par ty on its own offered only 79 candidates in the Assembly elec­tions in 1952, and this number went

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up to a meagre 100 in 1957. In the second General Elections, the C P I forged an electoral al l iance w i t h prac t ica l ly a l l other l e f t - w i n g ele­ments in the State, and ye t the combina t ion could give bat t le to the Congress for on ly 218 of the 252 seats. In the fo r thcoming elections the leftist al l iance led by the C P I is contesting only 228 seats, the Communists themselves p u t t i n g up 132 candidates.

I f i t i s a question of assessing electoral s t rength f r o m the number of candidates offered by a pa r ty , the C P I has obviously a long leeway to make up even in West Bengal before i t can c l a im to be on par w i t h the Congress. However, one m i g h t s t i l l enquire in to the ' dep th ' of influence wh ich the C P I wie lds over the electorate in areas where i ts strength is concentrated. The exercises i n Tables X I and X I I provide some clues to answering the question.

. . , But Catching Up Fast Table XI compares the Congress

and the C P I performances in the Assembly elections in terms of the average number of votes obtained per candidate. W h i l e the average number of votes per Congress can­didate increased by 57 pe rcen t bet­ween the two elections, the average per C P I candidate rose by almost 80 per cent. The sharpest image of the relative change in 'depth ' i s provided by c o l u m n ( 4 ) of the t ab le : the average number of votes per Congress candidate, when ex­pressed as a percentage of the aver­age number of votes per consti tu­ency, moved up f r o m 38-9 to 46 .1 1 4

between 1952 and 1957. In the case of the C P I candidate, it went up f r o m 32.3 to 44.7 . A t ' least in 'depth ' , the average C P I candidate was thus fast catching up w i t h the average Congress candidate.

Th i s impression is conf i rmed by estimates of the re la t ive perfor-mance of the two parties in the L o k Sabha elections given in Table X I I . I n terms o f the average num­ber of votes po l l ed per candidate, the C P I vote increased by more than 77 per cent; the corresponding increase in the Congress vote was less tha'n 50 per cent, As column

14 Since the Congress contested all the seats, these figures actually repre­sent the percentage of total votes obtained by it in the two elections.

( 3 ) shows, the C P I actual ly p o l l -ed more votes per candidate than the Congress in the L o k Sabha elections in 1957.

Left ist All iance Minus P S P Can one relate in any manner a t

a l l the preceding analysis to the prospects of the different parties in the t h i r d General Elections next month? The major change in the West Bengal landscape since the last elections is the w i thd rawa l of the P S P f r o m the l e f t i s t alliance In at least 80 Assembly constituen cies, the all iance led by the C P I w i l l have to compete w i t h the PSP The lat ter i s credi ted w i t h hav ing pockets of influence in 24-Perganas, Midnapore and Burdwan . Even in other areas where i t migh t not be relat ively in f luen t ia l , the ve ry fact that i t would have candidates in the field w o u l d take away some votes f r o m the candidates of the all iance.

The three part ies1 8 w h i c h formed themselves in to the P S P obtained 11.9 per cent of the votes polled in

18 The Kisan-Mazdoor Party, the Soci­alist Party and the Ruikar group of the Forward Bloc.

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w h i c h the fortunes of the left ist combinat ion w o u l d be affected by the spl i t w o u l d also par t ly depend upon the a t t i tude of the marg ina l accretion to the electorate since 1952. I f , as is generally supposed, most of the new ' le f t ' vote follows the C P I l ine, P S P's separate venture need not at a l l arrest the t rend toward polar isa t ion which emerged w i t h the 1957 elections.

At the other end, the Congress w i l l have to encounter some ' r igh t ­is t ' oppos i t ion f r o m the Swatantra Par ty , the Jan Sangh and the H i n d u Mahasahha. But f rom the list of candidates it does not appear that any of these elements would have anyth ing more than a nuisance value.

Conceivably the P S P's separate presence could help the Congress by d i v i d i n g the oppos i t ion vote. An analysis of the figures in Table V suggests the f o l l o w i n g poin ts :

(a) In at least two dis t r ic ts Dar jee l ing and Puru l i a , the P S P does not exist, and so the issue is not relevant.

( b ) In Ja lpa igur i , Cooch Behar, West D ina jpu r , Ma ldah . Bankura , Midnapore , Hooghly , Mursh idabad and Nabadwip , the Congress could hard ly better its 1957 posi t ion in terms of number of seats won. In these distr icts , s p l i t t i n g of the ' le f t ' vote could increase the m a r g i n of Congress victories, b u t is un l i ke ly to give the r u l i n g pa r ty any extra seats.

(c) However, in Burdwan , How-rah , 24-Perganas. and Calcutta the in te rvent ion of the P S P m i g h t wel l give away a number of m a r g i ­nal seats to the Congress, and so affect severely the to ta l electoral performance of the left is t alliance.

15 Per Cent Voles Non-aligned There remains the question of

secular accession of strength on the pa r t of the two leading forces, the Congress and the C P I . In 1957, about 15 per cent of the electorate

West Bengal was s t i l l not aligned either to the Congress or the ' lef t ' . If in the current elections, the Con-nress, on top of ho ld ing on to i ts 1957 posi t ion, cou ld capture even half of this residual of the electo-ate it would be able to command

clear m a j o r i t y of votes in the State. One outs tanding question hat w i l l be answered in the coming

elections is whether the 1957 vote represents the f inal consolidation of the r i g h t - w i n g vote in West Bengal, or whether the Congress is capable of fur ther f o r w a r d thrusts.

The elections w i l l also reveal the pat tern of secular g r o w t h of the C P I. The last two elections were notable milestones for the Par ty . W i t h 79 candidates, i t captured 10.8 per cent of the votes in 1952. This performance w o u l d have been equalled i f the Party 's 100 candi­dates in 1957 could ob ta in as l i t t l e as 13.7 per cent of the votes. Instead, the C P I got 17.8 per cent of the aggregate votes, w h i c h was 30 per cent h igher than what a linear project ion of the 1952 votes w o u l d have yielded. Can the C P I ma in ta in this tempo of advance at the ensuing elections, or is i t that the recent dissensions w i t h i n the Par ty , and the reflected disgrace fo l l owing f r o m the border f r i c t i o n w i t h China, has sapped its popula­r i t y so much that a b ig setback is in store for i t ?

I t wou ld be id le to speculate on the theme at this moment : the electorate in West Bengal w i l l de-' cide the issue. W h a t is possible is to lay down one or two simple tests by which to judge the actual per­formance of the C P I next month . I f , w i t h its 132 candidates, the Party-succeeds in ob ta in ing 23.5 per cent of the total votes cast, i t wou ld have equalled, on a propor t ionate basis, i t s 1957 performance. I f i t obtains more than 23.5 per cent of the votes, the Par ty would have improv­ed its posi t ion in bo th depth and expanse. A lower vote would i m p l y a decline in its s trength since 1957.

To assess the performance of the leftist alliance as a whole w i l l he a different matter. The 1957 elec­tions proved tha t the non-C P I candidates of the alliance tend to fare much worse than the Commu­nist candidates: w h i l e the average C P I candidate polled 44.7 per cent of the votes per Assembly constituency (see Table X I ) th is p ropor t ion was as low as 28-8 per cent fo r the average non-C P I candidate belonging to the left . Even apart f r o m the possible adverse consequences of the P S P's w i t h ­drawal , the aggregate performance of the lef t is t alliance w i l l therefore largely depend u p o n the degree to

w h i c h the non-Communists w i t h i n the all iance succeed in c l i n g i n g on t o the C P I coat-tails. I t i s ent i re ly possible that the C P I m i g h t on i t s o w n a t t a in remarkable success and yet f a i l to car ry a long to v i c to ry the other l e f f candidates.

Manifestoes T H E progress o f the I n d i a n people

depends above al l on their uni ty and cohesion and the integ-g r i t y of our country. Communal and sectarian approaches are not only bad in p r inc ip le , but ha rmfu l in thei r results and weaken the nat ion. Thus i t i s o f p r i m a r y i m ­portance to counter these nar row, disrupt ive and separatist appro­aches and w o r k for the f u l l un i ty and in tegr i ty of the country,

"The Congress has always stood and stands today for a uni ted, non-sectarian and secular I n d i a . I t be­lieves that only on this basis can our country progress and achieve greatness, w h i c h is her due. I t is to ma in ta in and persevere w i t h this basic approach and the policies enunciated in this manifesto that the Congress approaches the vast electorate of I n d i a and seeks its support and cooperation in the migh ty tasks that face our count ry . "

* * *

"The PSP invites a l l Indians to j o i n the common quest for intelle­ctual, aesthetic and mora l efflore­scence and strive for economic and social t ransformat ion whereby the s tubborn inequalit ies of ages are f inally pulverised. Only when the nat ion is d r a w n in to this gallant adventure of hope and achieve­ment that un i ty of nat ional l i f e w i l l be spontaneously realised".

' ' '

"The monopoly of power of the Congress and the b i g major i t ies i ' enjoys in Par l iament and Assem­blies ou t of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to the votes i t receives in elections has become today a positive hindrance to the g rowth of democracy and the advancement of people's cause.

" M o r e than ever before, i t has become today a nat ional necessity to weaken and break this monopoly of power by re tu rn ing in large number Communists and other candidates of Democrat ic Opposi­t i on to Par l iament and the State Assemblies"

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