well, doctor, what have we got, a republic or a

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• “Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?”

• “A republic, if you can keep it.”

Non-Negotiable Information

• Analyze the departure from the Articles of Confederation to the United States Constitution. (e.g. Failures/Successes of Articles, Philadelphia Convention, Federalist Papers, Bill of Rights)

• Understand the events surrounding state vs. federal power. (e.g. Shays’ Rebellion, Rise of Political Parties, Hamiltonian Finances, Taxation, Whiskey Rebellion, Great Compromise)

• Evaluate the challenges facing a nation growing exponentially. (e.g. Land distribution, Native American policy, Slavery policy, Religion, Women’s rights)

• Analyze the use of political power in the early republic. ( e.g. Washington’s departure, Alien and Sedition Acts, Foreign entanglements, The Election of 1800)

• Describe the significance of the Jeffersonian Era. (e.g. Jefferson’s presidency, The Marshall Court, The Louisiana Purchase, Lewis and Clark, Foreign Policy, changing economic philosophies)

• Analyze the social development of the time period, 1800-1816. (e.g. Republican Motherhood, changing literacy, Second Great Awakening)

• Understand the importance of the events surrounding the War of 1812. (e.g. Madison’s leadership, Hartford Convention, The Treaty of Ghent, Foreign Relations, New Orleans)

Give a King a Good Name

• Were the Colonists omnipotent?

• Why would they protect rights more than the British had?

• What role does the “fiction of democracy”play here?

• Jefferson “173 despots in a legislature would surely be as oppressive as one”

The Convention

• 1787• Some delegates are obvious- Washington,

Franklin, Madison• Some are noticeably absent- Jefferson, Adams,

Paine (Europe) • Patrick Henry? Refused to attend- he “smelt a

rat”• Who were the other participants?

– Merchants– Slave owners (19/55 there owned slaves) – “monied men”

Virginia Plan

• 1. Reject State Sovereignty• 2. Republic• 3. Three-tier government

– Lower House-– Upper House-

• Based on population

– Executive – Judiciary

• Chosen by the legislature

• Flawed politically – Too much power to the large states.

New Jersey Plan

• 1. Gave power to raise revenue/control commerce

• 2. Tried to preserve equality of states

– Unicameral legislature

• Neither small nor large satisfied at this point

Great Compromise

• Lower House- Population (Art. I Sec.II)

• Upper House- Equal (Art. I Sec. III)

– Every tax bill must originate in the House

– *State legislators would elect Senators

• Executive

– Electoral College

• Judiciary

– Power not yet specified

– “in one supreme court”

Common vs. Civil

• Common Law-

– Allows for Constitution to be short/flexible

• Civil Law-

– Elaborate legal codes

– Lengthy

– (Ex. India in 1950- 400 articles and runs 200 pages)

The Federalist

• At the height of his writing Madison was producing 1,500 to 2,000 words of argument for the US Constitution every two days. The three gentlemen (Madison, Hamilton and Jay) signed these political papers ‘Publius’. Political papers being signed anonymously was the norm of the day. However, the well-read would know that Publius Valerius Publicola had led the revolt against the Tarquin kings of ancient Rome and subsequently played a leading part in securing the liberties of the people. After you read each excerpt, please answer the questions that follow.

(Federalist No.2- Jay)

• Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government.

(Federalist No. 47- Madison)

• The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.

(Federalist No. 48- Madison)

• It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others.

(Federalist No. 84- Hamilton)

• I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?

(Federalist No. 85- Hamilton)

• A nation, without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible shape.

(Federalist No. 10 – Madison)

• AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction…..

• By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community…..

• The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property…

(Federalist No. 10 – Madison)

• If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote……When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it tosacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.

• By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of twoonly. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression…..

(Federalist No. 10 – Madison)

• a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention……

• A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking….

(Federalist No. 10 – Madison)

• The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

• The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations

(Federalist No. 10 – Madison)

• it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice…

• In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried……

(Federalist No. 10 – Madison)

• The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government…

• The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States…

• In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.

Alexander Hamilton

• Love / Hate Relationships

• Young, ambitious, brilliant man

• Moved to the mainland in 1772

• Treasury Secretary

• Has Washington’s ear

• “Report on Public Credit”

The Dinner

• Why was there such fear of disunion? Why was assumption so threatening? What was going on at this dinner?

• 49, 50, 51•

Assumption

• Define the importance of Assumption in Hamilton’s plan

• What did Hamilton’s program on assumption call for and why would southerners be so upset over this proposal?

• Why would New Englanders be for this proposal?

Redemption

• Bolster gov’t credit while paying dividends to the wealthy

– Ex. Merchants Burrell and Burrell bought $600 worth of Confederation notes, they had a face value of $2500. Their redemption gave them a profit of $1900

Funding

• Proposed to pay off the Burrells with newly issued government securities

• This would become a permanent debt

• Hamilton’s hope:

– Keep high value of gov’t credit

– Tie fortunes of wealthy to success of national government

– (Also enhances his authority) (He likes that)

Assumption Part II

• National Gov’t would take over war debts of states

• Speculation / Corruption run roughshod

• BEFORE Hamilton announces plan….– Ass’t Sec of Treasury and other speculators

used insider knowledge and buy up over ½the depreciated war bonds, then they sell after Hamilton’s announcement

• Congress concerned

• Hamilton next wants a National Bank

Post-Dinner

• Jefferson- whoops. “It was unjust and was acquiesced in merely from a fear of disunion, while our government was still in its infant state”

• Jefferson/Madison/Monroe-enemies of this plan

The Battle

Madison

• Why was he an advocate of a strong national government?– What he expects? Intellectuals / Talented Officials– What he finds? Obnoxious collection of financiers.

Social parasites. • Virginia would have transferred $3 million. Would have

been taxed $5 million. • Virginia was responsible. Paid its debt. Why should

Virginia be responsible for New England?• Saw the plan as an attempt at consolidation. • Madison/Jefferson do not value “paper pushers”• Speculators, investment bankers contributed little to

society. They moved paper and adjusted numbers• LAND mattered to them

Hamilton

• Embraced NY elite because they embraced him.

• Who was Madison to lecture him on the plight of the revolutionary soldier? Soldiers never forced to sell, they chose to sell.

• Wanted less to consolidate debts and more to consolidate allegiance and talents of aristocracy for the betterment of all Americans

• His model? Great Britain-National Bank, regulation of commerce, powerful aristocrats

Jefferson

• Deferred to Madison in this matter. He had just returned from France

• Dinner and private deals? Commonplace

• Saw the Union as more important (at the time)

• Why does Madison back off from original arguments in the House?

– Madison calm and collected. VERY rational.

– Did not think it was helpful to speak in an apocalyptic tone

Entire Episode

• Brings a few issues to the forefront – Sectionalism vs. Nationalism

– Agrarian vs. Commercial

– Impotent vs. Potent Federal Government

– Political Factions

Constitution provides forum for debate to continue