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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA—AFRICA

Iraq - Military units in Baghdad placed’ on alert as rumors of im- pending disturbances persist. UAR intensifies anti-Qasim propaganda and strengthen air defenses near

Singapore — Britain to extend finan- cialaid to Singapore moderates in attempt to prevent overwhelming vic-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 8Apr11l959

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DAILY BRIEF

1 THE COMMUNIST BLOC

I I. ASIA-AFRICA -

Iraq» UAR: In the face of a number of reports that at- tacks into Iraqi territory by UAR-equipped Shammar tribes- men may soon be intensified and of persistent rumors of im-- _

pending internal disturbances, Baghdad on 4 April ordered all divisional security units and all armored units in the cap--

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ital to what is believed to be their highest state of alert.

FAR propaganda has been intensified to exploit tensions rt,

wit ‘n Iraq by spreading stories of major uprisings and army vi mutinies and by establishing a "Voice of Free Iraq" radio

station in UAR territory. Meanwhile, UAR jet fighters have \

\for the first time at Deir-ez--Zor South, '

f nt' On a new airfield in eastern Syria near the Iraqi ro ier, _

2 April, six MIG-17s and one AN-2 transport were there; This deployment probably is designed to cope with reported Iraqi overflights and to provide air reconnaissance for any in-

- r dication of up in connection with recent borde: incidentsg

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(Page 1) (Map)

- *Singapore:fihe British Government, increasingly fear- ful that the Communist-infiltrated Peoples Action party (PAP) -

will swam its moderate o osition in the 30 May Singapore - P PP

general elections, has approved. covert financial moderate party of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock,

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mithe PAP will form the next ‘L;

government, andTthey will proba. y support some selected PAP " candidates, but they hope that their aid to Lim will help his

party to e e from the elections as a significant moderat- ing force (Page 3)

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. Appro\7eE1' rBFRBEase; 2020/02/21 003172476 v v II It THE WEST-

*West Germany: Under strong pressure from leaders of the Christian Dem.ocratic Union (CDU); Chancellor Adenauer accepted. the nomination for the presidency apparently in the hope of playing some role in choosing his successor and retain- ing a voice in the new government. Discontent within the CDU over Adenauer's leadership and methods has been gaining mo- mentum since the opening of the Berlin crisis. Despite public assurances by CDU leaders that foreign policy played no part in the decision to move Adenauer into the largely ceremonial office of the presidency, the action probably stems at least in part from the desire by certain key government supporters for greater flexibility on East-West questions, Economics 1VIinis- ter Erhard will probably be the next chancellor. Although no wholesale changes in major offices are likely before 15 Septem-

ire ome reshufflin before ber, when the presidential term exp‘ ‘s, s '

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that date is possible in order to avoid having - -

ministration during crucial East-West talkst (Pass 4) ,

Greece: Preliminary returns from the 5 April country- wide Greek municipal elections indicate that the Communist-

d EDA h f ‘led in its effort to discredit the sponsore . party as a1 government. However, claims of a "smashing defeat" for EDA appear to be exaggerated. The results do not necessarily indi- at la ti-left'st tr but -u st that the Greek c e a popu r an 1 end, s gge Government's anti-EDA propaganda and pre-election police measures have been effectiveul ‘(Page 5)

*Argentina: The riots of 3 April, ledby the Communists and joined l§_Per'onista extremists, demonstrated the Commu- nists‘ capability for subversion. The Frondizi government has declared at least five Soviet diplomats: persona non grata, charg- ing interference in internal affairs. Although the riots appare:ntly were brought under control rapidly, filers are reports of in- V

creased apprehension, especially among the military, over the government's capacity to meet the threat of continued labor agitation. One military group has reportedly given Frondizi a 30-day ultimatum to rid the governm '

low travelers, and corrupt elementsg (Page 6) "

8 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF ii

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B IWINI1 I"‘""l" Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC (No Back-up Material)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR-Iraqi Situation

On 4 April Baghdad. ordered. all armored units in the cap-- ital and all divisional security units in Iraq to what is believed to be their highest state of alert. This appears to be a reaction to persistent rumors of impending internal disturbances and to the threat of intensified attacks into i

' - equipped Shammar tribesmen.

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The first known move of. UAR regular ground forces towa.rd eastern Syria was observed. on the night of 2-3 April moving toward Deir-ez—Zor,; (ind on 2 April, six MIG-17 (rnsscos)

j and one AN-2 (COLT transport were reliably reported on Deir ez-Zor South airfield

UAR propaganda media have intensified their efforts to ex- ploit tensions within Iraq, They are spreading stories of a major uprising and army mutiny in the Kirkuk area, and of les- ser disturbances and army defections elsewhere. Cairo's Mid- dle East News Agency reports that three Soviet merchant ships Which passed. through the Suez canal on 5 and 6 April carried. "l9,000 tons of military equipment" for Iraq and "855 armed Kurdish volunteers" who allegedly are to enlist in a pro-Com- munist Iraqi "foreign legions" The "volunteers" referred to are, in fact, Kurdish repatriates tron‘: the“USSR. ,.A"Voice of Free Iraq" radio station has been established in Egypt, and a Cairo magazine says that "certain Iraqi personalities" have sought UAR help to set up a "free Iraqi government" in one of the Arab countries.

In addition to alerting military units and strengthening out- posts pear the Syrian border, Baghdad has accelerated expansion3 8 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

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Appr0\1eQf_0[ Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476 h

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of the Communist-dominated Popular Resistance Forces (PRF) and has ordered the immediate issuance of arms to PRF units in northern Iraq. On 6 April Qasim promised amnesty to any Shammar "rebels" who would return peaceably to their Iraqi villages. The sustained UAR pressure--and Qasim’s reaction to it-- t b t h ' tillf th th hldo th '- appear 0 e s rengt ening s ur er e 0 n e ov

of Communist and bro-Communist elements.

—sseRs-I

8 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

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F’7

British Plan Einancial Su;_>:pog_1;t_f;orgiModerate Singapore _ _

_Po1itica1 Party

(fhe British Government has approved significant financial. aid to the party of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, the Singapore People's Alliance (SPA), during its campaign for the 30 May Singapore general election. The previous "hands-off" policy of the British toward the elections stemmed from a desire to avoid any action which might jeopardize their chances of working with the "moderate" wing of the Communist-infiltrated P ple's Action party (PAP) following its anticipated election victoryjfi

éhe British now fear that moderate forces are in danger of be-in swamped by the PAP. This could prove dangerous to Brit- ain's position in Singapore, for it not only would destroy the strongly anti--Communist influence of Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock,f.but also would almost certainly enhance Communist pros-- pects of taking over the PAP. The strongly entrenched PAP Communists presumably would be reluctant to attempt to over» throw the present "moderate" leadership of the party if control of the government rested on a coalition or a narrow majority which required the continued 1 adership of PAP's moderate see» retary general, Lee Kuan Yewj

<::*itain's maximum goal probably is to prevent an absolute majo ty by the PAP in the 51-member legislative assembly. Its minimum aim is to elect enough moderates so that Chief Minister Lim will be able to form an effective moderate opposi-- tion, The British have also indicated that they may support a few selected PAP candidates, probably in order to avoid alienat- ing Lee Kuan Yew, the probable first prime ' '

artiallv self-“governing tate of Singapore)

'S'E€R-E-T-

8 Apr 59 QFMTPAI INTFIIIGFNCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

5:31 IIIIAIQQ Iii 1 I Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

*’ II I. THE WE ST ‘i

EF1??~E€U:*i1§e,1Y_t9rc$‘4c9?f§;?li*d?}l§Br?11_."r§,W!”St German Qhaneoellect Ludwig Erhard, West German economics minister and vice e

chancellor, will probably become the next chancellor, following Adenauer's decision to move into the ceremonial office of Pres- ident. Adenauer apparently preferred to bow out gracefully rather than risk a bitter intraparty struggle, apparently hopi.ng thus to retain some influence in the formation of a new govern- menta Although no changes in the chancellorship are expected before 15 September, when the presidential term expires, some reshuffling of cabinet posts is possible to avoid having a lame- duck administration during forthcoming East-West negotiations. The presidential elections are scheduled for 1 July, and Adenauer is assured of election.

Discontent with Adenauer"s leadership has been gaining mo- mentum within the CDU since the opening of the Berlin crisis-.. One CDU faction led by Bundestag President Gerstenmaier had. differed sharply with Adenauer over foreign policy and has advo- cated a flexible approach to unification, European security, and negotiations with Moscow in general. Gerstenmaier also favored more cooperation with the opposition parties, including the pos- sibility of a "government of national unity." Other CDU elements, meeting in February, considered Adenauer too old and rigid to cope with the Berlin crisis“ The final factor setting off the re- volt may have been Adenaueris instruction to Brentano during the NATO meeting, rejecting the new approaches to unification or European security that had been previously agreed upon. These instructions are reported to have been sent by Adenauer without consultation with the cabinet or party leaders“

Erhard, a professional economist, has been relatively dis- interested in international political affairs and is considered to be substantively weak on foreign-policy questions not involving economic policy. He is decidedly more anti-French and less in favor of European integration than Adenauer, and he has opposeds, on financial grounds, the increasing build-up of the armed forces.

The party will probably choose a foreign minister from among the party leaders who advocate a more flexible approach to East- West negotiations. Adenauer may retain som.e influence on govern- ment policy and in party affairs, but a review of foreign and de- fense policy can be expected. His retirement will probably have a serious impact on West Berlin opinion, w ' ' ' '

T1612! will interpret hms removal as a major concession to Moscow.

8 Apr 59 CEMTDAI |>.rn:|||r;::>.|r~|: m||n:.-rm Page 4, Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

I I Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

Greek cM\mi¢ii2a1c Elecqiiens Despite Greek Government claims that the pro-Commu-

nists suffered a "smashing defeat" in last Sunday's municipal elections, the alleged "solid victory" for progovernment candi- dates should not be regarded as indicating a definite popular trend away from the Communist-sponsored United Democratic Left (EDA). Preliminary reports show increased popular sup- port for the incumbent National Radical Union (ERE), some weakening in the political stature of the EDA, and a further trend toward elimination of the center parties. The local ad- ministrative picture will not be altered significantly, but the government's drive against pro-Communist elements begun before the election may have considerable impact.

The governing ERE entered no official slates and neither did EDA, except in certain isolated centers of known strength such as Piraeus, Mytilini, and Naoussa. Nonetheless, the main contest was between these two parties. EDA was deter- mined to roll up a massive antigovernment vote and to secure popular support for attaining "bourgeois legality." It failed in both attempts, largely because of the effective anti-EDA cam- paign -by the government and because the issues on which it fo- cused, especially Cyprus and missile bases, failed to stir the electorate.

EDA--supported candidates, who as a result of an agree- ment with the Liberal faction led by Sophocles Venizelos ran mostly as Liberals, virtually everywhere received fewer votes than EDA-supported candidates in the national election last May. EDA polled nearly 25 percent of the total vote in 1958. However, according to government statistics, EDA strength in last Sunday's election ran as high as 49 and 56 percent in some localities. Despite the loss in total comparative strength, when viewed in terms of the 1958 parliamentary elections, pro- Communist strength was impressive in several localities.

8 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03172476

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Arssniinec Q§>_mm“11iat§ D@m°1i%tP==1i@_$tPOns Subversive i Capability

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The ability of Argentine Communists to mobilize some 3,000 demonstrators for riots in central Buenos Aires on 3 April, despite a e11-publicized police ban and state-of- siege regulations, éias increased apprehension--especially among the military--over the governments capacity to meet this threat? Worker participation was limited to extremist Peronista 0 The interior minister termed the riots "a typ- ical Communist action, considering the persons who took part, the manner in which it was carried out, and the objectives pursued)‘

izontinuing strikes had weakened confidence in the government to the point where a small determined force could topple it..

\

lone military group had channeled through the army secretary a de- mand that President Frondizi rid the government of Commu--

__

nists, fellow travelers, and corrupt elements within 30 daysi)/

The Soviet Embassy counselor was declared persona non grata on 7 April, and as many as four other Bloc diplomats may be expelled as a result of official investigations indicat- ing foreign Communist participation in the riots. Mexico just took similar action against two Soviet diplomats accused of in.- volvement in the recent railway strikes therei

it Ml Argentine Commu- nis (1, leaders tofiiflocal meetings in late arch that the USSR was supplying them withdollars to fight the Yankees and that the "protest meeting" on 3 April was just the " . . a

Yankee rule in Latin Americal

_SE€'RE‘F

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THE PRESIDENT The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense -

The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force -

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force '

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander , Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific

I The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director

Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman

National Security Agency The Director

National Indications Center The Director

United States Information Agency The Director

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