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Puzzling over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions

Jonathan M. Weinberg and Aaron Meskin

. Introduction: Metaphilosophical !e"lections

#o $hat must a philosophical account o" the imagination be true, and upon $hatresources ma% such an account dra$& Surve%ing philosophical engagement $ith the

imagination in recent decades, $e see that both these 'uestions "re'uentl% receive the

same ans$er: a combination o" the precepts and posits o" ever%da% ps%cholog%, and theintimations and intuitions o" a "ull("ledged philosoph% o" mind. Indeed, man% o" the

'uestions about the imagination that philosophers have $rangled $ith have come "rom a

con"lict bet$een those t$o domains. )or e*ample, one common version o" the so(called

puzzle o" emotions and "iction is generated b% a con"lict bet$een t$o pieces o" "olk ps%cholog%, on the one hand+that $e do not believe that "ictional characters e*ist, and

that $e do "eel real emotions directed at "ictional characters+and a piece o"

philosophical ps%cholog%, on the other+that emotions re'uire belie" in the e*istence o"

their obects.

1

#%pical responses to this puzzle have similarl% dra$n upon an admi*tureo" ordinar% ps%chological concepts and philosophical maneuvering. )or e*ample,

-endall Walton deplo%s the "olk(ps%chological notion o" make(believe to ground hisapproach to the puzzle, and to attempt to "inesse our ordinar% belie" that $e really "eel

emotions to$ards "ictional characters, b% arguing that it is onl% make-believe that $e "eel

such emotions b%, as it $ere, imagining ourselves into the "iction Walton /01, //23.Walton does think that $e "eel $hat he terms 4'uasi(emotions5, b% $hich he means to

re"er to $hatever t%picall% combines $ith belie", evaluation, or assessment to constitute

emotion, and $hich is thus almost e*actl% like an emotion, e*cept "or the missing bit o"

cognition.end p.06

Still, 'uasi(emotions are not emotions, and so the philosophical claim that emotionre'uires belie" is saved. 2

7ur main purpose in this chapter is not to criticize Walton8s account though see belo$,

and indeed see Meskin and Weinberg 9223, but $e share $ith other theorists the sense

that Walton8s account cannot capture the phenomenological robustness o" our a""ectiveresponses to "iction ;arroll //2< =endler and -ovakovich 92263. )or "olk ps%cholog%

o""ers no resources to adudicate the status o" a""ective responses to "iction, and the

standard tools o" philosophical anal%sis are all designed to dra$ sharp lines+and are thus

ill(e'uipped to accommodate the sense in $hich there seems to be something right, %etsomething $rong, $ith sa%ing that our "ictionall% directed a""ective responses reall% are

emotions. And i" $e are restricted to "olk ps%cholog%, philosoph% o" mind, and the tools

o" philosophical anal%sis, then it is hard to avoid the sense that our solution to the parado* o" "iction must also include a de"inite declaration as to $hether such responses

are or are not emotions. Philosophers are le"t, then, needing to make the best o" a bad

situation. We must pick our solution, and then do enough philosophical tap(dancing todistract us "rom the discom"ort that stems "rom having to stipulate one $a% or another on

a claim that tugs us in both directions.

7ur proposal, then, is to break out o" the restriction to "olk and philosophical resources,

and look "or some added help "rom science in solving such philosophical conundrums< or,

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at least, "or those conundrums as the% arise $ith regard to the imagination. Perhaps some

'uandaries are such that philosophical navigation o" them $ill not be assisted b% an%

signi"icant appeal to science+it is hard to see $hat empirical discover% $ill aid us $iththe sorites parado*, "or e*ample+but it should hardl% be surprising that man% puzzles o"

the imagination might begin to dissolve $ith the appropriate application o" cognitive

science. #he imagination, a"ter all, is a "acult% that creatures like us contingentl% possessand deplo% in distinctive $a%s. Such contingencies are ust the sorts o" things that science

+ps%cholog% in this particular case+can help us understand.

Although these claims about the imagination and science are likel% to be uncontroversial,nonetheless it remains di""icult to see how to harness science to help $ith philosophical

puzzles about the imagination. It $ill not do "or philosophers to make a neo(>uinean

attempt to turn such puzzles over to science $holesale. 7ne obvious problem is that such

puzzles ma% not have %et struck the "anc% o" scientists, and it strikes us as perverse "or philosophers to sit idl% b%, $aiting "or scientists to come along and do the $ork "or them.

Moreover, and more importantl%, $hat counts as a scienti"ic ans$er to a scienti"ic

'uestion ma% not count as a philosophical ans$er to a philosophical problem. We hope

thatend p.0?

philosophers $ill be able to learn "rom science, but in a $a% that allo$s "or the survivalo" philosoph% in a recognizable "orm. 3

7ur suggestion is that philosophers interested in the imagination shi"t their methodolog%

"rom the traditional parado*(and(anal%sis model to a more empiricall%(oriented phenomena(and(e*planation model. As $e have ust discussed, $hen philosophers

con"ront a puzzling set o" propositions, their traditional approach is to look "or a $a% to

recon"igure the concepts deplo%ed in the propositions, casting about "or "ormulations that

look su""icientl% natural and motivated "rom the perspectives o" metaph%sics and "olk ps%cholog%, and $hich dissolve the apparent contradiction. We advocate instead that the

puzzling propositions be treated merel% as initial descriptions o" a set o" phenomena "or

$hich the philosopher must no$ seek a good e*planation. Scienti"ic considerations enterin at least t$o $a%s. )irst, the% can provide "urther data against $hich competing

e*planations can be evaluated. Second, the% can be an e*tremel% important source o"

theoretical machiner% to be deplo%ed in candidate e*planations.#he bene"its o" incorporating a bit o" science into our practice go be%ond ust having

more "acts to bounce o"" and more theoretical machiner% to pla% around $ith. @%

adopting a more empirical perspective, the evaluative measures "or candidate

e*planations ma% be trans"ormed. 7n the one hand, an empiricall% driven e*planation o"a phenomenon ma% look a bit mess% "rom the perspective o" the proect o" traditional

conceptual anal%sis see, "or e*ample, =ri""iths8s //03 account o" emotions, $hich "ails

to respect the tidiness o" traditional anal%tic accounts o" the topic3, but it is also true that a bit o" conceptual anal%sis that ma% initiall% appear clear and $ell(motivated ma% look

unmotivated once an empirical perspective is brought to bear. #o sta% in the domain o"

the emotions, consider ho$ an empirical perspective can make the emotion'uasi(emotion distinction seem like an implausibl% ad hoc maneuver.3

7ur strateg% in this chapter is to make the case "or the phenomena(and(e*planation model

b% instantiating it. We $ill "irst articulate an empiricall% in"ormed cognitive architecture

o" the imagination, dra$ing signi"icantl% on $ork in this area b% Shaun Bichols and





Stephen Stich. We $ill thereupon appl% that cognitive architecture to three standing

philosophical problems concerning the imagination: the puzzle o" "iction and emotions

$hich has alread% concerned us here brie"l%3, the puzzle o" imaginative resistance, andthe challenge o" demarcating the suppositionimagination distinction. We $ill sho$ ho$

an appeal to this cognitive architecture can shed ne$ light on each o" these issues, and

make ne$ solutions available that might not have been visible "rom the perspective o"either "olk ps%cholog% or traditional philosoph% o" mind.

end p.00

9. #he Architecture o" the Imagination

While the imagination has been an important topic o" philosophical interest "or centuries,

and our imaginative capacities, particularl% in the conte*t o" pretend pla%, have long beeno" interest to the science o" ps%cholog% Carris 9222: D03, $e are primaril% inspired b%

the $ork on this subect that has been done b% cognitive ps%chologists and empiricall%(

oriented philosophers over the last t$o decades. Imagining and pretending have been

investigated b% these researchers in the conte*t o" their $ork on autism, childhooddevelopment, and the "olk(ps%chological capacit% o" 4mindreading5. While there is still

some dispute about the e*act nature o" the cognitive mechanisms $hich under$rite thesecapacities, $e believe that t$o crucial insights have emerged "rom this research: that

there are signi"icant "unctional similarities bet$een imaginative states and belie" states,

but that distinct cognitive s%stems under$rite our imaginative and do*astic capacities.#he "unctional similarit% bet$een belie"s and imaginings itsel" consists in t$o related

phenomena. )irst, imaginative states and belie" states and the respective s%stems o"

$hich the% are a part3 are "unctionall% similar inso"ar as the% interact $ith largel%3 the

same mental mechanisms. #hat is, b% and large, i" the belie" s%stem takes input "rom or produces output to a cognitive mechanism, then the imagination s%stem does as $ell and

vice versa3. )or e*ample, the belie" s%stem drives various in"erential mechanisms, and

the imagination s%stem does too+the same is true $ith respect to the a""ect s%stems.Second, the relevant cognitive mechanisms treat representations "rom both s%stems in

roughl% the same $a%. 4 In Shaun Bichols8s terms, imaginative states or 4pretense

representations53 and belie"s states are in a 4single code5. As he puts it, 47n the singlecode h%pothesis, i" a mechanism takes pretense representations as input, that mechanism

$ill process the pretense representation much the same $a% it $ould process an

isomorphic belie"5 922E: 3.

@ut, importantl%, the similarit% is not per"ect. #here are some mechanisms $ith $hich the belie" s%stem interacts but the imaginative s%stem does not. )or e*ample, $hile belie"s

o"ten interact $ith our action control s%stem, it seems that imaginings do not t%picall% do

so. Fike$ise, perception almost al$a%s in"luences the contents o" our belie" bo* ver%directl%, but the interaction bet$een perception and imagination is t%picall% much more

tenuous and indirect though see belo$ on 4streaming5 input3.

What is the empirical evidence that supports the claim that imaginative states and belie"states are "unctionall% similar& 7ne source o" evidence comes "rom the $ork on

childhood pretense b% Alan Feslie //Ea 3. #his $ork suggests that children as %oung as

t$o %ears old engage in in"erential processing in the conte*t o" pretending. )urthermore,

the in"erences the% engage in $hile pretending mirror











end p.01

the in"erences the% $ould make in ordinar% li"e. )or e*ample, in the "amous tea(part%

e*periment per"ormed b% Feslie, children are seen to be capable o" making ordinar%in"erences about the e""ects o" upturning cups "ull o" li'uids $ithin the conte*t o"

pretense //Ea 3.

Another source o" evidence that supports the claim o" "unctional similarit% bet$eenimagining and believing can be "ound in the research $hich sho$s that readings designed

to prompt the imagining o" emotionall% laden scenarios can arouse autonomic responses

that $ould be e*pected in non(imaginative conte*ts Fang /1E3. While this does notsettle the 'uestions outlined above about our emotional responses to "iction, it is relevant

to the point at hand as an e*planandum to be accommodated.

#he second insight+that belie"s and imaginings are the products o" t$o distinct cognitive

s%stems+stems largel% "rom the "ruit"ul debate about simulative accounts o" pretenseand imagination that has taken place over the last ten %ears or so. Simulationists, such as

=ordon and @arker //E3 and ;urrie and !avenscro"t 92293, have been impressed b%

the "unctional similarit% bet$een belie"s and imaginings, and inspired b% this

phenomenon to o""er accounts o" pretense and imagining that, in essence, involve theredeployment o" our ordinar% do*astic s%stem. @ut in order to e*plain the $orkings o"

our imagination especiall% in the conte*t o" its engagement $ith "iction3, a separates%stem+distinct "rom belie"+must be posited. 7ur engagement $ith "iction essentiall%

involves interaction bet$een belie" and imagining< e.g. belie"s about genre ma% pla% a

role in the direction o" our imagination, as can belie"s about stars in the conte*t o"theatrical andor cinematic $orks. While our e*perience o" "iction ma% be entirel% in the

head, it is not entirel% in the imagination. And "or this reason, simulationist and

metarepresentational approaches to the imagination $hich tr% to get b% $ith ust the

belie" s%stem $ill not su""ice see Weinberg and Meskin 92263. We $ill thus speak "reel%o" both a 4belie" bo*5 @@3 and an 4imagination bo*5 I@3 throughout the remainder o"

this essa%, although our talk o" 4bo*es5 is meant onl% to re"er to "unctionall% distinct

pieces o" the cognitive architecture, and should not be assumed to have an%neuroph%siological implications. 5

As $e have ust pointed out, man% o" the mechanisms that interact $ith the imagination

are ones that also interact $ith the belie" s%stem. A "e$ such dual(purpose mechanismsare $orth discussing brie"l%: 3 the a""ect s%stems, 93 the monitoring s%stems, 3 the

in"erence mechanisms, E3 the Gpdater, and 63 various domain(speci"ic processes.

3 Affect systems: As noted above, our a""ective responses to "ictional characters and

events have long puzzled philosophers, especiall% since it can seem anend p.0/

intuitive piece o" "olk ps%cholog% that onl% belie"s can properl% be the causes o" such

emotions as pit% and "ear. @ut recent scienti"ic accounts o" the emotions have notobserved this intuition, and the philosophical literature on emotions has re"lected this

shi"t a$a% "rom a strict cognitivism about the emotions. )rom =ri""iths8s //03 Hkman(

inspired a""ect programs to Prinz8s 922E3 embodied perceptions to !obinson8s 92263a""ective appraisals, naturalisticall% minded philosophers have "ollo$ed the lead o" such

ps%chologists as aonc /1E3 and Feou* //?3 in positing non(do*astic triggers "or

our emotions. 7nce the presence o" such accounts loosens the tie bet$een belie" and

a""ect, $e can more easil% accept the idea that representations in the imagination can


























produce emotions as $ell. And indeed, $e argue in Meskin and Weinberg 922 that it is

plausible that the I@ can drive the a""ect s%stems in much the same $a% that the% are

driven b% the @@, and that thereb% the puzzle o" emotions and "iction is dissolved. And as$e shall argue here, that dissolution is ust the beginning o" the philosophical pa%(o""s.

93 Monitoring systems: 7ne noticeable "eature o" our interaction $ith "iction is our

abilit% to e*port, in metarepresentational "orm, the contents o" the "iction. #hat is, $e areable to "orm b% and large3 automaticall% belie"s about $hat is true in the "ictions $ith

$hich $e engage. Co$ is this done& We suggest that monitoring s%stems+posited b%

Bichols and Stich 922a 3 to e*plain some "orms o" sel"(a$areness+$ill be crucial todoing so. As Bichols and Stich point out, a person $ho believes that p is under normal

circumstances3 t%picall% capable o" easil%, accuratel%, and unsel"consciousl% "orming a

belie" $ith the content I believe that p. #he same is true "or man% o" the other

propositional attitudes. )or e*ample, i" %ou occurrentl% desire that p, %ou are t%picall%able+$ith ust a little re"lection+'uickl% and easil% to "orm the belie" that you desire

that p. So too $ith imaginative states. #his capacit% is easil% e*plained b% assuming that

$e are endo$ed $ith monitoring s%stems, $hich "unction b% cop%ing representations

"rom the belie" bo* or desire bo*, or imagination bo*3, pre"i*ing 4I believe that5 or 4Idesire that5 or 4I imagine that53 to them, and inserting the resulting representation back

into the belie" s%stem. 7" course, this much $ill provide a reader o" "iction onl% $ith belie"s about the contents o" their imagination< but since there is an intimate connection

bet$een the contents o" $hat one imagines $hen one reads a "iction and $hat is true in

that "iction, use o" the monitoring s%stems $ill be crucial.3 Inference mechanisms: As $as mentioned above, research b% ps%chologists such as

Feslie //Ea 3 and Carris 92223 provides ample evidence that the imagination interacts

$ith our ordinar% in"erential s%stems in much the same $a% as does the belie" s%stem.

#he patterns o" reasoning in $hich children engage, $hile in the conte*t o" pretense,mirrors their reasoning in ordinar% i.e. non(imaginative3 conte*ts. And this point can be

supported b% care"ul observation o" the $orkings o" ordinar% "ictions, $hich rel% heavil%

on the capacit% o" consumersend p.12

to make in"erences $ithin the conte*t o" their "iction(guided imaginings. It is not ust the

hero in the horror movie $ho h%pothesizes about the origins, nature, and motivations o"the monster+vie$ers o" such "ictions engage in such ratiocination too ;arroll //23.

E3 Updater : A particularl% important piece o" the cognitive architecture "or our purposes

is the mechanism or set o" mechanisms3 that Bichols and Stich 92223 have termed the

4Gpdater5. #his mechanism+perhaps a part o" the in"erence mechanisms+handles thecrucial task o" updating i.e. altering, adding, and deleting3 belie"s in the "ace o" ne$

in"ormation, in order to render the @@ and I@ each internall% consistent. @ut this

mechanism is clearl% re'uired to make sense o" our imaginative engagement $ith "iction,"or $e regularl% update the contents o" the I@ in light o" ne$ input "rom a "iction.

63 Domain-specific processes: #he s%stems mentioned above are ust a "e$ o" the man%

largel% automatic s%stems that $e suspect $ill interact $ith both the I@ and the @@. )olk biolog%, "olk ph%sics, and "olk ps%cholog% 6 all get deplo%ed in our interaction $ith

"iction, so it is reasonable to suppose that the s%stems that under$rite those capacities are

able to interact $ith the I@ in much the same $a% that the% interact $ith the @@. 7 And in

the conte*t o" our discussion o" imaginative resistance, $e are particularl% interested in




















mechanisms that under$rite our moral capacities+that is, the moral udgment s%stems3.

While $e are not prepared to argue at this point that the I@ interacts $ith all the

mechanisms that under$rite ordinar% moral udgments, it is $orth noting that it is crucialto our engagement $ith ordinar% narrative "iction that some moral mechanisms be

engaged b% the imagination. We $ould not be able to make sense o" the punishments and

re$ards that be"all the characters in "ictions+or the moral emotions o" those characters +$ere $e not able to make moral udgments about the "ictional and hence imagined3

events $hich be"all them ;arroll //13. )ollo$ing the narrative connections in much

standard "iction simpl% re'uires moral udgment, because those connections can o"ten beunderstood onl% in moral terms.

end p.1

While the a"orementioned mechanisms interact $ith both belie"s and imaginings, there

are also special(purpose mechanisms that must be posited to make sense o" the $orkingso" the imagination and pretense. We mention t$o o" particular importance:

?3 Inputter : While $e take it that $e are not "ree to believe $hat $e $ant+i.e. do*astic

voluntarism is generall% "alse+b% and large $e are "ree to imagine ust about $hatever

$e $ant.

8

Some mechanism or set o" mechanisms must allo$ us to insert contents, ustabout an% content $hatsoever, into the I@, on the basis o" a decision to do so. We $ill

call $hatever mechanisms subserve our capacit% to imagine $hat $e $ant the 4Inputter5.It is $orth noting that there are at least t$o $a%s in $hich the Inputter ma% $ork to add

contents to the I@+it ma% "unction b% adding one proposition at a time on the basis o"

distinct decisions to do so as in some conscious da%dreaming3, or it ma% involve oneoverarching decision to open the gates, as it $ere, to a stream o" incoming in"ormation

as in the case o" standard "ilm spectatorship3. Perhaps this suggests that there reall% are

t$o distinct mechanisms here. We are currentl% agnostic about the matter, although it

$ill be use"ul belo$ to distinguish bet$een the t$o modes o" Inputting ho$ever the% areimplemented3.

03 Script laborator : Bichols and Stich 92223 point to the need to posit some

mechanism that 4"ills in5 pretend or imaginar% scenarios be%ond $hat $e are e*plicitl%directed to imagine or in"er in the conte*t o" imagining. #he% call this mechanism the

4Script Hlaborator5, and $e "ollo$ their usage belo$. In "act, Bichols and Stich consider

the possibilit% that the Script Hlaborator also serves the "unction that $e have assigned tothe Inputter+that o" providing the initial contents "or imagining or pretending. And

considerations o" parsimon%, as $ell as the apparentl% similar "unctional roles o" the

Inputter and Script Hlaborator, might seem to make this an attractive suggestion. A"ter

all, both the Inputter and the Script Hlaborator seem to $ork b% providing the I@ $ithcontents that are not produced b% some in"erence mechanism or other e.g. the Gpdater3.

#hat being said, it is our contention that the Inputter and the Script Hlaborator can be

use"ull% distinguished. Some o" the argument "or this is laid out belo$, but oneobservation in support o" the point can be made no$: there is a signi"icant distinction to

be made bet$een the generative process o" creating propositional content "or insertion

into the I@ and the process o" putting contents+"rom $hatever source+into the I@. Wetake the Script Hlaborator to subserve generation, $hile the Inputter handles insertion.

end p.19

With this rough sketch o" the architecture o" the imagination in place, 9 $e can turn to our

solution o" the three a"orementioned challenges: the parado* o" emotions and "iction, the







puzzle o" imaginative resistance, and the distinction bet$een imagination and

supposition.

. Hmotions and )iction

!ecall the puzzle o" emotions and "iction described above. !ather than taking thetraditional anal%tic step o" choosing a proposition to discard and then $orking to e*plain

a$a% its appeal, $e suggest that a more "ruit"ul place to start $ould be to canvas the

relevant phenomena and then look "or an empiricall% based "rame$ork $ith $hich toe*plain them. #hank"ull%, the $ealth o" $ork that has been done on the topic makes the

"irst part o" that strateg% "airl% straight"or$ard. #here are, $e take it, "our important

phenomena that an% account o" our emotional engagement $ith "iction needs to make

sense o" c". Meskin and Weinberg 922< Weinberg and Meskin 92263: 3 our a""ectiveresponses to "ictions are phenomenologicall% and ph%sicall% robust< 93 these a""ective

responses are "ictionall% directed i.e. their intentional obects are "ictive3< 3 our

a""ective responses do not result in the "ull range o" behaviors that standard emotions

produce $e ma% cr% and shriek at the movies, but $e do not+at least t%picall%+engagein either "light or "ight3< and E3 such a""ective response have an ambiguous relationship

to "ull("ledged emotional responses+$e are pulled both to$ards categorizing theseresponses as emotions and a$a% "rom such a classi"ication.

7ur suggestion is that the cognitive architecture outlined in Section 9 is particularl% $ell

suited to e*plain these phenomena. )or i" the imagination s%stem is capable o" driving thea""ect s%stems, then $e should e*pect that interacting $ith $orks o" "iction+$orks

$hich, b% their ver% nature, are designed to engage the cognitive imagination+$ill o"ten

cause a""ective responses< hence, $e have an e*planation "or 3 above. Moreover, that

the representations in the imagination are o" the same s%ntactic and semantic "orm as therepresentations in the belie" bo* provides a natural e*planation "or the "act that our

imagination(driven a""ective responses are "ictionall% directed phenomenon 93 above3.

)or it is plausible that a""ective states and processes t%picall% inherit their intentionalend p.1

obects "rom the cognitive states that produce them+a belie" o" the "orm 4#hat snake is

poisonous5 'uite o"ten generates "ear o" the reptile in 'uestion. #he same is plausibl% trueabout imaginative states and the a""ective responses that the% drive. #he "act that our

imaginativel%(driven a""ective responses do not result in the "ull gamut o" behavioral

responses can be e*plained b% appealing broadl% to the "unctional dissimilarities bet$een

belie" states and states o" imagining and, more speci"icall%, b% pointing out the obvious"act that man% behaviors re'uire relevant motivational input i.e. not simpl% cognitive

input "rom the belie" bo* or the imagination bo*3. While a belie" that one is being

threatened b% a tiger $ill t%picall% interact $ith a standing3 desire not to be harmed andresult in "light behavior, imagining that one is threatened b% a tiger does not interact in

the same $a% $ith that standing desire. So 3 is naturall% e*plained. )inall%, the

"unctional similarit% but non(identit% bet$een believing and imagining helps e*plain E3 +the ambiguous nature o" "iction(driven a""ect. #o the e*tent that $e "ocus on the "act

that man% ordinar% emotional responses are caused b% belie"s, but a""ective responses to

"iction are caused b% distinct cognitive states i.e. imaginings3, and moreover, that belie"(

caused a""ect ma% interact $ith our motivational and action(production s%stems in a $a%



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that imagination(caused a""ect ma% not 10 +to the e*tent that $e "ocus on such

di""erences, $e $ill tend to resist characterizing the latter as "ull("ledged emotions. @ut to

the e*tent that $e "ocus on the "unctional similarit% bet$een belie" and imagination, as$ell as the phenomenological and biological similarities bet$een "ictive and non("ictive

a""ect, $e $ill be pulled to$ards assimilating "ictionall% driven a""ect to the general

categor% o" the emotions. So, b% taking each such inclination as a datum to be e*plained,and not an intuition to be re"ereed, the naturalistic approach can score as a success $hat

the more traditional approach must count as an unsolved problem.

E. Imaginative !esistance

7ne puzzle about the imagination that has been o" particular interest to philosophers over

the last t$o decades is the so(called puzzle o" imaginative resistance 4so(called5 since, asa number o" commentators have pointed out and as $e shall discuss belo$, there are in

"act a range o" distinct, related puzzles here3.

We begin $ith #amar =endler8s 92223 characterization o" the puzzle $hich $as "irst

introduced b% Moran //E3 and Walton //E3: ho$ to make sense o" 4our comparativedi""icult% in imagining "ictional $orlds that $e take to be morall% deviant5 =endler

9222: 6?3. #he imagination is largel% unconstrained b% our non(moral belie"s< i.e. $e can, b% and large, imagine things that are inconsistent $ith our non(moral belie"s. Ket it seems

signi"icantl% constrained b% our

end p.1Emoral attitudes. )or e*ample, it is "airl% eas% to imagine $orlds in $hich cats can "l%, or

in $hich slaver% is believed to be ust, but it is comparativel% di""icult to imagine $orlds

in $hich it is morall% acceptable to torture "l%ing cats "or no reason, or in $hich slaver%

is ust and not simpl% believed to be so3. Wh% is this so&In "act, the puzzle o" imaginative resistance does not appear to be simpl%, or perhaps even

primaril%, a moral puzzle. As Stephen Kablo 92293 and @rian Weatherson 922E3 have

pointed out, there are a range o" non(moral cases that generate similar phenomena. #heimagination is onl% largely unconstrained b% non(moral belie"s< it can be di""icult to

imagine $orlds that are inconsistent $ith our aesthetic, semantic, and metaph%sical

belie"s too. So it $ould be a mistake to assume that the moral phenomenon that =endlerdescribes deserves distinctive treatment although it $ould be ust as mistaken to assume

$ithout argument that all these phenomena call "or the same e*planation3. Moreover, the

puzzle o" imaginative resistance is not simpl% a puzzle about difficulty in imagining. As

=endler hersel" argues, un$illingness, rather than di""icult%, ma% pla% some signi"icantrole in e*plaining some o" the relevant phenomena: $hen the reader is asked to imagine a

morall% reprehensible vie$, she ma% cease so to imagine out o" a desire not 4to e*port

L"rom imagination back to belie" $a%s o" looking at the actual $orld $hich she does not$ish to add to her conceptual repertoire5 =endler 9222: 003.

So $e suggest dividing the broad set o" phenomena about our resistance to imagining

certain contents that are inconsistent $ith our belie"s and attitudes into t$o distinct puzzles: the pu!!le of imaginative refusal and the pu!!le of imaginative blockage. #he

"ormer has to do $ith our un$illingness or even "lat(out re"usal3 to imagine certain

contents< the latter $ith the di""icult% $hich ma% rise to "ull("ledged incapacit%3 o"

imagining such contents, no matter ho$ $ell(motivated $e are to tr%.

















In the remainder o" this section, $e shall "ocus on the puzzle o" imaginative blockage,

although $e shall have a bit to sa% about imaginative re"usal along the $a%. It is our

contention that the architecture that $e have laid out above has all that is re'uired toe*plain the phenomena that =endler and others have described so richl%. @ut "irst, $e

should sa% a "e$ $ords about alternative approaches to solving the puzzle. 7n our vie$,

e*tant proposals to solve the puzzle o" imaginative resistance have been signi"icantl%hampered b% an un$illingness to go be%ond the limited resources that "olk ps%cholog%

and metaph%sics can provide.

)olk ps%cholog% brings a mi*ed bag o" e*planator% resources to bear on the $orld,including appeals to propositional attitudes, the emotions, and such notions as agenc% and

responsibilit%. =enerall%, "olk ps%cholog% "ocuses on and appeals to aspects o" our

ps%cholog% that have some sort o" phenomenological presence. @ut $e do not "ind "olk

ps%cholog% able to o""er much to e*plain the unconscious or tacit aspects o" ourcognition, e*cept inso"ar as it treats unconscious states as merel% 4hidden5 versions o"

their conscious brethren.

end p.16

#hat8s part o" $h% it is appropriate to attribute to )reud the discover% o" the unconscious,and also $h% that discover% "irst took the "orm o" positing unconscious versions o" the

t%picall% conscious belie"s and desires o" ordinar% "olk ps%cholog%. So the $orkings o"man% o" the various and sundr% cognitive components $e identi"ied in Section 9 simpl%

lie be%ond "olk ps%cholog%8s reach. #his includes the ver% mechanisms o" "olk

ps%cholog% itsel" $hich are, $e suspect, domain(speci"ic processes3. We there"ore predict that, $hile "olk ps%cholog% might help e*plain imaginative re"usal+since

resistance and the desires that under$rite it tend to be phenomenologicall% salient+

imaginative blockage $ill prove too e*perientiall% thin to "all $ithin its e*planator%

ambit. #he "eeling o" blockage is, a"ter all, not much more than an e*periencedincapacit%, perhaps combined $ith a sense o" "rustration $ith the author $hose $ork

might thus be asking the impossible o" us. It o""ers to introspection no sense o" why $e

"ace such an incapacit%, and this is surel% part o" $h% it has remained an interesting philosophical problem.

)or e*ample, as noted above, =endler argues that paradigmatic cases o" moral

imaginative resistance in the conte*t o" "iction are rooted in a reader8s un$illingness toconsider in the imagination that $hich she $ould not $ant to carr% over into her belie"

s%stem. #his e*planation ma% account "or some imaginative re"usal, in particular cases o"

"iction in $hich $e might reasonabl% take ourselves to have been invited to engage in

such e*port. @ut it does not even handle all cases o" re"usal, since it seems possible togenerate re"usal even in conte*ts in $hich e*port is not at issue. )or e*ample, even i" $e

$ere e*plicitl% to disclaim an% intentions o" e*portation, $e e*pect the average reader

$ould e*hibit some re"usal at being invited to imagine various graphicall% horrible events be"alling them or their loved ones. Perhaps our account in Section ma% help in such an

e*planation: because a""ect can be produced b% representations in the I@, imagining such

events $ould have unpleasant emotional e""ects.3 And this e*portation(re"usal accountdoes not even begin to e*plain imaginative blockage, and philosophers such as

Weatherson and Kablo have documented several cases $here it seems that $e cannot

imagine various things, no matter ho$ much $e ma% $ant to do so.








We turn no$ to the other machine in the philosopher8s toolkit that is "re'uentl% deplo%ed

here, metaph%sics. Such notions as supervenience and metaph%sical necessit% have been

deplo%ed in popular accounts o" imaginative resistance, perhaps most "amousl% b%Walton, $ho argued //E3 that our resistance to imagining moral "alsehoods stems in

large part "rom the "act that the moral supervenes on the non(moral. 11 Ket it is clear that

metaph%sical notions by themselves can do little e*planator% $ork. We $ould not e*pectour imaginations to be constrained b% the ver% man% metaph%sical necessities o" $hich

human cognition is presumabl% ignorant, like $aterNC 9 7 in pre(chemistr% da%s< nor

end p.1?has it ever been constrained b% the putative supervenience o" the mental on the ph%sical.

And indeed, even no$, "ull% cognizant o" the chemical "acts and the necessit% o" that

identit%, $e suspect that $e $ould "eel no blockage $hen engaging, sa%, in a "antas%

"iction in $hich $ater is a unitar% element. #o ackno$ledge that $hat $e are imaginingis that $ater is unitar%, one need not take us thereb% to have invalidated the kind o"

imaginationDpossibilit% link so "avored b% man% metaph%sicians. See e.g. Cill, ;hapter

.3 #here are some standard maneuvers here. Proponents o" scienti"ic essentialism can

reinterpret such imaginings as perhaps onl% epistemic possibilities o" a sort< or perhaps"or our purposes $e need onl% a notion o" "ictional possibilit% that is $eaker still than the

epistemic modalit%. @ut our point is that metaph%sicians $ould need to appeal to some such machiner% to e*plain these imaginings away< and their having to do so is evidence

"or our claims here that the metaph%sics b% itsel" can8t do much $ork in accounting "or

imaginative blockage.#he appeal to ps%cholog%, then, is inevitable. Metaph%sics can thus enter into the game

onl% b% $a% o" a bit o" ps%cholog%, i" one contends that perhaps it is the noticed or

attended to impossibilities that prompt blockage. )or e*ample, in his //2, ;urrie

proposes a ps%chologized account o" truth in "iction, and challenges the more purel%metaph%sical accounts "ound in Fe$is /013. 7ne advantage he claims "or his account is

that Fe$is8s account has trouble making sense o" "ictions $ith an% impossible contents

$hatsoever, $hereas his account correctl% predicts that $e $ould have no di""icultiesengaging $ith a "iction in $hich =Odel8s Incompleteness #heorem is sho$n to be "alse+

at least in part because that theorem is so complicated that someone could $ell believe in

its negation $ithout ever noticing that it $as, in "act, impossible.Weatherson 922E3 attempts a highl% sophisticated version o" a metaph%sics(plus("olk(

ps%cholog% account< roughl% speaking, $hat prompts imaginative blockage is $hen $e

are instructed to imagine some claim $hich could be true onl% in virtue o" some lo$er(

level "acts, but $e are also "orbidden to imagine an% lo$er(level "acts $hich $ould makethe higher(level claim true. 7ne e*ample involves a "iction that invites us to imagine that

an obect is a television set, also that it is perceptuall% indistinguishable "rom a kni"e and

"ork.3 Ket, b% his o$n lights, he cannot e*plain 4#o$er o" =oldbach5(t%pe cases in $hichimagining a mathematical or other conceptual3 impossibilit% seems crucial to

appreciation o" the "iction, and instead argues that $e or at least man% o" us3 cannot, in

"act, imagine their contents. @ut $e "ind this claim implausible. #o read 4#o$er o"=oldbach5 $ithout imagining that 60Q9 is to "ail "ull% to engage $ith the stor%< and to

do so in a $a% that obscures the impossibilit% o" $hat has been imagined is to "ail to

appreciate the stor%. 12 #he robust $a% in $hich $e can make sense o" the events o" the

stor%, "ind a global coherence in its plot, and udge












end p.10

an overall rightness in the $a% its various pieces "it together+these aesthetic "acts place

a high burden o" proo" on an%one $ho $ould argue that $e do not, in "act, imagine that60 does not e'ual 9 at the relevant parts o" the stor%.

So neither metaph%sical impossibilit% itsel", nor appeal to unsatis"iable in(virtue(o"

relations, can e*plain the blockage phenomena. 7ur strateg% is to take the insights o" themetaph%sical approach, but transpose them more "ull% into a ps%chological ke%. We

claim that the con"lict involved is not bet$een "ictional claims and metaph%sical

necessities, nor bet$een supervenient and subvenient levels o" the "ictional $orld, but bet$een di""erent pieces o" our cognitive architecture. We appeal to the account o" the

cognitive architecture o" the imagination sketched in Section 9. 13 7" the large host o"

usuall% automatic s%stems that manipulate the I@, several o" them can both add

representations to, and remove representations "rom, the I@. Some o" them are I@(speci"ic mechanisms, like the Script Hlaborator, but because this is a h%brid or 4single

code53 architecture, man% o" them operate more t%picall% on the @@, including various

modular reasoning s%stems. #hus it is possible to get a con"lict bet$een these various

s%stems+in particular, a situation ma% arise in $hich one s%stem most t%picall% theInputter3 $ill insert a representation and attempt to maintain its presence even $hile

another most t%picall% the Gpdater3 $ill tr% to remove it. And that, on our account, ise*actl% $hat happens in cases o" imaginative blockage. 14

Fet us start $ith a simple case, and $ork up "rom there. Co$ is it that $e t%picall% cannot

imagine, "or e*ample, bald contradictions& #o do so $ould be to "ind both a p and a p representation in the I@. @ut the Gpdater $ill notice the contradiction, and remove at

least one o" the o""enders. #hat8s $hat $ould happen $ith a similar con"lict bet$een t$o

belie"s, and the single(code approach considers the I@ and the @@ both to be generall%

subect to the same sorts o" coherence(driven revision processes. We can attempt to keepthe contradiction in the imagination, b% directing the Inputter to reinsert the

representation< but again it or the other3 $ill automaticall% be taken a$a%. A component

o" our automatic cognition $ill simpl% not permit the contradiction to remain. So long asthe Gpdater is active, and $e are not given some $a% o" disguising the contradiction in

'uestion+sa%, b% trans"orming it into a more unsurve%abl%

end p.11complicated contradiction+then $e ust can8t keep the representation in the I@. We ust

"ind it unimaginable. 15

Bo$, let us consider the paradigm case o" blockage "rom the literature on "iction: moral

"alsehood. Suppose that one is reading a piece o" "iction, and that ever%thing has beengoing smoothl%+the automatic s%stems have had no problem enabling us to compl%

harmoniousl% $ith the instructions o" the author+$hen $e reach an invitation to

imagine some morall% abhorrent proposition A. 7ur anal%sis is that a set o" di""erentcognitive s%stems are no$ in con"lict: $e insert A into the I@ via the Inputter< but a

moral udgment s%stem $ill respond to the morall% salient "eatures o" the scenario and

place A in the I@< and at the same time, the Gpdater registers the resulting con"lict. 16

#his sets the stage "or the blockage.

Gnder some circumstances, $hen $e run into such a con"lict in the imagination, $e

simpl% end up $ith either the A or A removed b% the Gpdater. @ut ever%thing is not

e'uall% "ungible: some contents have been inserted b% specialized mechanisms, most






t%picall% the domain(speci"ic s%stems discussed earlier, $hich $ill continue to insert

them even should the Gpdater kick them out. And the Inputter itsel" is importantl% unlike

an%thing that creates belie"s, especiall% in that $e can stipulativel% undertake to treatsome o" its deliverances to the I@ as sacrosanct. Most o" the time $hile $e8re engaging in

a "iction, once $e8ve been instructed to imagine p, $e $ill onl% allo$ p to be

permanentl% removed "rom the I@ should $e come to believe that $e are no longer soinstructed e.g. i" $e take ourselves to no$ be instructed to imagine that some character

R $as dreaming that p< c". the /16D? season o" Dallas3. 7ur h%pothesis is that t%pical

cases o" blockage in "iction $ill involve con"licts bet$een a stipulated content, on the onehand, and on the other, a content produced b% a modular s%stem such as a moral

udgment s%stem as in our current e*ample3 or an arithmetic s%stem in the 4#o$er o"

=oldbach53. #he con"lict cannot be de"used b% simpl% reecting either content, then, since

"or di""erent reasons neither content can be easil% removed "rom the I@+one o" them is"i*ed as a part o" compliance $ith the instruction to imagine, and the other is "i*ed b% a

mechanism $hose "unctioning lies outside the range o" the Gpdater. I" $e8re not engaging

in a "iction, then most likel% $e8ll ust cease attempting to Input the problematic

representation. I" $e are engaging in a "iction, but the problematic proposition is notcentral to the "iction8s progress,

end p.1/$e might simpl% choose to disregard this one invitation, and continue other$ise

unhampered $ith our engagement $ith the "iction. @ut sometimes there8s no $a% to

imagine the rest o" the $ork $ithout imagining the problematic proposition, and $e canonl% resolve the blockage b% disengaging "rom the "iction altogether.

In the case o" the morall% abhorrent propositions, then, it is important that the relevant

moral udgment s%stems act on the I@ $ithout themselves being representations in the I@,

and thus $hen the Gpdater removes the A representation, another s%stem $illimmediatel% be putting it back in. 17 Its onl% $a% to resolve the con"lict $ould be to

remove A+but it $ould be doing so even $hile $e, in tr%ing to compl% $ith the "iction,

persist in attempting to Input that A. At that point, $e can no longer proceed $ith ourattempt to imagine A. Cence, $ith cases o" blockage $e t%picall% but onl% t%picall%3

have no option but to decline the invitation to imagine altogether: $e have been asked to

do something that $e do not %et see ho$ to do.#hat 4%et5 is important, though. )or $e ma% be sho$n some trick, some means o"

redirecting our attention, that can prevent the automatic s%stems "rom doing their usual

ob. We mentioned earlier the possibilit% o" re"ormatting o""ensive representations so that

their con"licts might "l% beneath the radar o" the Inputter. Surel% $e do this not ust inthe I@ but in the @@ as $ell, as in cases o" cognitive dissonance.3 7ther such tricks might

include the morall% and a""ectivel% disabling conditions o" man% cartoons, $hich keep us

"rom attending to the prima "acie moral demands o" sentient creatures like Wile H.;o%ote or a""% uck, enabling us to take pleasure in a $orld $here their pains are

morall% nugator%, or perhaps even praise$orth%. Similarl%, some science "ictions

s'uiddishl% hide their time(travel parado*es behind an ink cloud o" uninterpreted techno(sounding gobbled%gook, $hich allo$s us to imagine that there8s some e*planation,

be%ond our ken, "or the prima "acie parado*ical events, and thereb% rela* our impulse to

seek out the impossible and allo$ ourselves, $illing suckers, to be dragged along in the

stor%8s tentacles.



7ne rare but important trick "or handling blockage does not circumvent it, but rather

steers straight into it. As $e emphasized earlier, appreciating =endler8s 4#o$er o"

=oldbach5 re'uires that $e look at its impossibilit% head on. It is $orth noting the sortso" devices =endler deplo%s to allo$ us to do so: the appeal to the Almight%< the $inking

humor< and, above all, the $a% the stor% o""ers something to do $ith the usuall%

unsustainable proposition that 60 "ails to e'ual 9. We normall% cannot imagine such athing, because $e cannot see an% $a% to do so. #he representation slips a$a%

automaticall% as soon as $e consider it. @ut =endler8s stor% doesn8t ust ask us to imagine

it< it also tells us how to do so+"or e*ample, b% considering that it entails the "alsit% o"=oldbach8s ;onecture, and

end p./2

that gathering "ive mathematicians and seven mathematicians in one place $ill not

constitute a gathering o" t$elve mathematicians. We ma% not imagine it as e""ortlessl%and automaticall% as $e do contents that do not violate a modular s%stem, but $ith the

author8s help $e can sustain it in the imagination $ith some modicum o" e""ort. 18

@ut, $ithout the aid o" such devices, $e are blocked. Attempting to imagine A, $e can

cast about "or a $a% to consider the morall% abhorrent proposition $ithout gettingentangled $ith the output o" the moral udgment s%stems, but none $ill prove easil%

"orthcoming. So, $e are stuck: $e are instructed to do something that $e are simpl%unable to do.

7ur account easil% generalizes to other cases o" blockage reported in the literature. Most

t%picall%, one o" the s%stems involved in the con"lict $ill be the Inputter itsel", although$e8re not sure $hether this is a necessar% condition on blockage. epending on the other

s%stem involved, $e might generate di""erent sorts o" blockages. 7"ten the con"lict is not

bet$een the initiall% imagined proposition, but some other proposition that $e

automaticall% derive "rom it. )or e*ample, $e Input A to the I@< some in"erence s%stemnotices that A entails @, and so adds @ to the I@< some other modular s%stem places @ in

the I@< and the Gpdater notices the con"lict. In such a case, @ cannot be removed,

because it is automaticall% produced b% a modular s%stem. At this point, our imaginationis st%mied, and $e have no choice but to opt out o" imagining both A and @.

Although $e think that modular s%stems are t%picall% implicated in the more interesting

cases o" blockage, it is also possible to generate cases $here the con"lict arises "rom t$oseparate products o" the Inputter. #he e*plicit contradiction case $e started $ith $ould

be o" this sort, but o" course the con"lict can arise more indirectl%, bet$een an Inputted

proposition and a proposition in"erred "rom another Inputted proposition. In Weatherson8s

cases o" un"ul"illable 4in virtue o"5 relations, the in"erence in 'uestion is "rom somerealizable state o" a""airs to its being realized in some $a% or other< but a "urther

imagined content blocks an% such realization. 19

6. Imagination and Supposition

7ur ordinar% language terms 4imagine5 and 4suppose5 seem to pick out t$o closel%related but distinct mental activities. 7n the one hand, the% look as i" the% have much in

common, since the% both seem to be distinct "rom belie" e.g. neither is governed b%

norms o" truth, and both e*hibit a voluntarism that is decidedl%

end p./



non(belie"(like3 but are nevertheless both belie"(like to a signi"icant e*tent. 7n the other

hand, it has seemed to man% that there must be a di""erence bet$een the t$o states, since

$e "ind it eas% to suppose things that $e cannot or cannot easil%3 imagine =endler9222< Weatherson 922E3. In particular, $e generall% have no trouble supposing an%thing

at all "or the sake o" reductio in a logic class, but the imagination as $e have discussed

above3 is not so "ree. Philosophers have $ondered $hat e*plains this di""erence. @ut, ustas $ith the puzzles o" "ictive a""ect and imaginative resistance, the tools o" traditional

philosoph% are simpl% unable to carve imaginative nature at the right oints.

)or e*ample, Weatherson has proposed that imagination, but not supposition, mustal$a%s be "ine(grained, i.e. "illed in $ith signi"icant detail Weatherson 922E3. @ut in the

course o" man% imaginings, $e do not notice that m%riad aspects o" $hat $e imagine are

onl% imagined in coarse(grained detail. #o take t$o $idel%(per"ormed imaginings, $e

doubt that either the its%(bits% spider8s $aterspout ascent or Fondon @ridge8s dilapidationare t%picall% imagined $ith much speci"icit%. )or our purposes, that his proposed account

o" the distinction "ails is less interesting than $hat $e suspect is the e*planation "or its

apparent attraction in the "irst place: namel%, $hen one considers paradigm cases o"

supposition and imagination, something like a di""erence in grain can indeed be observed.And i" one approaches the issue o" the suppositionimagination distinction too

traditionall%, it can be hard to see $hat "urther resources could be brought to bear on theissue+and so an inessential di""erence bet$een some cases gets rei"ied into an attempted

anal%sis o" all cases. Similar problems "ace =endler8s account o" the distinction. She

claims that 4imagination re'uires a sort o" participation that mere h%pothetical reasoningdoes not5 =endler 9222: 123, and that this suggests 4that imagination is distinct "rom

belie", on the one hand, and "rom mere supposition on the other5 9222: 13. Inso"ar as

=endler understands participation as involving sel"(directed udgments, as is suggested(

b% her claim that $e 4take ourselves5, $hen imagining that M holds, to be 4implicated inthe $a% o" thinking that M presupposes5 9222: 123, $e see no reason to think that this

carves imagination and supposition o"" neatl% "rom one another. )or there is no reason to

think that imagining is essentially participator% in this sense3 rather than merel%typically participator%. )or similar reasons, Peacocke8s /163 distinction bet$een

supposition and 4the phenomenologicall% distinctive state5 o" imagining is e'uall%

problematic, since imaginative states need not involve phenomenolog% e.g. in theconte*t o" ver% long novels it is unlikel% that each proposition that %ou imagine has

associated phenomenolog%3, and there is no reason to think that suppositions cannot be

phenomenologicall% rich e.g. 4suppose that there $as a house that looked e*actl% like

%ours e*cept it $as le"t(right mirror(inverted53. 20

@etter, then, to enumerate a broader set o" phenomena, no one o" $hich ma% be su""icient

to establish a sharp distinction, but $hich collectivel% can provide

end p./9the e*plananda "or a richer architectural account. We $ill ust suggest "ive here, as

enough to begin to motivate our account+but remember that, in principle, our method

supports recruiting as large a data set as ma% prove relevant.Cere are some basic aspects o" $hat $e mark o"" in ordinar% practice as 4imagining5 or

4supposing5.


















i3 When supposing that p, one t%picall% onl% "ollo$s out p8s conse'uences broadl%

construed3< in imagining, one "re'uentl% embellishes p in arbitrar% $a%s. #his

di""erence seems to be under$ritten b% di""erent norms that govern the practices in$hich supposition and imagination usuall% take place. )or e*ample, $hile it is

per"ectl% appropriate to embellish in the conte*t o" engaging imaginativel% $ith

"iction, the norms that govern the practice o" using supposition in indirect proo" seemto prohibit embellishment.

ii3 As described above, man% things can be easil% supposed. Indeed, it seems that

anything can be easil% supposed, even patent contradictions and ethicall% repulsive propositions. @ut as $as also discussed above, imagining has some albeit unusual3

sticking points. #hat is, there is some degree o" both imaginative blockage and

imaginative re"usal, but little suppositional re"usal and still less perhaps no3

suppositional blockage.iii3Supposition8s t%pical epistemic roles are establishing conditionals via h%pothetical

argument, and as the basis "or arguments b% reductio. Imagining8s t%pical epistemic

role is in demonstrations o" possibilit%, not in"re'uentl% to be then deplo%ed as

countere*amples to arguments.iv3Supposition is almost al$a%s used "or epistemic purposes, though it can be used "or

"airl% specialized recreational purposes, such as pla%ing $ith logic puzzles.Imagining, on the other hand, can be used epistemicall%, but is deplo%ed in a much

larger range o" activities, including the construction o" and engagement $ith "ictions,

role(pla%ing games, and da%dreaming.v3 It is rare to con"use either supposing or imagining $ith believing, 21 but it seems

"airl% likel% that $e commonl% con"use supposing and imagining $ith one another.

A supposition ma% slide into a da%dream via "ree association i" one is not pa%ing

close attention, "or e*ample, and it ma% be impossible to sa% $here the one activit%leaves o"" and the other commences.

Bo$, none o" these e*plananda provide us $ith the means o" constructing a condition

that applies to all instances o" imagining and none o" supposing or vice versa3. @ut,$hen considered in light o" the single(code architecture, the% suggest an entirel% di""erent

kind o" $a% o" distinguishing supposing "rom

end p./imagining: they are mental activities which involve different characteristic sets of

cognitive processes engaging with the I". Moreover, "or both supposing and imagining,

and "or each process in the architecture, one can speci"% $hether its engagement is

t%pical, at%pical, or variable. 22

Hngagement $ith the monitoring s%stems seems to be t%pical o" both, in that $e have no

trouble $hatsoever "orming belie"s about $hat $e are imagining or supposing. Similarl%,

both imaginings and supposings are o"ten initiated b% our decisions to consider particular propositions, and thus use o" the Inputter is t%pical "or both although there appear to be

di""erences $ith respect to ho$ the Inputter "unctions in the t$o cases< see belo$3.

In"erence s%stems are almost al$a%s deplo%ed in the imagination+perhaps "reeda%dreams do not use them, but these are a relativel% in"re'uent "orm o" imagining+and

are part and parcel o" supposition.

It is rare "or us to engage in imagination $ithout deplo%ing man% o" our content(speci"ic

s%stems. As noted earlier, "or e*ample, moral evaluation is a necessar% component o" a



great deal o" our engagement in "iction. And even i" $e sometimes engage in stories $ith

"antastic creatures or $ondrous technologies, nonetheless such stories t%picall% e*ploit,

rather than contravene, the basic tenets o" "olk biolog% or "olk ph%sics. With supposition,ho$ever, $e "ind that some, but not all, instances recruit these s%stems. When a

philosopher teases out the sparsest o" implications "rom a set o" premises, she ma% $ell

suspend the use o" the content(speci"ic s%stems. @ut $hen a detective engages insupposition to determine the conse'uences o" a h%pothesis as to ho$ the murder might

have been committed, she $ill make use o" a $ider range o" cognitive resources. Such

activit% ma% t%picall% be categorized as supposition, and not imagining< the phrase 4Isuppose5 or 4suppose that5 is o"ten used to introduce such activities. 23 We suspect that the

norm "or such ratiocinative activit% is to reason coldl% and dispassionatel%, and thus

$ithout bringing the a""ect s%stems on(line, and that this norm o" a""ectlessness largel%

e*plains $h% such activities are labeled 4supposition5 more o"ten than 4imagination5.end p./E

With the Gpdater, ho$ever, $e begin to see di""erences bet$een the t$o kinds o" mental

activit%. 7ur imaginings usuall% have a sel"(consistenc% en"orced b% the Gpdater again,

e*cept perhaps in "ree da%dreaming3. @ut $e are rarel% called upon to en"orceconsistenc% in a supposition< in cases o" indirect proo", $e actuall% derive the

contradiction, and then emerge "rom the supposition and dra$ the desired conclusion: i.e.the negation o" the proposition introduced b% the Inputter to commence the supposition.

#he t$o s%stems that most clearl% distinguish imagination and supposition are the a""ect

s%stems and the Script Hlaborator. A""ect, indeed, is perhaps the paradigm distinguishings%stem. 7ur emotions are ver% o"ten engaged in the imagination, but onl% ver% rarel% in

supposition. 24 #his is a matter not merel% o" statistics, but o" norms that govern the

practices in $hich the t$o activities are t%picall% used: the arousal o" emotion is o"ten an

integral part o" certain uses o" the imagination, especiall% $ith the proper appreciation o"$orks o" "iction. 7" course, some other $orks o" "iction ma% "ail to spark a""ect, and

other deplo%ments o" imagination ma% simpl% be neutral on the 'uestion o" a""ect, as is

t%picall% the case $ith man% philosophical thought(e*periments. 25 @ut $hile a""ect iso"ten re'uired in acts o" imagining, and ma% be an unintended side(e""ect o" some

supposition, it is almost never a proper part o" a supposing. #he onl% e*ceptions might

be cases in $hich %ou are asked to suppose something "or the sake o" determining ho$%ou might "eel. It is an open 'uestion $hether such an e*ercise $ould re'uire use o" the

a""ect s%stems rather than the deplo%ment o" a bit o" "olk ps%cholog%.3 Indeed, it can get

in the $a% o" the pure in'uir% "or $hich supposition is usuall% deplo%ed.

Hlaboration similarl% produces a stark as%mmetr% bet$een imagining and supposing. We"airl% o"ten do embellish in the imagination, and even $hen $e happen not to do so+"or

e*ample, $hen $e are too caught up in the action o" a "ilm to take the time to elaborate+

nothing about imagination restricts us "rom doing so. @ut supposition $ould be $orthlessas an epistemic tool i" $e allo$ed propositions not properl% in"erable "rom the

supposition to mingle $ith those that are. )ull("ledged script elaboration, though

commonplace in imagining, is 'uite rare in the conte*t o" supposition. 26

end p./6

7ne other di""erence bet$een supposition and imagination, hinted at above, has to do

$ith the $a% in $hich the Inputter introduces contents into the I@. In imagining, $e ma%

put contents in one b% one either through deliberate decisions to do so, or because $e



recognize that the% are re'uired b% other imaginative commitments< e.g. "e$ "ictions

actuall% bother to state that shooting a human being can lead to their death, but it can be

clear that $e are meant to in"er "rom a character8s having been shot to her likel% demise3,or $e ma% simpl% open ourselves to a stream o" content as in the case o" our ordinar%

e*perience3. So $e distinguish bet$een the 4punctate5 mode o" the Inputter, as opposed

to its 4streaming5 mode. @oth modes are t%pical o" imagining. @ut onl% the "ormer $a% o"inserting contents is t%pical o" supposition. We do not "orm suppositions on the basis o"

overarching decisions to suppose $hatever a "ilm puts in "ront o" us< nor is it acceptable

to do so in the conte*ts in $hich $e engage in supposition.7ur theor% o" the cognitive architectural di""erences bet$een supposition and imagination

and bet$een both o" them and belie"3, can be summarized in #able 2..

7ur "ive starter e*plananda are accounted "or b% these di""erent pro"iles o" the t$o

activities. With e*planandum i3, supposing involves less "reedom because it does notinvolve the Script Hlaborator. @ut since imagining can use that process+though it does

not have to do so+it allo$s "or all sorts o" $a%s o" e*tending and "illing in the contents

o" the I@. #his di""erence also goes a long $a% to$ard e*plaining iii3. @% allo$ing

elaboration, imagination is better at "illing in details so as better to envision possibilities,$hereas h%pothetical reasoning re'uires precisel% that $e not so elaborate. In that

dimension, then, supposition is more belie"(like than the imagination is< moreover, that itis constrained in this belie"(like $a% goes some distance in e*plaining its distinctive

epistemic value.3 It is thus 'uite use"ul to us "rom an epistemic perspective that $e can

deplo% the Script Hlaborator $hen stocking our I@ $ith contents, but that $e need not doso. We also account "or e*planandum iv3 in terms o" the larger set o" processes that are

t%pical o" the imagination, $hich thereb% enable a larger range o"

10.1 Architectural Differences Between Imaginatin! "u##sitin! an$ Belief Imaginatio

n

Suppositio

n@elie"

Affect ariable At%pical #%pical

%nitring #%pical #%pical #%pical

Inference #%pical #%pical #%pical

&#$ater #%pical At%pical #%pical

Dmain's#ecific s(stems #%pical ariable #%pical

"cri#t )la*ratr ariable At%picalAt%pical

T

In#utter +#unctate, #%pical #%picalAt%picalT

In#utter +streaming, #%pical At%picalAt%pical

T

TNbut see belo$.

end p./?activities. As noted alread%, there are man% "ictions that it $ould not make sense to

consume $ith the a""ect s%stems disengaged: our eno%ment o" games o" make(believe

$ould be rather limited $ithout appeal to the Script Hlaborator, and the consumption o"

cinematic "ictions $ould be seriousl% hampered i" $e could not use the Inputter in itsstreaming mode.

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H*planandum ii3 is e*plained in terms o" both activities8 use o" the Inputter, $hereas

onl% imagining t%picall% involves the broader range o" processes that are implicated in

imaginative re"usal and blockage i" our account in Section E is correct3. A""ect pla%s alarge role in an% account o" re"usal, and a""ect is at%pical "or supposition. @lockage

t%picall% involves a domain(speci"ic s%stem, and $e have suggested that at least some

supposition o" the more "ormal, abstract variet% need not engage that class o" s%stems.)or e*ample, i" the moral udgment s%stems are not engaged during a supposition, then

the% $ill not be inserting the troublesome A $hen $e tr% to suppose a morall% abhorrent

proposition A. Without the A, there8s none o" the con"lict that leads to blockage int%pical imagination cases. Similarl%, our e*planation o" blockage calls on the Gpdater,

$hich is t%pical in imagination but at%pical in supposition. So supposition has none o" the

architectural entanglements that can lead to blockage in the case o" imagination.

Bo$, does it matter that $e get no strict distinction bet$een supposing and imagining&)or e*ample, cases in $hich $e engage in h%pothetical reasoning to determine $hat sorts

o" outcomes are possible i.e. to determine not $hat will happen, but $hat the range o"

things that might happen is3 ma% be cases $here $e allo$ the Script Hlaborator to do

some constrained embellishing on the relevant propositions. And such cases seem to "allin a gra% area bet$een supposition and imagination. With this "rame$ork in place, $e

can see that, in "act, those activities are best vie$ed not as altogether distinct, but ratheras ust variations $ithin the more general t%pe o" I@(involving cognitions. Perhaps $e

might stipulate a term such as 4considering5 to serve as a technical term neutral bet$een

all these di""erent $a%s o" engaging $ith a proposition in the I@. We could then see4supposing5 and 4imagining5 as simpl% picking out di""erent varieties o" considering, in a

rough $a% and $ithout an% strict di""erence bet$een them. And thus e*planandum v3 is

accommodated: not onl% $ill there be intermediate cases that do not "it s'uarel% $ithin

either activit%8s characteristic set o" processes as in the sort o" case mentioned above3, but also one might easil% cross into or out o" such a case simpl% b% some processes

coming on( or o""(line. 27 Ket neither $ill likel% be con"used $ith belie", since belie"

takes place in a di""erent representational s%stem altogether though one in the samerepresentational code3, and it seems that the monitoring s%stems are sensitive to this "act.

end p./0

@ut $hat is the basis "or our continued insistence that belie" involves a distinctrepresentational s%stem, $hile imagination and supposition are simpl% di""erent $a%s in

$hich one representational s%stem ma% be used& Wh% does the distinction bet$een belie"

and generic consideration push us to$ards positing t$o bo*es, $hile the di""erence

bet$een supposition and imagination is e*plained b% the redeplo%ment o" one bo* theI@3& #here is, a"ter all, a $hi"" o" simulationism about our approach to the

SuppositionImagination distinction, since $e see those states as stemming "rom di""erent

$a%s o" deplo%ing the same s%stem $ith various other mechanisms on( or o""(line3. Wh%do $e resist the redeplo%ment move in the belie"consideration case&

A number o" "actors are relevant here. )irst, $hereas the di""erences bet$een supposition

and imagination are generall% di""erences o" degree i.e. the% are, at most, the di""erence bet$een t%picalit% and at%picalit%3, the di""erences bet$een belie" and consideration are

"ar more stark. )or e*ample, although $e have characterized interaction bet$een belie"

and the Inputter as at%pical, it $ould be closer to the truth to sa% that the% do not interact

at all. #here simpl% is no non(pathological process $hereb% contents are inserted into the





belie" bo* merel% on the basis o" a decision to do so. 28 And something similar is true

$ith respect to the @@ and the Script Hlaborator. It is plausible that, inso"ar as the mental

mechanisms are $orking properl%, the Script Hlaborator simpl% cannot interact $ith the@@. Second, there are a number o" important processes le"t out o" the table that

distinguish belie" "rom both imagination and supposition. )or e*ample, and most

centrall%, belie"s t%picall% interact $ith desires and the practical reasoning s%stem, and, inso doing, pla% a central role in driving the action guidance s%stem. @ut $hile imaginings

ma% interact $ith our desires, neither imaginings nor suppositions t%picall% pla% an%

signi"icant role in decision(making or action guidance. And even $hen the imaginationin the conte*t o" pretense3 does "unction in action guidance, its role in generating action

ma% be 'uite di""erent "rom the role o" ordinar% belie" in ordinar% decision and action

conte*ts. ;hildren do not, a"ter all, t%picall% eat pretend pies made o" mud. )inall%, $e

ma% note that as $as mentioned above3 there are good reasons to think that theimagination and belie" o"ten run s%nchronicall%. We have argued else$here Weinberg

and Meskin 92263 that it is simpl% impossible to make sense o" our engagement $ith

"ictions $ithout appealing to t$o distinct representational s%stems that continuousl%

interact throughout the e*perience. @ut nothing like this is the case $ith respect tosupposition and imagination: $e note no phenomena that call "or the s%nchronic

$orkings o" these t$o "orms o" consideration. =iven these t$oend p./1

points, it seems legitimate to posit a t$o(bo* architecture rather than the one(bo*

architecture that some earl% simulationist accounts seem to posit, or some three(bo*architecture that might seem suggested b% the suppositionimagination distinction.

We conclude this section b% suggesting that this "rame$ork "or a theor% o" supposition

and imagination might also be use"ul in developing a theor% o" conceivabilit%, in

particular $ith an e%e to$ards providing guidance to philosophers as to $hen an act o"the imagination can provide evidence "or a modal claim. Just as a scienti"ic theor% o"

vision should help us to distinguish success"ul "rom unsuccess"ul instances o" visual

perception, so too a theor% o" the cognitive architecture o" the imagination should help usto distinguish accurate "rom inaccurate udgments o" possibilit% and impossibilit%. Shaun

Bichols ;h. 93 has suggested some $a%s in $hich general architectural concerns might

enable a skeptical criti'ue o" certain appeals to intuition: namel%, those concerning4absolute modalities5. @ut our account also suggests that looking at the particular

mechanisms that might or might not3 be involved in a given act o" the imagination might

also have more speci"ic pa%o""s "or an epistemolog% o" modal intuition.

@% $a% o" illustration, consider that some mechanisms ma% onl% be able to act properl%on representations that are properl% "ormatted. =erd =igerenzer //13, "or e*ample, has

suggested that our mechanisms "or probabilistic in"erence cannot "unction $ell $ith

percentage("ormat in"ormation, but per"orm admirabl% $ith "re'uenc%("ormatin"ormation. Fike$ise, $e conecture that some domain(speci"ic mechanisms might have

"ormat re'uirements. Suppose, "or e*ample, that our "olk(ps%chological s%stems "or

detecting the presence o" other minds depends on receiving appropriate input "rom perceptual or imager% s%stems. #his is a ver% plausible h%pothesis, $ith evidence going

back over hal" a centur% Ceider and Simmel /EE< see Scholl and #remoulet 9222 "or a

more recent summar% o" evidence "or s%stems dedicated to the perception o" animac%3. It

$ould "ollo$ that some classic thought(e*periments in the philosoph% o" mind might











sho$ less than their authors had thought. )or e*ample, @lock8s 4nation o" ;hina5

argument /013 and Searle8s 4;hinese room5 argument /123 both re'uire the udgment

that particular possible sets o" circumstances are not ones in $hich mentation isinstantiated. @ut it is part o" the ver% design o" those arguments that $e are discouraged

"rom imagining an%thing that looks like the sort o" being that can trigger our mind(

detection s%stems. So+unless one is prepared to argue that a necessar% condition onmindedness itsel" is happening to look like $hatever humans are evolved to detect as

mindedness+a thought(e*periment designed to provide evidence that one can have a

particular "unctional organization $ithout thereb% having a mind ma%, in "act, rel% on amere trick o" our cognitive architecture that has been accidentall% e*ploited b% those

philosophers. Attending to the particulars o" cognitive architecture, then, ma% make

available criti'ues and, surel%, validations3 o" modal intuitions and thought(e*periments

that $ould not be available $ithout such attention.end p.//

?. ;onclusion

We have considered three distinct philosophical issues concerning the imagination: the

puzzle o" emotions and "iction, imaginative resistance, and the suppositionimaginationdistinction. )or each, $e have argued that taking the underl%ing cognitive architecture o"

the imagination seriousl% puts positions in vie$ that are not visible "rom a perspective

that includes onl% "olk(ps%chological and metaph%sical machiner%. #he puzzle istrans"ormed into a set o" e*plananda, $hich are then amenable to scienti"ic e*plication.

#he particular contours o" imaginative resistance, initiall% resistant to being mapped, turn

out to match the contours o" our cognition. And $here more traditional anal%tic

approaches to the suppositionimagination distinction $ill be st%mied b% a range o"intermediate cases, the architectural approach sho$s that the cases are appropriatel% seen

as indeed legitimately intermediate, "or the% correspond to the range o" mechanisms that

can be brought to bear or not3 in the imagination. #his chapter thus serves as anadvertisement "or a particular kind o" naturalistic approach to philosophical problems

involving the imagination: attending to the cognitive architecture can enrich philosoph%,

$ithout thereb% replacing it.

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-ieran, Matthe$ ed.3 92263 &ontemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the %hilosophy of

Art Malden, Mass.: @lack$ell3.

++ and Fopes, ominic eds.3 9223 Imagination) %hilosophy and the Arts Fondon:

!outledge3.

-ornblith, Cilar% //Ea3 4Introduction: What is Baturalistic Hpistemolog%&5, in

-ornblith //Eb , DE.

++ ed.3 //Eb3 ,aturali!ing pistemology, 9nd edn. ;ambridge, Mass.: MI# Press3.

Fandis, Sean 92263 4Imagination and Supposition5 unpublished ms, #e*as #ech

Gniversit%, Fubbock3.Fang, P. J. /1E3 4;ognition in Hmotion: ;oncept and Action5, in ;. Izard, J. -agan,

and !. aonc eds.3, motions) &ognition and "ehavior Be$ Kork: ;ambridge

Gniversit% Press3, /9D99?. Feou*, Joseph //?3 $he motional "rain# $he Mysterious Underpinnings of

motional 0ife Be$ Kork: Simon and Schuster3. Feslie, Alan M. //Ea3 4Pretending and @elieving: Issues in the #heor% o" #oMM5,

&ognition, 62, 9D1. ++ //Eb3 4#oMM, #o@%, and Agenc%: ;ore Architecture and omain Speci"icit%5,

in F. Cirsch"eld and S. =elman eds.3, Mapping the Mind# Domain Specificity in

&ognition and &ulture Be$ Kork: ;ambridge Gniversit% Press3, /DE1. Fe$is, avid. /013 4#ruth in "iction5, American %hilosophical 1uarterly, 6, 0DE?.

Matravers, erek 9223 4)ictional Assent and the So(;alled3 Puzzle o" Imaginative

!esistanceX5, in -ieran and Fopes 922, /D2?.

Mc;loske%, Michael /13 4Intuitive Ph%sics5, Scientific American, 9E1 E3, 99D2.

Meskin, Aaron, and Weinberg, Jonathan 9223 4Hmotions, )iction, and ;ognitive

Architecture5, "ritish ournal of Aesthetics, E 3, 1DE.

end p.92

P!IB#H )!7M 7R)7! S;C7FA!SCIP 7BFIBH $$$.o*"ordscholarship.com3Y ;op%right 7*"ord Gniversit% Press, 922(9220. All !ights !eserved

Moran, !ichard //E3 4#he H*pression o" )eeling in Imagination5, %hilosophical

eview, 2, 06D2?. Bichols, Shaun 922E3 4Imagining and @elieving: #he Promise o" a Single ;ode5,

ournal of Aesthetics and Art &riticism, ?9, 9/D/. ++ and Stich, Stephen 92223 4A ;ognitive #heor% o" Pretense5, &ognition, 0E, 6D

E0. ++ and ++ 922a3 4Co$ to !ead Kour 7$n Mind: A ;ognitive #heor% o" Sel"(

;onsciousness5, in >. Smith and A. Jokic eds.3, &onsciousness# ,ew %hilosophical

ssays 7*"ord: 7*"ord Gniversit% Press3, 60D922.

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++ and ++ 922b3 Mindreading# An Integrated Account of %retense) Self-awareness

and Understanding 2ther Minds 7*"ord: 7*"ord Gniversit% Press3.

Peacocke, ;hristopher /163 4Imagination, Possibilit% and H*perience5, in J. )oster andC. !obinson eds.3, ssays on "erkeley 7*"ord: 7*"ord Gniversit% Press3, /D6.

Premack, avid //23 4#he In"ant8s #heor% o" Sel"(propelled 7bects5, &ognition, ?,

D?.

Prinz, Jesse 922E3 3ut eactions# A %erceptual $heory of motions Be$ Kork: 7*"ord

Gniversit% Press3.

!obinson, Jene"er 92263 Deeper than eason# motion and its ole in 0iterature)

Music) and Art Be$ Kork: 7*"ord Gniversit% Press3. Scholl, @rian, and #remoulet, Patrice 92223 4Perceptual ;ausalit% and Animac%5, $rends

in &ognitive Science, E 13, 9//D2/.

Searle, John /123 4Minds, @rains, and Programs5, "ehavioral and "rain Sciences, ,

E0D9E. Walton, -endall /023 4;ategories o" Art5, %hilosophical eview, 0/, ED?0.

++ /013 4)earing )ictions5, ournal of %hilosophy, 06, 6D90. ++ //23 Mimesis as Make-"elieve# 2n the 'oundations of the epresentational Arts

;ambridge, Mass.: Carvard Gniversit% Press3.

++ //E3 4Morals in )iction and )ictional Moralit%5, %roceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, suppl. vol. ?1, 90D62.

Weatherson, @rian 922E3 4Moralit%, )iction, and Possibilit%5, %hilosophers4 Imprint, E

3. Weinberg, Jonathan, and Meskin, Aaron 92263 4Imagine #hat5, in -ieran 9226, 999D6.

Kablo, Stephen 92293 4;oulda, Woulda, Shoulda5, in =endler and Ca$thorne 9229,

EED/9.

aonc, !obert /1E3 47n the Primac% o" A""ect5, American %sychologist, /, 0D9.

end p.929

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