week 4 lecturues with graphics

8/11/2019 Week 4 Lecturues With Graphics

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4.1 Overview of Week 4

Hello, welcome to the fourth week of our course. In this week, we will look at regional integration in a

global context. Now obviously, when we look at regional integration, there are many schemes over the

world, and actually sometimes we could even say one attempt of regional integration seems to spark

another attempt. So we will just look at a selection of cases. And obviously, the analysis that we apply

can also be valid for other regions.

We will start this lecture on European integration, how it has started, how it developed over time. Then

we will have a second lecture that looks at how the European Union developed in terms of aiming tocoordinate the position of member states in the world. We look at this over time. We look at how

political cooperation has actually developed in the EU.

After that, my colleague, Professor Giles Scott-Smith, takes you through two other examples, the

Shanghai Corporation Organization and the Arctic Council. You will get some insight about how these

organizations work and how they developed. And I think it will be very fascinating to look at this.

Also, for those of you who are in the advanced track, we really hope you enjoyed working on your

assignments, and you probably realized that this week, we have the peer review of these assignments.

That is also a fascinating thing to do. Obviously, the topic is extremely relevant, conflict resolution, and

looking at a case you're interested in. So now, let us start this, the first lectures. We will get to the

subject of regional integration.


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4. 2 EU Over Time

Hello there again, and welcome to the first lecture in this week. We will deal

with an important regional organization, the European Union, or EU. And seehow it has developed over time. We will start by briefly exploring its origins,

and then see how it has developed and where it stands now. We will also

familiarize you with core concepts of some important theories of integration.

History. After World War II, an important development in European integration

was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC, formally

established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The treaty

was signed by Belgium, France, Western Germany,

Italy, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg, who are also

the founding states of what now is the European

Union. The idea behind the creation of the coal and

steel community was to integrate the coal and steel

industries of the participating states, and notably of

two former core enemies, Germany and France. The

project was initiated on the basis of important

contributions by politicians such as Robert Schuman,

Jean Monnet, and the first Chancellor of Germany after World War II, Konrad

Adenauer. In fact, the then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, presented the plans for this coal

and steel community on the 9th of May 1950 in the Schuman Declaration.


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Here's a short passage from this declaration.

The pooling of coal and steel production will change the destinies of those regions

which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions war, of which they

have been the most constant victims.

You can see that the core idea was to move forward after World War II, and to start creating the

foundations for what today is the European Union.

Different Theories. To study and understand processes of regional integration,

different theories have been developed. A famous one is Neo-functionalism.

According to the theory, to which Ernst Haas has made a very importantcontribution with his 1958 book, The Uniting of Europe, regional integration

moves forward on the basis of processes of spillover. Spillover can, for example,

be functional, political, or what is calledcultivated.

Functional spillover essentially means that the benefits of

integrating in one area can only be fully exploited if

integration also happens in another area. For example,

economic cooperation can mean that it makes sense to

also initiate cooperation in the area of long-term policy.

Another type of spillover is political.It occurs on the basis

of political pressures, for example, by trans-national interest groups demanding

more integration.

Finally, spillover can be cultivated,meaning it is encouraged by supranational

institutions that support or cultivate further integration.


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Quite a different perspective is what is called intergovernmentalism . A major

author in this tradition was Stanley Hoffmann. According to Hoffman, regional

integration is not a self-perpetuating process. And supra national institutions

are not all that important. It's rather that the states decide on major stepsin

integration. His theory seemed to be very relevant, when in 1965, the Empty

Chair Crisis occurred. At the time, the French President, Charles De Gaulle,

disagreed with plans that he saw as further reducing

the influence of governments in decision making, and

vistas. He withdrew the French ministers from council

meetings where the intergovernmental decisions

were made. As a reaction to this, some Neo-

functionalists started revising their own approaches.

You see some references to work on Neo-

functionalism and inter-governmentalism in our list

of readings. [Links provided at the end of this

document.]

Pan-European integration moved forwards and plans for the creation of a

true common market, also called the internal market, were made. A new

strand of theorizing was presented that, in a way, combined elements of

intergovernmentalism and liberalism. The most famous author in this

tradition is Andrew Moravcsik, who is a professor

of politics at Princeton University. According to

this approach, integration moves forward in two

steps: domestic preference formation and

intergovernmental negotiations. In essence, inhis work, to which you also have some links in our

readings, he claims that major steps ahead in

European integration, such as the establishment

of the internal market or of European economic and monetary union, were

based on processes in which various domestic actors determined the

preferences of member state governments.

In the next step there are intergovernmental negotiations. When the preferences of the most powerful

states in European Integration converge, there will be new agreements that may lead to major new

steps forward.

These are just a few examples of theories explaining why integration moves forward. They can, of

course, also be applicable to other examples of regional integration, but European integration in a global

comparison has developed quite far.

Developments. From its origins onwards, European integration not only aimed at increased economic

cooperation, but also at moving towards what may be called political union. We have to keep in mind


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that its beginnings go back to situations of conflict and war. The integration

process, by creating increasing economic interdependence and the

establishment of supranational institutions, may have significantly

contributed to the fact that there has not been war among the member

states of this union since 1945. Given the conflictual path on the European

continent, this can be considered to be an impressive achievement. Actually,

this is one of the reasons why, in 2012, the European Union was awarded

the Nobel Peace Prize. in an era in which the European Union also faced

some criticism and what is called

Euroskepticism. This prize was a welcome

moment to honor the work of many who

support and believe in European integration.

After the end of the Cold War, large parts of Eastern Europe joined the

European Union. In 2004, there was what may be called a big bang

enlargement, by a total of ten new member states. Nonetheless, we cansee that in general terms, economic integration in what is now the

European Union seems to have come easier and faster than integration

in more political domains,such as foreign or security policy. We will get

back to this in the next lecture.

In economic terms, the European Union has even moved forward after having

created an internal market in the early 1990s to the establishment of a

monetary unionin which many of its members participate. In the wake of the

global financial crisis, the monetary union has also faced significant

challenges. But, it seems that these, in turn, have caused the integration

process to move forward by new agreements aiming at the maintenance of

fiscal and monetary stability. In a way, this process may then be seen as

following this neo-functionalist logic. But it is also true that governments

need to agree on such major new steps and support them, which is more in

line with intergovernmentalist reasoning.

Unfortunately, the crisis has also led to serious

challenges, notably in terms of rising

unemployment rates, such as among young

people in the European Union's south.

The EU Today. Today, the European Union is

an important actor in terms of global trade. Its

currency, the Euro, although still quite young, is

used not only in many European Union member

states, but also, for example, as a major reserve


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currency in several central banks around the

globe. The crisis has posed serious challenges to

this common currency but also has led to new

pressures on European integration in terms of the

need to find common approaches, helping to

safeguard fiscal and monetary stability also in

times of crisis.

Summary. The main driving force for European

integration was the mission to integrate sovereign

states in an effort to increase their welfare but

also to prevent conflict and war between them in the future. From the

establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, to the Internal

market, and later, even a Monetary union. Members have become

increasingly interdependent in economic terms. On the global scale, the

European Union is important as an economic entity. But its weight seems to

be somewhat less when we look at its collective voice in, for example, foreign

policy. This is a topic we turn to in the next lecture.


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4.3 EUs Foreign Policy

Building on the last video, we will now look at how the members of what today is the European union

started cooperating in noneconomic areas over time. We will see how they tried to coordinate their

positions, in terms of foreign policy, and how they aim to act as a collective

entity in an organization such as the United Nations.

History: After World War II. Since the establishment of the United

Nations, there have been attempts of European countries to coordinate

their positions in the United Nations, starting with regular consultations.

The first actual forum of foreign policy coordination in what then was the

European Community was in 1970 when European Political Cooperationor

EPC was established. EPC relied on intergovernmental processes of

coordination, and could, of course, not always lead to member states really

speaking with one voice. In 1973, it was declared that the nine member

states of the community at the time would aim, whenever possible, toadopt common positions within international organizations such as the

United Nations.

History: 1970s and 1980s. In 1974, the

community obtained what is called observer

statusin the United Nations General Assembly,

or UNGA. This implies that it got the right to

speak as an entity at UNGA meetings. But it

could not vote on its resolutions. In 2011 the European Union obtained

what's called enhanced observer status, meaning that now it can, for

example, submit proposals or make amendments, and speak among the

representatives of major groups in UNGA debates.

In 1986,the so called Single European Act or SEAwas signed. It created the

foundation for the internal markets, the free movement of goods, services,

person, and capital. Regarding European

political cooperation, the SEA also provided for

a further step, at least on paper. It established

that when all European community states were

members of a specific international

organization, they would have to endeavor to speak this one voice.

History: 1990s. In 1992, the Treaty on European Union, TEU, sometimes

also called The Maastricht Treaty, was signed. It essentially created the EU's

Monetary Union. But in terms of foreign policy it also initiated Europe's

Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP. The community committed

itself to ensuring overall consistency in all of its external activities. It also


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obligated EU member states in the Security Council to inform other EU

members and the permanent members to defend the interests of the

EU and this institution.

Did these provisions enhance the extents to which EU states have

coordinated their positions, for example, in the UNGA? An analysis thathad looked at this has been co-authored by Scheon, who holds a 2014

PhD here from Leyden University, and myself. This article is available in

our reading list. We found that over time, EU states indeed had

increasingly coordinated their votes in the UNGA, but overall

coherence is not that much higher compared to some other regional

organizations.

A later treaty, the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, ensured that a High

Representative for the Common Foreign and

Security Policy would be appointed. The first

person holding this position was Javier Solana,

who had been the secretary general of NATO

between 1995 and 1999. In 2004, in what was

called the Draft Constitutional Treaty, there

were quite ambitious plans to establish a

position of what would essentially be an EU

foreign minister. But the constitutional treaty

was not accepted in the referendums in France,

and in the Netherlands.


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The 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which is currently the basis on which the European

Union operates, made this function actually somewhat more modest than

had originally been envisioned. In a sense, this also shows how reluctant

governments, but also citizens, across the

European Union, sometimes are when it

gets to transferring competencies in foreign

policy to the collective level. The new

position, created by the Lisbon Treaty, is

called High Representative for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy. The first person appointed to this function

was Baroness Catherine Ashton.

Foreign Policy. The function of the high representative is a somewhat

challenging one because of the need to coordinate the preferences and

priorities of different EU institutions, and of course, of its member states. In

foreign policy, larger states sometimes have an important say, and thiscannot be ignored in practice, for example, when the EU tried to come up

with a common approach as how to react to the crisis in Libya, member

states had different visions on this matter. Before this, they were highly

divided as regards to best reactions to take in view of the war in Iraq. So,

finding common positions can be very challenging.

In December 2010, the European External Action

Service, or EEAS, was launched. It is headed by

the High Representative. In essence, it can be

seen as a gradually evolving EU diplomatic service. It also actively deals withcrisis management. Currently, European delegations exist in almost all of the

United Nation's member states. And they are headed by what now are EU

Ambassadors. The extent to which competencies are transferred to the EEAS,

however, very much depends on the willingness of the member states to

actually delegate such competences.

The EEAS is still young, but it is in constant

development. In terms of policy priorities so far,

the high representative has put much emphasis

on what could be called the use of soft power. High on the agenda are, for

example, foreign aid, support for citizens in crisis situations, development

and human rights. In the reading list, you have some work that looks at the

creation and the activities of the external action service.

External Representation. In terms of the EU's external representation,

there are also two other important functions, The President of the

European Commission and the President of the European Council. For


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example, in terms of taking policy initiatives to

combat diverse effects when the global

financial crisis hit, the President of the

European Council, Herman van Rompuy, played

a very active role in terms of trying to get

member states to agree on new measuresand

initiatives. Similarly, the European commission

and its President Jose Manuel Barrosolaid the

foundations for several agreements that are

now in place for enhanced stability in the

future.

Sometimes in an era of Euro skepticism, these

persons have also been criticized. But we have

to keep in mind that the actions of institutions

and their responses to the crisis can often onlybe taken if there actually is intergovernmental

agreement to take these steps. Given the large

number of EU states, 28 since 2014, this can be

rather difficult to achieve. So, in the processof

European integration, member states by incremental stepshave started to

coordinate their actions in the domain of foreign affairs, and agreed on the

establishment of new positions. This is trying to increasingly speak with one

voice. But there is still reluctance to do so since foreign policy is often

regarded as a core domain of a state's competencies.

Summary. So, what have we learned? European integration has led to

a gradual coordination in the ways in which member states are

represented externally. It now has a young, but evolving, common

diplomatic service. While the EU still does not really speak with one

voice in world politics, it is gradually coordinating its member states'

positions in some international organizations, including the United

Nations. In the next video, you will see examples of regional

coordination in other parts of the world. Of course, we cannot look at

each regional organization since there are so many at the time. But you

will learn about two examples, the Shanghai Corporation Organization,SEO, and the Arctic Council. The following lectures will be given by my

colleague, Professor Giles Scott-Smith.


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4.4 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Prof. Giles Scott-Smith)

Hello and welcome. My name is Giles Scott Smith and I am a professor in diplomatic history at Leiden

University. In this video, we will look at the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, SCO. The SCO is an intergovernmental organization

founded in Shanghai in Beijing on June 15, 2001 by six countries: China ,

Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Its member

states possess a total population of 1.45 billion, about of the world s

total. Its working languages are Chinese and

Russian.

History. The SCO was originally created by the

original Shanghai Five group, the SCO Six minus

Uzbekistan, which came together in the mid-1990s

as a measure to secure national borders in post-

Soviet central Asia. This was made official with the

1996 agreement on deepening military trust in

border regions, and the 1997 agreement on

reductions of military forces in border regions.

Uzbekistan joined in 2001, at the time of thecreation of the SCO itself.

In 2002, the SCO issued a charter outlining its purpose and governing apparatus.

The charter emphasizes the value of the organization for building trust, ensuring

regional stability, and promoting economic, social and cultural integration

amongst its members. In terms of specific areas of policy cooperation, the SCO


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focuses on countering the so-called three evils of terrorism, separatism,

and extremism, as well as combating illicit narcotics, arms trafficking, and

illegal migration.

In the mid-2000s, the SCO expanded its purpose. Looking for greater

recognition as an international organization, it secured observer status atthe United Nations. A permanent

secretariat was established in Beijing, and a

regional anti-terrorism structure, the RATS,

was set us in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The

SCOs determination to be seen as an

important player in global diplomacy was

summed up by the declaration from its 2005

in Kazakhstan. This must be seen against

the background of the Western supported

regime changes in Georgia, in 2003, Ukrainein 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and also

the increasing presence of US military forces

in the central Asia region following the

attacks on 9/11. The SCO was firmly fixed

on determining its position in this context,

and asserted its primacy as the organization

legitimately tasked with ensuring central

Asian security. This measure was backed

with full scale military exercises conducted

by the Russian and Chinese forces in August 2005.

Structure. The SCOs central body is the Council of the Heads of State, which meets annually to

determine the organizations priorities and further its agenda of cooperation. The Council is supported

by a hierarchical apparatus that includes the Council of the Heads of Government, which approves the

budget, the Council of Foreign Ministers and other ministerial meetings in specific policy fields, and the

secretariat located in Beijing.

New members are welcome, to be decided upon by the Council of the

Heads of State. Since 2001, no new members have been admitted,

although since 2004, several states have joined the SCO Summit as official

observers, Afghanistan, Iran, India, Mongolia, and Pakistan. A separate

group, known as dialog partners has also been created, currently including

Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka. Iran has shown a strong determination to

join as a full member in order to use the SCO to counterbalance pressure

from the United States, but apart from the 2005 declaration, the SCO has

largely avoided taking an anti-Western path. This mainly reflects the


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caution of the Chinese leadership,

and an unwillingness to include new

members who could prove divisive

within the organization and

undermine its effectiveness.

In 2012, India expressed a wish to display a constructive role as and

SCO member state, but despite Russian support, the message from

Beijing was that it was still too early.

Main Challenges. The main challenges for the SCO cover three main

areas:

1) contributing to the stabilization of Afghanistan after the

full withdrawal of NATO forces in 2014.

2)

Developing the organizations involvement in new policy

areas beyond counter-terrorism and security.

3) Establishing itself as a united international body able to

facilitate and coordinate the activities of its members in

global diplomatic settings.

Afghanistan was a priority for the SCO Summit in 2012. NATO-SCO

cooperation in Afghanistan has been minimal, although some

liason did start to take place after 2010. The Afghan president

Hamid Kharzai has been

attending SCO Summits as an

invited guest since 2004,

requested further support forsecurity and economic development at the Beijing meeting.

Future. There is a strong likelihood that India and Pakistan,

together with possible Iran will become the next states to join the


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SCO from 2014 onwards.

The current SCO states share mutual concerns about radical Islamic

terrorism networks, separatist movements, human trafficking, and drug

trafficking, with Afghanistan being the main source of the global heroin

trade. However, the challenge is not only to fill the potential powervacuum following the departure of US and NATO forces, it is also to

maintain cooperation among its member states, even if their national

interests collide.

The key issue involves the traditional

alignments of Russia-India and China-

Pakistan, and how these will work

within the SCO instead of being kept outside. India had donated $2

billion in aid to Afghanistan up to 2013, and there is an opportunity

to use the SCO to both overcome concerns on the future of

Afghanistan, and gradually overcome the decades long rivalry

between India-Pakistan, and China-India. Should the SCO contribute

to this, it would be a considerable shift in global politics.

The second challenge concerns the SCOs evolution as a significant

player on broader policy issues, both in the Central Asian region and

beyond. In July 2007, Vladimir Putin initiated the SCOs Energy club,

with the purpose of uniting the

SCOs energy producing and

consuming energy states,

coordinating energy strategies, and

strengthening energy security. At the

center of this arrangement lies Russia

as a major energy source, and China

as the worlds second largest

consumer of oil and natural gas.

Infrastructure projects are also a priority, the proposed

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India gas pipeline will

supplement existing oil and gas deals between Kazakhstan and India,

with Afghanistan becoming a key transit state. Once again, it remainsto be seen whether the SCO can deliver on its promise, or if

geopolitical concerns and submerged rivalries, including that

between Russia and China hamper its bid to foster a comprehensive

energy market.


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4.5 Arctic Council (Prof. Giles Scott-Smith)

In this video, we will look at an entirely different regional

organization, the Arctic Council. In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration

signed by the eight countries with territory above the Arctic Circle

brought the Arctic Counsel into existence. Its members are Canada,the United States, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and

Russia.

History. The council was an extension of the Arctic

Environmental Protection Strategy. AEPS agreed in

1991 to address problems related to the dumping of

hazardous materials by the former Soviet Union in

previous years, and to monitor pollution in the

region in general. The council was established as an

intergovernmental forum to facilitate and promote

cooperation and coordination among the arctic

states together with the indigenous peoples from

the region on issues such as sustainable

development and environmental protection.


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Of the approximately 4 million inhabitants north of the Arctic Circle, most

of them located in Russia and Norway, around 500,000 are recognized as

indigenous peoples. And there are six indigenous people's organizations

involved as permanent participants in the council.

Structure. The council holds a ministerial

level meeting once every two years.The

chairmanship also rotates among the

members, each member holding that

position for two years. Decisions are

made by consensus, and not by vote. The

council is supported by various working

groups and task forceswhich are established to focus on specific issues

of concern, such as conservation, emergency response, pollution

control and quality of ecosystems. The council's permanent secretariat

is located in Tromso, Norway.

Observer status is open to non-arctic states, intergovernmental and

nongovernmental organizations, IGOs and NGOs. They can qualify if

they meet certain criteria, including recognizing the sovereign rights

and jurisdiction of arctic states, and the applicability of international

law, in particular, the UN convention on Law of The Sea, UNCLOS, that

refers to sovereignty and determining territorial waters. There are

currently 12 observer states including India, Japan, People's Republic of

China, 9 IGOs and 11 NGOs contributing to the council as observers.

Main Challenges: The lowest extent of the Arctic ice cap was so far recorded in 2006. Since then it has

varied, but the average decline in ice coverage is around 2.6% per decade since 1981. At the same time,


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the Arctic is estimated to contain 30% of the globe's untapped gas

reserves and 15% of its oil. Three principal challenges facethe council in

the coming years, all of them related to the melting ice cap, making the

region more navigable and accessible.

First, [there is] the ability to manage increasing economic development of

the arctic region in a way that meets the needs of economic interests,

indigenous peoples and environmental

conservation. In 2013, Canada assumed the

chairmanship of the Arctic Council and stated as

its priority the livelihoods of the peoples living

within the region. Since then, it has played apivotal role in a task force for a circumpolar

business forum which, in January 2014, became the Arctic Economic Council,

the AEC. The AEC, functioning as part of the Arctic Council, will further

promote the business possibilities opening up in the Arctic, while still

maintaining a commitment to sustainable development. The danger of this

development is that the increasing economic potential will undermine, if not

prevent, the council's efforts to maintain ecosystems, and prevent further

environmental damage. Canada is spearheading a push to increase Arctic

Council coordination capabilities, a way to deal with this rising economic

activity, and has pushed for improved pollution control measures, bettersafety regulations for shipping and tourism, and the introduction of a

mandatory polar code by the international Maritime Organization. The

council will increasingly be faced with questions as to its priorities. But this

expansion of responsibilities will test not only the

priorities of the Arctic Council as granted by the

Ottawa Declaration, but also the ability of the

forum to continue to function according to consensus.

The second challenge concerns the ability of the Arctic Council to deal with

increasing demands. Some have called for a strengthening of the Council'smandate,now that the Arctic is becoming a region of great activity. But this is

contested. While the United States acknowledges the extra burden, it does

not support its transformation into an official international organization that

could issue binding agreements. Instead, it prefers to pursue flexible,


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cooperative arrangementswith other arctic and non-arctic states. The US

also agrees with Finland and Sweden that non-arctic states should be

allowed to join the council as full members. Opposing, Russia and Canada

both want to maintain an arctic only policy.

The third challenge concerns the increasing militarization of the Arctic byArctic and non-Arctic states, connected to disputed territorial claims and

opportunities for exploiting energy sources. While the world's southern pole

is protected from economic exploitation and military activity by the 1959

Antarctic Treaty, no such treaty protects the

Arctic. Neither does the Arctic Council discuss

security issues, The United States having insisted,

at the time of the Council's foundation, that this

should be excluded. Rising Russian nationalism

towards the Arctic has triggered a response from other nations. In 2007, a

mini submarine placed a Russian flag on the sea bed at the North Pole as asymbolic indication of its interests. And in December 2013, Russian President

Vladimir Putin declared the intention to increase the Russian military

presence in the Arctic.

Individual Countries. Under Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Canadahas, in

recent years, promoted the interests of indigenous peoples, and referred to

the Arctic as central to Canadian identity, and a

national priority. A string of directives since 2006,

Canada First Defense Strategy, Northern Strategy,

arctic foreign policy have demonstrated Canadianresolve. In 2012, Canada called the first ever

meeting of defense ministers from the arctic

states outside of the council.

The United States, which for many years

disregarded the arctic, has also recently shown

more engagement. National Security Presidential

Directive 66 on Arctic region policy from January

2009 highlighted an increasing US security and

economic interest. In 2011, then Security of State

Hillary Clinton attended the Arctic Council

Ministerial meeting in Nuke, Greenland. Yet the

Arctic does not really feature as a priority in US

military strategy.


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Since 2007, Norway has also turned its security attention northwards as a

response to Russian moves. Yet Norwegian wishes to include NATOin this

term, perhaps looking ahead to invite Finland and Sweden into the alliance,

have so far been disappointed.

Main Challenge. The main challenge will be

to what extinct the Arctic states can resolve

the continuing territorial disputes between

them. Norway and Russia did reach agreement on their border in the

Barents Sea in September 2010, hopefully setting a precedent for others.

Unresolved borders also exist in the Beaufort Sea and even between

Canada and the United States. The failure of the US Senate to ratify the

UN Convention on Law of the Sea complicates this issue. Russian claims

to sovereignty over the Lomonosov ridge are contested by Canada,

Norway, and Denmark. With new claims

being made all the time, disputes over

continental shelves and arctic territorial

waters will probably increase in coming

years. This will test the ability of the

council to successful continue as the prime international site for dealing

with arctic related matters.

Summary. The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum that focuses

on environmental security, economic opportunities, and the interests of

indigenous people living north of the Arctic circle. In the years to come,

it will face many challenges that will test its regional and international

importance. Despite these difficulties, it is, indeed, the most important

organization concerned with this geographical area. I hope you enjoyed

these lectures and good luck with the rest of the course.


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4.6 Wrap Up, Week 4

This week we have dealt with some examples of regional integration and the role of regional

organizations. I hope you enjoyed these lectures. There are more cases, but the tools to look at the

dynamics of regional integration can of course also be applicable to other cases. In our reading list, you

see some additional readings if you want to learn a little bit more about some of these subjects. I highlyencourage you to actually look at these additional readings too. You'll also have an end of the week test

as usual, and please make sure that you really study the regional integration literature that is assigned.

Next week we start looking at a different topic, actually a cluster of themes. We will look at the concept

of coercive diplomacy also as a tool to try to ensure peace or resolve violent conflict. We will also look at

the organization that very deliberately tries to have collective security for its members, the North

Atlantic Trade Organization, or NATO. You'll have some fascinating events next week. We look forward

to seeing you then.

Interview with Mohamed SalihAfrican Union

Very much welcome, again. Today we have the pleasure of introducing to you Professor Mohamed Salih,

who is a professor of the Politics of developing countries at Leiden University, and also a professor at the

Institute for Social Studies in Dehake. Very much welcome.

Professor Salih: Thank you.

Professor Salih, we start out asking you a question: we have dealt in this course with a couple of regional

organizations and their role in terms of the maintenance of peace and stability. I would be very

interested. How do you see currently the activities of the African Union, in terms of contributing to the

peace and stability of the African continent?


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Professor Salih: The African Union plays a very important role in peace and security in the continent,

despite many skeptics about whether this role is significant. At least, I can mention two reasons. The shift

in 2002 from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union signaled a major shift in the

orientation of Africa towards security. First of all that, the old idea about the sanctity of sovereignty and

non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries has ended, allowing the African Union in its

new form, number one, to interfere in conflicts where human rights and genocide or crimes against

humanity are committed. But, also, allowing African countries to request the African Union, particularly

it is an African security council, to intervene in such counties.

This is a major shift in terms of how Africans look at security. Because in the past, look at the conflict in

the Sudan. It continued from 1555 up to 1971-72. And then started again since 1980, 83, and ended in

2005, a long period of time where African Union could not interfere. The same thing [is true] with the

conflict in Ethiopia, conflict in Angola, conflict in Mozambique. All of these conflicts because African

Union. Fault of the sanctity of the borders that the African inherited from the colonial rule, they were not

able to interfere. Today, they can do that, and they have done a number of interventions. Whether it's

through forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone, whether they're joint forces with the United Nations in Darfurin the Sudan, in Burundi, Somalia, many other countries where you see the African community is

increasingly, involved.

And the second thing is that the new thinking in Africa, about African solutions for Africa. Shift also away

from the fact that Africa was very much dependent on foreign forces, particularly Europeans. It depends

on the country where it has a conflict. If the country was colonized by France, then of course, the anger

of foreign captives and they were French, the military which then tried to solve the problems. If it was

British, it is the principal foreign catalyst that would interfere. So, I think it plays a very, very major role.

Is it actually in institutional terms, it seems that the African Union Security Council, appears to be

muddled a bit on the bases of the example of the UN Security Council. Is that a coincidence, or has that

maybe been a deliberate attempt to account for a fair regional representation within the organization,

could such criteria have mattered?

Professor Salih: I think it is not a coincidence. First, the African Union is the architect of peace and

security, consists of the African Security Council. And then it is supported by three institutions, one

institution is stand-by force, second institution is the early warning system, and the third one is the

Military Committee, or the Committee of [INAUDIBLE]. They also have two support organizations of the

three different institutions, and that is African Peace Fund and the African Community of the Wise. The

whole structure itself is paid by the United Nations Security Council. You are right in that. But also it

derives its authority from the Security Council. It operates within the United Nations instruments.

Because if the Africans establish their completely separate security council that is not operating under

the international architecture for peace and security that is already there, they might be also isolated

from their own obligations to the international community. So, of course, you are very much right.

But, I think the main difference here, and that is something that I can consider it African, the committee

of the wise, the Wise men and women. And this committee of the wise, they're always the ones who


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start the very early visits to the countries where they have a problem, conflict, to start talking with the

adversaries, the government, the position forces, and those who are involved, and try to reach a solution

before they go and those issues are discussed and delivered over the African Security Council. So there is

some small African element attitude that is to see how can Africa also use some of their own tradition

and try to solve some of these own international problems within their continent.

Actually, a very amazing way of trying to tackle that issue. It's wonderful to see that. And actually, if we

talk in a general sense in terms of African security and African security needs. I believe I have seen in

your own academic work an emphasis that maybe the military security aspect has tended to be a bit

overemphasized, and that there will be other aspects that are extremely relevant to African security,

including human dignity and trying to establish the frame works for which such concepts really can be

realized on the ground. What is your opinion on that?

Professor Salih: I think my opinion is formed by my concern about the fact that because of the confidence

that the African witnessed during the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century, the concern about

security tended to shift towards military security. That is a time where you have the genocide of Rwanda,

you have the Somali conflict, you have the Liberia conflict, you have the Syrian conflict, and all of those

conflicts which have been bloody, really in terms of crimes against humanity. These crimes have been

committed, including the Sudan. And therefore we see that there's a gradual shift from the purpose for

which the African Union and the African Security Architecture is created, that is, to maintain peace and

security for the purpose of regional integration and development. That is the purpose.

That purpose now is not as strong. I give you one example, out of over about 400 million Euros paid by

the European Union in the first installment, between 2003 and 2008, to these African Europe

partnership, all of these resources that have been paid, just in so many cases, fact is that 40 to 50% of

money has gone to self security purposes. We see increasingly of course, with the emergence of Africa

within the continent, that there is a model that one way of winning hearts and minds is also trying to use

security for other purposes. Of course the issue of securitization of the development, and the linkage is

between development and security, created some very major issues.

So my idea in that what Africa needs in fact is not military security, not the old notion of security, but

rather human security. If you look at the problems very carefully, this is a problem created by

maldistribution of resources, poverty, greed by the elite, grievances by those who feel that they are left

out, and unequal distribution of resources in the continent. But also you see that violence itself is not just

a result of the fact that there is no military force to come to grips with violence. Rather, it is the other

way around in fact. The more you militarize development, the more society is militarized, the more you

are going to have problems.

So in fact, African vision of security should be more targeted toward human security that has respect for

human dignity as you have correctly said, and also human needs, basic human needs. And therefore if

you see this point of fact that the Cold War has ended, in the African continent in general, military

expenditure has increased and increased tremendously. And sometimes your countries are very poor.

There's an increasing military expenditure at the expense, of course, of expenditure on education and on


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health, et cetera. And that is why I think the shift of thinking has to be very serious where military to be

able to disagree.

I think these are absolutely relevant to the important topics in detail. On our course webpage we also

have some of your old readings on this subject matter. I think at this point we conclude this interview,

Thank you very much for this interview.

Professor Salih >> Yeah, thank you very much for inviting me.

On the course page index please have a look at the additional readings that we have listed. By Professor

Salih himself, and additional literature that you may be interested in. Thank you very much.

Required Readings

Frost, Alexander (2009): "The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, and Russias Strategic Goals in Central Asia", The China and Eurasia ForumQuarterly, 7, 3, 83-102. Click here to read.

Vanhoonacker, Sophie and Karolina Pomorska (2013): "The European External Action Service and

Agenda-Setting in European Foreign Policy",Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 9, 1316-

1331.Click here to read.

Recommended Readings

Drieskens, Edith and Louise G. van Schaik, eds. (2014): The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal andExternal Reform Practices. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.Click here to find more information about this

publication.

Hosli, Madeleine O., Evelyn van Kampen, Frits Meijerink and Katherine Tennis (2010): Voting Cohesion in the

United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European Union, paper presented at the 5th Pan-European

Conference, Porto, Portugal, June 24-26.Click here to read.

Jin, Xi and Madeleine O. Hosli (2011): Pre- and Post-Lisbon: European Union Voting in the United Nations

General Assembly, paper presented at the workshop "Decision-Making in the European Union Before and

After Lisbon", Leiden University (a later version of this paper has been published in 2013 in West European

Politics, 36, 6, 1274-1291).Click here to read.

John, Sarah St. (2013): Summarising the Intellectual Squabbles between Neofunctionalism and

Intergovernmentalism, September.Click here to read.
http://bit.ly/tcstoscohttp://bit.ly/tcstoscohttp://bit.ly/joepphttp://bit.ly/joepphttp://bit.ly/joepphttp://bit.ly/drieskenshttp://bit.ly/drieskenshttp://bit.ly/drieskenshttp://bit.ly/drieskenshttp://bit.ly/hoslikhttp://bit.ly/hoslikhttp://bit.ly/hoslikhttp://bit.ly/hoslijinhttp://bit.ly/hoslijinhttp://bit.ly/hoslijinhttp://educatingeurope.wordpress.com/2013/09/02/summarising-the-intellectual-squabbles-between-neofunctionalism-and-intergovernmentalism/http://educatingeurope.wordpress.com/2013/09/02/summarising-the-intellectual-squabbles-between-neofunctionalism-and-intergovernmentalism/http://educatingeurope.wordpress.com/2013/09/02/summarising-the-intellectual-squabbles-between-neofunctionalism-and-intergovernmentalism/http://educatingeurope.wordpress.com/2013/09/02/summarising-the-intellectual-squabbles-between-neofunctionalism-and-intergovernmentalism/http://bit.ly/hoslijinhttp://bit.ly/hoslikhttp://bit.ly/drieskenshttp://bit.ly/drieskenshttp://bit.ly/joepphttp://bit.ly/joepphttp://bit.ly/tcstosco


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Salih, Mohamed (2005): Understanding the Conflict in Darfur. Occasional paper, Centre of African Studies -

University of Copenhagen, May.Click here to read.

Tugsbilguun, Tumurkhuleg (2008-2009): "Does the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Represent an Example

of a Military Alliance?" Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, 15-16, 59-107.Click here to read.

Wijsmuller, Witte (2013): Bridging the Gap to Represent: The EEAS and Coherence in European Foreign Policy,

Master Thesis, Leiden University.Click here to read.

Extra links

The African Union (Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission), Click here to read more about

this department.

These notes are taken from a Coursera course provided by the University of Leiden. They are intended only forstudents of the course and not to be shared or sold they are the intellectual property of the University of Leiden.

Any errors are the fault of the transcriber and not the University. No payment was received for providing this

service.
http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/research/publications/occ._papers/muhamed_salihsamletpaper.pdf/http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/research/publications/occ._papers/muhamed_salihsamletpaper.pdf/http://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/research/publications/occ._papers/muhamed_salihsamletpaper.pdf/http://bit.ly/mongoliajournalhttp://bit.ly/mongoliajournalhttp://bit.ly/mongoliajournalhttp://bit.ly/wwijsmullerhttp://bit.ly/wwijsmullerhttp://bit.ly/wwijsmullerhttp://bit.ly/africanunionwebhttp://bit.ly/africanunionwebhttp://bit.ly/africanunionwebhttp://bit.ly/africanunionwebhttp://bit.ly/africanunionwebhttp://bit.ly/africanunionwebhttp://bit.ly/wwijsmullerhttp://bit.ly/mongoliajournalhttp://www.teol.ku.dk/cas/research/publications/occ._papers/muhamed_salihsamletpaper.pdf/

week 4 lecturues with graphics

Documents