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Annu.Rev. Sociol. 1995.21:387-417Copyright1995by AnnualReviews nc. All rights reserved

WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSISChristopher Chase-Dunn and Peter GrimesDepartmentf Sociology,ohnsHopkins niversity,Baltimore,Maryland1218KEYWORDS:conomiccycles, warfare, social evolution, global crisis, capitalism

ABSTRACTThis is a reviewof recent researchon world-systems.We overstudies of thecurrent systemand studies that comparehe contemporarylobal systemwithearlier, smaller ntersoeietal systems.Researchn the cyclesand secular rendsfound in the modem orld-systems discussed at length. This includes anexamination f economicycles of various engths as well as their links withbroadercycles like the rise and fall of hegemonicore powers, nternationalfinancial crises, and he cycleof global war. We lso survey ecent studies ofcore-peripheryierarchy.

INTRODUCTIONToday he phrases "world-economy,"world-market,"and even "world-sys-tem" are commonplace,ppearing n the sound-bites of politicians, mediacommentators, nd unemployedworkersalike. But few know hat the mostimportant ource or these phrases ies with work tarted bysociologists n theearly 1970s. At a time when he mainstream ssumption f accepted social,political, and economiccience was hat the "wealth of nations" reflectedmainlyon the cultural developments ithin those nations, a rapidly growinggroupof social scientistst recognizedhat national "development"ould only

IThe world-systems erspective originated primarily in sociology, but it has spread to many thersocial science disciplines. This is in part the ease because the study of wholeworld-systems snecessarily a transdisciplinary undertaking. Our review therefore includes the workof politicalscientists, geographers, nthropologists, historians, and archaeologists as well as sociologists.

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388 CHASE-DUNNGRIMESbe understoodontextually,as the complexutcome f local interactions withan aggressively expandingEuropean-centeredworld" economy. ot only didthese scientists perceive the global nature of economic etworks20 yearsbefore such networks ntered popular discourse, but they also saw hat manyof these networks xtendbackat least 500years. Over his time, the peoplesof the globe became inked into one integrated unit: the modemworld-system."Now, 0 years on, social scientists workingn the area are trying to betterunderstandhe history and evolutionof the whole ystem,as well as how ocaland national regions havebeen integrated into it. This current research hasrequiredbroadeningur perspectiveo includeever larger periodsof historicaltime and geographical pace. For example, ome ecent research has comparedthe modemurope-centeredworld-system f the last 500 years with earlier,smaller intersocietal networks hat have existed for millennia. Otherworkattempts to use the knowledge f cycles and trends that has grownout ofworld-systemsesearch o anticipate events ikely in the future witha precisionimpossible efore he adventof the theory. This is still a new ield, and muchremains o be done.Our eviewof current research focuseson three main opics:* How ifferent definitions of the world-systemoncept mplydifferent waysof breakingdown istory into discrete periods (e.g. when id the currentsystem egin,and what re the relevantcriteria for separating t fromothersystems n either time or space?).* Howhe patterned changes ntroducedby trends and cycles structure thereproduction of the modem orld-system* Howhe global hierarchy of wealth and power eproduces tself by theconstraints it imposes n the rangeof policy optionsfor mostnations.What Are World-Systems, and Why Do They Matter?The waywe define a "world-system" eflects both our understanding ofhistory and the questions we try to answer. For example,howconnectedmustpeoples be before we call thema "system?"How oes a "world-system"differ froma "society"? Have here been several such systems n history,and, if so, whatdistinguishesone fromanother n time or space?While hesequestions may t first seemabstract and scholastic, our answersdefine andchannelour understanding f history and thereby directly affect our under-standing of the present. Howwe respond to the challenges of our timesreflects our analysis of history. Some f the most mportantof these issuesare surveyedhere.Themodem orld-systems understood s a set of nested and overlappinginteractionnetworkshat link all units of social analysis---individuals, ouse-



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 389holds, neighborhoods,finns, towns and cities, classes and regions, nationalstates and societies, transnational actors, international regions, and globalstructures. The world-system s all of the economic, political, social, andcultural relations amonghe people of the earth. Thus, the world-systems notjust "international relations" or the "worldmarket." It is the whole nteractivesystem, where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. All boundariesare socially structured and socially reproduced, s are the identities of individ-uals, ethnic groups, and nations (Chase-Dunn& Hall 1993). Within this systemof nested networks, bulk goods exchanges re spatially restricted by transportcosts to a small region, political/military interactions occur over a largerterritory, and prestige goods exchangesare the largest important interactionnetworks. For any particular group it is the wholenested network with whichit is interconnected hat constitutes its "world-system." ystemic nteraction isroutinized so that the connected actors come o depend, and to form expecta-tions, based on the connections.Oneof the most important structures of the current world-system s a powerhierarchy between core and periphery in which powerful and wealthy "core"societies dominateand exploit weakand poor "peripheral" societies. Withinthe current system, the so-called "advanced"or "developed"countries consti-tute the core, while the "less developed"countries are in the periphery. Theperipheral countries, rather than developing along the same paths taken bycore countries in earlier periods (the assumptionof "modernization"heories),are instead structurally constrained to experience developmental rocesses thatreproduce their subordinate status. Put simply, it is the whole system thatdevelops, not simply he national societies that are its parts.In this moving ontext, core and peripheral countries generally retain theirpositions relative to one another over time, although here are individual casesof upward and downwardmobility in the core/periphery hierarchy. Betweenthe core and the periphery is an intermediate layer of countries referred to asthe "semiperiphery." These combine eatures of both the core and the peri-phery, and they are located in intermediate or mediating positions in largerinteraction networks.The Emergence f the World-SystemConceptThe originator of the current world-systems perspective is ImmanuelWaller-stein, whoargues in his book the ModernWorM-System: Capitalist Agricul-ture and the Origins of the EuropeanWorld-Economyn the Sixteenth Century(1974), that a world-systems a multicultural territorial division of labor inwhich the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials isnecessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants. It is thus by definitioncomposed f culturally different societies that are vitally linked togetherthrough the exchange of food and raw materials.



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390 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESWallerstein also understands the modem urope-centered world-system tobe the first capitalist system. Earlier systems were based to a muchgreater

extent on the use of the coercive powerof states. It is this same capitalistquality that also, he argues, accountsfor another of the unique features of themodem orld-system--its political structuring as an "interstate system" ofunequally powerful and competingstates. Wallerstein contends that earlierworld-systems ended periodically to turn into "world-empires" in which theeconomic ivision of labor betweencore and peripheral regions became argelyencompassed y a single political entity--an empire. Examplesare ancientRomeand China.The modemworld-system, Wallerstein argues, has not experienced thiskind of empire-formation because no single state has managed o conquerthe entire core region. Rather, the core has remained composedof severalstates, while exhibiting a phenomenonalled the "hegemonic equence"--tberise and fall of hegemonic ore states (e. g. the seventeenth century Nether-lands, nineteenth century Britain, and the United States in the twentiethcentury). The hegemonic tructures of the modem orld-system are thus lesspolitically centralized than were the earlier core-wide empires. Wallersteinattributes this again to the unique extent to which the modemystem is basedon capitalist accumulation.

Wallersteins key insight lies with the realization that trading patterns pre-vailing at different points in history demonstrate he essential economicnter-dependenceof the societies involved, whether or not they were united by asingle political center. 2 In addition Wallerstein contends that the modeofproduction (e. g. capitalism, tributary 3 modes) hould be used to distinguishbetweendifferent systems in both time and space. Thus, according to Waller-stein, the OttomanEmpire and Mughal ndia were not part of the Europeanmodem orld-systembefore they were forcibly incorporated into the peripheryof the modernworld-system as producers of low-wagecommodities or exportto the core. They were separate systems, according to Wallerstein, becauseEurope was capitalist while the OttomanEmpire and India were still predom-inantly tributary.

2His mphasisn he importancef the economicivision f labor n theexchangef basic oodsand awmaterialss meanto excludehe considerationf the exchangef luxury oods,whichWallersteinalls "preciosities." e rgueshat the exchangef luxury oodss not importantorsystemicynamicsnd hereforehat spatial links based n he exchangef luxury oodshouldnot be used o spatiallybound orld-systems.3The"tributaryodefproduction"iseanto applyo anddescribehose recapitalistocietieswhoseore egion xtractedtribute" romts subjugatederiphery. his ributeserved s a typeof"protectionacket"wherebyhe peripheryoughteace romnvasion y he core.The isabilityof this paymentanbecontrasted ith he "hidden"ransferof value rom eripheryo core hatoccurswithcapitalismoday ia the mechanismf unequalxchangeAmin976).



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 391Alternative definitions of the world-systemconcept have emerged n morerecent workwith the effort to study change over longer periods of time, and

to compare the modernsystem with earlier, smaller systems. Andre GunderFrank and Barry Gills (I993:106) define world-systems as follows:

The ransfer or exchange f economicurplus is the fundamentalriterion of aword ystemic elationship. Diplomacy,lliances, andconflict are additional, andperhaps erivative, riteria of systemicnteraction.Following the lead of Jane Schneider (1977) and other anthropologists,Frank & Gills contend (contra Wallerstein) that the exchangeof luxury goods

is also important for the reproduction of local social structures. Thus,networks of the exchange of prestige goods should be used to boundworld-systems, and the Europe-centered system studied by Wallerstein thenbecomes edefined as a regional part of a much arger Afroeurasian world-system. Frank & Gills use this widened oncept to study the continuities thatthey see in the system that emerged out of Mesopotamiawith the birth ofcities and states 5000years ago.Chase-Dunn& Hall (1993:855) widen the world-system concept even fur-ther. They define world-systemsas intersocietal networks n which the inter-actions (e.g. trade, warfare, intermarriage)are important for the reproductionof the internal structures of the compositeunits and mportantly affect changesthat occur in these local structures. This approach was designed to facilitatecomparisons between the modernglobal system with earlier, smaller inter-societal systems. Chase-Dunn Hall separate the definition of the world-sys-tem concept from the existence of states and core/periphery relations. Thisrevised conceptual apparatus makes t possible to examinestructural differ-ences as well as similarities betweendifferent types of world-systems. Verysmall systemsof egalitarian hunter-gatherers (lacking both states and a core/pe-riphery hierarchy) can be analytically comparedwith the modernglobal sys-tem, and the long-term processes of historical evolution can be studied usingworld-systems s the unit of analysis.Regarding the spatial bounding of world-systems, Chase-Dunn& Hall(1993:860) contend that different kinds of interaction maybe more or lessimportant in different systems, and that different sorts of interaction mayhavedifferent spatial characteristics. They propose a modelof nested networks inwhich bulk goods exchanges are spatially restricted by transport costs to asmall region, political/military interactions occur over a larger territory, andprestige goods exchangesare the largest important interaction networks. Forany particular group it is the wholenested networkwith which t is intercon-nected that constitutes its "world-system."Systemic nteraction is understoodas regularized in such a way that the connected actors come to depend andform expectations based on the connections.


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392 CHASE-DUNN GRIMES3500BC3000 ? -----~-BC

BC

1500BC

500 __ PHASE OF JC 77777 CENIRAL PMN1AD / z1 z + ?????RECOROmANAo I| P ASEOF~ooo~._1 ~ I,~_~-1 ~EmE~A~

AD OF CENTRALPMN2000 GLOBALPHASEOF CENTRALPMNFigure 1 The incorporation of 12 PMNsnto one central political/military interaction network.This figure illustrates the successive incorporation of autonomous MNsnto a larger, composite"Central PMWafter Wilkinson 1987:32).

Recent Researchon Delineating World System oundariesThe use of data for spatially boundingworld-system nteractions is still in itsinfancy. The best work to date has been done by David Wilkinson 1987, 1991)who tudies the boundaries of political/military interaction networks (PMNs).Wilkinson conceptualizes "world-systems/civilizations" primarily in terms ofmilitary alliances and conflicts among groupof states in a region. Using histype of interconnection, Wilkinson produces a spatio-temporal mapof theexpansion of "Central Civilization," the world-system hat was formed by themerging of the Mesopotamian nd Egyptian world-systems in the fifteenth



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WORLD-SYSTEMSANALYSIS 393century BCE Before Common ra). 4 Wilkinson shows how twelve regionalworld-systems becameengulfed by the expanding Central System (see Figure1). He also discusses the boundaries of the larger "trade oikumene" nd itsexpansion (Wilkinson 1992, 1993). This is equivalent to the "prestige goodsnetwork," the largest network in Chase-Dunn& Halls nested conceptualiza-tion of system boundaries.World-Systems and Modesof AccumulationAnother asic conceptual ssue yet to be resolvedconcernshe temporalboundingof world-systems nd the question of similarities or qualitative dif-ferences in systemic logic. The debate on this issue revolves around the logicof accumulation) Recall that ImmanuelWallerstein asserted that the modernworld-systems unique because it is capitalist. He thought that the transitionfrom feudalism to capitalism happened or the first and only time in sixteenthcentury Europe. Subsequent ransitions in the mode f accumulation n the restof the world have resulted from the global expansion of and conquest by theformerly regional Europe-centeredworld-system. Wallerstein contends that itis only in the post-sixteenth century capitalist world-economyhat powerfulactors focus primarily on the goal of "ceaseless accumulation." While heacknowledges hat there has been a trend toward ever greater commodificationand the expansion of capitalism within the modemworld-system since thesixteenth century, for Wallerstein it was then that the Europeanworld-systemfirst became capitalist systemuniquelydifferent from the precapitalist world-systems elsewhere on earth. 6 Samir Amin 1993) has also agreed that a trans-formation in systemic logic happened n the wayWallerstein described, whileat the same time acknowledging hat precapitalist world-systems also hadimportant core/periphery dimensions and processes of uneven development nwhich old core areas were superseded by new ones.

But Frank & Gills (1993), and earlier, Ekholm& Friedman(1982), contendthat capitalism has been an important aspect of the Eurasian world system formillennia. Documentary vidence confirms the existence of commodifiedormsof wealth and property and exchange n the early states and empiresof the Near

~Wese he conventionsowmployedyworld istorianso designateemporalras n a lessEurocentricmanner.husCEmeanscommonra" (after the birth of Christ), andBCE eans"before ommonra.5We se the term modef accumulation"s approximatelyquivalento the strueturalistMarxistmodef production,"ut withouthe implicationhat onlyproductionrocesses reimportantor systemicogic.6Wallersteinlsocontendshatcapitalisms a feature f thewhole orld-system,ot of its parts.Thus apitalism--theccumulationf economicurplusbymeans f the productionndsale ofcommodities--existsn both hecoreand he periphery.n the periphery,apitalisms importantlycombinedith nstitutionsof coercion, hile n the core,marketorcesand he commodificationof labor lay greater art n social ontrol nd eproduction.



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394 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESEast. This evidence contradicts the claims of Karl Polanyi (1957) and hiscolleagues that market trade was completely absent from these early statesystems and that all exchange was state administered. Ekholm& Friedman(1982) assert the existence of a "capital-imperialist" mode f accumulationwhichcore states and wealthy amilies exploited peasants and peripheral regionsby meansof a combinationof capitalist accumulation and state-organized ex-traction and conquest. They rgue that the core regions of both ancient and modemworld-systems scillate between tate-based and capitalist accumulation.Frank & Gills adopt a similar position that argues for the continuity insystemic logic in a single 5000-year-old world-system hat emergedout of theNear East and eventually expanded to the whole globe. Frank & Gills (TheWorld System: Five HundredYears Or Five Thousand?1993), contend thatthere was no transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe n the sixteenthcentury, because the word-systemhas had the same capital-imperialist modeof accumulation or five millennia. Frank & Gills also contend that China wasthe core of the Afroeurasianworld system until at least the eighteenth centuryCE. Europe remained a peripheral backwater, exporting bullion to China inexchange or silk and porcelain.Chase-Dunn& Hall (1993) have expanded the scope of world-system re-search in yet another direction to include small stateless and classless inter-societal systems. This allows them to study earlier examples of qualitativetransformations in systemic logic from kin-based to state-based modesofaccumulation. They also note the existence and growing importance of corn-modifiedwealth, land, exchange,and labor in the precapitalist world-systems,but they agree with Wallerstein and Aminhat the Europe-centered subregionof the Afroeurasion world-systemwas the first region to experience a predom-inantly capitalist regional system. Many ommodifiednstitutional forms de-veloped inside the tributary empires, especially Rome nd Han China. TheSungEmpire n particular nearly underwenta transformation to capitalism inthe tenth century CE. But the only states to be controlled by capitalists beforethe European ransformation in the seventeenth century were semiperipheralcapitalist city states such as the Phoenician cities, Venice, Genoa, Malacca.Theseoperated in the interstices between he tributary states and empires, andthough they were agents of commodification, hey existed within larger sys-tems in which the logic of state-based coercion remained dominant.Chase-Dunn& Hall (1993) contend that capitalism becamepredominantEuropebecause territorial states were weakand capitalist cities were closelypacked. This facilitated the developmentof market exchange as the Europeaneconomyrewout of stagnation and isolation. The irst capitalist "nation-state"was the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century, and this coming o statepower by capitalists in an emerging core region signaled the triumph ofregional capitalism in the European ubsystem.



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 395Cross-World-Systems ResearchBecause hese theoretical debates are quite recent, there has been little sys-tematic research intended to support or contest the different hypotheses. Frank(1993b) has specified a periodization of approximately 500 years for eco-nomic/political cycles in the Eurasian world-system throughout the Bronzeand Iron ages. He asserts that since 1700 BCEhe wholeEurasian word systemhas experienced system-wide 250-year upswings followed by 250-year down-swings. The evidence for or against Franks cycles is mixed. Counting thenumberof cities reported in Chandlers (1987) compilation of the wordslargest cities, Wilkinson 1991) found support for Franks hypothesizedcycles.Bosworth 1993), analyzing city growth and size distributions, also foundmixedsupport for Frank s very long cycles. But Chase-Dunn Willard (1993),using data on the population sizes of cities based on Chandler,found that citygrowth and stagnation corresponded with only about half of Franks phases.Chase-Dunn& Hall (1994) found little correspondence between changesthe territorial size of empires and Franks phases.

In an effort to assess the hypothesis of an integrated Eurasian-wideworld-system prior to the rise of Europeanhegemony,Chase-Dunn& Willard (1993)discovered an apparent simultaneity of patterns of urban growth and changesin the city-size distributions of Near Eastern and Chinese political/militarynetworks (PMNs)from 450 BCE o 1600 CE. These simultaneous sequencesof expansion and contraction lend support to the notion that China and theMediterranean/Near East were strongly linked muchearlier than most worldhistorians have supposed. This simultaneity is further supported by Chase-Dunn& Halls (1994) analysis of changes in the territorial size of empires.Yet at the same time, these sequences of urban growth, changes in city-sizedistributions, and in the territorial sizes of empires were found to be quitedifferent for the South Asian (Indic) PMNChase-Dunn& Hall 1994).Data on the sizes of the largest cities (Chase-Dunn& Willard 1994) supportFranks contention that Europe remained nferior and peripheral to the largeempires of the Near East and China until the late eighteenth century. Londonwas still smaller than Peking in 1825.

7just what ausedhe Far Eastern/Mediterraneanimultaneitys unknown.ranks 1992)analysisof the "centrality of CentralAsia" n the developmentalrocesses f the Eurasianworld-systems quiteplausible,Sin he absencef otherdata,urban opulationanbeused s a surrogateariableor the rangeof powerxercisedy hatcityover ts surroundingrea.Theeasons thatcitydwellersreparasiteson he workf the farmers,nd hegreater henumberf theseparasites, he arger hearea romwhichheydrawheir agriculturalurplus.By mplication,he "catchmentrea"surrenderingtssurpluss underhe political ndmilitaryontrol f thecity. Hence e an nfer hatPekingn 1825representedmore owerfulapitalwithints area handid London.


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396 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESCore~PeripheryStructures and MobilityOneof the mainstructures of all state-based world-systems s an intersocietalhierarchy composed f core, peripheral, and semiperipheral societies. In themodem orld-system his structure has been reproduced over centuries despitethe upwardand downwardmobility of a few national societies.Before the modemapitalist world-system, n the era of world-empiresbuiltaround the tributary modeof accumulation, peripheral societies gave up aportion of their surplus to the core in return for nominal ndependence, r theywere absorbed altogether (in whichevent they gave up an even larger portionof their surplus to the imperial core). The maintenanceof peripheral statusduring those times relied exclusively on the credible threat of military force.Today, he reproduction of the international powerhierarchy is achieved moresubtly through market mechanisms, and force is used only when the market"roles" (which act to sustain the dominanceof the core) are challengedinsurrection. The hypothesis of "unequal exchange" (Emmanuel 972, Raffer1987) contends that the central mechanism y which the global market actsto gather together the global surplus and channel t to the core is throughpriceinequality, in which the political and military suppression of wages in theperiphery allows the products of peripheral labor to be muchcheaper thanthose of the core. Put simply, an hour of labor in the periphery costs capitalonly a fraction of its costs in the core, so that a commodityroduced here ismuchcheaper than the same commodity roduced in the core. When ore andperiphery come ogether to exchange products, in the word market, the ex-changeresults in a net transfer of value from the periphery to the core. Hencethe marketmasksa process of exploitation, a process backedup by the militarypowerof the states in the periphery and, behind them, the military powerofthe core.The chronic impoverishment f the periphery prevents the typical peripheralstate from being able to finance programsof public welfare or infrastructuralimprovementeven if they wished o), so its popular legitimacy is low. Itthus always vulnerable to coups or popular insurrection. Yet despite thesebarriers, somestates have managed radually to improve heir infrastructureand to combine these improvements with policies that encourage the keyindustries that seem the most promising in the world market. Occasionally,such policies pay off in upwardmobility. Contemporaryexamples includeTaiwan, Singapore, Korea, HongKong, and China, while Japan has achievedan upward rajectory since 1880.Perhaps the most spectacular case of upwardmobility has been the UnitedStates, a region that went from being peripheralized to a semiperiphery andthen to core status (1880), and finally achieved hegemonywithin the core



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 397(1945). The current decline of US hegemonys one of the salient featuressequential change in the contemporary ystem.World-systemheorists continue to debate the conceptualization of core/pe-riphery relations. All agree that the core has more conomic nd political/mil-itary power han the periphery. The basis of this power n the current systemis the concentration of innovations in new ead industries and in military andorganizational technologies that affect the relative powerand capacities offirms and states. Disagreementscenter on the degree of mobility within thesystem available to individual states, as well as on the mechanisms nd mea-surable manifestations of that mobility.Just recently someexcellent workhas attempted empirically to measure heplacementof states in the core/periphery hierarchy. Using national states asthe unit of analysis, Terlouw 1992:164) ncludes six variables in his indexcore/periphery position: 1) GDP er capita as a percentage of world GDP ercapita, 2) the percentage of world trade 1978-1983,3) the stability of traderelations from 1961 to 1983, 4) the numberof foreign embassies sent andreceived in 1985, 5) the numberof foreign diplomats sent and received in1985, and 6) military manpower nd expenditures in 1985. Terlouws oper-ationalization includes two kinds of economicmeasures production and trade),political measures(diplomats and diplomatic missions), and military power.

Anearlier study by Arrighi & Drangel(1986) looked at changesover severaldecades in the distributions of GNP er capita of large numbersof nationalsocieties. This kind of time depth is quite important for analyzing structuralchange n the world-system. Arrighi & Drangel found a rather stable tri-modal(core-semiperiphery-periphery) distribution of national GNPs.But the useGNP er capita by itself led to strange conclusions, such as the inclusion ofLibya n the core becauseof its high revenuesdue to oil resources. Neverthelessthe Arrighi & Drangel work remains one of the most valuable contributionsto the study of the whole core/periphery hierarchy. A more recent study, byR Korzeniewicz& Martin (1994), of distributions of GNP ses data on morecountries and more ime points to confirm the findings of Arrighi & Drangel.Terlouws multicomponentmeasure corrects the errors due to reliance on anysingle measure. Terlouws measure assumes an approximately equal weightbetween economicand political/military dimensions of power.Much xcellent recent work has been done on core/periphery relations usingthe concept of "commodity hains," the global sequences by which raw ma-terials, production processes, and final consumers re linked (e.g. GereffiM. Korzeniewicz 1994).

9Terlouw 1992:220) usefully compares his measure with those used in five other studiescore/periphery position.



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398 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESAnother mportant research tool is the application of social network nalysisto the core/periphery problem. It is argued that networkmeasuresare superior

to attribute measuresbecause the core/periphery position of countries is rela-tional, that is relative to other countries. The networkapproachuses measuresof intercountry interaction to locate countries within interactional networks nterms of their positional similarities and differences with other countries in thenetworks. Usually these measurescombine everal different kinds of interac-tion networks that are claimed to be important dimensions of world-systemposition. The contention that networkmeasuresare superior to attribute mea-sures has been argued but not demonstrated. The question of methodof oper-ationalization is always confoundedwith the question of the substantive con-tent of the measures. The only network study that examines change over time(Smith & White 1989) confirmed manyworld-systems hypotheses about recentchanges in the world division of labor between1965 and 1980. Smith & Whitealso improvedupon earlier network analyses by using a method hat examinesmore bstract role equivalence ather than strict structural equivalence. Struc-tural equivalence tends to group countries that are connected to exactly thesame other countries, thus overemphasizinggeographical propinquity at theexpenseof similarities of role in the worlddivision of labor (see Schott 1986).Morework of this kind needs to be done.Strang (1990) used event history analysis to study patterns of decolonizationin the world-system between 1870 and 1987. He derived competinghypothesesfrom the world-systems and world polity perspectives, and his results lendsupport to both approaches. The "world polity" approach efers to the positionsadvancedby those scholars whocontend that a consensual and institutionalizedglobal culture has important effects on development n the world-system, e.g.Thomas t al (1987). Other important empirical studies have analyzed theprocess of world culture formation (e. g. Cha 1991, McNeely 993).

In a cross-national study of the effects of foreign investmenton the economicgrowth of peripheral and semiperipheral countries, Firebaugh (1992) presentsdata that he believes cast doubt on earlier findings. Several earlier studiesreported evidence hat dependence n foreign investment i.e. having a nationaleconomywith a relatively high ratio of foreign to domestically controlledcapital stock) had a negative effect on the growth of GNPper capita overperiods of 10 to 20 years (e. g. Bornschier & Chase-Dunn 985). Firebaughclosely replicated the analysis of Bornschier & Chase-Dunn, nd he found asimilar negative coefficient for the measureof investment dependence PEN),but he interpreted this as due to the fact that foreign capital investmenthas ales,s positive (rather than a negative) growtheffect than domesticcapital does.Firebaugh contends that the negative coefficient is due to a methodologicalartifact--a version of the ratio problem. The dependencemeasure, PEN, s the



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WORLD-SYSTEMSANALYSIS 399ratio of the stock of foreign investment to the size of the national economy.Firebaugh points out that the stock measure s the denominatorof the invest-ment rate, the ratio of new investment to the stock of investment, whichFirebaugh contends is the real engine of economicgrowth. Firebaugh arguesthat, because PEN s the denominatorof the (foreign) investment rate, whenPEN s high the investment rate is low, and vice versa. Thus, the negativecoefficient of PENs alleged to be due to this fact.But Firebaugh presents a new inding that must be disturbing to all thosewhowant to understand the causes of national development. He shows (1992:Table 4, p. 121) a significant negative coefficient for the domestic tock effecton economicgrowth. This, he argues, supports his interpretation that thenegative coefficient of the PENmeasure s really an artifact due to the ratioproblem. Does dependence on domestic capital stock also have a negativeeffect on growth? That would seem unlikely. Is Firebaugh right? Dixon &Boswell (1995) have shown hat the significant negative effect of PEN emainsafter controlling for the foreign investment rate. This undermines irebaughsinterpretation. New esearch using better and more recent data would addgreatly to our understandingof these processes.Trends and Cycles in the ModernSystemDespite disagreements ver the continuity of systemic logics, all scholars agreethat world-systems exhibit both developmental cycles and long-term trends.Someof these trends and cycles are thought to operate over very long timespans and in very different kinds of regional world-systems, while others arelimited to specific kinds of world-systems. Further research will reveal moreinformationabout cycles and trends in earlier history.Trends: PopulationWhile population growth has always been an important cause and consequenceof the historical evolution of world-systems, the pace of population growthhas increased dramatically in the modemworld. Research has indicated thatfertility is mainly affected by economic actors (Folbre 1977, Gimenez 977,Grimes 1981, Mamdani 972, Seccombe1983). An important implication ofthis finding is that the structure of economicncentives and costs accompany-ing each type of world-system tructure varies across both classes and accu-mulation modes. For example, universal and state-subsidized education amongthe contemporarystates of the core, combinedwith wagescales that (untilrecently) madepossible the support of children by their parents, has removedthe economic ncentive to have large families. But in the periphery, the per-sistence of a semi-proletarianized, semi-peasant coerced work-force suspendedbetween he current capitalist and "tributary" modes ustains the high value


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400 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESof children as valuable economic ssets and continues to provide a motivationfor high rates of fertility.

Asimilar analysis of the changing tructure of incentives over time with theEuropean ransition to contemporarycapitalism has suggested the successionof three distinct fertility regimes, each assigning to children and parents dif-ferent functions as the peasantry gradually succumbedo proletarianization(Seccombe 983). In the absence of economic hange, female literacy is knownto be an important factor in lowering fertility. Yet the economic eward struc-ture guiding ertility in the periphery cannot be entirely eliminatedby increasesin literacy, so planetary population growth rates can be expected to meetwhatevergrowthceilings exist.l Declining indigenous population growth ratesin the countries of the coreII have often been held out as exemplars of thegeneric human uture. But this suffers from the sameerror as older "modern-ization" theories, whichheld that the structures of the core were he future ofthe periphery. Instead, for the majority of the human opulation that has alwaysbeen ocated in the periphery, the ascendance f the capitalist mode as actuallyacted to encouragepopulation growth.

Technological ChangeTechnological change has also accelerated in modern apitalism. In earliersystems, the implementation and diffusion of new approaches and techniqueswere slow because such novelties were evaluated against, not just their effecton production efficiency, but also their potential effect on the structures ofsocial stratification (Anderson1974a). For a new echnique to displace an oldone, it had to be compatible with the preexisting "occupational structure" sothat traditional status hierarchies were not challenged. Under he current cap-italist mode,consideration of the social effects of technical change s largelyignored, because the producers are finns whose guiding principle is theirindividual profit and the suppression of their productioncosts, not the effectof technological change on the broader social structure. Further, inter-firmcompetition compelsfirms to be on a constant and aggressive search for newtechniques that hold the promiseof reducing production costs. Hence he rateof technical change has blossomed within contemporary capitalism in a waythat has been historically unprecedented. Meanwhile, he energy required to

IThe recise ocation f these eilings s difficult to discern, ndconsiderableebate asoccurredverwhereheymayie. Worldwatch1994) asannouncedhat theybelievehose imitsto have lreadyrrived,while thers hink hat heymayotbe eachedntil heplanetaryopulationhits 20billion. Givenhe geometricatureof the growth,venhe most enerousstimates ill besurpassedn only fewdecades.llAsdistinct fromhe growthates characteristic f newmmigrantsrom he periphery, hotendo continueheirhistoric atternsf high ertility.



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WORLD-SYSTEMSNALYSIS 401drive that technology has risen far faster than even the geometric growth ofthe population (Singer 1970, Star 1971).CommodificationAnother trend that modemapitalism has accelerated is that of"commodifica-tion" (Wallerstein 1984b). By this is meant he assignmentof a market "price"to an ever-expanding ercentage of the products of human ctivity. In the earlystages of capitalism, moneycomplementedbarter as a method of payment,while only those products created specifically for trade were created simplywith an end-market n mind e. g. textiles). In this early phase, the populationwas largely agricultural and food and clothing were individually producedasneeded by each family or community Braudel 1984: Vol. 1). As late as thesecond half of the nineteenth century, workers n the United States were stillexpected to supplement their wages with private gardens (Braverman 1974).In the age of McDonaldshis seems surprising--itself an indicator of justhowfar the trend toward commodificationhas progressed.Proletarianization and Capital lntensivityAmonghe most important subjects of the trend toward commodificationhasbeen human abor itself. The wagerelation between employers and employeesis widespread in both the core and the periphery. Because this means thathumanabor is a precisely priced cost of production, the cost of labor can moreeasily be comparedwith machinery, and where the latter "wins," labor isexpelled. In this way abor costs are a constant inducement oward cheaperand more capable machinery, along with cheaper energy to mn them. This hasmeshedwith, and largely powered, the drive toward faster technologicalchange. The overall pattern has been the displacement of labor by machinery,whichcan as well be described as the substitution of "inorganic" for "organic"energy. While an increase in economic efficiency (more items produced perwagedollar spent) is the motivationfor this substitution, it entails environ-mental costs that are undervaluedby the calculus of capitalism (e. g. globalwanning,ozonedepletion, topsoil loss, and deforestation--all linked in variousways to mechanization and automation).Increasing Size of FirmsDespite oscillations, in the last 200 years the largest finns have grown y everymeasure: production capacity, numberof employees, amountof capital con-trolled, and size of the market. This "monopoly" ector, characterized by asmall numberof huge finns, was originally born out of the broader "compet-itive" sector of small-scale companies,and the competitive sector continuesto be reproduced (OConner1973). But the emergenceof the monopoly ectorhas changed the face of modem apitalism most obviously in the realm of



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402 CHASE-DUNNGRIMESinternational trade, notwithstandinghe recent literature on "post-modern"flexible accumulation Harvey1989). Amonghe key advantagesaccruinglarge size are cheapaccess o large amountsf capital. This accessallows orreadyreinvestment n up-grading lder production acilities or building newones, enabling he developmentnd mplementationf new echnologies.Thisapplies not just to production,but also to marketing nd the substitution ofnewmaterials. Access o capital also allows or financingnew outs of auto-marionwith newwavesof investment, thereby propelling the secular trendtoward reater capital intensivity.Geographically,he physical area that a companysecisions could affectmbecause f the rangeof local markets hey supply,or the area fromwhich heydraw their employees, or the numberof governments o which they paytaxes--has continuallyexpanded, lbeit unevenly nd cyclically.State FormationIt has beenargued hat the Europeanation-statearose to facilitate the pros-ecutionof war (Tilly 1989). This maybe true, but another mportant unctionof the moderntate has been o control the economynd he surplus it gener-ates, becauset depends n this surplus or its basic existence.Thepower f states over he lives of their citizens has been xpandingincethe beginning f the first states, but this expansion as grown xplosively nthe last two centuries (Foucault1980, Boli-Bennett 980). While he "Abso-lutist State" emerging uring the end of feudalismasserted arrogant claimsabout he power f the monarchver the lives, bodies, and propertyof subjectcitizens (Anderson 974b),only today has technology nabledsomeof theseclaims o becomelmost iterally true. This expansion f the state has takenon two orms: a geographical xpansion f the power f the central governmentever farther away rom he capital city, combinedith a deepening f its powerover he daily ife of its citizens.

Eachbout of corporateand state expansion eems o have followed he samegeneral course: A waveof technological change enabled an expansion incorporate size and control, stimulating popular demandsor compensatoryregulationon a correspondingovernmentalcale. Corporate ttempts o evaderegulation have often involved crossing governmental oundaries, in turnleading to bilateral and multilateral agreements etween overnmentsn reg-ulations. Each oundhas led to an expandedtate chasingafter an expandingcorporate ize. International political integration has increased he level ofglobal governanceuch that someworld-systemcholars predict the eventualemergencef a world state (e.g. Chase-Dunn990, Arrighi 1990).Trend LimitsAswithpopulation rowth, here are ceilings to eachof these trends. Technicalchangeoften relies on energysources that are not infinite while producing



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 403effluents that are deadly; commodificationequires the equal expansion of theability to pay; proletarianization is curtailed by automation;both corporate andgovernmental ize must stop at the global level.

Eachceiling has the capacity to throw the modern apitalist world-economyinto either acute crisis or systemic collapse. For example, much f our tech-nology relies upon the use of fossil fuels, and this is the leading source ofglobal warming. If we continue using these fuels as we have been, globalwarming nd air pollution will kill increasing numbersof people, threateningthe viability of the entire world-system n both biological and political levels.Also, as we run out of these fuels (an inevitable event), prices will risedramatically, introducingrates of inflation that will threaten systemstability.

Anexampleof the effect of trend limits in commodification nd proletari-anization is provided by every recession, which s largely due to the failureby the workingclasses to consume n adequate volumeof the products createdby their ownwork. This is always attributable to inadequatewages the inverseside of excessive commodification) nd/or automation (the necessary by-prod-uct of proletarianization). The recent depression in the world-economy e-tween 1985-1994 llustrates these limits. Automation fossil fuel-dependent)is generating a vast and growingnumberof unemployedwho ack the abilityto buy. In the United States the employed emainder brings homea real wageequal to, or less than, the amount n 1973. This has placed a restraint on theeconomic recovery and may eventually block growth altogether, pending aredistribution of income.Such situation is already creating a crisis of politicallegitimacy and economicviability evident throughout he core in rising ratesof unemployment nd political extremism.These examplesshould highlight just howvulnerable the current word-sys-tem is, and howclose to its limits we have already come. Current rates ofincrease in population and energy use combinedwith capitalism as it existstoday simply cannot be sustained, so a major breakdown s as inevitable asearthquakes in California, yet equally difficult to pin down o a particularmoment.This should becomeclearer after the review of research on cyclesbelow. Different cycle phases either accelerate or retard trend developments,and each cycle acts along its own ime-scale. The sum of the respectiveinfluences of all of these cycles and trends affects the likely trajectory of ourcollective future.CyclesCycles in productionhave always existed. In societies closely tied to agricul-tural production, the cycle of the seasons imposes an annual periodicity onplanting and harvests. Longer-term fluctuations in economic output in theprecapitalist era have also been noted (Chase-Dunn& Willard 1993, FrankGills 1993).



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404 CHASE-DUNNGRIMESIn the current period, economic ycles appear to be endemic o moderncapitalism, and several have been identified, whichdiffer mainly n length.Themost mportant monghese are the Juglar cycle of 6-10years, the Kuznets

cycle of 20--25years, and he Kondratieff also knowns the "long wave"),thought to last around50 years (Kleinknecht t al 1992, Modelski&Thomp-son, forthcoming,Mandel 975:133-61).Regardlessof length, each has a similar underlying ogic: A new et ofproducts s introducedhat sells well, the market xpands, nd related employ-mentswells, allowing for an expansionof worked"consumer"pending. Themarketeventuallybecomesaturated, sales drop, income ontracts, and work-ers are laid off. Theeffect of the contraction s prolonged y the extendedfeed-back oop through hose firms producingcapital goods.Thesemanufac-turers of the meansof production ake orders in advance,whichmeanshatthey are producingmachineryor constructing he end-productong after theslump n sales of that producthas started. This long feed-back nly prolongsthe downturn.But eventually, the excess inventory s sold out, productionresumes, and renewedgrowth s possible (Mandel 968, 1975, Marx 967).Juglar CyclesOtherwiseknown s the "normal"or "classic" business cycle, such a cyclelasts 7-10 years (Gordon 986:522,Maddison 982:77). Even hough discus-sions of these cycles can be traced as far back as Marx 1967), the NationalBureauof Economic esearchhas conferred upon hem he nameof the muchmorerecentJacekJuglar. 12 Thecauseoftheseparticularcyclesisthoughttoliein the average ife span of capital equipment:After aroundeight years, themachinery f production ends to wearout or depreciate to the point thatreplacement becomesnecessary (Moore& Zarnowitz, in RJ Gordon1986:738). Thefact that the periodization of equipment urchases and factoryconstruction within firms also becomesynchronous cross firms throughoutthe economys a whole eflects how he firms are themselvescustomersofone another. Recent xamples f Juglar downturnsn the UnitedStates are therecessions of 1990-1992, 981-1983,and 1975-1976.Kuznets CyclesIn workspublished at various times through the period 1930-1960,SimonKuznetsraced whatappearedo be cycles of around 0-25years in the recordsof a variety of indicators for several corestates andone semi-peripheraltate(United States, United Kingdom, rance, Germany, elgium,Canada,Japan,Australia, and Argentina) (Maddison 982:262,note 15). Thesecycles have

12ThisdespiteMaddisonsssertionhat"Juglar everlaimedo have iscoveredheexistenceof aneight- o nine-yearhythm"Maddison982:77).



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 405been the subject of many ifferent investigators (e. g. Grimes1993, Thomas1954, Solomou 990), and several hypotheses have been put forward for theircause, although none has been uniformly accepted (Maddison 1982:73-77).Because he phases of the cycle are opposite for the United States and Britainfor a series of years, some e. g. Thomas 954) have suggested that trans-At-lantic migrations might be responsible, but this explanation does not accountfor the synchronization of countries in the Pacific, nor the other countriesmeasured by Maddison (1982), Solomou (1990), and Grimes (1993).possible explanation maybe to link the timing of the Kuznets oscillation togenerational turnover in the demandor housing and other buildings, but thislinkage is still speculative (Dassbach (1993).t3 Grimes 1993) has extendedthe coverageof nations to include all countries having GDP ata back to 1790,and he has found that a Kuznets-length ycle exists for all countries until 1955(see below). Although the precise mechanisms f this cycle are unknown,is reasonable o assume hat their timing is a reflection of a cyclical pattern ofreinvestment, even f the precise nature of that investment s still unclear.Kondratieff CyclesA Soviet economist writing in the 1920s, Kondratieff observed that the his-torical record of prices then available to him appeared to indicate a cyclicregularity of phases of gradual price increases followed by phases of decline(Kondratiev, reprinted in 1979). The period of these apparent oscillationsseemed o him to be around 50 years.

Kondratieffs controversial concept of a 40-60-year-long cycle has fadedin and out of academic avor often since he wrote. Most ecently, the onset ofpersistent sluggishness in the world economy n the 1970s has brought abouta revival (Berry 1991, Freeman1984, Goldstein 1988, Gordon 1978, Klein-knecht et al 1992, Mandel1975 1980, DiMatteoet al 1986, Van Duijn 1983).Despite enormousdeological differences, all of these scholars are united inarguing that long waves are markedand powered by massive investments innew infrastructure (Goldstein 1988).The basic argument s that periodically (approximatelyevery 40-60 years),factories, meansof production, communication, nd transport are all rebuiltincorporating new echnologies. A list of specific historical examplesof such"revolutionary" new technologies could include the construction of pavedroads (Braudel 1984(Vol. 3):316-17), the centralized factory system ofufacture (Marglin 1974), the early machineryemployed n the textile mills,

laAlthough Dassbaehsxplorations at present irected owardinking enerationsharingcommonet of historical forcesand hereby commondeologywith he cyclicalmovementsfthe40-60 earKondratieffave, is argumentould s easilybeappliedo the25-30 earKuznetscycleas well(Solomou990:157-59).



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406 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESthe infrastructure for the railroad system, the discovery and application ofelectric power, automobiles and the application of internal combustion ngines(Baran & Sweezy 966), electric homeappliances and factory machinery, andmicroprocessors and robotics (Mandel1975:Ch. 4).) Throughout he periodinitial implementationof these new echnologies, the "normal"business cycles(both Juglar & Kuznets) proceed unimpeded,However, ecessions are shorterand recoveries surer and longer (Mandel 1975:Ch. 4).

Eventually, however, he diffusion of the new echnologies becomes eneral.The market becomessaturated in precisely the same fashion as saturationoccurs n the Juglar cycle. Parallel with this diffusion comes decline in profits.Oncemore, investment shifts awayfrom production and into speculation, whileunemploymentmounts and effective demand decays. Yet because the wholeprocess is spread out over the entire infrastructure of the economy,ts declinealso stretches over several Juglar cycles, during which he depressive phasesgrow longer and the recoveries more anemic (Mandel 1975:Ch. 4).

Kondratieffs original observations were based upon records of prices, andmost of the recent works cited above have continued in that tradition, partlybecause price data are available for sustained periods. In one of the mostthoroughpieces of new research in this area, Goldstein (1988: 233) concludedthat:

Longwaves rc tentatively corroboratedn prices, production, nvestment, nno-vation, and wages the last twoare inversely correlated) but not in trade. Theyextend rom1495 at least for prices) throughhe present. Thevariablesare laggedwithin cycle time in the following equence: roduction, nvestment, nnovation,prices, and wages.Recent Cycle ResearchMostof the work on Kondratieff cycles has used price data (e.g. Berry 1991),although researchers have also examined nventories, consumptionpatterns,labor strikes, profit rates, and international debt (Gordon1986, Kowalewski1994, Poletayev 1993, Shaikh 1993, Silver 1993, Suter 1992). Until veryrecently (e. g. Kleinknechtet al 1992), less empirical workhas been done withdata on production, even though there are sound theoretical reasons for be-lieving that the essential engine of the manifoldcycles of capitalism lie ulti-mately in the dynamicsof production and accumulation (Mandel 1975, 1980).But that deficit has started to be filled. In a reanalysis of GDP roductiondataon eight European countries, 1850-1979, and a "world" production indexoriginally presented by Bieshaar & Kleinknecht (1984) for 1780-1979, Metz(1992) seems to have found strong evidence of long waves. His contributionlies in omitting the data distorted by the two world wars and substituting intheir place interpolated values, combined ith a creative application of spectralanalysis.



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WORLD-SYSTEMS NALYSIS 407The research into long waves is still young, so there remain importantdisagreements over relevant data and methods.14 One of these disagreements

is over the best approach to detecting cycles within time series data. Oneschool (exemplified by the works found in Kleinknecht 1992) advocates useof procedures hat are variations on spectral analysis, while another [typifiedby Goldstein (1988), Solomou(1990), and Grimes (1993 and below]ines data series by using percent change between data values (typicallyreferred to as taking "first differences"). Put simply, the first approach tartsby taking out any long-term trends in the data series and then ignoringfluctuations outside of the target cycle length; the second does not throw outany information, but assumes hat any cycles (regardless of length) willrevealed by the percent change data. Each method has virtues, so a finalchoice has yet to be settled upon. But unfortunately, the method chosenappears to influence the resultsmthose using spectral analysis typically findKondratiev-length cycles more often than those using first differences (e.g.Solomou 1990).Anexampleof the results available from the application of percentages isillustrated below in some recent work by Grimes.15 Most of the researchliterature surveyed above has restricted itself to analysis of data from corecountries, usually those in Europe. Missinghas been he inclusion of data fromcountries beyond hese few. Until recently, such data were not easily available.However,over the decade of the 1980s an important new source of data hasbeen made vailable in the series of historical statistics compiled nd publishedby Mitchell (1980, 1983, 1985). Brought ogether in these volumes or the firsttime are production and output-data for all of the countries around the worldfor which such data were recorded, including many ountries in Latin Americaand Asia for the nineteenth century. Using these data, Grimes computed heaverage percentage growth rate for available measuresof national product atfive-year intervals over the period 1790-1988.6 Figure 2 illustrates the number f eases available over that time. There is aclear explosion of cases after the massive waveof decolonization followingWorldWar I (and the entr6e of systematic data gathering by the WorldBank),

14Anxcellent eview f the theoretical nderpinningf thesedisagreementsanbe foundnRappoportReichlin1989.ISAmorehorougheportof this research anbe oundn Grimes1993).16Data ere ollected t five-year ntervalsonGDPndpopulationor 104of the largestcountries rom 790-1990.or he period1790-1945,ata were btainedromMitchell 1981,1982,1983) ndMaddison1982).For he period1950-1990,he GDPndpopulation atadrawnromhe World ank. lthoughataonGDPre not availableor every ountryor all years,the countriesor whichataexist n the period 790-1950ncludehe United tates,Mexico,ostof Europe,nd he largest ountriesn LatinAmericandAsia.


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408 CHASE-DUNN GRIMES

120

100

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01790 1805 1820 1835 1850 1865 1880 1895 1910 1925 1940 1955 1970 1985YEAR

Figure 2 N of cases by year. Countries with data available

but even well before then, Mitchells data has 20 cases back until 1905, and10 cases until 1865.Figure 3 illustrates the average growth rates amonghe countries measuredover the period. Empirically, the pattern of oscillation in their growth isperceptibly the same in both timing and amplitude from 1820 to 1940, even

though the numberof cases over that same period varies from 3 to 33. Thissuggests that the proportion of the globes economicactivity indirectly re-corded by the small numberof countries in the beginning maybe far greaterthan is implied by the size of the list alone. 17Figure 3 demonstrates that this methodof approaching the data showsnoobvious support for a Kondratiev-length pattern, but there is strong support

17There are also theoretical reasons to believe that the measured ases can be thoughtof as proxiesfor the vast majority of tbe larger world economyhat remains unmeasured.An examinationof thelist of countries measured shows hem to be the USA,France, England, and Germany--preciselythe countries whichwere he leading incubators or emergingndustrial capitalism, so it is reasonableto expect their production and trade to be the collective engine powering he system as a whole(Braudel 1984, Wallerstein 1974).


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WORLD-SYSTEMSANALYSIS 409

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1795 1810 1825 16401855 1570 1885 1900 1915 19301945 1960 1975 1986YEARFigure3 Mean rowth ates. GDP/Capita795-1988.N of cases next to relevant year)

for a Kuznets-length oscillation. 18 Despite the global nature of this recordedaverage, there is a lot of variation between individual countries--not all coun-tries rise and fall together. 19 Further work with these data is needed, especiallyits submission to the procedures of spectral analysis. At this point the jury onthe existence of Kondratievs in production is still out.

It easy to imagine, if there are regular cycles lasting at least one generation(such as the Kuznets) or possibly two (like the Kondratieff), that these oscil-lations might express themselves socially and politically. Particularly in thecase of the latter cycle length, where either phase ("up" or "down") is capableof lasting 20-30 years, then entire generations could come of age during either

lSNot hown ere are the results of T-tests on the differenceof meansor the Kondratieff"up"vs "down" hasesportrayedn Goldstein 1988).Noneweresignificantlydifferent except or thepost-WorldWar I "boom"s comparedith the periodsbeforeandafter it.

19Ina further analysisof the amountf between-countryovariation,Grimes1993) inds thatthe synchronizationf the word-economyas tself oscillatedbetween peak n the early nineteenthcentury, ollowed ya trough n the mid-nineteenthentury,another eakat the turn of the twentiethcentury,another rough n the aftermath f WorldWar I, rising onceagain o a sharppeak or theperiod 1970-1990. heunderlying ogic (if oneexists) to these pulsations is as yet unknown,although hey may eflect the influenceof the "Hegemonicycle" see below).


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410 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESgeneralized depression or prosperity, and that this wouldhave political con-sequences (Dassbach1993). Research has already shown hat general attitudesabout the relative importance of economic"well-being" as against economic"equity" are detectably different by cohort and are powerfully affected by theeconomiccircumstances of ones youth (Inglehart 1971). This linkage betweencohort attitude and the economic circumstances of childhood has also beendemonstrated cross-nationally. Berry (1991), Gordon 1978, 1986), anddel (1975, 1980) have all used this observation to suggest that the Kondratieffcycle shapes the timing of "key" elections, as well as the form and timing ofclass conflict. Yet efforts to test this seemingly lear corollary to cycle researchhave yielded only equivocal results.

One example of this research is provided by the work of Silver using thedata generated by the World Labor Research Working Group at Binghamton(1992, 1995). By carefully recording every reference to, or description of,forms of labor unrest throughout the world as found in the NewYork Timesor The Times (London), she was able to check for correlations between theamountand types of conflict and the long waveover the period 1870 to thepresent. While there was mild support for a long wave influence on classconflict, it was weak. Instead there was an unexpected match between suchconflict and the decentralization phase of the "hegemonic equence" (see nextsection). Anotherexampleof similar research is that of Kowalewski1991a-c).Like Silver, he used the NewYork Times and The Times (London) to gatherreports of political events to check against the pattern of the Kondratieff forthe period 1821-1985.But in his case, he looked for reports of revolutionarymovementsn the periphery, core interventions to suppress those movements,and the frequency of military coups. For the frequency of revolutionary move-ments and also that of coups, he found a clear upward rend throughout, whilefor core interventions there appeared to be a gentle upside-down"U" curve,peaking near 1920. But in looking for connections to the generally agreed-upontiming of the Kondratieff, like Silver, he found weak upport, but moreappar-ent correlation with the hegemonic equence--again unexpectedly.Finally, in other workon Kondratieff waves,S uters (1992) important studyof debt cycles shows hat the debt crisis of the 1980s in the periphery andsemiperiphery s only the most recent instance of a recurrent cycle of foreignindebtedness characterizing the world economy s a whole. Suter identifiesthree repeating phases (expansion, crisis, and settlement) that have accompa-nied four major periods of global debt-servicing incapacity among overeignborrowers: he late 1830s, the mid-1870s, he early 1930s, and the early 1980s.Suter concludes hat debt cycles are regularly related to both Kondratieff wavesand Kuznets cycles. Suters book, recipient of the 1993 Political Economyfthe World-Systemrize for distinguished scholarship, includes case studies ofPeru, Liberia, and the OttomanEmpire.



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WORLD-SYSTEMSNALYSIS 411Progress in this kind of research is necessarily slow and extremely labor-

intensive, so it maybe some ime before enough studies accumulate to allowus definitive conclusions. However,at present it wouldseem that althoughKondratievs appear in some important data series, the clear association wewouldexpect to find betweenpolitical struggles and the pulses of the Kon-dratieff remain unsupported, while those betweensuch conflict and the hege-monicsequence are somewhat entative, since the time for which data mustbe available is so very long.Hegemonic SequencesOneof the cyclical features that is commono all hierarchical world-systemsis a system-wideoscillation between centralization and decentralization ofpolitical organization. Thedistribution of power mong set of polities variesin concentration. In systems of chiefdoms, tates, and empires, the size of thelargest polity increases and then decreases. In state-based world-systems riorto the predominance f capitalism, these oscillations were manifested as thesequential rise and fall of empires. But in the modem orld-system,capitalismhas changed he dynamicsand the form of the political centralization/decen-tralization sequence.In the modem orld-system, the pattern of political centralization/decen-tralization takes the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic ore powers. Thisis analytically similar to the rise and fall of empires, but the differences areimportant. State-based world-systems prior to the modemne oscillated backand forth betweencore-wide empires and interstate systems in which the coreregion contained several states. In some egions the decentralization trend wentso far as to break up into mini-states. Thus feudalism maybe understoodas avery decentralized form of a state-based system.The simplest structural difference betweena core-wide empire and a hege-monic ore state is with regard to the degree of the concentration of political/military power n a single state. It is in this sense that Wallersteinsdistinctionbetweenworld-empires and world-economies oints to an important structuraldifference between the modemystem and earlier state-based systems. Butthis is not only a difference in the degree of peak political concentration. Thewhole nature of the process of rise and fall is different in the modem orld-system. The rise and fall of hegemonieshas occurred in a very different wayfrom the rise and fall of empires. Empire ormation was a matter of conqueringand exploiting adjacent core states by meansof plunder, taxation, or tribute.The rise of modem egemonshas not occurred in this way. Instead, modemhegemonsought to control international trade, especially oceanic trade, thatlinked cores with peripheries.This is why he modem orld-system is resistant to empire-formation. Themost powerful state in the system acts to block empire-formation and to



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412 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESpreserve he interstate system. Thus he cycle of political centralization/decen-tralization takes the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic ore powers. Thisimportant difference is due primarily to the relatively great importance hatcapitalist accumulationhas for the modern ystem.There is general agreement hat certain core states have been able to accessdisproportionate amountsof political, military, and economicpowerfor pro-longed periods averaging about one century. These unusual core states arevariously called either "leading" or "hegemonic,"because during their domin-ion they can promulgate nd militarily enforce international rules of trade andinternational relations that favor their status. With he most dynamic conomyand often the largest military, the hegemon lso disseminates its language,culture, and currency as "global" standards (Chase-Dunn1989, Goldstein1988, Modelski & Thompson 988 and forthcoming). It is also accepted thatat somepoint the transition between he hegemony f one country and that ofanother is punctuated and affirmed by global war. The key linkage betweenthe hegemonie ycle and war that all students of these issues accept is that theagreements ending any global war ratify the global powerhierarchy existingat wars end. Meanwhile, n the generations following the war, uneven nvest-ment and development gradually work to reorder the hierarchy in ways un-anticipated by the earlier international agreements.Eventually, the disparitybetween the "actual" hierarchy formed by long-term economic investmentpatterns and the "formal" hierarchy ratified by the last war grows largeenough--and the aging hegemonweak enough--that another memberof thecore seeks to unseat and replace it by initiating a new war (Boswell & Misra,forthcoming; Goldstein 1988, Modelski & Thompson 988, forthcoming).

Most other questions remain unsettled: Howmanycore states have beenhegemonic and for how long? Howhave these hegemons become dominant--what commodities did they monopolize? Whatare the links between economiccycles, wars, and the hegemonicsequence?Braudel (1984) provides one list of dominant economic"centers" focusedon cities: Venice (1378-1498), Antwerp(1500-1569), Genoa (1557-1627),Amsterdam (1585-1773), London (1773-1929), and New York (1929-pres-ent) (Braudel 1984, Vol. 3). For him, these "centers" were not "hegemonic"in the sense described above. Rather, they were the sites of the most dynamiceconomiesn their day, locations that acted as midwiveso the most importantinstitutional inventions facilitating capitalist development;hey werealso thetrading nodes through which the most advanced products were routed. Otherswriting since have imposed riteria for hegemonyhat delete someof Braudelscandidates because they conceptualize hegemonydifferently. Wallerstein

2The hreat of yet another global war in an age of nuclear and biological weaponsepresents anadditional reason to believe that the current word-systems transitory.



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WORLD-SYSTEMSANALYSIS 413(1984a) understands hegemony s a combination of economic power basedthe most profitable leading industries and military power. Modelski& Thomp-son (1988) originally focused on the importanceof naval forces that allowedthe "leader" to exercise global reach. Their study of changes n the distributionof naval capacity among he "great powers" remains one of the most importantcontributions to our understanding of the hegemonic equence. In their morerecent work, Modelski & Thompsonforthcoming) see global leadershipbased on economicnnovations hat allow the leader to be central in the leadingand most profitable industries in the word economy.Their empirical work onthe distribution of shares of the most profitable sectors over long periods oftime is very valuable, though the sectors chosen remain somewhat ontrover-sial.Modelski & Thompson1988, forthcoming) argue that there have been four"global leaders": Portugal (1516-1609), United Provinces of the Netherlands(1609-1714), United Kingdom 1714-1945), United States (1945-?), andcontend that the United Kingdommanaged o lead through two "leadershipcycles," one in the eighteenth and one in the nineteenth centuries. Wallerstein(1984a) is even more restrictive, admitting into the club of hegemonies nlythe United Provinces, United Kingdom, nd the United States.The cyclical nature of the rise and fall of these powersstrongly implies alinkage with the economic ycles surveyedabove. But the nature of this linkagehas yet to yield a consensus. Most tie the hegemonicsequence to the Kon-dratieff cycle, despite its empirical ambiguity. Modelski & Thompson1988and forthcoming)are the most explicit in this regard, arguing that each hege-monic cycle encloses two Kondratievs. Goldstein (1988) and Grimes (1988)are more lexible, asserting only that a global war and birth of a newhegemoncoincides with a Kondratiev upswing, but that not all upswings are accompa-nied by war. Boswell & Misra (forthcoming) assert that the relevant cyclegoverning the hegemonic equence is not the Kondratiev at all but instead a"Logistic" wave, a wave postulated to have the same dynamic as the Kon-dratievwinfrastructural innovation eventually giving way to market satura-tionwbut whose period is thought to be roughly twice as long (around 120years). (See also Arrighi 1994.)

But despite these disagreements, there remains a consensus that the enginedriving a rising core state and contender or hegemonictatus is that it is thegeographical homefor the emergenceof some revolutionary new technologyand related product(s). Sucha technology requires a change in basic infra-structure to be fully employed; hence it takes more than one generation tosaturate the market. The novelty of these products allows for disproportionateaccumulation ia technological rents, enabling the aspiring newcore to rapidlygain the capital required both for continued investment and military build-up.There have been important research contributions to our understanding of



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414 CHASE-DUNN GRIMESthe hegemonicsequence in the last few years. Taylors (1994) study of theDutch hegemony hows that it was the unique combination of the economicpolicies of city states with the protective capacity of territorial states thatenabled the Dutch o perform he role of hegemonnd consolidate the interstatesystem in the seventeenth century. Boswell& Misras (1994) study of the riseand fall of Dutchcontrol of the sea lanes is another important contribution.

Regarding the US hegemony,Bergesen (1995) has analyzed changes in thedistribution of economicpower in the worlds largest firms to document heUS decline relative to the Germanand Japanese economies. Schott (1994)studied performance, recognition, and centrality in global networks of engi-neering scientists, especially comparing he United States and Japan. He findsthat Japanese performance s surging relative to the United States, but thatJapanese recognition remains low, while the United States receives greaterrecognition than its relatively declining performancewould ustify. This is ademonstrationof howa declining hegemon an rest on its laurels.ConclusionsRecent research on the modemworld-system and comparisons between it andearlier systemscontinue to challenge the early assumptionsof the world-systemperspective, forcing students of the area to fine-tune concepts and to producenew heories of long-term social change. Current debates bring to the fore onceagain the huge questions of historical evolution. Wallerstein (1994:76), com-menting on the comparative world-systems project, says,

Whatmightbe-a possible fruitful line of enquiry s to compareoth the genesisand the terminalcrises of systems, o see if there are any patterns, which ouldthen (a) give us some nsight into "world history," if by that we mean hesynchronicunfoldingof humanocial existence, and (b) illuminate how ystembifurcations vide Prigogine)work n historical systems,which n turn mighthelpus with (c) the practical questionof how est to navigate he current bifurcation(or systemicdemise,or transformation romone historical system o one or moreother suchsystems).This potential for world-systemsanalysis to enable us to understand social

change and act in a collectively rational way to avoid predictable disasters(such as global war and environmental collapse) is the most alluring aspectencouraging research in the area. Already we know hat our current system iswobbling dangerously close to the edge of growth limits.As the best unit of analysis for studying social change on a global level,world-systems theory provides social science with a new purchase that canproduce robust and scientific theory explainingboth the past and likely future.The notion that long time horizons for historical analysis may ead to superiormodelsof the future is not a newone--it has long been he stuff of eschatology.But today the study of world-systemspromises to wrest our expectations about



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WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 415

the future away from theology and into the realm of science. In this respect,sociology may now be able to join with other sciences in demystifying theworld,

AnyAnnualReviewchapter, as well as any article cited in an AnnualReviewchapter,maybe purchased rom the AnnualReviewsPreprints and Reprints service.1.800.347-8007;415.259-5017;email: [email protected]

Literature CitedAmin S. 1976. Unequal Development. NewYork: Monthly Rev.AminS. 1993. The ancient world-systems ver-sus the modern apitalist world-system. SeeFrank & Gills 1993, pp. 247-77AndersonP. 1974a. Passages rom Antiquity toFeudalism. London: NewLeftAndersonP. 1974b.Lineages of the A bsolutistState. London: NewLeftArrighi G. 1990. The three hegemoniesof his-torical capitalism. Review13(3):365-408Ardghi G. 1994. The Long Twentieth Century.London: VersoAnighi G, Drangel J. 1988. The stratificationof the world-economy:n exploration of the

semi-peripheral zone. Review10(1):9-74Baran P, Sweezy P. 1966. MonopolyCapital-ism. NewYork: Monthly Rev.BergesenA. 1995. A networkanalysis of globaleconomic ompetition, 1956-1989. J. World-Sy. stems Res. 1(1) [Electronic journal: locatevm GOPHER://CSF.COLORADO.EDU/WSYSTEMS/JOURNALS/]Berry BJL. 1991. Long Wave Rhythms in Eco-nomic Developmentand Political Behavior.Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. PressBieshaar H, Kleinknecht A. 1984. Kondratiefflong waves in aggregate output? An econo-metric test. Konjunkturpolitik30(5):279-303Boll-Bennett J. 1980. Global integration andthe universal increase of state dominance,1910-1970. In Studies of the ModernWorld-System, ed. AJ Bergesen. NewYork: Aca-demicBornschier V, Chase-DunnC. 1985. Transna-tional Corporations and Underdevelopment.NewYork: PraegerBoswellT, Misra J. 1991. The rise and fall ofAmsterdamand Dutch hegemony: evidencefrom the Baltic SoundTolls, 1550--1750. InCities in the World-System,ed. R Kasaba,pp. 55-80. NewYork: GreenwoodBoswellT, Misra J. 1995. Cycles and trends inthe early capitalist world-economy:n anal-ysis of leading sector commodity rades,1500-1600/50-1750. Review Summer. Inpress

Bosworth T. 1993. World cities and economiccycles: testing Barry Gills and Andre GunderFrank s A and B phases. Dep. Polit. Sci.,Univ. Wash., Seattle. Unpublished ms.Braudel F. 1984. Civilization and Capitalism,15th-18th Century. 3 Vols. New York:Harper & RowBraudel F. 1984. Civilization and Capitalism,15th-18th Century. Vol. 3. The Perspectiveof the World. NewYork: Harper & RowBravermanH. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Cap-ital. NewYork: Monthly Rev.Cha Y-K. 1991. Effect of the global system onlanguage instruction, 1850-1986. Sociol.Educ. 64:19-32

Chandler T. 1987. Four Thousand Years ofUrban Growth: An Historical Census.Lampeter, Wales: Edwin MellenChase-DunnC. 1989. Global Formation. Cam-bridge, MA:BlackwellChase-DunnC. 1990. World state formation:historical processes and emergentnecessity.Polit. Geogr. Q. 9(2):108-30Chase-DunnC, Hall TD, eds. 1991. Core/Pe-riphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds.Boulder, CO: WestviewChase-Dunn C, Hall TD. 1993. Comparingworld-systems: concepts and working hypo-theses. Soc. Forces 71(4):851-86Chase-Dunn C, Hall TD. 1994. Cross-world-system comparisons: bnilarities and differ-ences. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am.Sociol.Assoc., Los Angeles, Aug. 9Chase-Dunn C, Willard A. 1993. Systems ofcities and world-systems:settlement size hi-erarchies and cycles of political centraliza-tion, 2000BCo 1988AD.Presented at Annu.Meet. Int. Stud. Assoc., Acapulco,March25.[Data appendix is available from an dee-tronic archive at Boulder, CO: csf.colo-rado.edulwsystemsldatasetslcitypoplcivilizations/citypops_2000be- 1988adChase-DunnC, Willard A. 1994. Cities in thecentral political/military netw

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