Modern Halakha – How Jewish law is responding to modern controversies

The changing attitude towards secular Jews

in contemporary halakhic literature

Rabbi Johnny Solomon

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1. Rabbi Moshe Weinberger, Jewish Outreach: Halakhic Perspectives p. 97 There are very few poskim of recent generations who maintain that the literal definition of mumar be upheld in regards to Jews in western society.

2. Judith Bleich, ‘Rabbinic Responses to Nonobservance in the Modern Era’ in Jewish Tradition and the Non-traditional Jew pgs. 72-73 Changing sociological realities prompted rabbinic authorities to undertake a fundamental reassessment of certain time-hallowed distinctions. Although rabbinic authorities reacted with stringency to ritual innovations even remotely akin to those advocated by exponents of Reform, their response to lapses in observance on the part of individuals was far more tolerant. There was even an underlying feeling of sympathy for the plight of those whose deficiencies in observance were motivated by economic hardship. Increasingly large numbers of individuals no longer conformed to Orthodox standards of religious and ritual observance. Confronted with this fact, many authorities drew a crucial distinction between individuals whose deviation from religious practise was prompted by economic considerations, or was born of ignorance, and those whose nonobservance was the result of an ideological metamorphosis.

This distinction was enunciated and justified in halakhic categories in a seminal responsum authored by Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger. In talmudic sources the status of a “mumar with regard to the entire Torah”, a person who rejects the commandments of the Torah in their entirety, is tantamount to that of an apostate. The Gemara (Hullin 5a) declares that one who desecrates the Sabbath in public is to be regarded as a “mumar with regard to the entire Torah.” Rashi elucidates this categorization by noting that public desecration, ipso facto, constitutes denial of the divine role in creation of the universe. In publicly rejecting his obligation with regard to Sabbath observance the transgressor denies both God as Creator and the veracity of the biblical account of creation. Hence the Sabbath-desecrator is a “mumar with regard to the entire Torah.”

The novel socioreligious phenomenon of otherwise devout and believing Sabbath-desecrators prompted Ettlinger to a reassessment of the implications of such desecration.

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A. WE THOUGHT IT WAS PERMITTED 3. Talmud Bavli, Makkot 9a

: אומר מותר - אנוס הוא! א"ל, שאני אומר: אומראביי: באומר מותר. א"ל רבאאלא אמר ונמצא אדם, כנעני ואזדו לטעמייהו, דאיתמר: כסבור בהמה - קרוב למזיד הוא. מותר ונמצא גר תושב - רבא אומר: חייב, אומר מותר - קרוב למזיד הוא; רב חסדא אומר: פטור, אומר מותר - אנוס הוא. איתיביה רבא לרב חסדא: +בראשית כ'+ הנך מת על האשה אשר לקחת; מאי לאו בידי אדם! לא, בידי שמים. דיקא נמי, דכתיב: +בראשית כ'+ מחטוא לי. ולטעמיך, +בראשית ל"ט+ וחטאתי לאלקים, לאלקים ולא לאדם? אלא דינו מסור לאדם,

הכא נמי דינו מסור לאדם.

Said Abaye to him: If he thought that he had a right to kill, he is himself a victim of misadventure. Answered Raba: [Indeed, he is] for I consider anyone doing wrong thinking that it is permissible as next to a deliberate offender. And they both maintain that view [consistently] as both follow their own respective principles as expressed elsewhere. For it has been stated: Supposing one thought it was a beast and it happened to be a human being; a heathen and it happened to be a sojourning-stranger, Raba says he is liable [and R. Hisda says he is acquitted. Raba says he is liable] for one who thought he had a right to kill is next to a deliberate offender and R. Hisda says he is acquitted because one who thought he had a right to kill was [himself] a victim of a misadventure. Thereupon Raba referred R. Hisda to the [Scriptural] text, Behold, thou shalt die, because of the woman whom thou hast taken; for she is a man's wife. What else does it imply but liability to human execution [for his error]? — No, liability to Heaven's displeasure, and note carefully the context, And I also withheld thee from sinning against Me.

B. WE KNEW NO BETTER 4. Mishna Shabbat 7:1ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות השוכח עקר שבת כל בשבת. אמרו גדול כלל הרבה, אינו חיב אלא חטאת אחת. היודע עקר שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה, חיב על כל שבת ושבת. היודע שהוא שבת ועשה מלאכות הרבה בשבתות הרבה, חיב על כל אב מלאכה ומלאכה. העושה מלאכות הרבה מעין מלאכה אחת,

אינו חיב אלא חטאת אחת:They have laid down a general rule for the Sabbath: Whoever utterly forgets the essence of the Sabbath and commits many acts of (forbidden) labor on many Sabbaths, is liable for only one sin-offering. Whoever is aware of the essence of the Sabbath and commits many acts of (forbidden) labor on many Sabbaths is liable for each and every Sabbath. Whoever knows that it is the Sabbath and commits many acts of (forbidden) labor on

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many Sabbaths, is liable for each and every category of labor. Whoever commits many acts of (forbidden) labor within one category of work is only liable for one sin- offering.

5. Talmud Bavli, Shabbat 68b רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו: אפילו תינוק שנשבה בין הנכרים, וגר שנתגייר לבין הנכרים -

ורבי יוחנן ורבי שמעון בן לקיש דאמרי תרוייהו: דוקא הכיר כהכיר ולבסוף שכח דמי, וחייב.ולבסוף שכח, אבל תינוק שנשבה בין הנכרים וגר שנתגייר לבין הנכרים - פטור.

Rab and Samuel both maintain: Even a child who was taken captive among Gentiles or a proselyte who became converted in the midst of Gentiles is as one who knew but subsequently forgot, and so he is liable. But R. Johanan and Resh Lakish maintain: Only one who knew but subsequently forgot [is liable], but a child who was taken captive among Gentiles, or a proselyte who became converted in the midst of Gentiles, is not culpable.

6. Rashi on Shabbat 68b. דקסברי ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש: אומר מותר - אנוס הוא, ולא שגגה היאפטור -

7. Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 3: 3 במה דברים אמורים באיש שכפר בתורה שבעל פה במחשבתו ובדברים שנראו לו, והלך אחר דעתו הקלה ואחר שרירות לבו וכופר בתורה שבעל פה תחילה כצדוק ובייתוס וכן כלבין ונולדו ובני בניהם שהדיחו אותם אבותם בני התועים האלה התועים אחריו, אבל הקראים וגדלו אותם על דעתם, הרי הוא כתינוק שנשבה ביניהם וגדלוהו ואינו זריז לאחוז בדרכי המצות שהרי הוא כאנוס ואע"פ ששמע אח"כ ]שהוא יהודי וראה היהודים ודתם הרי הוא כאנוס שהרי גדלוהו על טעותם[ כך אלו שאמרנו האוחזים בדרכי אבותם הקראים

שטעו, לפיכך ראוי להחזירן בתשובה ולמשכם בדברי שלום עד שיחזרו לאיתן התורה.

This applies only to one who repudiates the Oral Law as a result of his reasoned opinion and conclusion, who walks lightmindedly in the stubbornness of his heart, denying first the Oral Law, as did Tzadok and Boethus and all who went astray. But their children and grandchildren, who, misguided by their parents, were raised among the Karaites and trained in their views, are like a child taken captive by them and raised in their religion, whose status is that of an anus, who, although he later learns that he is a Jew, meets Jews, observes them practice their religion, is nevertheless to be regarded as an anus, since he was reared in the erroneous ways of his fathers. Thus it is with those who adhere to the practices of their Karaite parents. Therefore efforts should be made to bring them back in repentance, to draw them near by friendly relations, so that they may return to the strength-giving source.

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C. REDEFINING SECULAR JEWS 8. Responsa Binyan Tzion HaChadashot No. 23

פסקים שלא להלכה למעשה. ב"ה אלטאנא יום ד' כ"ט מרחשון תרכ"א לפ"ק. לידידי מחותני הרב המופ' מו"ה

שמריהו צוקערמאן נ"י. מה שכ' מעכ"ת נ"י שהוא הי' נוהג לאסור בשתיית יין שנגע בו ישראל מחלל שבת בפרהסיא מפני שהוא מומר לכל התורה כולה והוכיח כן משו"ת המבי"ט שהביאקראים מפני שהם בו יין שנגעו לאסור בשתיית קכ"ד( )סי' י"ד הכסף בנקודת מחללים את המועדות והמה כמחללי שבתות. אמנם יש מי שחולק עליו ולכן שאל

אותי איך דעתי בזה.

לענ"ד הדין עמו דכיון דמחלל שבת בפרהסיא הוא כמומר לכל התורה דינו כעובדשס"ל שם הכסף בנקודת שהביא המהרש"ל שאפילו ואפשר /כוכבים/ ככבים דקראים אינם אוסרים מודה בזה דקראים אינם מחללין שבתות רק מועדות מפני שחולקים על קביעות שלנו וששוה מחלל מועדות למחלל שבתות לא ס"ל. אבל במחלל שבת ממש דלכ"ע הוי מומר לכל התורה אפשר שגם המהרש"ל מודה. וא"ל כיון דגזירת יינם הוא משום בנותיהם והרי בנות מחללי שבתות לא נאסרו. ז"א דא"כ מומר לעבודת ככבים לא יאסור יין בשתיי' ולפי מה דאמרינן בחולין )דף ד'( אוסר וצ"ל כמש"כ הר"ן בחידושיו שם וכמו שהעתיק גם מעכ"ת נ"י כיון דהוי ככותי גמור הוא בכלל גזירתן אעפ"י שאין בבנותיו איסור חתנות וא"כ ה"ה במומר לחלל שבתשבת לחלל דמומר קי"ט( )סי' הב"י הביאו בשו"ת הרשב"א וכ"כ בפרהסיא. בפרהסיא יינו יי"נ. והנה עד כה דברנו מעיקר הדין איך לדון מחלל שבת בפרהסיאפשתה שבעו"ה אחר בהם אדון מה ידענא לא שבזמנינו ישראל לפושעי אבל הבהרת לרוב עד שברובם חלול שבת נעשה כהיתר אם לא יש להם דין אומר מותר שרק קרוב למזיד הוא ויש בהם שמתפללים תפילת שבת ומקדשים קידוש היום ואח"כ מחללים שבת במלאכות דאורייתא ודרבנן והרי מחלל שבת נחשב כמומר בלבד מפני שהכופר בשבת כופר בבריאה ובבורא וזה מודה ע"י תפילה וקידוש ומה גם בבניהם אשר קמו תחתיהן אשר לא ידעו ולא שמעו דיני שבת שדומין ממשאבותיהן שמעשה מפני שבת שמחללין אעפ"י כמומרים נחשבו דלא לצדוקין גם וכ"כ שפ"ה( )סי' כמבואר ככבים עובדי לבין שנשבה כתינוק והם בידיהם המבי"ט )סי' ל"ז( ואפשר נמי דצדוקין שלא הורגלו בתוך ישראל ולא ידעו לעיקרי הדת ואינם מעיזין פניהם נגד חכמי הדור לא חשבי מזידין וכו' יע"ש. והרבה מפושעי הדור דומין להם ועדיפי מהם שמה שמחמיר הר"ש בקראים להחשיב יינם יי"נ אינו מפני חילול מועדות שדומה לשבת בלבד אלא מפני שכפרו גם בעיקרי הדת שמלין ולא פורעין ואין להם דיני גיטין וקדושין שעי"ז בניהם ממזרים. ובזה רוב הפושעיםיין של הפושעים הללו נגיעת ולכן לענ"ד המחמיר להחשיב שבזמנינו לא פרצו. לסתם יינם תבוא עליו ברכה. אכן גם למקילים יש להם על מה שיסמכו אם לא

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שמבורר לנו שיודע דיני שבת ומעיז פניו לחללו בפני עשרה מישראל יחד שזה ודאיכמומר גמור ונגיעת יינו אסור.

.כנלענ"ד הקטן יעקב

9. Responsa Shevet Halevi 2:172

ואף שראיתי בד"ת יו"ד סי' קכ"ב ס"ק י"ב הביא מתשובת בנין ציון החדשות סי' כ"ג שאיןכתינוק והם בידיהם גמורים שמעשה אבותיהם נחשבין מומרים דזמנינו מחללי שבת שנשבה בין העכו"ם ע"ש, מ"מ צ"ע רב אם שייך זה באה"ק שאין לומר תינוק שנשבה לבין העכו"ם, ואם כי הוא תינוק שנשבה לבין החופשים מבני עמינו ה' ירחם, מ"מ מי לא יודע

משבת קודש, ועוד הרי כבודו כותב שהוא גם אוכל נבילות וטריפות כנראה פקר בכולהו

D. ARE NEW DEFINITIONS NEEDED?

10. Rabbi Yuval Sherlow , ‘ The Halakhic Status of the Secular Jew: A Question of Public, Not Personal, Halakhah ’ in The Relationship of Orthodox Jews with Jews of Other Religious Ideologies and Non-Believing Jews (ed. A. Mintz) pgs. 228-231 The classic strategy of the halakhah in dealing with new realities is application of pre-existing categories and structures. In general, the halakhah tends not to create new frameworks but rather prefers to examine reality from a familiar perspective. This is precisely what halakhah did when secularism became prevalent in the Jewish community toward the end of the eighteenth century. The first known responsum that deals with this new phenomenon was that of Rabbi Jacob Ettlinger (Germany, 1798-1871) in his book Binyan Tzion haHadashot. Rabbi Ettlinger doesn’t try to hide the perplexity in facing the new reality, and he shares his hesitation about the proper response:

... as to Jewish sinners of our time, I do not know how to consider them.… For because of the multitude of our sins the sore has spread greatly, to such an extent that for most of them the desecration of the Sabbath has become like a permissible act, unless we were to define them as “those who think that a certain transgression is permitted,” which is considered close [but not exactly equivalent] to intentional transgressors. …There are those among them who offer Sabbath prayers and recite the Kiddush and then violate the Sabbath in actions prohibited both by the Torah and by rabbinical decree, and while one who desecrates Shabbat is considered an apostate because denying the Shabbat is tantamount to denying the very act of Creation, this person affirms Creation by participating in the prayer and Kiddush.

When dealing with the offspring of transgressors, he attempts to utilize yet another category:

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Regarding their children who have never even heard of the laws of Shabbat, they are like the Saducees who are not considered apostates despite the fact that they desecrate Shabbat because they are only following the ways of their parents, and they are like infants who were held captive by idolators. A careful reading will discern that Rabbi Ettlinger writes clearly that he doesn’t definitively know how to digest this new phenomenon, unknown to halakhic decisors in previous generations. After presenting this doubt, in the short passage we quoted he tried to identify no less than four (!) possible categories that could be utilized: they may be mezidim (intentional transgressors), omrim mutar (those who incorrectly think that a certain forbidden action is permitted), tinokot shenishbu (captive infants), or mumarim (apostates). For the posek, these are well-known halakhic categories, which had been used successfully to define phenomena in traditional Jewish society. Doing so required a not insignificant amount of halakhic juggling. For example, the “captive infant” is a category that originates in criminal law and lowers the level of culpability. Rabbi Ettlinger transforms it into a term that deals with normative communal behavior. This transformation is not totally original: it follows Rambam, who wrote of the children of Karaites as “captive infants.” (Mamrim 3, 3)

As I pointed out previously, this is the usual way for halakhic treatment of new conditions. Rav Ettlinger’s analysis was trail-blazing, and other halakhic categories subsequently have been proposed to define the status of the secular Jew, beyond the four that appear in the responsum quoted above. One example is to define secular Jews as a whole (in light of the Ramban on Bamidbar 15:22) as a community of inadvertentsinners. Recently Rabbi Yehuda Brandes proposed identifying the secular Jew with the classic am-ha’aretz. His claim is that the original meaning of the term refers not to the person’s intellectual achievement, but to the degree of halakhic commitment. The converse of the am-ha’aretz is not the hacham, but rather the haver, who is punctiliousin his observance of mitzvot.

In analyzing the paths taken by the halakhah in recent generations we can discern four different methodologies:

1. An absolute denial of changes in reality, thus continuing to classify secular Jews as intentional sinners or even apostates. This is the approach of the Satmar Rebbe zatzal in his book Va-Yoel Moshe and of various contemporary halakhic decisions that forbid contact with secular Jews, and certainly deny recognizing them. I note that even Rabbi Ettlinger did not preclude the possibility of seeing them as intentional transgressors or apostates.

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2. Awareness of secularization, but imposing a specific interpretation on the situation. For example, secular Jews are not culpable for their actions, because the reason for their being secular Jews is that they were “taken captive” since infancy. This definition comes close to defining secular Jews as people coerced into sin, since they had no way of determining what the right actions are and therefore have no legal responsibility.3. Facing the reality of secularization but claiming that secular Jews are simply mistaken. This methodology allows different ways of defining them—whether as inadvertent sinners, as those who think that the prohibited action is in fact permitted, or as communal shogeg—and each possibility suggests a specific way of perceiving the secular world.

4. A claim that halakhah itself recognizes different degrees of Judaism. This argument is the basis for the recent suggestion of Rabbi Brandes regarding halakhic recognition of the am ha’aretz. Another possibility, raised by Rabbi Dov Linzer (“The Discourse of Halakhic Inclusiveness” Conversations, Spring 2008/5768), is that in the modern era the notion of “one who says it is permitted” should not be seen a person who “should have known better” but regarded as one sincerely convinced that such actions are permitted and cannot be expected by us to believe otherwise. Consequently the halakhah can utilize the category of omer mutar to promote an inclusive attitude to non-observant Jews by the Jewish community.

There is no need to explain the advantages of using ready-made halakhic categories. Defining new realities by using such categories continues time-honored halakhic process and allows wide acceptance of circumstances that were previously not recognized by halakhah. At the same time, we are all aware of the problems involved in halakhic decisions based solely on this type of deliberation. The major impediment to this discourse is the obvious fact that the secular person is indeed a new reality. He is neither an infant nor a captive (this claim was already made by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zatzal in his book Ma’adanei Shlomo, pp. 27-29); he certainly has not adopted another religion; he is not simply someone who “thinks that that which is forbidden is in fact permitted,” since he (and many secular Jews) may have no intention at all of fulfilling the word of God; he is not an intentional transgressor, for he has no wish to rebel against the Almighty—he is simply a secular Jew.

E. THE MITZVAH TO REBUKE

11. Vayikra 19:17 לא־תשנא את־אחיך בלבבך הוכח תוכיח את־עמיתך ולא־תשא עליו חטא

Do not hate your brother in your heart. You must surely rebuke your neighbour, and not bear sin because of him.

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12. Talmud Bavli, Yevamot Page 65b ואמר רבי אילעא משום ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון: כשם שמצוה על אדם לומר דבר הנשמע, כך

מצוה על אדם שלא לומר דבר שאינו נשמע.Rabbi Ilia further stated in the name of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Simeon: Just as one is commanded to say things that will be listened to, so too one commanded not to say things that will not be listened to.

13. Rashi ibid. . דכתיב )ויקרא יט( הוכח תוכיח להוכיח מי שמקבל הימנולומר דבר הנשמע -

14. Talmud Bavli, Betzah Page 30a

אמר ליה רבא בר רב חנין לאביי: תנן, אין מטפחין ואין מספקין ואין מרקדין, והאידנא דקא)רבא( ולטעמך, הא דאמר ליה: - אמר ולא מידי? ולא אמרינן להו חזינן דעבדן הכי, +מסורת הש"ס: רבה+ לא ליתיב איניש אפומא דלחיא דלמא מגנדר ליה חפץ ואתי לאתויי )ארבע אמות ברשות הרבים(, והא הני נשי דשקלן חצבייהו ואזלן ויתבן אפומא דמבואה, ולא אמרינן להו ולא מידי? אלא, הנח להם לישראל, מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין. הכא נמי - הנח להם לישראל, מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין. והני מילי - בדרבנן, אבל בדאורייתא - לא. ולא היא, לא שנא בדאורייתא ולא שנא בדרבנן לא אמרינן להו ולא מידי, דהא תוספת יום הכפורים דאורייתא הוא, ואכלי ושתו עד שחשכה ולא אמרינן להו ולא

מידי.Raba son of Rav Hanin said to Abaye: We have learnt: You may not clap the hands or slap the thighs or dance; and yet we indeed see that [people] do this and we do not take them to task! …Let Israel [go their way]: it is better that they should err in ignorance than deliberately…This, however, applies only to a Rabbinical [prohibition] but not to a Biblical [prohibition]. But this is not so! Whether it [the prohibition] is Biblical or Rabbinical we do not tell them anything; for the additional time to the Day of Atonement [when we are told that the fast begins] is a Biblical injunction, yet people eat and drink until dusk and we do not say anything to them.

15. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 608:2 נשים שאוכלות ושותות עד שחשכה, והן אינן יודעות שמצוה להוסיף מחול על הקדש, אין ממחין

וה"ה בכל דבר איסור אמרינן: מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ולא יהיובידן כדי שלא תבואו לעשות בזדון. הגה: מפורש בתורה, מוחין בידן מזידין; ודוקא שאינו מפורש בתורה, אע"פ שהוא דאורייתא; אבל אם

)ר"ן דביצה ורא"ש בשם העיטור(. ואם יודע שאין דבריו נשמעין, לא יאמר ברבים להוכיחן, רק פעם אחת, אבל לא ירבה בתוכחות מאחר שיודע שלא ישמעו אליו; אבל ביחיד חייב להוכיחו עד

שיכנו או יקללנו. )ר"ן ס"פ הבע"י(.

16. Biur Halacha ibid. וכו'... בתורה מפורש אם המפורשאבל דבדבר שפסק הרמ"א דמה ודע דמסתברא

בתורה חייב למחות דוקא שהוא באקראי אבל אלו הפורקי עול לגמרי כגון מחלל שבת

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בפרהסיא או אוכל נבילות להכעיס כבר יצא מכלל עמיתך ואינו מחויב להוכיחו וכן איתא בתנא דא"ר פי"ח הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך ועמיתך שהוא אוהבך ושהוא עמך בתורה ומצות אתה חייב להוכיח אותו אבל לרשע שהוא שונאך אין אתה חייב להוכיח אותו והעתיק זהאו מחלל שבת שלא לתיאבון נבילות אוכל ולענין ע"ש אליהו בקיצור באדרת הגר"א

בפרהסיא יש לעיין בדבר:

F. ENABLING ANOTHER TO SIN

17. Vayikra 19:14'לא־תקלל חרש ולפני עור לא תתן מכשל ויראת מאלקיך אני ה

Do not curse the deaf. Do not place a stumbling block before the blind. You must fear your God. I am God. 18. Talmud Bavli, Avodah Page 6b מנין שלא יושיט אדם כוס של יין לנזיר, ואבר מן החי לבני נח? ת"ל: +ויקרא יט+ ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול; והא הכא דכי לא יהבינן ליה שקלי איהו, וקעבר משום לפני עור לא תתן

מכשול! הב"ע - דקאי בתרי עברי נהרא.How do we know that it is prohibited to stretch out your hand holding a cup of wine to a Nazir, or to tempt a non-Jew with a limb from a living animal? Because we have been told in the Torah “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind”… What case are we talking about? When there are two people on opposite sides of a river [that is, one person could not have attained the prohibited article without help from the other]. 19. Tosfot on Talmud Bavli, Shabbat Page 3a דלא עבר משום לפני עור דמושיט כוס יין לנזיר מוקי לה בפ"ק דמס' עבודת כוכבים )דף ו:(

דקאי בתרי עברי דנהרא מ"מ איסור דרבנן מיהא איכא שחייב להפרישו מאיסורEven though the Torah prohibition of “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” only applies when there are two people on opposite sides of a river – that is, when the “blind” person was unable to perform the forbidden action without the assistance of the other, nevertheless there is a rabbinic rule that every Jew must try and distance their fellow Jew from sinning.

20. Rabbi Hayyim David Halevy, Mayim Hayyim Vol. 1 p. 265

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23. Rabbi Dr J. D. Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems IV

21. Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:358

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22. Rabbi Dr J. D. Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems IV pg s. 97-99Many individuals involved in outreach endeavors directed toward persons who have not had the benefit of a traditional Jewish upbringing and designed to motivate them to adopt a Jewish life-style have found that invitations to a shabbat or Yom Tov meal often leave a profound impression and contribute greatly to developing an ongoing personal relationship. They have also found such invitations to be a most effective way of providing a meaningful experience in Jewish living.

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However, not infrequently, the invited guests choose to avail themselves of forbidden forms of transportation. R. Moshe Sternbuch, Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, I, no. 358, reports that he was consulted by a newly-observant young man regarding the propriety of inviting his parents to shabbat meals in the hopeful anticipation that their enjoyment of shabbat would, over a period of time, lead them to become observant. His concern was that it might be improper for him to do so because of the fact that they customarily travel to and from his home by automobile.Rabbi Sternbuch responded with a short but novel analysis of the prohibition "nor shall you place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). Rabbinic tradition as recorded in Mekhilta, ad locum, teaches that this verse serves as a prohibition against counseling a person in a manner that does not serve that individual's best interests and, as stated by the Gemara, Pesachim, 22b, as a prohibition forbidding a person to assist another in the commission of a transgression. Rabbi Sternbuch asserts that this interpretation does not yield an absolute prohibition with regard to facilitating a transgression. In light of the phraseology employed in this verse, Rabbi Sternbuch argues that the prohibition applies only in situations in which an act is designed to cause damage or harm in the form of a transgression but that any act intended to yield an ultimate benefit is, by definition, not a "stumbling block". The intention to benefit, argues Rabbi Sternbuch, is, in effect, exculpatory.Rabbi Sternbuch compares this prohibition to the prohibition against "wounding" which does not apply in the case of a physician who performs a surgical procedure designed to promote health and well-being. Accordingly, concludes Rabbi Sternbuch, an invitation designed to advance the spiritual well-being of the parents cannot be categorized as a "stumbling block" and hence is not forbidden.Rabbi Sternbuch's thesis is appealing but, at least as formulated by him, it is not supported by the sources that serve to define the prohibition. His comparison of "placing a stumbling block" in order to achieve a goal that it beneficial and laudatory to therapeutic "wounding" is entirely inapt. Causing a person to transgress is regarded by the Mekhilta as explicitly forbidden by this commandment; causing the transgression is defined as a malum per se. Therapeutic "wounding" is permitted, not because of the benevolent intent of the physician, but because therapeutic wounding is, by definition, not a battery.

23. Rabbi Yuval Sherlow, Resh’ut HaRabim pgs. 75-6

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24. Halakhic positions of Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik Vol. 2 pgs. 93-4

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If a non-observant Jew, driving his car on Shabbat, stops to ask directions, are we permitted to offer our assistance, or would this be in violation of Lifnei Iver? Many orthodox Jews would not render any assistance for fear of the violation, or at most, would feel very uncomfortable with the situation. According to Rav Soloveitchik, the contrary is true. By not assisting the mechalel Shabbat (transgressor) to reach his desired destination in the shortest and quickest way possible, we would be causing him to drive around aimlessly, extra blocks, or even miles on Shabbat. This additional driving on his part could have been avoided if we had done our part in directing him correcting to his destination. This teshuva of the Rav is strictly on the halakhic principle and does not address the far-reaching issue of building a bridge of positive relationship between the orthodox and non-orthodox Jewish community.

25. Reb Elyah, pgs. 86-87One Shabbos, as [Reb Elyah Lopian] was walking out of the yeshivah, a car pulled up next to him and stopped. The driver of the car said to him in Hebrew, “Rabbi, can you tell me how to get to this-and-this street?”Reb Elyah answered in a voice so obviously filled with love and concern for the nman asking him directions, “I know how to get there – and I would tell you how to get there, but how could I allow myself to participate in this activity of you travelling on Shabbos?”“If you won’t go on Shabbos, I’ll give you directions,” Reb Elyah concluded. Reb Elyah’s words and tone of voice touched the driver of the car so deeply that he replied, “Rebbe, tell me how to get there. I will not go on Shabbos!”True to his word, Reb Elyah gave the man directions to his destination. The driver then got out of his car, closed the door and locked it as he said, “Until tonight, the car remains here. I gave you my word; I’ll keep my word.”

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