AFF

1AC

Inherency

President Trump’s recent loosening of restrictions on drone exports have placed arms sales at the heart of US foreign policyThompson 18 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates and former Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, 4/20, “Trump Drone Decree Signals Arms Exports Are Now A Key Feature Of U.S. Economic Policy”, HYPERLINK "https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/04/20/trump-drone-decree-signals-arms-exports-are-now-a-key-feature-of-u-s-economic-policy/" \l "780fe6f332a5"https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/04/20/trump-drone-decree-signals-arms-exports-are-now-a-key-feature-of-u-s-economic-policy/#780fe6f332a5, Aly M)

Donald Trump is turning out to be the best thing to happen to the defense industry since Ronald Reagan left town. On Thursday of this week, the White House released a presidential memorandum loosening the restrictions on overseas sales of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as "drones." Defense companies have been arguing for years that regulations concerning the export of drones were too burdensome, and enabled competitors to capture foreign markets.Clearly, the White House has heard these complaints.But the implications of the April 19 memorandum are far more momentous, because it commits the federal government to actively facilitating arms sales to overseas allies and partners. The government has always been a participant in decisions to export weapons, but now it looks poised to become a promoter. The memorandum cites several reasons why this is desirable: it creates jobs, it reduces the trade deficit, it spurs innovation, it maintains our military's warfighting edge, and it reduces the need for other countries to seek U.S. "boots on the ground."

Yemen

Scenario 1: Civil War100 civilians are dying every week in the war in Yemen – the atrocities are unacceptableUNHCR 3/7 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019, “Almost 100 civilian casualties each week in Yemen in 2018”, HYPERLINK "https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/3/5c8121734/100-civilian-casualties-week-yemen-2018.html"https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/3/5c8121734/100-civilian-casualties-week-yemen-2018.html, Aly M)

Civilians continue to pay a high price in the conflict in Yemen, according to the latest data released today by the UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency, led Protection Cluster. On average, almost 100 civilian deaths or injuries were recorded each week in 2018.According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Report for 2018, more than 4,800 civilian deaths and injuries were reported over the course of the year resulting in an average of 93 civilian casualties per week.These casualty figures are based on open source data. It is collected, analyzed and disseminated as part of the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) which publishes this information in support of humanitarian protection programs in Yemen. UNHCR leads the Protection Cluster within the UN’s humanitarian response in Yemen, with the support of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) as co-coordinator.According to this latest report, the largest number of casualties in 2018 were reported in Yemen’s volatile west coast, which includes Al Hudaydah governorate, one of the epicenters of the conflict since June 2018. Almost half (48 per cent) of all reported casualties were recorded in this region, followed by Sa’ada and Al Jawf (22 per cent) which also remain a flashpoint of the conflict.“The report illustrates the staggering human cost of the conflict. Civilians in Yemen continue to face serious risks to their safety, well-being and basic rights. Exposed to daily violence, many live under constant fear and suffer in deteriorating conditions, turning in desperation to harmful coping mechanisms in order to survive,” said Volker Türk, UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees.Thirty percent of civilians were reported to have been killed and injured inside their homes. Civilians were also killed while travelling on the roads, while working on farms and at local business, markets and other civilian sites.A fifth of all civilian casualties recorded were inflicted on children (410 deaths and 542 injuries).In addition to direct civilian casualties, the report also highlights the impact of armed conflict for civilians in accessing critical infrastructure and essential services. Partners on the ground estimate that attacks on civilian infrastructure restricted access to food, water, aid and health care for more than half a million civilian families.“UNHCR reiterates its call to all parties to the conflict to do their utmost to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure in accordance with international humanitarian law. Only a peaceful resolution of the conflict will halt further suffering and stem humanitarian needs,” said Türk.Four years of conflict in Yemen has created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. It has left more than 14 million people in need of protection and forced nearly 15

per cent of the entire population, some 4.3 million people, to flee their homes. This includes 3.3 million people who are still displaced across the country, while one million have attempted to return home.

US drones have assisted the Saudi coalition in targeting air strikes in the ongoing conflict in YemenEmmons 4/14 (Alex, a reporter covering national security, foreign affairs, human rights, and politics for the Intercept, 2019, “SECRET REPORT REVEALS SAUDI INCOMPETENCE AND WIDESPREAD USE OF U.S. WEAPONS IN YEMEN”, HYPERLINK "https://theintercept.com/2019/04/15/saudi-weapons-yemen-us-france/"https://theintercept.com/2019/04/15/saudi-weapons-yemen-us-france/, Aly M)

Since the beginning of the war, the U.S. has backed the coalition bombing campaign with weapons sales and, until recently, midair refueling support for aircraft. But the French report suggests that U.S. drones may also be helping with Saudi munitions targeting.“If the RSAF benefits from American support, in the form of advice in the field of targeting, the practice of Close Air Support (CAS) is recent and appears poorly understood by these crews,” the document says. A footnote after the word “targeting” specifies that the possible U.S. “advice” refers to “targeting effectuated by American drones.”Though the U.S. has denied engaging directly in hostilities against the Houthis, American MQ-9 Reaper drones – a reconnaissance drone with hunt-and-kill capabilities – have flown over Houthi occupied territory. After the Houthis shot down one of the drones in October 2017, it led to speculation that the U.S. could be using them to collect intelligence for the Saudis. Targeting being effectuated by American drones could mean that U.S. drones play a more active role in coalition targeting, like laser-sighting precision-guided munitions drops, for example.

US-Saudi air targeting leads to mass civilian causalities – millions are dying from starvation and disease Bazzi 19 (Bazzi, Mohamad. “Both Saudi Arabia and the United States Are Probably Guilty of War Crimes in Yemen.” The Nation, 17 May 2019, www.thenation.com/article/war-crimes-united-states-saudi-arabia-yemen/.)

On August 9 of last year, warplanes from a Saudi-led coalition bombed a school bus near a market in the northern Yemeni town of Dahyan, killing 54 people, 44 of them children. After interviewing more than a dozen witnesses and survivors, Human Rights Watch called the attack an “apparent war crime” because “there was no evident military target in the market at the time.” The munition used by the Saudis was supplied by the United States—a 500-pound laser-guided bomb made by Lockheed Martin. As it has done repeatedly when its air strikes kill cxivilians, the Saudi coalition at first insisted that it had attacked a legitimate military target. On August 11, Saudi Arabia’s mission to the United Nations claimed that the strike had “targeted Houthi leaders who were responsible for recruiting and training young children, and then sending them to battlefields.” It did not provide evidence to support these claims. Finally, after growing international condemnation, on September 1, the Saudis acknowledged that the attack was unjustified and vowed to “hold those who committed mistakes” accountable. In an interview with Axios in November, President Donald Trump said the Saudis and their allies did not know how to use American weapons properly. Asked if he was bothered that the Saudis had blown up a school bus with a US-made bomb, Trump responded, “Bother’s not strong enough. That was basically people that didn’t know how

to use the weapon, which is horrible.” He called the bus attack a “horror show” and promised to take up the matter with Saudi leaders. “I’ll be talking about a lot of things with the Saudis,” Trump added, “but certainly I wouldn’t be having people that don’t know how to use the weapons shooting at buses with children.” Trump’s muddled answer reflected a narrative that has been gaining traction for years among US officials and in sectors of the Western media: that the Saudis and their allies in the Yemen war, especially the United Arab Emirates, are killing civilians and destroying infrastructure by mistake. But this is not true. The Saudi coalition has targeted civilians and the country’s infrastructure by design since it intervened in Yemen’s civil war in March 2015. It’s not that the Saudis and their allies don’t know how to use American-made weapons or need help in choosing targets—they’re using them as intended. And American officials have known this for years. On April 4, the House voted to end US military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, finally approving a bill to restrain presidential war powers that has taken years to pass both chambers of Congress. The measure, which invoked the 1973 War Powers Act and argued that Congress never authorized support for the Saudi coalition, underscored growing anger over American involvement in a war that has created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. The vote was also a rebuke to Trump for doubling down on his support for Saudi Arabia’s ruthless crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, after Saudi agents murdered journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. On April 16, Trump vetoed the bill, and supporters in Congress did not have enough votes to override that veto. One of the most persistent false arguments advanced by Pentagon and Trump administration officials against the congressional bill is that American support is necessary to keep the Saudi coalition from killing even more civilians. On April 29, Michael Mulroy, deputy assistant defense secretary for the Middle East, told a Washington think tank that US support is now limited to “side-by-side coaching to help mitigate civilian casualties.” He argued that if Congress was to override Trump’s veto of the War Powers Act resolution, this US assistance would end. “If that happens, that’s obviously not helping the situation,” Mulroy said at the Center for a New American Security. The Trump administration continues to insist that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have tried to reduce civilian deaths and to enable humanitarian-aid deliveries in Yemen, despite contradictory evidence documented by the United Nations, human-rights groups, and, most recently, former US officials who served in President Barack Obama’s administration. In September, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo formally assured Congress that the two US allies were trying to reduce civilian deaths. Congress required the administration to make this certification a condition for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance. But Pompeo’s claim contradicted most other independent reviews of the war, including a report issued in August by a group of UN experts. The report found both the Saudi-led coalition and rebel Houthi militia responsible for likely war crimes, but it blamed the Saudis and their allies for killing far more civilians. “Coalition air strikes have caused most of the documented civilian casualties,” the report said. “In the past three years, such air strikes have hit residential areas, markets, funerals, weddings, detention facilities, civilian boats, and even medical facilities.” Saudi leaders and their allies have ignored American entreaties to minimize civilian casualties since the war’s early days. And, according to recent testimony in Congress by two members of the Obama administration, US officials recognized as early as 2016 that top Saudi and UAE leaders were not interested in reducing civilian casualties. In little-noticed testimony to the House Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism in early March, the two former State Department officials explained how deeply involved the United States has been in helping the Saudis choose their targets in Yemen, creating “no-strike” lists, and sending trainers to help avoid civilian casualties. The officials were Dafna Rand, a former deputy assistant secretary of state, who is now a vice president at Mercy Corps; and Jeremy Konyndyk,

former director of the USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. Rand testified that soon after the Saudis launched the war in 2015, and civilian casualties started to mount, the State Department sent a trainer to Riyadh to work with Saudi Defense Ministry officials. She said the trainer had worked with the US military’s Central Command to reduce civilian casualties in Afghanistan, and US officials had thought the Saudis could use similar techniques to reduce casualties in Yemen. “We approached this very technically behind closed doors, very quietly, sent our trainer in,” Rand said, adding that, after a cease-fire in 2016, US officials were hopeful that their efforts were paying off. But once the cease-fire collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi coalition attacked a series of civilian targets that caused mass casualties. At that point, Rand said, “it gave us pause to recalibrate the strategy, and wonder what had happened to our training.” The State Department continued to quietly send the trainer to Riyadh. But Rand and other officials soon realized that top Saudi leaders were not interested in limiting civilian casualties, despite American appeals. She said Saudi leaders only cared if the president—first Obama and later Trump—applied pressure or threatened to suspend weapons sales. Rand did not mention Mohammed bin Salman, who was then the deputy crown prince and Saudi defense minister and a major architect of the Yemen war. “We came to the conclusion by late 2016 that although there were very many well-meaning and professional generals in the Saudi Ministry of Defense, there was a lack of political will at the top senior levels to reduce the number of civilian casualties,” she said. Representative Tom Malinowski, a Democrat from New Jersey who had served as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor during the Obama administration, asked Rand if the problem was “imprecise targeting, or were they targeting the wrong things?” Rand responded, “It was very clear that precision was not the issue, and that guiding was not the issue. It was the type of target selection that became the clear issue, and even when the US government told them which targets not to hit, we saw instances where the coalition was targeting the wrong thing.” “So they deliberately struck targets like water treatment facilities and food distribution centers that were on a no-strike list that was handed to them?” Malinowski asked at the sparsely attended hearing. Konyndyk, who in his role at USAID helped compile a no-strike list of civilian targets, responded that US officials initially assumed that the Saudis and their allies would know not to attack schools and hospitals, which are visible from the air. The initial list of humanitarian sites included the offices of nongovernmental organizations and warehouses—“things that if you looked at them from the air, you would not be aware it’s a humanitarian facility.” American officials soon realized that “the Saudis tended to treat anything not on the no-strike list that we gave them as fair game, so then we expanded the list,” Konyndyk said. “And we began naming categories of sites, including specific road routes that were critical to the humanitarian effort.” But the Saudis and their allies attacked sites that were on various no-strike lists, which has grown to include thousands of locations compiled by the UN and humanitarian groups. In August 2016, for example, the Saudi coalition bombed the main bridge on the 155-mile road from Hodeidah port, along the Red Sea coast, to the capital, Sanaa. That road was the main artery for humanitarian groups to bring aid into Yemen, especially territory controlled by the Houthi militia. “They struck that [bridge] despite us having specifically told them through that process not to,” Konyndyk said. Radhya al-Mutawakel, co-founder and leader of Mwatana for Human Rights, a Yemen-based organization, told the House subcommittee that the Saudis and their allies simply don’t care about protecting Yemeni civilians. “It’s not a matter of training. It’s a matter of accountability. They don’t care,” she said. “If they cared, they can make it much better, at least not to embarrass their allies.” According to the Yemen Data Project, Saudi and UAE warplanes have conducted more than 19,500 air strikes on Yemen since the war began, an average of nearly 13 attacks per day. (About a third of these attacks are on military targets,

while the rest are classified as nonmilitary targets or “unknown.”) The coalition has bombed schools, hospitals, markets, mosques, farms, factories, roads, bridges, power plants, water-treatment facilities, even a potato-chip factory. Rand and Konyndyk did not accuse the coalition of war crimes, but international humanitarian law forbids the intentional targeting of civilians during war. Representative Ted Lieu, a Democrat from California and a former military lawyer who has been one of the most vocal critics in Congress of the US role in Yemen, was more blunt at the subcommittee hearing: Saudi Arabia and the UAE “are deliberately targeting civilians,” he said. “I think these are war crimes.” Despite thousands of air strikes over the past four years, the Saudi-led alliance has failed to dislodge the Houthis from Yemen’s capital. That stalemate has embarrassed the war’s two main architects: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has overseen the Yemen campaign from its start, and his mentor, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince and the UAE’s de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed. And as the war dragged on, the two leaders have become more brutal, with little restraint from the United States or other Western allies. Beyond the intentional bombing of civilians in violation of international law, the Saudi and Emirati militaries have also destroyed civilian infrastructure and imposed air and naval blockades that have led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Yemenis from starvation and preventable diseases like cholera. In their report last August, a group of independent UN experts noted that, before the Saudi-led war, Yemen imported nearly 90 percent of its food, fuel, and medical supplies. The report concluded that the Saudi-UAE blockades “have had widespread and devastating effects on the civilian population.” The war triggered a humanitarian catastrophe, which has been partly obscured because the UN stopped updating civilian deaths in January 2017, when the toll reached 10,000. Many news reports still rely on that outdated figure, even though the actual death toll is far higher. An independent estimate by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project has recorded more than 70,000 fatalities between January 2016 and April 2019. (That figure includes both civilian and military casualties, but it does not cover the first seven months of the war, when the death toll was highest.) And even that estimate fails to capture the full scope of human suffering in Yemen. In November, the aid agency Save the Children released an analysis estimating that 85,000 children have likely died of hunger since Saudi Arabia and its allies began their bombing campaign. “For every child killed by bombs and bullets, dozens are starving to death and it’s entirely preventable,” Tamer Kirolos, the group’s country director, said in the report. “Children who die in this way suffer immensely as their vital organ functions slow down and eventually stop.” Last month, the United Nations Development Programme issued a report, produced primarily by researchers at the University of Denver, with a dramatically higher estimate: It warned that the death toll in Yemen could rise to 233,000 by the end of 2019. That projected count includes 102,000 deaths from combat and 131,000 indirect deaths due to the lack of food, health crises like the cholera epidemic, and damage to Yemen’s infrastructure. The conflict has turned into a “war on children,” with one Yemeni child dying every 12 minutes; the report estimates that 140,000 of those killed by the end of 2019 would be children under the age of 5. The Saudi-UAE alliance is also using starvation as a weapon of war by deliberately targeting the infrastructure of Yemen’s food production and distribution, including the agricultural sector and fishing industry. As a result, the war has also left more than 22 million people—75 percent of Yemen’s population—in need of humanitarian aid, and 1.4 million infected with cholera. The UN estimates that 8.4 million Yemenis are on the brink of starvation and need assistance to stay alive. The destruction of Yemen’s food supply is another war crime, which has been documented by human-rights groups that have investigated Saudi and UAE conduct in the war, including a report issued in October by Tufts University and the World Peace Foundation. The report, written by Martha Mundy, an emeritus professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics, shows that the Saudi

coalition has deliberately targeted food supplies and distribution systems in an attempt to starve the Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen into submission. Mundy found that, after August 2015, when it became clear to the Saudi coalition that it would not achieve a quick military victory—the kind of triumph promised by bin Salman and bin Zayed—“there appears a shift from military and governmental to civilian and economic targets, including water and transport infrastructure, food production and distribution, roads and transport, schools, cultural monuments, clinics and hospitals, and houses, fields, and flocks.” The report makes clear that the coalition is targeting food supplies by destroying agricultural land and fishing vessels—a war crime under international humanitarian law. For example, the report notes that, from the start of the war through December 2017, the coalition destroyed at least 220 fishing boats along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, killed 146 fishermen, and reduced fish catches by at least half from pre-war levels. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not the only states potentially implicated in war crimes. By the summer of 2015, some US officials were worried that American support to the Saudis—including weapons sales, intelligence support, assistance in identifying targets, and the mid-air refueling of Saudi and allied warplanes—would make the United States a co-belligerent in the war under international law. That means US personnel could be implicated in war crimes and, in theory, could be exposed to international prosecution. By late 2015, Reuters reported, Obama administration officials had debated for months whether to proceed with arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which was becoming Washington’s largest weapons customer. American officials were particularly worried about a 2012 ruling from an international tribunal that convicted Charles Taylor, Liberia’s former president, for “aiding and abetting” war crimes committed by rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone in the 1990s. The tribunal ruled that an individual could be guilty of “aiding and abetting” if he provided “practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of a crime.” Yet, despite those concerns, in November 2015, State Department officials approved the sale of nearly $1.3 billion in bombs and missiles to replenish Saudi munitions dropped in Yemen. In October 2016, the Saudi coalition bombed a community hall in Sanaa, where mourners had gathered for a funeral, killing at least 140 people and wounding hundreds—the deadliest attack of the war. As international condemnation mounted, the Obama administration promised to review its military support for Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen. Human Rights Watch found that the Saudi coalition used an American-made 500-pound laser-guided bomb in the attack, which it called “an apparent war crime.” In a follow-up letter, the group urged Obama to halt all weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and warned, “The repeated use of US-manufactured munitions in unlawful attacks in Yemen could make the US complicit for future transfers of arms to Saudi forces.” Representative Ted Lieu, the former military lawyer who has been a leading critic in Congress of American involvement in Yemen, wrote to then–Secretary of State John Kerry warning of potential US complicity in war crimes. “The Charles Taylor case precedent puts US officials at risk of being implicated in aiding and abetting war crimes in Yemen,” Lieu wrote in October 2016. “In addition, under both international law and U.S. law, American officials can be prosecuted for conspiring to commit war crimes.” Despite these warnings, Obama essentially gave the Saudis a slap on the wrist: He suspended the sale of about $350 million in munitions and directed the Pentagon to stop sharing some intelligence. Once Trump took office in 2017, he reversed Obama’s decision on the weapons sale and escalated US military involvement in Yemen. And the Trump administration dismissed worries about US exposure to war crimes. Instead, Trump and some of his top administration officials, especially Pompeo and national-security adviser John Bolton, accepted the Saudi and Emirati line that Yemen is an extension of the campaign to contain Iran’s regional influence. (While the Saudis were quick to label the Shiite Houthis as agents of Iran, the group did not receive significant help from Tehran before the Saudi

intervention.) As criticism of Saudi Arabia increased in Congress after Saudi agents murdered Jamal Khashoggi last October, the Trump administration took a step to appease members of Congress critical of the US role in Yemen. In November, the administration announced it was ending one element of US military assistance: the refueling of Saudi and UAE warplanes bombing Yemen. But that’s not enough to end the war. In addition to refueling warplanes and providing intelligence assistance, Washington has rushed billions of dollars’ worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts to help the Saudi and UAE militaries continue their bombing campaign. But neither the Obama nor Trump administrations put enough pressure on the Saudis or Emiratis to negotiate a political settlement with the Houthis to end the war. Two days after Trump announced his decision to end the mid-air refueling, a group of 30 former senior officials in the Obama administration—including former national-security adviser Susan Rice and former CIA director John Brennan—released a letter acknowledging some responsibility for initiating American support for the Saudi coalition. “We did not intend US support to the coalition to become a blank check. But today, as civilian casualties have continued to rise and there is no end to the conflict in sight, it is clear that is precisely what happened,” the former officials wrote, adding, “However, rather than learning from that failure, the Trump administration has doubled down on support for the Saudi leadership’s prosecution of the war, while removing restrictions we had put in place.… It is past time for America’s role in this disastrous war in Yemen to end.” The former Obama administration officials exaggerated how many constraints they had put on the Saudis and avoided responsibility for not acting far more forcefully sooner. The Obama administration could have ended weapons sales and other military assistance long before the tentative steps it took in late 2016. But these former officials are right about one thing: Trump has given Saudi Arabia and the UAE an even bigger blank check in Yemen—and he’s made the United States more deeply complicit in war crimes.

Yemen war escalates to destabilize the Middle East instability – major powers get drawn in as oil shipments get cut offDorsey 18 (Dorsey, James. “US Spurring Instability in the Middle East.” The Globalist, 3 Aug. 2018, www.theglobalist.com/middle-east-conflict-oil-united-states/.)

Multiple Middle Eastern disputes are threatening to spill out of control. This is largely due to the changed role of the United States. Perceptions of U.S. unreliability were initially sparked by former U.S. president Barack Obama’s Middle East policies. This included his declared pivot to Asia, support of the 2011 Arab popular revolts, criticism of Israel as well as willingness to engage with Iran. Trump’s partisan approach Donald Trump has proven to be more partisan than Mr. Obama in his backing of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel and his confrontational approach of Iran. Although Trump appears to have granted Middle Eastern partners near carte-blanche, his mercurial unpredictability has made him no less unreliable even in the perception of the foremost U.S. allies in the region. Mr. Trump’s partisan approach as well as his refusal to reign in U.S. allies has led to potential escalation of multiple conflicts. This includes the war in Yemen, mounting tension in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, a race for control of ports and military facilities in the Horn of Africa, Israeli challenging of Iran’s presence in Syria as well as confrontation with Iran. At the same time, the fact that nations in the region need to fend more for themselves has had some real consequences. For example, the UAE, driven by a quest to control ports in the Horn of Africa and create a string of military bases, together with Saudi Arabia, played a key role in reconciling Ethiopia and Eritrea after more than two decades of cold war. Looming threat of conflict More often however, U.S. allies appear to be increasingly locked into pathways that threaten mounting violence, if not outright military confrontation. The recent escalation of the Yemen war that threatens

the free flow of oil with Saudi Arabia halting oil shipments through the Bab el Mandeb strait and an unverified claim by Houthi rebels to have targeted Abu Dhabi’s international airport constitutes the latest fallout of U.S. failure. Analysts see the halt in oil shipments as an effort to get major military powers, including the United States, Europe and Muslim allies like Pakistan and Egypt who have shied away from sending troops to Yemen, to intervene to defeat the Houthis. Many of those powers depend on oil shipments through Bab el Mandeb. The bid to suck them into the Yemen war is an effort to secure a victory that neither Saudi Arabia or the UAE have been able to achieve in more than three years of fighting that has devastated Yemen. Little wonder that external powers responded cautiously to the Saudi halt of oil shipments. U.S. and EU spokespeople said they were aware of the Saudi move.

Middle East escalation draws in US and Russia -- causes global nuclear warBorger 18 -- Guardian's world affairs editor, former Middle East correspondent

[Julian, "The Syria powder keg: danger in rush for influence on crowded battlefield," The Guardian, 4-15-18, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/syria-crisis-danger-airstrikes-assad-battlefield]

It’s debatable when the world last found itself in such a perilous situation – and there are disturbing echoes of the eve of the first world war As UN secretary general, it is António Guterres’s increasingly frequent duty to warn the major powers they are rushing towards catastrophe. On Friday, on the eve of the US-led airstrikes, it was the former Portuguese prime minister’s turn once again to raise the alarm at the latest of a series of deadlocked security council sessions on Syria. “The cold war is back with a vengeance and a difference,” Guterres said. The difference is that it is no longer cold. American troops are already a grenade’s toss away from Russians and Iranians in Syria, and this weekend, missiles and planes from the US, UK and France flew at the Syrian regime. “The mechanisms and safeguards that existed to prevent escalation in the past no longer seem to be present,” the secretary general said. It is debatable exactly when the world last found itself in such a perilous situation. Perhaps the 1983 missile standoff in Europe, when a Nato exercise, Able Archer, almost triggered a panicked nuclear launch by the Soviet Union. The level of paranoia has not yet reached that pitch, but other aspects of the current crisis are arguably more dangerous. There is less communication between Washington and Moscow and there are no longer just two players in the game, but a jostling scrum of major powers in decline and middling powers on the rise. Pursuing national agendas on such a crowded battlefield without colliding with others is increasingly hard. The precise targeting of the Friday night airstrikes was all about avoiding such a potentially catastrophic collision. But US defence secretary James Mattis and his generals were reportedly under pressure from the White House to use the strikes as an opportunity to take a swipe at Iran. Those temptations are not going to go away, particularly after the arrival in the White House of John Bolton, a radical hawk on Iran, whose new position as national security adviser at Trump’s ear will echo what the president is hearing from Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In the gravitational pull of these agendas and allies, there are disturbing echoes of the eve of the first world war. It has more than a whiff of Sarajevo 1914 – with nuclear weapons looming not far off stage.

Scenario 2: International LawUS alignment with Saudi Araba in Yemen bombings violates International Humanitarian Law

Hathaway et al. 2018 ((Oona A. Hathaway, Aaron Haviland, Srinath Reddy Kethireddy, and Alyssa T.

Yamamoto), Professors of International Law at Yale Law School [“Yemen: Is the US Breaking the Law?”, Harvard National Security Journal, HYPERLINK "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3272263"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3272263]) //emILC Article 16, which is understood to reflect customary international law,297 provides that: “A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”298 There is a strong case that U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition meets this test. Subsection (b)299 is clearly met by U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition. Any bombings that indiscriminately violate international humanitarian law would be illegal if they were conducted by the United States itself, rather than by the Saudi-led coalition. It is true that the United States is not a party to Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing non- international armed conflicts. However, as a matter of treaty and customary international law, the United States is legally obligated to follow the full range of international humanitarian law obligations that apply to parties to a non-international armed conflict. Notably, these obligations are much broader than those that are subject to prosecution under the U.S. War Crimes Act. Subsection (a) presents more difficulty and requires careful analysis of the assisting state’s (here the U.S.’s) requisite intent. The ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles, which is meant to provide clarity, unfortunately does not entirely succeed on this point. In its commentary to Article 16(a), the ILC stipulates two related requirements: first, “the relevant State organ or agency providing aid or assistance must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State internationally wrongful;”300 and second, “the aid or assistance must be given with a view to facilitating the commission of the act, and must actually do so.”301 At first glance, these two requirements may appear inconsistent.302 They can be reconciled, however, if the first element is understood to require knowledge that the aid or assistance facilitated an internationally wrongful act—that is, knowledge of the wrongfulness of the action to be taken by the assisted state. The second condition then would be understood to require intent to facilitate the action taken by the state, even if the state did not specifically intend that act’s wrongfulness. Understood in this way, the ILC Commentary corresponds relatively closely to the text of Article 16 itself. Applying this reading to the Saudi-led campaign, the second condition outlined above is clearly met: the United States has provided support to the Saudi-led coalition—including munitions, intelligence, and mid-air refueling—with a view to facilitating the coalition’s military campaign. As described in earlier sections, this support has, in fact, facilitated that bombing campaign. This type of aid need not have been essential to the wrongful act to fall within Article 16; “it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act.”303 Significance turns on “how the assistance rendered relates to the wrongful act.”304 Harriet Moynihan of Chatham House explains that this “nexus element” has two dimensions: scale and remoteness.305 ILC member Nikolai Ushakov noted during the Commission’s 1978 session: “[P]articipation must be active and direct. It must not be too direct, however, for the participant then becomes a co-author of the offence, and that [goes] beyond complicity. If, on the other hand, participation [is] too indirect, there might be no real complicity.”306 Regardless of the metric,307 arming and mid-air refueling undoubtedly qualify as a significant contribution to the bombing campaign. The harder question is whether the United States’ assistance meets the first requirement— that the United States knew that the aid or assistance it provided facilitated an internationally wrongful act. As the ILC Commentary puts it, “[i]f the assisting or aiding State is unaware of the circumstances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be used by the other State, it bears no international responsibility.”308 As noted above, there is some ambiguity in the Commentary as to whether the assisting state must intend to facilitate the wrongful act—that is, that it not only intends the act to occur but intends for it to occur in an internationally wrongful manner. A number of commentators have concluded that “knowledge” is the correct measure.309 But there is disagreement about what knowledge requires. Harriet Moynihan states that knowledge “means actual

or near certain knowledge of specific illegality on the part of the recipient state.”310 Intent in this view is satisfied by “knowledge or virtual certainty that the recipient state will use the assistance unlawfully.”311 Ryan Goodman and Miles Jackson, however, adopt a less stringent test in which mere knowledge of the circumstances is sufficient: “The assisting State has intention to facilitate and/or knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.”312 The United States is undoubtedly aware that there have been numerous credible allegations of violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). Therefore, its support for the Saudi-led coalition almost certainly meets the less stringent knowledge test; it may also satisfy the more stringent “actual or near certain knowledge of specific illegality,” though that is a higher bar to clear. Adhering to international humanitarian law is necessary to renew US human rights credibilityEmily Nagisa Keehn et al 16 - *Emily Nagisa Keehn is the Associate Director of the Human Right Porject at Harvard Law**Anna Crowe is a Clinical Instructor and Lecturer on Law at the Human Rights Program***Yee Htun is the Director of Myanmar Program for Justice Trust(“Investing in International Human Rights in the Age of Trump”;12/15;http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/staff/investing-in-international-human-rights-in-the-age-of-trump/)

It is now well trodden discourse that the election of Donald Trump, like the rise in nationalist movements in Europe, is both creating and reflecting paradigmatic shifts in the way we view global institutions. These shifts point to pressing concerns for the international human rights project. The xenophobic, rights-abusive platform of the Trump campaign put the human rights community on notice, and we have assumed a defensive stance to protect the potential roll-back of hard-won progress. In the era of Trump, we believe the U.S. human rights community must continue to draw on international human rights law as an advocacy and accountability tool, partnering with international movements and actors to stop rhetoric from becoming reality. For U.S. scholars, lawyers, policymakers and activists committed to the defense of human rights, the rhetoric and fledgling policies of the incoming administration have raised strategic and existential questions. In this new era, we are examining and debating critical concerns about the state and utility of international human rights law, and questioning where to place our resources. For those of us working within law schools, we face added questions from students, some of whom feel a crisis of conscience about where best to stake their social justice careers. From our perspective we must continue to invest in international human rights. To begin with, we must dispel with the false dichotomy that pits domestic rights against the international human rights regime. International human rights norms are implemented by domestic actors and often embedded in national constitutions. And human rights abuses are not a phenomenon that ‘happens’ abroad, violating the rights of ‘others’ who are unconnected to us. The systemic interlinkages in our globalized world make us common rights-holders, in issues spanning trade and the environment, to counter terrorism. The international system exists as a failsafe for local and domestic efforts. No domestic space is a paradigm of human rights virtue and we all benefit from the scrutiny of global institutions. Granted, international human rights law has limited power in U.S. courts, but it is not impotent. We have seen its persuasive function in important Supreme Court Cases such as Lawrence v Texas, which struck down the sodomy law in Texas, and Roper v Simmons, which abolished capital punishment for people under 18. There is further work to do in pushing back against American exceptionalism by both diffusing international norms, and keeping human rights language and knowledge alive, in the U.S. legal community and judiciary – if anything, U.S. human rights activists have perhaps prematurely given up on the project of making international human rights law enforceable in U.S. courts. History shows that human rights

violations carry reputational risks, and have tangible costs for national security and the U.S.’s geopolitical position. For instance, the Bush-era war on terror and the torture memos made the U.S. an outlier to established international law, damaged its moral authority, and fanned the flames of conflict. During this period of what may be a redux in U.S. human rights ‘deviance’, we must fight to limit damage to the integrity of human rights norms. This requires our continued engagement with global institutions mandated with international human rights law protection, to prevent and seek accountability for any new violations, and to protect against the dismantling of important gains. This could include backslides in progress under international U.S. leadership in the areas of LGBTQI rights, women’s health and reproductive rights, and a strengthened UN Human Rights Council. Protecting gains also means safeguarding against cuts in U.S. government support for human rights defenders around the world who are working with vulnerable people in hostile environments. Finally, we must demonstrate heterogeneity and dissent in U.S. voices in international settings, and avoid brain drain and the deskilling of the U.S. human rights community. For humanistic and principled reasons, concern for human rights should not follow national borders or be driven by nationalist impulses. This cuts to the core of our group identity as a human rights constituency, committed to the foundational principles of universal application of human rights for all. Today’s shifting ground and the risks of a regressive trajectory present an opportunity to re-double efforts and promote the resonance of international norms domestically. Now, more than ever, work needs to be done to bring the U.S. into a larger comparative framework. Human rights actors are needed in both domestic and international institutions to serve as critical, reinforcing bridges between these two arenas.

US human rights credibility key to democracy worldwideGriffey 11 (Brian, human rights consultant who has worked for the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International USA. [“U.S. leadership on human rights essential to strengthen democracy abroad” The Hill March 18th, 2011 Congress Blog URL: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/150667-us-leadership-on-human-rights-essential-to-strengthen-democracy-abroad)

In the midst of what many are calling the Arab world’s 1989, the United States has a chance to revisit that effort, and reaffirm President Carter’s declaration: “Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.” Since helping to establish the United Nations, U.S. participation in international human rights treaties and mechanisms has been fraught with debate over the merits of involvement and perceived threats to U.S. policymaking prerogative, topics still contentious on Capitol Hill. Nonetheless, U.S. leadership on human rights offers clear opportunities to advance not only international peace and security – a fundamental purpose of the U.N. – but also conjoined US political and economic interests at home and abroad. The U.S. is presently demonstrating exactly how crucial such involvement is as an elected member of the Human Rights Council, participating in vital negotiations on how best to mitigate widespread abuses responding to ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, including by strategic US allies in global security and trade. As Secretary Clinton expressed en route to Geneva to participate in recent talks on human rights violations in Libya, joining the Council has “proven to be a good decision, because we’ve been able to influence a number of actions that we otherwise would have been on the outside looking in.” In its first submission to the body, the U.S. likewise recognized that participation in the Council’s peer-review system allows the U.S. not only to lead by example and “encourage others to strengthen their commitments to human rights,” but also to address domestic human rights shortcomings. By leading international discourse on human rights, the U.S. will be in a better position both to advance

observation of human rights abroad, and to take on new treaty commitments that demonstrate adherence of our own system to the vaulting principles we identify with our democracy. While the U.S. is party to more than 12,000 treaties, it has dodged most human rights treaties drafted since World War II through the U.N., and has ratified only a dozen. Upon transmission of four core human rights treaties to the Senate in 1978, President Carter observed: “Our failure to become a party increasingly reflects upon our attainments, and prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law of human rights.” The Senate ratified two of those treaties 15 years later. The others continue to languish in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, still awaiting ratification after 32 years. It likewise took the Senate almost 40 years to approve a treaty punishing genocide, after signing it in 1948 following the Holocaust. Other human rights treaties U.S. presidents have signed – but the Senate has yet to agree to – include U.N. conventions protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities. The U.S. is the only nation in the world that hasn’t ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, with the exception of war-torn Somalia, which lacks a functioning government and control over much of its territory. As we watch the contours and nature of power being reshaped in the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S. must have a singular message on human rights – both at home and abroad: Human rights go hand-in-hand with a healthy democracy, and demand a concerted and collective effort to be upheld, especially in times of crisis. Greater U.S. participation in U.N. human rights treaties would ensure that the country has not only a seat at the table, but also an authoritative voice on matters vital to advancing democracy abroad, and our national security. A welcome consequence would be a more prominent place for the human rights lens in our vision of U.S. democracy – and perhaps a stronger resolve to ameliorate the plights of those least well off in our own society.

US democracy credibility prevents global democratic backslidingKagan 15 (Robert, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Security, Jan, "Is Democracy in Decline? The Weight of Geopolitics" Brookings Institution, HYPERLINK "http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/01/democracy-in-decline-weight-of-geopolitics-kagan"www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/01/democracy-in-decline-weight-of-geopolitics-kagan)

These are relevant questions again. We live in a time when democratic nations are in retreat in the realm of geopolitics, and when democracy itself is also in retreat. The latter phenomenon has been well documented by Freedom House, which has recorded declines in freedom in the world for nine straight years. At the level of geopolitics, the shifting tectonic plates have yet to produce a seismic rearrangement of power, but rumblings are audible. The United States has been in a state of retrenchment since President Barack Obama took office in 2009. The democratic nations of Europe, which some might have expected to pick up the slack, have instead turned inward and all but abandoned earlier dreams of reshaping the international system in their image. As for such rising democracies as Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa, they are neither rising as fast as once anticipated nor yet behaving as democracies in world affairs. Their focus remains narrow and regional. Their national identities remain shaped by postcolonial and nonaligned sensibilities—by old but carefully nursed resentments—which lead them, for instance, to shield rather than condemn autocratic Russia’s invasion of democratic Ukraine, or, in the case of Brazil, to prefer the company of Venezuelan dictators to that of North American democratic presidents. Meanwhile, insofar as there is energy in the international system, it comes from the great-power autocracies, China and Russia, and from would-be theocrats pursuing their dream of a new caliphate in the Middle East. For all their many problems and

weaknesses, it is still these autocracies and these aspiring religious totalitarians that push forward while the democracies draw back, that act while the democracies react, and that seem increasingly unleashed while the democracies feel increasingly constrained. It should not be surprising that one of the side effects of these circumstances has been the weakening and in some cases collapse of democracy in those places where it was newest and weakest. Geopolitical shifts among the reigning great powers, often but not always the result of wars, can have significant effects on the domestic politics of the smaller and weaker nations of the world. Global democratizing trends have been stopped and reversed before. Consider the interwar years. In 1920, when the number of democracies in the world had doubled in the aftermath of the First World War, contemporaries such as the British historian James Bryce believed that they were witnessing “a natural trend, due to a general law of social progress.”[1] Yet almost immediately the new democracies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland began to fall. Europe’s democratic great powers, France and Britain, were suffering the effects of the recent devastating war, while the one rich and healthy democratic power, the United States, had retreated to the safety of its distant shores. In the vacuum came Mussolini’s rise to power in Italy in 1922, the crumbling of Germany’s Weimar Republic, and the broader triumph of European fascism. Greek democracy fell in 1936. Spanish democracy fell to Franco that same year. Military coups overthrew democratic governments in Portugal, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. Japan’s shaky democracy succumbed to military rule and then to a form of fascism. Across three continents, fragile democracies gave way to authoritarian forces exploiting the vulnerabilities of the democratic system, while other democracies fell prey to the worldwide economic depression. There was a ripple effect, too—the success of fascism in one country strengthened similar movements elsewhere, sometimes directly. Spanish fascists received military assistance from the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. The result was that by 1939 the democratic gains of the previous forty years had been wiped out. The period after the First World War showed not only that democratic gains could be reversed, but that democracy need not always triumph even in the competition of ideas. For it was not just that democracies had been overthrown. The very idea of democracy had been “discredited,” as John A. Hobson observed.[2] Democracy’s aura of inevitability vanished as great numbers of people rejected the idea that it was a better form of government. Human beings, after all, do not yearn only for freedom, autonomy, individuality, and recognition. Especially in times of difficulty, they yearn also for comfort, security, order, and, importantly, a sense of belonging to something larger than themselves, something that submerges autonomy and individuality—all of which autocracies can sometimes provide, or at least appear to provide, better than democracies. In the 1920s and 1930s, the fascist governments looked stronger, more energetic and efficient, and more capable of providing reassurance in troubled times. They appealed effectively to nationalist, ethnic, and tribal sentiments. The many weaknesses of Germany’s Weimar democracy, inadequately supported by the democratic great powers, and of the fragile and short-lived democracies of Italy and Spain made their people susceptible to the appeals of the Nazis, Mussolini, and Franco, just as the weaknesses of Russian democracy in the 1990s made a more authoritarian government under Vladimir Putin attractive to many Russians. People tend to follow winners, and between the wars the democratic-capitalist countries looked weak and in retreat compared with the apparently vigorous fascist regimes and with Stalin’s Soviet Union. It took a second world war and another military victory by the Allied democracies (plus the Soviet Union) to reverse the trend again. The United States imposed democracy by force and through prolonged occupations in West Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria, and South Korea. With the victory of the democracies and the discrediting of fascism—chiefly on the battlefield—many other countries followed suit. Greece and

Turkey both moved in a democratic direction, as did Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia. Some of the new nations born as Europe shed its colonies also experimented with democratic government, the most prominent example being India. By 1950, the number of democracies had grown to between twenty and thirty, and they governed close to 40 percent of the world’s population. Was this the victory of an idea or the victory of arms? Was it the product of an inevitable human evolution or, as Samuel P. Huntington later observed, of “historically discrete events”?[3] We would prefer to believe the former, but evidence suggests the latter, for it turned out that even the great wave of democracy following World War II was not irreversible. Another “reverse wave” hit from the late 1950s through the early 1970s. Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador, South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Greece all fell back under authoritarian rule. In Africa, Nigeria was the most prominent of the newly decolonized nations where democracy failed. By 1975, more than three-dozen governments around the world had been installed by military coups.[4] Few spoke of democracy’s inevitability in the 1970s or even in the early 1980s. As late as 1984, Huntington himself believed that “the limits of democratic development in the world” had been reached, noting the “unreceptivity to democracy of several major cultural traditions,” as well as “the substantial power of antidemocratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union).”[5] But then, unexpectedly, came the “third wave.” From the mid-1970s through the early 1990s, the number of democracies in the world rose to an astonishing 120, representing well over half the world’s population. What explained the prolonged success of democratization over the last quarter of the twentieth century? It could not have been merely the steady rise of the global economy and the general yearning for freedom, autonomy, and recognition. Neither economic growth nor human yearnings had prevented the democratic reversals of the 1960s and early 1970s. Until the third wave, many nations around the world careened back and forth between democracy and authoritarianism in a cyclical, almost predictable manner. What was most notable about the third wave was that this cyclical alternation between democracy and autocracy was interrupted. Nations moved into a democratic phase and stayed there. But why? The International Climate Improves The answer is related to the configuration of power and ideas in the world. The international climate from the mid-1970s onward was simply more hospitable to democracies and more challenging to autocratic governments than had been the case in past eras. In his study, Huntington emphasized the change, following the Second Vatican Council, in the Catholic Church’s doctrine regarding order and revolution, which tended to weaken the legitimacy of authoritarian governments in Catholic countries. The growing success and attractiveness of the European Community (EC), meanwhile, had an impact on the internal policies of nations such as Portugal, Greece, and Spain, which sought the economic benefits of membership in the EC and therefore felt pressure to conform to its democratic norms. These norms increasingly became international norms. But they did not appear out of nowhere or as the result of some natural evolution of the human species. As Huntington noted, “The pervasiveness of democratic norms rested in large part on the commitment to those norms of the most powerful country in the world.[6] The United States, in fact, played a critical role in making the explosion of democracy possible. This was not because U.S. policy makers consistently promoted democracy around the world. They did not. At various times throughout the Cold War, U.S. policy often supported dictatorships as part of the battle against communism or simply out of indifference. It even permitted or was complicit in the overthrow of democratic regimes deemed unreliable—those of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. At times, U.S. foreign policy was almost hostile to democracy. President Richard Nixon regarded it as “not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”[7] Nor, when the United States did support

democracy, was it purely out of fealty to principle. Often it was for strategic reasons. Officials in President Ronald Reagan’s administration came to believe that democratic governments might actually be better than autocracies at fending off communist insurgencies, for instance. And often it was popular local demands that compelled the United States to make a choice that it would otherwise have preferred to avoid, between supporting an unpopular and possibly faltering dictatorship and “getting on the side of the people.” Reagan would have preferred to support the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s had he not been confronted by the moral challenge of Filipino “people power.” Rarely if ever did the United States seek a change of regime primarily out of devotion to democratic principles. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the general inclination of the United States did begin to shift toward a more critical view of dictatorship. The U.S. Congress, led by human-rights advocates, began to condition or cut off U.S. aid to authoritarian allies, which weakened their hold on power. In the Helsinki Accords of 1975, a reference to human-rights issues drew greater attention to the cause of dissidents and other opponents of dictatorship in the Eastern bloc. President Jimmy Carter focused attention on the human-rights abuses of the Soviet Union as well as of right-wing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. The U.S. government’s international information services, including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, put greater emphasis on democracy and human rights in their programming. The Reagan administration, after first trying to roll back Carter’s human-rights agenda, eventually embraced it and made the promotion of democracy part of its stated (if not always its actual) policy. Even during this period, U.S. policy was far from consistent. Many allied dictatorships, especially in the Middle East, were not only tolerated but actively supported with U.S. economic and military aid. But the net effect of the shift in U.S. policy, joined with the efforts of Europe, was significant. The third wave began in 1974 in Portugal, where the Carnation Revolution put an end to a half-century of dictatorship. As Larry Diamond notes, this revolution did not just happen. The United States and the European democracies played a key role, making a “heavy investment . . . in support of the democratic parties.”[8] Over the next decade and a half, the United States used a variety of tools, including direct military intervention, to aid democratic transitions and prevent the undermining of existing fragile democracies all across the globe. In 1978, Carter threatened military action in the Dominican Republic when long-serving president Joaquín Balaguer refused to give up power after losing an election. In 1983, Reagan’s invasion of Grenada restored a democratic government after a military coup. In 1986, the United States threatened military action to prevent Marcos from forcibly annulling an election that he had lost. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush invaded Panama to help install democracy after military strongman Manuel Noriega had annulled his nation’s elections. Throughout this period, too, the United States used its influence to block military coups in Honduras, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, and South Korea. Elsewhere it urged presidents not to try staying in office beyond constitutional limits. Huntington estimated that over the course of about a decade and a half, U.S. support had been “critical to democratization in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Uruguay, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and the Philippines” and was “a contributing factor to democratization in Portugal, Chile, Poland, Korea, Bolivia, and Taiwan.”[9] Many developments both global and local helped to produce the democratizing trend of the late 1970s and the 1980s, and there might have been a democratic wave even if the United States had not been so influential. The question is whether the wave would have been as large and as lasting. The stable zones of democracy in Europe and Japan proved to be powerful magnets. The liberal free-market and free-trade system increasingly outperformed the stagnating economies of the socialist bloc, especially at the dawn of the information revolution. The greater activism of the United States, together with that of other successful democracies, helped to

build a broad, if not universal, consensus that was more sympathetic to democratic forms of government and less sympathetic to authoritarian forms. Diamond and others have noted how important it was that these “global democratic norms” came to be “reflected in regional and international institutions and agreements as never before.”[10] Those norms had an impact on the internal political processes of countries, making it harder for authoritarians to weather political and economic storms and easier for democratic movements to gain legitimacy. But “norms” are transient as well. In the 1930s, the trendsetting nations were fascist dictatorships. In the 1950s and 1960s, variants of socialism were in vogue. But from the 1970s until recently, the United States and a handful of other democratic powers set the fashion trend. They pushed—some might even say imposed—democratic principles and embedded them in international institutions and agreements. Equally important was the role that the United States played in preventing backsliding away from democracy where it had barely taken root. Perhaps the most significant U.S. contribution was simply to prevent military coups against fledgling democratic governments. In a sense, the United States was interfering in what might have been a natural cycle, preventing nations that ordinarily would have been “due” for an authoritarian phase from following the usual pattern. It was not that the United States was exporting democracy everywhere. More often, it played the role of “catcher in the rye”—preventing young democracies from falling off the cliff—in places such as the Philippines, Colombia, and Panama. This helped to give the third wave unprecedented breadth and durability. Finally, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it the fall of Central and Eastern Europe’s communist regimes and their replacement by democracies. What role the United States played in hastening the Soviet downfall may be in dispute, but surely it played some part, both by containing the Soviet empire militarily and by outperforming it economically and technologically. And at the heart of the struggle were the peoples of the former Warsaw Pact countries themselves. They had long yearned to achieve the liberation of their respective nations from the Soviet Union, which also meant liberation from communism. These peoples wanted to join the rest of Europe, which offered an economic and social model that was even more attractive than that of the United States. That Central and East Europeans uniformly chose democratic forms of government, however, was not simply the fruit of aspirations for freedom or comfort. It also reflected the desires of these peoples to place themselves under the U.S. security umbrella. The strategic, the economic, the political, and the ideological were thus inseparable. Those nations that wanted to be part of NATO, and later of the European Union, knew that they would stand no chance of admission without democratic credentials. These democratic transitions, which turned the third wave into a democratic tsunami, need not have occurred had the world been configured differently. That a democratic, united, and prosperous Western Europe was even there to exert a powerful magnetic pull on its eastern neighbors was due to U.S. actions after World War II. The Lost Future of 1848 Contrast the fate of democratic movements in the late twentieth century with that of the liberal revolutions that swept Europe in 1848. Beginning in France, the “Springtime of the Peoples,” as it was known, included liberal reformers and constitutionalists, nationalists, and representatives of the rising middle class as well as radical workers and socialists. In a matter of weeks, they toppled kings and princes and shook thrones in France, Poland, Austria, and Romania, as well as the Italian peninsula and the German principalities. In the end, however, the liberal movements failed, partly because they lacked cohesion, but also because the autocratic powers forcibly crushed them. The Prussian army helped to defeat liberal movements in the German lands, while the Russian czar sent his troops into Romania and Hungary. Tens of thousands of protesters were killed in the streets of Europe. The sword proved mightier than the pen. It mattered that the more liberal powers, Britain and France, adopted a neutral posture throughout the liberal

ferment, even though France’s own revolution had sparked and inspired the pan-European movement. The British monarchy and aristocracy were afraid of radicalism at home. Both France and Britain were more concerned with preserving peace among the great powers than with providing assistance to fellow liberals. The preservation of the European balance among the five great powers benefited the forces of counterrevolution everywhere, and the Springtime of the Peoples was suppressed.[11] As a result, for several decades the forces of reaction in Europe were strengthened against the forces of liberalism. Scholars have speculated about how differently Europe and the world might have evolved had the liberal revolutions of 1848 succeeded: How might German history have unfolded had national unification been achieved under a liberal parliamentary system rather than under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck? The “Iron Chancellor” unified the nation not through elections and debates, but through military victories won by the great power of the conservative Prussian army under the Hohenzollern dynasty. As the historian A.J.P. Taylor observed, history reached a turning point in 1848, but Germany “failed to turn.”[12] Might Germans have learned a different lesson from the one that Bismarck taught—namely, that “the great questions of the age are not decided by speeches and majority decisions . . . but by blood and iron”?[13] Yet the international system of the day was not configured in such a way as to encourage liberal and democratic change. The European balance of power in the mid-nineteenth century did not favor democracy, and so it is not surprising that democracy failed to triumph anywhere.[14] We can also speculate about how differently today’s world might have evolved without the U.S. role in shaping an international environment favorable to democracy, and how it might evolve should the United States find itself no longer strong enough to play that role. Democratic transitions are not inevitable, even where the conditions may be ripe. Nations may enter a transition zone—economically, socially, and politically—where the probability of moving in a democratic direction increases or decreases. But foreign influences, usually exerted by the reigning great powers, often determine which direction change takes. Strong authoritarian powers willing to support conservative forces against liberal movements can undo what might otherwise have been a “natural” evolution to democracy, just as powerful democratic nations can help liberal forces that, left to their own devices, might otherwise fail. In the 1980s as in the 1840s, liberal movements arose for their own reasons in different countries, but their success or failure was influenced by the balance of power at the international level. In the era of U.S. predominance, the balance was generally favorable to democracy, which helps to explain why the liberal revolutions of that later era succeeded. Had the United States not been so powerful, there would have been fewer transitions to democracy, and those that occurred might have been short-lived. It might have meant a shallower and more easily reversed third wave.[15] Democracy, Autocracy, and Power What about today? With the democratic superpower curtailing its global influence, regional powers are setting the tone in their respective regions. Not surprisingly, dictatorships are more common in the environs of Russia, along the borders of China (North Korea, Burma, and Thailand), and in the Middle East, where long dictatorial traditions have so far mostly withstood the challenge of popular uprisings. But even in regions where democracies remain strong, authoritarians have been able to make a determined stand while their democratic neighbors passively stand by. Thus Hungary’s leaders, in the heart of an indifferent Europe, proclaim their love of illiberalism and crack down on press and political freedoms while the rest of the European Union, supposedly a club for democracies only, looks away. In South America, democracy is engaged in a contest with dictatorship, but an indifferent Brazil looks on, thinking only of trade and of North American imperialism. Meanwhile in Central America, next door to an indifferent Mexico, democracy collapses under the weight of drugs and crime and the resurgence of the caudillos. Yet it may be unfair to blame regional powers for not doing what they have never done.

Insofar as the shift in the geopolitical equation has affected the fate of democracies worldwide, it is probably the change in the democratic superpower’s behavior that bears most of the responsibility. If that superpower does not change its course, we are likely to see democracy around the world rolled back further. There is nothing inevitable about democracy. The liberal world order we have been living in these past decades was not bequeathed by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” It is not the endpoint of human progress. There are those who would prefer a world order different from the liberal one. Until now, however, they have not been able to have their way, but not because their ideas of governance are impossible to enact. Who is to say that Putinism in Russia or China’s particular brand of authoritarianism will not survive as far into the future as European democracy, which, after all, is less than a century old on most of the continent? Autocracy in Russia and China has certainly been around longer than any Western democracy. Indeed, it is autocracy, not democracy, that has been the norm in human history—only in recent decades have the democracies, led by the United States, had the power to shape the world. Skeptics of U.S. “democracy promotion” have long argued that many of the places where the democratic experiment has been tried over the past few decades are not a natural fit for that form of government, and that the United States has tried to plant democracy in some very infertile soils. Given that democratic governments have taken deep root in widely varying circumstances, from impoverished India to “Confucian” East Asia to Islamic Indonesia, we ought to have some modesty about asserting where the soil is right or not right for democracy. Yet it should be clear that the prospects for democracy have been much better under the protection of a liberal world order, supported and defended by a democratic superpower or by a collection of democratic great powers. Today, as always, democracy is a fragile flower. It requires constant support, constant tending, and the plucking of weeds and fencing-off of the jungle that threaten it both from within and without. In the absence of such efforts, the jungle and the weeds may sooner or later come back to reclaim the land.

Democracy solves nuclear warMuravchick 1 (Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute [Joshua, “Democracy and Nuclear Peace,” 7-11-01, Presented before the NPEC/IGCC Summer Faculty Seminar, UC-San Diego, HYPERLINK "http://www.npec-web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm"www.npec-web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm)

The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of democracy. In a famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states."1Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was pointing to two down-to-earth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. Neither point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy ... fights in anger ... to the bitter end."2 Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed the

proposition that democracies do not go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."3Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy off- putting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II.4 In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. The strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was also democratic within the confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the case of England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other non- democratically constituted states ... is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which there is little systematic evidence," he says.5Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight one another they often fight against others. The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve. Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support France. Later, Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an American military response to its invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed existing U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington would offer no forceful resistance. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive, during the Cold War."6 But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor, but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None would dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold War, the United States may have initiated some skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was

"containment." The so-called revisionist historians argued that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the Soviet Union away from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would. "We would have been able to avoid many ... difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our country," he wrote.7 To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is called "right intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other than aggrandizement, for example, when America invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by self-interest more than altruism, primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip, however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But America had no designs upon Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation, such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by Greek nationalists. In contrast, the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or subjugation. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. No doubt many of the instances of democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times, and it was abandoned after World War II. Since then, I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement, but there are several cases where dictators have done so. One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens ... will have a great hesitation in ...calling down on themselves all the miseries of war."8But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations. Russett aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the "structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not."9 If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. The citizens and officials of democracies

recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or outrageous. A different kind of challenge to the thesis that democracies are more peaceful has been posed by the political scientists Edward G. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. They claim statistical support for the proposition that while fully fledged democracies may be pacific, in th[e] transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war- prone, not less."10However, like others, they measure a state's likelihood of becoming involved in a war but do not report attempting to determine the cause or fault. Moreover, they acknowledge that their research revealed not only an increased likelihood for a state to become involved in a war when it was growing more democratic, but an almost equal increase for states growing less democratic. This raises the possibility that the effects they were observing were caused simply by political change per se, rather than by democratization. Finally, they implicitly acknowledge that the relationship of democratization and peacefulness may change over historical periods. There is no reason to suppose that any such relationship is governed by an immutable law. Since their empirical base reaches back to 1811, any effect they report, even if accurately interpreted, may not hold in the contemporary world. They note that "in [some] recent cases, in contrast to some of our historical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all." But according to Freedom House, some 62.5 percent of extant governments were chosen in legitimate elections.11 (This is a much larger proportion than are adjudged by Freedom House to be "free states," a more demanding criterion, and it includes many weakly democratic states.) Of the remaining 37.5 percent, a large number are experiencing some degree of democratization or heavy pressure in that direction. So the choice "don't go at all"12 is rarely realistic in the contemporary world. These statistics also contain the answer to those who doubt the second proposition behind Fukuyama's forecast, namely, that the world is growing more democratic. Skeptics have drawn upon Samuel Huntington's fine book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington says that the democratization trend that began in the mid- 1970s in Portugal, Greece and Spain is the third such episode. The first "wave" of democratization began with the American Revolution and lasted through the aftermath of World War I, coming to an end in the interwar years when much of Europe regressed back to fascist or military dictatorship. The second wave, in this telling, followed World War II when wholesale decolonization gave rise to a raft of new democracies. Most of these, notably in Africa, collapsed into dictatorship by the 1960s, bringing the second wave to its end. Those who follow Huntington's argument may take the failure of democracy in several of the former Soviet republics and some other instances of backsliding since 1989 to signal the end of the third wave. Such an impression, however, would be misleading. One unsatisfying thing about Huntington's "waves" is their unevenness. The first lasted about 150 years, the second about 20. How long should we expect the third to endure? If it is like the second, it will ebb any day now, but if it is like the first, it will run until the around the year 2125. And by then--who knows?--perhaps mankind will have incinerated itself, moved to another planet, or even devised a better political system. Further, Huntington's metaphor implies a lack of overall progress or direction. Waves rise and fall. But each of the reverses that followed Huntington's two waves was brief, and each new wave raised the number of democracies higher than before. Huntington does, however, present a statistic that seems to weigh heavily against any unidirectional interpretation of democratic progress. The proportion of states that were democratic in 1990 (45%), he says, was identical to the proportion in 1922.13 But there are two answers to this. In

1922 there were only 64 states; in 1990 there were 165. But the number of peoples had not grown appreciably. The difference was that in 1922 most peoples lived in colonies, and they were not counted as states. The 64 states of that time were mostly the advanced countries. Of those, two thirds had become democratic by 1990, which was a significant gain. The additional 101 states counted in 1990 were mostly former colonies. Only a minority, albeit a substantial one, were democratic in 1990, but since virtually none of those were democratic in 1922, that was also a significant gain. In short, there was progress all around, but this was obscured by asking what percentage of states were democratic. Asking the question this way means that a people who were subjected to a domestic dictator counted as a non-democracy, but a people who were subjected to a foreign dictator did not count at all. Moreover, while the criteria for judging a state democratic vary, the statistic that 45 percent of states were democratic in 1990 corresponds with Freedom House's count of "democratic" polities (as opposed to its smaller count of "free" countries, a more demanding criterion). But by this same count, Freedom House now says that the proportion of democracies has grown to 62.5 percent. In other words, the "third wave" has not abated. The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001 suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974. That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization.

Drone Prolif

US sales directly contribute to drone proliferationMehta 18 (Aaron Mehta, Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News [“Do new Trump arms export rules live up to the hype?”, Defense News, HYPERLINK "https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/04/23/do-new-trump-arms-export-rules-live-up-to-the-hype/?fbclid=IwAR2jFOuQbA5yy3D94I9-VIG3_BZvfvEddOyzU6T-xOqsf6_UFk8kTXSsLmk"https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/04/23/do-new-trump-arms-export-rules-live-up-to-the-hype/?fbclid=IwAR2jFOuQbA5yy3D94I9-VIG3_BZvfvEddOyzU6T-xOqsf6_UFk8kTXSsLmk]) //emBut where the U.S. is indeed seeing a steep rise in competition is in the unmanned vehicle sector, particular from China, which has made inroads into the traditionally U.S.-dominated Middle East with its cheaper UAVs. According to analytics firm Avascent, between 2013 and 2018 there were 56 countries that invested in a non-U.S.-made unmanned system, with the majority of the systems coming from Israel, China, the United Kingdom or indigenous suppliers. Investment in non-American military UAS amounted to $1.9 billion in 2013 and grew to $3.5 billion in 2018 ― an estimate that may be low due to a lack of transparency from Israeli and Chinese firms. Overall demand for non-Russian, Chinese or U.S. unmanned systems is expected to reach $4.1 billion in 2025, $1.6 billion of which is not yet under contract, said Avascent’s Doug Berenson, who added “the majority of the value in the opportunity space lies in MALE/HALE systems, Combat UAS, and Tactical UAS. The new regulations should let U.S. firms access [the] first two markets more easily.” Tina Kaidanow, principal deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the U.S. State Department, said the drone rule change represents “efforts to do things a little bit more strategically. We need to do, the U.S. government, a better job of strategic advocacy for some of our companies. We need to think about those areas where we can really enable sales overseas.” The drone policy change included two important changes. The first is opening up the opportunity for companies to sell systems via the Direct Commercial Sales process, under which a company and another nation can directly negotiate, rather than requiring a more formal Foreign Military Sales process, where the U.S. government acts as a go-between. DCS sales are seen as faster than FMS sales. Secondly, the government is eliminating rules that marked unarmed systems with laser-designator technology as “strike enabling,” which put them in the same category as armed drones, and hence received higher scrutiny. Kaidanow said the goal was to make sure “U.S. industry faces fewer barriers and less confusion when they are attempting to compete against other countries and marketing and selling those similar systems to our partners. “ While those changes will be welcomed by the UAV industry, they fall short of what was expected and hoped for by major producers of military drones. Industry was looking for the administration to reinterpret the “strong presumption of denial” clause in the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international arms control agreement among 35 nations that governs the export of missiles and drones. The current clause makes it difficult to approve the sale of category-1 drones capable of carrying 500-kilogram payloads for more than 300 kilometers. The Obama administration had set a standard of how it interprets the MTCR language that some in industry have complained is too strict, and had expected to see changed with this policy a “presumption of approval” for a specific set of allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. “U.S. drone export policy had gotten out of sync with both the technology and the realities of Chinese and Israeli exports,” said Michael Horowitz, a former Pentagon official now with the University of Pennsylvania who has studied drone issues. He added that the new drone policy seeks to balance the realities of ongoing drone proliferation and the growing international market with U.S. responsibilities under the MTCR,” but warned that future opening up of drone sales will likely require dealing with the MTCR directly.” Kaidanow acknowledged an intent to try and reform MTCR, without details. But American officials in October floated a whitepaper to allies proposing that any air vehicle that flies under 650 kilometers per hour would drop to “category-2” and thus be subject to approval on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to having to follow the more strict “category-1” policies. Human rights groups had also been bracing for a

major shift in how drone sales were handled, with an expected de-emphasis on monitoring how systems were used by foreign customers. Instead, the language largely remains, although Stohl notes it has been deemphasized in favor of economic priorities. “Human rights are clearly not at the forefront of this policy. This is a policy about the economy. It is a policy about America first,” Stohl said.

US restrictions on drone sales based on conflict usage can manage the effects of drone proliferation Horowitz 18 (Michael Horowitz, Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania [“A way to rein in drone proliferation”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, HYPERLINK "https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/a-way-to-rein-in-drone-proliferation/?fbclid=IwAR10QNqtuJvQ2hYL8b42qWujcNllSs-7-jTI9wcY-ydKXr7ungoiJeWE704"https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/a-way-to-rein-in-drone-proliferation/?fbclid=IwAR10QNqtuJvQ2hYL8b42qWujcNllSs-7-jTI9wcY-ydKXr7ungoiJeWE704]) //emThe status quo has not just failed to control the spread of armed drones, but also undermined the credibility of the MTCR as a whole. Reform is necessary. From an American perspective, if the United States could export UAVs under rules more like those governing exports of fighter aircraft, it could ensure that countries use their drones more responsibly than if they acquire drones from other sources. US drone exports could also build the capacity of US allies and partners, who would generally prefer to buy American anyway. The HYPERLINK "https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39"Arms Export Control Act requires governments receiving weapons from the United States to use any armaments only for legitimate self-defense and in accordance with international law. Moreover, diminishing the market share of non-members of the MTCR would reduce their ability to use drone revenues for future technology development. Additionally, allied forces using American UAVs, instead of Chinese or Israeli platforms, would have greater interoperability with the US military. Interoperability enables coalition building, can reduce alliance-wide military expenditures, and increases the overall efficacy of military capabilities. To help achieve these goals, members need to rethink the MTCR, though there are no clear fixes for how to move forward. The regime operates by consensus, making substantive change difficult to achieve. Russia, for example, is well aware of the way the MTCR constrains American UAV exports, and might seek to block any changes, or threaten to violate the regime by exporting more Category I missiles in response. Such challenges notwithstanding, it would be worthwhile to continue discussing changes to regime rules. One option would be altering the MTCR to put drones in the same category as inhabited aircraft, which are not regulated by the regime. This would be a common-sense solution, as UAVs are more like aircraft than they are like cruise or ballistic missiles. A second option might involve a broader shift away from exclusive reliance on the 300 km and 500 kg restrictions. For example, adding a speed constraint to the definition of a Category I system could distinguish missiles from UAVs, since missiles travel so much faster. This kind of shift might be more palatable to other members than the first option. But UAVs will evolve over time, and could become significantly faster. Creating restrictions based on a snapshot of the technological present runs the risk that regulations will become obsolete sooner rather than later. If changes to the MTCR itself are not possible, states have other options. For example, the United States could remain a member of the MTCR, but simply ignore the regime’s guidelines on UAVs and choose to treat drones more like inhabited aircraft. In 2016, the United States and 53 other countries already signed a HYPERLINK "https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811.htm"Joint Declaration on the responsible export and use of UAVs; Washington could observe those guidelines instead. If it also reaffirmed its commitment to preventing long-range missile proliferation, this move could, in theory, allow the MTCR to retain credibility for preventing the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles. Yet such a unilateral move by the United States might encourage MTCR members like Russia and others to increase missile exports. The regime has successfully slowed proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles, and to a lesser degree

cruise missiles. This effect would likely diminish. Finally, current MTCR members and other interested states could create a new arms control agreement focused specifically on drone proliferation, while exempting drones from the MTCR. But it would be hard to conclude a new agreement in the current international political climate. Moreover, it is not clear what the basis of such an agreement would be. There appears to be little appetite for a more formal international agreement beyond the Obama-era Joint Declaration. There is no easy answer, but MTCR members—as well as other governments—have to consider the options. Turning back the clock to a time when few countries had military drones is not going to be possible. However, governments can manage their spread in a way that is less destabilizing, with fewer violations of international law. A more common-sense approach, treating drones more like aircraft than missiles, is likely a key part of the answer.

The rapid proliferation of drones risks artificial intelligence making lethal decisions – puts humanity at riskPerrigo 18 (Billy, Reporter for TIME magazine, 4/9, “A Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the Battlefield”, HYPERLINK "https://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/"https://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/, Aly M)

Over the weekend, experts on military artificial intelligence from more than 80 world governments converged on the U.N. offices in Geneva for the start of a week’s talks on autonomous weapons systems. Many of them fear that after gunpowder and nuclear weapons, we are now on the brink of a “third revolution in warfare,” heralded by killer robots — the fully autonomous weapons that could decide who to target and kill without human input. With autonomous technology already in development in several countries, the talks mark a crucial point for governments and activists who believe the U.N. should play a key role in regulating the technology.The meeting comes at a critical juncture. In July, Kalashnikov, the main defense contractor of the Russian government, announced it was developing a weapon that uses neural networks to make “shoot-no shoot” decisions. In January 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense released a video showing an autonomous drone swarm of 103 individual robots successfully flying over California. Nobody was in control of the drones; their flight paths were choreographed in real-time by an advanced algorithm. The drones “are a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature,” a spokesman said. The drones in the video were not weaponized — but the technology to do so is rapidly evolving.This April also marks five years since the launch of the International Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which called for “urgent action to preemptively ban the lethal robot weapons that would be able to select and attack targets without any human intervention.” The 2013 launch letter — signed by a Nobel Peace Laureate and the directors of several NGOs — noted that they could be deployed within the next 20 years and would “give machines the power to decide who lives or dies on the battlefield.”Five years on, armed drones and other weapons with varying degrees of autonomy have become far more commonly used by high-tech militaries, including the U.S., Russia, the U.K., Israel, South Korea and China. By 2016, China had tested autonomous technologies in each domain: land, air and sea. South Korea announced in December it was planning to develop a drone swarm that could descend upon the North in the event of war. Israel already has a fully autonomous loitering munition called the Harop, which can dive-bomb radar signals without human direction and has reportedly

already been used with lethal results on the battlefield. The world’s most powerful nations are already at the starting blocks of a secretive and potentially deadly arms race, while regulators lag behind.

Artificial intelligence throws MAD theory out the window – outweighs nuclear warPerrigo 18 (Billy, Reporter for TIME magazine, 4/9, “A Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the Battlefield”, HYPERLINK "https://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/"https://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/, Aly M)

The implication of this approach is a return to the cold war tenet of mutually assured destruction. But campaigners say the risks could be even higher than those of nuclear weapons, as artificial intelligence brings with it a level of unpredictable complexity. Many in the tech community are concerned that autonomous weapons might carry invisible biases into their actions. Neural network technology, where machines crunch vast amounts of data and modify their own algorithms in response to results, comprises the backbone of much AI that exists nowadays. One of the risks that brings is that not even the technology’s creators know exactly how the final algorithm works. “The assumption that once it’s in the technology it becomes neutral and sanitized, that’s a bit of a problem,” says Schwarz, who specializes in the ethics of violent technologies. “You risk outsourcing the decision of what constitutes good and bad to the technology. And once that is in the technology, we don’t typically know what goes on there.”

Despite treaties, conditions of war will push countries to use drones against civiliansPerrigo 18 (Billy, Reporter for TIME magazine, 4/9, “A Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the Battlefield”, HYPERLINK "https://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/"https://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/, Aly M)

Even though attacking civilians goes against international humanitarian law, Sharkey argues the lack of a specific treaty means it can happen anyway. He fears the same might be the case with killer robots in the future. “What we’re trying to do is stigmatize the technology, and set up international norms,” he says.”But Scharre argues the opposite. “When push comes to shove and there’s an incredible military technology in a major conflict, history shows that countries are willing to break a treaty and use it if it will help them win the war,” he says. “What restrains countries is reciprocity. It’s the concern that if I use this weapon, you will use it against me. The consequences of you doing something against me are so severe that I won’t do it.” It’s that thinking that drives current U.S. policy on autonomy.

Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should substantially reduce direct commercial sales and foreign military sales of drones from the United States by increasing end-use restrictions and ongoing conflict restrictions on drones.

Solvency

The plan prevents escalating global drones arms races and sales to countries who are engaged in the ongoing conflict in YemenBoyle 2/11 (Michael, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, 2019, “HOW TO PREVENT AN ESCALATING DRONE ARMS RACE”, HYPERLINK "https://scholars.org/contribution/how-prevent-escalating-drone-arms-race"https://scholars.org/contribution/how-prevent-escalating-drone-arms-race, Aly M)

In 2018, limits were further relaxed by the Trump administration, which eliminated some of the bureaucratic barriers on direct commercial sales to foreign governments and reclassified drones with strike-enabled technology as unarmed, thus making them easier to sell. More importantly, the Trump administration signaled a willingness to renegotiate the Missile Technology Control Regime to exclude drones. These steps will increase U.S. drone exports and spur the drone arms race.RecommendationsAlthough the Trump administration is unlikely to limit U.S. drone sales or cede more of the market to Israel and China, it can still take three steps to limit escalation of a drones arms race:Restore stronger end-use agreements: The Trump administration‘s policy weakens the requirement for end-use monitoring for drones sold under direct commercial licenses. Restoring restrictive end-use restrictions on commercial sales of U.S.-made drones and insisting on accountability for violations, including revoking foreign purchase rights if necessary, would restrain states from taking risky actions with the technology.Limit sales of armed drones to countries not involved in ongoing interstate conflicts. The Obama administration allowed sales only to NATO countries and close allies, but the Trump administration wants a wider pool of buyers. One way to ensure that drones are not misused is to demand a State Department certification that the foreign buyer is not involved in ongoing territorial disputes or active conflicts with its neighbors.

Middle East Advantage Extensions

Drones Harm Civilians

Drones are more likely to harm civiliansMaguire 15, (Laura, Director of Research and Editor in Chief of Philosophers' Corner, 9-9-2015, "The Ethics of Drone Warfare," Philosophy Talk, https://www.philosophytalk.org/blog/ethics-drone-warfare) accessed 7-3-2019

First, to say that drones reduce unintended casualties is misleading, at best. While US soldiers may not be in direct danger when we drone attack Pakistan, Afghanistan, or wherever it is we’re terrorizing these days, hundreds upon hundreds of civilians have been killed by drones since Obama took office. It’s hard to see how that’s “morally preferable.” Sure, if we used less precise technology to bomb those places, there would probably be even more civilians deaths. But that’s assuming we’d bomb these targets at all, which brings me to the second point. A big part of the moral problem with drones is that they make it too easy for the powers-that-be to bomb whomever they want without much political fallout. Sending troops in on the ground and putting them in direct danger comes with political consequences, but if we attack our so-called “enemies” remotely, and don’t have soldiers coming back in body bags, then there’s not going to be nearly as much backlash. And so, politically speaking, it’s easy for commanders to order strikes, which then leads to a lot of civilian casualties on the other side. Of course, the number of civilian casualties from drone attacks has more to do with foreign policy and intelligence gathering practices than the technology of drones per se. If avoiding civilian casualties is not a priority for the commander in charge of a strike, we’re going to see lots of civilian casualties, regardless of the kind of weapons used. We’re told that drone attacks target high value terrorists, when, in reality, it’s also farmers, low level drug dealers, and men exercising in “suspicious looking” compounds who are targeted.[2]

Drone Prolif Advantage Extensions

Cartels Add-On

Drone Proliferation will lead to military drones spreading to civilian spaces such as cartels Bergen and Rowland 12, (Peter Bergen, Cnn National Security Analyst, and Jennifer Rowland, Special To Cnn, 10-8-2012, "A dangerous new world of drones," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/01/opinion/bergen-world-of-drones/index.html) accessed 7-3-2019

A decade ago, the United States had a virtual monopoly on drones. Not anymore. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, more than 70 countries now own some type of drone, though just a small number of those nations possess armed drone aircraft. The explosion in drone technology promises to change the way nations conduct war and threatens to begin a new arms race as governments scramble to counterbalance their adversaries. Late last month, China announced that it would use surveillance drones to monitor a group of uninhabited islands in the South China Sea that are controlled by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan. In August 2010, Iran unveiled what it claimed was its first armed drone. And on Tuesday, the country's military chief, Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, disclosed details of a new long-range drone that he said can fly 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles), which puts Tel Aviv easily in range. Israel looks to Lebanon after drone shot down But without an international framework governing the use of drone attacks, the United States is setting a dangerous precedent for other nations with its aggressive and secretive drone programs in Pakistan and Yemen, which are aimed at suspected members of al Qaeda and their allies. Just as the U.S. government justifies its drone strikes with the argument that it is at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates, one could imagine that India in the not too distant future might launch such attacks against suspected terrorists in Kashmir, or China might strike Uighur separatists in western China, or Iran might attack Baluchi nationalists along its border with Pakistan. This moment may almost be here. China took the United States by surprise in November 2010 at the Zhuhai Air Show, where it unveiled 25 drone models, some of which were outfitted with the capability to fire missiles. It remains unclear just how many of China's drones are operational and how many of them are still in development, but China is intent on catching up with the United States' rapidly expanding drone arsenal. When President George W. Bush declared a "War on Terror" 11 years ago, the Pentagon had fewer than 50 drones. Now, it has around 7,500. Study: Drone strikes kill, maim and traumatize too many civilians As Bush embarked on that war, the United States had never used armed drones in combat. The first U.S. armed drone attack, which appears to be the first such strike ever, took place in mid-November 2001 and killed the military commander of al Qaeda, Mohammed Atef, in Afghanistan. Since then, the CIA has used drones equipped with bombs and missiles hundreds of times to target suspected militants in Pakistan and Yemen. CNN Radio: Drone debate -- who can you trust? Only the United States, United Kingdom and Israel are known to have launched drone strikes against their adversaries, although other members of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, such as Australia, have "borrowed" drones from Israel for use in the war there. Drone technology is proliferating rapidly. A 2011 study estimated that there were around 680 active drone development programs run by governments, companies and research institutes around the world, compared with just 195 in 2005. In 2010, U.S.-based General Atomics received export licenses to sell unarmed versions of the Predator drone to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates. And in March, the U.S. government agreed to arm Italy's six Reaper drones but rejected a request from Turkey to purchase armed Predator drones. An official in Turkey's Defense Ministry said in July that Turkey planned to arm its own domestically produced drone, the Anka. Israel is the world's largest exporter of drones and drone technology, and the state-owned Israeli Aerospace Industries has sold to countries as varied as

Nigeria, Russia and Mexico. Building drones, particularly armed drones, takes sophisticated technology and specific weaponry, but governments are increasingly willing to invest the necessary time and money to either buy or develop them, as armed drones are increasingly seen as an integral part of modern warfare. Sweden, Greece, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and France are working on a joint project through state-owned aeronautical companies and are in the final stages of developing an advanced armed drone prototype called the Dassault nEURon, from which the France plans to derive armed drones for its air force. And Pakistani authorities have long tried to persuade the United States to give them armed Predator drones, while India owns an armed Israeli drone designed to detect and destroy enemy radar, though it does not yet have drones capable of striking other targets. The Teal Group, a defense consulting firm in Virginia, estimated in June that the global market for the research, development and procurement of armed drones will just about double in the next decade, from $6.6 billion to $11.4 billion. News: Drones expected to hunt for suspects in Libya attack States are not alone in their quest for drones. Insurgent groups, too, are moving to acquire this technology. Last year, Libyan opposition forces trying to overthrow the dictator Moammar Gadhafi bought a sophisticated surveillance drone from a Canadian company for which they paid in the low six figures. You can even buy your own tiny drone on Amazon for $250. (And for an extra $3.99, you can get next-day shipping.) As drone technology becomes more widely accessible, it is only a matter of time before well-financed drug cartels acquire them. And you can imagine a day in the not too distant future where armed drones are used to settle personal vendettas. Given the relatively low costs of drones -- already far cheaper than the costs of a fighter jet and of training a fighter jet pilot -- armed drones will play a key role in future conflicts. Opinion: When are drone killings illegal? While the drone industry thrives and more companies, research institutes and nations jump on board the drone bandwagon, the United States is setting a powerful international norm about the use of armed drones, which it uses for pre-emptive attacks against presumed terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen. It is these kinds of drone strikes that are controversial; the use of drones in a conventional war is not much different than a manned aircraft that drops bombs or fires missiles. According to figures compiled by the New America Foundation, drone attacks aimed at suspected militants are estimated to have killed between 1,900 and 3,200 people in Pakistan over the past eight years.

Cartels drive governance failures globally, magnifying structural violence and risking extinction from resource diversionMatfess, Miklaucic & Williams 16 (Hilary Matfess, research associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses, contributor to the Nigeria Social Violence Project at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, has conducted fieldwork in Tanzania, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, current research focuses on social violence and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, former research analyst at the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University; Michael Miklaucic, Director of Research, Information, and Publications at the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University, editor of PRISM, the journal of CCO, formerly chief operating officer for the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance, and rule of law specialist in the Center for Democracy and Governance, former Department of State deputy for War Crimes Issues; and Phil Williams, Wesley W. Posvar Chair and director of the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, former Visiting Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, former Visiting Scientist at the Computer Emergency Response Team of the Carnegie Mellon University; “Introduction: World Order or Disorder?” and “1 The Global Crisis of Governance,” in Beyond

Convergence: World Without Order, eds. Hilary Matfess & Michael Miklaucic, Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016, p.ix-23, HYPERLINK "https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=802188"https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=802188)

[MATFESS & MIKLAUCIC]

The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a “high warning”—or worse—in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade.1 State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty.2 A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror.3 An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends—convergence, hybridization, and state capture— poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes “convergence” (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or “battlespaces,” and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing

threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity—if not explicit partnership—between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, “criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks.”4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by “the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney General’s Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations.”5 According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State’s 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade.6 The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now outman, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistanbased handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror.7 The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and

threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old “International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range,” of “$1 to $3 trillion” or “two to five percent” of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the “global war on terror” (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion.11 The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America’s post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs—the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT—comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: • the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; • the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; • the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and • the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico’s death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year.13 Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America’s Northern Triangle—comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and

Guatemala—resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador’s official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000.14 Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births.15 Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran’s Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted.16 That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate— at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state’s diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity.17 North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang’s infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities.18 The Stakes Are High To succeed in meeting the international security challenges of the 21st century, the United States and its allies need capable and legitimate partners. Today, ISIL’s assault on Syria and Iraq is being vigorously resisted by a coalition that includes many American partner countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar, and Bahrain, among others. Imagine a world in which the United States had no partners. No partners in the Middle East or Africa would leave

only U.S. boots on the ground to combat ISIL, al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram. But capable and legitimate partners are hard to find, and getting harder. The global community of democracies from which America prefers to choose its partners has shrunk, as the domain of freedom is much diminished in recent years.19 Many potential partners have shown deep fault lines leading to instability. Consider for example Egypt, Mali, and Thailand; each so consumed with internal fissures that effective partnership is beyond their current capability. Though some argue the world has actually become gradually safer over time, many countries once thought to be stable and safe have recently experienced the trauma of indiscriminate terrorism.20 The Global Peace Index reports that, “The world has become less peaceful every year since 2008.”21 Attacks in countries as diverse as Kenya, India, France, Belgium, and the United States show that there is no nationality, religion, or terrain immune from this onslaught. The Westphalian system of global governance has always been an aspirational model—and a geographically limited one at that. Despite its limitations, however, it is unclear if a better model of governance exists. Under the Westphalian system, economic growth has surged and the quality of life has flourished. In the 368 years since the Peace of Westphalia established this rule-based system based on sovereign equality, the world has experienced an unprecedented surge across a range of quality of life indicators: life expectancy has surged from below 40 to over 70 years, per capita gross domestic product increased from around $600 to over $10,000 per year, and literacy has increased from less than 10 percent to over 80 percent of the global population. Rather than abandoning the Westphalian system in favor of an untested, and likely less capable, system, we must cultivate global partnerships to reform and strengthen the system. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and a growing number of weak and corrupt states leaves alarming gaps in the global rule-based system of states. This book aspires to act as a roadmap for those seeking to understand the forces—both the external pressures and the internal failings—that have led us to the current global crisis of governance. The text is organized in four sections. The first section, “Slouching Toward Dystopia,” offers a vision of a world unmoored from the organizational principles of the Westphalian order. This part imagines the worst-case scenarios if current assaults on the international system go unchecked. It includes Phil Williams’ discussion of the crisis of the international order, arguing that global governance has failed because of the inability of states to govern themselves. Nils Gilman describes the state under pressure from “twin insurgencies,” plutocrats and criminal networks, both detached from any loyalty to the state, and both limiting the capacity of the state. Scott Atran reveals the profound and widespread alienation from the global status quo that leads to violent extremism as a redeeming virtue. Francis Fukuyama and Hilary Matfess examine emerging alternative forms of governance, emulating antidemocratic norms, that are cropping up globally, complicating the American search for willing partners abroad. Jay Chittooran and Scott Helfstein explain how criminality has affected equity market returns, illustrating the tangible economic effects that new criminal actors have had on economic stability and development. Section II, “One Network,” examines the expansion of existing criminal networks and explores their operational characteristics and policy implications. Christopher Dishman describes the extent and interconnectivity of criminal networks, terrorist groups, and other violent actors that enable the external corrosion of the state. Matthew Levitt explores the global reach of Hezbollah, detailing how the group’s global networks have allowed it to exploit “Useful Idiots, Henchmen, and Organized Criminal Facilitators.” Douglas Farah discusses the spread of criminality and anti-system norms in Latin America, suggesting that an anti-American coalition is on the rise south of the border. Jessica Stern describes the rise of ISIL as a global threat—highlighting the group’s mixture of ideological and material interests that has propelled it to the forefront of national and international security discussions. Section III, “Pandora,” describes recent innovations that

complicate the global threat landscape. Tuesday Reitano and Andrew Trabulsi discuss the role of social media in bolstering the appeal of antistate actors, allowing them to establish “cult-like” followings and to facilitate “intimate connections to an individual which can be used to raise funds, identify and cultivate associates and victims.”22 Mark Shaw describes the rise of “protection economies,” particularly in West Africa, where jihadist networks are increasingly a part of the drug smuggling business in the region. Describing a massive and nefarious parallel economy, Karl Lallerstedt adds to this discussion through an exploration of global counterfeit and smuggling networks, and the growing gray space between licit and illicit commerce. Weak state capacity hampers efforts to counter this trend, threatening to allow the region to descend into alternatively governed spaces. Raj Samani shows how the technological innovations that have made our lives and work so much easier have produced disconcerting vulnerabilities in the cyber domain that are increasingly being exploited by criminal groups, terrorists, and hostile states alike. Section IV, “A Toolbox for the 21st Century,” offers responses to these challenges; the authors offer tangible policy options to mitigate the threats. Clare Lockhart and Michael Miklaucic discuss the critical role of state-building as a remedy to the rise of illicit actors and tempting but toxic ideologies. Celina Realuyo explains how public-private partnerships (P3 ) can be leveraged to form effective alliances against antistate forces. Sebastian Gorka details the remarkable appeal of ISIL’s destructive ideology, the ways in which this affects the nature of the fight to counter violent extremism worldwide, and how armed forces can adapt. Christopher Fussell and D.W. Lee build upon General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal’s “Team of Teams” approach to offer an organizational solution to the rigidity of governmental bureaucracy, rendering it nimbler and more effective in the face of a metastasizing threat. Throughout the book, a number of common threads emerge, which should be considered by leaders seeking to preserve and strengthen the liberal world order. The first is that American confidence that the end of the Cold War also denoted the end of the global ideological struggle was premature. As this collection shows, across the globe, the contemporary paradigm of governance consisting of democracy and liberalization is being challenged. This challenge emanates not only from China, despite the media attention focused on this purported rivalry, but also from gangs and cartels in Latin America and nonstate actors in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The “new brand” of global jihadist terrorism traffics not just in weapons, oil, and people, but also in a profound sense of communal marginalization. And it has global reach—the arc of connectivity spans from the cartels in Mexico to the insurgents in Mindanao, and encompasses the gangs of Central America, the cartels of Colombia, al-Qaeda affiliates in the Maghreb, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. Hovering over many of these is the specter of a new caliphate, ISIL. The second is that new technology not only reduces the “capacity gap” between conventional and unconventional forces, but also introduces new vulnerabilities to America’s security and that of its allies. Communications technology, which has been a force for democratic change, has also proven to be a powerful enabler for recruitment to groups like ISIL, and facilitated its ability to coordinate attacks in Paris, Brussels, Istanbul, and across the Levant. The rise of social media has allowed remote groups to have a global presence; consider, in an age before propaganda videos could “go viral,” would Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, have a presence outside of the Lake Chad Basin? Further, the innovations that have made life easier for affluent Westerners, including personal computers and web- or cloud-based technologies, are increasingly being exploited by criminal groups to gather funds and collect valuable personal information. Even more troubling than the rise of internet scams, however, is the looming possibility of major hacks and cyber warfare. The “Sony Hack” in the fall of 2014 was quickly

relegated to a late-night punch line, overlooking the significance of North Korean operatives having the capacity to hack into a multibillion dollar company. The following summer, news broke that the U.S. Office of Personnel Management had been hacked. The records of an estimated 21.5 million people who had worked for, or had applied for positions within the U.S. federal government were compromised in the breach, which was traced to China. Third, many of the states within the international community are at a severe handicap in their efforts to mitigate the unprecedented threats to their sovereignty. Their weakness is exacerbated by networked adversaries, of either the terrorist, insurgent, or criminal types, which eat away at state institutions—and more importantly, erode the social contract between governments and the governed. The proliferation of weak, fragile, and failed states leaves big holes in the rule-based system of sovereign states, thus weakening the system, and rendering vulnerable all the gains that flow from that system. An alternative model of global disorder is emerging in which the public good or public interest is a constant casualty. In this alternate global disorder, pure self-interest, violence, and deceit are the major currencies, and the vulnerable of the earth are the constant victims. Finally, strong states, led by trusted, capable governments that are accountable to their populations, are the most effective line of defense against these threats. While “state-building” has become anathema in some circles, it is clear that improving state governance is a necessary corrective measure in the fight against endemic insecurity. Learning from our previous endeavors and identifying effective means of building partner capacity is necessary if the United States is to remain a global leader. Exporting democracy, defined merely by elections, without corresponding rule of law and economic development, will likely exacerbate the disruptive dynamics already at play. Though these themes are addressed by all of the authors, the correct “solution” to the problems described is elusive, and remains a source of disagreement even among the most reasonable people. What role should America play in global ideological conflicts, how legal and regulatory systems should adapt to technology, and how best to promote state-building globally are all thorny questions with no obvious answers. Undeniable, though, is that the discussions surrounding how America and its allies must respond to these challenges should be well-informed, nuanced, and timely. Ultimately, our purpose is not to offer a comprehensive review of every threat facing the United States and its allies or to prescribe solutions. Rather, it is to provide insight for understanding the contemporary threat environment, and offer strategies to mitigate the accelerating trends and forces that threaten us. If this book contributes to a reorientation away from our siloed, traditional approach to analyzing national security, to a more holistic understanding of the threat landscape we face in the 21st century, we will count ourselves successful. Most importantly, we hope that this book will generate discussions recognizing the gravity of these threats among those with the power to affect change in our current policies for addressing the challenges on the horizon, in our backyards, in our bureaucracies, and in our future. Notes 1 The Fund for Peace, a nongovernmental organization, ranks the stability of 178 countries each year based on 12 key political, social, and economic indicators (which in turn include over 100 sub-indicators). The ranking categories are “sustainable,” “stable,” “less stable,” “low warning,” “warning,” “high warning,” “alert,” “high alert,” and “very high alert.” The Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index 2015,” available at <http://library. fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>. 2 Michael Miklaucic and Moises Naim, “The Criminal State,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013). 3 Stanford University, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” Mapping Militant Organizations Project, available at <https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/225>. 4 Scott Helfstein with John Solomon, “Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of

Contraband,” The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 2014, available at <https://www.ctc.usma. edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf>. 5 U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration, “FY 2014 Performance Budget Congressional Submission,” available at <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/16/dea-justification. pdf>. 6 Remi L. Roy, “Dissecting the Complicated Relationship Between Drug Operations and Terrorism,” The Fix, October 8, 2014, available at <http://www.thefix.com/content/dissecting-confounding-nexus-drugs-andterror>. 7 Jeremy Kahn, “Mumbai Terrorists Relied on New Technology for Attacks,” New York Times, December 8, 2008, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/world/asia/09mumbai.html?_r=0>. 8 “Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda (The Base),” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified on December 17, 2015, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>. 9 Michel Camdessus, “Money Laundering: The Importance of International Countermeasures” (address given at the Plenary Meeting of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Paris, February 10, 1998). 10 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2014,” June 2015, available at <http://www. state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf>. 11 Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008). 12 “Economic Costs,” in Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015). 13 Molly Molloy, “The Mexican Undead: Toward a New History of the ‘Drug War’ Killing Fields,” Small Wars Journal 9, no. 8 (August 2013). 14 David Gagne, “InSight Crime 2014 Homicide Round-up,” InSight Crime, January 12, 2015, available at <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-2014-homicide-round-up>. 15 American Immigration Council, “A Guide to Children Arriving at the Border: Laws, Policies and Responses,” June 6, 2015, available at <http://immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/guide-children-arrivingborder- laws-policies-and-responses>. 16 Daniel Valencia, “The Evolving Dynamics of Terrorism: The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus of Hezbollah and The Los Zetas Drug Cartel” (capstone project, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2014), available at <http://academics.utep.edu/Portals/4302/Student%20research/Capstone%20projects/Valencia_Evolving%20 Dynamics%20of%20Terrorism.pdf>. 17 Douglas Farah, “Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliances,” PRISM 2, no. 3 (2011): 15-32. 18 Kelly Olsen, “North Korea’s Secret: Room 39,” The Salt Lake Tribune, June 11, 2009, available at <http://www.sltrib.com/ci_12566697>. 19 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2016,” January 27, 2016, available at <https://freedomhouse. org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf>. 20 For an argument that the world has become less violent and more secure over time, see Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined (New York, NY: Viking Press, 2011). 21 The Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Peace Index Report 2015,” available at <http://static. visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf>. 22 See Tuesday Reitano and Andrew Trabulsi’s chapter entitled, “Virtually Illicit: The Use of Social Media in a Hyper-Connected World,” in this volume.

[WILLIAMS]

I. Slouching Toward Dystopia 1 The Global Crisis of Governance Phil Williams The world has entered a period of kaleidoscopic, irregular conflicts in which the reassertion of traditional geopolitical rivalries is inextricably linked with the activities of a bewildering assortment of violent nonstate actors (VNSAs). States in the Middle East, for example, increasingly define national interests in terms of sectarianism; however, the civil war in Islam is being played out not only in the direct, competitive dynamic of Saudi

Arabia and Iran, but also through the proxies these two states use, including sectarian factions, tribes, warlords, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). These VNSAs pursue their own agendas, yet interact and ally with states when it is convenient and advantageous to do so. They might, on occasion, act as state proxies; but, they are not pawns. On the contrary, they generate their own conflict dynamics and follow strategic imperatives that sometimes complement the actions of their state allies, but, on other occasions, can equally well confound them. In South Asia, D-Company, the criminal organization led by Dawood Ibrahim, is closely allied with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Indeed, D-Company is used by ISI to provide money and logistic support for terrorist actions against India, and for assistance in introducing counterfeit currency into India. The organization also provides plausible deniability for ISI and for Pakistan, in return for which Pakistan provides sanctuary and protection.1 The relationship is symbiotic and D-Company enjoys a high degree of impunity, while continuing to profit from its extensive portfolio of transnational criminal activities. Moreover, at times, its close relationship with Pakistani intelligence and military services has hindered efforts to improve relations between India and Pakistan. In other words, traditional geopolitics is alive and well, but is sharing the stage with a variety of new players that are useful to states but are not necessarily or not fully under state control. This is a complex picture in which states, at the very least, remain the major players, and often set the frameworks within which VNSAs operate. At the same time, VNSAs add elements of fluidity and unpredictability, complicating state calculations and rendering desired outcomes uncertain. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed that favorable power asymmetries do not guarantee victory, that military power often matters less than political resilience, and that even political success can prove impossible to sustain. Such complexities and uncertainties are increasingly reflected in current U.S. military planning with its focus on gray zones, irregular operations, and hybrid enemies, as well as its reliance on technological superiority to provide what has been characterized as the “third offset.”2 Underlying this panorama of actors, and somewhat obscured by the current crises and tensions, is a fundamental global trend in which the nature of governance provided by many states is inadequate and unable to meet the needs, demands, and expectations of their citizens. In other words, the Westphalian order is undergoing a long-term secular decline that is bringing with it a series of convulsions along with what Nathan Freier terms, “prolific insecurity.”3 This does not mean that the state is going away anytime soon; the state remains critical in defining political order, and will continue to play much of that role for the foreseeable future. Yet there is an important, albeit often unrecognized, distinction between failed states and failed governance. Governance can fail dismally even while the formal state remains intact. In many cases around the world, state governance is failing to meet the needs of citizens even as states continue to meet all the formalities of statehood and are recognized by their peers as part of the international community. Sovereignty as a formal legal status in which the state recognizes no higher authority than itself and mandates nonintervention in its domestic affairs is alive and thriving; sovereignty as exclusive and full territorial control and protection of citizens within the area of the state’s jurisdiction, however, is increasingly illusionary. As a result, other actors are stepping in, both to challenge the state directly and to provide governance where the state has limited presence or is simply absent. In many countries, especially in the developing world, the traditional equation between the state and governance has broken down. This has four major consequences: high levels of violence in many societies, the rise of alternative loyalties that supersede loyalty to the state, the emergence of alternative governance mechanisms, and large numbers of refugees and migrant flows from countries where governance—but not the state—has effectively failed. These consequences are discussed more fully below. Although there is considerable hand-wringing over

what is often seen as the failure of global governance, it should be emphasized that this is not what is being discussed here. This chapter is not about global governance; it is concerned with governance at the state level, which is becoming a problem of truly global proportions and one that can only exacerbate the shortcomings of global institutions and thereby underline the paucity of effective global governance. If the constituent units that make up the global community of states cannot effectively govern the territory and populations they nominally control, then developing common solutions to global challenges such as climate change will likely prove impossible.

Drone Leadership Scenario

US is losing drone leadershipBoyle 15 Michael J. Boyle, 2015, "The Race for Drones," Michael J. Boyle is an Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University and a Senior Fellow at the ForeignPolicyResearchInstitute.,HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438714000763"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438714000763 date accessed 7/2/19)

Such complacency about the consequences of a global race for drones is not warranted. Today, America’s comparative advantage in drones is being eroded as drone technology is spreading across the international system. While their current technology lags, and in some cases merely imitates, U.S. drone models, global competitors such as China and Russia are now spending billions to catch up to the United States in research and development for drone technology. The U.S. lead will remain for the next decade or more, but the substantial Chinese, Russian and European investments in drone research and production will gradually match the technological advantage currently held by U.S. companies. Moreover, the United States is not the dominant player in the current export market for drones. Israel has become the world’s supplier of first resort, selling drone technology to a large number of other states for domestic and military uses. Due to U.S. and Israeli exports, and the efforts of other states to develop drone export markets, drones have now spread to most established militaries in the developed world. Between 2004 and 2011, the number of states with active UAV programs doubled, from 40 to over 80.5 More than one third of the states in the world have developed their own drones programs, ranging from relatively small boutique programs to growing multi-purpose drone programs used for combat, surveillance and civilian uses. According to a RAND study, 23 countries are developing their own technology for different types of armed drones.6 Even in an era of austerity and steep cuts in defense spending, the demand for drones is increasing, leading a growing number of states to consider joining the export market. The American and Israeli companies that traditionally have dominated the drones market are now facing increasingly stiff competition from Chinese companies who are developing dozens of drone models for the export market. The competition will only become more intense as new arms manufacturers from Europe, Russia, and the Middle East begin to catch up. Moreover, many of these states, such as Russia and China, face fewer export restrictions and will be able to sell sophisticated drones to governments not authorized by the U.S. Congress to receive comparable American models. The result is that drones of increasing quality will soon be in the hands of states such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea.7 Similarly, non-state actors will get into the race for drones, as the United States recently discovered when Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS deployed drones to coordinate attacks against targets in Syria. 8 The long-term strategic consequences of this new arms race in drones around the world will not be known for decades. At this point, drones are not an immediate strategic game changer in the way that nuclear weapons once were. A better analogy is the diffusion of military aircraft: after the pioneering use of heavierthan-air aircraft by the U.S. in 1910, all of the major powers at the time—Britain, France, Austria, Germany and Italy—rapidly followed suit with their own military aviation programs, while many other states became purchasers of aviation from dominant American, British and other European suppliers. The diffusion of military aircraft (of varying quality) continued throughout the 1930-1940s to the point where almost every major military in the world boasted at least a token military aviation capability. Over time, it became a mark of prestige for a state to have an air force even if it conveyed little more than symbolic value. By the late 1940s, it was clear that the diffusion of military

aviation was creating dramatic strategic consequences, either by resetting the terms of competition for existing rivalries or by introducing a degree of uncertainty into regional balances of power.

US drone leadership is key to develop drone norms that will solve the impact to proliferationBoyle 15 (Michael J. Boyle, 2015, "The Race for Drones," Michael J. Boyle is an Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University and a Senior Fellow at the ForeignPolicyResearchInstitute.,HYPERLINK "https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438714000763"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438714000763 date accessed 7/2/19)

The world is now approaching a similar point with drones as the race for this technology is resetting the terms of global competition and quietly altering the rules of the game for many long-simmering conflicts and rivalries. This is happening in part because few, if any, states will use drones in the way that the United States currently does, as a way to ruthlessly target militant networks in ungoverned territories. Rather, the proliferation of drones will also be accompanied by rapid adaption of drones to new, and perhaps unforeseen, civilian and military uses, which will have three consequences for the international system. First, the proliferation of drones will reset the rules and norms governing surveillance and reconnaissance and invite new counter-measures that may paradoxically increase uncertainty between regional rivals over the long run. Second, as a low-cost, apparently low-risk form of technology, drones will become increasingly useful to governments in testing the strategic commitments and the nerves of their rivals. Even today, a number of governments and rebel groups facing regional rivalries have started to use drones in ways that chip away at the foundations of previously stable deterrent relationships. Third, the worldwide proliferation of drones in contested airspace, and the increasing risk that a drone will have an accident with a civilian aircraft, multiplies the chances of a conflict spiral stemming from an accident or drone misuse. Given these risks, it is in Washington’s interest to take a leading role in slowing the race for drones and developing new legal, institutional and normative mechanisms to govern drone usage and sale in the future.

China Fill In DA – AFF Answers

Uniqueness AnswersChina currently ‘selling the hell’ out of drones, US market entrance likely to backfire Turak 19 (Natasha Turak, CNBC Correspondent [“Pentagon is scrambling as China ‘sells the hell out of’ armed drones to US allies”, CNBC Defense] https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/21/pentagon-is-scrambling-as-china-sells-the-hell-out-of-armed-drones-to-americas-allies.html) //emAs one U.S. official at Abu Dhabi’s international defense expo, IDEX, put it this week, “China has been selling the hell out of its drones” to Gulf militaries like those of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. The U.S., while a top security partner to these states, currently does not supply them with its armed drone technology due to strict export regulations. But in the face of record Middle East defense spending and encroaching foreign competition, it’s under renewed pressure to do just that. Lt. Gen. Charles Hooper, director of the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), emphasized

changes underway to the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy, which has thus far prevented the sale of armed drones to Washington’s Arab allies. “As an element of the changes to the CAT policy, we’ve reviewed and are in the process of implementing changes to our policy with respect to unmanned aerial systems,” Hooper told media at the conference Sunday. “We want to make many of our unmanned aerial systems available to our partners. Many of them have been asking for some time, we’re going to move forward as quickly as possible.” Those systems that Gulf allies have wanted include the lethal MQ-9 Reaper, produced by General Atomics, a hunter-killer drone that can carry up to four hellfire missiles as well as laser-guided bombs and joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs). What’s been stopping the sales include concerns over proliferation, or risks that it could end up in the wrong hands. “We will still continue to vet those cases, look at

each of those on a case-by-case basis,” Hooper said. “But we do understand that it’s a very competitive world out there and we want to ensure that we are doing everything in our power to provide U.S. systems, the best in the world, to our partners.” Why the Gulf is buying Chinese drones in the first place Simply put, China’s weaponized drones are on the market when others aren’t . The UAE has had Chinese Wing Loong I drones since 2016, and started receiving its purchases of the upgraded and deadlier Wing Loong II in early 2018. The UAVs, intended for surveillance and reconnaissance, can carry a range of weapons including missiles and laser-guided bombs to blow up targets on land or in the air. The Saudis have bought China’s CH-4 and the Wing Loong II, and both countries have deployed their drones in Yemen. Last summer, Riyadh confirmed that the Chinese were building a CH-4 production facility — the first drone factory in the region — in Saudi Arabia. The CH-4, an ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and attack drone with similarities to the Reaper, is also used by the UAE, Iraq and Egypt. In addition to being able to sell to any willing buyer, the Chinese also offer the lowest prices on the market. According to Jack Watling, a land warfare expert at the Royal United Services Institute

(RUSI) in London, the UAE’s Chinese drone purchases began after the the U.S. refused to sell them American armed UAVs. Now, he says, “the (President Donald) Trump administration has reduced its threshold for sale, which partly happened after the UAE started its Chinese drone purchases.” Gulf militaries do have American drones, but not ones capable of destroying targets. These include the U.S.-made Predator XP, which can carry ISR camera packages, but it’s downgraded so that it can’t carry weapons systems. Still, Watling says, U.S platforms are better than their Chinese counterparts — and if given the opportunity, buyers would likely choose those. “Chinese UAS (unmanned aerial systems) are not as stable as American systems,” he explained. “They therefore have to

fly lower, though they are improving. This has resulted in several Chinese platforms being shot down.” ‘Definitely a threat’ “The

Chinese are definitely a threat,” Gerard Robottom, international market area director at California-based UAV manufacturer AeroVironment, told CNBC at the conference. But he stressed that reliability is key, adding, “you can find a lot of our customers out here, and they’ll tell you the importance of a good ISR from a reputable company.” Robottom’s colleagues attested to the lengthy U.S. government process for approving even non-lethal drone exports, which they described as a hindrance to international business. “This is something the administration takes very seriously,” Michael Bedke, senior regional policy advisor at the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security Administration, told CNBC at the event. “As part of the CAT implementation policy ... there were lines of effort that looked at how we could provide more systems and more advanced systems to the region, and how we can speed up the process to allow us to transfer those systems as well.” In November, as part of the Trump administration’s push to sell more weapons abroad, the State Department released updates to the CAT policy featuring measures to speed up arms transfers and reduce previous restrictions. The first task listed in the State Department’s policy update read: “Effectively compete with strategic competitors by providing allies and partners with alternatives to

foreign defense articles in order to maintain U.S. influence in key regions.” ... But it could backfire But supplying the technology to the Gulf could backfire on the U.S., Watling says. The U.S. provides its allies ISR in exchange for access and leverage; “if they sell the platforms, and the UAE and Saudis get good at using them, then they will be less dependent on the U.S.” And in the current political climate, where international criticism of Saudi Arabia and its role, along with the UAE’s, in Yemen’s bloody conflict is at a high, the optics may not be particularly welcomed. “If the U.S. provides Predators or Reapers, and the UAE and Saudis start striking more targets — some of which may not match with U.S. priorities — then there could be backlash against the U.S. ,” Watling said. Because of concerns like this, the Pentagon’s Bedke stressed that the transfer process would remain on a case-by-case basis. “But the new policies in place will give us more flexibility,” he said, “and I would continue to watch this space in the next couple of months to see what happens.”

China consistently dominates UCAV marketPeck 19 (Michael Peck, contributing writer for the National Interest [“A Really Big Deal: China is a Drone Superpower.”, The National Interest] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/really-big-deal-china-drone-superpower-47692)//emFor years, drone warfare has been an essentially American pursuit. The new age of armed robots has been symbolized by Predators and

Reapers spewing Hellfire missiles. But guess who’s the biggest exporter of combat drones? China. “In 2014–18 China became the largest exporter in the niche market of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), with states in the Middle East among the main recipients,” according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which compiles estimates of global military strength and arms spending. Indeed, combat drones are spreading across the globe. “The number of countries that import and use unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—which are remotely controlled armed aircraft often referred to as armed drones—continued to increase in 2014-18,” SIPRI said. “There is widespread discussion about the impact of UCAV

proliferation on peace and security. China has become the primary exporter of UCAVs. Whereas China exported 10 UCAVs to 2 countries in 2009-13, in 2014-18 it exported 153 to 13 countries—5 of which are in the Middle East: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In contrast, the United States delivered three UCAVs in 2009-13 and five in 2014-18. In both periods all the deliveries were to the United Kingdom. Iran delivered 10 UCAVs to Syria in 2014-18, while the UAE delivered 2 to Algeria.” This explains why the U.S. Army, which has been lackadaisical about air defense for years, is now suddenly interested. Nations such as Iran are far inferior to the United States in conventional combat

weapons such as tanks and jet fighters, but it doesn’t take much money or advanced technology to strap a bomb onto a small drone that’s hard to detect or shoot down. China’s arms exports are slowing after a massive surge over the last few years. After nearly tripling between 2004 and 2013, they increased by only 2.7 percent over the 2014 to 2018. Interestingly, China’s more aggressive foreign policy in Asia has hampered its arms exports. “China’s arms exports are limited by the fact that many countries—including 4 of the top 10 arms importers in 2014-18 (India, Australia, South Korea and Vietnam)—will not procure Chinese arms for political reasons,” SIPRI noted. During the Cold War

and after, China was notorious as an exporter of cheap knockoffs of old Soviet hardware such as tanks and jet fighters. Yet China’s push to develop Western-style smart weapons, from aircraft carriers to stealth fighters, appears to be paying economic dividends. “Improvements in Chinese military technology have opened up opportunities for arms export growth, including exports to new custom ers,” said SIPRI. “The number of countries to which China delivers major arms has grown significantly over the past few years. In 2014-18 China delivered major arms to 53 countries, compared with 41 in 2009-13 and 32 in 2004-2008. Pakistan was the main recipient (37 per cent) in 2014-18, as it has been for all five-year periods since 1991. China supplied relatively small volumes of major arms to a wide variety of countries: 39 of the 53 recipients in 2014-18 each accounted for less than 1 per cent of total Chinese arms exports.” However, China’s arms exports haven’t totally dampened Beijing’s appetite for imported—mostly Russian—arms. China was the world’s sixth-largest importer of weapons between 2014 and 2018, down 7 percent from the 2009 to 2013 time period. “Russia accounted for 70 per cent of Chinese arms imports in 2014-18,” SIPRI estimated. “China remains reliant on imports for certain arms technologies such as engines for combat aircraft and large ships as well as long-range air and missile defense systems. Its own arms industry has yet to develop the technological capability to match Russian suppliers in these fields.”

China’s market for UAVs continues to grow Waldron 19 (Greg Waldron, Asia Managing Editor, FlightGlobal [“China finds its UAV export sweet spot”, FlightGlobal] https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/china-finds-its-uav-export-sweet-spot-457947/)//emThe export of medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) UAVs has been a distinct bright spot in China's efforts to join the ranks of the world's leading defense aerospace exporters. According to figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which tracks global arms flows, China exported 163 large, weapons-capable UAVs to 13 countries from 2008 to 2018. By comparison, SIPRI data suggests that USA manufacturer General Atomics delivered just 15 MQ-9 Reaper systems to international customers in the past 10 years, with outstanding international orders for 28 additional examples. UAV giant Israel has exported about 167 MALE UAVs of the Hermes and Heron series during the same period, with these assets serving in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions – not attack roles). In recent years, China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC) has had a prominent presence at major international air shows, including static displays of mock-ups of the AVIC Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II UAVs. The Wing Loong family has long been a staple at the biennial Air Show China in Zhuhai. The type regularly appears surrounded by an array of bombs and guided missiles. In addition, China has enjoyed success selling the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) Cai Hong ("Rainbow") series of UAVs, which includes the Cai Hong 3 (CH-3) and larger CH-4. Siemon

Wezeman, senior researcher at SIPRI, says China has enjoyed "amazing" progress in the Middle East and African UAV markets in recent years. "Over the years they've gotten to know the market better, and are much slicker now." In addition to provoking the ire of western UAV manufacturers, Beijing's efforts in the export space have attracted the attention of the Pentagon. It mentioned the UAV exports in its recent annual report to congress about Chinese military developments. "China's market for armed UAVs continues to grow; China now sells Caihong series UAVs to at least Burma, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates," says the report. "China faces little competition for these sales; most armed UAV exporters have signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and/or the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies and face sales restrictions." SIPRI data indicates that the most prolific Chinese MALE UAV export is the type apparently shot down in Yemen, the Wing

Loong I, with 62 examples. Major customers include the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. An AVIC flyer distributed at Zhuhai in 2018 indicates that the system has an endurance of 20h and a maximum payload capacity of 200kg (440lb), sufficient for a single missile under each wing. The system only needs 1,000m (3,280ft) to take off and 600m for landing. Take-off and landing are both conducted automatically, and the aircraft boasts an encrypted data link. In addition, it is capable of electronic intelligence and jamming. The Wing Loong II, of which Beijing has sold 15 to Saudi Arabia, 15 to Turkmenistan, and an unspecified number to Egypt, is far more capable. Whereas the Wing Loong I has a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 1,200kg, the Wing Loong II's MTOW is 4,200kg. As with its smaller sibling, it includes a ground control station and integrated logistics system. It has three hardpoints on each wing. An AVIC flyer for the type shows it carrying 10 air-to-ground munitions, with four mounted on dual racks. Sensor payloads include an

electro-optical (EO) surveillance/targeting system and a synthetic aperture radar. AVIC states that users can customise the system for "electronic intelligence, radar jamming, communications intelligence, intelligence collection, photo reconnaissance, communications relay, search and rescue, as well as other advanced payloads, data link equipment, and airborne weapons". AVIC has also developed another variant of the family, the Wing Loong ID, an upgraded version of the Wing Loong I that is specifically designed for the export market. The system had its maiden flight on 23 December 2018. The aircraft is entirely made of composites and its basic payload is an EO pod and a synthetic aperture radar. It has four hardpoints that can accommodate 10 types of missiles or bombs. It has a more powerful engine than the Wing Loong I, its MTOW is 300kg higher, at 1,500kg, and it can carry an external payload of 400kg. In addition, SIPRI shows that 44 CH-3s have been sold to users such as Algeria, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkmenistan. Twenty CH-4s have been delivered to Algeria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, in 2017, Riyadh entered an agreement to produce CH-4s locally as it seeks to develop its aerospace sector. The MALE UAV segment represents a notable area where China has made inroads with defence buyers that are typically strong customers of US and European defence equipment. Owing to the vagaries of the MTCR, selling assets such as the MQ-9 Reaper to countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has been off limits. This is despite the large numbers of advanced US combat jets, attack helicopters and smart weapons found in the air forces of these countries. This has allowed Chinese UAV manufacturers to seize significant market share in one of the defence industry's

frontier market segments. "Chinese manufacturers appear to have spotted a gap in the market as a result of US restrictions on the sale of armed UAVs and have used this as a route to market,"

says Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for Military Aerospace with International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "Beijing has made sales in the Middle East to countries that have traditionally more often bought US systems. In terms of advantages the most obvious is the ability to acquire an armed UAV, with China offering a range of air-to-surface munitions and missiles either already integrated or capable of being integrated. The systems are also likely price competitive. Disadvantages likely cover a less capable overall performance, and possible training and support deficiencies." Another advantage that Chinese systems offer as opposed to western systems is that Beijing is less selective with its clientele. "The Chinese will sell without asking questions," says Wezeman. "The Chinese will just take one look at you and sell to you. Western suppliers will look at you and give you a list of conditions." Despite strong sales, however, there are questions about the quality of Chinese systems. One area of weakness lies in turboprop engines – engines are a persistent problem with Chinese-produced aircraft. This shows up in performance. The MQ-9B Reaper, for example, has published service ceiling of 49,000ft, while that for the Wing Loong II is 29,500ft. The Reaper is also faster, with a top speed of 260kt (480km/h), compared with 199kt for the Chinese aircraft. Of course, a Wing Loong II likely costs a fraction of an MQ-9B. A ChinaPower report on Chinese UAV technologies indicates that a Wing Loong II likely costs $1-2 million, compared with $16 million for the Reaper. Experts also question the datalinks of Chinese systems, suggesting that they are not as robust as those available for similar western platforms. China is also working its way up the technology ladder. AVIC promoted its turbojet-powered Cloud Shadow strike/reconnaissance UAV at the 2017 Dubai air show, where it displayed a mock-up of the type. In the armed role, the Cloud Shadow can carry up to 400kg of munitions on four or six hardpoints, while it can also be configured with a range of EO sensors and used in search and rescue. Its endurance is up to 4h and it has an operating altitude of 41,000ft. "China, in particular, has become an increasingly influential player, taking advantage of that hole in the market,"

says a Royal United Services Institute paper on UAV exports to the Middle East. "Some within China believe that by implementing a selective export policy on drones, the US was trying to maintain its dominant and exclusive role in the field. Instead, by capitalising on the gap created in the market, over the past few years, Beijing has supplied armed drones to several countries that are not authorised to purchase them from the US, and at a dramatically cheaper price."

Internal Link/Impact Answers

AT: US-China War

No War – arms sales are priced in – Trump and Xi don’t want political consequences of warHu 2018 – Weixing Hu is a Professor and Head of the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong (“Trump's China Policy and Its Implications for the "Cold Peace" across the Taiwan Strait,” China Review, Volume 18, Number 3) bhb

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are an important issue that may affect future cross-Strait relations during the Trump administration. Through the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Washington considers itself obliged to continue providing arms to Taiwan to defend itself. For a long time, U.S. arms sales have also been considered an important source of leverage for Washington to interfere in cross-Strait relations. For decades after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and PRC, Washington has maintained its influence in cross-Strait relations by its arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing has tried very hard to deprive Washington of this leverage but not successfully. Beijing's strong reactions to the U.S. arms sales did not stop Washington's arms sales. For Washington, Beijing's strong reaction indicates that with growing economic and military strength, China has become less tolerant of swallowing "the bitter fruit" of arms sales to Taiwan and has attempted to change the rules of game on that issue. For Beijing, Washington's consistent policy in arms sales to Taiwan also tells the Chinese that it is still unrealistic to ask Washington to completely stop selling arms to Taiwan, and it has to live with it for the foreseeable future. Under Trump, U.S. arms sales are very likely to continue because the administration's policy in probusiness and in favor of creating jobs for American workers. Actually, after just a few months in office, the Trump administration announced a new arms sales package to Taiwan. The issue could lead to a new round of competition between Washington and Beijing. Despite the lack of a clear Taiwan policy in the Trump administration, conservative members of the U.S. Congress could take the initiative to drive the relationship and become a source of conflict. These members have already introduced new bills similar to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act introduced a few years ago in Congress to force the administration to upgrade U.S.-Taiwan relations.36 Although the prospects of these bills becoming law are weak, it could affect Trump's conduct in his China policy and policy toward cross-Strait relations. 5. Conclusion The United States and China have different views on the current "cold peace" or hardening stalemate across the Taiwan Strait. But they have overlapped interests in avoiding conflict and maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Neither President Trump nor President Xi wants the Taiwan issue to become the top priority in their bilateral [End Page 84] agenda. The Trump administration, unlike the Obama administration, does not have a clear regional strategy of hedging and balancing against China in the Asia Pacific. It has no interest in pushing Taipei and Beijing to the negotiation table either. It is unlikely that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will come up with a new formulation that is equivalent to the 1992 Consensus or any other form of reassurance toward each other. It is also unlikely the Tsai Ing-wen government will rock the boat and move toward de jure Taiwan independence. Therefore, if there are no new provocative actions from the Tsai government, Beijing will withhold significant punitive actions that may hurt the people in Taiwan. Beijing is preoccupied with its domestic agenda. As long as the Tsai government is not pushing the envelope, Beijing will remain patient and let the status quo continue. So cross-Strait and trilateral relations will remain in a situation of muddling through and the "cold peace" will continue for the foreseeable future.

China won’t risk war with the US

Yan 2018 - Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University Xuetong, "The Age of Uneasy Peace," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-12-11/age-uneasy-peace

Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.

AT: Heg

China’s rise is inevitable and weapon systems aren’t key

Roggeveen 2018 - senior fellow at the Lowy Institute in Australia Sam, "What Role Do Arms Sales Play in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions?" Jan 23, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24044/what-role-do-arms-sales-play-in-china-s-geopolitical-ambitions

But beyond China’s relationships with its customers, I think there is a strategic agenda. China wants be a world power, and this ambition is being advanced largely through technological means. China clearly wants to compete with Boeing and Airbus as a maker of civilian airliners, and it has an equally ambitious space program. It is also focused on leading the way in artificial intelligence and computer technology. China wants to be a world-class manufacturer of weapons, too, and if it is going to make these weapons for its own armed forces, it might as well export them. WPR: What are the implications of Chinese arms sales in its immediate spheres of influence? Roggeveen: In strategic terms, the most significant arms export to Asia that China has ever conducted is still its transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. Next to that, everything else pales for two reasons. First, the scale of Chinese conventional weapons exports to the rest of Asia remains relatively modest—though, as the SIPRI figures show, it is clearly growing. But second, if China were not exporting weapons to Asia, countries would simply be purchasing them from elsewhere. Granted, China’s presence in the market creates competition, presumably driving down prices and improving overall quality. But the conventional weapons Beijing is offering to the market are in ready supply, whereas nuclear weapons technology is much harder to come by. For those reasons, I doubt Chinese arms sales make a huge contribution to Beijing’s ambitions for greater regional influence, particularly in contrast to its signature initiative, known as One Belt, One Road. China is offering fast, large-scale infrastructure support, which other players such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors do not provide. The connections these projects create with China are physical and can generate economic markets that are painful to disturb, so they are much more durable than the ties created by arms sales.

AT: Terror

Arm sales do nothing to prevent terror

Thrall 2018 - senior fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy DepartmentA Trevor and Caroline Dorminey, "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy," Mar 13, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#full

Nor does the threat of transnational terrorism justify most arms sales. Most fundamentally, the actual threat from Islamist-inspired terrorism to Americans is extraordinarily low. Since 9/11, neither al Qaeda nor the Islamic State has managed an attack on the American homeland. Lone wolf terrorists inspired by those groups have done so, but since 9/11 those attacks have killed fewer than 100 Americans, an average of about 6 people per year. There is simply very little risk reduction to be gained from any strategy. The idea that the United States should be willing to accept the significant negative effects of arms sales for minimal counterterrorism gains is seriously misguided.49 Moreover, even if one believed that the benefits would outweigh the potential costs, arms sales still have almost no value as a tool in the war on terror for several reasons. First, the bulk of arms sales (and those we considered in our risk assessment) involve major conventional weapons, which are ill suited to combatting terrorism. Many U.S. arms deals since 9/11 have involved major conventional weapons systems such as fighter jets, missiles, and artillery, useful for traditional military operations, but of little use in fighting terrorists. Insurgencies that hold territory, like the Islamic State, are one thing, but most terrorist groups do not advertise their location, nor do they assemble in large groups. Second, there is little evidence from the past 16 years that direct military intervention is the right way to combat terrorism. Research reveals that military force alone “seldom ends terrorism.”50 This comports with the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror to date. Despite regime change, thousands of air strikes, and efforts to upgrade the military capabilities of friendly governments, the United States has not only failed to destroy the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it has also spawned chaos, greater resentment, and a sharp increase in the level of terrorism afflicting the nations involved.51 Given the experience of the United States since 2001, there is little reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates will reduce terrorism, much less anti-American terrorism specifically. Relatedly, many arms deals since 9/11, made in the name of counterterrorism, were irrelevant to U.S. goals in the global war on terror because they provided weapons to governments fighting terrorist groups only vaguely (if at all) linked to al Qaeda or ISIS. Although selling weapons to the governments of Nigeria or Morocco or Tunisia might help them combat violent resistance in their countries, terrorist groups in those countries have never targeted the United States. As a result, such arms deals cannot be justified by arguing that they advance the goals of the United States in its own war on terror in any serious way. Finally, arms sales are completely useless to combat the largest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland — lone wolf attackers already living in the United States. As noted, none of the successful attacks in the United States since 9/11 resulted from operations directed by al Qaeda or ISIS. And in fact only two foiled attempts since then — the underwear bomber and the printer-bomb plot — can be ascribed to al Qaeda.52 Instead, in almost all cases, persons already living in the United States, inspired by Islamist groups, decided to carry out attacks on their own. Clearly, arms sales to foreign nations won’t help with that problem; rather, as many analysts have suggested, amplifying conflicts abroad may well make the problem worse.53

Link AnswersChinese companies easily circumvent Trump, start manufacturing drones in the US to keep sales high Shepardson 19 (David Shepardson, Reuters correspondent [“China's DJI plans to build drones in California amid U.S. security concern”, Reuters Business] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-china/chinas-dji-plans-to-build-drones-in-california-amid-u-s-security-concern-idUSKCN1TP2JP)//emChinese manufacturer SZ DJI Technology Co Ltd, the world’s largest producer of consumer drones, said on Monday it plans to use a company warehouse in California to assemble them, a move that follows security concerns raised by some U.S. lawmakers. DJI said it will assemble its Mavic 2 Enterprise Dual drones in Cerritos, California, after the U.S. Customs and Border Protection determines that the U.S. produced value of its drones will qualify under the U.S. Trade Agreements Act. That designation should make it easier for some U.S. government agencies to buy the drones, the company said “This new investment will expand DJI’s footprint in the U.S. so we can better serve our customers, create U.S. jobs, and strengthen the U.S. drone economy,” the company said in a statement. DJI has come under fire from some lawmakers and security experts in the United States and was criticized last week at a U.S. Senate Commerce subcommittee hearing by security researchers. Senator Rick Scott, a

Republican, asked at the hearing if Congress should outlaw the U.S. sale of Chinese-made drones. “I think we’re crazy to do business with the Chinese,” Scott said during the hearing. “We ought to be buying American products in every way we can.... They are not our friend.” Senator Ed Markey, a Democrat, said at the hearing

that Americans who own Chinese-made drones are worried about individual privacy and security concerns. “Chinese animate (drones) with their values, which are inconsistent with ours,” Markey said. On June 10, U.S. President Donald Trump said in a memo “the domestic production capability for small unmanned aerial

systems is essential to the national defense.” Harry Wingo, a faculty member at the National Defense University, told the Senate panel “the U.S. is over-reliant” on DJI, saying its market share may exceed 70% globally. “The glaring gap between U.S. and Chinese companies like DJI in the (drone) platform market should be a wake up call,” Wingo said. He suggested the issue “presents a national risk, similar to that highlighted by President Trump in calling out the risk of using 5G equipment from Huawei in U.S. telecommunications networks.” Last month, the U.S. Homeland Security Department (DHS) warned U.S. firms of the risks to company data from Chinese-made drones. On June 13, three House Republicans wrote DHS seeking more information about that alert. DJI said in May it gives “customers full and complete control over how their data is collected, stored, and transmitted.”

2020 DA – Link TurnDrone usage is popular in the US – reducing sales would hurt Trump’s re-election bidFuller 14 (Jaime, reports on national politics for "The Fix" and Post Politics and she worked previously as an associate editor at the American Prospect, 7/15, “Americans are fine with drone strikes. Everyone else in the world? Not so much.”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/07/15/americans-are-fine-with-drone-strikes-everyone-else-in-the-world-not-so-much/?utm_term=.099579842193, Aly M)

Despite plenty of debate in Congress, a majority of the American people (52 percent) remain in favor of using drones against extremists on foreign soil.On that count, though, the United States is in the distinct minority on the Planet Earth.While a slight majority in the United States approve of drone strikes, only two other countries— Kenya and Israel — approve of them. (Kenya has had success in using drones to reduce poaching by 96 percent — perhaps explaining their pro-drone posture.)Meanwhile, Israel is the world's biggest exporter of drones, and has used drones against Palestinian militants — which would explain why Palestinians only give U.S. drone strikes a 7 percent approval rating.Just about everywhere else in the world, opposition to drone strikes is sweeping. And the global distaste has only grown more resounding in the past year.Here's last year. While 11 countries back then had at least 40 percent approval of U.S drone strikes, today there are only four such countries.

Support for drones in the United States has also dropped by nine percentage points in the past year, but Americans still stand as some of the strikes' strongest supporters -- and have for awhile. In 2011, a Pew poll found that 68 percent of the public approved of drone strikes.

NEG

China Fill In DA

1NC

Uniqueness - American exports of drones are directly trading off with Chinese sales in the status quoMehta 18 - (Aaron Mehta is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners,” Trump admin rolls out new rules for weapon, drone sales abroad”, Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/04/19/trump-admin-rolls-out-new-rules-for-weapon-drone-sales-abroad)4/19/18

U.S. President Donald Trump holds up a chart of defense weapon sales during a visit by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office of the White House on March 20, 2018. (Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images) WASHINGTON ― The Trump administration has rolled out a new set of policies governing its exports of military equipment abroad, with a focus on the idea that “economic security is national security.” But the changes may fall short of what the defense industry was hoping for, particularly when it comes to the export of military drones. The new rules, rolled out April 19, create broad new language emphasizing the need to consider economic benefits when looking at potential weapon exports to partner nations. Peter Navarro, White House National Trade Council head, said this change will allow allies and partners “to more easily obtain” American security goods, which in turn improves the security of the United States while “reducing” the need for them to buy Chinese and Russian systems. “For too long we have hamstrung ourselves and limited our ability to provide our allies and partners with the defensive capabilities they require, even when in the U.S. interests,” Navarro said. Tina Kaidanow, principal deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs, said the change represents “efforts to do things a little bit more strategically. We need to do, the U.S. government, a better job of strategic advocacy for some of our companies. We need to think about those areas where we can really enable sales oversea.” Talking to reporters ahead of the announcement, both noted that there will now be a 60-day period for feedback from industry, which will help shape potential changes in the future. However, the two offered few hard details about what would change for conventional arms transfers, and Navarro declined to say what economic impact could potentially be in terms of jobs or dollar figures. But industry is excited about the possible impact. “This is a really big deal. These are issues that had typically been relegated to the second tier,” said Remy Nathan, vice president of the Aerospace Industries Association. “Credit this administration, credit [Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis] for putting partnerships in his top three priorities.” The U.S. defense industry continues to dominate on a global scale. According to numbers from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, American accounted for 34 percent of total arms exports from 2013–17, with 98 countries buying American goods. The second largest exporter in the world, Russia, accounted for 22 percent of weapon exports during that same period, with 47 countries as clients; China, the fifth-ranked exporter, represented only 5.7 percent of global exports, with 48 countries. But where the U.S. is seeing a steep rise in competition is in the unmanned vehicle sector, particularly from China, who has made inroads into the traditionally U.S. dominated Middle East with their cheaper UAVs. With today’s announcement, the U.S. has made two tweaks to how it handles drone exports. The first is opening up the opportunity for companies to sell systems via Direct Commercial Sales process, under which a company and another nation can directly negotiate, rather than requiring a more formal Foreign Military Sales process, where the U.S. government acts as a go-between. DCS sales are seen as faster than FMS sales. Secondly, the government is eliminating rules that marked unarmed systems with laser-designator technology as “strike enabling,” which put them in the same category as armed drones, and hence received higher

scrutiny. Kaidanow said the goal was to make sure “U.S. industry faces fewer barriers and less confusion when they are attempting to compete against other countries and marketing and selling those similar systems to our partners. “ A new policy could make it easier to sell "strike-enabled" unmanned systems abroad. (Airman 1st Class Emily A. Kenney/U.S. Air Force) While those changes will be welcomed by the UAV industry, it falls short of what was expected and hoped for by major producers of military drones. It had been expected that the new policy would reinterpret the “strong presumption of denial” clause in the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international arms control agreement among 35 nations that governs the export of missiles and drones, a second source explained. The current clause makes it difficult to approve the sale of category-1 drones capable of carrying 500-kilogram payloads for more than 300 kilometers. The Obama administration had set a standard of how it interprets the MTCR language that some in industry have complained is too strict, and had expected to see changed with this policy a “presumption of approval” for a specific set of allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. However, changes to the MTCR remain on the table for the long term, with Kaidanow saying: “We are looking to ensure that the MTCR keeps pace with the dynamic quality.” While she did not explain what changes to the MTCR may come, American officials in October floated a whitepaper to allies proposing that any air vehicle that flies under 650 kilometers per hour would drop to “category-2” and thus be subject to approval on a case-by-case basis, as opposed to having to follow the more strict “category-1” policies. Despite fears from nongovernmental organizations that human rights concerns would be weakened under the new policy, both Navarro and Kaidanow pushed back at the idea human rights were being weakened under the new policy, with Kaidanow saying “nothing” had changed from that regard. Navarro added that the policy continues to “require enhanced end use monitoring, directing the federal government to work with partners to reduce civilian casualties in conflict and championing principals of human rights in international law, including the law of armed conflict.”

Link - When US drone sales are restricted, China fills inDudley 18 (Dominic Dudley is a writer concerning business and politics in the Middle East; 12/17/18; “How China Is Fueling The Arms Race In Drones In The Middle East”; HYPERLINK "https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/12/17/china-fueling-drones-arms-race-middle-east/" \l "5850c05f4bb4"https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/12/17/china-fueling-drones-arms-race-middle-east/#5850c05f4bb4; accessed 7/2/19)

Armed drones have become an increasingly common sight in the skies around the Middle East in recent years, notably in the war zones of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. But rather than the most advanced Western technology being used, it is a combination of Chinese imports and home-grown alternatives that are being deployed by local armed forces. The U.S. is the global leader in terms of military drone technology but it has tough rules about which countries can buy them. That has forced Middle East governments to either develop their own or look for other potential sources – and it is China that has taken advantage. That is partly due to the relatively low price of its drones, but also its willingness to sell to any government that comes calling. Beijing’s approach to drone sales was characterized as one of “no questions asked” in a HYPERLINK "https://drones.rusi.org/"paper released by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a defence think-tank, in London on December 17. Even countries that have traditionally favored Western military equipment have been turning to Beijing, after being rebuffed by Washington. For example, when Jordan’s request to buy unarmed Predator XP drones from the U.S. was turned down in 2015 it looked east, buying two CH-4Bs drones from China Aerospace Science & Technology

Corporation (CASC) the following year. Similar episodes have played out in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey. When Iraq was refused permission to buy MQ-1 or MQ-9 drones from the U.S. it invested in at least three CH-4Bs from China. It has since used them on several hundred missions against Islamic State forces. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also both bought Chinese drones. According to RUSI, in 2014 Saudi Arabia bought two CH-4s from CASC and five larger and deadlier Wing Loong IIs manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG). Riyadh has used its drones in Yemen, with some of them stationed at the Sharurah and Jizan airbases near the border. However, most drone strikes in Yemen are thought to have been carried out by the U.S. or the UAE. Some of these drones have been lost in the conflict. A CH-4 crashed in Yemen in August 2018 and another drone was lost the following month – although it is not clear if they were Saudi or UAE aircraft. The UAE’s drone fleet includes Wing Loongs and Wing Loong IIs from CAIG, which Abu Dhabi started to buy after the U.S. refused to supply American-made armed drones. As well as Yemen, the UAE appears to have HYPERLINK "https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/covert-emirati-support-gave-east-libyan-air-power-key-boost-u-n-report-idUSKBN1902K0"deployed its armed drones in Libya in support for Khalifa Haftar’s forces and in breach of the international arms embargo on the country, according to a UN Panel of Experts report. When Turkey was denied access to armed MQ-1 Predator drones from the U.S. in 2008, they first turned to Israel and bought unarmed Heron TPs. But in more recent years, Ankara has been pushing the development of a domestic drone industry. So far Turkey has developed two armed drones: the Anka-S from Turkish Aerospace Industries and the Bayraktar TB2 made by Kale-Bayker. A third model, the Karayel, developed by Vestel Defence Industry is thought to be in the testing phase. The Bayraktar TB2 has been used for strikes against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey as well as in Kurdish areas of neighboring Syria. A number of other countries have been developing their own drone manufacturing capability and here too China is at times playing a role. In 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a HYPERLINK "https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2017-04-12/saudi-arabia-buying-and-building-chinese-armed-drones"licensing deal with CASC to manufacture its drones in the kingdom. The largest regional operator of drones is Israel. Most of the time it uses the unmanned aircraft for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. However, it has at least three types of armed drone which have been used to conduct strikes in Gaza and possibly in Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan and Syria too. They are the Heron TP made by Israel Aerospace Industries, and the Hermes 450 and the Hermes 900, both made by Elbit Systems. Israel is also the most active exporter from the region, having delivered 165 drones to customers over the past three decades, according to RUSI. However, with the exception of those sales to Turkey, all have gone outside the region. Another country which has developed significant capabilities in drone manufacturing is Iran, which has had to do so while being largely cut off from international suppliers. As well as a number of unarmed drones, there are two Iranian-made armed UAVs: the Shahed-129, built by Shahed Aviation Industries, and the more recently unveiled Mohajer 6, produced by Ghods UAV Industries. The design of the Shahed-129 closely resembles Israel’s Hermes 450, which suggests Iran may have had access to that aircraft, possibly reverse engineering one that was lost on a covert mission. For Iran, drones fit in well with its doctrine of asymmetric warfare, which it has developed to compensate for the limited abilities of its conventional forces compared to those of its opponents. In terms of overall numbers, drones still make up only a small element of the Middle East countries’ arsenals. According to RUSI, the seven countries covered by its report have built between 128 and 174 drones and have imported an estimated 23 drones from China. However, in the future they are likely to become a more significant tool for both surveillance and conducting strikes. One indication of the potential scale of operations in the future is the fact that Saudi

Arabia has a deal to buy 300 Wing Loong drones from CAIG. “The proliferation is likely to continue,” said Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, a research fellow at RUSI and co-author of its report. As drones become more common, developing defenses to tackle them will also become more important. A delegation of UAE officials visited French and Finnish companies that manufacture anti-drone systems during the summer. HYPERLINK "https://archive.crossborderinformation.com/Article/UAE%2fRegion+Ukraine+taps+new+Gulf+markets.aspx?date=20170908&docNo=16&qid=2&page=2"Ukrainian companies have also been eyeing up the potential to sell anti-drone technology to the region. And in June, Australia’s DroneShield reported that an unnamed Middle East country had placed a $3.2m order for 70 of its droneguns, which are designed to disable hostile drones, with further orders “in the pipeline.” With the market shifting away from it, the U.S. has shown signs of changing its approach and relaxing its rules. In April, the State Department unveiled a HYPERLINK "https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280619.htm"new policy on the export of unmanned aerial systems which it said would remove barriers to the global market “and avoid ceding export opportunities to competitors where such self-imposed restrictions are unwarranted.” To date, however, that hasn’t led to any reported sales to the Middle East. If they are able to switch suppliers and buy American in the future, it is likely that many Middle East governments will do so. At the moment, Western countries including the U.S. and U.K. do not allow their systems to be integrated with Chinese technology, including its drones. That undermines the Chinese drones’ utility to the likes of the UAE and Saudi Arabia which have air forces based around Western aircraft. While governments continue to build up their capabilities, the greatest use of drones in and around the region to date has been by outside forces. In particular, the U.S. has used them widely in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia for many years. According to one HYPERLINK "https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-ramped-up-drone-strikes-in-americas-shadow-wars"recent report, President Donald Trump’s administration launched 238 drone strikes in these three countries in 2017 and 2018.

Internal Link - Chinese drone sales help give them influence in the Middle East instead of the US – fueling civilian casualties and instabilityShih 18 (Gerry Shih, The Associated Press, 10-3-2018, Gerry Shih is the Washington Post China correspondent based in Beijing. He previously covered China as Beijing correspondent for The Associated Press. Before that, Shih was based in San Francisco, where he wrote about Silicon Valley and California. "Chinese armed drones now flying over Mideast battlefields. Here’s why they’re gaining on US drones," Military Times, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/10/03/chinese-armed-drones-now-flying-over-mideast-battlefields-heres-why-theyre-gaining-on-us-drones/)jtb

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — High above Yemen’s rebel-held city of Hodeida, a drone controlled by Emirati forces hovered as an SUV carrying a top Shiite Houthi rebel official turned onto a small street and stopped, waiting for another vehicle in its convoy to catch up. Seconds later, the SUV exploded in flames, killing Saleh al-Samad, a top political figure. The drone that fired that missile in April was not one of the many American aircraft that have been buzzing across the skies of Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan since Sept. 11, 2001. It was Chinese. Across the Middle East, countries locked out of purchasing U.S.-made drones due to rules over excessive civilian casualties are being wooed by Chinese arms dealers, who are world's main distributor of armed drones. "The Chinese product now doesn't lack technology, it only lacks market share," said Song Zhongping, a Chinese military analyst and former lecturer at the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force University of Engineering. "And the United States restricting its arms exports is precisely what gives China a great opportunity." The sales are helping expand Chinese influence across a region vital to American security interests. "It's a hedging strategy and the Chinese

will look to benefit from that," said Douglas Barrie, an airpower specialist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "I think the Chinese are far less liable to be swayed by concerns over civilian casualties," he said.

Impact - China fill-in collapses US heg causing global instability and violenceHaass 17 Richard Haass (President of the Council on Foreign Relations). “Who Will Fill America’s Shoes?” Project Syndicate. June 21st, 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-leadership-successor-to-america-by-richard-n--haass-2017-06

Still, a shift away from a US-dominated world of structured relationships and standing institutions and toward something else is under way. What this alternative will be, however, remains largely unknowable. What we do know is that there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what had been the US role. China is a frequently mentioned candidate, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high economic-growth rates to stave off popular unrest. China’s interest in regional and global institutions seems designed mostly to bolster its economy and geopolitical influence, rather than to help set rules and create broadly beneficial arrangements. Likewise, Russia is a country with a narrowly-based economy led by a government focused on retaining power at home and re-establishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe. India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan. Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic political and economic constraints, and its neighbors’ suspicions. Europe, for its part, is distracted by questions surrounding the relationship between member states and the European Union. As a result, the whole of the continent is less than the sum of its parts – none of which is large enough to succeed America on the world stage. But the absence of a single successor to the US does not mean that what awaits is chaos. At least in principle, the world’s most powerful countries could come together to fill America’s shoes. In practice, though, this will not happen, as these countries lack the capabilities, experience, and, above all, a consensus on what needs doing and who needs to do it. A more likely development is the emergence of a mix of order and disorder at both the regional and global level. China will promote various trade, infrastructure, and security mechanisms in Asia. The 11 remaining members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership may launch their trade pact without the US. Less clear is whether China is prepared to use its influence to restrain North Korea, how India and Pakistan will avoid conflict, and the resolution of Asia’s many territorial disputes. It is all too easy to imagine an Asian and Pacific future characterized by higher spending on arms of all types – and thus more susceptible to violent conflict. The Middle East is already suffering unprecedented instability, the result of local rivalries and realities, and of 15 years during which the US arguably first did too much and then too little to shape the region’s future. The immediate danger is not just further deterioration in failed states such as Yemen, Syria, and Libya, but also direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

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Countries abandoning Chinese drones for American products

Axe 19 (David Axe, Defense Editor of the National Interest [“One Nation Is Selling Off It’s Chinese Combat Drones”, The National Interest] HYPERLINK "https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/one-nation-selling-its-chinese-combat-drones-61092?fbclid=IwAR3y_mSa3zRLd7F5N_HRl3lq-5ygZ-U-Z3mlpP-eYGjaoLng5iLwkfo77WE"https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/one-nation-selling-its-chinese-combat-drones-61092?fbclid=IwAR3y_mSa3zRLd7F5N_HRl3lq-5ygZ-U-Z3mlpP-eYGjaoLng5iLwkfo77WE) //emThe Jordanian air force has put up for sale six Chinese-made CH-4B drones. It’s unclear why Amman is trying to get rid of its CH-4s just three years after acquiring them. But it’s possible the divestment is related to Jordan’s ongoing efforts to source Predator-style drones from the United States. “The general command of the Jordanian armed forces ... announces its desire to sell the following aircraft,” the defense ministry in Amman stated on June 3, 2019. The for-sale list includes four CASA transports, an old C-130B cargo plane, 12 Hawk 63 training jets, six MD530 helicopters and six CH-4s. Jordan bought the missile-armed CH-4s, which are broadly similar to General Atomics’ early-model Predators around 2016 after the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama rejected Amman’s request for MQ-1 Predators. General Atomics also makes the larger MQ-9 Reaper drone. The Jordanian air force’s No. 9 Squadron operated the Chinese-made drones. The same unit operates the air force’s other unmanned aerial vehicle, including Schiebel S-100 Camcopters and Leonardo Falcos. It wasn’t until May 2018 that the Jordanian air force displayed a CH-4 in public. “Marketed by Aerospace Long-March International Trade, the CH-4B has found a good market here in the Middle East, in part due to the reluctance of U.S. authorities to sell armed UAVs to their allies in the region,” Al-Monitor reported. “Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq have all acquired the CH-4B armed version, and the type has been employed widely on operations in Yemen and against Daesh targets in Iraq.” But Jordan never gave up trying to get permission to buy American drones, which are widely considered as having better sensors, weapons and communications links than the Chinese drones do. Amman perhaps believes Pres. Donald Trump is more open to approving drone sales to Middle East customers, not only for the military benefit but also as a way of commercially competing with China.

American drone sales are directly used to deter Chinese activityStone 19 (A professional policy and news writer,” U.S. to sell 34 surveillance drones to allies in South China Sea region,Reuters, HYPERLINK "https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-drones/u-s-to-sell-34-surveillance-drones-to-allies-in-south-china-sea-region-idUSKCN1T42ST)4/3/19"https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-drones/u-s-to-sell-34-surveillance-drones-to-allies-in-south-china-sea-region-idUSKCN1T42ST)4/3/19

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Trump administration has moved ahead with a surveillance drone sale to four U.S. allies in the South China Sea region as acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said Washington will no longer “tiptoe” around Chinese behavior in Asia. A ScanEagle drone is shown during an Insitu customer event in Mazagon, Spain May 15, 2018, Courtesy Insitu/Handout via REUTERS The drones would afford greater intelligence gathering capabilities potentially curbing Chinese activity in the region. Shanahan did not directly name China when making accusations of “actors” destabilizing the region in a speech at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday but went on to say the United States would not ignore Chinese behavior. The Pentagon announced on Friday it would sell 34 ScanEagle drones, made by Boeing Co. to the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam for a total of $47 million. China claims almost all of the strategic South China Sea and

frequently lambastes the United States and its allies over naval operations near Chinese-occupied islands. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have competing claims. The Pentagon said Friday’s sales included spare and repair parts, support equipment, tools, training and technical services and work on the equipment was expected to be completed by March 2022. As many as 12 unarmed drones and equipment would go to Malaysia for about $19 million. Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country would buy eight drones, the Philippines eight, and Vietnam six. In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration rolled out a long-awaited overhaul of U.S. arms export policy aimed at expanding sales to allies, saying it would bolster the American defense industry and create jobs at home. That initiative eased rules for exporting some types of lethal as well as non-lethal U.S.-made drones to potentially dozens more allies and partners. There is no armed version of the ScanEagle, but Insitu, the division of Boeing that makes the drone, also makes the RQ-21A Blackjack which is an optionally armed drone used by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

Countries abandoning Chinese drones for American productsAxe 19 (David Axe, Defense Editor of the National Interest [“One Nation Is Selling Off It’s Chinese Combat Drones”, The National Interest] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/one-nation-selling-its-chinese-combat-drones-61092?fbclid=IwAR3y_mSa3zRLd7F5N_HRl3lq-5ygZ-U-Z3mlpP-eYGjaoLng5iLwkfo77WE)//emThe Jordanian air force has put up for sale six Chinese-made CH-4B drones . It’s unclear why

Amman is trying to get rid of its CH-4s just three years after acquiring them. But it’s possible the divestment is related to Jordan’s ongoing efforts to source Predator-style drones from the United States. “The general command of the Jordanian armed forces ... announces its desire to sell the following aircraft,” the defense ministry in

Amman stated on June 3, 2019. The for-sale list includes four CASA transports, an old C-130B cargo plane, 12 Hawk 63 training jets, six MD530

helicopters and six CH-4s. Jordan bought the missile-armed CH-4s, which are broadly similar to General Atomics’ early-model Predators around 2016 after the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama rejected Amman’s request for MQ-1 Predators. General Atomics also makes the larger MQ-9 Reaper drone. The Jordanian air force’s No. 9 Squadron operated the Chinese-made drones. The same unit operates the air force’s other unmanned aerial vehicle, including Schiebel S-100 Camcopters and Leonardo Falcos. It wasn’t until May 2018 that the Jordanian air force displayed a CH-4 in public. “Marketed by Aerospace Long-March International Trade, the CH-4B has found a good market here in the Middle East, in part due to the reluctance of U.S. authorities to sell armed UAVs to their allies in the region,” Al-Monitor reported. “Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq have all acquired the CH-4B armed version, and the type has been employed widely on operations in Yemen

and against Daesh targets in Iraq.” But Jordan never gave up trying to get permission to buy American drones, which are widely considered as having better sensors, weapons and communications links than the Chinese drones do. Amman perhaps believes Pres. Donald Trump is more open to approving drone sales to Middle East customers, not only for the military benefit but also as a way of commercially competing with China.

Links

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US export rules deter competition with Chinese dronesPomerleau 1/15 (Mark Pomerleau is a reporter for C4ISRNET and Fifth Domain; 1/15/19; “Who is China targeting with its armed drones sales?”; HYPERLINK "https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2019/01/15/who-is-china-targeting-with-its-armed-drones-sales/"https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2019/01/15/who-is-china-targeting-with-its-armed-drones-sales/; accessed 7/2/19)

China is cashing in on the demand for armed drones, according to a new Department of Defense report. China was the fifth largest arms supplier in the world between 2012 and 2016, the report, titled “Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access,” said. The Chinese completed more than $20 million in sales with the country’s second largest arms sales going to the Middle East and North Africa “likely due to the demand for armed” unmanned aerial vehicles. The HYPERLINK "https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/14/2002079292/-1/-1/1/EXPANDING-GLOBAL-ACCESS-REPORT-FINAL.PDF"report, dated December 2018 but made available Jan. 14, is mandated by law. The report notes that the drone and armed drone market is a niche market but China is one of the world’s few suppliers. In large part to China’s apparent willingness to export such technology to other nations, the number of nations across the globe with armed drones has grown significantly in recent years. The United States was the first nation to use this technology in combat zones. However, the United States has historically been limited in sharing its technology with other nations and partners due to export rules, much to the frustration of friendly nations, though the Trump administration HYPERLINK "https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/04/19/trump-admin-rolls-out-new-rules-for-weapon-drone-sales-abroad/"has sought to change that. The United States has allies and partners who want to buy MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones, so they go to the Russians, the Chinese, the Israelis, the French — all whom are more than willing to sell their technology to others, he said. So the United States ends up with an ally that has systems that are not interoperable with U.S. systems, noting “that’s a problem.” As a result, China faces little competition to sell these systems given most nations that produce armed drones are restricted from selling the technology as signatories of the Missile Technology Control Regime and/or the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the DoD report notes. DoD’s report notes, however, that Chinese arms are lower quality and less reliable than those offered by top international arms suppliers. “Most of China’s customers are developing countries that prefer less expensive Chinese arms,” the report states. “These arms generally come with few end-use restrictions, which is attractive to customers who may not have access to other arms sources for political or economic reasons.” For example, China’s ability to remain one of the top five nations in global arms sales hinges on continued strong sales to Pakistan and demand for their armed drones, the report says. The report points out key developments for China recently include sales of armed drones to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

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Link: When countries can’t buy drones from the U.S., China fills in fueling Middle East violence and drone prolifZhao 18 (Liu Zhen, reporter on China for the South China Morning Post, 12/18/18, “China fills gap left by US in Middle East military drone market, British think tank says,” HYPERLINK "https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2178584/china-fills-gap-left-us-middle-east-military-drone-market"https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2178584/china-fills-gap-left-us-middle-east-military-drone-market, accessed 7/2/19)

China plays a significant role in the supply of military drones to Middle East countries, especially those that are barred from importing them from the United States, a British think tank has said. The Royal United Services Institute said in a report that China has filled a void left by the US, which has become more selective about exporting armed drones and related technologies to the region. “China has often been described as a no-questions-asked exporter of drones, has played and is likely to continue playing a key role as a supplier of armed UAVs to the Middle East,” the report said. The only two rules Beijing follows are dealing only with state actors and prioritising usage for counterterrorism purposes, it said. China has sold advanced armed drones to several Middle Eastern countries, including Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the grounds they will be used to combat terrorism, the report said. Beijing has stated on more than one occasion that it does not take sides on conflicts in the region. All countries are therefore potential clients. China is not a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international treaty signed in 1987 that seeks to control the sale of weapons such as missiles and armed unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, it restricts the sale of missiles and related technologies that are capable of carrying a 500kg (1,100lb) payload for 300km (186 miles) or more. China applied to join the treaty in 2004 but was rejected. It has since pledged to voluntarily abide by its rules. But military experts have said that some armed drones fall into a grey area under the agreement. For example, the CH-4B Rainbow, a UAV manufactured by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp, has a range of just 150km if controlled from the ground but more than 1,000km if fitted with a satellite guidance function. It is not known if the company has ever sold Rainbow drones with the enhanced capability to any of its clients. While US drones are generally regarded as technologically superior to their Chinese counterparts, buyers in the Middle East often do not have the option to buy the former and the latter are significantly cheaper. Iraq, for instance, bought at least four Rainbow drones from China in 2015 after failing to complete a deal on US-made MQ-1 Predator models. According to reports by the Iraqi air force, as of the second half of this year the drones had been used to carry out more than 260 strikes against Islamic State. Similarly, the UAE bought two different models of the Wing Loong drone manufactured by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group after it too failed to finalise a deal on Predators. The think tank’s report said China has also offered to help countries, including Saudi Arabia, to manufacture their own drones. “Proliferation in armed UAVs in the Middle East is unlikely to stop and could even accelerate, either through domestic production or reliance on external suppliers, such as Beijing,” the report said.

Link: Saudi Arabia and the UAE will go back to China if the U.S. cuts off salesBrimelow 17 (Ben Brimelow, intern for Business Insider's Military and Defense unit, 11/16/17, “Chinese drones may soon swarm the market — and that could be very bad for the US,” HYPERLINK "https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-drones-swarm-market-2017-11"https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-drones-swarm-market-2017-11, accessed 7/2/19)

China showed off some of its latest drone models and projects at this year's Dubai Airshow and it looks like many spectators were interested. China has seen a dramatic increase in the amount of drones it has sold to foreign countries in recent years, and that could be a troubling development for the United States. The global military drone market has been dominated by the US. American-made models like the MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk have been deployed around the world in a number of countries. In large part, China poses a threat to America's dominance in the drone industry for its ability to make more products that are, at the very least, just as good if not better than the competition, but at a lower price. China is building impressive and inexpensive drones The most well-known and used Chinese drones are the CH-3, CH-4, CH-5, and the Wing Loong. The CH-3 and CH-4 propeller-driven drones are essentially Chinese versions of the Predator and Reaper, respectively, and have similar capabilities. The CH-5 has a current range of 4400 miles over 60 hours, and a planned upgrade that will bring it up to 12,000 miles over 120 hours. The CH-5 also has a 2,000 pound payload, and the capability to house electronic warfare systems inside it. The CH-3 and CH-4 have price tags around $4 million, whereas the Predator and Reaper can cost $4 million and $20 million respectively. The Wing Loong, another Chinese counterpart to the Predator, is priced even lower, at just $1 million. Even the CH-5, which is currently China's deadliest drone in service, costs " less than half the price" of a Predator. The prices are so low in part because the Chinese drones are not as sophisticated as their American counterparts. The Chinese drones are not satellite-linked, for example, meaning they cannot conduct operations across the globe the way Predators and Reapers can. The Chinese drones are still very capable — all are sold with the ability to carry large amounts of ordinance, and many nations have decided to turn to them in order to fill in the gap left by the US. The US has restrictive regulations and policies Lower prices, however, may not the only reason behind China's increased drone sales. A large part of China's increased market share looks is linked to regulations and policies that have been in place in the Unites States for years. In 1987, the US signed the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary pact of 35 nations aimed at preventing the mass proliferation of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles by requiring them to have heavy regulations and tight export controls. Currently, under the agreement, drones that can fly over 185 miles and carry a payload above 1,100 pounds are defined as cruise missiles. The Predator and the Reaper, both of which can carry payloads of 3,000 pounds or more, are thus subject to these regulations and controls. The US has been hesitant to sell drones with lethal capabilities to other countries — especially in the Middle East, because of a fear that they could potentially end up in the wrong hands, and challenge Israel's dominance in the region. In fact, the only nation apart from the US that uses armed American-made drones is the United Kingdom. China, on the other hand, is not constrained by the Missile Technology Control Regime because it never signed it. This means that its products are not under the intense regulation and controls that American drones are. Additionally, China has traditionally not been as cautious as the the US about selling weaponry and equipment to countries known for human rights violations or in volatile regions and has sold drones to many nations. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have purchased a number of Wing Loongs, and Turkmenistan operates the CH-3. In Africa, Nigeria has used CH-3 drones against Boko Haram. Pakistan and Myanmar both operate CH-3's as well. By far though, the biggest market is the Middle East. In 2015, desperate in its fight to counter ISIS gains, Iraq bought a number of CH-4s. After giving up on buying drones from the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE turned to China and are using CH-4s and Wing Loongs in their campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen. Jordan and Egypt have purchased Chinese drones as well. China is even willing to set up factories overseas, which could bypass export restrictions entirely. China's future drone projects are even more impressive Last year, at the Zhuhai 2016 Airshow,

the public was able to get a glance at some of the newest drones China plans to build and export. Among those was the Cloud Shadow, a semi-stealth drone with six hardpoints capable of carrying up to 800 pounds of ordinance. There was also the CH-805, and concept CK-20 stealth target drones, which are designed to help train pilots and test air defenses. Finally, there was the SW-6, a small "marsupial" drone with folding wings capable of being dropped from larger aircraft. Its intended mission is to conduct reconnaissance, but it is considered a prime candidate for China's drone "swarm" project; dozens, potentially hundreds of small drones linked together in a hive mind and capable of swarming and overwhelming targets. China has also just successfully shattered the record for the highest flying drone. Previously held by the US RQ-4 Global Hawk, the bat-sized drone was able to fly at a staggering 82,000 feet- 22,000 feet higher than the Global Hawk. Though the drone did not have a camera or any weapons, it did carry a terrain mapping device and a detector that would allow it to locate and mark ground troops, and was virtually undetectable. In addition to all this, China is also looking to increase its satellite capabilities, something that could make China's drones just as advanced as their US counterparts. In an attempt to combat the loss in sales, the Trump administration, which has not been subtle in its hopes to get foreign countries to buy more American-made defense products, is trying to ease restrictions on the sale of American-made drones. This includes things like renegotiating the Missile Technology Control Regime, and allowing a number of countries that are not deemed risky to be able to get fast tracked orders. Though probably interpreted as a way to help the defense industry make more profits, there is actually some logic behind the push. The more China sells drones to countries that are US partners, the more they will become reliant and closer on China. "It damages the US relationship with a close partner," Paul Scharre, a Senior Fellow and Director at the nonpartisan Center for a New American Security told the Wall Street Journal. "It increases that partner's relationship with a competitor nation, China. It hurts US companies trying to compete." For now, Israel dominates the military drone market, with 60% of international drone transfers in the past three decades coming from the small nation. However, China sells far more armed drones, and is gaining momentum on overall drone sales as well. If current trends continue, China could profit immensely in a market that could be worth $22 billion by 2022.

2NC L – Turns Drone Prolif

China will fill-in if the US limits its sales - results in drone proliferationPaulsson 18 (Henrik Paulsson is a researcher with the Military Transformations Program at RSIS in Singapore; 11/10/18; “Explaining the Proliferation of China’s Drones”; HYPERLINK "https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/explaining-the-proliferation-of-chinas-drones/"https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/explaining-the-proliferation-of-chinas-drones/; accessed 7/2/19)

China’s overt offshore military presence has grown in recent years. These activities vary, ranging from operating the first Chinese overseas military facility in Djibouti to conducting patrols in the Indian Ocean. However, China has long used its extensive arms industry as a way to gain footholds – even if just through minor links. Their sales of drones are a clear example of this. Most armed drones today are built by the United States, China, and Israel. The United States mostly sells to NATO allies, increasing the interoperability and common supply chains within the alliance. U.S. sales to India are an attempt at supplanting Russia’s influence – part of the larger U.S. focus on Asia, including countering China. Israeli provision of drones to India are part of a larger defense cooperation between the two, while their exports to Azerbaijan provides a presence just north of the largest regional rival, Iran. Chinese armed drones have been operated or ordered by 17 countries. While visually similar to the U.S. and Israeli drones, China’s are cheaper and less advanced – all the while quite operational. What is curious is to whom the Chinese are selling to, and their relation to wider policies and strategic choices. The buyers are widely dispersed; China has an interest in building links with these countries because of geographic position, economic conditions, or political situation. Most already have Chinese investments, loans, and other weaponry. Many of the countries importing Chinese drones lie along the path of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Pakistan and Myanmar have long-standing ties with China, and both are now flying Chinese armed drones, with Pakistan even producing a licensed version of the Wing Loong II model. Further inland, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have all received armed drones from China. All five of these countries are critical for the BRI to function and have seen increasing Chinese investments and connections over recent years – including significant military investments in addition to the drones. Chinese interests extend also into Africa. Egypt, Algeria, and the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia all have roles to play in the continued viability of maritime trade from China to Europe. Zambia has large Chinese investments in their mining regions, while Nigeria has oil and importantly lies on the Gulf of Guinea. These African and the above mentioned Asian states are positioned along vital trade routes, giving China a distinct interest in building relationships and providing tools to help secure trade. The combination of both trade and investments provides ample excuse to provide drones in addition to other weaponry – all with increased ties to the Chinese military and defense industry. In the Middle East, China is more opportunistic in selling their armed drones, supplying them to countries that cannot get drones from Israel or the United States for economic or political reasons. While the Israeli constraint is obvious, Iraq and Jordan are both hindered by the high cost of U.S. drones – instead opting for Chinese versions for their fight against the Islamic State. Politically, the Saudi- and Emirati-led campaign in Yemen is more problematic, where they are accused of war crimes utilizing Chinese drones. The lessening influence of the United States in the Persian Gulf also provides inroads for China to replace Washington, with their drones being a useful tool in this endeavor. No matter the location, all of the operators get pulled toward China. The sale of drones causes an increasing dependence on Chinese materiel – such as spare parts and missiles – to operate in the first place. The drones also create a necessity to maintain defense ties with China for training and operations. These are, after all, quite advanced and complicated machines. In their armed drones, China has found a way to increase their

influence and expand their presence with any country that that the United States and Israel will not – or cannot – sell to. Fully aware that the drones are pulling them toward China, why would other states choose to receive them? Simply put, most of the countries discussed above either need or want the capability that operating drones can bring. This stretches from the more basic, like conducting long-range surveillance patrols, to the more infamous, in the form of armed strike missions. Many of these countries are also engaged in murky conflicts and accused of abuses. China’s willingness to supply armed drones and countries’ demand for them provides a win-win situation: China gets a foothold, while the receiving end gets their weaponry. Especially when the United States and Israel are unable to supply their drones, why would a country in a conflict willingly abstain from improving their capability? Most modern manned aircraft have significant costs involved in procurement, maintenance, and use. Training a pilot can cost millions of dollars — an investment that does not necessarily disappear with unmanned aircraft. It does, however, lower the risk of losing the aviator. For countries with poor maintenance standards and a history of unfortunate mishaps, this is a salient point. Combined with the advanced age of their existing air forces, the cost of operating traditional planes in the first place can be insurmountable. Chinese drones offer a similar, albeit lower, capability to manned aircraft and at a cheaper price. China’s proliferation of armed drones benefits their strategic vision, protecting their investments and interests, and provides a foothold. Meanwhile countries are willing to accept increased links with China in exchange for a new capability and tool for combating threats. This willingness is only magnified by economic and political isolation from other options. The capability gap exists and will not disappear – and China will be there to fill it with their armed drones.

Internal Links

2NC I/L – Heg

If China dominates the drone market, drones get used by adversaries to hurt US military operationsMcLeary 18 (Paul McLeary, reporter for Breaking Defense, 6/15/18, “China’s Eating Up US Drone Market; U.S. Troops At Risk” HYPERLINK "https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/chinas-eating-up-us-drone-market-u-s-troops-at-risk/,"https://breakingdefense.com/2018/06/chinas-eating-up-us-drone-market-u-s-troops-at-risk/, accessed 7/2/19)

U.S. forces are at increasing risk as China and other nations sell more armed drones to anyone with the money to pay for them, and restrictive U.S. export policies may be making the situation worse, says a new report delivered to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The RAND Corp. report says that drones produced by unfriendly nations will pose a “growing threat to U.S. and allied military operations,” in the near future, as China, Russia, and Iran recognize the power of unmanned platforms, making it certain that in future conflicts, “U.S. forces will have to cope with adversaries equipped with different types and sizes of UAVs, both armed and unarmed.” In some ways, the future is now. In 2017, Iranian-made drones dropped small munitions near U.S. forces in Syria, forcing American aircraft to knock them out of the sky. Iranian drones have also buzzed American warships in the Persian Gulf, and Iranian-made unmanned suicide boats have targeted Saudi warships off the coast of Yemen. American export restrictions on the sale of large long-range drones have allowed China and Iran to step in and fill the gap left open by US policies. Beijing has really stepped up its efforts to capture the market in ISR and strike drones, making plans to build a drone production facility in Saudi Arabia, and actively courting countries spurned by the American restrictions. Exports of American-made drones have primarily been restricted to the handful of allies who have signed the Missile Technology Control Regime, a consortium of 35 nations that sets limits based on range and payload. At issue are Category I drones, which can carry a payload of 500 kilograms for more than 300 kilometers. Under the MTCR, these systems are subject to a “strong presumption of denial” for transfer. But changes being proposed by Washington seek to open new categories of drones available for sale in part by focusing on speed instead of range— allowing drones that can fly less than 650 kilometers per hour to be capable of being shipped to international partners. U.S. partners such as Jordan, the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia — all denied requests to purchase drones from the United States — have turned to China, which is not an MTCR member. Chinese CH-4 medium range drones are already stationed at the Saudi’s Jirzan Regional airport, not far from where UAE-operated Predator drones operate from the same air base. Egypt has also purchased the system, along with the Medium-Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Wing Loong drone. The UAE has also taken to selling drones to Russia and offering them to other countries. Overall, China has sold advanced drones to at least nine nations. China has signed an agreement to establish a UAV manufacturing plant in Saudi Arabia to produce up to 300 new drones — some of them Category I. China and the UAE are not only marketing their own drones, but also offering to build factories for co-production. Even MTCR member states appear to be edging away from the protocol, with Germany codeveloping a unmanned system with Qatar, and Italy making plans to export a long-range system to the UAE. The Trump administration has been loosening controls on U.S. exports of advanced drones, allowing General Atomics sell some advanced drones to India, and lifting some other restrictions on arms transfers overall this spring. The White House has for months been circulating what it calls its Arms Transfer Initiative, which would further slash red tape in military sales to allies, speeding up the process and making more weapons more readily available for export. The Rand report concluded that while the MTCR has been effective in limiting the proliferation of large drones, “the availability of these vehicles

from non-MTCR nations has significantly eroded the MTCR’s efficacy to limit the proliferation of large UAVs,” while also hurting U.S. drone makers who are restricted in who they can sell to. Ellen Lord, head of Pentagon acquisition, told reporters at a special operations conference in Florida last month that she wants to “promote allied readiness by enhancing military capacity through targeting improvements in foreign military sales.” The glacial pace of the U.S. government in approving sales means that some allies look elsewhere, telling American officials that “we’re going to go with the Russian alternative, we’re going to go with the Chinese alternative because we know we can get it quickly,” Lord said. “We know that it might fail 80 to 90 percent of the time, but we will have something. That’s a missed opportunity for the U.S. and we’re going to make sure we do everything possible to improve upon that.”

2NC I/L – China Soft Power

Drone sales are vital to China’s “soft power” strategyHan and Rossi 18 (Aisha Han, an intern at the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council, and Rachel Rossi, an intern at the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council, 8/10/18, “What are the Implications of Expanded Chinese Investment in the MENA Region?” HYPERLINK "https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-are-the-implications-of-expanded-chinese-investment-in-the-mena-region"https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-are-the-implications-of-expanded-chinese-investment-in-the-mena-region, accessed 7/3/19)

China’s overall strategy to increase its role in world affairs indicates further engagement in its global investments in Asia, Africa, and beyond. It holds the most foreign reserve assets in Asia and is the largest trading partner in Africa. However, China is also continuing to diversify its portfolio by adding investments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Although these investments are significantly smaller, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the MENA region is growing rapidly. Since 2010, China invested billions of dollars in nearly every MENA country and in 2016 eclipsed the United Arab Emirates to become the leading investor in the region. China’s surge in investment is underpinned by the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt. The CASCF is a formal dialogue initiative that promotes various types of cooperation, including economic and trade exchanges. The BRI is a major trade and infrastructure project that links some seventy one countries—with high-speed railroads, gas and oil pipelines, and motorways—to promote and facilitate global trade. It includes several proposals to stimulate cooperation between China and MENA countries. Within the BRI, the China-Central-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCAWAEC) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) offer the most direct routes for China-MENA trade. In many ways, China’s interest in the MENA region is purely economic in nature: the region plays an important role in the BRI, and China relies on energy resources from the Middle East. As the world’s most populous country with the second largest economy, China has enormous energy demands; China's National Bureau of Statistics reported that China’s energy consumption totaled 4.48 billion metric tons in 2017, more than every European Union country combined. China is the world’s top crude oil importer, and much of its crude oil comes from the Middle East. In 2018, Saudi Arabia was the second largest supplier of crude oil to China, and Iraq was the third largest supplier. China’s interest in the MENA region is also driven by the belief that economic development can contribute to mitigating certain security problems. The region’s economic performance is severely impacted by terrorist attacks carried out by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) in countries like Libya, Iraq, and Syria, as well as long and violent wars like the ongoing Syrian and Yemeni conflicts. The region is also plagued by the misuse of government wealth by corrupt and ineffective leaders. For example, Iraq has experienced widespread unrest over poor public services and job prospects, exacerbated by graft. China sees similar security problems within its own borders. Terrorist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) continue to grow in size, and there is a persistent widening of socioeconomic rifts along ethnic lines. In response, China not only increased security personnel in the province, but also enacted economic practices meant to bolster lower-income regions and stimulate economic growth. These efforts are meant to mitigate violent uprisings from aggrieved populations. China’s foreign investment strategies reflect its domestic policies. When Western powers lifted sanctions on Iran in 2016 after the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), President Xi strengthened diplomatic ties with Iran’s leaders and promised to increase bilateral trade to $600 billion over the next ten years. It is unclear how the US withdrawal from the

JCPOA in May and reinstatement of sanctions on Iran on August 6 will affect this investment. Additionally, despite the ongoing Syrian civil war, China is maintaining its investments in Syria, but at a fraction of its investment across the region. China became a 35 percent stakeholder in Syria Shell Petroleum Development (SSPD) in 2010; which is a subsidiary run in Syria and operated by Shell. SSPD held a 31 percent stake in al-Furat Petroleum Company, and operated three production licenses in one of Syria’s biggest oil conglomerates; until it was sanctioned by the European Union in December 2011. It is set to potentially invest in Syria’s reconstruction, renewable energy, and healthcare. According to Qin Yong, the Vice President of the China-Arab Exchange Association, Chinese companies are eyeing projects to rebuild Syrian infrastructure and industry across the country. More recently, China opened a new chapter in Sino-Arab relations by pledging $23 billion in loans and financial aid to MENA countries. Loans totaling $20 billion aim to facilitate economic and industrial reconstruction in the Middle East, as well as cooperation on oil, gas, and nuclear energy. China will set up a consortium of Chinese and Arab banks, with a dedicated fund of $3 billion. Finally, China is expected to give an additional $15 million to Palestinians for economic development and $90 million in aid to Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon. China has not provided details on when or how the money will be dispersed, and the overall relationship between the consortium, loan package, and financial aid is also unclear. By 2020, China aims to reach a $600 billion trade aggregate with the Middle East. Undoubtedly, this will be a boon to some countries. Other countries, however, have expressed concern about China’s expansionist ambitions. The United States potentially has the most to lose. Projects like the BRI suggest that Beijing has the desire to augment its growing economic and strategic influence with a "soft power" narrative that presents China as an alternative leader to the global hegemony of the United States. Essentially, China is continuing to use financial mechanisms to become an international player deeply embedded in the MENA region’s geopolitical landscape. As China moves forward with its own agenda, its MENA investments should be closely monitored.

Despite “soft power” approach – there is no peaceful China rise

Mulgan 2016- prof of Japanese politics, U of New South Wales Aurelia George, "China’s Rise as a Predator State," thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rise-as-a-predator-state/

China’s land grab and subsequent militarization of “islands” in the South China Sea have finally dispelled the myth that its rise will be peaceful. Indeed, these developments point to an unwelcome fact – that China has become a predator state. Rand’s Michael Mazarr wrote about predator states in the late 1990s. He argues that what distinguishes a predator state above all is “territorial aggression” – the predisposition to grab territory and resources. China is one of two contemporary examples; the other is Russia in Europe. The best historical examples are Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and more recently Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These examples teach us that predator states cause wars. Predator states are buoyed by an expansionist ideology – the active promotion of the idea that neighbouring territories (both land and maritime) belong by rights to the predator. Such states often possess a sense of historical grievance or victimization that can only be “righted” by territorial grabs. Indeed, a Mazarr contends, the “politics of memory operates powerfully…causing [predator states] to react by forming aggressive, predatory instincts.” Besides territorial aggression, predator states exhibit several other distinguishing features. First, national policy demonstrates very high levels of militarization. Predator states divert large quantities of national resources into military expansion for purposes of power projection. The emphasis in military planning and weapons acquisitions is inherently

offensive rather than defensive and is geared to intimidating potential adversaries and winning offensive wars. The flipside domestically is, as Mazarr writes, that “military, nationalistic, and territorial issues continue to play a large role in domestic politics and in the states’ approach to the world.” In China’s case, nationalism has overtaken Marxism and more recently developmentalism as state ideology. Second, predator states adopt a strongly strategic perspective on national advancement and display an associated willingness to use all the institutions and instruments of the state over which they maintain control – economic, cultural, military, technological, resource, trade, legal, media – in the pursuit of this overwhelming important strategic objective. China, for example, deployed a broad range of retaliatory instruments against Japan over the Senkaku Islands affair in 2010, including restricting the export of rare earth metals. The use of such “strategic” instruments extends beyond such punitive acts of state retaliation to a whole range of long-term, so-called “market-based” investments. These include foreign acquisitions in strategically important and sensitive areas such as land, resource and water assets and critical infrastructure as well as in private-sector developments and industries. The “strategic” element cannot be discounted in these acquisitions because the line between private enterprise and state-owned enterprises in the Chinese case is imprecise given the complex interweaving of business and state actors. In the end, everything becomes “strategic” in the sense of supporting national advancement and security. Third, predator states are not democracies where there exist checks and balances and other moderating influences that negate the potential for predation against other states. Predator states have authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political leaders are only answerable to other power cliques and display a willingness to engage in political repression, including imprisonment and even murder of their opponents. In such states, there is no real separation of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of law. Levels of domestic lawlessness are matched by international lawlessness. Predator states do not respond to appeals to international laws or norms because they are inherently lawless themselves – they understand and respect only power in international affairs. China’s actions in the South China Sea clearly demonstrate that it does not support a rules-based regional or global order; nor does it believe that you can fight power with rules as other states are attempting to do in dealing with this issue. Finally, predator states show a predisposition to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation is entertained only where it fits with the long-term strategic interests of the state. Moreover, there is little willingness to trade off state interests for larger collective interests in the international community. In that sense, predator states are not interested in providing international public goods and should not be considered as potentially benign hegemons.

Impacts

2NC Impact – US-China War

China’s aspirations will spark a war with the US

Pickrell 2015 - Master’s in IR, currently pursuing a PhD in IR and Diplomacy at Central China Normal UniversityRyan, "The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?," Oct 26, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3

Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. That’s especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst. Failed pursuit of strategic stability China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United

States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed. America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old “shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach is only a temporary stop on the road to functional strategic stability. At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into conflict. Drawing Lines in the “Sea” The problems pushing the Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous and diverse, but if you are looking for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the territorial disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state actors led by the United States are threatening China’s territorial sovereignty. For China, because of its history, territorial sovereignty issues implicate regime survival in a way that transcends all other quarrels and disagreements. The United States, on the other hand, views China’s territorial claims and actions to bolster those claims as Chinese expansionism, aggression against American allies and strategic partners, and a threat to the guiding principles of the liberal world order—which the United States views as crucial for the preservation of America’s global hegemonic power. The situation in the South China Sea has been steadily escalating for several years now. In April, 2014, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel met with Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan. During the meeting, Hagel said, “All parties should refrain from provocative actions and the use of intimidation, coercion, or aggression to advance their claims. Such disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law.” Chang replied, “I’d like to reiterate that the territorial sovereignty issue is a Chinese core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromises, no concessions. Not even a tiny bit of violation will be allowed.” The inability to discuss openly or compromise on this issue has made it impossible to resolve and has led to escalation and increased tension. In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in island construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities have

stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded that China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not only has China dismissed America’s demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in order to establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within the scope of international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in violation of the law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for the preservation of the international legal system—a cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order. In August of this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims “to safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and promote adherence to international law and standards.” The Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “opposes any country’s attempt to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom.” Responding to Chinese criticisms of America’s new regional maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “Make no mistake, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits…We will do that at times and places of our choosing.” In 2014, the United States carried out “freedom of navigation” exercises in various parts of the world and challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to officially challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering sending American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands in order to force China to end its land reclamation activities. Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, “China mustn’t tolerate rampant US violations of China’s adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to launch countermeasures according to Washington’s level of provocation.” The article further stated, “If the US encroaches on China’s core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it.” The article stated plainly, “If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will breach China’s bottom line, and China will not sit idly by.” Other reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that if the bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers. Granted, this may just be saber rattling, but even if that is the case, this issue is still decidedly zero-sum—which increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political preservation and a potential Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the United States, the liberal world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner or later, this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy or military force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both countries. Were the international institutions for collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they arise—and if China and the United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each country’s respective security concerns and encourages effective collaboration—it might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully. But given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful thinking. As there is currently no clear solution to this problem that would allow both countries to walk out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each country’s level of

commitment and resolve, this situation may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome of the geopolitical power struggle between China and the United States will almost certainly be decided in the South China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue. On the contrary, it is the most pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be forced to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea, geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.

2NC Impact – Heg

Containment is the only way to prevent bandwagoing and arms races, impact outweighs the entire aff

Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations CommandRobert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 39-40

Whether a Sinocentric structure in Asia is a subconscious Chinese goal or not, there are enough lingering fears elsewhere in the region about this prospect to create active resistance to the concept. Simply put, we should expect Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and many others to resist the establishment of a new Middle Kingdom. Should the United States scale back its security role in the region, that resistance would also occur, only in more unstable and dangerous forms. It is important to discuss why China's neighbors tolerate-indeed, even welcome-U.S. security hegemony in the region and why, by contrast, these same countries would strongly resist Chinese hegemony. There is a structural reason why this is so, and it relates to geography and is therefore enduring: China is a large neighbor in the region and the United States is not. Because the United States has to project its presence across a vast ocean, it requires the permission of most countries in the region to continue its role as the security hegemon. The United States requires bases, access rights, and negotiated agreements with local governments to fulfill its security guarantees. If these governments withdrew their permission due, say, to bad American behavior, the United States would find it difficult and costly to sustain its presence across the ocean in the face of broad resistance. China, by contrast, is a permanent presence in the region that the neighbors can never dislodge. Should China engage in the same bad behavior, these countries cannot make China go away. They can only fight or accept China's treatment. It is therefore easier for the countries in the region to enter into a security contract with an outside power, knowing they have some bargaining leverage and an escape clause. When dealing with a powerful neighbor like China that isn't going anywhere, the only way to achieve the same bargaining leverage is to match that neighbor's power, especially its military power. And that implies arms races and spiraling security dilemmas.10 Thus, hegemons are not all created equal. It is easier to strike a bargain with an outside hegemon than with a local one-an immutable reason why the U.S. security presence will be welcome in the region. Even more crucially, U.S. service as the region's security hegemon is much more likely to result in stability than if the region were left alone to find its own stable structure (more on this below}. Adding to America's attractiveness as an outsider are the United States' seven-decade record of keeping the region's commons open for all and its not having territorial disputes with countries in the region. The logic behind why most countries in the region welcome the United States as the security hegemon, and why most would resist China attempting to play the same role, is a strong argument for maintaining this arrangement. Which brings us to Global Trends' second pathway, the Hobbesian scramble for security, as the most likely outcome should the United States opt to reduce its costs by withdrawing from the region. As this chapter will later explore, this outcome would very likely trigger multisided missile and nuclear arms races across the region, with unpredictable and unstable consequences. The risk of military disaster inside the most important economic region in the world would rise abruptly. The U.S. economy and standard of living would not escape the risks and costs of these developments. It is easy to see how the absence of the United States as an outside security provider could result in a dangerously unstable security competition in East Asia. The rapid rise of China's military power would create the logic for an offsetting alliance by most of its neighbors. Some however (perhaps, e.g., a future unified Korea) may choose to bandwagon with China instead, especially if historical grievances make

allying with some of China's adversaries politically unacceptable. Bandwagoning by some would increase the security anxiety of the remainder that don't. Finally, some significant powers (e.g., Russia) might choose to remain unaligned, which would compound the region's uncertainty because the players would have to ponder how these neutrals would eventually act during a regional crisis. Should one or more countries conclude that stability was unachievable and conflict inevitable, the calculation would then turn to the logic of security trends and time pressure and the possible advantage gained by striking first rather than waiting for adversaries to grow even stronger in the future.

2NC Impact – Terrorism

Chinese drones will get in the hands of terrorists, makes them uniquely worse than the US

Reimann 2019 - contributor to Foreign Policy In FocusJakob, "China is Flooding the Middle East With Cheap Drones," Feb 18, https://fpif.org/china-is-flooding-the-middle-east-with-cheap-drones/

Pandora’s box is open Of particular concern is China’s drone policy in Saudi Arabia. A $ 65 billion economic program clinched between the two countries in spring 2017 includes the construction of a Chinese drone factory in Saudi Arabia — the first of its kind in the region. Initially, the license production of 300 drones was agreed, which represents a massive figure given the 88 drones that China has exported in the last decade altogether. However, the license drones are not exclusively intended for the Saudi Royal Air Force — Riyadh can explicitly market them to other countries in the region. End-user certificates do not exist for deals with Beijing. In view of the fact that Saudi Arabia, along with supporting various jihadist groups in the region, is a close ally of Al Qaeda in Yemen, it is within the realm of possibility to envision some of these drones end up in terrorist’s hands. Fueled by Beijing’s export policy, the threat scenario of drone-armed jihadists has moved significantly closer. Research by the Jamestown Foundation shows that we have already entered the era of “unmanned terrorism.” Groups commonly labelled as “terrorists” from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen are already using mini-drones to drop bombs, grenades, and incendiary devices onto enemy positions or civilian facilities. Further flooding the region with cheap combat drones from China will certainly heave these tactics to the next level in the future. Since 2001, thousands of people, most of them civilians, have been killed by drone in the so-called “War on Terror,” changing the nature of war in its entirety and exposing civilians in all these undeclared war zones to a permanent threat on their lives. Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama proved he could always escape punishment and international condemnation even after using drones to turn weddings and funerals into blood baths and mass graves. And so, the desires of local actors to acquire these practical killing tools were aroused, too. The Chinese leadership is exploiting these developments without compromise and flooding the Middle East with cheap drones. The consequences of this expansionary policy cannot be foreseen. Pandora’s box is already open.

AT: Middle East Advantage

Defense

Middle East war inevitable -- hawks on both sides are itching for a conflict.Hunter, 19 (Shireen T, Research professor; Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, “Don't Rule Out the Possibility of War with Iran.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. Mar/Apr 2019, Vol.38 Issue 2, p12-14. 3p. 1 Color Photograph., Vol.38Issue 2, p12-14. 3p., Accessed 7/2/2019, EB)

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, Iran has all but despaired of the European Union's ability-or, perhaps more accurately, willingness-to work out a system of financial transactions that could facilitate Tehran's trade with Europe. Not only that, largely under pressure from Denmark and Holland, the EU imposed sanctions on Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and two individuals on charges of plotting to kill leaders of the Ahwaz separatist movement in Europe. This group was involved in the bombings that took place in Ahwaz in September 2018. These developments seriously undermine the chances that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal with Iran, will survive. Iran will be in an even more difficult situation if it fails to maintain trade relations with countries such as India and China or, more importantly, can't gain access to the money earned from its exports. Under these conditions, domestic pressures, especially from the Iranian hard-liners who opposed the JCPOA from the beginning, would mount on the government of President Hassan Rouhani to leave the JCPOA and resume its suspended nuclear activities. In fact, rumors have spread that Iran's exit from the JCPOA and Foreign Minister Javad Zarifs resignation are imminent. The government has since denied these rumors. Because Iran has not received any real benefit from the agreement, the hard-liners' arguments may be making headway with the Iranian people. The lack of faith shown by the United States and now Europe in carrying out their side of the nuclear bargain would seem to vindicate those Iranians who argue that only nuclear weapons can provide for Iran's security and shield it from potential attacks by the United States, Israel, or both. Should the government of President Rouhani succumb to such pressures, Iran hawks in the United States and some Iranian opposition groups-along with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE-would lobby President Trump to take military action against Iran. Such pressures could reach irresistible levels. Within the Trump administration, National Security Adviser John Bolton, in particular, would champion such a move, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is unlikely to put up any opposition. Bolton and other Iran hawks would argue that, as long as Iran is standing, the United States cannot reduce the level of its military engagement in the Middle East and Southwest Asia war zones because Iran would otherwise fill the vacuum. According to this logic, before reducing its overseas military engagements in Syria or Afghanistan, the United States must effectively disable Iran economically and militarily. The United States might feel pressured to attack Iran for other reasons. Iran is the last country on the list of regime change in the post-9/11 period that has thus far escaped American military intervention, directly or through proxies. Iraq was invaded in 2003, Libya was attacked in 2010, and Syria has been devastated by civil war. For the foreseeable future, none of these states will be able to influence Middle East dynamics significantly, nor do they pose any military threat to America's regional allies, notably Israel. In short, Iran is the last remaining link in this chain of dismantling state systems in the region. Moreover, at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, some in the United States and in the region would have preferred that America attacked Iran first and then Iraq. These people will not feel safe until Iran is attacked. A main goal of security hawks in the United States, as described in the 1992 U.S. Defense Planning Guidance (which has never been superseded), has been "to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." The document lists Southwest Asia as one such region. In this region, Iran is the country best suited to become the hub of regional power. This concern about

Iran's potential did not start with the Islamic revolution. America's change of heart regarding the shah was partly because of his ambitions to turn Iran into a viable economic and military power. Any other viable regime in post-Islamist Iran, including a nationalist regime, would also want to develop the country's resources. This might be one reason why the current American administration favors the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK), rather than any other opposition group, as the successor to the Islamist government. Reports are circulating that the United States has moved back some MEK fighters to Iraq, perhaps in anticipation of moving them into Iran. The MEK was willing to support Saddam Hussain and cede Iran's Khuzestan province to Iraq. There is no reason to think that it won't similarly follow U.S. bidding. The hawks' ideal scenario involves Iran's disintegration along ethnic and linguistic lines, or at least its transformation into a loose federation with a weak central power. Such goals, which can't be achieved through sanctions and destabilization efforts, would require military operations, though short of a full-scale land invasion. A massive air strike targeting Iran's vital infrastructure would suffice. For some years now, many analysts have recommended such an option. Amitai Etzioni, for instance, once said that the United States should confront Iran by bombing its civilian infrastructure or risk losing the Middle East. Key U.S. policymakers in the Trump administration share such views, as do key U.S. regional allies. There is one last reason why the U.S. might attack Iran. Many in America have not forgiven Iran for its 1979 revolution, the hostage crisis, and the defiant behavior it adopted. They believe that allowing Iran to get away with this behavior sends the wrong message to other potential challengers. In short, Iran is a rebellious satrapy that must be subdued. Of course, the current Iranian regime could seif-dissolve and accept all the 12 conditions laid out by Secretary of State Pompeo. But Iran is unlikely to do so. Instead, Tehran would try to make potential military operations as costly as possible for the United States. Therefore, those in the United States-as well as in Europe and elsewhere-who do not want another devastating war in the Middle East should do all they can to end the current U.S.-lran standoff. One possible way of avoiding disaster would be for the United States to suspend sanctions on Iran for a year in exchange for Iran agreeing to new and wide-ranging talks on all outstanding issues between the two states. Key European states could try to broker such a deal. Of course, for this suggestion even to be considered, Iran must indicate willingness to engage in broad and comprehensive talks with the United States, and be prepared to reconsider the most controversial aspects of its foreign policy.

War with Iran is imminent and inevitable—sanctions are escalating tensions and the administration has legal justification for starting a war with Iran after designating the IRGC a “Foreign Terrorist Organization”Cirincione and Kaszynski, 19 (Joseph and Mary, Joshep Cirincione is the President of the Ploughshares Fund; a public grant-making foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy and conflict resolution, Mary Kaszynski is the deputy director of policy at Ploughshares Fund, “The Path to War with Iran Is Paved With Sanctions.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. May 2019, Vol. 38 Issue 3, pOV-15-OV-16. 2p., Accessed 7/2/2019, EB)

The Trump administration is laying siege to Iran. Taking pages from the Iraq War playbook, senior officials paint a picture of a rogue, outlaw, terrorist regime bent on acquiring nuclear weapons and whose "malign activities" are the cause of all the chaos in the Middle East. They know what they are doing. They have done it before. They are building a case for war. The "maximum pressure" campaign by the White House, Treasury Department and State Department accelerated this week with the announcement that the United States would force China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey to cease all imports of Iranian oil or face severe U.S. sanctions. The goal is to cut to zero all of Iran's oil exports,

which account for some 40 percent of its national income. This strategy is unlikely to force the capitulation or collapse of the regime, but it very likely could lead to war. The United States has already reimposed all the nuclear-related sanctions lifted by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that successfully rolled back and effectively froze Iran's nuclear program and put it under the most stringent inspections ever negotiated. The goals of the sanctions announced April 22, however, go way beyond nuclear issues. "We have made our demands very clear to the ayatollah and his cronies," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in remarks to the press Monday morning."End your pursuit of nuclear weapons. Stop testing and proliferating ballistic missiles. Stop sponsoring and committing terrorism. Halt the arbitrary detention of U.S. citizens." All are worthy policy goals. The first, of course, has been met. The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran concluded that Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. There is no evidence that the program has restarted. Instead, in true Trumpian fashion, the administration simply asserts the counterfactual. It claims that the program has restarted, with slippery phrases about seeking weapons or references to long-ended activities. The media, overloaded with the Mueller report and a daily cascade of lies, does not challenge these claims. THE ROLE OF BOLTON It is no accident that National Security Adviser John Bolton, the man who declared unequivocally in November 2002, "We are confident that Saddam Hussain has hidden weapons of mass destruction and production facilities in Iraq," is now the chief strategist behind the drive toward war-with Mike Pompeo happily riding shotgun. Both are manipulating a distracted and largely uninformed president into a confrontation he may not actually want. Although Trump came into office promising to cancel the JCPOA painstakingly negotiated by the Obama administration and our allies, he was initially held in check by the united front of his military, intelligence and diplomatic advisers. Then, Trump ousted Rex Tillerson and replaced him with Mike Pompeo. He fired H.R. McMaster and appointed John Bolton. He accepted the resignation of Jim Mattis as secretary of defense and replaced him with a former Boeing executive more interested in contracts than policy. Bolton has had a clear field ever since. With minimal or no inter-agency discussion, Bolton quickly dispensed with the Iran accord, but he did not stop there. By Christmas 2018, Bolton had dismantled what remained of U.S.-Iran relations. The United States reinstated all sanctions on Iran that were previously lifted by the Iran accord, and the State Department pulled out of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran, which provided a "legal framework for bilateral relations." As a result, Iran's currency hit a historic low and the country witnessed waves of economic protests. Bolton used his national platform to publicly send bellicose warnings to the regime with statements like, "If you cross us, our allies, or our partners. . . there will indeed be hell to pay." THE TERRORISM 'CONNECTION' The "maximum pressure" campaign escalated in 2019. When terrorists attacked the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-an official branch of Iran's military-killing 27 and wounding 13, the State Department offered no condolences. When widespread flooding devastated Iranian cities and infrastructure, claiming 60 lives in one week, the United States faulted the regime for the "mismanagement that has led to this disaster." The campaign hit a crescendo on April 8, 2019-exactly one year to the day after Bolton's appointment-with the unprecedented move of designating the IRGC a "Foreign Terrorist Organization." It now appears alongside the Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram on this list. That day Pompeo delivered a statement to the press and public in which the words "terror," "terrorism" and "terrorist" appeared 21 times. This designation brings at least the IRGC and perhaps the entire nation within arm's reach of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, legislation originally written to provide a legal basis for the invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. The 2001 AUMF gives the president wide scope for the unilateral use of force against any parties or individuals associated with the 9/11 attacks, a point not lost

on Pompeo. For over a year, the Trump administration, and Pompeo in particular, has been exaggerating the connection between Iran and al-Qaeda to claim legal justification for military action against Iran under the 2001 AUMF. In 2017, the CIA released additional records from the bin Laden files, ostensibly "to enhance public understanding of al-Qaeda." Wrote former CIA analyst Ned Price: But this release by Pompeo wasn't about transparency. Pompeo is playing politics with intelligence, using these files in a ploy to bolster the case against Iran by reinvigorating the debate on its terrorist ties. While the politicization of intelligence is more than sufficient cause for concern, the fact that he appears to be returning to the Bush administration's pre-Iraq war playbook underscores the danger. This effort reeks of former vice president Dick Cheney's consistent false allegations of links between Saddam Hussain's Iraq and the 9/11 attacks, a nexus the Bush administration debunked only after we had lost too much in blood and treasure. Bolton, Pompeo and their allies in and out of government continued to hype the Iran-al-Qaeda link. In May 2018, announcing the U.S. abrogation of the nuclear agreement, Trump made a point of saying that "Iran supports terrorist proxies and militias such as. . . al-Qaeda." In a speech at the Heritage Foundation later that month, Pompeo said: "Today we ask the Iranian people: Is this what you want your country to be known for, for being a co-conspirator with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda?" Experts have disparaged the administration's claims, noting the longstanding hostility between Iran, a Shi'i- majority nation, and the radical Sunni group. A definitive New America study published in late 2018 found no evidence that Iran and al-Qaeda collaborated in carrying out terrorist attacks. That hasn't stopped the administration from continuing the insinuations. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pompeo went out of his way to construct explicit connections between al-Qaeda and the IRGC with multiple statements like: "there is no doubt there is a connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and al-Qaeda. Period, full stop." INVOKING THE AUMF Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) zeroed in to the subtext of Pompeo's repetitive al-Qaeda-Iran connections. If the administration determines a valid link between al-Qaeda and the Iranian government, it may be able to declare war on Iran by using the 2001 AUMF, bypassing Congress entirely. So, Senator Paul pressed Pompeo on that point, asking him if he believes that the 2001 AUMF applies to Iran or Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Pompeo dodged the question: "I would prefer to leave that to the lawyers, Senator." Neither Bolton nor Pompeo has yet provided a clear answer. The administration's plan is clear: keep beating the twin drums of terrorism and nuclear threat. Bolton and Pompeo will use both to justify more sanctions and more provocations. They have a highly disciplined, coordinated messaging strategy. They establish the following false claim, as Bolton did this January in a conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel: "Despite getting out of the Iran nuclear deal, despite the sanctions, we have little doubt that Iran's leadership is still strategically committed to achieving deliverable nuclear weapons." The claims are then echoed, as this one was in a Twitter video a few weeks later. And again by U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, in a New York Times op-ed, demanding that Iran "behave like a normal, peaceful nation: end the pursuit of nuclear weapons, stop testing ballistic missiles, stop sponsoring terrorist proxies." And again this week by Pompeo, in announcing the oil sanctions, when he demanded that Iran "end [its] pursuit of nuclear weapons." It does not matter that U.S. intelligence assessments-as well as Israeli intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency-confirm that Iran is complying with the JCPOA. Or that Saudi Arabia has likely funded al-Qaeda and other Sunni terrorist groups. Or that the U.S. invasion of Iraq is the principle cause of Middle East chaos today. Trump officials will cherry-pick information, package it, and amplify it across a willing echo chamber- exactly as the Bush administration did in the lead up to the Iraq war. The real question is whether America will fall for it again.

Offense

Drones decrease civilian casualty risks in conflicts like YemenSaletan 15, (William, 4-23-2015, "Civilian Deaths Would Be Much Higher Without Drones," Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/04/u-s-drone-strikes-civilian-casualties-would-be-much-higher-without-them.html) accessed 7-2-2019

The New America Foundation keeps a different tally. Its figures imply a civilian casualty rate of 8 percent to 12 percent in Pakistan and 8 percent to 9 percent in Yemen. A third count, maintained by the Long War Journal, indicates a 5 percent civilian casualty rate in Pakistan (once Weinstein and Lo Porto are added to the tally) and 16 percent in Yemen. Compare those numbers with any other method of warfare. Start with an apples-to-apples comparison: the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s analysis of “other covert operations” in Yemen. According to BIJ’s methodology, this category consists of nondrone attacks by U.S. forces, “including airstrikes, missile attacks and ground operations.” BIJ counts 68 to 99 civilian deaths in these operations, among 156 to 365 total casualties. That’s a civilian casualty rate of 27 percent to 44 percent: three times worse than drone strikes in the same country. Or look at the bureau’s data from Somalia. For drones, the BIJ counts 23 to 105 casualties, of whom zero to five were civilian. For other covert operations, the BIJ counts 40 to 141 casualties, of whom seven to 47 were civilian. If you go with the low-end numbers, drones have a perfect record in Somalia. If you go with the high-end numbers, drones are seven times safer than the alternatives. In the past month, hundreds of civilians have died in Yemen. But the culprit isn’t drones. It’s old-fashioned airstrikes and artillery fire, courtesy of Saudi Arabia and its Arab partners. The campaign got off to a roaring start, with attacks on schools, hospitals, houses, mosques, a market, a dairy factory, and a refugee camp. As of April 14, the U.N. reported at least 364 civilian deaths. During this time, the BIJ counted four drone strikes in Yemen, resulting in 13 to 22 fatalities. None of them were civilian. Before the emergence of drones and other precise weapons, war was far more dangerous for ordinary people. In World War II, an estimated 40 to 67 percent of the dead were civilians. In Korea, the estimate was 70 percent. In Vietnam, it was about one civilian for every two enemy combatants. In the Persian Gulf War, it may have been no better. In Kosovo, it seems to have been worse. In Afghanistan, civilian deaths have been estimated at 60 to 150 percent of Taliban deaths. In Iraq, civilians account for more than 80 percent of the casualties. To be fair, these were full-blown wars. You can argue that the better alternative to drone strikes is diplomacy, not invasion. But you ought to credit drones, conversely, for providing a military alternative to all-out war. Last summer, Israel took extraordinary measures to avoid killing innocent people in Gaza. But the results were still horrific. According to a postwar investigation by the Associated Press, Israel’s 247 airstrikes on residential buildings killed 844 people. Of these, 508 were women, children, or men aged 60 or older, “all presumed to be civilians.”

Drones stabilize conflicts such as Yemen - Sustainability, Precision, and Cost Prove Parker 18, (Clifton 3-6-2018, the Social Sciences Writer at Stanford News, "Next-gen drones will enable cheap, credible threats," Futurity, https://www.futurity.org/armed-drones-coercion-threats-1696282-2/) accessed 7-2-2019

“Armed drones are likely to offer coercion ‘windows of opportunity’ in at least one important circumstance: states that have armed drones confronting states that do not,” says Amy Zegart, political scientist at Stanford University. “As wars grow longer and less conclusive, armed drones enable states to sustain combat operations, making threats to ‘stay the course’ more believable.” Zegart believes that drone technology is becoming a more effective instrument to change a state’s behavior than

yesteryear’s more costly option of using ground troops or large-scale military movements in war or conflict. “Drones may be turning deterrence theory on its head,” says Zegart, referring to the cost-benefit calculation a potential aggressor makes when assessing an attack. Zegart’s focus is on next-generation drones, which are essentially unpiloted fighter jets and are currently in development. She is not examining the use of existing drones like quadcopters and Reaper and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles. Three coercion advantages Zegart’s research, published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, is based on surveys of 259 foreign military officers that took place between 2015 and 2017. Participants were highly experienced foreign military officers who were attending classes at the National Defense University and Naval War College. A drone is an unmanned aircraft that can be piloted remotely to deliver a lethal payload to a specific target. Today, Zegart says, many scholars are studying whether drone proliferation across the world could change the future of warfare. “But even here the focus has been the implications for the use of force, not the threat of force,” says Zegart, director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. New weapons often evolve technologically before “game-changing ideas” occur about how to use them. New drones are more lethal than ever, offering greater speeds, ranges, stealth, and agility, according to Zegart. The US is ahead, but not alone, in using drones. Nine countries have already used armed drones in combat, and at least 20 more are developing lethal drone programs—including Russia and China. “It is time for a rethink” about drones, Zegart says. Technological advances will soon enable drones to function in hostile environments better than ever before. “Drones offer three unique coercion advantages that theorists did not foresee: sustainability in long duration conflicts; certainty of precision punishment, which can change the psychology of adversaries; and changes in the relative costs of war,” she says. Threats involving a high cost may be actually less credible than assumed, says Zegart. Her findings challenge the belief of “cost signals,” a military strategy where a country threatens another with a high-cost option, such as ground troops, which is intended to show resolve. Why big data can’t predict the next armed conflict Drones may actually signal a nation’s resolve more effectively because—as a low-cost option—they can be part of an enduring offensive campaign against an enemy. “The advent of armed drones suggests that costly signals may no longer be the best or only path to threat credibility,” she says. “In situations where a coercing state has armed drones but a target state does not, drones make it possible to implement threats in ways that impose vanishingly low costs on the coercer but disproportionately high costs on the target,” Zegart says. It’s happened before Zegart says that throughout history, whenever a new military technology emerges, adversaries have basically faced two choices—either concede or innovate to overcome the other side’s advantage. “There is no reason to expect drones will be any different. The more that drones are used for combat and coercion, the more likely it will be that others will develop drone countermeasures,” she says.

Military drones cause less casualties, are effective, and minimalize threats to citizensSimkovits 17, (Mathew, undergraduate studying political science and economics at Washington University in St. Louis., 6-16-2017, "Drone Strikes, Pro," Common Reader, https://commonreader.wustl.edu/drone-strikes-pro/) accessed 7-3-2019

In fact, proponents of drone strikes argue that in comparison to the military operations that would be required to perform similar functions, drone strikes actually minimalize collateral damage. For example, boots-on-the-ground assaults and large-scale air strikes tend to have much greater casualties (about seven times as many). Additionally, drone strikes typically occur after large intelligence gathering operations, and they have the ability to hover over an area until the optimal time to strike. In terms of

effectiveness against terrorism, proponents argue that drone strikes effectively remove terrorist leadership, disrupt terrorist organizations and deny terrorist sanctuaries. Some examples are this strike, which killed Osama bin Laden’s chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman in 2011, and this one, which recently killed Abu al-Khayr al-Masribi, Osama’s son-in-law and al-Qaeda ideological leader. There has also been some quantitative evidence in favor of the effectiveness of drone strikes as well. One study found that drone strikes lead to a decrease in both the incidence and lethality of terror attacks, at least in the short-run. Finally, proponents argue that drones’ ability to remotely target terrorists reduces the direct risk counterterrorism operations place on American soldiers. This argument has long been one of the most convincing in favor of drone strikes. A country has an obligation to minimalize threats posed to its citizens, and since drone strikes certainly do so in the case of American soldiers, this is a strong point in their favor.

AT: International Law Advantage

Defense

International law doesnt succeed- no one pays attention to it. All countries act in their own self interestGoldsmith and Posner 05 (Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, lawyer and Harvard Professor, a professor of international law, contract law, and bankruptcy, among other areas attended Yale and Harvard, April 2005, “The Limits of International Law”,https://www.studocu.com/en-gb/document/the-university-of-edinburgh/international-law/summaries/the-limits-of-international-law/4470976/view, 07/ 07/19)

The UN played a relatively minor role in bringing the conflicts in the Balkans to the end. Members of the Security Council could not agree on the use of force in Kosovo, and the NATO intervention was thus a violation of international law. The various inter- national criminal tribunals turned out to be cum- bersome and expensive institutions, they brought relatively few people to justice, and they stirred up the ethnic tensions they were meant to quell. Aggressive international trade integration pro- duced a violent backlash in many countries. Treaty mechanisms seemed too weak to solve the most serious global problems, including environ- mental degradation and human rights abuses. American Reluctance on Treaties The biggest problem, from the perspective of international law advocates, has been the United States. Long the champion of international legal- ization and the richest and most powerful country, the United States was a laggard in the 1990s. During treaty negotiations, the United States consistently worked to weaken treaty language and create exceptions. It ended up opposing the International Criminal Court and has cajoled dozens of countries into entering bilateral immunity agreements, which require them not to turn over Americans on their territory to the ICC. It refused to enter the Kyoto Global Climate Change Treaty. It refused to enter a treaty that banned landmines. It has refused to enter several human rights treaties, and it has entered others only subject to reservations that ensure that they do not change Ameri- can policy. It led the illegal intervention in Kosovo. Although many other states have been recalcitrant about these and similar international institutions— including Russia, China, India, and other major powers—it has come as a shock to many American internationalists that the United States acts more like these countries than like western European countries. From their perspective, matters only became worse after 9/11. The American military response to the al Qaeda threat has raised grave questions of international law. So has both the invasion of Iraq—arguably, in viola- tion of the UN Charter—and the conduct of the war there. The Bush administration also has forcefully reiter- ated American opposition to the ICC and to Kyoto, and withdrawn from the ABM treaty with Russia; and many of its officials have shown skepticism about the value of international law for American foreign policy. International law advocates now regard the United States as a rogue state but have no ideas about how to change American behavior. Defenders of American for- eign policy sometimes argue that nobody pays attention to international law, and so therefore the United States should not; and, at other times, they argue that weak states are using international law to prevent the United States from acting in its national interest. The partisan debate is hampered by lack of understanding about how international law really operates. Relations between Self-Interested States The Limits of International Law intends to fill that gap. The book begins with the premise that all states, nearly all the time, make foreign policy decisions, including the decisions whether to enter treaties and comply with international law, based on an assessment of their national interest. Using a simple game-theoretical framework, Goldsmith and Posner argue that interna- tional law is intrinsically weak and unstable, because states will comply with international law only when they fear that noncompliance will result in retaliation or other reputational injuries. This framework helps us understand the errors of the

international law advocates and their critics. On the one hand, large multilateral treaties that treat all states as equal are unattractive to powerful states, which either refuse to enter the treaties, enter them subject to numerous reservations that undermine the treaties’ obligations, or refuse to comply with them. The problem with these treaties is that they treat states as equals when in fact they are not, and they implicitly rely on collective sanctions when states prefer to free ride. Thus, many human rights treaties are generally not enforced, and so they have little effect on states’ behav- ior. And the international trade system is mainly a framework in which bilateral enforcement occurs, so powerful states may cooperate with other powerful states but not with weaker states, whose remedies for trade vio- lations are valueless. -2- International law has no life of its own, has no special normative authority; it is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal with relatively discrete problems of international cooperation. On the other hand, international law is not empty or meaningless, as many critics have argued. States are able to cooperate with each other, especially on a bilateral basis, and their patterns of cooperation eventually con- geal into the customary international norms. Coopera- tion also occurs within bilateral treaties and within the general frameworks set up in multilateral treaties. In the absence of a world government, the cooperation remains relatively thin, and often erratic; its character changes as the interests and relative power of nations change. But none of this is to claim that international law is phony or illusory or a great public relations game. What it does suggest, however, is that international law has no life of its own, has no special normative authority; it is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal with relatively discrete problems of international cooperation. There is no reason to expect states to enter treaties just for the sake of expanding the domain of international law; and there is no reason to expect states to comply with treaties when their interests and powers change. The aggressive international legal- ization expected and yearned for by international lawyers just cannot happen as long as there are nearly 200 states with independent interests, agendas, and ideologies. Even democratic states have no reason to commit them- selves to international law when doing so does not serve the interests of the voters.

Trumps new immigration policy is already breaking international law Conley, 6/27(julia Conley,, 6-27-2019, "Claiming Trump Is Forcing Them to Commit 'Widespread Violation' of International Law, Asylum Officers Back Lawsuit Against President's Policy," Common Dreams, https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/06/27/claiming-trump-forcing-them-commit-widespread-violation-international-law-asylumdate;7/7/2019;aka)

The law forcing asylum seekers to return to Mexico is "fundamentally contrary to the moral fabric of our nation and our international and domestic legal obligations," officers say byJulia Conley, staff writer 3 Comments Members of Mexican National Guard detain Central American migrants trying to cross the Rio Bravo, in Ciudad Juarez, State of Chihuahua, on June 21, 2019. (Photo: Herika Martinez/AFP/Getty Images) Expressing grave objections to an immigration policy which has forced them to violate international law, U.S. asylum officers filed a federal court brief demanding an end to President Donald Trump's so-called "Remain in Mexico" policy under which asylum seekers have been turned away at the U.S.-Mexico border. Ordering people who are exercising their legal right to seek asylum to turn back and endure a months-long or years-long wait for their applications to be processed is "fundamentally contrary to the moral fabric of our nation and our international and domestic legal obligations," wrote the American Federation of Government Employees Local 1924, the union which represents asylum officers. "By forcing a vulnerable population to return to a hostile territory where they are likely to face persecution, the MPP abandons our tradition of providing a safe haven to the persecuted and violates

our international and domestic legal obligations." —American Federation of Government Employees Local 1924 The amicus brief was filed by the union in support of the ACLU, which is challenging the Remain in Mexico policy, officially known as Trump's Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program. Since Trump enacted the program in January, the Mexican government says about 15,000 people have been sent to Mexico while their applications are processed. Human rights advocates have decried the policy, warning that asylum seekers may face violence in Mexico as many did in their home countries. "By forcing a vulnerable population to return to a hostile territory where they are likely to face persecution, the MPP abandons our tradition of providing a safe haven to the persecuted and violates our international and domestic legal obligations," reads the brief. Earlier this month, the president also reached a deal with Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrado, under which Mexico agreed to step up immigration enforcement in exchange for the cancellation of tariffs. Weeks later, police in Veracruz reportedly opened fire on a truck carrying Central American immigrants, killing a young woman. When Trump enacted the MPP program, his administration claimed that if asylum seekers are allowed to wait in the U.S. while their applications are processed, they would "disappear into the United States." In fact, the union noted, there is "no evidence" that asylum seekers pose any security risk. Justice Department statistics indicate that 90 percent of people fulfill their legal obligations while awaiting asylum rulings in the United States. "The MPP is entirely unnecessary," wrote the union. "The system has been tested time and again, and it is fully capable—with additional resources where appropriate—of efficiently processing asylum claims by those with valid claims while removing those that are not entitled to protection after they undergo the process designed to ensure that they will not be returned to a place where they will be persecuted." By failing to adhere to the 1967 Protocol, the U.N. accord stating that participating countries including the U.S. would not "expel or return a refugee in any manner," wrote the officers, the Trump administration is compelling government employees to break international law. "The MPP places [asylum officers] at risk of participation in the widespread violation of international treaty and domestic legal obligations," wrote the union, "something that they did not sign up to do when they decided to become asylum and refugee officers for the United States government."

Offense

International law will be manipulated to crush hegemony Rivkin, former DOJ director, 2K—partner in the law firm of Baker & Hostetler, LLP, and was Deputy Director, Office of Policy Development, U.S. Department of Justice, and served in the White House Counsel’s Office. (David and Lee A. Casey—served in the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice, The Rocky Shoals of International Law, Winter 2000, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2000_Winter/ai_68547471/)

Second, as a practical matter, the new international law has the potential to undermine American leadership in the post-Cold War global system. Even more fundamentally, international law may well make the world safe for aggression, by imposing undue constraints on those countries that are willing to use force to deter and punish it. Although, as noted above, the new international law has a number of manifestations, those elements dealing with the use of military force, and the potential consequences for individual American officials who order or implement its use, are the most advanced and pernicious. As the world's pre-eminent military power, with global interests and responsibilities, the United States should be very concerned about any effort to create international judicial institutions capable of prosecuting individual soldiers, officers and elected officials in the chain of command. The international criminal "norms" applied in these courts, both in the ad hoc criminal courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and in the International Criminal Court, are ambiguous in their meaning and remarkably fluid in their application. For example, one of the "war crimes prosecutable in the ICC is defined as [i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. Whether any particular attack causes "excessive" civilian injuries or environmental damage is very much a matter of opinion. This is, in fact, a crime that can be tailored to fit almost any circumstances, as was all but openly acknowledged by the prosecutor's office of the Yugoslav tribunal during its investigation of alleged NATO war crimes. This investigation was undertaken after a number of NGOs complained that NATO's 1999 air campaign against Serbia resulted in too many civilian deaths. As candidly noted in [t]he answers to these questions [regarding allegedly excessive civilian casualties] are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the background and values of the decision-maker. It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would always agree in close cases. [4] The key underlying problem here is that injuries to noncombatants and their property--so-called "collateral damage"--are an endemic consequence of combat. As a result, the traditional law of war, jus in hello, although proscribing certain hostile actions toward civilians, eschewed overly rigid rules on collateral damage. Unfortunately, instead of continuing to rely on the broad, traditional jus in hello principles of proportionality and discrimination, the new norms have come to resemble American domestic regulatory law. These rules are overly prescriptive and proscriptive, to such an extent that ensuring full compliance has become almost impossible. This is particularly the case because the new international law seems to suggest that zero civilian casualties and no collateral damage are not only attainable outcomes in modern combat, but that these should be the norm. The combination of the unrealistic norms and unaccountable judicial bodies that would apply them is particularly problematic. The American military is particularly vulnerable here. This is because

U.S. military doctrine has always been attrition-oriented, emphasizing the intensive application of firepower and the use of "decisive force." It is inevitable that damage to civilian sites, and civilian casualties, will result. This is all the more likely given the growing American aversion to combat casualties, which forces our military commanders to rely more and more on air strikes and missile attacks. This raises the real possibility that American soldiers and officials will be considered subject to prosecution, even in situations where the intervention has been "humanitarian" in character, as with the air campaign against Serbia. Significantly, while no prosecutions against NATO officials are currently planned, even the relatively tame Yugoslav tribunal did not give the alliance a clean bill of health. Indeed, the prosecutor's office declined to bring indictments, not because it concluded that no crimes were committed by NATO, but because "[i]n all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offenses." Future outcomes in the permanent ICC, a court that will be less dependent upon U.S. and NATO largesse than is the Yugoslav tribunal, may be very different. And the fact that the United States has not signed, and would not ratify, the ICC treaty will not prevent the ICC from pursuing Americans. The court claims to exercise a form of "universal jurisdiction" that will allow it to prosecute American citizens when their actions, or the effects of their ac tions, take place on the territory of a state that has signed the ICC treaty. Moreover, the danger here is not limited to the potential actions of the ICC. Based on the "universal jurisdiction" theory--which suggests that any state can prosecute international humanitarian violations wherever they occur, whether or not that state's own citizens are involved--any state, or even a low-level foreign magistrate, can begin a prosecution against American military or civilian officials. This was, of course, the case with the former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, who traveled to England for medical treatment in 1998, and was very nearly extradited to Spain to stand trial for his actions during his rule in Chile. Overall, there is no doubt that, insofar as they can successfully claim the right to prosecute military and civilian leaders for violations of the laws of war and international humanitarian norms, international judicial bodies and interested states will be able effectively to shape American policy. An American president would be far less likely to use force if there were a genuine possibility that U.S. soldiers or officials, including himself, would face future prosecution in a foreign court. Both our allies and our adversaries fully understand the importance of molding the new international law to fit their needs, and its power as an effective weapon against the United States. Examples of this phenomenon are not difficult to find. Human rights activists, of course, have frequently made exaggerated claims that pre-existing international humanitarian norms require fundamental changes in U.S. foreign and domestic policy. States are also increasingly using the language of law as a means of shaping U.S. policy. In one of the most boldly cynical examples of this phenomenon, the People's Republic of China--desperate to prevent American deployment of even a limited anti-ballistic missile defense--has asserted that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union remains in force (even though the Soviet Union disappeared a decade ago), and that it cannot be terminated by the United States because that treaty has assumed the status of "customary" international law.

AT: Drone Prolif Advantage

Offense

Generic

Drone prolif good for national security and strengthens US hegemonyLin-Greenberg 18, (Erik, Post Doctoral fellow expert in international relations. Focuses on the impact of unmanned weapons systems on military escalation. 4-24-2018, "Why Washington’s New Drone Export Policy Is Good For National Security," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/why-washingtons-new-drone-export-policy-is-good-for-national-security/) accessed 7-2-2019

When allies turn to other states for advanced military technology, U.S. national security suffers in three critical ways. First, withholding military technology from close allies and partners can strain security relationships. Since these partnerships are grounded in trust, shared interests, and common threats, partners may equate a state’s unwillingness to export drones with waning loyalty and commitment to other security agreements. For instance, the former top Italian Air Force general questioned Washington’s initial denial of Italy’s request for armed drones, arguing that “it seemed impossible that a loyal ally could be ruled out” from receiving armed drones. He noted that “in Afghanistan, we would have saved Italian lives if we had had armed drones.” By streamlining the process for foreign states to acquire U.S. drones, the new policy helps reduce this sort of tension that can engender mistrust and muddy interactions between Washington and its partners. Second, denying exports can degrade effectiveness and interoperability during coalition operations. By not exporting weapons to allies, supplier states potentially limit the ability of allies to share operational burdens. For instance, export controls and international agreements that blocked the transfer of armed drones to many NATO allies left Washington responsible for operating the bulk of armed drones in Afghanistan. This demand placed additional strain on the already under-manned and overstretched American capacity. Additionally, if states turn to alternate suppliers, their ability to easily operate with American forces may be reduced. Common systems and similar technical infrastructure helps streamline information sharing, planning, maintenance, and operations. Given the frequency of coalition operations in the current security environment, interoperability is key to increasing operational effectiveness and reducing the likelihood of mishaps and confusion during future crises and contingencies. Third, and perhaps most strategically important, Washington loses political and military influence when states turn to other suppliers. When a state transfers arms, it hopes to establish influence in the recipient state throughout and beyond the lifecycle of the weapon system. In the short term, influence is established via agreements to train personnel or maintain equipment. Producer states design training curricula and can withhold future deliveries, parts, or maintenance if a recipient takes actions that run counter to their interests. Over time, these relationships often deepen into wider security partnerships. For instance, personnel who operate U.S.-produced equipment frequently attend training or exercises in the United States. There, they gain exposure to U.S. military principles, culture, and values. Because of these experiences, these personnel may be selected for professional military education programs like the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College later in their careers. These relationships can strengthen bonds between personnel from the United States and states that receive U.S.-built equipment, ensuring long-term American influence. The new policy makes it easier for the United States to provide drones to foreign states, helping to prevent Washington from losing influence to China and other supplier states who are eager to increase their global sway. While the export of U.S.-produced drones enhances national security, what effect will increased drone sales have on international security? Drone proliferation pessimists often lament that weakening drone export controls will make it easier for states to launch military operations and destabilize security by triggering arms racing between states eager to one-up their rival’s drone capabilities. These concerns are likely overstated for two reasons. First, the transfer of drones is unlikely

to be inherently destabilizing. To be sure, the reduced risk associated with operating remotely piloted aircraft may lead risk-averse decision-makers to more frequently launch drones on intelligence gathering and strike missions. However, limited transfers of drone technology have had a minimal effect on regional stability. For instance, Iraq and Nigeria have used recently acquired drones to launch missile strikes on suspected terrorists, but these operations have been limited in scale and geographic scope. Carrying out worldwide drone operations like those conducted by the United States requires a massive technological and logistical infrastructure, and as I describe in a forthcoming book chapter, a complex backbone of intelligence personnel and organizations that costs billions and takes decades to develop. Even if countries acquire drone aircraft, it takes time to develop the required network of bases, satellites, computer systems, and personnel before a state can conduct sustained, large-scale drone operations. Second, even if the sale of drones under the new policy triggers drone arms racing, remotely piloted aircraft often have a stabilizing effect on crisis situations. As I have argued elsewhere, drones allow states to carry out military operations without risking significant escalation. Drones can help stabilize crises by collecting intelligence that can make subsequent operations more precise or limited, or can be deployed in lieu of more escalatory means, like ground forces or manned aircraft. While states may be more prone to launch drones on risky missions, states are unlikely to take escalatory military or diplomatic responses after a drone is lost to enemy action. In other words, drones provide a de-escalatory off-ramp that typically is not an option when inhabited assets are involved. For instance, the Pentagon largely ignored Syria’s downing of a remotely piloted Predator reconnaissance drone in 2015. In contrast, Syria’s recent shoot down of an inhabited Israel Air Force F-16 fighter in February triggered a massive Israeli retaliation that reportedly destroyed half of Syrian air defenses. As drones become an increasingly common fixture on the modern battlefield, the new export policy marks an important step in managing their proliferation and promoting Washington’s national security interests. Streamlining the drone export process helps Washington strengthen ties with allies and partners, enhances interoperability during coalition operations, and limits the ability of competitors to jeopardize U.S. influence. But more can be done to ensure allies can acquire U.S. drones. For instance, one retired Air Force general just called for changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime that would reclassify drones like the Reaper and ease their export. Until then, China and other drone producer states may attempt to woo customers by undercutting U.S. prices. Or, they might impose fewer political conditions to sales, allowing exports to states with shadier human rights records.

Drones are good and their consequences are exaggerated- interstate conflict unlikely, drones have stabilizing effects, limit amount of troops needed in combatHorowitz, et al. 16 (Michael C. Horowitz is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, Sarah E. Kreps is Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University. Matthew Fuhrmann is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University and Visiting Associate Professor at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation”, (November 10, 2016), HYPERLINK "https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257" \l "authorsTabList"https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257#authorsTabList 7/2) vr

Second, some analysts exaggerate the capabilities of current-generation drones. With limited weapons capabilities, the ability to operate only at relatively slow speeds, and no ability to defend themselves against ground-based or airborne threats, there are significant limits on the types of operations where

drones are useful. Current-generation drones are unlikely to be useful in contested environments. As a result, the utility of drones for interstate operations or coercive diplomacy is quite limited when an adversary has sophisticated air defenses. Third, existing views on drone proliferation gloss over a key point: drones may have stabilizing effects on the international security environment in some cases. Our analysis suggests that by enhancing the ability of states to monitor disputed territories and borders, drones can potentially reduce uncertainty about an adversary's behavior, which could promote peace if the enemy's intentions are benign. If the adversary is making preparations for an attack, drones could increase the likelihood of early detection. Particularly given the fledgling, albeit shaky, norm that shooting down drones does not constitute grounds for escalating a conflict, this is a significant aspect of drone proliferation that existing studies ignore. But, because they make countries more likely to use force in certain circumstances and are easier to deploy, there is always a risk that drones could encourage crisis escalation in a case where an actor views the shooting down of its drones as especially provocative, or where the deployment of a drone leads to a diplomatic incident that might not otherwise occur. Fourth, current-generation drones could have significant consequences for domestic politics. Democracies likely value drones in part because they reduce the risk of casualties, making the use of force more acceptable to the public. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders may find drones attractive for monitoring and repressing domestic opponents. Drones may also allow leaders to exert greater control over the military and become less dependent on large number of soldiers on the battlefield. In this context, the technical constraints of drones are minimized because governments generally control their airspace, reducing the risk that a drone would be shot down. To date, there have been relatively few uses of drones domestically, but this may change in the future. Leaders in Nigeria and Pakistan have used already drones to address regime threats, and it is not inconceivable that other states, such as Saudi Arabia, may employ armed drones to deal with similar threats in the future. Fifth, even small drones could prove useful for militant groups that deploy drones attached with inexpensive and rudimentary explosives as weapons. Countries such as the United States tend to have sophisticated air defenses that are focused on larger aerial objects, or advanced ground defenses geared toward stopping a truck full of explosives, but nonstate groups seeking to wreak havoc could do so with drones that become the equivalent of suicide bombs. Future Developments One challenge in assessing the consequences of drone proliferation is the speed of technological change. This article focuses on current-generation drones, but next-generation systems already in development could improve the capabilities of drones to perform the types of surveillance and strike missions they do now, as well as gain the ability to conduct new missions currently limited to manned aircraft. For example, China is currently pursuing the development of a stealth drone, reportedly named the Sharp Sword, which has already undergone initial flight testing. The Sharp Sword would not only have a larger weapons bay than China's CH-4 or Wing Loong; it would also have low observability characteristics that could make it harder for Western radars to detect. Until early 2016, the U.S. Navy was considering acquiring a next-generation armed drone (UCLASS, as mentioned above) as the follow-on to the X-47B, an experimental platform. The X-47B has an air-to-air refueling capability, allowing it to extend its range. Also, it is reportedly designed to support stealth technology, and it uses a piloting algorithm to take off from and land on an aircraft carrier. Some plans for follow-on programs included a large weapons bay capable of launching a wide variety of munitions, not just the Hellfire used by the Reaper and the Predator.133 The United States decided, however, to turn the UCLASS program into an unmanned, carrier-based, air-to-air refueling program—the MQ-25 Stingray/Carrier-Based Aerial Refueling System (CBARS)—and delay acquisition of a next-generation armed platform.134 The capabilities demonstrated by the X47-B show,

however, that if bureaucratic political support exists, the United States could build a drone with the ability to do what current-generation drones cannot do (i.e., operate in environments with adversary air defenses and complete strike missions more like those conducted by manned aircraft now). Similarly, one version of plans for the U.S. Air Force's Long Range Strike Bomber includes an “optional manning” feature that would allow the aircraft to go from a manned to an unmanned platform, “meant to give the bomber the best attributes of a killer drone (long endurance, no risk to aircrews) and a manned warplane (greater flexibility and the ability to respond to a fast-acting enemy).”135 These advances would make drones more useful in conventional, interstate settings given that they would be less vulnerable to air defenses. As a result, armed drones might assume a larger role in the context of wars such as the conflict in Syria or in a potential U.S.-China or NATO-Russia conflict. Although more operationally capable drones could translate into more capabilities for striking in contested environments, it is unlikely that they would make interstate conflict—which is rare for a number of reasons136—significantly more likely. In addition, ongoing trends in the development of commercial drones could reduce the cost of drones and make them financially advantageous for militaries to acquire. Military technologies based on underlying commercial capabilities generally experience faster relative price declines than military technologies such as stealth, which have only military markets.137 As the commercial drone market continues growing around the world, price competition in the high-end commercial market is likely to make more capabilities (excluding the military aspects of those capabilities, such as the most advanced surveillance packages and launching weapons) available at a lower price point. Trends in the development of military robotics suggest that drones are merely the beginning with regard to the integration of robotics in militaries around the world. For example, Israel already deploys an armed, remotely piloted, naval surface ship to patrol its sea borders.138 The U.S. Navy is developing the Knifefish, an unmanned underwater vehicle that will help protect its ships from sea mines.139 Russia is reportedly developing ground-based drones to help guard the perimeters of its ballistic missile bases.140 These systems are likely to be among the first of many developed and deployed by militaries around the world. From European countries facing labor shortages and budget crunches to autocracies concerned with regime stability above all, drones and related military robotic systems are likely to appear increasingly attractive over the next decade. As drones move from a niche capability to part and parcel of how militaries generate and deploy military power, their effects will undoubtedly change. Over the longer term, as technological uncertainty increases, the effects of military robotics could further shift the development and use of military power. For example, a shift to smaller, cheaper swarming platforms—which involve many drones flying together in formation—as opposed to large platforms could drive changes in how military operate. Given the significant uncertainty about technological trends in these areas, however, such outcomes remain speculative. Conclusion To whatever extent a U.S. monopoly on cutting-edge drones existed, it is over. Given ongoing proliferation trends and the technological advancements made by countries such as China, drones (and military robotics more generally) appear to be a critical area of military investment for many states over the next generation. How should the United States respond to this trend? Washington has placed significant restrictions on UAV exports, but if widespread proliferation is likely anyway, especially as countries such as China and Israel seem to be less discriminate in the marketplace, the United States could increase its level of drone exports. Which policy would best advance U.S. strategic interests in the coming years and decades? There is no easy answer, as there are costs and benefits associated with each approach. One contribution of our study is to underscore the trade-offs that the United States must consider as it responds to the proliferation of drones. The global spread of militarily useful UAVs could affect U.S.

national security, but in more limited ways than the alarmist view suggests—namely, by lowering barriers to the use of force domestically or in uncontested airspace. That drones are unlikely to prompt new interstate conflicts or transform international relations, however, suggests that the United States could reap the benefits of exporting UAVs in some cases while avoiding the most significant costs. Moreover, given the potential for drones to provide useful information about an adversary's maneuvers and possibly ease tension in some circumstances, U.S. exports could help provide reassurance to Washington and its allies. Nevertheless, there are several potential concerns for the United States regarding drone proliferation. As described above, technological advancements will likely make some drones more suitable for use in contested airspace, potentially increasing their military and political effects. Indeed, as drones continue proliferating and are used for a much broader array of missions than counterterrorism strikes, the U.S. military will have to consider how to deal with the use of drones by potential adversaries in areas where its forces are present. The use of armed drones also raises important ethical dilemmas that may become more acute as the technology spreads globally. The United States has a potential role to play in shaping global norms for drone use. More transparency by the United States concerning its decisionmaking process for drone strikes could give it more credibility in seeking to convince other countries to use their newly acquired drone capabilities in ways that comply with international law.141 Finally, one long-term risk for the United States is that its edge in more traditional, manned systems causes it to underestimate the potential uses of drones and other military robotic systems as the technology continues to advance. Leading militaries often struggle in the face of innovation, as it can be difficult to combine new technologies with human capital and organizational processes to effectively field them.142 That the U.S. Air Force has no program of record for the development of a next-generation armed drone and the U.S. Navy canceled the UCLASS program suggests that the bureaucratic politics of drones remain an important obstacle. In any case, it seems likely that drones are here to stay.143 It would therefore behoove the international community to anticipate the regional and international consequences of further drone proliferation. Our analysis shows that understanding these consequences first requires identifying the contexts in which drones may be used. Based on that perspective, it is clear that current-generation drones are not uniformly transformative. When it comes to future developments, however, it may be a different story.

Defense

Drone prolif theory is flawed Gilli and Gilli 16 (Andrea Gilli & Mauro Gilli Andrea Gilli is a Senior Researcher in Military Affairs at the NATO Defense College in Rome — where he served as intern in 2008 — and an Affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University in Palo Alto, CA. He holds a PhD in Social and Political Science from the European University Institute (EUI) in Fiesole (Florence, Italy), an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and a BA in Political Science and Economics from the University of Turin (Italy).[“The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints”https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134189])

Problems in the IR Literature The mainstream view among IR scholars suffers from several problems. First, the assumption that military technology diffuses quickly and easily lacks empirical and theoretical support. The existing literature does not provide concluding evidence that military technology is easy to produce or that it diffuses easily; moreover, this claim contradicts the literature in economics, economic history, management, and sociology.21 As the gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe illustrates, the number of exceptions is such that they cannot be discounted as simple anomalies.22 Part of this failure can be attributed to the fact that IR scholars have largely underestimated the technological challenges of designing, developing, and manufacturing combat-effective military platforms.23 Some scholars like Jonathan D. Caverley, Eugene Gholz, and Stephanie G. Neuman have discussed these aspects.24 However, their contribution has not been integrated in the literature on the diffusion of military innovations as of yet. Second, while the IR scholarship has correctly discussed the cultural, economic, institutional, and organizational constraints to the adoption of military innovations, it has neglected the material support they require.25 For example, British naval mastery in the late nineteenth century depended on coaling bases around the world.26 In fact, as Alfred Thayer Mahan noted, steam-powered warships were like “land birds, unable to fly from their own shores” without these bases.27 Similar considerations also apply to contemporary military platforms: without air-to-air refuel tankers, satellite communications, air- and sea-lift capabilities, regional commands, operating bases, and support facilities, many military technologies are of little or very limited utility.28 THE ECOSYSTEM CHALLENGE AND THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY INNOVATIONS In light of the problems of the existing IR literature, in this section we develop a theoretical framework aimed at explaining why and when military technology spreads easily and widely or not. Building on the ecosystem literature in management and in particular Ron Adner’s scholarship about the innovations’ ecosystem challenge, we argue that the successful adoption and employment of military innovations depends on meeting the ecosystem challenge.29 First, a country must be able to design, develop, and manufacture a combat-effective weapon system (platform challenge). Second, a country must also be able to provide or to ensure access to the required infrastructural and organizational support (adoption challenge).30 We discuss these two aspects more in depth in the following subsections. Platform Challenge In contrast to the dominant consensus in IR theory, designing, developing, and manufacturing military technology is far from easy and may actually entail significant technological and industrial challenges. Such challenges are not constant: they are a function, on the one hand, of the weapon systems’ capabilities (technology) and, on the other hand, of the manufacturer’s knowhow and experience (technological capacity). Technology. The challenge of developing a weapon system depends on its specific features: the higher the number of tasks it can fulfill, the wider the number of missions it can conduct, the more severe the environmental conditions in which it is expected to operate, and the more advanced the performance it

can achieve across a wide range of parameters (such as speed, accuracy, or radar cross-section, just to name a few), the more complicated its design, development, and production will be.31 First, as the capabilities of a military platform increase, it will require a higher number of more advanced systems, subsystems, and components. Integrating them together and ensuring reciprocal compatibility and systemic reliability, while maximizing the platform overall performance, is extremely daunting. On the one hand, cutting-edge technologies inevitably give rise to compatibility problems that are difficult to anticipate, to understand, and to address because of a lack of sufficient knowledge and experience.32 On the other hand, as the number of systems, subsystems, and components grows, the integration process becomes more complex: the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, for instance, features seventeen miles of copper wiring while its software contains eight million lines of code.33 Minor variations from the expected ideal specification for even marginal components (such as the weight of fasteners) can result in severe malfunctions and possibly even in systemic failure.34 Second, anticipating, understanding, and addressing the problems emerging from operating in demanding environmental conditions (solar activity, temperature excursion, or wind), as well as designing, developing, and integrating systems and subsystems aimed at neutralizing enemy countermeasures, adds a further layer of complexity that, inevitably, renders production more challenging.35 Technological Capacity. The intensity of these technological challenges is not constant across countries: it is a product of a country’s technological capacity to produce a given weapon system. Such capacity depends on whether a country possesses the necessary qualified workforce as well as an advanced technological and industrial base (laboratories, testing and production facilities, and accumulated experience and know-how). The degree to which such capacity can be met, in turn, is a product of the very military technology being developed. The more demanding the technology is, the more specific (that is, unique) will the required capacity be and hence difficult to meet. When the technology being developed is relatively unsophisticated (in terms of functions, performances, and capabilities), manufacturers can easily.

Drone prolif won’t happen- current generation drones are open to attacks, and have significantly less capabilities then current military technology, a policy in efforts to limit drone prolif would damage possible ally relationshipsHorowitz, et al. 16 (Michael C. Horowitz is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, Sarah E. Kreps is Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University.Matthew Fuhrmann is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University and Visiting Associate Professor at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation”, (November 10, 2016), HYPERLINK "https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257" \l "authorsTabList"https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257#authorsTabList 7/2) vr

What are the consequences of drone proliferation for international security? Despite extensive discussions in the policy world concerning drone strikes for counterterrorism purposes, myths about the capabilities and implications of current-generation drones often outstrip reality. Understanding the impact of drones requires separating fact from fiction by examining their effects in six different contexts—counterterrorism, interstate conflict, crisis onset and deterrence, coercive diplomacy, domestic control and repression, and use by nonstate actors for the purposes of terrorism. Although current-generation drones introduce some unique capabilities into conflicts, they are unlikely to produce the

dire consequences that some analysts fear. In particular, drone proliferation carries potentially significant consequences for counterterrorism operations and domestic control in authoritarian regimes. Drones could also enhance monitoring in disputed territories, potentially leading to greater stability. Given their technical limitations, however, current-generation drones are unlikely to have a large impact on interstate warfare. Assessing the consequences of drone proliferation has important implications for a range of policy issues, including the management of regional disputes, the regulation of drone exports, and defense against potential terrorist attacks on the homeland. Introduction In the last decade and a half, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), “drones,” has become commonplace.1 In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched its first armed drone strike in Afghanistan in November of that year. The strike missed its intended target—Mullah Akhund, the Taliban's number three in command—but killed several others. A year later, the United States used an armed drone to strike suspected al-Qaida members in Yemen, including Qa'id Salim Sinan al Harithi, who was thought to have plotted the attack against the USS Cole in 2000, which had killed seventeen U.S. sailors. Since then, U.S. drone strikes have grown in both geographic scope and number, extending to Pakistan in 2004 and Somalia in 2007, and increasing from about 50 total counterterrorism strikes from 2001 to 2008 to about 450 from 2009 to 2014.2 U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta once understandably referred to drones as “the only game in town” in terms of stopping al-Qaida.3 Although the United States has been the most prolific user of combat drones, several other countries have employed them as well, including Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. Almost a dozen states, including China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, reportedly now possess armed drones, and many others—including India—are racing to acquire them. The spread of armed drones has ignited considerable debate among scholars and policymakers about the consequences of armed and unarmed drone proliferation for international and regional security. One camp views drones as an important, even transformative, military technology. Many within this camp caution that drones lower the costs of using force to the point of making war too easy and therefore more likely.4 Additionally, because drones have a variety of commercial applications and because drone exports are increasing, those in this camp generally believe that militarily-relevant drones will spread very quickly.5 Drone proliferation, therefore, is both inevitable and highly consequential for the international security environment. In contrast, a second camp views drones as a nontransformative technology that replicates capabilities that many modern militaries already possess.6 In addition, analysts in this camp contend that the technological requirements of sophisticated drones are beyond the reach of many countries.7 Consequently, drone proliferation is relatively insignificant for regional and international security. This article assesses the consequences of current-generation drone proliferation, concluding that both of the above perspectives are misguided. Examining the effects of UAVs in six different contexts—counterterrorism, interstate conflict, crisis onset and deterrence, coercive diplomacy, domestic control and repression, and use by nonstate actors for the purposes of terrorism—we show that, although current-generation drones will introduce some unique capabilities into conflicts around the world, they are unlikely to produce the dire consequences that some analysts fear. In particular, drone proliferation carries potentially significant consequences for counterterrorism operations and domestic control in authoritarian regimes. Drones lower the costs of using force by eliminating the risk that pilots will be killed, making some states—especially democracies, which may be especially casualty sensitive—more likely to carry out targeted attacks against suspected militants. In addition, using drones could provide autocratic leaders with a new tool to bolster their domestic regime security.8 Yet, in general, current-generation drones are likely to have a minimal impact on interstate relations. Armed or advanced unarmed drones are unlikely to

provoke international crises or incite regional instability. In addition, current-generation drones offer little utility for coercion against other governments. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, moreover, drones might enhance security in disputed border regions by providing states with a greater ability to monitor contested regions persistently at lower cost. Monitoring can help to reassure states that potential adversaries are not attempting to change the status quo through force. The limited significance of current-generation drones in interstate contexts beyond monitoring stems from a key technological limitation: drones currently in operation are vulnerable to air defense systems, so they are much less likely to be effective when operating in hostile airspace.9 The stakes in the debate about drone proliferation are significant. For example, if drone proliferation is inherently dangerous, the United States should be leery of other states acquiring drones, especially armed drones. The United States should therefore attempt to limit drone proliferation, including through its own exports. Such a policy might reduce drone proliferation, but it could have adverse consequences for the U.S. industrial base, while causing Washington to miss opportunities to build capacity among allies. Alternatively, if current-generation drones are no different from, and less capable than, other comparable conventional military technologies, the United States should be less concerned with the effect of drone proliferation on the regional and international security environment. The article proceeds as follows. First, we contextualize the drone debate by discussing ongoing trends in drone proliferation. Second, we describe in more detail the core arguments made by the two camps concerning the military and political effects of drones. Third, we lay out our main claim that the reality is more complicated than either of these two perspectives suggests. Fundamentally, current-generation drone proliferation will likely have heterogeneous consequences, being more influential in the context of counterterrorism and intrastate conflict than interstate conflict. In the fourth section, we argue that the consequences of drone proliferation could change dramatically with technological advancements over time. We conclude by identifying some of the national security implications for the United States. Trends in Drone Proliferation Unmanned aircraft have a rich history in world politics.10 The 1849 Italian War of Independence and the American Civil War, for example, featured the use of unmanned balloons. In World War I, the United States tested the Kettering Bug, a “self-flying aerial torpedo” that, driven by wind, released its bomb onto the target. The war ended, however, before the aircraft became operational.11 During World War II, the United Kingdom and the United States developed target drones, and Germany commissioned a project to develop an unmanned vehicle for combat, which resulted in the V-1. The V-1, however, was more of an early cruise missile than a drone.12 The 1960 U-2 incident, in which American pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union, catalyzed further work on drones to try to reduce the vulnerability of pilots.13 The United States used Firebee UAVs to conduct frequent surveillance missions during the Vietnam War, and Israel used drones in the 1982 Lebanon War to locate targets that piloted aircraft later destroyed.14 The United States deployed the unarmed Predator for surveillance in the 1990s Balkans war, but moved to arm the aircraft only after the September 11 attacks, when it deployed Predators with Hellfire missiles in Afghanistan.15 Although the Predator and its successor, the Reaper, are armed and can travel long distances at medium altitude to strike targets, most drones fielded by militaries around the world are tactical and unarmed; they can fly for only a few hours at a time and are designed exclusively to provide local surveillance data.16 Of the nearly ninety countries that now have military drones of some kind, the majority do not yet possess armed and advanced drones. Still, the number of states with those capabilities is growing. According to Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael Horowitz, by the end of 2014, twenty-seven countries possessed “advanced” drones, defined as UAVs that can stay in the air for at least twenty hours, operate at an altitude of at least

16,000 feet, and have a maximum takeoff weight of at least 1,320 pounds.17 In addition, seven countries possessed armed drones, and nearly two dozen others had programs in place to acquire a lethal UAV capability. Advanced unarmed and armed drones continued to spread internationally in 2015 and 2016. The United States agreed to arm Italy's previously unarmed Reapers; it also agreed to sell unarmed Reapers to Spain and the Netherlands; and several European states began a new joint armed drone program that seems more likely to succeed than prior joint efforts.18 In 2015, Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan used armed drones in combat for the first time—against domestic insurgents.19 All three of these states acquired their armed drones from China, a country that has solidified its role as a global provider of armed drones.20 In addition, after using unarmed surveillance drones in Kashmir and witnessing Pakistan's use of armed drones, India sought armed UAVs from the United States.21 It also reached a deal with Israel to acquire the Heron, a drone capable of conducting air strikes.22 The capabilities of current-generation armed drones vary considerably. Most armed UAVs lack the capabilities of the U.S. Predator or Reaper, which, combined with data processing and logistical capacity, give the United States the ability to conduct drone strikes around the world. Other armed drones, such as variants of the Chinese CH-3 or Wing Loong, may lack global positioning system (GPS) integration or over-the-horizon strike capabilities, and thus have limited reach. In addition, an armed CH-3 can reportedly remain in the air for about six hours, or less than half as long as the U.S. Reaper can, and its range is just 250 kilometers. Moreover, it can carry only two missiles, or half of the payload of the Reaper.23 Even less capable armed drones have military relevance, however. Consider the Pakistani Buraaq, which many analysts believe is a variant of China's CH-3, the same system used by Nigeria. The Pakistan government's intended use for this platform is either within Pakistan or against India, so the platform's relatively short endurance and range are less limiting than they might be for the United States, whose stated operational demands are more expansive. Additionally, in combination with other military assets, including manned aircraft, a country can extend the “reach” of its drones even without GPS integration. Unarmed, short-range drones may have military relevance as well; they can increase a state's monitoring abilities and provide greater situational awareness. Because most interstate disputes occur between neighbors, states' primary security concerns often involve surveillance or limited military actions across relatively shorter distances. Armed and unarmed drones without global reach are thus sufficient for most national military requirements. In sum, militarily relevant drones are spreading widely, though the most advanced drones remain beyond the reach of many countries, a trend that likely will continue in the short term. The logistical challenges for longer-range drone operations are daunting even for a country such as the United States. Given these challenges, it is unlikely that many states will use drones the way the United States sometimes does for global strike operations. Two Narratives on Drone Proliferation What are the implications, if any, of drones and drone proliferation for the international security environment? Two competing narratives dominate debates about drone proliferation, with cleavages emerging based on divergent assumptions about the inherent nature of the technology. We sketch the core arguments here to illustrate the competing claims. Our discussion reflects the broad contours of the debate, but it is important to note that arguments lumped in the same camp may be analytically distinct. A TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGY Many analysts and policymakers argue that drones will transform warfare in the twenty-first century. Scholars and journalists in this camp routinely describe drones as a revolutionary military technology. As Adam Stulberg wrote in 2007, “It is now conventional wisdom that we stand at the dawning of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) revolution in military affairs.”24 More recently, Amy Zegart stated: “Drones are going to revolutionize how nations and nonstate actors threaten the use of violence.”25 From the above

perspective, drones are revolutionary because they lower the costs of using military force. In his annual report on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, United Nations special rapporteur Christof Heyns noted that “drones make it not only physically easier to dispatch long-distance and targeted armed force, but the proliferation of drones may lower social barriers in society against the deployment of lethal force and result in attempts to weaken the relevant legal standards.”26 Drones change decisionmaking because they do not inherently risk the life and limb of the user.27 States with armed drones can conduct strikes without risking the lives of their pilots. This capability is particularly useful when governments fear the domestic political or diplomatic consequences of taking military action that could result in casualties. Moreover, drone strikes often involve secrecy and therefore shield leaders from domestic blowback. As U.S. President Barack Obama said in May 2013, the typical decisionmaking barriers to the use of force become eroded when using drones because they do not attract “the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites.”28 By lowering the political threshold for using force, this argument suggests, drones make states more willing to deploy their military assets. Military deployments, in turn, make the use of lethal force more likely. Proponents of this view (though not necessarily of the uses of force themselves) cite the prevalence of U.S. drone strikes in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, arguing that the United States would have used military force less frequently in these countries if it did not have drones at its disposal.29 Lowering the threshold for military deployments also includes the use of unarmed drones such as surveillance aircraft that may be more likely to transgress an adversary's airspace because they can do so at a lower cost. The second-order effect of deploying even unarmed surveillance drones is that other countries may be more willing to shoot down drones than manned aircraft, which some analysts worry could cause tense situations to escalate.30 Some analysts therefore conclude that drones will be destabilizing for the security environment. As Michael Boyle argues, “[T]he race for this technology is resetting the terms of global competition and quietly altering the rules of the game for many long-simmering conflicts and rivalries.”31 In this view, drone proliferation has mostly undesirable consequences for international security, and the rapid diffusion of armed and advanced drones around the globe may exacerbate this destabilizing tendency.32 Drones are the tip of the spear for the spread of robotics writ large, a commercially driven enterprise that renders many key components of drones as fundamentally dual-use technologies.33 Although many countries may find state-of-the-art armed drones hard to operate, continuing technological advances eventually will make it easier for them to do so, just as they have with other military technologies, such as combat aircraft. For all of these reasons, armed drone proliferation is an important international security issue from this perspective. JUST ANOTHER PLATFORM A second camp questions whether current-generation drones will transform how states conduct military operations, and whether UAVs will fundamentally increase the mobility or destructive power of armed forces.34 Drones can be used to carry out targeted strikes, but states may also carry out targeted killings through other means, such as manned F-16 strikes or, in the case of the raid that ended with the death of Osama bin Laden, Special Operations forces. In this view, UAVs are just another platform that militaries may employ to achieve an objective.35 As Canada's chief of staff, Gen. Thomas Lawson, said in 2013: “If a kinetic round is propelled toward a confirmed enemy for strategic purposes by a rifle, by an artillery piece, by an aircraft manned, or an aircraft unmanned, any of those that end up with a desired effect is a supportable point of view.”36 Scholars and policymakers in this camp suggest that the policy of targeted killing is more important than the technology used to carry out strikes. Charli Carpenter, for example, argues that, to the extent that one is concerned about drone strikes violating international law, the problem is U.S. policy.37 Drones are merely the delivery system, which could just

as easily be a soldier or manned aircraft. Some current and former policymakers have expressed a similar view. In his memoirs, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta states: “[T]o call our campaign against Al Qaeda a ‘drone program’ is a little like calling World War I a ‘machine gun program.’ Technology has always been an aspect of war … what is most crucial is not the size of the missile or the ability to deploy it from thousands of miles away” but how the munitions are used.38 In 2012 Gen. Norton Schwartz, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, stated that “if it is a legitimate target, then I would argue that the manner in which you engage that target, whether it be close combat or remotely, is not a terribly relevant question.”39 What militaries do, in this view, is more significant than how they do it. Drones themselves are not especially unique, even if the way in which the United States has employed this technology after the September 11 attacks is novel. Proponents of this perspective point out that current-generation drones have significant technological limitations, which we discuss in greater detail below. Because they fly at low altitudes and slow speeds, for instance, drones are highly vulnerable to enemy air defenses. In light of these limitations, drones have little utility in interstate disputes—especially compared to technologies such as nuclear weapons. As the authors of a 2014 RAND report put it, “By themselves, armed UAVs do not win wars, and wars can be won without them.”40 Drones may have aided U.S. operations against the Taliban, for instance, but they have not helped the United States achieve a decisive victory. According to those in this camp, given the technological limitations discussed above, the effects of drone diffusion on the international security environment are likely to be modest. In addition, some scholars question the notion that armed drones will spread at a rapid rate. Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, for instance, argue that armed drones are expensive and difficult to buy, build, and operate.41 Referencing the massive logistical support that the United States requires to conduct drone strikes—including forward operating bases in far-flung places in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa42—they argue that few other countries will be able to acquire and use armed drones as expansively.43 This is yet another reason that concerns about the consequences of drone proliferation are overblown, these scholars contend. The Advantages and Limitations of Drones Neither of the above perspectives is complete. Those who argue that drones are transformative overlook important operational limits. The more dismissive view, by contrast, fails to appreciate how removing pilots from aircraft changes the decisionmaking calculus of using drones versus manned alternatives. Missing from the current debate about the consequences of drone proliferation is a realistic understanding of what today's drones can and cannot do. Accurately capturing the capabilities of current-generation drones is critical to understanding how drones may (or may not) change military affairs or world politics more generally. We take up this task in the following sections. WHY DRONES ARE NOT A SILVER BULLET Some observers may view drones as a panacea for many national security challenges that could involve the use of force. Current-generation drones have at least five serious limitations, however. First, as noted previously, drones fly significantly slower than manned aircraft (the cruise speed of an F-16 is about six times that of a Reaper). One U.S. Air Force general therefore described even the most advanced current-generation drones as “useless in a contested environment”44 (i.e., in a scenario where the United States is fighting an adversary with air defenses). Countries with anti-air defense systems are well positioned to shoot down the slow-moving drones. Hamas discovered this in 2014 when it flew what it referred to as an armed drone—though it was very rudimentary—into Israel, only to have the drone shot down.45 Second, the data link that connects drones to remote pilots creates a potential vulnerability, because it introduces the risk of jamming, hacking, and spoofing.46 Smaller drones must be linked by radio to their controllers, and the data links can be easily jammed and disabled. One study showed how hackers could mimic GPS signals and fool the navigation systems.47 Cyber attacks could cause a drone, at the least, to

be unable to calculate its position, allowing it to be brought down fairly easily. Responding to these vulnerabilities, the U.S. Defense Department has developed a software program designed to prevent the hacking of drone control and navigation systems.48 Third, current-generation drones do not possess air-to-air capabilities or countermeasures. The U-2, a manned reconnaissance platform, has sophisticated countermeasures to defend against Russian-made air defense systems such as the S-300. The Global Hawk, the unmanned equivalent, lacks these countermeasures.49 Upgrades that would bring the Global Hawk's air defense system to a level of rough parity with the U-2s would cost $1.9 billion over ten years, reducing the hourly-usage-cost advantage of the Global Hawk over the U-2.50 Fourth, UAVs duplicate many of the features of other systems that advanced militaries already possess, including fighters, helicopters, and other related systems. Thus, in only a limited number of operational circumstances do drones provide unique operational capacity. For example, even though the use of Hellfire missiles by the Reaper receives considerable media attention, the manned Apache helicopter fires more Hellfire missiles per year than any other platform in the U.S. military. In general, helicopters, ballistic missiles, and manned aircraft can perform many of the same functions as current-generation armed drones, and they are less vulnerable to anti-air defense systems. China's manned JH-7, for example, is more maneuverable and able to defend itself than the CH-4 armed drone. Additionally, compared to the CH-4, the JH-7 has a much larger payload and holds heavier bombs. The U.S. manned A-10 is more effective for close air support—eliminating ground troops at close range—than the MQ-9 Reaper, because it flies low and is reinforced with titanium to protect it from ground fire.51 Fifth, the ubiquitous deployment of drones in a conventional conflict is potentially limited by the difficulty of retaining pilots to guide them.52 Operators sit behind consoles for long shifts, putting in thirteen to fourteen hour days and logging about three to four times as many flight hours as pilots of manned aircraft, about 900–1,100 compared to 200–300 flight hours per year.53 The long hours in front of a console create a “mix of boredom, loneliness, and stress,”54 sometimes resulting in high levels of post-traumatic stress as operators develop a sense of familiarity with the targets whom they may be responsible for killing. Thus, despite having been trained at rates far higher than fighter and bomber pilots combined, drone pilots have left the service at three times the rate of those operating manned aircraft. As a result, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in 2014 that the Air Force had only 85 percent of the drone pilots needed to carry out its missions.55 In 2015, the figure dropped to 65 percent,56 with about 1,000 active-duty pilots. One source suggests that although the U.S. Air Force trains 180 drone pilots a year, it loses another 240 to attrition.57 If these challenges exist for the United States, the country with the most extensive pilot training system in the world, they very likely exist for others as well. THE UNIQUE FEATURES OF DRONES Despite their limitations, drones can still have important battlefield consequences. Indeed, the perspective that suggests that drones are just another platform, substitutable with manned airborne or ground equivalents, glosses over some key advantages of drones. As discussed earlier, one obvious benefit is that drones operate without a pilot in the cockpit. States with armed drones can conduct strikes without risking the lives of their forces, thus minimizing casualties. At the same time, current-generation drones—manned and unmanned—operate most effectively in permissive airspace, where there is a relatively low risk of being shot down. The reduction in casualty risk afforded by UAVs nonetheless has implications for the way in which many actors—especially in democracies—think about the use of military force. Precisely because drones reduce the cost of war in terms of casualties, they risk creating a sense of distance from the conflict, which the philosopher Immanuel Kant warned could remove important checks on the use of force.58 As Kant put it, “[I]f the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared … nothing is

more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources.”59 As scholars who study the constraints faced by democracies in war observe, when citizens bear the direct burdens of war, in part through incurring casualties, they pressure leaders to be more selective about the wars that they fight.60 The use of drones remains popular among the U.S. public, allowing it to conduct counterterrorism strikes without producing U.S. military casualties. Levels of support in the United States for U.S. use of UAVs from 2011 to 2014 hovered around 65 percent.61 Given the responsiveness of democratic legislatures to public attitudes,62 reducing the risk to soldiers may also loosen legislative constraints on the use of force. With foreign interventions, in general, Congress has incentives to grant the executive latitude in deciding when to use force. The reason is simple: legislators receive little credit for foreign policy actions that go well and get the blame for those that do not.63 Congressional opposition has therefore been limited to isolated cases of members who are concerned not with the overall policy but rather with the prospect of the United States using drones to target its own citizens. Senator Rand Paul cited the potential of drones to target U.S. citizens in attempting to delay the confirmation of John Brennan as director of central intelligence in 2013 with a parliamentary procedure known as the filibuster, arguing that Americans should first be found guilty of a crime before being executed.64 Second, and perhaps more significantly, drones have operational advantages, because they allow for sustained and persistent flights over potential targets. The existing U.S. arsenal of armed drones—primarily the Predator and Reaper—can remain aloft, fully loaded with munitions, for more than fourteen hours, compared with four hours or fewer for F-16 fighter jets and A-10 ground attack aircraft.65 Naval air platforms such as the F-18 E/F have an effective mission time of slightly more than two hours.66 These systems can be refueled in the air, but that requires more resources and does not address the fundamental constraint arising from the limits of human endurance. These advantages could be magnified in some next-generation systems. For example, the efficient electronic motors and long wingspan of the SolarEagle, a solar-powered drone that Boeing and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are developing, will allow the aircraft to remain in the air for five years, making it a possible replacement for satellites that are costly to both develop and maintain.67 Next-generation armed UAVs at the high end, such as the U.S. Navy's recently scrapped Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program, could have flight times ranging from six to twelve hours, though they could have air-to-air refueling capabilities and be able to carry a weapons load similar to that of an F-18.68 The ability of UAVs to “loiter,” to fly slowly over a small area, offers clear advantages in terms of identifying and engaging targets. Greater endurance enhances situational awareness, such that UAV pilots can more carefully verify targets than an attack aircraft pilot with mere seconds to accomplish the same objective.69 The ability to divert missiles launched from a UAV in response to changes on the ground, combined with the UAV's greater overall situational awareness, makes UAV strikes more likely to be accurate than strikes by alternative platforms at the same targets.70 Lastly, drones might reduce the diplomatic fallout associated with the use of force. In particular, drones allow the country flying them to maintain some semblance of diplomatic cover given that the pilots are thousands of miles away rather than directly flying overhead. Although countries such as Pakistan sometimes publicly protest about drones operating above their territory, such complaints are most likely displays of domestic political theater.71 As a number of sources suggest, Pakistan has approved foreign drone strikes on its territory; indeed, the high frequency of such strikes suggests that at least tacit approval would have been essential.72 Yet drones give the government conducting the strikes greater plausible deniability than alternatives such as ground forces,

which require a considerable logistical footprint, or manned aircraft. The amount of diplomatic cover that drones provide obviously has limits—a CH-4 with a Chinese flag painted on its side is still a Chinese military platform—but the belief that drones provide some degree of diplomatic cover could make countries more likely to use them. In sum, current-generation drones have unique political, operational, and diplomatic advantages, all else equal, and those advantages could make it easier for states to use force in some settings. These advantages point to an important corrective of the perspective that maintains that drones are just another platform and therefore do not in and of themselves shape how states are likely to consider using force. The Strategic Consequences of Drone Proliferation Given the preceding discussion, what are the strategic consequences of drone proliferation? It depends. Drones may be transformative in some contexts but not others. In this section, we assess the impact of drone proliferation in six contexts: (1) counterterrorism; (2) interstate conflict; (3) crisis onset and deterrence; (4) coercive diplomacy; (5) civil war and domestic conflict; and (6) operations by nonstate actors. Research on the strategic effects of military technology identifies these particular contexts as potentially salient.73 We therefore focus our attention on them here, recognizing that they are by no means the only areas in which drones might matter.74 As the following analysis shows, the effects of drone proliferation are heterogeneous. Current-generation drones are likely to be consequential for counterterrorism and domestic conflict, but less transformative in most other settings.

AT: Solvency

Defense

Policies to stop selling drones are ineffective and fail to consider the dual use problemSchulzke 18 (Marcus Schulzke is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University at Albany, “Drone Proliferation and the Challenge of Regulating Dual-Use Technologies”,(May 18, 2018), HYPERLINK "https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viy047/4999288%207/3"https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viy047/4999288 7/3) vr

The controversy surrounding military drones has generated many proposals for restricting or prohibiting existing drones, additional autonomous variants that may be created in the future, and the sale of drones to certain markets. Moreover, there is broad interest in regulating military drones, with proposals coming not only from academics but also from NGOs and policymakers. I argue that these proposals generally fail to consider the dual-use character of drones and that they therefore provide inadequate regulatory guidance. Drones are not confined to the military but rather spread across international and domestic security roles, humanitarian re- lief efforts, and dozens of civilian applications. Drones, their component technologies, the control infrastructure, and the relevant technical exper- tise would continue to develop under a military-focused regulatory regime as civilian technologies that have the potential to be militarized. I evaluate the prospects of drone regulation with the help of research on other dual- use technologies, while also showing what the study of drones can con- tribute to that literature. Drones’ ubiquity in nonmilitary roles presents special regulatory challenges beyond those associated with WMDs and mis- siles, which indicates that strict regulatory controls or international gover- nance frameworks are unlikely to succeed. With this in mind, I further argue that future research should acknowledge that drone proliferation across military and civilian spheres is unavoidable and shift focus to con- sidering how drone warfare may be moderated by countermeasures and institutional pressures. Keywords: Drones, security, weapons Introduction The dual-use problem, which arises when the same commodities can be used in weapons or in peaceful civilian applications, is a challenge for research on inter- national security and international trade that brings these fields into dialogue with each other and forces us to make tradeoffs between economic, humanitarian, and security goals (Fuhrmann 2008). “Most of the components of major weapons sys- tems are dual use in nature” (Fuhrmann 2012, xi), making it difficult to prevent the spread of weapons technologies without also impinging on legitimate trade or even interfering with the acquisition of goods that have vital peacetime bene- fits. Further complicating the dual-use problem is that the knowledge and material 2 Drone Proliferation infrastructure acquired from civilian programs can provide the foundation for later efforts to build weapons. Most of the research on dual-use technologies focuses on weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles (Mistry 2003; Busch and Joyner 2009; Stinnett et al. 2011; Fuhrmann 2012; Tucker 2012b), but the prolifer- ation of drones over the past decade presents a new regulatory puzzle with distinct challenges that must be considered to advance the study of dual-use technologies and, in particular, research on drones. Drones have the potential to alter how and when wars are fought, especially when it comes to asymmetric conflicts (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016). By allow- ing their users to strike from a distance and avoid the risks associated with deploy- ing human combatants on the battlefield, drones arguably lower the threshold for using lethal force and make it easier to escape accountability for use-of-force deci- sions (Kreps and Kaag 2012; Sauer and Schornig 2012; Enemark 2013; Kaag and Kreps 2014; Chamayou 2015). Drone variants operating in other roles or those with higher degrees of autonomy raise still more worries, including the prospect that autonomous machines may one day be able to kill independently (Sparrow 2007; Krishnan

2009; Tonkens 2013; Schulzke 2013). Concerned academics, policymak- ers, and activists have proposed a range of regulatory mechanisms to curtail the use of UAVs and the development of new drone models (Altman 2013; Zenko and Kreps 2014; Boyle 2013; Buchanan and Keohane 2015; Sparrow 2016). However, these ef- forts suffer from a serious defect: they assume a sharp division between military and civilian technologies. Research on the dual-use problem must address a larger range of innovations, take a broader conception of dual-use that includes software and finished products in addition to the component parts that are typically the object of study, and recog- nize the importance of cultural and normative shifts that may alter attitudes toward dual-use goods. At the same time, the study of drone regulation should be situated within the research on dual-use technologies and weapons regulation. Research on military drones is usually limited to machines that are designed with explicit mili- tary functions, and even here the focus is on machines that are armed, rather than on the many types of unarmed military drones. Conversely, research on drones and autonomous systems in civilian roles, such as in cars, proceeds without much com- ment on how these could impact the future of international security (Meier 2015). Looking at the dual-use character of drones exposes the unrecognized challenges inherent in existing regulatory proposals, while also offering opportunities for re- thinking how future research could be more profitably framed. Drones pose several regulatory challenges that go beyond those coming from the dual-use goods associated with WMDs and ballistic missiles or even those re- lated to more conventional military hardware. First, drones are dual-use in a more expansive sense than how this term is generally used. Most efforts to restrict dual- use technologies focus on the component parts of weapons, while treating final products as being military or civilian in their function. Drones are dual-use, both when it comes to their constitutive parts and when it comes to the final products, because machines produced for nonmilitary security roles or the commercial mar- ket can be transformed into weapons or vice versa, often with little modification. Second, the market for drones is so vast, heterogeneous, and conducive to civil- military technology sharing that it is open to a more diverse array of actors than other dual-use markets. This increases the possible routes of technology sharing, thereby raising additional regulatory challenges. The diversity of drone models also introduces formidable difficulties when it comes to defining the scope of regula- tions. Broadening restrictions in response to this challenge would improve the like- lihood of successfully curtailing the proliferation of military drones but would come at the expense of increasing the costs of restrictions and the incentives for defec- tion. Third, the pervasiveness of drones and related technologies in civilian life, as well as their usefulness in humanitarian roles, could cause cultural shifts beyond those associated with dual-use goods that are less visible in civilian life. Finally, one of the central problems for proponents of drone restrictions is the effort to pre- vent the development of autonomous drones that could select and engage targets by themselves or with limited human oversight. Regulatory efforts might therefore have to focus on software in addition to hardware. I argue that ambitious projects to severely constrain or even prevent military drone proliferation are untenable because they cannot cope with the dual-use prob- lem. Future research would benefit from exploring more modest efforts to slow the pace of technological diffusion. Although drones are potentially revolutionary weapons platforms, the impact of current generation drones has been limited be- cause they are fairly unsophisticated compared to manned vehicles and because they are vulnerable to countermeasures (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016). This suggests that drones present a security risk that can be managed so long as the machines do not advance too quickly. Restrictions that are designed to moderate the pace of development, rather than stopping it entirely or creating elaborate over- sight mechanisms that states would have little incentive to support, could make it possible to realize the benefits of drones while still affording the time

needed to de- velop effective countermeasures for those that are directed into military purposes. Such restrained diffusion would not prevent drone proliferation, but it would have the advantage of being an easier point of compromise between the many private and public actors that would need to coordinate to limit the industry. Subsequent research on drone regulation would be best served by looking for ways of managing drone proliferation across military and civilian roles so that it does not dramati- cally upset the balance of military forces. It is particularly important to give more thought to the role of antidrone countermeasures and to institutional pressures that may slow the adoption of drones in military roles.