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Otto von Bismarck Bismarck’s political career Elected to Prussian Diet in 1847 Involved in counter-revolutionary plots in 1848 Excessively anti-liberal “Only two things matter for Prussia – to avoid an alliance with democracy and to secure equality with Austria.” Becoming increasingly anti-Austrian, Bismarck was convinced that war between Prussia and Austria was inevitable Fear that Germany would be divided in North and South Seek support among German nationalists and that Austria should be driven out of the Confederation and a Kleindeutschland established under Prussian control Bismarck had a reputation as a tough, ambitious and ruthless politician – he was a loyal supporter of the monarchy but was also seen as an unpredictable maverick and a realist Realpolitik The term is used to describe the ruthless and cynical policies of politicians, like Bismarck, whose main aim was to increase the power of a state. Realpolitik characterized Bismarck’s political career from first to last. He recognized that a conservative regime could no longer operate without popular support, not least that of the liberals whose power was growing. He hoped to achieve conservative ends by means that were far from conservative. His unscrupulous methods occasionally brought him into conflict with William I and the Prussian military and political elites. But while many distrusted his tactics, most respected his judgment. Bismarck’s aims

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Page 1: bmshistoryblog.files.wordpress.com  · Web viewRealpolitik characterized Bismarck’s political career from first to last. He recognized that a conservative regime could no longer

Otto von Bismarck Bismarck’s political career

• Elected to Prussian Diet in 1847• Involved in counter-revolutionary plots in 1848• Excessively anti-liberal• “Only two things matter for Prussia – to avoid an alliance

with democracy and to secure equality with Austria.”• Becoming increasingly anti-Austrian, Bismarck was

convinced that war between Prussia and Austria was inevitable

• Fear that Germany would be divided in North and South • Seek support among German nationalists and that Austria should be driven out of the

Confederation and a Kleindeutschland established under Prussian control• Bismarck had a reputation as a tough, ambitious and ruthless politician – he was a loyal

supporter of the monarchy but was also seen as an unpredictable maverick and a realist

RealpolitikThe term is used to describe the ruthless and cynical policies of politicians, like Bismarck, whose main aim was to increase the power of a state. Realpolitik characterized Bismarck’s political career from first to last. He recognized that a conservative regime could no longer operate without popular support, not least that of the liberals whose power was growing. He hoped to achieve conservative ends by means that were far from conservative. His unscrupulous methods occasionally brought him into conflict with William I and the Prussian military and political elites. But while many distrusted his tactics, most respected his judgment.

Bismarck’s aims

• Prussian domination of north Germany rather than full national unity (Prussian patriot rather than German nationalist)

• Aware of the popular appeal of German nationalism, he realized that the movement might be manipulated in the interests of enhancing Prussian power. He tended to see Prussian and German interests as one and the same.

Opportunism: taking advantage of opportunities that present themselves

Realpolitik: doing what is practical vs what is ideal (Bismarck’s aim: Prussia to lead the German nation)

Solving the constitutional crisis is an example of Bismarck’s opportunism and Realpolitik in the steps to unification.

Page 2: bmshistoryblog.files.wordpress.com  · Web viewRealpolitik characterized Bismarck’s political career from first to last. He recognized that a conservative regime could no longer

Austro Prussian ConflictRelations between Austria and Prussia became icy after Bismarck’s appointment. In December 1862 he warned Austria that it was inviting catastrophe unless it recognized Prussia as an equal in Germany. By 1863 it was clear that Bismarck and Austria were at odds over the future German development. In 1863 the prospect of Bismarck defeating Austria and bringing about a Prussian-dominated Germany seemed highly unlikely.

The problem of Schleswig HolsteinBismarck sees that the crisis offered splendid opportunities. He hoped to annex the two duchies, strengthening Prussian power in north Germany.

Austrian-Prussian co-operationBismarck first won Austrian help, but the Austrians had very different aims from Bismarck. They were suspicious of rampant German nationalism and anxious to prevent Bismarck from allying Prussia with the forces of nationalism. They then pursued the traditional policy of co-operation with Prussia. Together they issued an ultimatum to Denmark threatening to occupy Schleswig unless it withdrew the new constitution within 48 hours. Denmark refused. Thus, in January 1864, a combined Prussian and Austrian army advanced through Holstein and into Schleswig.

Denmark had little choice than to surrender in July 1864.

Treaty of Vienna (1864), the King of Denmark gave up his rights over Schleswig and Holstein, which were to be jointly administered by Austria and Prussia

The question of the long-term fate of the duchies now became a source of severe tension between the two German powers. Prussia had begun working for annexation which was unacceptable to Austria

Neither Austria nor Bismarck wanted war at this stage. Austria, almost financially bankrupt, regarded war as too expensive a luxury. Bismarck was aware that William I was reluctant to fight a fellow German state. Nor was he convinced that the Prussian army was yet ready to fight and win. While Bismarck and William I were visiting the fashionable Austrian spa town of Bad Gastein, an Austrian envoy arrived to open negotiations.

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Convention of Gastein (1865)• Holstein, the duchy nearer to Prussia would be administered by Austria• Schleswig would be administered by Prussia• The two powers would retain joint sovereignty over both duchies

Bismarck knew that he could now pick a quarrel with Austria over Holstein at any time he wanted.

The particular problem of the duchies was solved, albeit it temporarily, but the more general problem of rivalry between Prussia and Austria remained. While Bismarck may have not wanted war at this stage, he realized that it was a distinct possibility. He therefore, did all he could to strengthen Prussia’s international position. Confident that Britain and Russia would not support Austria, he still feared France.

In October 1865 Bismarck met the French Emperor Napoleon III at Biarritz in the south of France. Historians continue to debate what occurred. Almost certainly nothing specific was agreed. Bismarck was not prepared to offer German territory in return for France’s neutrality. Napoleon, calculating that a war between the two German powers would be exhausting and inconclusive, intended to remain neutral and to turn this to advantage by mediating between the two combatants, gaining a much greater reward in the process than anything Bismarck could currently offer. Given Napoleon’s anti-Austrian stance, it took little skill on Bismarck’s part to secure the emperor’s good wishes.

War with AustriaOver the winter of 1865/66 Prussian-Austrian relations worsened. Prussia found every possible excuse to denounce Austria for violating against the terms of the Convention of Gastein. Austria, convinced that war was inevitable, determined on a policy of confrontation with Prussia. It did so from a weak position:

• Austria had no allies• Austria was on the verge of bankruptcy• Holstein was sandwiched between Prussian territory

In February 1866, Bismarck declared that war with Austria was only a matter of time. It would be fought not just to settle the fate of the duchies, but over the wider issue of who should control Germany. Bismarck carefully laid the groundwork for war. A secret alliance was made with Italy, by which Italy agreed to follow Prussia if it declared war on Austria within three months. In return, Italy would acquire Venetia from Austria when the war ended.

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Prussian, French and Austrian troop numbersYear Prussia France Austria1850 131,000 439,000 434,0001860 201,000 608,000 306,0001866 214,000

(Prussia’s ally Italy had an army of 233,000)

458,000 275,000

1870 319,000 (by 1871, the German states under Prussia’s leadership was able to mobilize 850,000 men)

452,000 252,000

Railways (km in operation) in Prussia, France and AustriaYear Prussia France Austria1850 5856 (the later Reich) 2915 15791860 11 089 9167 45431870 18 876 15 544 9589

Immediately after the treaty with Italy, Bismarck stoked up tension with Austria over Holstein and over proposals to reform the Confederation. Bismarck knew these would be unacceptable for Austria (e.g. expelling Austria from the Confederation). The Austrians, afraid of a surprise attack, were forced to take what appeared to be the aggressive step of mobilizing in April 1866. Prussia mobilized in May, seemingly as a response to Austrian threats.

Britain, France and Russia proposed a congress to discuss the situation. Bismarck felt compelled to agree: to do otherwise would put him in a weak position. But he was very relieved when Austria refused, making the congress unworkable. The situation deteriorated further when, in early June, Austria broke off talks with Prussia and, in breach of previous promises, referred the problem of the duchies to the Bundestag. Bismarck’s response was to send a Prussian army into Austrian-controlled Holstein.

To his surprise and disappointment, however, this did not immediately lead to war. The Prussians eventually withdrew from the Confederation, declared it dissolved and invited all other German states to ally themselves with them against Austria. However, most began mobilizing against Prussia.

Bismarck now issued an ultimatum to three northern states, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony, to side with Prussia or else be regarded as enemies. When the ultimatums were rejected, Prussian troops invaded the three states and were quickly defeated.

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The Seven Weeks’ WarThe future of Bismarck, Prussia and Germany lay with the Prussian army, which was under the command of the gifted military leader, General von Moltke. Advance planning and preparation, particularly in the use of railways for moving troops, meant that mobilization was much more efficient than that of the Austrian army. Moreover, Prussia had a large core of troops who were far better trained, disciplined and equipped than their Austrian counterparts.

But Austria’s position was far from hopeless:

• It had more soldiers - 400,000 to Prussians’ 300,000• Most of the other German states supported Austria• Austria had the advantage of a central position• Initially many Prussians were indifferent about the war• Prussia’s industrial power would make little difference if the war was short

The Italians fulfilled their part of the secret treaty by following Prussia into the war. This meant that Austria had to fight on two fronts. However, the Italian army, weak and inefficient, was defeated by Austria very soon.

On July 3, 1866, the major battle of war and decisive victory for Prussia was fought at Königgrätz (Prussian name – or Sadowa in Bohemia). Austria had suffered 45,000 causalties, Prussia 9000. The Prussians had won the battle and with it the war.

The Austrian government recognized that further fighting would almost certainly lead to further defeats and might even result in a break-up of the Austrian Empire. For Austria the priority was a rapid end to the fighting, at any reasonable cost. Prussia was now in a position to dictate terms as the victor. It was a personal victory for Bismarck and put him in a position to dominate not only Prussia, but also the whole of Germany for the next quarter of a century.

• 3 fronts for Prussians to contend with

1. North – Hesse-Cassel, Saxony: no resistance but Saxony’s army goes to Bohemia to help Austria. Hanover defeated by June.

2. South – Italy holds up 200,000 Austrian troops. Heavy casualties. Helps Prussia.3. Austria (+ Saxony). 3 July 1866 Prussian victory at Königgrätz (Sadowa).

Armies balanced in number but Prussians better weapons too much for Austrians

• Bismarck hailed as hero in Prussia. Promoted to Major General. Wears uniform more

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often.• Significance of victory – justifies army budget and reforms. Bismarck gets support of

LiberalsSummary diagram: Austro-Prussian conflict

Bismarck's policy 1862-66

Danish War

the situation in Schleswig Holstein

Austro-Prussian cooperation

Denmark defeated

Austria

Convention of Gastein

Holstein (Austria)

Bismarck's motivesMaster plan?

Meeting at Biarritz with

France

Alliance with Italy

War with Austria

Austrian advantages

Battle of Königgrätz (Sadowa)

Austrian defeat

Prussian victory

Prussian advantages

Opportunist?

Schleswig (Prussia)

Prussia

Bismarck's aims

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What were the main results of the Seven Weeks’ War?

Austria was at Prussia’s mercy after Königgrätz. William I, once reluctant to wage war on a fellow monarch, now proposed an advance on Vienna and a takeover of Austria. Bismarck, fearful that France and Russia might intervene, counselled caution.

We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely; we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge; we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia. . . . Austria's conflict and rivalry with us was no more culpable than ours with her; our task was the establishment or foundation of German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia.

• Bismarck has what he wanted. Austria out of German affairs. • Example of opportunity, planning, others’ mistakes (notably Austria)

The Treaty of Prague- Terms mainly concerned with the remodeling of northern Germany:- Prussia annexed a good deal of territory, including Schleswig and Holstein, Hesse,

Cassel, Hanover, Nassau and Frankfurt- All other German states north of the River Main were to be formed into a North

German Confederation under Prussian leadership

Bismarck opposed pressing for the unification of all Germany in 1866. As well as the threat of French intervention, he feared that if Prussia absorbed too much too soon, this might be more trouble than it was worth. The four Catholic states south of the River Main – Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt retained their independence. Nevertheless, all four states agreed to sign a secret military alliance with Prussia, whereby, in the event of war, they would not only fight alongside Prussia but also put their armies under the command of the King of Prussia.

The Treaty of Prague is usually seen as a milestone on the way to German unity. Ironically, the destruction of the German Confederation could be seen as dividing rather than uniting Germany. After 1866 Germans were separated into three distinct units:

- The North German Confederation- The four South German states- The Austrian Empire

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Bismarck (1869)‘I am not so arrogant as to assume that the likes of us are able to make history. My task is to keep an eye on the currents of the latter and steer my ship in them as best I can’

Factors helping Bismarck• The Prussian army• Prussian economic success• Economic unity and the Zollverein• German nationalism • The weakness of Austria• The international situation

The fact that Prussia was regarded as a second-rate power in 1862 helped Bismarck. He was able to achieve supremacy in Germany without arousing suspicion or the hostility of Prussia’s neighbors:

• The prevailing view in Britain was that it had nothing to fear from Protestant Prussia and that a strong Germany would be a useful bulwark against France or Russia

• Russia, concerned with reform at home, showed little interest in central Europe. Its sympathies lay with Prussia. Russia had still not forgiven Austria for its policy during the Crimean War.

SummaryAfter 1849 Austria and Prussia jockeyed for position within the German Confederation. While Austria appeared to be Germany’s strongest power in the 1850s, Prussia was growing in economic and military strength. Bismarck, appointed minister-president in Prussia in 1862, was determined to expand Prussian power at Austria’s expense and was prepared to use ‘blood and iron’ policies to achieve his aims. A successful war with Denmark (1864) over Schleswig-Holstein helped Bismarck’s cause. The results of this war enabled him to pick a quarrel with Austria. Prussia defeated Austria in the Seven Weeks’ War (1866). Prussian victory enabled Prussia to take control of north Germany. However, the position of the four south German states, Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt remained to be resolved…

Revision Questions:

1. Why did Austria and Prussia go to war with Denmark?2. What were the results of the Danish War?3. Why did Austria and Prussia go to war against each other in 1866)4. What were the main results of the Seven Weeks’ War?

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5. What factors helped Bismarck achieve success pre-1870?

Source AFrom the memoirs of General von Moltke, published in 1893. Von Moltke was the Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1888. He wrote extensively about the military campaigns that he was involved in and is here recalling the background to the 1866 Austro-Prussian War.

The war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria did not begin because the existence of Prussia was threatened, nor was it caused by public opinion and the voice of the people. It was a struggle long foreseen and calmly prepared for. It was recognized as a necessity by the Cabinet, not for territorial expansion, nor for the extension of our influence, nor for material advantage, but for an ideal end – the establishment of power. Not a foot of land was taken from Austria, but she had to renounce all part in the leadership of Germany. Austria had exhausted her strength in cionquests south of the Alps, and left the western German provinces unprotected. Austria’s center of gravity lay out of Germany; Prussia’s lay within it. Prussia felt itself called upon and strong enough to assume the leadership of the German races

Source BFrom Alexander Malet, The Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in 1866, published 1870 (Malet was a British diplomat who was based in Germany in the years 1849-66. He was a friend of Bismarck)

The principles on which the chief alterations in the army organization were based are sound and practical, as was abundantly proved in the campaign of 1866.The superiority of the armament of Prussia’s infantry, and the diversion of a large part of the strength of Austria against Italy, placed Prussia in the campaign of 1866, in a position of advantage. The skill of her commanders was admirably seconded by the courage and endurance of the soldiery. A great social and political revolution was accomplished. The transformation of a whole nation into one vast machine – for such is the Prussian army – is no slight triumph of intelligence, and is worthy of all admiration. It works with perfection. Much has been said of the Prussian needle-gun. It is the first breech-loading arm with which a European army has yet taken the field, and the advantages of this system have been quite sufficiently shown by the Prussian weapon. The advantages which the new method of loading gives to the troops armed with them over their enemies who are armed only with muzzle-loaders are clear.

How far could historians make use of Source A and B together to investigate the reasons for Prussian success against Austria? Explain your answer using both sources, the information given about them and your own knowledge of the historical context.