Title: How to promote integration in the last bastion of sovereignty? The case of the European

Defence Agency

Author: Antonio Calcara (Ph.D. Student- Department of Political Science- LUISS “Guido

Carli-Rome)

THIS IS A DRAFT: DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

Abstract

In a fragmented and violent international system and in the context of economic austerity and

decreasing defense budgets, there is an important debate, at the political and academic level, on the

urgency for a greater defense in Europe. In this evolving landscape, the European Defence Agency

(EDA), thanks to the adoption of a large number of strategic documents and its expertise in the

formulation of projects and data collection, has became a crucial player in the European defence

field. However, the role of the EDA and the everyday practices of the people that work in and

collaborate with the Agency remain to be studied systematically. No empirical studies have been

conducted to assess the EDA “hybrid” way of working that includes "national", "European" and

non-governmental experts on activities on a very technical level.

I argue that the EDA is at the core of an emerging transgovernmental network of European defence

experts and professionals, that are able to share best practices, “know how” and develop common

norms of communication. In the complex landscape in which the EU Global Strategy is situated,

this study is necessary to assess the role of the EDA after more than ten years since its establishment

and to analyse how defence cooperation works in practice, paying more attention to bottom-up

processes within institutions at the EU level.

Introduction

In a fragmented and violent international system and in the context of economic austerity and

decreasing defense budgets, there is an important debate at the political and academic level on the

urgency to improve defence capabilities in an integrated EU framework. While President Juncker

has declared defense as a priority, reiterating the long term vision of a "European Army"1 and the

High Representative Federica Mogherini has issued a new EU "Global Strategy"2, on the other hand

1 Euractiv- "Juncker: NATO is not enough, Europe needs an army". 09/03/2015 http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/juncker-nato-is-not-enough-eu-needs-an-army/ 2 European Commission Website: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union

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we are witnessing a growing "renationalisation" of defence policies of the member states (Kehoane

2016).

The European Defence Agency (EDA), thanks to the adoption of a large number of strategic

documents and its expertise in the formulation of projects and data collection, has became a crucial

player in the European defence field. Despite these developments, the role of the EDA has been

underestimated in European studies and International Relations literature, focusing only on its

formal and legalistic aspects3, on the agency's institutionalization4 or on EDA's norms.5

However, everyday practices of the people that work in and collaborate with the Agency remain to

be studied systematically. No empirical studies have been conducted to assess the role of the

network of experts fostered by the system of specialized capacity committees in the EDA. Indeed,

the Agency has developed an “hybrid” way of working that includes "national" (capital-based

member states), "European" (EDA's staff) and non-governmental experts on activities on a very

technical level. The EDA has been able to combine a top-down (based on EU strategic capabilities

shortfalls) with a bottom-up approach (close, regular dialogue with national counterparts and non-

governmental actors). The EDA is becoming de facto the hub of an emerging transgovernmental

network of European defence experts and professionals and it is gaining legitimacy “vìs a vìs”

member states and the European Commission (EC).

This study is aimed to answer the following questions: what is the relation between member states

experts and the EDA's staff? Is it possible to differentiate between a "national" and a "European"

model in the development and offer of technical expertise? What is the role of the non-

governmental experts? What are the characteristics of this emerging transgovernmental network in

the European defence field?

This paper is divided into five main parts: in the first part I will analyze how the academic literature

on security and defence policy at the EU level has underestimated the impact of EDA, because it

works in an area traditionally characterized by the exclusive role of member states. In the second

part I will introduce the main features of the Agency and its activities in more than a decade after its

establishment in the European defence institutional space. In the third part, I will focus specifically

on the activities of the experts that populate the agency, organized through small specialized

committees capacity. Finally, in the last two parts - thanks to a series of semi-structured interviews

with EDA's civil servants and officials and with national and non-governmental experts - I will try

to assess the role of the three different types of actors such as EDA's staff, national experts and non-

governmental ones, with particular attention to their relations and interactions within the wider 3 Dyson et al, European Defence Cooperation; Trybus, European Defence Agency.4 Ekelund, Institutionalist Approaches.5 Cross, European Defence Agency and Member States.

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panorama of defence collaboration in Europe.

1. The EDA in Academia: The State of the Art

The EDA, created to support member states and the Council in their effort to improve European

defence capabilities, represents an important development in the context of the EU security and

defence institutional framework. However, the Agency has received very little attention from the

academic and research community in Europe, because it works in an area traditionally characterized

by an unrestricted sovereignty of member states. In fact, the area of foreign, security and defence

policy of the EU has consciously been set within the rigid intergovernmental framework of pillar

two of the Maastricht Treaty, and, although the Lisbon Treaty abolished the previous structure of

distinct pillars, the CSDP have maintained a rigid intergovernmental character.6 The majority of the

scholars in the security and defence policy at the EU level field are very skeptical about the

prospect of a closer integration among member states in the defence sector. Hoffmann argues that

the area of security and defence is one of the issues of “high politics”, that cover all the matters that

are crucial to determine the independence, integrity and the survival of the member states.7 The

CSDP is subject to the unanimity rule, because each member state seeks to defend its “national

interest”, during rational bargaining negotiations.8 Dyson and Konstandinides, applying the insights

of EU law and a neo-realist perspective, argue that the CSDP is and will remain a strictly

intergovernmental affair.9 According to these scholars, the principle of national sovereignty in

defence will remain the fundamental prerogative for EU member states, as long as competition and

uncertainty remain the main features of the international system. They can see the possibility of a

greater harmonization in the softer aspects of security, but not in the most important issues,

including defence policies, military structures, force postures and capability procurement. Dyson

and Konstadinides, in fact, argue that despite its contribution in facilitating cooperation in European

armaments integration, the EDA has several limitations, due to the fact that it is not an armaments

acquisition agency or a defence procurement coordinator, but it is only an instrument in the hands of

the most influential European states.10 This analysis is shared by Trybus, who argues that the

creation of EDA was a way to preserve the intergovernmental character of European Capabilities

and Armaments Policy against the pressure of the EC in the arms procurement issues.11 According

6 Howorth, Security and Defence.7 Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete.8 Moravscik et al, Choice for Europe.9 Dyson et al , European Defence Cooperation.10 Dyson et al, Understanding Limitations CSDP.11 Trybus, European Defence Agency.

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to these scholars, the EDA is a strictly intergovernmental institution. Its scarce budget, its staff and

the composition of the Steering Board limited to the ministries of defence, make the EDA highly

dependent on the will and interests of member states.

However, a number of scholars have - albeit not in a systematic way - highlighted a number of

characteristics that describe the EDA as something different than a simple intergovernmental

agency. Bàtora argues that the agency – since its establishment – is slowly increasing its agenda and

its mission, becoming a more independent and autonomous political actor.12 Lemmens affirms that

the EDA is deviating from a rigid intergovernmentalism towards a “new hybrid governance”,

through the focus on non-binding and voluntary regulations, peer pressure and reciprocity.13 These

new governance characteristics are bringing EDA to a model of “experimental governance”, in

which EU level governance works through an ongoing process of comparison, assessment and

revision and where national actors share experiences and learn from each other difference.14

Furthermore, in parallel, a number of scholars have focused on a more complex institutional

structure and decision-making process than that implied by the concept of intergovernmental

cooperation. H. Wallace and W. Wallace identified the governance in the (former) second pillar as

“intensive transgovernmentalism” to indicate that the intensity of interactions and the density of

structured and productive collaboration create transgovernmental relations that differ from the

typical rational bargaining of the intergovernmentalism.15 The EDA is, thus, an example of

cumulative transgovernmentalism, which coexists with continuing arguments about shifts from

transgovernmentalism to communitarization.16 Howorth coined the term “supranational

intergovernmentalism”, to describe that “decisions in security and defense policy are very often

shaped and even made by small groups of relatively well-socialized officials in the key committees

acting in a mode which is as close to supranational as it to intergovernmental”.17 Following this

strand of research, M. Cross focuses on the crucial role played by the epistemic communities,

defined as networks of experts who persuade others of their shared norms and policy goals by virtue

of their professional knowledge.18 These transnational networks of experts are the key driver of the

process of security integration, through their expertise, common culture, professional norms, and

meeting frequency. Transnational interactions in Europe have been conductive to the establishment

of influential knowledge-based network of actors, that through the sharing of technical and specific

12 Bàtora, European Defence Agency.13 Lemmens, Governance Relationships in European Defence.14 Sabel et al, Experimentalist Governance.15 Wallace et al, European Union Policy-Making.16 Ibid, 353.17 Howorth, Supranational Inter-Governmentalism, 3.18 Cross, Security Integration in Europe.

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professional behavioural rules and preference, have the capacity to shape the mission of their

organizations beyond the original formal mandate.19

However, despite a growing number of studies that emphasize the necessity to go “beyond

intergovernmentalism”20 in the study of decision-making processes in the main institutional bodies

of CSDP, the EDA has been always presented as a “non-case”, in which there is no room for

manoeuvre for experts in exercise collective action beyond the formal mandate given by the

European member states.21

Actually, all the analyses of the EDA have focused only on its formal and legal characteristics. In

the current academic landscape there are not empirical analyses that specifically aim to assess the

role of the network of experts fostered by the system of specialized capacity committees in the

EDA. Mapping the characteristics of the different actors that are involved in the day-to-day work of

the Agency not only gives us a better idea of who the administrative and bureaucratic actors are, but

it sheds light also on how the exchange of technical info and best practices among experts from

EDA's staff, national government and industry and academia are creating a transgovernmental

network of defence experts and professionals at the EU level.

2. The EDA: An underestimated actor in the EU Defence Institutional Framework

The institution of the EDA was promoted by a French-British initiative during the Le Toquet

summit in 2003 and presented to the Thessaloniki European Council in June of the same year. The

EDA - created to support the member states and the Council in their effort to improve European

defence capabilities- was institutionalized by the member states Joint Action in 2004 and became

fully operational in mid-2005. The Agency is made up of twenty-seven states (all of EU member

except Denmark), but it has also signed “administrative arrangements” with Norway (2006),

Switzerland (2012) and with the Republic of Serbia (2013), enabling them to participate in EDA's

projects and programmes. The mission of the Agency is to “identify operational requirements,

promote measures to satisfy those requirements, contribute to identifying and, where appropriate,

implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the

defence sector, participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and assist the

Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities”.22

The Agency is governed by a Steering Board that meets at the ministerial level (the only case in the

19 Gornitka et al, Expert-Executive Nexus, 5-6.20 Norheim-Martinsen, Beyond Intergovernmentalism.21 Cross, Limits Epistemic Communities.22 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835. art.2.

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European institutional framework) through the member states ministries of defence. The Head of

the Agency is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that

guarantees a strong link with the EC and the supranational institutional architecture. The EC can

take part in the Steering Board meetings but it has not the right to vote. The Steering Board appoints

a Chief Executive every four years and his task is to “ensure the EDA's annual work programme,

staff matters, the oversight and coordination of the functional units, and the preparation of the work

of the Steering Board, including the preparation of the draft annual work programme and the draft

annual general budget”.23 The EDA decisions are taken by a qualified majority (QMV) by the

Steering Board. This could seem a departure from the strict intergovernmentalism that characterizes

the field of the (former) second pillar. Actually, there is an “emergency brake” or “safety break”

clause, according to which a vote is not taken if a pMS expresses the intention to oppose a decision

for important or stated reasons of national policy. In this case the decision involved is blocked and

the Council decides with an unanimous vote.24 Since Council's reorganization in January 2014, the

Agency's organizational structure has comprised of three operational directorates: Cooperation

Planning and Support, Capability, Armament and Technology and European Synergies and

Innovation, in order to ensure a better coordination among the experts and the EDA's staff.

The EDA has the aim to get better the members States military capabilities for the operations of

crisis management under the framework of the CSDP. Founding on 2010 Headline Goals, the

Capability Development Plan (CDP) “provides a view of future capability needs, taking into

account the impact of future security challenges, technological development and other trends. It

assists the Member States in their national defence planning and programmes” 25. CDP is

repeatedly revised and updated according to the member State information, the Council Secretariat

and the EU Military Committee, as well as according to the results of former CSDP operations. In

order to develop CDP requirements, the EDA has been trying to implement capabilities cooperative

programmes, joint and coordinate R&T, with the aim to promote research on future capability

requirements and among participating member states.

The EDA's way of working has shown that an effective multilateral cooperation is possible. EDA

experts and technicians have successfully launched various programmes and shared results among

member states, promoting the development of new technologies. EDA organizes its R&T activities

into Joint Investment Programmes (JIP), that typically involve a large number of participants with a

common budget of more than € 10 million and other specific, ad-hoc projects, that can be also built

around only two nations. These JIPs indeed provided a great opportunity for a large group of 23 Trybus, European Defence Agency, 682.24 Trybus, European Defence Agency, 682.25 EDA website: https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/whatwedo/strategies/Capabilities accessed on 13/04/2016.

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countries to engage in multinational European defence research projects, to strengthen personal

contacts among research teams, to establish cooperation with military and users from other

countries and to build platforms for future cooperation, inside or outside of EDA.26 The EDA was

also able to generate cooperation on a generic technological building block. For example, the

research programme on gallium nitride is the key to improve the performance and functionality of

radars, communication antennas and other electromagnetic systems. This is also the case of the

work on the identification of a list of Critical Defence Technologies (CDT), that was endorsed in

June 2014 during an EDA Steering Board and it will constitute the basis for future prioritization of

R&T activities.27

Positive signs can be also found in the productive relations that the Agency has developed in the

European institutional framework. The EDA has started to work fruitfully with the European

Commission (EC) on the crucial issue of collaborative defence R&T. In 2009, EDA, EC and the

European Space Agency (ESA), launched a process to prepare a programme, called EFC (European

Framework Cooperation), with the aim to “maximize complementarity and synergy between the two

fields of defence and security”.28 The previous European framework Programme for Research and

Development (R&D) (2007-2013) established a committed research theme on security, which

allowed R&D of security-relevant technologies. The current Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) has

institutionalized this mechanism through co-funding procedures on civilian or dual-use R&D. The

EDA is seeking collaboration with the EC to develop projects that can be used in both military and

civilian fields, as evidenced by the successful programmes in the “Unmanned Air System” ,

“Software Defined Radio” and the project on the protection against the dangers of CBRN

(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear), that have application both for military use and for

first responders (police, fire service etc...).

The EDA is becoming one of the main players in the defence research field at the EU level and it is

gaining legitimacy in the European institutional framework. The EDA has a crucial role to play in

stimulating R&T cooperation among its member-states and it has developed a comprehensive set of

tools to do that. If we want to explain why and in what way the EDA has grown in scope and scale,

we have to look to the internal institutional structure and the every-day dynamics of the Agency.

I argue that one of the greatest achievements of the Agency is having developed an “hybrid” way of

working that includes “national” (member states capital-based), European (EDA's staff) and non-

governmental experts (from industry and academia) on a very technical level, creating an emerging

26 European Defence Agency. Ten Years of Working Together, 2014. https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/eda_10years

27 Ibid.28 Piquer, Research and Technology, 118.

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transgovernmental network of defence professionals and experts at the EU level.

The next paragraphs will be devoted to describe in detail how the Agency develops its internal work

on cooperative capabilities programmes and joint R&T projects, focusing specifically on the role of

the Capability Technological Groups.

3. The Role of Experts in the EDA: The CapTechs

The EDA has a very small staff, but they work with around 4000 defence specialists, based in

member states capitals, who are able to ensure the member states direct involvement in EDA's

activities and projects. The permanent staff works, then, in an integrated way with their expert

counterparts in member states through the Networks of national Points of Contacts (POCs), that

prepare the ministerial Steering Board and deal with organisational, institutional and budgetary

matters. The Agency's goal is to foster defence cooperation and coordination among member states

and, for this reason, EDA applies a “flexible, à la carte approach”, bringing together military

planners, research, defence industries and leading military figures to develop a comprehensive

planning and capacity building process.29

The European Defence Agency organises its R&T activities through the establishment of different

Capabilities Technology Areas (CapTechs). From the conceptual point of view, the CapTechs are

two things at once: on one hand, each Captech represents a technology area focused on a particular

defence capability, on the other hand, Captechs are groups of experts from governments, industry,

small and medium enterprises (SME) and academia, moderated by the EDA permanent staff .30 The

aim of CapTechs is to propose R&T activities in response to agreed defence capability needs and to

generate cooperative R&T projects, in order to centralising the R&T cooperation under the EDA's

umbrella.31 Currently, there are 12 CapTechs assembled in three major groups: Knowledge- IAP

(Information, Acquisition and Processing), Engagement- GEM (Guidance, Energy and Materials);

and Manouevre- ESM (Environment, Systems and Modelling). All 12 CapTechs are based on the

participation of four types of experts: a CapTech moderator, that is one of the EDA staff member

that chairs the meeting and acts as the EDA point of contact for CapTech members. Moreover, they

conduct exchanges with other CapTechs as required in an horizontal and transversal way, organize

meetings of experts on specific topics and maintain updated expert list. The CapTech National

Coordinators (CNC) act as official representative of participating member states and have the task

to distribute the information on CapTechs activities with their countries. The CNC have also the 29 Ekengren, Extending Experimentalist Governance, 273.30 EDA website: http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/how-we-work/expert-teams/capability-technology-areas 31 EDA website: http://www.eda.europa.eu/randtuserguide/home/captechs

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role to designate the CapTech Governmental Experts (CGE), that contribute in and propose R&T

activities within their field of expertise. Finally, a crucial role is played by the CapTech non-

governmental experts (CNGE), that come from various professional background (e.g: industry,

research organisations, scientific institutes and universities). The role of CNGE is particularly

interesting because they contribute as experts to the work conducted in CapTechs, but they can also

propose R&T projects and studies on a bottom-up basis. The Captech's management and the

planning of the research activity in each technology domain contributes to establish a Strategic

Research Agenda (SRA), with the objective to have technologies in place when demanded by the

military side or by the Agency’s CDP, thus to improve the generation of R&T collaboration among

member states. The CapTechs were not built from scratch: they were similar to the Western

European Armaments Group (WEAG) technology areas called CEPA and, initially, the EDA

defined and assigned technologies to each CapTech using the same taxonomy employed in the

WEAG. The problem is that it was very difficult to divide the entire technology spectrum into a

limited number of grouping, without a lack of uniformity and a certain dose of inconsistency.32

Attempting to cope with these issues, a new CapTech structure was approved in 2008 by the R&T

Directorate Steering Board, following a consensus between the EDA and the member states.

According to this new arrangement, four areas for transversal activities (ground; naval; aerial

systems; aeroespacial systems) were defined, aiming at facilitating the implementation of

multidisciplinary work and to ensure internal coherence within them.33

The rationale for the creation of CapTechs was to invite the already existing working group and

networks to transfer their activities in the EDA's framework. Existing WEAG projects were

transferred to the EDA starting in August 2005. Of a total of 52 projects among EU member states

valued at 226.0M €, 42 were transferred and the CEPAs (Common European Priority Areas)

working groups smoothly transitioned into the agency's CapTechs. Moreover, even in the context of

the LoI34 and its Group of Research Directors, it was established a practice that once a study or

project was defined, it would be launched under the CapTechs framework.35

On a more practical level, CapTechs have an important role to perform, that of efficiently

interfacing with civil research. The experts working in these groups often take part in other forums,

groups and organizations dedicated to research, they establish contacts with experts in the civil or

security fields, whether governmental or industrial. Within CapTechs, all the national, non-

governmental and EDA experts share ideas and proposals at regular meetings, but they also 32 Piquer, Research and Technology, 93.33 Dahlmann et al, EDA and Research and Technology.34 The Letter of Intent (LoI) Framework Agreement (FA) Treaty was signed on 27 July 2000 by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK.35 Piquer, Research and Technology, 95.

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communicate on a daily basis, using the Agency's centralized computer network. The launch of the

“EDA extranet” enables to the defence professionals to easily exchange information, create

discussion forum and sharing best practice among defence practitioners and professionals.

The Agency's work is based on both a top-down and a bottom-up approach. The top-down approach

is a “typical” capability driven process, in which the projects are generated by the EDA or the pMS,

with the aim to address an identified capability gap. Instead, the bottom-up approach is a

technology-driven process, because the projects are proposed directly by governmental and non-

governmental experts that work in the CapTechs, based mainly on technical reasons and approved

by a certain number of participating member states.36

4. Assessing the role of experts

The EDA has a unique institutional and organizational structure in the European landscape. On the

one hand it is closely dependent, from a political point of view, from the commitment of the

member states sat in the Steering Board of the agency; on the other hand it depends on its network

of experts, as regards its daily work, activities and its relations with other key stakeholders in the

European defence field, such as the EC, OCCAR and NATO. The close interaction between EDA's

staff and the increasingly intensive network of lower-levels of governmental and non-governmental

experts, fostered by the system of specialized capacity committees, is developing a unique way of

working, oriented towards a high flexibility and the constant institutionalized involvement of

member states and non-state actors, primarily the defence industry and research centres around

Europe.

What is particularly interesting from this analysis is the fundamental role of such experts in the

daily work of the Agency. In fact, if on the one hand, they report directly to the Steering Board

directives, on the other hand, their daily work and their advises are crucial on a bottom-up level,

both in the fundamental strategic direction of the Agency and in the search of innovative ways to

improve the European defense cooperation. In the words of a senior official of the EDA: “The

Agency works with a balance of top-down pressure and bottom-up experts' work- both are needed to

move forward. Therefore, the personal involvement of Ministries of Defence is essential. They sit in

EDA's Steering Board. But without the input from experts (bottom-up) it would never work. EDA

operates directly with experts in capitals, through meetings but also through electronic

communication tools. These experts networks are crucial. EDA itself can initiate, stimulate or

catalyze activities, but at the end of the day the Member States have to contribute and invest, as

36 Ibid. 97-98.

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defence remains a bastion of national sovereignty”37.

EDA is a unique laboratory where we can observe the interactions between three types of experts:

those working directly within the agency, experts representatives of the member states and non-

governmental experts from industry and academia.

4.1. EDA's Staff

The EDA has a permanent staff of less than 130 professionals, that possess an high level of

expertise, with extensive previous background in the defence or in the military field. The EDA's

professional staff is selected through an open competition based on merit, not through a quota

system or to an effort to represent each member state equally.38

Each member of the staff is limited to work for a maximum of three years in the same position and,

incorporating all positions held, the total number of years that staff shall be able to serve at the

Agency shall be less than ten years39. This is very significant because it implies that the national

civil servants who are working for the EDA will not be able to make a career there. Two are the

main reasons: first, the Agency, being a small organization with a limited budget, offers few

opportunities for internal promotion. Secondly, the limit of three years ensures to the member states

that the Agency must remain closely linked to them, as the Steering Board must unanimously

approve any type of recruitment. Some scholars have noted that actually the EDA is becoming a

platform where experts from participating member states could learn the Brussels practices and the

"European" way of working before going back to their national ministries. This development could

be lead to a "Brusselization" of national defense ministries, because these former officials of the

Agency have the capacity to spread, once back in their respective capitals, their "European"

knowledge at the national level and to develop a certain harmonisation of practices and perspectives

among the European defence space.40 Actually, as shown by a series of semi-structured interviews

and informal meetings that I had with EDA's civil servants during 2015-2016, most of them already

come from another European institution or, in any case, they had already had other work

experiences in the communitarian field.

The internal staff of the agency is therefore composed of people already "Europeanised" and very

specialised in EU affairs. As stated by an EDA's civil servant : “Many colleagues did not go back to

their national ministry, they jumped to another agency or European institution”. Another official 37 Ekengren, Extending Experimentalist Governance, 274.38 Cross, Limits Epistemic Communities, 94.39 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835. art.11:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?

uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.266.01.0055.01.ENG)40 Leroux, Institutionalisation European Defence, 68-69.

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declared: “if we have regular contacts with our administration, we do not receive national

instruction and as public servants we are very specialised and Europeanised: it is not difficult to

feel attracted by the process”.41 The Agency's internal environment, at least as regards the

permanent staff, consists of truly "European" civil servants, that have regular contacts with their

national administrations but that they could diverge from national interests, in order to pursue the

Agency's mission. As one of the high rank EDA's official told me: “We are developing an European

way of doing things, and we are very committed to the idea that a potential military integration

among member states is crucial for the EU peace, prosperity and stability ”.42 Consequently, the

EDA is participating in the development of the European defence culture, not only through the

documents it issues but also through the work of its officials. They create a European defence

environment in Brussels, even though it was intended for them to go back to their national

ministries.

4.2. National experts

The working groups of national experts, including capacity committees, constitute the basis for the

EDA's activities. The role of national experts is essential in the production of the EDA: they enable

it to reach a higher technicality than it would get with only administrative personnel and they are

able to ensure the member states commitment to cooperative programmes under the umbrella of the

EDA. Thanks to the national experts role, the agency acquires new and useful expertise through the

collecting of information about member states (military equipment, military procurement,

deployment of troops as well as R&D); so the agency is in the process of developing an

unprecedented centralised monitoring and evaluation system of the European defence capabilities.43

The main role of the national experts is therefore to know what are the needs of member states in

terms of internal capacity and find innovative solutions to fill this gap. Then, if in the permanent

staff of EDA you can notice a growing process of socialization in Europe, experts from the member

states remain closely anchored to the respective defense ministries. Through the interviews

conducted, all the national experts that I contacted confirmed that they are in constant contact with

their respective ministries of defense and they have, consequently, a narrow margin of autonomy.

This is also due to the peculiar agency's institutional structure, the only European institution in

which the Steering Board is directly composed by the defense ministries of the respective member

states. It is clear, therefore, that the role of the experts of member states governments depends on 41 Ibid.42 Skype Interview with EDA's official, 18/3/201643 Bauer, Defence Agency vs. Commission.

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whether different member states have a contrasting strategic vision of the Agency’s role. Academic

literature has focused almost exclusively on the differences between France and the UK as two

opposite poles in the evaluation and receipt of the Agency's activities. Britain has always had a

close relationship with the Atlantic Alliance and it has a project-oriented approach to the Agency's

activities, while France has always pushed for an agency with a stronger political impulse.44

Less visible, but more interesting in the case of EDA, are the differences in the strategic field

between big countries with a developed defense industry and small member states, with less

developed defense industry and most lacking from the technological point of view . As noted by

Leroux “the added-value of such an agency is much more significant for small countries, rather

than big ones. Indeed, they do not have as many qualified personnel on defence, and it can help

them to fill up the gaps in this field. If they still lack the economics means to really influence the

direction in which the organisation is going, the EDA represents a useful and cheap tool which

gives them a voice in the largest EU debate”.45 Moreover, Maulny and Matelly emphasize that: “It

is difficult for countries that do not have the same financial involvement and the same technological

level to cooperate. The concern of the largest countries, as well as that of their companies, is the

dissemination of technologies in keeping with the rule that everyone has access to the results of a

study conducted jointly”.46

The national affiliation and experts' membership in their respective ministry of defence is so crucial

to analyse the role of the Agency. However national experts, thanks to their knowledge of agency's

internal discussions, can get some room for manoeuvre on individual projects, notwithstanding the

strategic priorities of the respective member states.

4.3 Non-Governmental Experts

Defence industries play, no doubt, a strategic political leading role in the Agency's activities. EDA,

de facto, recognizes and institutionalizes the important role that industry has in the definition of its

executive strategy, especially in the research and technology field.47 They implement the directions

of the member states through the EDA Steering Board, as well as they have an autonomous capacity

to influence decisions of the Agency itself, especially in the initial phase of the development of

cooperative programmes in the EU framework. Lots of EDA projects, in fact, more than actual EU

bridging capabilities shortfalls, were clearly influenced by the technological requirements promoted

44 Mawdsley, France, the UK and the EDA.45 Leroux, Institutionalisation European Defence, 50.46 Maulny et al, Pooling of Defence, 8.47 Piquer, “Research and Technology”, 96.

13

by defense industries.48

However, classical project generation process, commonly known as bottom-up, as opposed to a top-

down, or defence industries are not the only non-governmental actors present in the daily activities

of the specialized committees capacity. A prominent role is played by experts from academia or

research centres specializing in the field of defence and security. This expertise is often

underestimated, because it is not very visible and it is perceived as unable to generate tangible

changes in the daily practices of a particular organization. Instead, as some EDA civil servants have

confirmed to me, reports, and workshops organized by academics and researchers are very

important, especially in the early stages of a project, in order to identify, at the macro level, what are

the aspects to be considered in particular project cooperation at the European level. Particularly

interesting is the interaction between the work done by experts in CapTechs and research activities

promoted by the Agency. For instance, while at scientific and technological level, CapTechs

networks have identified capabilities at risk (affecting technologies, skills, know-how,

competencies, non-EU dependencies, etc..), EDA, in parallel, funded a study on “Key Skills and

Competences for Defence”, a project that aims to define the specialist skills and competences

necessary to design, build and support military equipment in the defence sector, in order to identify

and to build a taxonomy of the current skills and competences available within the EDA member

states' educational sector, government and industry.49 This report, as confirmed by an EDA's civil

servant, will be the future for the agency's activities and contributes to create a European way of

addressing not only cooperatives programmes under the EDA's umbrella, but also a process of

education and training at the more general European level. In this regard, of particular importance

are the courses that the EDA is organizing with the European Security and Defence College

(ESDC), a network of vocational training institutes. The "European Armaments Cooperation

Courses" are intended primarily for practitioners working in national and international armament

cooperation who need to acquire knowledge and experience in European acquisition and project

management. As the EDA Deputy Chief Executive, Rini Goos, said: “We, in Europe, need to be

clear on how we work together, learning from each other and tackling co-operation from a

European perspective. This is essential and in the long-term I would like to see a common

understanding and approach emerge, supported where required through training and education

courses like this one. This is where I see the EDA adding the most value and impact”.50 The EDA

Head of Unit Education, Training & Exercise is very clear in this regard: "We are developing a truly 48 Oikonomou, “Brothers in arms”, 51.49 EDA website: https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/key-skills-and-competences-for-

defence accessed on 13/04/201650 EDA website http://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2014/10/28/eda-organises-joint-course-with-

european-security-and-defence-college accessed on 13/04/2016

14

European way of working (..) In these courses we are transposing European standards for the

acquisition and management arms (...) the number of participants is constantly increasing and,

despite the general political considerations, defence professionals in all member states are very

interested in our activities".51

5. An Emerging Transgovernmental Network?

From the analysis on the three types of experts that populate the agency, it appears that the EDA's

staff has assumed a supranational character and a way of working based on a truly European

perspective. National experts are instead anchored to the ministries of defense of the countries

where they come from, because of the peculiar structure of the Steering Board of the Agency. It is

therefore still possible to differentiate between a "national" model and a "European" one in the

development and offer of technical expertise in the EU defence field and moreover, these national

and European networks of experts are not capable to autonomously shape the interests and priorities

of the European member states in the defence field. Many scholars, following this strand of

research, stated that the EDA is “too small to influence the general mind-set of the structural

determinants of the defence sector”.52

However, these analyses on member states motivations and on the potential top-down

Europeanization of defence policy tend to neglect the most interesting development in this field: the

relationship building and networking among defence professionals and experts, under the umbrella

of the EDA. The EDA has not the budget, nor the institutional competences to become the only

central player in the EU defence field. The added value of the Agency is, instead, in the everyday

relationship between the three types of expertise: with regard to sharing of assets, officials from

both EDA and national-capitals report that they are in ongoing contact with each other through

formal and informal meetings, procedures, emails, phone calls and teleconferences. Continuous

interaction provides great opportunities for discussing issues and challenges with other officials in

small committees, in turn enabling officials to learn how other defence experts solve problems and

address national and European capabilities shortfalls. Network participants routinely interact and

share valuable assets such as knowledge, information, practices and experiences with their

colleagues who conduct similar scientific-technical tasks and have comparable professional

concerns, by focusing actor's attention towards common issues, challenges and solutions. Officials

report that they get new ideas and inspiration from being part of a larger professional environment.

51 Skype Interview with EDA Head of Unit Education, Training & Exercise, 21/03/201652 Molling, Pooling and Sharing, 6

15

EDA provides not only coordination of scientific expertise, but it is also a driver for training,

harmonizing procedures and setting standards in the EU defence space. During more than ten years

of activities, EDA has launched a great number of key documents, strategies, codes and soft law

mechanisms that, even if they are not binding, contribute to make the cooperation among member

states easier and to create mechanisms of peer pressure. Moreover the EDA collects information

about the member States military expenses, developing a centralised monitoring and evaluation

system of the European Defence capabilities, and it is promoting standardisation of procedures in

armaments acquisition through best practices and benchmarking among the member States.

EDA has so been able to become an hub for the development of a transgovernmental network of

defence experts in Europe. Defence collaboration is very fragmented at the European level and

today it is characterized by a bottom up and demand-driven affairs in bilateral or minilateral

formats53, especially among neighbouring countries.54 If the challenge is to unite these “islands of

cooperation”, in order “to form a coherent and mutually supportive European archipelago of

defence”55, the skills, competences and best practices developed by defence experts in the network

of specialised committees in the EDA will constitute an essential starting point.

Conclusion

The fundamental dilemma in the academic literature about the EU defence policy is that member

states intuitively have a strong interest in sharing military resource and cooperate at the EU level,

but, at the same time, they are unwilling to give-up sovereignty in such a secretive and sensitive

area.

This paper is aimed to fill a gap in the literature about the role of the EDA in the European defence

field. Indeed, there are no academic analyses that focus specifically on the activities of the network

of experts that populate the agency, organized through small specialised capacity committees.

Thanks to an extensive review of academic literature and official documents, and a series of semi-

structured interviews with EDA's civil servants and officials, I had been able to assess the role of

the three types of expertise involved in the day-to-day activities of the agency provided by EDA's

staff, national experts and non-governmental ones. After having described how these networks of

experts work in their daily activities, I realized that these experts, for the strong relationship

between national experts and its ministries of defence and the consequent peculiar nature of the

EDA's Steering Board, have not yet been able to autonomously drive the EU defence research 53 Andersson, European Defence Collaboration, 2.54 Marrone et al, Defence Budgets, 4.55 Andersson, European Defence Collaboration, 4.

16

agenda, without the political commitment of the member states. However, I argue that the EDA is at

the core of an emerging transgovernmental network of European defence experts and professionals,

that are able to share best practices, “know how” and develop common norms of communication.

This empirical micro-analysis on the work of European, national and non-governmental experts and

technicians in the EDA is essential to analyse how defence cooperation work in practice and to pay

more attention to bottom-up processes within institutions at the EU level.

Nevertheless, this strand of research should be complementary to a larger study on military and

strategic cooperation framework in Europe, taking into consideration that the EDA is not the unique

actor seeking to achieve integration in the defence field, but it was created in an environment

already crowded with pre-existing institutional actors.56

In a fragmented and violent international system and in the context of economic austerity and

decreasing defence budgets, the role of the EDA is becoming increasingly important and the

analysis of its internal composition is the key to understand its role in the more general European

defence space.

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