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ASIA PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (APSA) CONFERENCETRANSFORMING SOCIETIES: CONTESTATIONS AND CONVERGENCES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The Symbolic Politics of Power – A Framework for Understanding the Strategy Behind Myanmar's 'Race and Religion Protection Laws'

Richard RoewerBirkbeck, University of London

Amalie WeinrichBirkbeck, University of London

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IntroductionThe proposal of a controversial package of four bills, known as the ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’, has evoked an outcry from national and international civil and human rights advocates as well as from several of Myanmar’s1 ethnic and religious minority groups. Similarly, political responses from outside the country have largely reviewed the proposal as a development that stands in stark contrast to Myanmar’s ostensible democratization and liberalization process that followed the general elections in 2010 and the by-elections in 2012. The European Union and European Union member state embassies note in a joint statement that ‘these draft bills do not appear to be in line with the international human rights treaties to which Myanmar is a party, including the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The EU calls upon the Government of Myanmar and the Hluttaw 2 to ensure that all legislation adopted be fully in line with Myanmar’s own international human rights obligations. Further, these bills contain provisions which do not seem consistent with the current transition towards national reconciliation and an open democratic society.’3

With general elections scheduled for the 8th of November 2015 the proposal of the four bills comes at an ostentatious time. Research from the field of election strategy and symbolic politics warrants the suggestion that the proposal is part of the election strategy of the current government. Thus, it might be introduced at this point for reasons that go well beyond the obvious legislative changes that are proposed. Indeed, in this paper we aim to provide a framework for considering possible strategies behind the four bills. In doing so we do not denounce their apparent implications but want to provide a basis for the often heard but so far little substantiated theories about the motivations for the laws. Clearly, we believe that there is an argument to be made for the existence of a strategy that reaches further than pleasing a nationalist movement. Furthermore, on the basis of the theoretical framework that we propose we argue that the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws' constitute a case of symbolic politics of power. It is worth noting, however, that our claims do not carry an evaluation in the sense of praising or condemning the action. The strategic use of legislative processes is a status quo in virtually all forms of government andasserting power is desirable for all

1The military government changed the name of the country from “Burma” to “Myanmar” in 1989. The official name of the country is “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”. But the name Burma is still very commonly used, not at least because the use of “Myanmar” for Burma is considered a legitimation of the military government by some Burmese nationals. We will use the two names interchangeably in this work.2The Royal Court3According to a statement published on the website of the European Union Delegation to Myanmar on 12.01.2015, accessible via [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/myanmar/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150112_en.htm]

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political actors alike. Still, unravelling political strategies is vital for an assessment of the means that are employed by actors pursuing them and therefore add an important piece to understanding and subsequently evaluating the political pre-election process. We seek to verify our claim through the application and combination of two approaches. On one hand a psychosocial account of the dynamics of control and power, that provides a fundamental understanding of power that exceeds the limitation to the question why power is desirable, which is common in political science. On the other hand a symbolic politics account, that exceeds the idea of only attending to direct implications of formulated legislation and sheds some light on the dynamics of symbolism that surround legislative processes. Accordingly our paper is divided into 5 chapters.The first subsection will provide a short overview over the political landscape that constitutes the framework for the upcoming election, introducing actors, values and, maybe most importantly, their cross-interlocking. A short summary of the issues embedded into the ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’ will also be provided. The second section will introduce the theory of symbolic politics. It will supply a distinct perspective on an essential part of the political process, that explains the symbolism of legislative changes while not limiting them to it.The third section will introduce the psychosocial theories of control and power and define a set of characteristics that determines their successful display in the dynamics between individual interaction and between groups. Furthermore, it will examine which form of power we witness in the legislative process of the four bills. The fourth section will summarize the motivation for the aforementioned considerations and their outcome.

Actors, Values and the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws'Myanmar will hold national elections on the 8th of November 2015. The elections are expected to be a major political inflection point. There are no opinion polls in Myanmar and an analysis of the election outcome largely remains guesswork. Recently a local business analysis company in Yangon found that 65% of the population still doesn’t know who they will vote for.4 More than 70 political parties are registered to contest the polls, with the USDP, established by the former regime, and the NLD, party of Aung San Suu Kyi, both trying to win majorities. The election administration itself has been significantly improved since the deeply flawed elections in 2010, that were boycotted by the NLD. However, ‘there remain major challenges to a credible, inclusive and peaceful election. Much of the periphery of the country is affected by armed conflict, and though there have been important steps toward bringing the six-decade civil war to a close, the process remains fragile and incomplete. The vote could be marred by violence in some areas and will not be possible in others. In central Myanmar, rising Burman nationalism and anti-Muslim sentiment have exploded sporadically into violence, something that could happen again in the politically charged context of an election. In Rakhine state, minority Muslim communities have been disenfranchised by a decision to cancel the identification documents (…) The country has little experience of democratic polls, including government staff at the local level. Understanding among the electorate is very low, and major education efforts will be required.5 Indeed, in a political landscape that is characterized by an

4According to Larry Jagan in his article ‘Parties brace for a bitter election battle’, published in the Bangkokpost on 07.06.2015, accessible via [http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/special-reports/584481/parties-brace-for-a-bitter-election-battle]5According to International Crisis Group report, ‘Myanmar’s Electoral Landscape’, published 28.04.2015, accessible via [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/266-myanmar-

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extremely low understanding of political processes values and beliefs are important and deeply influential. Thereby, the aforementioned anti-Muslim sentiment and wave of Buddhist nationalism that has swept over the country comes to play an important role in the upcoming election.

Since the USDP has come to power, nationalism has seen a steady and to some extend unprecedented rise. The Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, often referred to as the Ma Ba Tha, wields extensive influence over voters and their perceptions of policies and the political actors that support or oppose them. The very fact that the Ma Ba Tha was able to push for the set of four bills, known as the Race and Religion Protection Laws, to be brought up in front parliament supports this claim. Identifying with the nationalistic sentiment has become an important point in order to secure votes in the upcoming election. A desirable situation for the currently dominant Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), but one that is decidedly difficult for the opposition, most notably the National League for Democracy (NLD), which opposes the set of four bills. This opposition is especially difficult considering that the bills not only have strong public support but also due to the fact that the NLD is not able to influence the outcomes of parliamentary votes in a way that exceeds a mere gesture. The first two of the bills, the Population Control Bill and the Buddhist Women's Special Marriage Bill, was passed by parliament and signed by President Thein Sein in May and July respectively. At this point it is useful to take a closer look at the connection between the government and the recent rise of nationalism, that has largely been fuelled by actors from the sangha. Here, two things must be noted. Firstly, that an all-embracing account of the relationship between religious extremism, come nationalism, cannot be presented here for the capacity of this paper lies in a different question.6 Secondly, that assessing the relationship between government and religious extremism, turned nationalism, only comes to involve the USDP at a late stage of the process. It should be clear, however, that the USDP was established by the former regime.

Much has been written about the Buddhist nationalist movement, or more precisely extremist movement. This movement, spearheaded by organizations such as the Ma Ba Tha and the 969, propagates the notion that the sāsana7 is under threat, supposedly by the Muslim community, fostering an upsurge in nationalism. Popularly, this sentiment dictates the deliberate denial of a solution to the Rohingya Crisis, but it also pushed for the proposal of the ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’. Before addressing the issues these bills carry it is helpful to establish a framework that allows for an understanding of the dynamics of religious extremism, come nationalism, and the state. Two things are crucially important. Firstly, that Buddhism in Myanmar is intertwined with the government to such a great extent that it proves difficult to distinguish religious policies from state

s-electoral-landscape.pdf]6For accounts dedicated to the relationship of Buddhism, nationalism and the state a number of article prove useful. Consider among others: A. Aung-Thwin, Michael, 'Of Monarchs, Monks, and Men: Religion and the State in Myanmar', Asia Research Paper Working Paper Series, 127 (2009), 3-24;Long, Mary Kate, `Dynamics of State, Sangha, and Society in Myanmar - A close look at the Rohingya Issue`, in Asian Journal of Public Affairs, 6 (2013), pp. 75-91; Schober, Juliane, `Buddhism, Violence and the State in Burma (Myanmar) and Sri Lanka`, in Disrupting Violence: Religion and Conflict in South and Southeast Asia, ed. by Linell E. Cady and Sheldon W. Simon (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 51-567sāsana is here understood in the common range of possible translations, i.e. Teaching, practice, doctrine, and the 'teaching of Buddha'.

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policies. And secondly, that there exists a strong correlation between the recent wave of nationalism and the USDP government. In order to understand this state of intertwinement one needs to go back to 1962.When Ne Win seized power in Burma through a coup in 1962 and established a military regime under the Revolutionary Council8 he founded the new state ideology, interweaving Buddhist concepts with Marxist notions of dialectics. The new ideology was put forward in two documents, “The Burmese Way to Socialism” and “The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment”. These documents employed Buddhist morality concepts to legitimate the socialist approach of the government. At the same time the government ceased state support of the sangha and Buddhism as a whole.9 Consequentially the Buddhist clergy started to challenge the government which in turn led the government to declare all religious laws void and to prohibit monks from any political engagement. Furthermore the government dissolved the Buddha Sasana Council that had been established under U Nu, introduced a programme for the reformation of religious educationand a registration card for monks. During the mid-1970's in an effort to gain more control over the sangha the government organized a sangha congregation in 1980 that was successful in putting the various orders under greater state control by performing a “sasana reform”10 that established fixed procedures for solving vinaya conflicts and the registration for the members of the sangha. Furthermore three new organs of the sangha were introduced on both state and provincial level: the Ovadacariya Committee as a legal arm of the sangha, the sangha Maha Nayaka committee, an executive arm consistent of 47 abbots, and the Sangha Central Working Committee as a secretariat. Effectively these committees were controlled by the state and have been its second most important tool to control the sangha, next to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. At this point the government had effectively centralized the sangha by establishing a structure that paralleled the organisational structure of the government.11 But opposition grew larger again when the economic situation of the country worsened significantly in the 1980's after the 1988 uprising12 the military 'cleansed' monasteries and pagodas of “political elements” within the clergy. At the same time, the open dispute with parts of the sangha did not keep the government from using semi-religious practices and spiritual elements to support its power. Especially after Than Shwe assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1992 he started to put a strong emphasis on his moral impetus. Steinberg writes “when it (the government) is taking some action or is indeed in power, it is distributing benefits with cetena (goodwill)13, an extremely important Buddhist concept that is constantly reiterated in the press and in government slogans. Under such circumstances, no one could possibly disagree or object to the actions taken, and thus social protest against the military requirements imposed on the public is completely inappropriate in this essentially Buddhist context.”1415 Although Myanmar appears to

8Jalal Alamgir, 'Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma', Pacific Affairs, 70 (1997), pp. 330-504, (p. 334)9Stephen Enelkamp, 'Moral Authority in Burmese Politics`, Asien, 109 (2008), pp. 37-53, (p. 47)10Whether this can be seen as a sasana reform in religious terms remains open for debate.11Through the forced registration we know that there were 280.000 properly ordained monks in Myanmar in 1985.12The 1988 Uprising was a series of demonstrations and protest against the military government in Burma. Becausekey events occurred on the 8th of August 1988 the uprising is sometimes referred to as the 8888 Uprising.13Understanding kamma in the Buddhist sense of emerging from volition, cetena, or goodwill, is a centralconcept within the religion.14David I. Steinberg, Burma:The State of Myanmar (Washington:Georgetown University Press, 2001), p. 4215If one was to adopt this point of view than the actions taken by the government could be seen as an attempt

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have left the authoritarian dictatorship behindthe structural organisation of Theravada Buddhism remains largely unchanged to this day and there is no strong opposition to this either. Yet, this structural connection alone might not be considered sufficient ground to argue that the government is at least to some extend actively involved in the rise of Buddhist nationalism that has swept over the country. Here, it is useful to take a closer look at those religious figures and movements that promote the idea that Islam poses a threat to the sasana most vividly.

to purify the sangha, essentially a sasana reform. It is interesting to note that the adherence to this point of view is not unpopular, even among academic writers on the subject matter. Michael Aung-Thwin poses as a good example for this phenomenon. For further reference consult his article “Of Monarchs, Monks, and Men: Religion and the State in Myanmar”, pp. 18-19

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The Buddhist extremist movement, known as 969, and its chief proponent Ashin Wirathu are very popular in present day Myanmar. Further, Wirathu and other leading figures of the 969 movement also play an important role within the Ma Ba Tha. Wirathu's position is clear, he states “Islam is the cause of the conflicts. If there were no Islam, there would not have been any conflicts” 16. In order to understand how this man, who has been described by Times Magazine as the “Buddhist Face of Terror”, has come to exert so much influence, one has to examine the history of the 969 movement. Kyaw Lwin, a former monk, government official and prolific writer is credited with the creation of the movement17. After the 1988 uprising he was chosen by the government to promote Buddhism and made head of the newly created Department for the Promotion and Propagation of Sasana (DPPS), which belonged to the Ministry of Religion in 1991. In the following year the DPPS published a collection of Kyaw Lwin`s writings in the book “How To Live As A Good Buddhist”, the front cover bearing an early version of the 969 movements symbol18. Unsurprisingly, Kyaw Lwin had close ties with the ruling elite of the totalitarian regime, meeting ex-dictator Than Shwe every so often to discuss religion. Before Kyaw Lwin retired from his post as the head of the DPPS he met Wiseitta Biwuntha, who is known today as Ashin Wirathu, and with whom he stayed in touch till his death in 2001. That very year Wirathu started preaching about 969, and the U.S. State Department reported “a sharp increase in anti-Muslim violence” in Myanmar19. But two years later Wirathu was arrested and sentenced to 25 years in prison for inciting communal riots in his hometown which led to the killing of 10 Muslims. He was set free when the current government granted an amnesty for political prisoners in 2011. Since 2012 the 969, with Wirathu as one of their top leaders, has sought to boycott Muslim businesses nationwide, after initial success in boycotting a Muslim bus company in Moulmein, Mon State's capital, is building an extremist network in Myanmar and incite religious hatred against Muslims all over the country. In June 2013 Wirathu presented his first proposal to prohibit Buddhist woman from marrying Muslim men at a monastic convention in Yangon. Although edited, it is this proposal that has now been signed into law.

16This statement is taken from an interview with Ashin Wirathu, conducted on behalf of the author by Htuu Lou Rae, a Burmese human rights activist, in March 2014.17He is credited as the founder of 969 by the movement itself rather than by objective accounts.18 Andrew R. C. Marshall, 'Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-Muslim monks', Reuters, 27 June 2013, p. 519 Andrew R. C. Marshall, 'Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-Muslim monks', Reuters, 27 June 2013, p. 6

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This connection between religion and state constitutes the framework in which the proposal of the set of four bills has to be reviewed. In a piece prepared for the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Richard Horsey summarizes the process of the bills as such 'During the course of 2013, the '969' movement and the aligned 'Organization for Protection of Race and Religion' began collecting signatures in support of the enactment of faith-based legislation. In total, several million signatures were collected, and in July 2013 these were forwarded to PresidentThein Sein together with a request for the enactment of four laws restricting inter-faith marriage, polygamy, religious conversion and unequal population growth. The president initially took no action on the matter. However, for reasons that remain unclear, some six months later he decided to act. On 25 February 2014, he forwarded the demands of the petitioners to the speaker, asking the legislature to discuss the proposal to enact these laws. The speaker replied that it was most appropriate that the bills be drafted in the first instance by the respective government ministries (a position backed by Aung San Suu Kyi).'20After a commission was tasked with drafting the bills 'the president submitted the four bills to the legislature on 26 November 2014, and they have been tabled for discussion in the current session of the legislature, which began on 19 January 2015 and is scheduled to run until mid-March.'21Horsey further notes that 'there is clearly a recognition among political leaders in Myanmar that these issues raised by such legislative proposals are highly sensitive and controversial' and, in line with the EU statement, that 'the bills have also drawn considerable international attention, given that the intention behind them appears discriminatory and targeted at Muslims, potentially violating not only Myanmar's constitutional provisions on religious freedom and non-discrimination, but also its treaty obligations under various international human rights conventions.'2223Yanghee Lee, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, finds clearer words stating that 'these bills risk deepening discrimination against minorities and setting back women's rights in Myanmar'.24The set of four bills includes the Religious Conversion Bill, the Monogamy Bill, which are under consideration and the already signed Population Control Healthcare and the Buddhist Women's Special Marriage Bill. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights summarizes the bills as follows25.

20Richard Horsey, 'New Religious Legislation in Myanmar', in Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 13.02.2015, p. 221See footnote 2022See footnote 2023For a number of conventions and treaties that are violated by the proposal consider HRW's 'Burma: Drop Draft Religion Law', accessible via [https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/29/burma-drop-draft-religion-law], note that this considers the conversion law only.24Via the the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, accessible on [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16015&LangID=E]25A more detailed account of the content of the bills can be found in Horsey's article, accessible via [http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Horsey-2015-02-New_Religious_Legislation_in_Myanmar-en.pdf]

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'The Religious Conversion Bill establishes a State-regulated system for religious conversion, involving justification, registration, interview, study and approval.'26Heiner Bielefeldt, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belied stated that 'the right to conversion has the status of unconditional protection under international human right law. States must respect everyone's freedom of religion or belief by removing administrative obstacles.'27The Myanmar Buddhist Woman's Special Marriage Bill 'discourages interfaith marriages between Buddhist women and men of other faiths by imposing disproportionate penalties on non-Buddhist men. Moreover, under the Bill, a cohabiting couple, where the female partner is Buddhist and the male is not, is de facto deemed 'married'. If one or both parties do not wish to marry, they may be forced into marriage by a Court, which interferes greatly with the right to enter into marriage with free and full consent.'28The Monogamy Bill is redundant since the Penal Code already prohibits polygamy. This is in accordance with human rights requirements, but 'the Bill adopts a restrictive and discriminatory approach toregulate marriage. It makes specific references to 'non-Buddhist persons' and omits other forms of marriage discriminatory to women (…).29On the Population Control Healthcare Bill the UN comments that ' while the stated objectives of the Bill are to improve living standards, alleviate poverty, ensure quality healthcare and develop maternal and child health, its provisions are extremely vague and lack any protection against discrimination.' Further, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health pointed out that 'any coercive requirement for birth spacing with the aim to 'organise' family planning would constitute a disproportionate interference in the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women and could amount to a violation of women's human rights.'30Then, reviewing of the four bills does not leave much room for a favourable argument. Their actual benefit for the community is not only extremely low but down right debatable. While it might be all too easy to explain why nationalist extremists are demanding such measures it is slightly more difficult to account for them from the perspective of the government. One is ought to ask cui bono?

Symbolic PoliticsMany theories from the field of political science would allow us to look at this question in greater detail. Most commonly, maybe we would see a divide between (neo)-realist and (neo)-liberalist approaches that focus on their respective motivations for state-actions and their specific characterization of the state. Furthermore, the debate could easily extend into a number of fields: electoral politics, public policy analysis and institutional analysis, to name a few, would all offer insightful perspectives and shed light on different pieces of the puzzle.Yet, it shall be forestalled that the cui bono question will not be addressed in this paper with the goal to produce a definitive clarification of all actors that benefit. Rather, it shall afford the possibility to transport the aforementioned concepts of power and control into the political domain. Thereby, not merely trying to connect come what may but on the basis of a mirroring political theory. This political theory can be found in the study of symbolic politics. The aim of this connection is not to argue that the parliamentary debate around the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws' is only symbolic. At the same time their symbolism should not be underestimated.

26See footnote 2427See footnote 2428See footnote 2429See footnote 2430See footnote 24

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Murray Edelman noted that 'few political scientists would doubt, on the basis of common sense evidence, that public policies have value to interested groups both as symbols and as instruments for the allocation of more tangible values.'31Further Edelman put forth the hypothesis that 1) 'the interests of organized groups in tangible resources or in substantive power are less easily satiable than are interests in symbolic reassurance.' and further laid out that 2) 'necessary conditions associated with the occurrence of the latter type of interest {interests in symbolic reassurance} are: a) the existence of economic conditions in some measure threatening the security of a large group; b) the absence of organisation for the purpose of furthering the common interest of that group; c) widespread political responses suggesting the prevalence of inaccurate, oversimplified, and distorted perceptions of the issue.' Following from this is a pattern of political activity that is 'represented by lack of organization, distorted perception, interests in symbolic reassurance, and quiescence' and is a key element in theability of organized groups 'to use political agencies in order to make good their claims on tangible resources and power, thus continuing the threat to the unorganized.'32Consequentially, the question arises whether such condition is present in Myanmar today?Indeed, the conditions are clearly to be confirmed although they have to addressed from two different perspectives. Firstly the group that perceives a threat but is not under threat, here Ma Ba Tha and their followers. Secondly, the group that is actually under threat, i.e. religious minorities. An application to Ma Ba Tha maps as follows: a) the economic situation is developing to the better but remains unstable and attained economic gain is not equally distributed. Furthermore, a large part of the population believes it is under threat (by the Muslim minority); b) the group is clearly well organised, although not strongly institutionalised; c) widespread political responses suggesting the prevalence of inaccurate, oversimplified, and distorted perceptions that suggest that the sasana or Buddhism is under threat and needs protection. For the minority group it maps in a slightly different manner: a) The economic situation is developing to the better but remains unstable and attained economic gain is not equally distributed; b) there is no powerful and well organized advocate group; c) widespread political responses suggesting the prevalence of inaccurate, oversimplified, and distorted perceptions that suggest that the group itself poses a threat to the society as a whole. This shall then be the framework in which the proposal of the so called 'Race and Religion Protection Laws' will be considered here. Thereby it is useful to remind ourselves of a few characteristics of political processes that will be generalised here for sake of shortness. Firstly, resources, benefits and power are 'frequently not distributed to unorganised group interests as promised in regulatory statutes and the propaganda attending their enactment.'33

Furthermore, 'the deprived groups often display little tendency to protest or to assert their awareness of the deprivation.'34Interestingly, Edelman points out that 'statutes (…) having promised something substantially different from what was delivered are also the ones which have been most intensively publicized as symbolizing protection of widely shared interests.'35But one must wonder 31Murray Edelman, 'Symbols and Political Quiescence', in The American Political Science Review, 53 (3), 1960, p. 69532See footnote 3133See footnote 3134Murray Edelman, 'Symbols and Political Quiescence', in The American Political Science Review, 53 (3), 1960, p. 69635See footnote 34

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why this status quo, widely recognized by scholars and backed up by countless cases of public policy review, persists? For Edelman the characteristics themselves suggest that 'non-rational reaction to symbols among people sharing a common governmental interest is a key element'36 of this process. Then, one must consider how irrationality could be so persistent? There are a number of answers. Firstly, people read their own meanings into situations that are unclear or provocative of emotion. As phrased by Fensterheim37 'the less well defined the stimulus situation, or the more emotionally laden, the greater will be the contribution of the perceiver.'38Further feeding the irrationality is the fact that large numbers of people review and think in stereotypes, personalization and oversimplifications. Or as Edelman puts it: 'they cannot recognize or tolerate ambiguous and complex situations.'39He then addsthat 'emotional commitment to a symbol is associated with contentment and quiescence regarding problems that would otherwise arouse concern.'40Adorno found a similar phenomenon, stating that 'since political and economic events make themselves felt apparently down to the most private and intimate realms of the individual, there is reliance upon stereotype and similar avoidances of reality to alleviate psychologically the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty and provide the individual with the illusion of some kind of intellectual security.'41These findings about the symbolic use of politics might be categorized into three sub-groups before they are applied to the case of the set of four bills in an effort to unravel some of the strategy. First are the actors that are directly and indirectly involved in this policy process, i.e. Ma Ba Tha, or the nationalistic movement, that proposed the bills. Then, the government that is discussing and signing/not signing the bills. Finally, the minority group, mostly Muslims but also Christians and a range of other religious minorities, to whom the bills constitute a disadvantage. These actors have to be considered in relation to the characteristics that have been suggested earlier (a,b,c). The government is exempt from this as it has the distinct status of the decision-maker (subjecting not subjected). The second sub-group bundles the claims that have been made. In short, 1) benefits and power are seldom equally distributed through politics; 2) disadvantaged groups don't protest; 3) statutes that deliver least are symbolised the most. The third group consists of the behavioural characteristics that enable the status quo of grouping two, i.e. 1) emotion creates meaning, that is informed by the prevalence of inaccurate, oversimplified, and distorted perceptions of the issue; 2) peoples assessment tends to be subject to stereotypes, personalisation and oversimplification; 3) Symbolism enables the resolution of tension (insecurity).

Transfer of these sub-groups to the current case of politics as evident in the process of passing the set of four bills, known as the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws', creates a two-fold paradigm of political symbolism. Furthermore, it confirms the aforementioned analysis. The nationalistic movement (Ma Ba Tha, 969, inter alia) perceives itself to be under threat, since it is organized it is able to spread its inaccurate and distorted perception to the extent that it pushes for the set of four bills. The government can use this to its advantage by drawing up, considering and to some extend

36See footnote 3437And as mentioned by Edelman.38Herbert Fensterheim, 'The Influence of Value Systems on the Perception of People', in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48, 1953, p. 9339Murray Edelman, 'Symbols and Political Quiescence', in The American Political Science Review, 53 (3), 1960, p. 69940See footnote 4141T.W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1950), p. 665

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signing the bills. Since the religious minority group is it has no power, is unorganized and the inaccurate and distorted perception is widespread, it will not protest (in any significant way). Importantly, this status is then confirmed by the third group, the behavioural characteristics. Therefore the government is able to please many constituents at little cost. It uses the symbolism of the bills to appear to offer a resolution to the tension that the nationalistic movement perceives. Yet, this is not the whole picture. Of course one must consider that relationship between the government and the rise of religious extremism, come nationalism. The full picture needs to take into account the governments support for nationalism. Thus, the dynamic of the use of politics as symbolism is slightly more differentiated. The government supported the nationalistic movement for years. In doing so, knowingly creating a movement that would afford the government to use symbolic politics of appeasement at a later time.

Figure 1., relation between actors involved.

Moreover, this move afforded the government with the invaluable opportunity to assert an ability to control politics and likewise the power to govern effectively during a pre-election period. But what kind of power do the government and the other involved actors actually assert through the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws'?.

Understanding PowerThe concept of power is central to both social and political science. At the same time, there remains a notable lack of agreement about its definition and about the conceptual context in which it should be understood. Although a realist conception of power is still popular in the fields of social and political science there have been a number of attempts to modify, supplement and replace it42. Critics have long pointed towards a lack of precision and a range of contradictions within the realist attempt

42Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (2005) Power in Global Governance. In: Power in Global Governance. Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (Editors) Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Pp. 2.

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to use and understand the concept of power. Possible contradictions are evident between central descriptive and prescriptive components of realism. Either way understanding power in realist terms, i.e. solely as a means to gain more of itself or security or both, makes for a rather one-sided explanation of political and social processes. More precisely, it limits the assessment of power to its motivation rather than explaining the process of its assertion. Yet, rather than dismissing realist ideas about power, the concept of its motivation is accepted here, but an approach will be presented in order to understand its dynamics. A psychosocial examination of power serves this interest. The key conception of this multi-disciplinary field is the investigation of the psychic43 life of subjects in relation to the surrounding environment. One cannot become a self without becoming a social self. But since there can be no question of social structures simply determining the psychic life of individuals, psychoanalytic and psychosocial theorists still needs to account for the ways in which the subjects, in a given social setting, link to, assert, and perceive the notions of power and control in relation to the social and cultural institutions.Important is an understanding of how these two concepts are intertwined. Human control needs are in many ways basic and predict information seeking in social relationships. Those without social power typically seek diagnostic information, making individuation more likely. Those who do have social power seek less diagnostic information about others and are more likely to stereotype them. Moreover, feelings of control not only reflect individual power positions but also group power positions. Hobbes defined power as a subjects ‘present means to obtain some future apparent good’. In addition, one might consider the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche that underlies much of the 20th century analysis of power. Nietzsche disseminated ideas on the ‘will to power’, which he saw as the domination of other humans as much as the exercise of control over one's social environment. Given that power is not innate and can be “granted” to others, to acquire power you must possess or control a form of power currency44.

Foucault famously argued that power only existed when put into action: when one has power over someone. In contrast to the Marxist movement, which understood power as held by a single entity, Foucault argued that power is present everywhere but dispersed unevenly among subjects within societies. Much of the recent sociological debate about power revolves around the issue of what it means to enable, in other words, power as a means to makesocial actions possible as much as it may constrain or prevent them. Foucault saw power as a structural expression of ‘a complex strategic situation in a given social setting’ that required both constraint and enablement. This, Foucault argues, stands in some contrast to notions of power in earlier societies, such as sovereign power. The image of this power is the sword of the sovereign: the right that it induces is the right to ‘take life and let live’. This metaphor became associated with the concept of the sovereign power, however the sword is not able to create anything, its only method of power lies in its prohibition, its rejection, exclusion, or mask. Its tool is the law, defined in negative terms: ‘do not steal’, ‘do not engage in sodomy’, and ‘do not move within such and such areas’. Socially, too, this prohibition manifests through discourse: the way we talk delimits our possible and possibly desired actions 45. But sovereign 43The concept ‘psychic life’ was first used and explained by the psychosocial scholar Judith Butler in her 1997 publication ‘The Psychic Life of Power’. Butler understands the term psychic life as the inner, psychological entity of a subject. She makes this term a synonym for a subjects personality and the ‘psyche’ of a subject.44McCornack, Steven. Reflect & Relate: An introduction to interpersonal communication. Boston. Bedford/St. Martin's. p. 291.45 Harcourt, Bernard E. (2005) Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. Pp. 152.

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power was largely replaced by disciplinary power, which ceases to be prohibitive and rather encourages an action positively: 'do wear this kind of clothing’. Its tool is not prohibition through law, but normalization through the norm, which not only creates a positive ideal of existence and rewards all those that participate in conformity but also punishes those people that cannot or do not live up to this social norm: people that don’t conform46. Through this an understanding of 'us' and 'them' and the idea of an 'inside' and an 'outside' of social groups or populations is created. Yet, albeit a development from the sovereign form of power, disciplinary power is not usually considered all to relevant for the modern nation state.

Consequentially, another conception of power, bio-power, sometimes referred to as bio-politics, shall be introduced at this point. bio-power extends much further than sovereign power, that prohibits, or disciplinary power, that conforms. It seeks to determine a multiplicity of aspects of the subjects (population) life. 'Where discipline is the technology deployed to make individuals behave, tobe efficient and productive workers, bio-politics is deployed to manage population;(...)'47Management entails an attention to detail and a general applicability that is dependent on a high degree of homogeneity. Thus, the essential demands of sovereign power and disciplinary power remain present but are substantially extended into a sheer endless number of domains of the life of the population. Hence the vehicle for power gain has changed accordingly from the sovereign motivation of 'no chaos', to the disciplinary of 'conformity', to the manageability that comes with bio-power.

Yet such clear differentiation between types of power based on motivation and the way it is exercised may be counter-factual within any real political/societal setting. One of the key scholars arguing against the Foucauldian understanding of not only the very clarification of power and control but also the dynamics of the two concepts is the Italian philosopher Agamben. He puts forward a counterargument against Foucault claiming that contemporary societies still exist within a sovereign political context and that these societies never developed from a sovereign power into a bio-power condition. Drawing on the work by Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmidt, Agamben provides another philosophical forum for understanding the political structure of contemporary societies throughout the world. Moreover, he insists that the ‘bare life’48 of subjects has always been at the heart of sovereign power.This consideration sheds some light on the question what kind of power the government and the other actors actually assert and are subjected to through the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws'? One might have presumed from the very start that bio-power, through its all-encompassing character, is most relevant. Striking is that bio-power is both informed and characterized by manageability of the subjects, not just by the power to live and let die or a desire for conformity. Agamben claims that bio-power, which takes the bare lives of the citizens into its

46 Foucault, Michel (1990) The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Vintage Books. Pp. 140.47As Foucault famously argued in his lecture series Society must be defended.48Agamben explained his concept ‘bare life’ also referred to as ‘homo sacer’ as the original figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserving the memory of the exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted. The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life, that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed is the life that has been captured in this sphere. Agamben, Giorgio (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press. Stanford. Pp. 83.

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political calculations may be more marked in the modern states but has essentially existed since the beginnings of sovereign societies. Consequentially, there is no clear distinction between the types of power. Rather, bio-power should be understood as having sovereign and disciplinary power components.

It is this understanding of power that is ought to be considered when reviewing the 'Race and Religion Protection Laws'. The question is which components of power are exercised by the actors involved and which kinds of power these actors are subjected to?

Figure 2., power relations between actors involved.

Naturally the government exercises power. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the nationalist movement also exercises some degree of power. Both the minority groups and the general public, those neither affiliated with the nationalist movement or the minority groups, exercise no power at all. But the power that is being exercised by the nationalist movement and the government is very different and to no small degree dependent on the subject of power. The government pretends to exercise bio-power in the sense of a manageability motivated move over the general public, that is it tries to justify the laws through the claim that they will be beneficial for the wider society, arguing it would offer security through protection. In actuality the government is solely exercising its sovereign power together with a disciplinary component that is aimed at conformity. At the same time, the government exercises power over the nationalist movement as it is able to utilize them as supporters through carefully considering their demands and eventually agreeing to meet them. Furthermore, it is important to consider that the government enabled the nationalist movement in the first place. Lastly, but most importantly the government exercises power over the subjects of the law, the minority groups. More precisely, here it does exercise power that actual gives a manageability benefit to the government itself because control of the group becomes easier. At the same time the execution of power remains sovereign in its character as it is not to the wider benefit of society.Of

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course this also shows the groups that are subjected to power and the kind of power they are subjected to. Yet, a question around the extend of power remains when considering the relationship between the government and nationalist movement. Who holds how much power? Is the nationalist movement merely being instrumentalized or does it hold power in itself, put differently: how much power does the tool hold?

ConclusionThe foremost concern of this paper is the establishment of a framework for considering the strategy behind Myanmar's 'Race and Religion Protection Laws'. A framework should be exemplary for the issue it is addressing, thus proposing one possible way to assess the given scenario. Consequentially, a careful consideration of the actors, their motivations and abilities is needed. In this paper these considerations are attempted with a focus on three main parts: the relations between actors that constitute the environment for the issue that is discussed; political symbolism; and a detailed understanding of power. Subsequently the analysis of the individual segments has shown a number of things. The relationship between the actors, most importantly between the government and the nationalistic movement, has shown that there is reason to consider the instrumentalization of the former by the latter. This may be particularly interesting in the setting of the current pre-election period. Understanding the symbolism of politics and some basic dynamics thereof should strengthen this claim and spark more analysis that may either support or dismantle it. The thorough assessment of various types of power and their components is providing a basis for the application of psychosocial theories to cases like the one discussed here and furthermore shows important motivations for power gain, understanding of which is detrimental to understanding political processes.There are no doubt other things that need to be considered and so this framework should be understood as an encouragement to extend the analysis of this ongoing and most interesting issue.

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Online Resources

HRW 'Burma: Drop Draft Religion Law', accessible via:[https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/29/burma-drop-draft-religion-law]

International Crisis Group report, ‘Myanmar’s Electoral Landscape’ on 28.04.2015, accessible via: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/266-myanmar-s-electoral-landscape.pdf]

Larry Jagan in the Bangkokpost on 07.06.2015, accessible via: [http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/special-reports/584481/parties-brace-for-a-bitter-election-battle]

The European Union Delegation to Myanmar on 12.01.2015, accessible via: [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/myanmar/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150112_en.htm]

UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, accessible via:[http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16015&LangID=E]

Comment

When in doubt over the precise meaning of a Burmese word the author consulted the Burmese-English/English-Burmese dictionary by Nance Cunningham and Aung Soe Min, Paiboon Publishing.

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· web viewfurthermore three new organs of the sangha were introduced on both state and provincial...

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