wcd case studies tucuruí hydro-power complex (brazil)the tucuruí dam, built on the tocantins river...

____________________________________________________________________________________________________This is a working paper of the World Commission on Dams. The report published herein was prepared for the Commission aspart of its information-gathering activity. The views, conclusions, and recommendations are not intended to represent the views of theCommission.

WCD Case Studies

Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex (Brazil)

FINAL SCOPING REPORT

1999

World Commission on Dams SecretariatP.O. Box 16002, Vlaeberg, Cape Town 8018, South Africa

Phone: 27 21 426 4000 Fax: 27 21 426 0036.Website: http://www.dams.org E-mail: [email protected]

World Commission on DamsBrazil Case study, Tucurui Hydro-Power Complex, Scoping Report, 22/09/1999 i


DisclaimerThis is a working paper of the World Commission on Dams - the report published herein wasprepared for the Commission as part of its information gathering activity. The views, conclusions, andrecommendations are not intended to represent the views of the Commission. The Commission'sviews, conclusions, and recommendations will be set forth in the Commission's own report.

World Commission on Dams5th Floor, Hycastle House58 Loop StreetPO Box 16002Vlaeberg, Cape Town8018, SOUTH AFRICATelephone: +27 21 426 4000Fax: +27 21 426 0036Email: [email protected]://www.dams.org

World Commission on DamsBrazil Case study, Tucurui Hydro-Power Complex, Scoping Report, 22/09/1999 ii


The Study Team

Co-ordinator:

Prof. Emílio Lèbre La Rovere (Energy and Environmental Planning)

Consultants:

Dra. Bertha Becker (social issues)Dr. Eneas Salati (ecological issues)Dr. Gilberto Canali (technical and economic issues)

Researchers:

Marcia Gomes Ismerio (management, social issues)Maria das Graças da Silva (regional planning)Oscar de Moraes Cordeiro Netto (management, technical and economic issues)

World Commission on DamsBrazil Case study, Tucurui Hydro-Power Complex, Scoping Report, 22/09/1999 iii


Contents

1. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................................1

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT : DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TUCURUÍHYDROPOWER COMPLEX ..............................................................................................................................3

2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE TUCURUÍ HYDROPOWER COMPLEX...........................................................42.2 THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT.................................................................................................................52.3 THE TUCURUÍ HYDRO-POWER COMPLEX ..................................................................................................102.4 THE TUCURUÍ HYDRO-POWER COMPLEX RESERVOIR AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PROJECTSSCHEDULED FOR THE TOCANTINS RIVER HYDROGRAPHIC BASIN .......................................................................12

3. CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES: LEGAL ISSUES AND THE GRANTOR AUTHORITY...............17

3.1 AWARDING THE HYDRO-POWER PROJECT CONCESSION .............................................................................173.2 CHANGES IN JURIDICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................173.3 THE TUCURUÍ HYDRO-POWER COMPLEX IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION ANDINTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................19

4. COSTS, BENEFITS AND IMPACTS: EXPECTED X ACTUAL .........................................................21

4.1 HYDRO-POWER GENERATION.....................................................................................................................214.2 NAVIGATION .............................................................................................................................................214.3 SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS CAUSED BY THE TUCURUÍ HYDRO-POWER COMPLEX:PROCESSES AND MANAGEMENT.........................................................................................................................214.4 RESETTLEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES: PROCEDURES AND IMPLICATIONS ...........................................224.5 INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES .......................................................................................................................244.6 ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS...............................................................................................................................25

5. UNEXPECTED IMPACTS........................................................................................................................29

5.1 IMPACTS IN THE LOCAL AREA OF INFLUENCE.............................................................................................295.2 DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS............................................................................................................................315.3 COMMENTS ON TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION AND POPULATION GROWTH IN THE TUCURUÍ REGION ...32

6. DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ......................................................................................35

7. THE TUCURUÍ DAM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TOCANTINS RIVER BASIN ..............37

8. LESSONS LEARNED AND TRENDS OF CHANGE IDENTIFIED ....................................................38

World Commission on DamsBrazil Case study, Tucurui Hydro-Power Complex, Scoping Report, 22/09/1999 1


1. IntroductionThe World Commission on Dams (WCD) was set up in order to deal with a key controversy in theworldwide discussion over sustainable development. The Commission offers a unique opportunity tofocus on the many assumptions and paradigms underpinning efforts to reconcile economic growth,social equality, environmental preservation and political participation within a global context ofchange. In a frequently abstract discussion over the real meaning of sustainable development, damsoffer a rare opportunity to discuss these critical issues as we move towards the XXI century.

From this standpoint, the general objectives of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) are to:

• Review the contribution of dams to development and assess alternatives for the use of water andpower generation; and

• Establish standards, guidelines and rules – when appropriate – that are acceptable at theinternational level for the planning, design, assessment, construction, function, monitoring andshut-down of dams.

One of the objectives of the WCD is a global review of the contribution made by dams todevelopment. This contribution is defined in a broad-ranging manner, based on the relevance andsuitability of dams as a response to the needs which prompted their construction (such as irrigation,production of electricity, flood control, water supplies, etc.). This definition also includes services andbenefits - both forecast and obtained - as well as costs associated with results achieved, the distributionof gains and losses among the groups involved, and the general context of their construction andoperation. This latter aspect is also related to the decision-taking process, checking the validity of theassumptions on which the projects were initially drawn up.

To do so, various in-depth case studies are being undertaken in both the more developed anddeveloping nations, analysing dams built over the past few decades. The Tucuruí dam, built on theTocantins River in Amazonia was selected as one of these case studied. Completed in 1985, this is thefirst large dam built in a tropical rainforest, and one of the largest in Latin America.

The main objective of this study is to assess the past experience of the Tucuruí dam (Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex, Brazil) in terms of its performance and its contribution to development, seeking toidentify the main lessons learned with regard to the planning, implementation and operation of theproject.1

The common methodology adopted by the WCD for these studies calls for the organisation of datacollection, with discussion and analysis of the information available on six key issues:

The six key questions posed by the WCD:

1. How were the main decisions taken during the project cycle?2. What were the expected benefits, costs and impacts, compared to the current actual effects?3. What unexpected costs, benefits and impacts were encountered?4. What was the distribution of the costs and benefits; who won and who lost?5. To what extent did the project meet the criteria and guidelines in effect at the time of the

concession, construction and operation of the venture?6. What are the main lessons learned from the experience of this project?

These questions, which are general in nature, are common to all the case studies and are adapted to thespecific context of each case by defining the scope and discussions with the social players involved inthe process. The main stages scheduled for the case studies consists of the following:



1. A brief institutional analysis identifying the various interest groups and institutions involved inand/or affected by the planning, construction and operation processes of the venture;

2. A preliminary report on the scope, giving basic information on the topics and issues to be studiedin greater depth during the case study, as well as it contents and the approach to be adopted; thisreport is analysed at an initial meeting with the groups and specialists involved, and revised asnecessary;

3. The case study is prepared by Brazilian consultants, under the supervision of the WCD Secretariat.The results obtained are analysed – and revised if necessary – at a second meeting with these sameparticipants.

During the study preparation process, all reports offered by persons and institutions are welcome,wishing to submit comments on the project, as well as additional information. The various views,concerns and standpoints of the social players will be recorded systematically during the study, basedmainly on listening to comments and reports from individuals, interest groups and institutionsinvolved.

The Study Team of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex case study prepared this report as an initial stepin drawing up the case study, using the methodology described above. In general, it follows the normalprocedures for studies assessing the environmental and social impacts of projects. A first 4-pagedocument summarising the key issues was prepared for discussion by local stakeholders in the Tucuruíregion in a preparatory meeting held in the city of Tucuruí on 22-23 July 1999, gathering 85participants. A preliminary version of this report was then prepared and submitted for theconsideration of the main stakeholders identified, which discussed the proposed approach for this casestudy at the Scoping Meeting held in Belém (state of Pará) on 9-10 August 1999, gathering 50participants.

This wording of this Final Scope Report was polished and supplemented on the basis of the commentsand contributions put forward by all participants at the Scoping Meeting, thus constituting a Term ofReference that will guide the work required for Phase II of this Study.



2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT : DESIGN ANDIMPLEMENTATION OF THE TUCURUÍ HYDROPOWERCOMPLEX

Located deep in the Amazon rainforest, the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex is one the largest projectsof this type in the world. Its conceptualisation and implementation falls within the historical context ofthe late 1960s through to the early 1980s - a time of dynamic interaction between a nation-widedevelopment project spurred by vigorous state intervention and backed by the easily-availableinternational loans at low interest rates.

Under the military regime, a policy was deliberately promoted by an authoritarian government, whichresulted in social exclusion, implementing a geo-political project as a strategy for the rapidmodernisation of society and Brazilian territories. This was considered vital to economic growth,strengthening the State and enhancing the international status of Brazil.

The quest for technological autonomy and making better use of geographical areas were key elementsin this project. Two National Development Plans (NDP I and II) laid down the guidelines forconservative modernisation, fostering (a) the technification of agriculture; (b) after the first oil crisis,the II National Development Plan (1975/1979) in particular shifted the dynamic focus of the economyfrom durable consumer goods to semi-finished production goods and capital goods. This switch wasbased on foreign debt and rising exports; (c) rapid national integration, implying the definitiveinclusion of Amazonia.

A network of tandem technical and political controls – called a scheduled network – was imposed onthis region, designed to remove material, political and ideological obstacles to modern capitalistexpansion (Becker, 1990). This was firmed up particularly through extending all types of networks inorder to complete nation-wide circuits - highways, telecommunications, energy, urban facilities etc.while also establishing new growth hubs to which investments were channelled. This drive was alsounderpinned by the widespread increase in the traditional mobility of the Brazilian people, spreadingrapidly throughout the country due to tamped-down wages and poverty, with rural workers beingthrown off the land by agricultural modernisation, together with the concentration of land ownershipand the attraction of dynamic urban hubs.

The settlement of Amazonia on a giant scale at a rapid pace was tagged as top priority in economicand geopolitical terms, as it was felt that this area would be able to absorb social tensions and supplyfresh resources, expanding the domestic market and ensuring the status of Brazil in South America.The rapid introduction of all the components in the “scheduled network” (networks and hubs),together with subsidised capital flows and induced migration ensured the feasibility of rapid settlementof this region along a mobile frontier that had until then been restricted to the Eastern edge of therainforest.

Assailed by the economic woes triggered by the first oil crisis, which grew worse during the 1980s,with the second oil crisis (1979) and the sudden hike in interest rates on the international market,attempts were made to shore up economic growth through exports, attracting foreign investments andthe expansion and transnationalisation of state-run enterprises. Regional policies implemented byconventional civil service agencies were replaced by the implementation of huge mining projects withmassive investments, set up as joint ventures which linked state-run enterprises and multinationalcorporations, or which were otherwise managed by one or the other of them.

It is within this context that the construction of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex took place, fromits inventory and feasibility studies (1972) through to its inauguration in 1984. It represents a massive



attempt to supply power for huge aluminium production projects, while encouraging industrialisationat the regional level, while also underpinning regional connections and producing energy to supply theentire country on a nation-wide basis.

Even at the time when major projects - including Tucuruí - were being inaugurated, the authoritarianregime was faltering, undermined by the economic, fiscal and political crises assailing the State andthe appearance of new social players on the regional scene.

It became clear that regional policy over the period in question was not linear and homogeneous. Tothe contrary, faced with international and domestic conditions, in order to achieve the project targets, itwas necessary to implement a series of rapid alterations in its strategies, which assigned variousweights to its components, constituting different phases. Throughout this process, the significance ofbuilding a large-scale hydropower complex in this region also varied.

2.1 Historical Overview of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex

In general, three phases can be identified in the conceptualisation and implementation of Tucuruí,associated with alterations in Government strategies, which should be studied in greater depth.

2.1.1 Amazonia as the settlement border/energy for Belém

Between 1968 and 1974, the main concern of the Government with regards to Amazonia was to fosterits settlement for the economic and geopolitical regions already outlined. This phase saw theimplementation of the highways, particularly the Transamazon, and settlement projects, morespecifically those along the Transamazon highway and in Rondônia. Regional electricity suppliescame from thermo-power plants with the exception of the small hydropower plant at Coaracy Nunes(Amapá State) and Curua-Uná near Santarém (Pará State). This could no longer keep pace with therapid growth of Belém after the construction of the Brasilia-Brasilia highway, as well as old and newtownships springing up through both planned and spontaneous settlement.

The first attempt to take good advantage of the hydro-power potential of Amazonia was undertaken inthe late 1960s and early 1970s by ENERAM (the Co-ordinating Committee for Energy Studies inAmazonia), which was established in 1968. These studies focused on providing power for Belém,offering different options for the location of the power-plant, including two sites on the TocantinsRiver, one of which was Tucuruí, although no provision was made for a complex the size of thecurrent project (Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex, Case Study 1992). Based on these indications,Eletrobrás undertook its Inventory of the Tocantins Basin and the Eletronorte power utility wasestablished in 1973.

2.1.2 Amazonia as a Resource Frontier / Energy for Major Mining andMetallurgical Products

After the first oil crisis in 1973, Government strategies became more selective and more diversified,with a firmer economic slant, viewing Amazonia as a major source of revenue (Becker, 1982). Agri-businesses based on farming and ranching were encouraged, instead of settlement projects; in 1974 thePolo Amazonia Agri-Business, Mining and Metallurgical Hubs Program assigned higher priority toareas instead of extending highways. The value assigned to this region rose, particularly in Pará State,as Brazil’s main store of minerals, which could ease its economic crisis by exporting ores, with theparticipation of foreign capital. As the oil crisis also affected aluminium production in Japan and theUSA due to higher power costs, there was much interest in exploiting the mineral and energyresources of Amazonia. In parallel, efforts were made to ensure power supplies for Belém, São Luísand Marabá, as well as interconnecting the electrical system with Northeast Brazil.



The construction of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex began in November 1975, designed largely tomeet fresh demands from mining and metallurgical projects. The initial guidelines for this newGovernment approach were contained in the II National Development Plan (1975-1979), but expandedas the economic crisis worsened.

If the initial idea had been to provide power for mining and metallurgy projects in Southeast ParáState, after the second oil crisis as interest rates also rose on the international market stepping up oreexports was seen as a solution for rolling over the foreign debt. A proposal was prepared byCompanhia Vale do Rio Doce covering global exports of the natural resources of Eastern Amazonia,focused on ore mining. This proposal gave rise to the Greater Carajás Program, announced officiallyin late 1980 and covering an area containing immense mineral wealth, considered a real geologicalanomaly on the Planet.

This speeded up the selective strategy of the Government, which, instead of channelling investmentsto various hubs, focused on one huge single territory under the Carajás Program, covering 10.6% ofBrazil. The inauguration of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex in 1984, thus fell within the newcontext of pushing back the natural resources frontier, as well as major projects, which, with theexception of Mineração Rio do Norte (1979), were all inaugurated during the first half of the 1980s,when the conservative modernisation project was already thoroughly depleted.

2.1.3 Amazonia as a Frontier for Social Movements / Tucuruí Challenged

If the 1980s were considered as the Lost Decade in economic terms, this was certainly not the casefrom the social standpoint. The implementation of the authoritarian project did not take place at littlecost.

Starting with the crisis undermining the State, the implementation of major projects, particularlyTucuruí, resulted in a rapid and violent upsurge in the mobility of the populace. Re-routing the courseof the Tocantins River and filling its reservoir flooded not only the forest but also some indigenouslands, affecting part of the rural population and various townships, including some which had recentlysprung up spontaneously along the Transamazon Highway. The resettlement of indigenous andmigrant communities, added to the environmental impacts, resulted in intense conflicts which werereflected in better-organised demands throughout the 1980s, prompting a groundswell of grassrootsmovements with broad-ranging repercussions at the regional and national levels.

The new regional players moved into a negotiation phase with Eletronorte, claiming their rights, whichstill today shapes the situation of this hydropower complex.

2.2 The Environmental Context

The Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex is located on the Tocantins River in Pará State, some 7.5kilometres upstream from the town of Tucuruí, and 300 kilometres from the town of Belém, as thecrow flies.

The Tocantins River and its main tributary, the Araguaia, constitute a single basin, sometimes knownas the Tocantins Basin, or the Tocantins-Araguaia Basin. This river springs from Brazil’s high centralplateau, and runs through huge tracts of cerrado savannahs before entering dense Amazon rainforestareas in Pará State, where the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex is located.



2.2.1 Physical Characteristics

The Tocantins-Araguaia hydrographic basin is located almost completely between the 2nd and 18thparallels, at a longitude between the 46th and 56th meridians West. Its elongated configuration in alongitudinal direction follows two major water courses – the Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers – whichjoin on the Northern border of the basin to form the lower Tocantins, flowing into the Pará River,which in turn is part of the Amazon River estuary.

The Tocantins River basin has an average annual flow rate of 10,900 m3/s, with an average annualvolume of 344km3 and a drainage area of 767,000km2, representing 7.5% of the land mass of Brazil;with 83% of the area of this basin divided among the States of Tocantins and Goiás (58%), MatoGrosso (24%); Pará (13%) and Maranhão (4%), in addition to the Federal District (1%). It borders thebasins of some of the largest rivers in Brazil: the Paraná in the South, the Xingu to the West, and theSão Francisco to the East. Much of its area lies in Central-West Brazil, from the sources of theAraguaia and Tocantins Rivers through to their confluence on the border of Goiás, Maranhão and ParáStates. From here on downstream, this hydrographic basin extends into Northern Brazil, and is limitedto a mere corridor along the banks of the Tocantins River.

2.2.2 Climate

The lengthy course of the Tocantins River basin is directly related to the steady presence of hot, moist,equatorial mainland air masses, which results in relatively homogeneous climate and weather. This ischaracterised by seasons, which are repeated year after year with very minor variations in terms oftemperature, rainfall, atmospheric humidity, sunshine, windspeed and other climate parameters.

North of the 6th parallel South, the climate is hot and humid, with annual average temperaturesvarying from 24ºC to 28ºC, peaking at 38ºC in August and September, and bottoming out in June at22ºC. South of this parallel, average annual temperatures drop gradually, as the latitude increases. Tothe far South of this region, in certain areas, due to the orography of the Central Planalto, a tropicalhigh-altitude mainland climate is found, with average annual temperatures hovering around 22ºC.

The rainfall increases from South to North, ranging from 1,500mm to over 2,400mm. The region withthe lowest rainfall is found to the West of Paraná (Goiás). Average annual figures drop West ofCarolina ( Maranhão), on the border with the Northeast region, reaching 1,700mm to the West alongthe Xingu River. Seasonal rainfall distribution is divided into two periods during the year: the dry andrainy season. To the far North, the dry season is limited to three months of the year (June, July andAugust), while throughout the remainder of the region it extends to between five and six months. Tothe South, the rainy season occurs from September through April, with a few dry spells betweenJanuary and February known as veranicos, which are extremely harmful to temporary crops.

Looking at the annual evapometric averages for the various latitudes (Equatorial, Transition, Tropicaland High Altitude Tropical), an average of 905.8mm evaporation is noted for the entire region.

The area of the basin under study posts very high figures during the rainy season, with an annualaverage of approximately 76% throughout the region. To the North, relative air humidity tops 85%from December through May, dropping below this level during the remaining months but still at highlevels. Throughout most of the region, below of the 6th parallel South, the annual relative humidityhovers around 70%, with some extremely dry months (July, August) when this figure drops tobetween 40% and 50%, compared to figures of around 80% from December through April.



2.2.3 Geomorphology

In geographical terms, the Tocantins-Araguaia basin is bordered to the South by the Central Planalto,to the West by the Carajás, Seringa, Gradaús and Roncador ranges of hills, to the East by the SerraGeral de Goiás range and the Mangabeiras escarpments, and to the North by the Amazon Riverestuary. The watershed between the Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers lies in the Serra Dourada range ofhills.

This region is found on the portion of the Brazilian Shield known as the Central Massif, the CentralBrazilian Massif, or the Goiás - Mato Grosso Massif, with the Southern Amazon Shield dropping inaltitude towards the North (500-200m), where it is coated by Amazon basin sediments, rising towardsthe South-Southeast in the Center-West region (500-800m and 800-1,200m). Here, at times fossilisedby the sedimentation of the Paraná River basin or the excess of sedimentation of the Paraná Riverbasin or extensive Cretaceous sedimentation, it builds up into the vast high-altitude plateaus that formthe watersheds between the hydrographic basins of the Amazon, Paraná-Paraguay and São FranciscoRivers.

In the Southeast portion of the Goiás Massif are the highest altitudes in this region at 1,100 – 1,300m.The Chapada dos Veadeiros has the highest point in Center-West Brazil at the top of this escarpment,1,676 meters high. Also noteworthy is the Serra Geral do Paraná range of hills and the Contagemescarpment, over 1,200 meters high.

2.2.4 Hydrography

Running some 2,500 kilometres, the Tocantins River is formed by the Almas and Maranhão Rivers,which rise in the Goiás Planalto at an altitude of 1,000 meters in the heart of Brazil. Its maintributaries through to its confluence with the Araguaia River are (upstream to downstream): Bagagem,Tocantinszinho, Paranã, Manoel Alves de Natividade, Sono, Manoel Alves Grande and Farinha on theright bank, and Santa Tereza on the left bank.

The main tributary of the Tocantins, the Araguaia River is considered as having the same level ofimportance in the general context of the basin. It stands out due to its hydrological characteristics andits role in the process of settling these lands. It rises along the edges of the Serra do Caiapó range ofhills on the state border between Goiás and Mato Grosso at an altitude of some 850 meters. With alength of some 2,115 kilometres, much of its course lies parallel to the Tocantins River, runningnorthward. These two rivers meet after forming the huge and largely marshy Ilha do Bananal island,which is 80 kilometres wide and 350 kilometres long. The confluence of these two major rivers takesplace at an altitude of 70.80 meters.

The Tocantins-Araguaia basin has a clearly defined hydrological system. Its dry season culminates inSeptember/October, with a flood season that peaks between February and April. Along the TocantinsRiver, the highest figures are recorded each year in February/March, and in March/April along theAraguaia. This lag is due to the huge floodplains of Ilha do Bananal river island, which slow theprogress of the floods.

The average flow rate for this basin is estimated at 10,950 m3/s, with the Araguaia River contributingsome 5,500m3/s, 450m3/s coming from the Itacaiúnas River and the Tocantins River contributing5,000 m3/s before it meets the Araguaia. In the Tocantins, the average specific flow rate drops as faras Porto Nacional (Goiás), and then increases as it moves towards its confluence with the Araguaia,due to the heavy inflow from its right bank tributaries.



It is important to stress the even nature of rainfall distribution all over this basin, as well as the factthat some 30% of the rainfall drains away through its water-courses.

2.2.5 Vegetation

The dominant vegetation over much of the basin under study is cerrado savannahs, from its Southernborder as far as Itaguatins (Goiás), on the Tocantins River, around Conceição do Araguaia (Pará); tothe North, this becomes mesophilic forest, constituting a broad transition strip edging the Amazonrainforest itself. An exception is found in the Northwest Goiânia, and from there westwards, with theappearance of the seasonal forest known as the semi-deciduous forests of Mato Grosso and Goiás.

Local variations in terms of the density size and composition of forest plantlife are at times due tolocalised climate variations (microclimates). However, these are usually related to pedagogicaldifferences in the cerrado savannah environment, with frequent patches of more fertile soilsoriginating from limestone base rocks or calciferous sediments.

2.2.6 Geology and Geomorphology

The area of influence of the Tucuruí reservoir is characterised by two major geological domains: acrystalline base consisting of igneous rocks and meta-sediments, and a sedimentary overburdenconsisting of sediments deposited during the Mesozoic and Cenozoic periods (Tertiary andQuaternary). The reservoir is located in the contact zone between the crystalline rocks of the XingúComplex (left bank) and the low-level metamorphic rocks of the Tocantins Group (left bank, riverbedand right bank).

The location where the Tucuruí dam was built is located at the end of a long stretch of waterfalls, andmay be divided into three tracts: Pará - Maranhão Southern Planalto; Lower Amazon Planalto; and theSouthern Pará Peripheral Depression. This latter covers almost the entire area of the reservoir. Itsorigin is related to the actions of erosive processes, which began towards the end of the Tertiaryperiod. There are various types of terrain in the region, particularly areas with flat soil surfaces, dried-out areas on flat-topped hills, and river plains.

2.2.7 Soils

The soils found in the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex region are acid and nutrient-poor, with lownatural fertility levels. The main types of soils which prevail almost completely in the regionsurrounding this venture are Red-Yellow Podzolic (predominant); Red-Yellow Latosols and YellowLatosols. The Red-Yellow Podzolic soils are located mainly on the left bank of the reservoir, coveringover 60% of its area of influence; despite some constraints, they are favorable for farming activities.The Red-Yellow and Yellow Latosols cover some 25% of the area, and are located mainly on the rightbank of the reservoir. Nutrient-poor, they can be used for farming purposes when fertilised andcorrectly prepared.

2.2.8 Limnology and Water Quality

The Tocantins River and its tributaries were originally classified as nutrient-poor clearwater riverswith a low concentration of ions and sediment loads. Flooding large areas of forest and thedecomposition of organic matter has resulted in the depletion of the dissolved oxygen (DO) at thedeeper levels of the reservoir, with the production and release of CO2 and CH4 during andimmediately after the filling stage. The Tucuruí reservoir currently has different sections with theirown limnological characteristics and special dynamics, which are determined by their specifichydraulic time of residence; morphology of the banks; different depths, thermal and chemical



stratification standards, and inflow rates which vary with the hydrological cycle. The Tucuruí reservoiris divided into the following regions: (a) uptake region, with the same characteristics as those of theriver (shallow, homogeneous water column, dissolved oxygen throughout the year); (b) open areas,represented by the former Tocantins River bed, with a limited hydraulic time of residence, verticalstratification and anoxic hypolimnion during the dry season, vertical mixture and oxygenation of thewater column during the rainy season; (c) riverbank areas with permanent chemical stratification, ananoxic bottom level, higher figures for ions and nutrients, and the presence of aquatic macrophytes;(d) Caraipé branch, with it own limnological dynamics, a high hydraulic time of residence, andpermanent stratification of the water column.

The aquatic macrophytes are found mainly along the left bank of the reservoir, where they foster thedevelopment of different types of organisms, such as periphyton, which is an important item forfeeding shrimp found in the reservoir. In turn, shrimp is one of the main food items for the tucunaré, afish that is of commercial interest in this region.

2.2.9 Wildlife

The wildlife in the lower Tocantins region is considered as among the richest and most diversified inthe world. Before filling the reservoir, a survey of the species found in this area was carried out, andthe animals in the flood area were rescued as the lake was formed. Based on these studies, it isestimated that the Tucuruí region shelters 117 mammal species, 294 bird species and 120 species ofreptiles and amphibians.

Various species are found in this region, which are endemic, rare, or threatened with extinction.Outstanding among them is the miniature green macaw (ararajuba) and the saki monkey (cuxíu).Additionally, species of synergetic value are also found, including various species of peccary, deer andalligator, as well as birds such as curassow and tinamou.

This is one of the areas in Amazonia undergoing intensive settlement processes, which results in thedestruction of natural habitats; together with poaching, this is reducing the abundance of these species.

2.2.10 Icthyofauna

The Araguaia-Tocantins basin is home to some 300 fish species, predominantly Characidinae,Silurídae and Cichlídae, with communities differing between the lower Tocantins, with fish typical ofCentral Amazonia, and the mid and upper reaches of this river, which is home to non-Amazon species.

The formation of the Tucuruí reservoir resulted in the sweeping transformations in the icthyofaunafound in the Tocantins River. In general, there was a reduction in the abundance and diversity ofspecies from the mouth of the river towards its upper reaches, due to the lack of flood-plains andvariations in the flow of the mid and upper Tocantins River.

In the reservoir, the main modifications in the communities have been related to the increase in thepopulation of carnivorous fish (whitefish, dogfish, tucunaré and piranha), due to increased foodsupplies (shrimp and fry), as well as an increase in the population of plankton-eating fish (mapará) andthe establishment of iliophage species (curimatã and jaraqui) in the upper part of the dam.Downstream, alterations have occurred in the communities, without reducing the diversity of species:the predators dominate the area closest to the dam wall, with the abundance of commercial speciesshrinking.

In general, major modifications have occurred in the fish life found in the Tocantins basin, causedlargely by the formation of the Tucuruí reservoir: (a) interruption of the migratory routes of the large



catfish (dourada, piraíba, pirarara and barbado) and some carachoids (curimatã and ubarana); (b) initialdisappearance of the curimatã; (c) reduction in the fish stock of mapará in the lower Tocantins; (d)increase in the quantity of fish in the mid Tocantins (curimatãs, jaraquis, branquinhas, pirapitinga,matrinchã, surubim or pintado, mandubé and barbado), which feed in the reservoir and swim up theTocantins to spawn during the high-water period.

2.3 The Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex

The potential of the Tocantins River has been estimated at some 25 million kW, of which the TucuruíHydro-Power Complex – as the largest of its projects – is designed to generate 8,370 MW (32% of thetotal for the entire basin). Work began in November 1975, and the reservoir filling took place nineyears later, with the plant being commissioned on November, 1984.

The initial estimates were made on the basis of the aerophotogrammetric restoration undertaken priorto filling the reservoir, with regard to the area to be flooded, which indicated a lake surface of some2,430km2, forming around 600 islands. Later surveys carried out on the basis of satellite images of thelake, once it had been fully formed, have modified these estimates. At the 72m level, the reservoir canhold a volume of some 50.8 million cubic meters, flooding an area of 2,875km2, with a length of some170 kilometres along the main river, and a maximum width of 40 kilometres. The outer perimeter ofthe reservoir on the left bank is around 1,800 kilometres, reaching 1,100 kilometres on the right bank.Considering the perimeter of almost 1,800 islands which have formed, estimated at 3,500 kilometres(CET, 1988), the total estimated perimeter of its banks reaches 6,400 kilometres.

The maximum depth of the reservoir is 75 meters, with an average depth of 17.3 meters. Its averagewidth is 14.3 kilometres, with the maximum distance between its banks reaching 40 kilometres.

The minimum operating level is 58.00 meters, with its normal maximum at 72.00 meters, and its fullmaximum being 75.30 meters above sea level. Downstream, the normal minimum is 4.00 meters, thenormal maximum is 6.80 meters, and the utmost maximum is 24.50 meters. The average residencetime of water in the reservoir is approximately 50 days, with a non-renewable water volume of only3%.

2.3.1 Objectives of the Project

The main objective of the project is power generation. During the initial stage, with twelve turbinesinstalled, the Tucuruí power-plant has a capacity of 4,245 MW. Plans have been drawn up to doublethis capacity, boosting its current capacity to the total planned power of 8,370 MW.

In the preliminary studies, only energy production was indicated as the purpose of the reservoir.However, some references were made to using the lake as a way of travelling along the river. In fact,having flooded the Tucuruí rapids, the Tocantins could well become navigable the entire year throughas far as Marabá, should lock-gates be installed in the dam. This hypothesis was considered when theCarajás mining complex was set up.

At that time, society in Pará State called for lock-gates to be built on the Tucuruí dam in order toensure that ore from Carajás would be carried along the Tocantins River. However, the decision toship Carajás ore to the Port of Itaqui in Maranhão State for export by rail rather than by waterway wastaken by CVRD prior to the decision to build the Tucuruí dam. This decision was shaped by thecompany’s experience in transporting ores by rail, as well as the amount of investments required, andthe annual costs for of maintaining a marine ore terminal in Pará State, as well as ensuring that theTocantins Rivers was navigable throughout the entire year through to the coast.



The railroad in question is owned and run by the same company which holds a majority stake inCarajás: Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, which was State-owned at that time and is today privatised.The original project made provision for building two more lock-gates in order to ensure the feasibilityof shipping from Belém through to Santa Isabel (680 kilometers).

Should the objectives of regional development have prevailed in the decision to build the Tucuruídam, feasibility studies should have been carried out for the lock-gates, which would probably haveresulted in a decision other than that adopted at the time: building partial lock-gate structures allowingthe transportation of significant amounts of sundry cargo along the Tocantins River.

The conclusion of these lock-gates is today a rallying-call for the entire local populace, with thisproject scheduled for implementation under the Brazil in Action Plan. The State Government feels thatthe failure to build the lock-gates on the Tucuruí dam at that time has curbed regional development.

Nevertheless, these lock-gates remain a controversial project, as some sectors of the FederalGovernment are not yet convinced of their economic feasibility.

Flood control was not taken into consideration as a possible use of the reservoir. In fact, the risk offlooding at the intake point of the reservoir (Marabá and surroundings) is considered a constraint onoperations, being one of the factors, which defines the maximum level for operation. However, there isno denying the role that could be played by the reservoir in reducing downstream flooding. Skilfullydeployed, reservoir volumes can reduce high floodwaters downstream to little more than averageintensity. Nevertheless, the reservoir would have little effect in dealing with severe floods such asthose, which took place in 1926 and 1980, and in this case might even worsen the situation byincreasing peak volumes due to improper operating manoeuvres.

More efficient use of this venture for flood control downstream and at the intake point of the reservoirwould be possible, but would result in a loss in energy production efficiency, due to the need toallocate space in the reservoir.

Nevertheless, artificial control of floods and drought along the rivers may well constitute a benefit forproduction activities as well as riverside communities, although this frequently causes seriousenvironmental damage due to the modifications introduced into the dynamics of aquatic eco-systems.

An unforeseen use for the reservoir, which later proved important from both the social and economicstandpoints, is commercial fishing.

Irrigation is not an important use for the Tucuruí reservoir. However, the climatic characteristics of theregion, with a marked dry season from June through November, allied to the type of rural settlement inareas along the banks of the reservoir, may result in a demand for irrigation water, which does notexist at the moment. The quality of water in the reservoir and downstream is not subject to anyconstraints for use in irrigation. No conflicts are foreseen between this use and energy production, inview of the limited volumes probably needed for irrigation.

The use of reservoir water for household supplies is not planned. The townships located around thereservoir and even downstream have access to other wellsprings, whose quality and location are moreappropriate for this purpose. However, there is the problem of communities scattered over the islands,which formed in the reservoir, whose only water supplies come from the lake itself. In this case,situations may arise where water supplies become a more serious issue, particularly in those sectionsof the lake where water quality problems may arise, including floration and algae.



The initial costs for building the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex were estimated at US$1.2 billion, andwere tipped to reached US$4.6 billion by 1983, boosting the cost per installed kw to US$1,150,including service on its debt. By 1985, the cost of power generation in Tucuruí, including financialcosts, was US$35/MWh.

2.4 The Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex reservoir and itsrelationship to other projects scheduled for the Tocantins RiverHydrographic basin

A series of investments have been planned for Hydro-Power Complexes in the Tocantins basin, and, toa lesser extent, the Araguaia basin. Recently, the Serra da Mesa reservoir was filled (Tocantins River,Goiás) making it Brazil’s largest artificial reservoir in terms of accumulated water volumes.

With regards to other projects scheduled for this basin, this study will seek a fresh inventory withANEEL, ELETROBRÁS and ELETRONORTE in order to outline the most probable scenario forplanning future power plants.

Main questions on the characterisation of the project:• Which are the basic elements and hypothesis in the cost/benefit analysis for the project?• Basic data on the conceptualisation and design of the project: to what extent has the original

design undergone modifications due to technical, economic, environment and/or social variables?• What is the composition of the financing scheme for the project, and conditioning factors?• What planning scenarios were used in the basin inventory at the time, and during its development?

2.4.1 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

WCD Question: How were decisions taken at the various stages of the project?The case study should document and analyse the decision-taking processes with regard to theplanning, construction, operation and management of the project and associated activities. The role ofinterest groups during the main stages of the project will be analysed, stressing traditionallymarginalized groups. The treatment and negotiation of conflicting priorities at various administrativelevels will be documented.

The initial reconnaissance of the water resources of the Tocantins and Araguaia basin was undertakenby the Bureau of Reclamation through the Agency for International Development, US Department ofState, for the Interstate Commission for the Araguaia Tocantins Valley (CIVAT – ComissãoInterestadual dos Vales do Araguaia-Tocantins) in 1964.

The former National Department of Ports and Navigable Waterways, which preceded PORTOBRAS(neither exist today), undertook studies of the Tocantins River between 1968 and 1972 as part of theirgeneral studies of navigable waterways in Brazil.

The Amazonia Energy Studies Co-ordination Committee (ENERAM – Comitê Coordenador dosEstudos Energéticos da Amazônia) was established in 1968, and undertook the first systematic studyof the potential of Amazonia from January 1969 through to December 1971. Its interests focused onservicing the main development hubs in this region, particularly Belém.

The final report of ENERAM recommended that a company be incorporated – which later becomeELETRONORTE – as well as continuing studies of the Tocantins, focused on Tucuruí, in orderservice the Port of Belém.



After ELETRONORTE was established in 1973, the studies, which had been carried out until then byELETROBRAS, were transferred to this new company which completed them in 1974/75. In 1975,the basic and executive designs began for Tucuruí, which were awarded to the ENGEVIX-THEMAGproject consortium.

Work on the Phase I coffer dam began in November 1975, diverting the river in October 1976. Themain work began in January 1977, with the reservoir beginning to fill in September 1984. The powerplant began to produce energy in November 1984 (Eletronorte, 1989).

2.4.2 The Tucuruí dam and the Government Projects in this region

The construction of reservoirs to make good use of the hydro-electric potential of the Tocantins-Araguaia system formed part of the strategy drawn up by the Brazilian Government to foster thedevelopment of the Eastern Amazonia, in view of the countless deposits of base and precious and/orsemi-precious metals found in this region.

An understanding of the planning and the decision-taking process at Tucuruí necessarily involves ananalysis of the political, economic and energy strategies of the State at the time when this venture wasundertaken. Authoritarian and centralising, to a certain extent they continued unchanged until aroundthe year the reservoir was filled (1984). This was also the year that saw a return to participatorydemocracy in Brazil, ushering in appreciable changes in the power structure, with other social playersappearing as spokespersons and becoming involved in political negotiations.

The main needs centred around energy supplies through interconnecting systems at the nation-widelevel, and characterising the energy scenario as providing backing and support for the mining andmetallurgical industry which was being planned at that time for Eastern Pará State, providing theconditions required to set up major Brazilian and transnational companies, including ALBRAS, theCarajás Iron Ore Project, and ALUMAR, later followed by other smaller ventures.

The Agri-Business and Agri-Mining Hubs Program for Amazonia (PoloAmazônia) was introduced in1974 as a planning tool for infrastructure projects which would draw Amazonia into Brazil’s economiccontext. The colonisation and settlement projects were edged out by the introduction of massiveenergy ventures and mining and metallurgy enterprises as “... infrastructure should precededevelopment” (Eletrobrás, interviews, 1992).

The project of building the Tucuruí dam, defined by Eletronorte, was justified in the following words:“the implementation of a power plant the size of Tucuruí at the gateway to Amazonia will ensure theprocessing in Brazil of the abundant forest and natural resources in this region, and will ensure energysupplies for at least three selected areas in the PoloAmazonia and PoloNordeste: Tocantins-Araguaia,Carajás and the Pre-Amazon region in Maranhão State, due to their potential for agri-business, agri-mining and agri-industry.”

Other investments become feasible through the introduction of major infrastructure projects,developing into key factors in the process of settlement and exploration of this region during the 1970sand 1980s, and resulting in new territorial configurations. Outstanding among them are:

• The ALCAN (Belém) and ALCOA (São Luis) plants producing alumina and aluminium frombauxite;

• Laying the Transamazon highway (BR-230), as well as the PA-150, BR-422 and PA-263highways, which constituted the main axes for the settlement of this region;



• Settlements established by the former Araguaia-Tocantins Lands Executive Group (GETAT –Grupo Executivo de Terras do Araguaia/Tocantins); National Institute for Colonization andAgrarian Reform (ITERPA – Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária); and the ParáState Lands Institute (ITERPA – Instituto de Terras do Pará);

• Implementation and development of the Carajás Iron Ore Project;

• Construction of the railroad running between Carajás and the Itaqui harbor (S.Luís, Maranhão);

• Establishment of the Camargo Corrêa Metais (CCM) plant at Breu Branco, then part of theTucuruí district, to mine metal silicon; and

• The ongoing process of deforestation intended to ensure land ownership for speculative purposes,among other factors.

It is important to note that the decision to build the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex pre-dates thedecision to implement the Greater Carajás Program. Conceptualised later, one of the objectives of thisProgram was to interlink various Government actions in this region.

Power generation was intended mainly to meet the demands of the mining and metallurgy projects.This was the responsibility of the Federal Government, as made clear in the Activities Report ofEletronorte (1984) apud Kowarick (1995), of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, under the ErnestoGeisel Government: “I reached the conclusion that it would be very difficult, almost impossible, tomake investors put money into a hydro-power plant. The reasons are simple: the partners had almostconflicting interests, and each venture had a different schedule (...) we decided (...) that each projectshould seek its own economic feasibility, while power generation would be assigned to the FederalGovernment (...) when we enter the Government, there was an oil subsidy of around US$ 500 million,and few people were aware of this. On March 31, 1974, we eliminated the subsidy, as we increasedgasoline prices by 32%. With some of these funds, we started work on the Tucuruí project.”

In fact, the dam was initially designed to supply power to Belém and the surrounding region.However, when the Geisel Administration took office, the objective of producing power for the AlbrásAluminum Project (in association with Japanese capital) began to take on increased importance. At theend of the day, it was this objective of producing aluminium which finally defined not only the siteand the characteristics of the Tucuruí dam, although in a somewhat non-explicit and poorly-organisedmanner, as well as its works schedule. The electricity sector and ELETRONORTE in particular hadvery little influence in the decision on where and when to build. If the electricity sector had been ableto decide on how to supply Belém with power, the decision would probably have been different. TheNational Waters and Electric Power Department (DNAEE - Departamento Nacional de Águas eEnergia Elétrica) also had little say in this decision at that time, with no regulatory or oversightfunction in the decision process.

Nevertheless, the Tucuruí project offered a major advantage at that time which was acknowledge byexperts in the electricity sector: it consisted of a two-stage project without requiring much additionalinvestment, meaning that it could be paced to the development of power demands and technology.

2.4.3 Tucuruí and industrial mining projects

The case of Tucuruí is outstanding insofar as the logic, which regulated the expansion of powersupplies in general terms, was strongly slanted towards the social and economic development ofBrazilian society. However, this was subject to powerful influences from other factors outside the



scope of the electricity sector. Seen from the standpoint of regional requirements foreseeable at thattime, the Tucuruí project was implemented with only half its total capacity, with its output channelledalmost solely towards supplying the aluminium industry that was being set up in this region withstrong state backing.

The main industrial customers for the energy generated by Tucuruí were:

• ALUMAR, located at São Luis, Maranhão, with an average demand of 662 MW to producealuminum ingots;

• ALBRAS, at Barcarena, Pará State with an average demand of 625 MW to produce aluminiumingots;

• ALUNORTE, in Barcarena, with an average demand of 160 MW for bauxite processing;

• Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), at Carajás, Pará State, with an average demand of 31 MWfor mining iron and manganese ores; and

• Camargo Correa Metais (CCM), at Breu Branco, Pará State, with an average demand of 16 MW toproduce metal silicon.

The consumption of the aluminium smelters at Barcarena and São Luís was equivalent to over 50% ofthe energy generated, sold at 16.45 US$/MWh in 1985, meaning less than half the energy cost atTucuruí, and only 65% of the average price of energy in Brazil, which at that time was 25 US$/MWh.Energy is a vital input factor for this sector, representing 35% to 40% of the costs of convertingalumina into aluminium. The energy supply contract signed by Eletronorte made provision forlowering tariffs over a twenty-year period, guaranteeing that the power cost would not exceed 20% ofthe price of aluminium on the international market.

2.4.4 Electricity sector planning

The planning for hydropower ventures to be implemented in principle followed a methodology whichwas launched by the studies undertaken by CANAMBRA, an association of American, Canadian andBrazilian companies, carried out in the late 1960s. The purpose of these studies was to survey thehydropower potential of the rivers in Eastern and Southern Brazil, and propose an arrangement ofventures following the criteria of lowest costs for implementation and energy produced. Braziliancompanies undertook the inventory of the Tocantins River shortly afterwards.

According to the methodology adopted, the inventory studied finds the use of the hydro-electricpotential of this basin through hydro-power plants located appropriately in function ofgeomorphological and hydrological characteristics, as well as easy access and connection with thedispatch system for the energy to be produced, in addition to other technical and economic factorsfalling within the specific engineering domain of works of this type. Expanding domestic andinternational experience and consequent mastery of technology in the various fields of technicalexpertise required for the design, construction and operation of hydro-power plants allowedadvantageous alternative projects to be defined, such as Tucuruí. Environmental factors rarely placedany constraints on the conceptualisation on these projects, perhaps because any awareness of the needfor consideration of what were known as “external environmental factors” was as negligible as thelevel of knowledge and assessment capacity of the implications and effects of large-scale projects onthe environment, as well as – above all – alternative ways of control and mitigation.

The concept, planning and execution studies for this enterprise focus on the following aspects:



• economic and technical feasibility;

• protection of the venture “against environmental impacts which could adversely affect itsconstruction and operation” (Goodland Report); and

• resettlement of communities to be relocated.

The spatial scope of these studies was limited to the area of the reservoir and its surroundings, with noregional or downstream studies undertaken.

However, it should be noted that the decision process of Tucuruí was certainly original, even withinthe electricity sector. This did not involve a huge dam, which that was not interconnected to theSouth/Southeast System, nor to the Northeast System, meaning that the assessment “models” adoptedby Federal companies such as Furnas and CHESF at that time were not used.

2.4.5 Stakeholders involved in decision making

With regard to the players involved in the decision-taking process and their forms of participation, thiswas hampered by the political situation at that time, with the State acting as the formulator, financingagency and executor of the national project, as well as the regional political basis which legitimisedthe Federal decision within the political and economic context in effect at that time.

The implementation of this venture was backed by studies carried out by the scientific community, aswell as local and foreign companies commissioned by the recently established Eletronorte. A lowcapacity for absorbing the know-how produced was noted, as well as limited management of themanner in which these studies provided effective input shaping practices designed to resolve theimpacts generated.

Lacking the mobilisation and networking present today and achieved over time, civil society and thelocal community in particular were relegated to the bottom of the hierarchical power structure in effectat that time, and had to build up their own paths to participation through a long process of resistance,conflicts and clashes, as well as negotiation.

Main questions on the decision-making process:• What technical, economic and political factors shaped the main decisions regarding location,

sizing and sequencing of the work?• Which factors influenced the time schedule and the implementation strategy for the project?• What was the influence of the various interest groups and social players in the decision-taking

process at the various stages of the work?• What was the financing situation for the project, and its main financial backer? What was the

influence of subsidies on returns on investments?• What was the role and influence of social and environmental impact studies in the decision-taking

process?• What links were built up between the concessionaire and other civil service agencies, and what

were the consequences on the implementation of the project? E.g. management of infrastructureand services for relocated townships, the CAPEMI case.



3. CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES: LEGAL ISSUES AND THEGRANTOR AUTHORITY

WCD Question: To what extent did the project comply with the requirements of the legislationin effect, and the criteria and guidelines in effect at the time of the concession, construction andoperation of the venture?• The case study will identify the main laws and criteria in effect at the time when this venture was

undertaken, indicating gaps and loop holes in environmental legislation and population studies.• The case study should assess to what extent the criteria and guidelines in existence at that time

were complied with during the project cycle. Where applicable, these criteria and guidelines willbe analysed in order to determine their effectiveness and identify incentives and the institutionalframework providing support for its implementation.

• The case study should also analyse to what extent the regulation; criteria and guidelines inexistence at that time were complied with during the project cycle. Where applicable, these criteriaand guidelines will be analysed in order to determine their effectiveness and identify incentivesand the institutional framework providing support for its implementation.

• The case study should also analyse to what extent the regulations; criteria and guidelines inexistence at that time were complied with during the project cycle. These regulations, criteria andguidelines will be analysed in order to determine their effectiveness and identify the incentives andthe institutional framework for implementation.

3.1 Awarding the hydro-power project concession

According to the legal arrangements at that time, Brazil’s electricity sector consisted of a state-runholding company – ELETROBRAS, and four regional companies, with ELETRONORTE being thelast of these enterprises established to constitute the nation’s electricity system. A subsidiary ofELETROBRAS (Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A.), ELETRONORTE (Centrais Elétricas do Nortedo Brasil S.A.) was established as an electric power public service concessionaire by Law No. 5,824,dated November 14, 1972, and were incorporated through a public deed on June 30, 1973, authorisedto function by Decree No. 72,548 dated July 30, 1973.

The operating areas of Eletronorte consist of Legal Amazonia, covering 58% of Brazil, and includingthe States of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima andTocantins.

Characterised as a monopoly, this electricity power utility planned, implemented and operated theprojects set up to supply the electric power market through a concession that could be awarded only bythe President of Brazil.

The nation’s abundant water resources and relative shortage of energy-producing fossil resourcesshaped Brazil’s decision to use the potential of its water courses to produce electricity.

3.2 Changes in juridical and institutional framework

3.2.1 The 1988 Constitution and financial compensation for the use of naturalresources

Brazil’s 1988 Constitution introduced the law which made provision for financial compensation(payment of royalties) for power generation, ore-mining and oil production, paid to districts and statesaffected by the loss of arable farmlands. The overall amount of the financial compensation paid by



each power plant is a function of the energy revenues produced, and the distribution is a function ofthe flooded area in each municipal district. The rate charged for power generation is 6%, with 45% ofthe revenues generated assigned to the municipal district. (Valença, 1991)

Based on a new territorial division of municipal districts, a heated dispute arose over spatial resourceswhen the new municipal borders were drawn up, based on the share-out of the high-value riverbanksin order to receive financial compensation.

The municipal districts, which border the reservoir waters, are currently: Tucuruí, Jacundá, Itupirangaand Rondon do Pará.

However, there is much clamour in this region from the populace in general (rural and urban workers,fisherman, indigenous communities, etc), as well as the grassroots movements which represent them,stressing the need for participative management jointly with the Government, in order to ensure thatthe funding received by the municipal districts is distributed fairly, and channelled properly to projectsdesigned to upgrade the quality of life, including healthcare, education, production incentives, etc.

3.2.2 Environmental Legislation and Licensing

After the implementation of Brazil’s first large-scale hydro-power plants highlighted their undesirableeffects, with heightened awareness for the need for environmental conservation, the environmentallegislation introduced in the early 1980s demanded that the effects on the environment be taken intoconsideration, as well as absorption of the respective costs, and social scrutiny of the alternatives tothe use of the natural resource in questions. In 1986, the National Environment Council included damson the list of potentially polluting activities, making their implementation subject to environmentallicensing.

The Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex pre-dates this important legal milestone, as it started upoperations in 1984, meaning that its conceptualisation and the award of its concession for operationsby ELETRONORTE, in addition to its effective implementation, did not explicitly take into accountthe effects on the environment in the broader sense, particularly social aspects. However, it should bestressed that the Contour Line 72 decision was taken on the basis of a physical constraint imposed bysocial and environmental consequences: flooding part of Marabá.

With regard to Environment Licensing, it was only in 1998 that the status of the Tucuruí Hydro-PowerComplex was legalised, with the concession awarded by the Pará State Bureau of Science andTechnology (SECTAM – Secretaria de Estado de Ciência e Tecnologia do Estado do Pará) of theinstallation license for the eleven main turbines and the two auxiliary turbines, in addition to theOperating License for the venture as a whole.

Notification No. 159/98, dated 22 May 1998 was issued by SECTAM, granting respective licenses.However, this was conditional on the reformulation and implementation of a series of environmentalprograms. The fish stock control programs must be reworked, as well as the programs monitoringwater quality and aquatic macrophytes. Additionally, programs must be implemented for themanagement and recovery of degraded areas, together with an integrated supervision program, and anassessment of the transit facilities offered by the dam for fish species, with environmental educationprograms, and ecological and economic zoning.



3.2.3 Recent changes in the institutional framework of Brazil’s electricitysector

At the national Government level, decentralisation is both is a discourse and a reality. The stateGovernments have been strengthened, as well as municipal Governments, under the BrazilianConstitution.

The institutional framework for the electricity sector is currently changing. The electric power agency(ANEEL) was established by Law No. 9,427 dated 26 December 1996 in order to regulate andsupervise the production, transmission and marketing of electric power in Brazil. This complies withthe new reality shaped by the changing role of the State in the energy sector, which has shifted frombeing an executor to a role that is essentially regulatory and supervisory.

This agency is currently being structured, with its actions defined on the basis of a managementcontract signed with the Ministry of Mines and Energy.

In parallel to current intentions of privatising power generation, this indicates that the electricity sectorscenario is indicating a trend towards sweeping changes, which should be identified in this study inorder to analyse the implications of the restructuring of the electricity sector on the management ofthis project, making recommendations.

3.3 The Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex in the light of currentenvironmental legislation and international recommendations

The backdrop in terms of the legislation, under which major projects were approved and implementedin the Amazon region, and even in other parts of Brazil, is very different from current legalrequirements.

Brazil’s experience in managing water resources in the course of its history resulted in the pertinentlegislation as well as the institutional structure for its implementation being altered.

From the Waters Code introduced by Decree 24,643 dated 10 September 1934 through to currentwater resource management practices based on Law No. 9,433 dated 8 January 1997, Brazil has madegreat strides forward in protecting natural resources, particularly water resources.

Federal Law No. 9,433 introduced the National Water Resources Policy and set up the National WaterResources Management System, while regulating item XIX of Article 21 of the Federal Constitutionpromulgated on 5 October 1988. Many Brazilian states have also introduced their own statelegislation, which is compatible with Federal Laws.

An analysis and approval of dam construction projects, particularly major hydro-power ventures,under current legislation also takes into account the requirements of the National Environment Policyestablished by Law No. 6,938 dated 31 August 1981, as well as modifications thereto. This is far morecomplex and demanding compared to the requirements in effect prior to the construction of theTucuruí Hydro-Power Complex.

It may even be considered that difficulties in approving a new major hydropower project are greaterfrom the social and environmental standpoints (environmental legislation) than from the viewpoint ofthe technical engineering problems involved, which are easily handled by domestic engineering skills.

In terms of project financing provided by multinational financing agencies (IDB and IRDB) theinternational scene is today dominated by conventions and recommendations approved by the UN



Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 which approved two conventions (the Convention onGlobal Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity) as well as Agenda 21, whichrefers directly to sustainable development. Although Agenda 21 is not an international convention,project analyses are undertaken by financing agencies on the basis of their sustainable developmentobjectives.

Main questions on criteria and guidelines:• To what extent were the criteria, guidelines and policies in effect at the time complied with during

the project cycle?• To what extent were these criteria adequate? What aspects were highlighted?• What were the institutional incentives and support factors, which influenced it implementation?• To what extent were the new criteria (e.g. mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment/Report

for dams) and alterations in the juridical and institutional framework internalised afterconstruction? How do they influence project management of the operating phase?

• Analyse the relationship between growth and transformation of social, economic and spatialstructures (through the receipt of royalties) compared to the dissemination of productivity at levelof local society: who were the beneficiaries of increased municipal revenues? How are theseresources being deployed?



4. COSTS, BENEFITS AND IMPACTS: EXPECTED VERSUSACTUAL

WCD Question: What were the expected and actual benefits, costs and impacts of the project?This chapter assesses to what extent the large dam projects achieved their objectives. Depending onthe type of dam, the expected replies involve a comparison between estimated energy production vs.power effectively generated; expected irrigation areas vs. irrigated areas; changes in damage caused byflooding before and after the project; expected and actual costs and impacts; benefits expected andachieved; impacts foreseen and their mitigation.

4.1 Hydro-power generation

This item compares the forecast and actual benefits of hydropower generation in terms of: estimated xeffective production; extent and nature of markets; value of production; direct economic benefits;multiplicatory effects, etc.

Main questions on power generation:• Determine the electricity production estimates and benefits at the time of conceptualisation of the

project, compared to the actual production figures and benefits;• Characterise the contribution of energy generated by the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex to local,

regional and national development;• What is the energy efficiency of the venture: economic and financial?

4.2 Navigation

The construction of lock-gates was included in the design for Tucuruí, in order to make good use ofthe Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers to cross the dam, thus allowing small and medium-sized vessels tonavigate up the river from Belém to above Tucuruí, and in the reservoir.

This item describes the main elements in this component of the project, including the estimated costsand benefits of building the lock-gates, their economic and social importance for the region, basicregulations in terms of shipping in the basin, and the institutional framework providing support for theoperation of the lock-gates, etc.

It is worthwhile stressing that, in order to identify the estimated and real costs and benefits in terms ofshipping, the approach taken by this study will include an analysis of the historical records reflectingthe social and economic importance of shipping for Pará State and its populace.

Main questions on navigation:• What was the contribution of the project to increasing the navigability of the Tocantins River, and

potential regional repercussions?• To what extent were the long-standing expectations and claims of the populace taken into account

and/or considered at the various phases of this venture, with regard to the navigability of theTocantins River, and the implications on stronger local/regional economic support?

4.3 Social and ecological transformations caused by the TucuruíHydro-Power Complex: Processes and Management

The construction of this project between 1975 and 1984 prompted sweeping social and ecologicaltransformations in parts of Southeast Pará State and the lower Tocantins, both upstream and



downstream respectively. In 1984 - 1985, the formation of the reservoir flooded an area along thebanks of the Tocantins River covering some 2,875 square kilometres, of which some 90% were uplandand floodland forests traditionally worked by various local social groups. Thousands of families weremandatorily relocated, and some hamlets or villages were also affected, either partially or totally. Thetown centre of Jacundá was completely flooded, with part of the Tucuruí, Jacundá and Itupirangamunicipal districts also being covered by water, in addition to a small area of Rondon do Pará. Part oftwo indigenous reserves (Parakanã and Pucuruí) and 170 kilometres of Federal highway also vanishedunder the waters. Additionally, works required for this venture took over 60% - 70% of indigenouslands of the Gaviões da Montanha nation, who had to leave their reserve and move the Mãe Mariareserve, which was also split by a transmission line nineteen kilometres long, with a right of way 150meters wide.

Due to the flooding and the decomposition of organic matter immediately after the reservoir wasfilled, it became covered by aquatic macrophytes, well-known as a primary nursery for mosquitolarvae, which proliferated uncontrollably in areas around the power-plant. Although this is a biologicalphenomenon, the rapid expansion of aquatic macrophytes is associated with many social problems.Outstanding among them is the impact on the health of local communities, in terms of the appearanceof skin diseases and respiratory ailments2, mental disturbances associated with mosquitoes, anduncomfortable situations which result in stress and undermine the quality of life of local communities.Constantly bitten by mosquitoes, families were forced to use smudge-pots in their homes in an attemptto minimise mosquito attacks. Added to this is the deterioration of the quality of water due to the hugeproduction and decomposition of organic matter, preventing fishing and travel, and adversely affectingcrops with the appearance of insect vectors etc.

This plague of mosquitoes which is minimised here due to the limits set by this preliminary analysis,forced recently-relocated groups to live in hostile surroundings, with some areas being completelyunsuitable for either humans or animals.

The situation of the former settlers along the “old Transamazon Highway” who had been mandatorilyresettled on the Parakanã land which formerly belonged to this tribe and which had been broken updue to the construction of a road parallel the Transamazon Highway (today called the “New Highway”as the original stretch was flooded), clearly reflects this phenomenon known as the “plague ofmosquitoes”, which has lasted for more than decade.

Another consequence of building this dam is the loss of timber resources, as there was not enoughtime to clear the land properly. Due to technical and organisational problems, as well as limitedinfrastructure caused by the huge size of the area and the wide diversity of timber species, the naturalinventory of timber with commercial value in the forest was not properly used. Initially responsible forclearing the land at Tucuruí, the CAPEMI company dropped out of this venture after an action, whichleft many doubts and was heavily criticised and discussed in the press, disclosed in great detail.Dealing with these timber resources is still today a major technical and economic challenge in thisregion.

4.4 Resettlement of local communities: Procedures andImplications

The mandatory resettlement of local communities was and is still (due to its consequences) one of themain problems involved in the process of social exclusion caused by the expropriation of land in orderto establish this venture, as it was considered vacant land with no connection to social or culturalpractices. Serious consequences in the lifestyle and survival mechanisms of the communities living inthe neighbourhood of this project were caused by the de-stabilisation of local eco-systems, forcingthem to redefine their material, social and cultural reproduction practices. This is an issue which falls



under the direct influence of building the dam, and which requires an in-depth analysis in the course ofthis study.

The process of moving families who were forced to leave their homes and places of work waspermeated by implications which resulted in latent conflict situations as the support of the socialgroups involved was not always obtained, and many of them were unable to fit into their new homesin geographical, economic and social terms.

Empirical evidence and specific literature show that the formal process of taking these decisions -within the historical context of Brazil and even due to the lack of experience of the Company withissues of this type - failed to take into account all specific characteristics, as well as the complexities ofsocial relationships and the possibility of more intensive participation by the groups involved.

The compensation process was also riddled with problems, as Eletronorte based its actions on criteriaanalysing administrative and financial efficiency, supported on juridical procedures, with a scheduletimed to the construction period of the power plant. The criteria for assessing the goods forcompensation purposes took only material aspects into account, leaving out any appreciation of thevalue of the work invested in dealing with the land, as well as symbolic and affective values, meaningthe cultural logic, and the social and historical conditions of the local communities.

Resettlement was undertaken very late in the day, and on a limited scale, compared to the technicalpreparation for this project. This was a process where it proved hard to define the number of familiesor persons resettled on any firm basis. In 1978, a BASEVI study showed that this project had resultedin the resettlement of 1,750 families, with a total of 9,500 people. In November 1982, the Eletronortesurvey put this figure at 3,152 families, equivalent to some 15,600 people. The Eletrobrás report(1992, p. 80), indicate that 4,407 families were resettled, 3,407 of them on rural land, and 1,000families in townships.

In order to justify these discrepancies, the Company argues that the increase in the number of familiesinvolved was caused largely by the huge flow of migrants to areas surrounding the project, who evensettled on land which had been tagged for flooding. It is important to stress that the estimates of thenumber of people resettled are generally limited to families with the right to compensation - land-owners and those who improved their property living in the areas to be expropriated. These figures failto include sectors of the populace, which moved to riverbank areas on a seasonal basis in order toensure their survival.

In addition to rising migration and systematic underestimates, Mougeot (1985) includes another factor,which helps outdate the original forecast. Without the flows of migrants being taken intoconsideration, the number of people resettled by 1980 may be as high as 25,000 - 35,000 people.

Additionally, resettlement took place in areas, which frequently proved inappropriate for this purpose,forcing social and economic shifts, which failed to take into account the previous forms of survivaland interaction of communities with their surroundings. Mention is made of riverbank communitiesresettled in land, as well as extractivist groups transferred to areas where farming and grazingactivities had to be undertaken. These are situations, which certainly helped underpin the lack ofsuccess of this resettlement program, reflected in the high abandonment rates for the land where theexpropriated families were settled.

These comments lead to the statement that the entire resettlement process prompted sweepingalterations in the lifestyles of the relocated communities. This means that a task, which shouldcertainly be undertaken, is a study of the real dimensions of the change in order to offer anunderstanding of its scope, as this is a striking social phenomenon.



It is also possible to foresee that the processes of change prompted by break-down in lifestyles wereclustered with other impacts of various types in both the social and cultural fields, as well as at thephysical and biotic level. However, neither these impacts nor their size has yet been fully assessed.This means that it is also important to understand the transformations/impacts detected and theirranking in terms of importance from the standpoint of the communities’ affected3.

This means that the relocation process prompted striking alterations in the lifestyles of localcommunities, prompting major grassroots movements, as well as noting that the social andenvironmental treatment profile at Tucuruí indicated not only the ranking of social issues in hydro-power planning (Eletronorte, 1992), which is reflected in negative aspects (costs) at the social level, aswell as showing that this issue is still today viewed by social organisations and members of thescientific community at the national and regional level as being the most vulnerable point in terms ofthe performance of this venture.

Main questions related to impacts on communities4:• How did the project define its areas of influence?• How was territorial rearrangement undertaken - the new geography?• What were the dynamics of the resettlement process (planned and actual)?• How did the negotiation process take place with local communities?• What compensation criteria were adopted and how appropriate were they to community needs?• What are the impacts on health and the quality of life of communities (planned and actual), and

mitigatory measures?• Analysis of permanent circumstantial impacts - time and structure - on the populace.• How did State policies affect this region and what were the social-economic repercussions?• What transformations can be directly associated with the emergence and growth of the grassroots

movements and their effects in the compensation process?

4.5 Indigenous communities

The specific nature of the indigenous issue within the social fabric as a whole in terms of the region ofdirect influence of this project always requires further analysis of resultant interference regardingethnic and historical aspects, as well as demographic and ethnic-ecological factors which characteriseindigenous groups in this region:

• Parakanã (reservoir area);• Guajajara;• Krikatis;• Pucuruí;• Assurini do Tocantins; and• Gavião da Montanha / Mãe Maria (power transmission line area).

This item will identify and analyse the impacts caused by this venture on each ethnic group, with thekey items being: healthcare, education, land protection, relationships with other communities (non-indigenous), appreciation of work, etc.

With regard to mitigatory programs, Eletronorte launched its Parakanã Program, through which itproposes to reimburse the Parakanã community not only “for losses caused to their lands, as well as intheir lives”. Approved and implemented in 1988, this Program is managed by a multidisciplinarytechnical group linking (FUNAI / ELETRONORTE), currently established in the town of Tucuruí andoperating in various areas: healthcare, education, production support, border surveillance, works,infrastructure and administrative backing. This is currently considered as handling these issues



effectively, particularly due to its emphasis on the possibility of Parakanã ethnic rehabilitation,(Eletronorte, 1992). In terms of this Program, the study should comment on its sustainability, as itintends plans to work with this indigenous community for 25 years, implementing a fairly specificimpact mitigation program.

Main questions on impacts affecting indigenous communities:• Analysis of impacts by ethnic group in terms of healthcare, education, land protection,

relationships with other communities (non-indigenous) appreciation of work, etc;• Interference from the new regional dynamics on indigenous communities;• Identification of expropriation processes for indigenous lands: the specific case of compensation

for resources negotiated by the Gavião da Montanha community;• Resettlement of the Parakanã and their specific problems (conflicts with the resettled riverbank

community, etc.) and the issue sustainability;• Studies, actions and programs designed to mitigate the impacts on indigenous communities

(specify)• Analysis of permanent circumstantial impacts - time and structure - on indigenous communities.• Records of environmental studies of indigenous lands.

4.6 Ecological impacts

Studies of possible impacts - more specifically the environmental effects caused by the construction ofthe Tucuruí dam - were commissioned from the National Amazon Research Institute (INPA – InstitutoNacional de Pesquisas Amazônicas) as construction of the dam was nearly completion. In terms of thisproject (by 1980), already at the point of no return, the efforts of a few dozen researchers resulted in avast storehouse of knowledge about the eco-systems of the Araguaia and Tocantins Rivers, as workswere undertaken not only in the area of the reservoir as such, but also along its tributaries. Thesestudies covered aspects of the physical surroundings, as well as its biota, in addition to social andeconomic aspects, but were undertaken from the standpoint of ensuring project feasibility, failing totake into account the dimension of the historical processes of this region. The main environmentalproblems noted on that occasion, among others were: reduction in the concentration of oxygen in thewaters of the dam due to the decomposition of organic matter not removed from the area to beflooded; development of aquatic plants, both floating and emerging in various parts of the lake;impacts on fishlife due to alterations turning a dryland environment into a water-covered area;alterations in fishlife downstream due to blockage of fish migration routes, as well as alterations in thequality of the water due to sedimentation and the biogeochemical processes prompted by new waterdynamics; impacts on wildlife in areas to be flooded; loss of sites containing records of ancientcultures, including pre-Colombian civilisations; impacts on indigenous communities; impacts onriverbank communities, particularly the caboclo populace; impacts on the regional microclimate, dueto the existence of a large area covered by water; human health problems caused by the possibleproliferation of disease vectors.

The various work-teams attempted to approach each of the issues listed above in a qualitative andquantitative manner. These conclusions and recommendations formed part of the reports issued by theINPA for Eletronorte, some of which were later published as scientific studies5.

Main questions on environmental impacts:• Register the various processes and impacts upstream, downstream and around the reservoir.• Stress the analysis of the ichthyofauna (not only in terms of fishing, but all aquatic fauna) and

water quality (mosquitoes, mercury, chemical wastes caused by CAPEMI processing, etc).• Comparison between the nature and magnitude of the impacts forecast in the environmental

impact study and the actual impacts of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex;



• Analysis of the efficiency of the mitigatory measures adopted and their implementation throughenvironmental management;

• Analysis of the impacts whose estimates are more subtle, such as effects on land-basedbiodiversity, etc.

• Analysis of permanent circumstantial impacts - time and structure - on the physical surroundingsand biota.

• Analysis of the environmental costs such as the flooded forests, water quality etc.

4.6.1 Fishing along the banks and in the reservoir

In the work entitled "Impactos das Hidrelétricas sobre a Ictiofauna da Amazônia: O Exemplo deTucuruí", on the impact of hydro-power plants on fishlife in Amazonia, taking Tucuruí as an example,Leite and Bittencourt (1991), carried out a detailed study which compared variations before and afterbuilding the dam. This work involved comparative analyses of the forecasts and the experimentalconclusions noted after the dam was completed. This study divides the river into stretches upstreamand downstream from the dam. Some of the forecasts were confirmed, although bearing in mind thatthe initial hypotheses were based on studies carried out in other parts of the world, some unexpectedimpacts or discrepancies were also noted.

Immediately after the dam was built, cutting off the flow of water completely, some shallowerstretches of the riverbed virtually dried up. The mortality rates were lower than expected, probablybecause the fish migrated more rapidly to the North, although once the dam came into operation,various large-scale fish deaths occurred, due probably to the quality of the water discharged by theturbines, which was low in oxygen and rich in sulfur dioxide gas.

The studies also showed alterations in the composition of species, particularly due to the impossibilityof immigration. Although the shrimp catch (macrobrachium amazonicum), which is an importantsocial and economic product in this region, did not alter during the year subsequent to closing off thedam, it dropped steeply afterwards: the catch by weight in 1981 was 178 tons, falling to 111 tons in1985, and plummeting to 49 tons in 1986.

Variations in upstream icthyofauna also showed countless alterations due to the transformation of adryland environment into a water-covered area. Estimates of the reduction of the number of specieswere proven, as well as the predominance of Tertiary consumers, with piranha (serrasalmus spp.)particularly noteworthy, followed by tucunaré (cichla ocellaris and c. temensis).

According to these authors, there is a negative aspect on the social economics of riverbankcommunities, due particularly to the collapse of fishing activities downstream at Cametá. A study ofmore recent publications on fishing productivity in this region is recommended, probably throughconsulting the authors indicated: Regina de A. N. Leite and Maria M. Bittencourt from the INPA(1991), as well as some supplementary bibliographical references (see Bibliography).

Main questions to be studied:• What are the impacts of the dam on fishlife and fishing activities in the Tocantins River, and the

reservoir?• What are the impacts of the dam on all aquatic fauna?• What species are affected, and what is their social and commercial value?• What are the social and economic importance of fishing in the region and the consequences of

these changes on for local communities?



4.6.2 Aquatic Macrophytes

In 1980 Eletronorte requested the INPA to study a serious environmental problem noted along the leftbank of the lake. Some INPA researchers travelled to this region and identified a massive proliferationof waterplants of various species along the left bank of the lake. Dr. Wolfgang Jung, who at that time(1980) was the head of the Fishing Catch Sector of the INPA studied the problem of these aquaticmacrophytes in the Tucuruí reservoir.

Although the development of both floating and emerging waterplants was forecast, the intensity andsize of this occurrence went well beyond expectations. The INPA staff studying this topic in 1980 and1981 identified huge masses of water plants, which fostered the development of insects, particularlymosquitoes, along the left bank of the lake. The INPA researchers warned of the hazards of possibledisease transmission, particularly Malaria. Not only were human beings attacked, but domesticanimals also suffered, including mammals and birds. The sheer size of this problem prompted variousactions and movements targeting Eletronorte, with claims for compensation and even requests fortransfer of property. (This is an aspect that should be analysed in detail, in terms of its current situationin the Tucuruí Lake).

Main questions to be studied:• Forecast situation vs. actual situation with regard to macrophytes and their consequences

(acidification of water, effects on turbines, etc);• Proliferation of mosquitoes and other aquatic vectors, and the consequences for local

communities;• Analysis of the evolution of the incidence of diseases caused by the proliferation of these vectors

(malaria, schistossomosis, stress, inconvenience etc).

4.6.3 Archeology

The archeological rescue project in the area of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex was handled by ateam from the Emílio Goeldi Museum, working closely with the Smithsonian Institution in the USA.

The field work was undertaken in 1977 and 1988. Surveys focused on the sector above the town ofTucuruí, which was to be flooded by the dam.

This rescue project located 28 sites, one corresponding to a Parakanã village that was inhabited until1920. Collections of surface artefacts took place at all the inhabited sites, but adverse circumstancesprevented most of them from being excavated. However, where possible, stratographic cross sectionswere cut through to the sterile.

The total number of ceramic fragments reached 46,543, with stone chips topping 4,400 items. Samplesfrom six sites were too small or too eroded to provide reliable identification. No pre-ceramic remainswere identified.

The sites researched represented two separate phases: the Tucuruí Phase and the Tauá Phase. The TauáPhase is tentative related to the Polychrome Tradition, while the Tucuruí Phase is not affiliated to anytradition.

The sites attributed to the Tauá and Tucuruí Phases were found in neighbouring regions bordering thefirst rapids near the dam wall site. No excavations produced any evidence of any stratographicoverlays in the spatial distribution of the phases, which provided circumstantial evidence of theircontemporaneity. The subsistence stress created by marked seasonal differences in fish productivity inthese two regions may have been moderated by formal trade mechanisms. The ceramic remnants offer



actual evidence underpinning the feasibility of this hypothesis, which should be strengthened by futureresearch.

Question to be studied:• What is the importance and scope of the impacts foreseen vs. and those, which actually occurred

with regard to the cultural and archeological heritage?

Questions on the summary of the expected impacts vs. the actual effects:• What was the quantifiable and non-quantifiable interference on the nature environment?• What was the quantifiable and non-quantifiable interference on the pre-existing social, economic

and cultural structures found in this region?



5. UNEXPECTED IMPACTSWCD Question: What were the unexpected impacts to the project?Dams usually present unexpected costs and benefits that should be taken under consideration. This isundertaken by assessing the real costs and impacts. They include: resettlement costs, impacts onhealth, compensation for unexpected losses, environmental impacts, the effects on production systems,etc. Unexpected benefits may include recreation, better access facilities, agricultural expansion etc.Lessons may be learned in order to deal with uncertainty and unexpected effects in future projects.

Normally, when in development projects are analysed in terms of the environmental impacts, only theareas directly affected by the project were taken into consideration. Regional consequences weretreated as outside factors. This routine was regularly adopted by international financing agenciesthrough to the 1980.

In the specific case of Amazonia, there are several examples where the secondary impacts were greaterand more significant from the environmental standpoint than the project itself. An example is theconstruction of the railroad linking the Carajás range of hills to São Luís do Maranhão, which had animpact in terms of deforestation and alterations in land use extending well beyond forty meters eachside of the railroad, originally planned as the area of direct impact.

In the specific case of the Tucuruí dam, the environmental impact studies focused particularly on areasdirectly connected to it, which would be flooded. However, the analysis of the effects of the CarajásIron Ore Project on alterations in land use and deforestation highlights its influence over an area fargreater than the direct project area.

In the specific case of the real impacts of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex, the analysis shouldcover a wider area, and assess their implications within the context of other infrastructure projects inthis region. These results which were unexpected or not taken into consideration in the original projectconcept should thus be studied in greater detail within the context of this work.

With regard to unexpected benefits related to the possible multiple uses of the reservoir (even thosenot planned at the time) such as: recreation, commercial, fishing etc., this study will identify the extentof their importance as economic activities which help slot this venture into the regional developmentframework.

The structure of the analysis will focus on the areas produced and their respective impacts bothupstream and downstream, as well as throughout the region as a whole.

Main questions on unexpected impacts:• What are the unexpected impacts of the implementation of the project, both positive and negative?

Why were they not identified?• How were these impacts managed?

5.1 Impacts in the local area of influence

A large number of situations were noted associated directly with the advent of the dam, with noprovision made for management measures in the studies undertaken for this venture. Outstandingamong these impacts are:

• rapid, disorderly growth of the town of Tucuruí;



• disorderly, indiscriminate settlement of the area around the reservoir caused partly by over 1,000kilometres of local roads laid by Eletronorte;

• rising predatory use of timber on the islands and on the reservoir banks, prompted by theformation of the lake itself, which opened up waterborne access to the regions which werepreviously not accessible;

• lack of establishing a protective strip around the reservoir, due to the lack of a reliablecartographic base;

• alteration in the land market structure, with steeply rising volumes for land located near the dam,and the townships built by the ELT, with a steady drop in value for properties located along theformer routes of relocated roads;

• social and economic relationships which sprang up in areas where prices were rising, stressingrapid unplanned urbanisation (regional polarisation and attracting flows of migrants –demographic flows); and

• breakdown in the family farm structure – nutritional security in the immediate surroundings.

5.1.1 The formation and settlement of islands:

As the water level stabilised in the Tucuruí reserve in March 1986, former hilltops formed some 1,600islands, located between the banks delineated by the 72 meter contour line in what was formerly theCaraipé valley. Since then, an intensive settlement process has progressed, particularly in areasoffering easier access located close to the banks on the town of Tucuruí.

It should be stressed that the Caraipé area was only flooded due to the possibility of building the lock-gates over the short term. Without the lock-gates, the need to flood the Caraipé area would only ariseduring the second stage of the works. The decision to set aside an area for large-scale lock-gates notonly increased the costs of this project by over US$300 million, but also brought forwardenvironmental costs and effects that would only have possibly occurred during the second stage of thisventure.

5.1.2 Logging timber submerged in the reservoir:

Timber submerged by flooding the reservoir has resulted in the appearance of drowned forestlandsknown as paliteiro in Portuguese. Well-conserved, it presents a problem that is still awaiting solution,as it is a boating hazard, particularly in the igarapé inlets, while also preventing access to the banks.

In 1989, under an agreement signed with Brazilian Institute of the Environment and RenewableNatural Resources (IBAMA – Instituto Brasileiro do Meio-Ambiente e dos Recursos NaturaisRenováveis), ELETRONORTE granted a license to regional logging companies to extract thesubmerged timber, which is a low-cost project offering possibilities of boosting the local economy.

However, the progress of this activity still seems to depend on streamlining the competitive biddingprocess, with closer supervision of this venture (Eletrobrás, 1992).

5.1.3 Methane and carbon dioxide emissions:

Flooding tropical rainforests without removing biomass, as was the case with the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex, results in the emission of gases such as methane and carbon dioxide that contribute tothe building up of the greenhouse effect. In spite of the uncertainties associated with the results ofrecent measurements of these emissions from the Tucuruí dam, this important impact will deserve acareful analysis under this study.



5.1.4 Mercury concentration in the reservoir water and fish :

Existing information about a high mercury content in some fish species from the Tucuruí reservoirwill be carefully evaluated under this study, due to the health risks involved for the local population,requiring the identification of mitigation options and environmental education programmes.

Questions on unforeseen local impacts:• What is the importance and magnitude of these impacts?• Which communities are affected, and how?• What are the consequences for the cost/benefit ratio of the project?• How are they being handled, and what are the concrete results?

5.2 Downstream Impacts

The occurrence of downstream impacts was underestimated, as consideration was given almostexclusively to the occurrence of direct impacts associated with a reduction in the quantity of waterduring the reservoir-filling phase. Shortly before filling, with the possibility of a halt in the supply ofdrinking water to Belém due to the introduction of salt water drawn back into the Guamá river throughthe lack of outflow from the Tocantins River, a study based on mathematical modelling concluded atthat time that this did not offer a risk to Belém (as proved to be the case), but that problems couldoccur in districts downstream from the dam.

The occurrence of indirect social and economic impacts was then noted, caused by halting the flow ofwater, particularly direct and indirect impacts associated with alterations in the quality of the riverwater downstream. Outstanding among the primary effects in the downstream area are:

• blockage of the migratory routes of certain fish species;

• disappearance of some fish species through the elimination of rapids which formerly existedupstream from the dam;

• alteration in the sediment levels in the downstream stretch, dropping below levels notedpreviously;

• alteration in the river system that may (although no definitive assessment has been carried out)affect matters ranging from the fish reproduction cycle through to the production of native plantspecies (açaí, for instance);

• modification in the chemical composition of the water (modification in oxygen levels and colour)prompted by the food chain; alteration in the biotic composition (phyto and zooplanckton and itsicthyofauna) resulting in a series of consequences for production activities in the region;

• modification of oxygen levels during the dry season prompted by the appreciable reduction in thewater volumes flowing into the reservoir. In this case the importance of the total water volume runthrough the turbines and lacking oxygen becomes increasingly more significant in the compositionof the total volumes discharged downstream, resulting in countless social and environmentalconsequences; and

• the disappearance of certain fish species such as the mapará, for instance, has been pinpointed as afactor resulting in the de-structuring of small scale and subsistence fishing, as well as an increase



in the local morbidity rates due to a decrease in the amount of protein ingested by lower-incomesectors of the populace.

The secondary downstream effects have not been studied to any extent. However, studies andinformation already collected prompt the consideration that this region of the lower Tocantins with itsmarginal lakes under the permanent influence of the tides forms a highly complex eco-system that isextremely fragile. A minor modification in the chemical composition of the water could well promptappreciable alterations in the natural environment, thus affecting riverbank communities immediatelyand directly, as well as production activities.

Questions on unforeseen impacts downstream:• What is the importance and magnitude of these impacts?• What are their consequences for the cost/benefit ratio of the project?• How are they being handled and what are the concrete results?

5.3 Comments on Territorial Reorganization and PopulationGrowth in the Tucuruí region

Based on the interpretation of satellite images, in 1992 Eletronorte disclosed that the alterations in thesettlement of this region were taking place in a rapid and disorderly manner. In 1986, the Tucuruíurban area consisted of the town of Tucuruí, Eletronorte township, Novo Repartimento and BreuBranco, covering 1,775 hectares, with a rural area of 25,200 hectares.

Along the Transamazon highway, including the BR-422 highway, the settlement process covered100,675 hectares. On the right bank of the reservoir, the PA-150 highway and the road connecting it tothe town of Tucuruí (PA-263) were equivalent to 311,025 hectares. This means that there has been anincrease of some 400% in settlement of rural areas, with urban areas expanding 150%.

The Tucuruí urban area has grown, due mainly to townships built by the company, as well as aninflow of migrants which has in fact been underway since the Transamazon highway was laid.However, this increased with work on the dam, concentrated largely in the towns of Marabá, Tucuruíand Cametá. Demographic data indicate that the town of Tucuruí had a population of some 12,000inhabitants in 1974, rising to 30,000 people in 1979. This is increased by the 28,000 people living inthe townships and accommodation provided by Eletronorte. However, this demographic increase wasnot accompanied by any expansion in basic services and infrastructure facilities.

This situation worsened when Supplementary Law No. 167 dated 12 September 1974 introducedservice tax (ISS) exemption for companies undertaking administrative activities linked to water worksor civil construction, as well as the respective engineering consulting services when hired byGovernment agencies. It is stressed that all companies involved in building the Tucuruí Hydro-PowerComplex were exempt from paying the ISS service tax.

It was not only the town of Tucuruí, which expanded; other towns also experienced rapid growthprocesses, as well as small townships. The population of the area of influence of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex was sized on the basis of the data in the 1980 Demographic Census, with estimates ofthe population for 1985 and the Quick Count of some townships in the area undertaken in 1987 underan agreement between Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – IBGE and Eletronorte,resulting in the following data:



Town 1980 1985 Marabá 59,915 133,559 Jacundá 14,868 21,847 Itupiranga 15,641 23,773 Tucuruí 61,140 84,326

In the downstream area of influence, the situation was as follows:

Town 1980 1985 Baião 16,261 18,481 Mocajuba 12,789 15,298 Cametá 79,317 91,693 Limoeiro do Ajuru 13,752 15,637

The population of the local area of influence totalled 151,564 inhabitants in 1980, and was estimatedat 263,505 inhabitants in 1985. This estimate has been widely questioned as it differs from maps notpublished by SUCAM/FNS.

As a result of these processes and the complexity of the social problems involved, in the early 1990s,new municipal districts were carved out of the expanding townships that had been built to housecommunities whose original homes had been flooded:

• Breu Branco: a township built after construction of the dam which flooded the original BreuBranco, located between Tucuruí and Repartimento, which had grown up during the constructionof the Transamazon highway. The New Breu Branco is located at Kilometer 11 on the PA-263highway. Work started here in 1980, housing resettled communities as well as migrants, mainlyfrom Northeast Brazil. With Law No. 163 dated 29 October 1991, it was endowed with politicaland administrative independence. Covering 4,013 kilometres, this municipal district was spun offfrom the Tucuruí, Moju and Rondon do Pará districts. Its population was estimated at 15,245inhabitants. In addition to its own tax revenues, it also receives financing from the MunicipalDistrict Participation Fund (FPM – Fundo de Participação do Município) and royalties from theWater Resources Financial Compensation Fund (Fundo de Compensação Financeira por RecursosHídricos).

• Goianésia do Pará: this sprang up along the PA-150 highway, when the PA-263 highway waslaid, resulting in an increase in its population, becoming a district of Rondon do Pará. Law No.5,685 established this district, with an area covering 7,174 kilometres. It was carved out of theRondon do Pará, Jacundá, Moju and Tucuruí districts. In 1995, IBGE estimated its population at11,936 inhabitants.

• Novo Repartimento: before the dam was built, this was a hamlet which grew up from a work-sitecamp set up by the Mendes Júnior construction company at Kilometer 157 on the Transamazonhighway. With the construction of the dam, a township was established at the junction with theBR-422 highway running between Tucuruí and the BR-230 highway. It achieved politicalindependence through Law No. 5,702. Covering 14,565 kilometres, it was carved out of theTucuruí, Jacundá and Pacajá districts. In 1991, its population was 29,405 inhabitants, rising to31,541 inhabitants by 1995 according to IBGE estimates. This is the district, which receives thehighest proportion of royalties.



• Nova Ipixuna: established in 1993 by Law No. 5,762, it was carved out from the Jacundá andItupiranga districts.

Questions on unexpected regional impacts:• What is the importance and magnitude of these impacts?• What are their consequences for the cost/benefit ratio of the project?• How are they handled and what are their concrete results?



6. DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS AND BENEFITSWCD Question: What was the distribution of the costs and benefits of the projects: who wonand who lost?The case study should identify the main beneficiaries of the project and the principal sectors affectedat the local, regional and national levels. This study should show how these groups benefited orsuffered losses due to the construction and/or operation of the project.

Outstanding among the beneficiaries of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex are major industries andlarge mining companies established in this region supplied – among other incentives – with subsidisedpower for their production activities. The urban communities in North and Northeast Brazil alsobenefited through better electricity supplies through the interconnected network.

On the other hand, small land-owners and farmers were excluded from the benefits of the dam, as wellas indigenous peoples and the population in general, particularly wage-earners and communitiesthroughout the region. The immediate environmental impacts in this area caused adverse effects ineconomic terms through the loss of land, timber, forest assets, and fishing, due to the extremely poorwater quality and the increase in pests and diseases in villages and the land.

Statements from the downstream populace indicate the following alterations in the long-establishedconfigurations of the water and fishlife of the Tocantins River: the presence of “slime” in the water;shortage of fish and shrimp; alterations in water colour; poor quality of the catch (rots quickly);increase in diseases (dermatitis, diarrhoea, etc.), decrease in the output of açaí and cacao; appearanceof insects species formerly unknown in the region.

Due to the well known interaction between the lifestyle of local communities and the river, accordingto local witnesses, these environmental alterations undermine the traditional means of substance,particularly in fishing villages, while also worsening health conditions that were already precarious.For specific sectors of the downstream populace, these alterations began some six months after theTucuruí dam shut off the water flow. This means that they associate these alterations with a possiblelink of causality between the situation noted in the river eco-system of the Tocantins River and theadvent of the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex.

As the river is the key cultural reference for the populace, visible alterations (murky water, bad smell,large-scale fish deaths, new insects etc.) are affecting the cultural habits of the riverbank community(they drink directly from the river, bathe in it etc). This means that the modifications noted in the riversystem are causing rising uncertainty over what could occur, meaning that the downstream effects ofthe Tucuruí Hydro-power project are prompting the consolidation of an ongoing awareness of issuesrelated to the river.

These residents almost always indicate Eletronorte as the entity, which is responsible or jointlyresponsible for the problems, as well as their solutions.

Main questions to be studied regarding the distribution of the costs and benefits of the project:• How did the project define its beneficiary? And who were the beneficiaries at the local, regional

and international levels?• The distribution of the costs and benefits (both planned and unexpected) deriving from the

implementation of the Tucuruí Hydro-power complex, according to their spatial repercussions andthe various social groups involved (who won / who lost) including the benefits for the mining andmetallurgy market, the Concessions Award Plan, Marabá and other major urban centres in Paráand Maranhão States, for Northeast Brazil, etc;



• Emigration/immigration balance: social categories; alterations in income and activities, as well asland and resource ownership rights, social structures and local politics;

• The distribution of costs and benefits (both planned and unexpected) deriving from the impacts ofits implementation on the physical environment (natural resources);

• Loss compensation mechanisms: their effectiveness and suitability to the needs of social groupsadversely affected.



7. THE TUCURUÍ DAM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THETOCANTINS RIVER BASIN

The study should analyse the role of the Tucuruí dam within the context of the Tocantins River basin,noting to what extent this project shaped the subsequent and future development of the TocantinsRiver basin region. Another angle for consideration is to what extent other hydropower projects in thisbasin have or is affecting the performance of the project, and its contribution to development.

Main questions to be studied on the dam within the context of the hydrographic basin:• To what extent has construction of the project altered the usage practice for water and land in the

basin? Particularly, what are its effects on traditional practices, and have they been positive ornegative? What alternative types of use have necessarily been abandoned due to the constructionof the project?

• Does the Tucuruí project depend on building other dams in order to achieve its objectives in full?To what extent does the project form part of a River basin planning and management process as awhole?

• How does the construction of the Tucuruí project shape the future development of the basin? Hasit introduced or eliminated incentives and opportunities for other types of activities?



8. LESSONS LEARNED AND TRENDS OF CHANGEIDENTIFIED

This chapter will summarise the conclusions on the experience of Tucuruí, in the light of theinformation collected and the analyses in the previous chapters, focusing on project performance andits contribution to development.



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1 The Tucuruí project consists of two phases, the second of which is currently under construction. The WCDmethodology calls for drawing perspectives and lessons from the experience gained from the past performanceof case study dams. As such, aspects related to the second phase will be addressed insofar as they prove relevantto the construction and operation of the project to date, and to the historical decision-making context.

3 Based on these observations, the concept of affected population is increased in this paper by social, historicaland cultural categories, making this convergence of situations more expressive and broader-ranging, whetherstructural or circumstantial, conflicting with traditional lifestyles, that the populace may undergo with the adventof the Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex dam. From this standpoint, the use of these concepts is justified in thiscase study.

4 Strictly speaking, from the standpoint of the entrepreneur the idea of impacts refers back to the logic of thepractives, and their technical efficiency, whereby social effects are expected, although naturalised, in contrast tothe viewpoint of the local populace, which is socially, environmentally, culturally and economically beyond thislogic. In fact, these are successive and/or cumulative consequences that are not given a priori, but rather derivefrom diverse actions, interests and factors. These consequences redefine or destructure the cultural setting of thepopulace, which precedes it. From this standpoint, human beings cannot be seen as mere natural beings, but arerather the builders of cultural projects that mediate their practice and relationships with other men.

5 The Tucuruí Hydro-Power Complex Case Study undertaken by Electrobrás in 1992 (mentioned in theBibliography of this paper) queries the internalization of these studies and others carried out later in terms ofimpact mitigation by Eletronorte, as the logic for the implementation of this venture was tied to the worksschedule.

wcd case studies tucuruí hydro-power complex (brazil)the tucuruí dam, built on the tocantins river...

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