ways of coming to understand: metacognitive awareness among first‐year university students

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This article was downloaded by: [Universite De Paris 1] On: 01 September 2013, At: 23:33 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csje20 Ways of Coming to Understand: metacognitive awareness among firstyear university students Bo Dahlin a a Department of Educational Science, University of Karlstad, S651 88 Karlstad, Sweden Published online: 07 Jul 2006. To cite this article: Bo Dahlin (1999) Ways of Coming to Understand: metacognitive awareness among firstyear university students, Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 43:2, 191-208, DOI: 10.1080/0031383990430205 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0031383990430205 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms

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This article was downloaded by: [Universite De Paris 1]On: 01 September 2013, At: 23:33Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Scandinavian Journal of EducationalResearchPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csje20

Ways of Coming to Understand:metacognitive awareness amongfirst‐year university studentsBo Dahlin aa Department of Educational Science, University of Karlstad,S‐651 88 Karlstad, SwedenPublished online: 07 Jul 2006.

To cite this article: Bo Dahlin (1999) Ways of Coming to Understand: metacognitive awarenessamong first‐year university students, Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 43:2,191-208, DOI: 10.1080/0031383990430205

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0031383990430205

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoeveras to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of theauthors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracyof the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verifiedwith primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms

& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1999 191

Ways of Coming to Understand:metacognitive awareness amongfirst-year university studentsBO DAHLINDepartment of Educational Science, University of Karlstad, S-651 88 Karlstad,Sweden

ABSTRACT This paper presents a phenomenographic study of conceptions of how understand-ing comes about. In-depth interviews with 30 first-year university students were carried out,dealing with questions about learning, understanding and knowledge. The analysis presentedhere focuses on the experience of how understanding arises. The subjects came from teachereducation, cultural studies and chemistry economics. Data were analysed according to phe-nomenographic principles. Three main categories of conceptions were found: coming to under-stand by (1) experiences, (2) mental construction and (3) merging with reality. The order ofthe categories is interpreted as a progression in 'metacognitive awareness'. The results arecompared with other phenomenographic studies of conceptions of understanding. Finally, theyare related to constructivist models of learning and some philosophical views. It is suggested thatsuch a re-contextualisation of students' conceptions can be made part of the curriculum in orderto stimulate a 'deep approach' to study and learning.

INTRODUCTION

In the present and previous decades there have been several studies of the concep-tions of learning and related phenomena among many different categories ofstudents (see for example Säljö, 1982; Pramling, 1983; Marton et al, 1984, 1993;Entwistle, A. & Entwistle, N.J., 1992; Purdie et al, 1996). One assumption behindthis research is that understanding students' experiences of learning provides a basisfor improving teaching. This paper reports a phenomenographic study in this area,focusing on experiences of how understanding comes about in academic studies.Instead of focusing on learning in general, the experience of how genuine under-standing arises, from the students' point of view, is explored. The study was carriedout in the hope that it would contribute further to our understanding of students'learning experiences and hence also to our ability to improve teaching (cf. Ramsden,1992).

Phenomenographic Studies of Learning and Understanding

Phenomenography is a qualitative, explorative research approach aimed at describ-

0031-3831/99/020191-18 © 1999 Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research

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TABLE I. The six categories of conceptions of learningfound by Säljö (1982) and Marton et al. (1993)

1. Learning as accumulation of knowledge.2. Learning as memorizing and reproducing.3. Learning as application.4. Learning as understanding.5. Learning as seeing something in a different way.6. Learning as changing as a person.

ing the ways in which people experience or conceptualise various phenomena. As forphenomenographic studies of conceptions of learning, six different conceptions havebeen found, if the results of Säljö (1982) and Marton et al. (1993) are put together.They are listed in Table I.

The six categories form a hierarchy with the first being the most simple andundifferentiated. The categories evolve from a quantitative to a qualitative view oflearning and knowledge. In the first three categories, learning is considered asassimilating more and more facts, algorithms or skills. In categories 4-6, learningmeans understanding the message of a text or coming to understand phenomena froma new perspective. In the last category, this coming to look at things in a new waymeans that the learner himself has changed.

The six categories can be said to progress along a dimension of 'depth' inlearning. This depth dimension has to do with what the act of learning is focused on.In 'memorising and reproducing' the focus seems to be on the words, texts or signsused to communicate knowledge, rather than on the significance of these signs, 'thesignified'. 'The signified', in turn, can be taken as either the comprehensive messageor meaning of the text or the phenomenon itself that it is pointing to and dealingwith. Conceptions focusing on 'significance' rather than on 'signs' are generallyassociated with a 'deep approach' to study and learning, as measured by, forinstance, Biggs' Study Process Questionnaire (Biggs, 1987).

However, the six categories also refer to different phases of learning as a processin time. Thus, 'application' seems to belong to a later phase of the learning processthan for instance 'memorising'. Therefore, Marton et al. (1997) have divided thelearning process, as it appears in these conceptions, into three phases: acquiring,knowing and applying. Memorising and coming to understand belong to the acquir-ing phase. This concerns 'taking in' new knowledge in some way. Having accumu-lated knowledge and having changed as a person belong to the knowing phase. Thisrefers to the state of the person, resulting from having acquired new knowledge.Application and seeing in a new way belong to the applying phase, taking 'seeing ina new way' as the capacity to apply a new conceptual perspective. Thus, in additionto the depth dimension, we have a temporal dimension of the learning experience.

These results deal more with the learning experience in general, less with theparticular experience of understanding as such. However, the study presented hereis focused on this particular aspect of the acquiring phase, namely the experience ofcoming to understand something. Since understanding is such an important goal of

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TABU; II. Aspects of the experience of understanding presentedby Entwistle, N.J. and Entwistle, A. (1991)

The nature of understandingFeelings of satisfactionMeaning and significanceCoherence, connectedness and 'provisional wholeness'Relative irrevcrsibilityConfidence about explainingFlexibility in adapting and applying

Developing understandingActive engagement with the taskRelating to previous knowledge and experienceUsing or developing a structure

Individual forms of understandingBreadth of understandingDepth or level of understandingSource and nature of structure

from lecture or booksthrough own structure in revision notesfrom theoriesfrom an individual conception of the discipline

education in all areas, an effort to understand its nature and origin 'would seem tobe an obligation' (Nickerson, 1985, p. 217). Nickerson's study is based on analyticalreflections, not on empirical data. An empirical, explorative and qualitative study ofthis area has, however, been reported by Entwistle and Entwistle (Entwistle, N.J. &Entwistle, A., 1991, Entwistle, A. & Entwistle, N.J., 1992). From interviews withuniversity students engaged in intensive studies for their final exams, these authorsanalysed conceptions of understanding in three dimensions: the nature of under-standing; the development of understanding, and individual forms of understanding(see Table II). Characteristic of the nature of understanding was a feeling ofsatisfaction and a sense of meaning and 'provisional wholeness'. The developmentof understanding was typically seen as involving active engagement, relating toprevious knowledge and experience and using or developing a conceptual structurefor the subject being studied. Forms of understanding were described in terms ofbreadth, depth and source of structure (lectures, books, own constructs, etc.). I willreturn to this study in the discussion below, where a comparison between the resultsof the present investigation and those of Entwistle and Entwistle will be made.

The Research Problem

The study reported here differs in some important respects from that of Entwistleand Entwistle. First of all, the sample of students being interviewed by theEntwistles turned out to be 'biased towards the more successful students' (1992, p. 5).The sample also consisted almost entirely of psychology students. In addition, thesestudents had just been intensely involved in revision for their final exams at the end

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of a three- or four-year university course. In contrast, the students forming thesample of the present study were freshmen at the university. Even though most ofthem were teacher trainees, the sample represents a broader spectrum of disciplinesand disciplinary interests (see below).

A second difference concerns methodology. It is not clear to what extentEntwistle and Entwistle really followed the phenomenographic principles of analysisand interpretation. They say they did so 'to some extent' (1992, p. 5). However, thetype of results they present seems sometimes to be based on a thematic contentanalysis, rather than on the 'contextual analysis' characteristic of phenomenography(Svensson, 1989). As Svensson notes, phenomenography is based on:

... a relational view of conceptions, meaning that conceptions are seen asdependent both on the activity of the individual and on the part of theworld which is conceptualized. An understanding of the specific characterof the conceptions and the act of conceptualization is seen as fundamentalto making conclusions about the character of, and the development of,conceptions, (p. 530)

The results of such an analysis are 'categories of description' which have a holisticquality and are related not only to the phenomenon focused on, but also toindividual interview transcripts (corresponding to the relational character of concep-tions). It was results of this type that the investigation presented here was intendedto produce.

This study therefore seeks to extend our present knowledge of how understand-ing is experienced. The research questions behind it can be more precisely stated inthe following manner.

• How do students at the beginning of their tertiary studies experience theorigin of understanding? Are there critical differences in the way thisexperience is conceptualised?

• If there are such differences, can progress or development along somedimension of experience be seen?

These questions are justified by the general knowledge we have of the correlationsthat exist between students' conceptions of learning and knowledge, their learningstrategies and the quality of the outcomes of their studies (Van Rossum & Schenk,1984; Schommer, 1994). A clearer view of how students at the beginning of theirtertiary studies may conceptionalise how understanding comes about may help us toconstruct their curriculum in ways which stimulate a 'deeper' approach to theirsubsequent studies (cf. Ramsden, 1992). A suggestion in this direction will be madein the final section.

METHODOLOGY

It needs to be pointed out that the study presented here was part of a researchproject with a wider range of interest. Apart from conceptions of learning andunderstanding, the students' 'everyday philosophy' about ontological and epistemo-

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logical questions was also investigated. Answers to interview questions relating tosuch themes have been included in the analysis.

The choice of a qualitative approach like phenomenography is motivated by theintention to explore and describe different ways of conceptualising such a complexexperience as that of 'coming to understand'. The choice of semi-structuredin-depth interviews suggested itself as most appropriate for exploring suchexperiences as fully as possible.

Phenomenographic Analysis

The object of phenomenographic research is the variation in conceptions expressedin the data [1]. This means that similarities as well as differences in the way peopledescribe their experiences are considered. If the analysis is based on interviewtranscriptions, statements and expressions of direct relevance to the experiencebeing investigated are marked, indexed and compared with each other. The meaningof each statement is considered in relation to two equally important contexts: thatof the interview to which it belongs and that of all the interviews together. The firstcontext is important because the same verbal expression may mean different thingsin different interviews, all meaning being context dependent. The second context isof course necessary in order to make the comparisons and see the variation.

From this careful analysis a set of categories of conceptions, which differ fromeach other in terms of structure and content, gradually emerge as the result of theinvestigation. Expressions of experience which share a similar structure and contentare classified as belonging to the same 'category of description'. Thus, a 'category ofdescription' refers to ways of conceiving, understanding or experiencing which havea basic structure and content in common.

Since the object of research is the variation in conceptions, the establishment ofa fixed relation between an individual and a particular (category of) conception isnot a primary issue. Particular individuals may move between categories, whilst thestructural variation of categories remains stable.

The validity of phenomenographic research is generally based on three factors.The first is the logic of the system of categories emerging from the analysis. Thecategories must be logically distinct and exclusive. A second factor is the correspon-dence between the results and what is known from previous studies in the field.Finally, the plausibility of the categories may be considered, i.e. to what extent theyare recognisable as representing actual or possible human experiences.

As for reliability, a co-judge procedure has been used in this study, giving anindication of the 'communicability' of the categories of description. The degree ofintersubjective agreement at the level of the main categories was 70%. At the levelof the subcategories, it was 63%. The results of the co-judge procedure are furtherdescribed in the Appendix.

The Subjects

Thirty interviews with students in the first year of their studies (at the University of

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Karlstad, Sweden) were carried out. In order to maximize the variation in studyexperience, students from different fields and courses were chosen: cultural studies(5), chemical and administrative sciences (5) and teacher education (20).

The 20 student teachers had chosen different teacher training programmes,specializing in teaching younger (grades 1-7) or older (grades 4-9) children, as wellas different subject areas. In their first courses they were introduced to forms ofteaching and study that were rather different from their previous experience atcollege, including a lot of group discussions and work in 'study groups'. The coursesin cultural studies consist of a variety of human sciences, such as cultural history,literature, philosophy and media. In these areas of learning, interpretation andpersonal points of view tend to be relatively more emphasised than in for instancethe chemical and administrative sciences. In the latter courses, students are expectedto learn 'hard facts' and standard algorithms for their future work in the chemicalindustry. Thus, the interviewees represent different types of studies with regard toboth form and content.

The students were between 19 and 39 years old. Many had come directly fromcollege or high school. One third of them (20) were < 22 years old, which was thearithmetic mean age of the whole group.

The 20 student teachers were interviewed during the first 12 weeks of theircourse. The students in cultural studies and chemical and administrative scienceshad been at the University one semester (20 weeks) longer than the student teachers.Each student was interviewed once, in a separate room where only the student andthe interviewer (author) were present. The interviews lasted for 40-75 minutes.They were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim.

RESULTS

Most subjects made a distinction between having acquired fragmented pieces ofknowledge (or information) about something and having reached a real understand-ing of it (although they sometimes used the word 'knowledge' for 'understanding'and vice versa). Real understanding was often characterised as having a grasp of'thewhole' and seeing how things are connected or related, i.e. how they belong togetherin that whole.

Since the acquisition of fragmented pieces of information was not generallyconsidered to be genuine understanding, our focus on experiences of coming tounderstand could to a great extent also be described as an exploration of thedifferent ways in which 'a sense of the whole' originates in students' experiences oflearning.

Categories of Description

The results are described in the following system of categories.

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Main category 1 : Understanding originates in experiences.Subcategories:

(a) in experiences of doing things;(b) in experiences of recognition;(c) in experiences of personal meaning.

Main category 2: Understanding develops by gradually merging with reality.Subcategories:

(a) construction by putting things together;(b) construction by interpretation.

Main category 3: Understanding originates in partaking in reality.In the following sections these categories will be more fully described and

illustrated.

Main Category 1: Understanding originates in experiences

According to this view, real understanding comes about by gaining certain experi-ences. Such experiences are of three kinds, described in the following three sub-categories.

Subcategory (a): Experiences of doing things. The learner can try to create thenecessary experiences by doing various things. One can engage in discussions,practice, experiment, etc. By the accumulation of such more or less intentionallycreated experiences, understanding grows. The following quote is an illustration:

I: Is there anything special needed in order to come to thisunderstanding?

IP: Yes.I: There must be something more than just learning by rote?IP: Yes, it is to practice on it.I: To practice on it?IP: Yes, work, like doing your homework, one could say. (2) [2]

Subcategory (b): Experiences of recognition. Sometimes the necessary experiences arealready part of one's background or personal memory. That is one kind of recogni-tion: one connects the meaning of a text with previous experience. Another kind ofrecognition is where one connects the meaning of a text with new experiences,coming later. The following quotes illustrate these two types of recognition:

I: If you are going to learn something from a book, if you read about thedevelopment of children for instance?

IP: If you have something similar that has happened, then it may be thatyou think about that too, 'this is how it was at that time'.

I: It happens by itself?IP: Mmm. (3)

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IP: ...if you sit and read for instance psychology and such, it can be a bitboring here, but when you come out then you see, then you canpractice what you have learnt and look at people to see how they actand what they do, 'but this is what I have read', like, then you graspmore of the context. (4)

The difference between this and the previous subcategory is that here there is sharpfocus on the relation between 'text' and 'real experience'. 'Text' in itself cannot giveunderstanding, only on the basis of a conscious connection between 'text' and'experience' can understanding arise.

Subcategoty (c): Experiences of personal meaning. Finally, one student argues that thebasic experiences must be personally significant, they must touch one's heart in someway. This gives 'wholeness' to the knowledge one acquires:

IP: In order for it to stick and in order to really understand one must really,one must... perhaps experience it in practice and have one's ownexperience of it.

I: Why do you think that is so?IP: Because then it becomes much more personal. It becomes ... well, one

gets a concrete situation to refer back to and compare with, 'that's howit was, I myself experienced that... ' . (1)

In the last quote the importance of 'recognition', in the sense of having somethingto 'refer back to', also appears. What is added is the emphasis on the personalsignificance of that which is recognized.

Main Category 2: Understanding originates in mental construction

The conceptions in this category focus on what is happening in the mind or brainof the learner. Things like 'facts' or 'pieces of information' are somehow importedinto the mind, where they are treated in various ways. As one student says:

IP: It is they [the thoughts] that interpret, process. It is then that you twistand turn, look at things xxx [inaudible] ... [laughter] before you decideif you are going to keep them or not. (13)

Thinking, or thought, sometimes seems to play a central role in this treatment of'facts'. As in the quote above, thought is then seen as 'interpreting' or 'processing'received information.

In general, understanding according to this category comes about through akind of information processing and has the character of a mental construction. Thisprocessing of information is experienced in two somewhat different ways, describedin the following subcategories.

Subcategory (a): Construction by putting things together. One way is expressed asputting together 'facts' or 'pieces' into a coherent image. This is like doing a jigsawpuzzle: you look for pieces that fit together or you suddenly find a piece which fits

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into a gap somewhere. Pieces that do not fit anywhere are sooner or later'discarded'.

IP: Yes, like you have to put them into a larger picture, so that they get aplace somewhere where they fit in with other things, and if they don'tdo that then, for instance if one has small pieces of knowledge orexperience everywhere and there are no, well, lines between them, nocontacts between them, then you lose them. (29)

Subcategory (b): Construction by interpretation. Here you recognise that the piecesyou are building with are not always given in a static form: sometimes you 're-form'them so that they find a place in the whole. That is, you interpret facts so that theymore easily fit into the pre-established pattern in your mind.

IP: Well, what shall I say now, first you get a lot of written information andthere the first selection takes place. And then you interpret thingsyourself too. If you say something to me I don't necessarily perceive itthe way you want me to perceive it, you know. But there is a sort ofinterpretation there. And then there is just this that you, well, if youdon't understand it, then you discard it I should think, unless youreally really want to learn, then you try again. But if you understandthen you have perceived it in a way that you think is good, then it alsosticks I think. Then it's like, then you have passed through this cycle.(13)

Main Category 3: Understanding develops by gradually merging with reality

The factor which provides real understanding here is reality itself. By partaking inreality or penetrating it in one's thinking, learning becomes insight into how thingswork or how they hang together. One of the differences between this view and thatof the previous category is that in category 2 'pieces of knowledge' or information areconnected in the mind of the learner; here 'things themselves' are discovered to berelated or connected. Another difference is that in category 2 things are first takenin and then put together, whereas in this third category (the consciousness of) thelearner moves out into the objects or phenomena of the world. This 'moving out' intothe world may express itself as investigating, asking why people behave like they do,looking for causal explanations, etc.

The following quotes are from interviews which contain particularly clearexpressions of this conception.

I: [What is learning?]IP: ...I don't know how to define it but. . . to deal with our reality, time and

space . . . .I: To deal with our reality?IP: Yes. We have to, naturally, in order to be able to partake in reality you

have to learn what reality looks like. (14)

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As pointed out in the section on methodology, philosophical questions of anepistemological and ontological character were included in the interviews. As aconsequence of such questions the student in interview 14, from which the previousquote was taken, has a sudden insight into the 'identity' of knowledge and reality.Therefore, for him, 'partaking in reality' becomes the same as 'partaking in knowl-edge':

IP: Yes, but knowledge is part of reality, according to, if we trust theimpressions and theories we have, if we start from that, then knowledgeis part of reality.

I: Mm ... a part of reality, yes . . . .IP: Well it is reality!I: It is reality?IP: Yes, sure [laughter] ... one must say that. And if you partake in reality

you get knowledge. (14)

Another student, dealing with the role of the T in learning, provides a clearexpression of the 'moving out' of the learner's consciousness or 'I ' into the world,in a kind of merging with reality itself:

IP: ...It is actually I that change 'into' reality [Swedish: det ær ju jag somfærændras in i verkligheten], so that it is I that look at it with differenteyes the more I know, or the less I know. (30)

The Swedish words used here are difficult to translate, because it is not a proper wayof speaking even in Swedish. It is not that I change by 'turning into' reality, but by'moving out into and merging' with it. The idea of 'merging' with reality lies behindthe naming of this third category.

The Relations of the Categories to Each Other

In the first category, the learner is above all aware of their outward actions, beingintent on an experience of recognition. This experience, when it comes about, is aspontaneous happening. Even though the outward activities are more or lessplanned and calculated, recognition as such is not a necessary, causal effect of theseactivities. It happens by itself (which implies that it may not happen at all).

The spontaneous and automatic character of this act of recognition is illustratedin the following quote:

IP: ...that you keep on with it and practise and do it a lot, then eventuallyyou understand perhaps, involuntarily you do. (11, author's emphasis)

Expressions such as 'involuntarily', 'automatically' and 'it happens by itself aredistinctive traits of category 1, when it comes to describing how understandingcomes about.

'Doing things' and 'recognition' are also expressed in category 2. However,another element is added: one experiences oneself as active on a different level. One

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is not merely doing things in an outward sense, there is also a mental activity takingplace in 'linking' or interpreting:

IP: ...things that you take in and that you can learn and that you processyourself and make something from within yourself. That to me islearning. And you asked this thing about the I, and it is absolutelyimportant that it is I who process something that I get to hear, perhapsthree different things and then I take it in and then something comesout that comes from me, that I have sort of..., that is learning for me.(26)

Thus, the characteristic trait of category 2 is a kind of mental processing ofinformation, in which the T or the person themselves often seems to be the guidingfactor.

In the third category, yet another activity of the T is added: that of 'partakingin' or even 'changing into' reality. Behind these expressions there seems to bean intentional act of opening oneself to phenomena themselves. In this act, knowl-edge becomes transparent or even disappears as something that exists in itself:knowledge becomes reality.

This analysis of the relations of the categories to each other implies that theyform a hierarchy, with category 3 representing the most inclusive type of conception.In phenomenographic studies such a hierarchic 'outcome space' indicates a pro-gressive relation between the categories. 'Progression' in this sense does not meanchange or development; it is a theoretical interpretation of the differences betweenthe categories. What is the dimension of the experience of 'coming to understand'along which these categories move? I suggest that this dimension can be calledmetacognitive awareness. The expression 'metacognitive awareness' is used byEntwistle (1997). He defines it as 'a feel for the nature of the discipline throughwhich their [the students'] idiosyncratic interpretations have been formed' (p. 7). Iwould like to suggest a slightly modified definition: a feel for the nature of the actsand experiences through which one's understanding has been formed. From thispoint of view, 'metacognition' means being aware of the relations between oneself,one's acts of learning, knowledge and the world [3].

If we look at the three categories from this perspective, we may say that agradual expansion of awareness takes place. In the first category, awareness isfocused solely on one's own experience of things. In this sense, the self-reflectiveawareness in learning is mainly subjective: my experience is what counts.

In the second category, self-reflection is widened to the awareness of understand-ing itself as a personal construction and how I myself actively contribute to thatconstruction.

In the third category, awareness is shifted to focus on the world. But it is theworld as internally related to the learner and mediated by understanding. This wayof seeing is therefore based on the previous categories: it includes the subject andtheir understanding.

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DISCUSSION

The primary aim of this study was to explore different ways of conceptualising theexperience of how understanding comes about among first-year university students.The analysis of the interview data resulted in three main categories of conceptions.On a general level, understanding was conceived as arising out of:

• experiences;• mental construction; and• a merging with reality.

The focus was on the development of understanding, rather than its nature. As forits nature, we noted that a majority of subjects agreed that understanding has aholistic character. To understand often meant to have a sense of wholeness aboutsomething. A more precise meaning of this 'sense of wholeness' is indicated by theway in which understanding is perceived to arise. It seems logical that the 'sense ofwholeness' arrived at is dependent on its genetic process. Thus, in category 1'wholeness' has a pragmatic, tacit and feeling nature. In category 2 it seems toconsist mainly of conceptual networks or mental structures. In category 3, wholenessseems to have a more 'existential' character, being based on the experience of'merging' with reality.

The interviewees came from different domains of study. However, there wereno clear-cut correlations between these domains and the conceptions expressed.Therefore, it seems that the categories have captured general features of the processof understanding. As Nickerson (1985) notes, 'there arc undoubtedly some thingsthat can be said about understanding that arc relatively independent of domain'(p. 217). Nickerson also says:

Understanding is an active process. It requires the connecting of facts, therelating of newly acquired information to what is already known,the weaving of bits of knowledge into an integrated and cohesive whole. Inshort, it requires not only having knowledge but also doing something withit. (p. 234)

These few lines point to the central aspects of several of the conceptions found anddescribed in this study. Understanding requires activity—category 1 a; relating newinformation to previous knowledge—category lb; connecting facts and weaving bitsof knowledge together—category 2.

A comparison with the results of the study by Entwistle, A. and Entwistle, N.J.(1992) also reveals some similarities. They note that the experience of understand-ing generally 'included a recognition of coherence and connectedness' (p. 7), i.e. a senseof wholeness. The metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle also appears in this context, in asimilar manner to that described in category 2 above.

As for the development of understanding, Entwistle, A. and Entwistle, N.J.(1992, p. 10 ff.) found the following categories:

• active engagement with the task;• relating to previous knowledge and experience; and• using or developing structure.

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'Active engagement' included 'using the material' and 'discussing with friends'(p. 11), i.e. doing things with the material being learnt. This corresponds closely tocategory la in this study. 'Relating to previous knowledge' clearly correspondsto category lb, the central feature of which is 'recognition'. However, only 'half ofthis category is captured by Entwistle and Entwistle. This study has contributed theother half, namely to have a real-life experience which suddenly illuminates what youhave previously read but not understood. Entwistle and Entwistle note that under-standing generally has a feeling tone, but there is nothing in their results comparablewith category lc of this study, where the feeling of personal significance is seen as thecentral factor for the development of understanding.

'Using or developing structure' is illustrated by 'imposing a structure' on thematerial being studied or developing a framework in which to 'slot it in'(Entwistle, A. & Entwistle, N.J., 1992, p. 12). This is analogous to what wasdescribed in category 2 of this study, which focused on the development of links andconnections between facts or bits of knowledge.

There is nothing in Entwistle and Entwistle's study comparable with category3. This is probably an infrequent type of conception (see Appendix) and its degreeof intra-individual 'stability' may not be very high. Nevertheless, it is worth someattention because of its character of 'deep approach', the kind of approach tolearning which is generally appreciated by university lecturers (Ramsden, 1992).

Metacognitive Conceptions

Our second research question was whether it was possible to see a progression alongsome dimension of experience in the different categories that emerged from theanalysis. To answer this question, the order of the categories was interpreted as aprogression in metacognitive awareness. This implies a step-wise widening of theawareness of the significance of the different factors involved in the development ofunderstanding. In the first category the focus is on the subject's actionsand experiences. In the second category, awareness of one's own constructive andinterpretative acts is added to this. In category 3, the relations between oneself, one'sunderstanding and reality itself are experienced as more or less internal and mutuallyconstitutive. Thus, metacognitive awareness seems to progress from an outwardlooking, 'external' awareness towards a more inclusive awareness, which embraces'outer experience', 'mental acts' and the learner as one whole.

It seems that the results described in this study correspond to von Wright's(1992) notion of metacognitive conceptions, von Wright discusses the distinctionbetween metacognitive skills and metacognitive knowledge or conceptions. The latter'seems to involve reflective understanding of the process under consideration andthe actor's role in it' (p. 64). This self-conscious reflection presupposes a well-developed concept of self, von Wright argues. He further adds that 'metacognitiveknowledge is not only a graded phenomenon (in a quantitative sense), it alsoundergoes fundamental qualitative changes during development' (p. 64). Thisstatement seems to be underpinned by the results presented above.

Metacognitive knowledge, based upon self-conscious reflections on one's own

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role in the process of coming to understand, does not seem far from philosophicaltheories on the sources of knowledge. In conclusion, and as a way of relating theresults to the practice of teaching, let us consider the students' conceptions in aphilosophical context.

CONCLUSION: STUDENTS' CONCEPTIONS IN A PHILOSOPHICALCONTEXT

The conceptions described above touch upon epistemological questions, which havebeen dealt with in traditional philosophy as well as in modern theories of learning.A few striking similarities between such philosophical and theoretical arguments andthe conceptions found will be indicated.

Conceptions in the first category focus on experience. At first glance, it mayseem that these conceptions are most similar to the ideas of 17th and 18th centuryempiricism, since that is the philosophy of knowledge which stresses the role ofexperience most of all. This is perhaps true for the first subcategory, whereexperience is seen as the result of 'doing things': experimenting, practicing, etc.

However, in the second subcategory the emphasis is on a particular kind ofexperience, namely recognition. The theme of recognition can be found in philosoph-ical thinking much earlier than that of the British empiricists. For instance, Augusti-nus, the 5th century church father, comes upon it in a treatise called De Magistro,dealing with the use of words (or signs) in the communication between teacher andstudent. Augustinus is discussing the problem of what the words of the teacher canactually do for the student. He comes to the conclusion, that they serve either torecall what the student already knows or to indicate something which the student maysearch for:

The import of words ... consists in this: they serve merely to suggest thatwe look for realities. These they do not exhibit to us for our knowledge . . . .It is indeed purest logic and most truly said that when words arc uttered weeither know what they signify, or we do not know. If we know, we recallrather than learn; but if we do not know, we do not even recall, thoughperhaps we receive the impulse to inquire. (De Magistro XI, p. 36, quotedin Colish, 1968, p. 55)

In this reasoning we can discern the two kinds of recognition described in the secondsubcategory of the first main category. When the students listen to a lecture or reada text, they can connect what they hear/read to their previous experience, i.e. theycan 'recall' what it is about. If there is nothing in their experiential backgroundwhich seems to fit what they hear/read, they can still keep the words or 'ideas' inmind, in order to try to discover their real meaning later, i.e. the words can indicatesomething to be looked for and perhaps recognised in future experiences [4].

The conceptions in the second category seem somewhat related to present dayconstructivism. According to these conceptions, the act of learning is centred around'linking' together pieces of information or knowledge, which are 'taken in' byreading or listening to lectures. The links created form a pattern or build up an

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image, where the 'pieces' function like the many bits of a jigsaw puzzle. Thesimilarity between this reasoning and that of 'information processing' and 'buildingschemata' in constructivist models of learning is rather obvious. Look for instance atthe following quote from Head and Sutton (1985), where they talk about howcognitive structures are built up:

Structures are Built Up from Discrete Parts. We have many differentexperiences that we make sense of gradually, a bit here and a bit there aswe meet them. On some occasions, links can be made between these bitsso that a wider sense is made, incorporating previously separatedunderstandings . . . . (p. 92)

As for the third main category, let us first point out that in Swedish, the wordfor learning is 'inlærning', which could literally be translated as 'in-learning'. Theprefix 'in-' hints at what Säljö (1992) has called the root metaphor for learning in theSwedish language (it is perhaps so in other languages too), i.e. learning implies thatsomething from the outer world comes 'in', into the mind (or the brain) of thelearner.

In the third category, there seems to be a break with this common rootmetaphor. Instead of something from the outside coming 'in', / move out into theworld. The direction is from the subject to the object. This 'directedness' ofconsciousness has some affinity with the phenomenological concept of intentionality(cf. Sokolowski, 1964). In particular, it reminds one of Heidegger's concept ofhuman existence as 'ck-stasis', being 'outside itself, with the things of the world.This implies that the 'I' is not primarily a 'subject' that relates itself to internalrepresentations of phenomena, but a being that can only exist by being 'directed'towards everything else in the world (cf. Lübcke, 1987, p. 132). The idea that inlearning the 'I ' partakes in reality or 'merges' with it can be seen as a vague reflectionof the concept of intentionality in existential phenomenology. I partake in reality by'directing' myself towards it, by intending it.

This philosophical re-contextualization may be interesting in itself, indicatingsimilarities between conceptions among present day students, on the one hand, andphilosophies and theories of learning past and present, on the other. However, it isalso suggested as an educational strategy which can be used in turning the students'conceptions of learning into an instructional content of higher education. There areindications that such a course design may help the development of 'deep ap-proaches' to learning. Sheppard and Gilbert (1991) investigated the effects ofcourses addressing students' epistemological conceptions in the contexts of thehistory of philosophy and of science. They concluded that:

... where courses include content which explicitly considers alternativeconceptions of knowledge and teaching which addresses the existing con-ceptions of students, they are more likely to facilitate learning based onpersonal meaning orientation and, thus, an enhanced quality of learningoutcome, one manifestation of which is the development of epistemologiesbased upon the relative nature of knowledge, (p. 248, italics in original)

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Thus, by taking up for reflection and discussion the students' conceptions ofunderstanding in the context of the history of epistemology, we may hope tostimulate the development of motives and strategies for 'deep learning', learningbased upon personal commitment.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The research reported here was sponsored by the Swedish Council for Research inthe Human and Social Sciences. Special thanks are due to Ms Ann-CharlotteMardsjö in the Department of Educational Science, Göteborg University, whoundertook the work as co-judge.

NOTES

[1] The main points in the description of the method arc taken from Marton (1986) and Marton andBooth (1997, pp. 110 ff.).

[2] Interview quotes have been translated from Swedish by the author.[3] Thus the term 'metacognition' is here used in a different sense from that which prevails in cognitive

science or constructivist theories of learning. There metacognition is often defined in terms of'monitoring' or 'controlling' one's own 'information processing strategies' (Mctcalfc & Shinamura,1994; Vosniadou, 1996).

[4] It may be argued that Augustinus writes in the context of teaching and learning about the Christianfaith, not that of knowledge in general. However, in the 12th century Thomas Aquinas re-actualizedAugustinus' argument in precisely that wider context (Colish, 1968).

REFERENCES

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COLISH, M.L. (1968). The Mirror of Language: a study in the medieval theory of knowledge. New Haven,CT: Yale University Press.

ENTWISTLE, A. & ENTWISTLE, N.J. (1992). Experiences of understanding in revising for degreeexaminations. Learning and Instruction, 2, 1-22.

ENTWISTLE, N. (1997). Metacognitive and strategic awareness of learning processes and understanding,paper presented at the 7th EARLI Conference, Athens, 26-30 August, 1997.

ENTWISTLE, N.J. & ENTWISTLE, A. (1991). Contrasting forms of understanding for degree examinations:the student experience and its implications. Higher Education, 22, 205-227.

HEAD, J.O. & SUTTON, C.R. (1985). Language, understanding, and commitment. In L.H.T. WEST &A.L. PINES (Eds) Cognitive Structure and Conceptual Change. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

LÜBCKE, P. (1987). Heidegger: filosofi som radikalt frågande [Heidegger: philosophy as radicalquestioning]. In P. LÜBCKE (Ed.) Vår tids Filosofi. Stockholm: Forum.

MARTON, F. (1986). Phenomenography—research approach to investigating different understandings ofreality. Journal of Thought, 21, 28-49.

MARTON, F. & BOOTH, S. (1997). Learning and Awareness. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.MARTON, F., HOUNSELL, D. & ENTWISTLE, N.J. (Eds) (1984). The Experience of Learning. Edinburgh:

Scottish Academic Press.MARTON, F., DALL'ALBA, G. & BEATY, E. (1993). Conceptions of learning. International Journal of

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MARION, F., WATKJNS, D. & TANG, C. (1997). Discontinuities and continuities in the experience oflearning: an interview study of high-school students in Hong Kong. Learning and Instruction, 7,21-48.

METCALFE, J. & SHINAMURA, A.P. (Eds) (1994). Mctacognition. Knowing about knowing. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.

NICKERSON, R.S. (1985). Understanding understanding. American Journal of Education, 93, 201-239.PRAMLING, I. (1983). The Child's Conception of Learning. Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis

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RAMSDEN, P. (1992). Learning to Teach in Higher Education. London: Routledge.SÄLJÖ, R. (1982). Learning and Undemanding. A study of differences in constructing meaning from a text.

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SCHOMMER, M. (1994). Synthesizing cpistemological belief research: tentative understandings andprovocative confusions. Educational Psychology Review, 6, 293-319.

SHEPPARD, C. & GILBERT, J. (1991). Course design, teaching method and student epistemology. HigherEducation, 22, 229-249.

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APPENDIX

The co-judge was informed about the proposed hierarchical structure of the categories and askedto place each interview in the highest category expressed in that transcript. In cases where theauthor's and the co-judge's categorisations differed, conceptions which were (more or less clearly)identified in the interviews, but not considered definite or unambiguous enough for the finaldecision, arc noted in parentheses. It can be seen that even if the final categorisation differs, inmany cases the same conceptions have been identified. In three cases (7, 10 and 26), theregistered conceptions arc identical, but the final decision differs.

Interview

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930

Author

lclalblb (la)lalb (2a)lb(3)2b3lb (2b)la (2b)lb2b3la (2a)2blb (2a)lb(3)2a2ala (2a)lblbla2a2b (3)32a2a3 (lb,c, 2a)

Co-judge

lclalblc(la)lalb (2a)3 (lb)2b32b (lb)2b (la)2a (la)2b32b2b2b (2a)2a2a2alb (la)lblbla2b (2a)3 (2b)32a2a3 (lb,c)

Two main reasons for disagreement were found. The first had to do with the difficulty ofdifferentiating between expressions of automatic (lb) and consciously active (2a) creations of linksbetween experiences or bits of knowledge. This difference did not always come through clearly inwhat was said. The second difficulty arose from expressions like 'turning things around' or'meeting things in different contexts'. Such statements could be taken as expressions of interpret-ation from different points of view (2b), but also as repeatedly doing things (la) or recognisingthem in various circumstances (lb).

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