WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS:WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND CONFLICTS:

The case of the Euphrates and the TigrisThe case of the Euphrates and the Tigris

Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu

Gebze Institute of Technology

Turkey

Jean Michel Guldmann

The Ohio State University

U.S.A.

INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

History: Conflicts over the control of fertile and irrigable agricultural lands.

Today: Conflicts over the control of scarce water resources.

The Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP). Ethnicity & Religion: Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, and

Shiites. High population growth rates: Doubling over 20 years. Inelastic water supply.

LITERATURELITERATURE REVIEW REVIEW Applications of Cooperative GamesApplications of Cooperative Games

Dinar & Wolf (1994)– Introduction of an international WM (Water Market)– Utilization of game theory and optimization– Incorporation of political feasibility analyses

Rogers (1969) – The Ganges – Game theory (non-zero sum games)

Rogers (1993) – ‘Reasonable and Equitable’ sharing – Pareto-Admissibility – Game theory

Application of Spatial Equilibrium Models Application of Spatial Equilibrium Models

to Water Allocation Problemsto Water Allocation Problems Flinn & Guise (1970)

First application of spatial price equilibrium model Hypothetical river basin and water allocation

Vaux & Howitt (1984) Average cost pricing v.s. marginal cost pricing Water Market in California Results 1) Reduces the need for large supply-augmenting

conveyance facilities 2) Provides welfare gains

Booker & Young (1994) Colorado River Institutional Model (CRIM) Water market for efficiency

The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ETRBM)Model (ETRBM)

Goal: Development of a methodology and its application

Content:Benchmark ModelApplication of cooperative game theory

concepts to define sustainable benefits and water resources allocations 

Model AssumptionsModel Assumptions Same agricultural productivity throughout the region; Environmental problems are ignored (e.g., salinization, low BOD); Same energy prices throughout the region; Water unit values in urban and agricultural areas do not vary

throughout the region; In Iraq and Syria, only cities exceeding 100,000 are incorporated; Groundwater resources are ignored due to lack of spatial information; Constant water transportation unit costs throughout the region; The optimization model maximizes the total net benefits, rather than

the benefits of any country or of any sub-portion(s) of the basin; Supply-to-supply internodal link unit costs are assumed to be the same

as agricultural transport unit costs between supply and demand nodes; Water withdrawals per acre and per person are constrained by upper

limits, to prevent excessive withdrawals.

Spatial Structure of the ETRBMSpatial Structure of the ETRBM

45 Supply Nodes (j) • Turkey has 15 supply nodes • Syria has 7 supply nodes • Iraq has 23 supply nodes63 Demand Nodes (i)• Turkey has total of 24 demand nodes• Syria has 16 demand nodes• Iraq has 23 demand nodesThree Interbasin LinksAll links from the Tigris to the Euphrates• from j=21 to j=12: Turkey to Syria • from j=28 to j=14: In Iraq • from j=31 to j=16: In Iraq

Mathematical Structure of the ETRBMMathematical Structure of the ETRBM

Optimization Technique: Linear Programming Objective function (Maximize)

– Agricultural benefits – Urban benefits– Energy benefits– Delivery costs to urban and agricultural uses – Transshipment costs over the links

Constraints (Subject to)– Node balance constraints– Feasibility constraints (Supply to Supply & Supply to Demand)– Minimum & maximum withdrawal constraints– Equalities

Objective FunctionObjective Function

)()()( 12,2112,2116,3116,3114,2814,28

, ,

,, ,

,, ,

DSSCTSSPQDSSCTSSPQDSSCTSSPQ

PQEGEPR

URBTCDSDWWTVALUR

AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEB

lj ljj

ijurbj ijurb i

ijagrj ijagr i

Sets:

i: demand nodes (1 to 63)

j & l: supply nodes (1 to 45)

agr: set of agricultural demand nodes

urb: set of urban demand nodes

Constraints: Node BalanceConstraints: Node Balance

l jlji iji

jji ji

PQTFWTRFR

RELQW

,,

,

i ijij WTRFRTRFN ,

ConstraintsConstraints

j iji WWT ,

MAXAGRSIZEWTMINAGRSIZE iii

MAXURBSIZEWTMINURBSIZE iii

l jlj QPQ ,

ljlj FTRNSSMPQ ,,

ijij FTRNSDMW ,,

Data and Parameter EstimatesData and Parameter Estimates

Supply Data– Tributary Flows– Return Flows– Evaporation

Demand Data– Agriculture & Urban Use

VALAG & VALUR MINAGR & MAXAGR MINURB & MAXURB

– Water Conveyance Cost and Energy Price Data Transportation Costs Energy

General Summary of the Benchmark SolutionGeneral Summary of the Benchmark Solution Energy benefits

constitute nearly 50% of overall returns;

Return flows make up almost 50% of the water input from tributaries, and are available for reuse;

Total water withdrawal is very close to the total tributary flow input, whereas water released to the Gulf makes up to 35% of the total tributary inflow.

Solution

Net system benefit (NEB), 2,407,731,200$

Water use benefits (TECBW) 2,091,003,000$

Energy generation benefits (TECBE), 1,175,087,800$

Transportation costs for urban uses (TTCURB) 32,145,138$

Transportation costs for agricultural uses (TTCAGR ) 826,214,547$

Interbasin transfer cost (TTRSS ) 0$

Water release to the Gulf (GULF) 28,225

Total water withdrawal (TWT) 78,528

Total return flow (FRET) 42,582

Total in-out balance (TOTBAL) 0

Total agricultural water withdrawal (TWAGR) 77,505

Total urban water withdrawal (TWURB) 1,022

System Parameters

Total tributary flows (TFT) 81,920

Total reserve evaporation (RELT) 17,750

Minimum required total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMIN) 0

Maximum total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMAX) 122,519.12 Minimum required total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMIN) 0Maximum total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMAX). 1,880.95

Net benefits of Turkey and Iraq are almost the same – Turkey obtains most of her benefits from energy generation (75%)– Iraq obtains hers from agriculture (90%)– Syria obtains 56% from water withdrawals and 44% from energy generation

Energy generation potential at the upstream nodes Agricultural uses potential at the downstream nodes

– Turkey has the lowest transport cost– Iraq the highest transport cost

Total urban transportation costs constitute an insignificant share of the total transportation costs in the whole system and in each county

Summary

Economic Benefits 3,266,090,800$ 1,161,095,600$ 294,048,029$ 1,810,947,300$ Transport Costs 858,359,685$ 144,065,122$ 60,237,792$ 654,056,771$ Net Economic Benefits 2,407,731,200$ 1,017,030,400$ 233,810,237$ 1,156,890,500$ Economic Benefits / Transport Costs 3.81 8.06 4.88 2.77

Percent DistributionWithdrawal 64.0% 24.6% 56.3% 90.5%Energy 36.0% 75.4% 43.7% 9.5%Urban Withdrawal 4.7% 3.0% 2.9% 6.1%Agricultural Withdrawal 59.3% 21.6% 53.3% 84.5%

Transport CostsUrban Withdrawal 3.7% 7.6% 4.7% 2.8%Agricultural Withdrawal 96.3% 92.4% 95.3% 97.2%Link Transshipment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Total Turkey Syria Iraq

Benefit Allocation by Country and UseBenefit Allocation by Country and Use

Water Resources Allocation by Country, Basin, and UseWater Resources Allocation by Country, Basin, and Use

The highest withdrawal (61,934 Mm3) in Iraq Iraq obtains its major benefits from agriculture water withdrawal

Turkey (with nearly 2/3 of Iraqi land) withdraws only 1/6 of Iraqi withdrawal (10,263 Mm3)

Urban withdrawals (1,022 Mm3) Agricultural withdrawal (77,505 Mm3).

Summary

Euphrates Urban 180 0.2% 45 0.1% 58 0.1% 78 0.1%Tigris Urban 843 1.1% 190 0.2% - - 652 0.8%Euphrates Agriculture 35,475 45.2% 3,402 4.3% 6,273 8.0% 25,800 32.9%Tigris Agriculture 42,030 53.5% 6,626 8.4% - - 35,405 45.1%

BasinEuphrates Total 35,655 45.4% 3,447 4.4% 6,331 8.1% 25,878 33.0%Tigris Total 42,873 54.6% 6,816 8.7% - - 36,057 45.9%

UseUrban Total 1,022 1.3% 235 0.3% 58 0.1% 730 0.9%Agriculture Total 77,505 98.7% 10,028 12.8% 6,273 8.0% 61,205 77.9%

OverallTotal Withdrwals 78,528 100.0% 10,263 13.1% 6,331 8.1% 61,934 78.9%

Total Turkey Syria Iraq

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN WATER COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION: RESOURCES ALLOCATION:

Game – Theoretic AnalysesGame – Theoretic Analysesa. Independent Action by Individual CountriesStep 1

Step 2

Step 3

Diagram 1 Diagram 2 Diagram 3

b. Two-Country CoalitionsStep 1 Step 1 Step V=T+1

Step T=V+1

Step 2 Step 2

Diagram 1 Diagram 2 Diagram 3

c. Grand Coalition

Step 1

Diagram 1

LEGEND

Return Flows

Water Releases

Turkey

Syria

Iraq

T

S

I

T

S

I

TS

I

T

SI

T

S I

T

S

I

T T

SEnergy Prices (EPR) EPR = $0 EPR = $25 EPR = $100 Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights Water Resources

(TTF=Bm3) Turkey: 1.1 Syria: 1.0 Iraq: 0.9 59.8 Minimum A11 A12 A13 81.9 Average A21 A22 A23 A 92.6 Maximum A31 A32 A33

Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights Water Resources (TTF=Bm3) Turkey: 1.0 Syria: 1.0 Iraq: 1.0

59.8 Minimum B11 B12 B13 81.9 Average B21 B22 B23 B 92.6 Maximum B31 B32 B33

Agricultural Productivity (VALAG) Weights Water Resources (TTF=Bm3) Turkey: 0.9 Syria: 1.0 Iraq: 1.1

59.8 Minimum C11 C12 C13 81.9 Average C21 C22 C23 C 92.6 Maximum C31 C32 C33

Objective FunctionsObjective Functions

lst lstst

ijtuj ijtu i

ijtaj ijta i

PQEGEPR

URBTCDSDWWTVALUR

AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEBt

, ,

,, ,

,, ,

)( 12,2112,21

, ,

,, ,

,, ,

DSSCTSSPQ

PQEGEPR

URBTCDSDWWTVALUR

AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEBs

lss lssss

ijsuj ijsu i

ijsaj ijsa i

)()( 16,3116,3114,2814,28

, ,

,, ,

,, ,

DSSCTSSPQDSSCTSSPQ

PQEGEPR

URBTCDSDWWTVALUR

AGRTCDSDWWTVALAGNEBi

lsi lsisi

ijiuj ijiu i

ijiaj ijia i

NEBiNEBsNEBtNEBtsi

NEBiNEBsNEBsi

NEBsTINEBsNEBsNEBtNEBti &

NEBiTSNEBiNEBsNEBtNEBts &

Individual Country Objectives

Coalition Objectives

Grand Coalition Objective (Equivalent of Objective in the Benchmark Model)

Core ConditionsCore Conditions

min),min( NEBtNEBtSINEBtX t

min,min NEBsNEBsTINEBsX s

min,min NEBiNEBiTSNEBiX i

NEBtsXX st

NEBtiXX it

NEBsiXX is

NEBtsiXXX ist

Models for Core and Subsidy DeterminationModels for Core and Subsidy Determination

Maximize

Subject to

ZF

min),min( NEBtNEBtSINEBtX t

min,min NEBsNEBsTINEBsX s

min,min NEBiNEBiTSNEBiX i

NEBtsXX st

NEBtiXX it

NEBsiXX is

NEBtsiZXXX ist

Shapley Allocation (e.g., Iraq)Shapley Allocation (e.g., Iraq)

Iraq joining the “empty” coalition

Iraq joining either the Turkey or Syria coalition

Iraq joining the Turkey-Syria coalition

minNEBiIBi

minNEBtNEBtiIB ti

minNEBsNEBsiIB si

minNEBtsNEBtsiIB tsi

Core Analysis SummaryCore Analysis Summary

Differences Between Shapley, Core, and Minimum BenefitsDifferences Between Shapley, Core, and Minimum Benefits

FURTHER RESEARCHFURTHER RESEARCH Environmental issues

– Gulf area preservation (intrusion), salinization, drainage Utilization of nonlinear objective functions Incorporation of groundwater resources Multi-period river basin analyses

– Utilization of large reservoirs More details for the demand nodes (smaller size) Projections for the future demands Water transfers to the other countries

– From where to where?– Impacts to the system

Evaluation of impacts of important projects and government subsidies– e.g., Urfa Tunnel