water conflicten in een globale context onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden! pieter van der zaag...

Water conflicten in een globale context

Onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden!

Pieter van der Zaag

13 November 2010

Water conflict

1. between the haves and the have-nots- 0.9 billion without clean water; 2.6 billion without basic

sanitation

2. between water users within the same sector - e.g. irrigators

3. between different sectors- agriculturalists vs. pastoralists- urban water supply vs. irrigators- distant energy consumers vs. riparian communities

4. between hydrological units - inter-basin water transfers

5. between different social/political entities - the transboundary dimension

6. at the global scale - e.g. the current land & water grab in Africa

Water conflict

Cochabamba - Bolivia

Omo river basin (Ethiopia) and Lake Turkana (Kenya)

Mekong

Manantali dam - Senegal river

Scheldt estuary - Netherlands/Belgi

um

phot

o: E

ric B

aran

Overview

1. The water asymmetry

2. Water allocation – local and national practices

3. Water allocation in transboundary river basins

4. Towards “water rationality”

• benefit sharing

• payment for environmental services

• issue linking

5. Water conflict or cooperation?

6. Concluding remarks

seasea

1. The water asymmetry

boundaryup

down

2. Water allocation – local and national

practices

Different historical regimes:• Local (“customary”) water sharing

arrangements; principles of fairness, equity, respect for the environment, respecting hydraulic property

• Imposed (colonial) national water laws (e.g. riparian system, prior appropriation)

• Subsequently: comprehensive water sectors reforms

2. Water allocation – local and national

practices

Emerging consensus:• Access to water is widely considered a human right

• Environment is a legitimate water user

• Transboundary commitments are recognised

• Permits for non-primary (= economic) uses

• Equitable (proportional) allocation

3. Water allocation in transboundary river basins

Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (ILA, 1966)

UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN, 1997)

3. Water allocation intransboundary river basins

Principles of the UN Watercourses Convention (1997)

Reasonable and equitable utilization (Article 5)‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. …’ (Art. 5, s.1)

No significant harm (Article 7)‘Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.’ (Art. 7, s.1)

(borrowed from Helsinki Rules)

(new)


Principles of the UN Watercourses Convention (1997)

Reasonable and equitable utilization (Article 5)‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. …’ (Art. 5, s.1)

No significant harm (Article 7)‘Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.’ (Art. 7, s.1)

(new)

Consistent with the Rio Declaration (1992):

“States have … the sovereign right to exploit their own

resources pursuant to their own environmental and

development policies, and the responsibility to ensure that

activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause

damage to the environment of other States”

Watercourses Convention (1997)

UN General Assembly vote (May 1997)

For: 104 countries

Against: 3 countries

Abstained: 27 countries

Absent: 33 countries


Watercourses Convention (1997)

The formulation of the two principles regulating the use of international water resources appears to be:

the best possible compromise between two opposing interests:

• the right to development

and

• defending existing uses

consistent with the Rio Declaration (1992)


BUT: The Convention is not (yet) in force!*

As of October 2010, the 1997 UN Convention had been ratified,

or acceded to, by only 20 countries:

Finland, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunesia and Uzbekistan.

(NB: Countries in italics did not vote in favour of the UN Convention, yet ratified it.)

Source: http://treaties.un.org; look for Status of Treaties, then Chapter XXVII Environment; then entry no. 12

* 35 countries need to ratify, accept, approve or accede to, the Convention before it comes into force.


Principles of equity and fairness, without causing significant harm

imply that water users have to respect the needs of other users.

Thus, users will have to (be willing to) forego some potential (and immediate) water benefits.

Why would water users voluntarily accept toforego immediate benefits?

4. Towards “water rationality” *

* Alam, 1998

Is it rational

to cooperate??


* Alam, 1998

seasea

boundaryup

down

Is it rational

to cooperate??

If water users acknowledge that they depend on each other,

• not only in terms of water but also otherwise

• not only now but also in future

it may be rational for them to cooperate and forego some immediate benefits.

• Even for upstream users/countries

• Even in cases where power-differences are large

* Alam, 1998


Strategy:

1. make explicit the existing interdependencies between parties

2. actively seek to increase mutual dependencies

If water users acknowledge that they depend on each other,

• not only in terms of water but also otherwise

• not only now but also in future

it may be rational for them to cooperate and forego some immediate benefits

• even for upstream users/countries

• even in cases where power-differences are large * Alam, 1998


Strategy:

1. make explicit the existing interdependencies between parties

2. actively seek to increase mutual dependencies

Examples:

1. Benefit sharing - joint infrastructure development

2. Payment for Environmental Services

3. Issue linking - beyond the basin, beyond water

1. Benefit sharing


seasea

boundary

1. Benefit sharing

Joint infrastructure development!

boundary

sea

boundary

sea


1. Benefit sharing


boundary

sea

boundary

seairrigators

riverine residents

riverine residents

local government

local fisheries

local NGOs

government

international NGOs

cityresidents

basincommission

irrigators

riverine residents

riverine residents

local government

local fisheries

local NGOs

government

international NGOs

cityresidents

basincommission


1. Benefit sharing


boundary

sea

boundary

sea



Maguga dam - Incomati river

Khatse dam - Orange river

Kariba dam - Zambezi river

1. Benefit sharing


boundary

sea

boundary

sea



Maguga dam - Incomati river

Khatse dam - Orange river

Kariba dam - Zambezi river

1. Technically complex and data intensive

2. Pre-supposes a consensus over basic water entitlements

3. Should encompass all costs and all benefits across the

entire basin

4. Requires effective institutions to re-distribute the benefits

fairly


Blue Nile basin

1. Benefit sharing

Benefits of transboundarycoordination - Blue Nile river basin

Source: Goor et al., 2010

• More water for Egypt through reduced evaporation losses

(+1 - 2.5 x 109 m3/a)• Increased hydropower in Ethiopia (+1650 %)• Increased irrigation in Sudan (+5.5 %)• Less hydropower from Aswan for Egypt (-9%)

• Total basin-wide benefits: ~ 1 - 3 x 109 US$/a


1. Benefit sharingBlue Nile basin

Source: Goor et al., 2010


downstream (blue) water users subsidise upstream (green) water usersto promote soil and water conservation measuresin order to decrease flood flows and soil erosion



downstream (blue) water users subsidise upstream (green) water usersto promote soil and water conservation measuresin order to decrease flood flows and soil erosion


Source: ISRIC, 2008Tana river - Kenya

2. Payment for EnvironmentalServices

Requires:- well defined rights to land and water- voluntary transaction- well defined environmental service (unambiguous dose-response relationships)- service providers- service buyers- transparent verification mechanism


3. Issue linking


Meuse

Scheldt

3. Issue linking


Meuse

Scheldt

1585 - 1800: Dutch close Scheldt for access to the Port of Antwerp

1839: Separation Treaty – NL commits to free access to the Port of Antwerp (under pressure of London en Paris)

1967 - 1975: Cross-basin issue linkages and the Belgian-Dutch water conventions

1975 - 1985: A total deadlock

1985 - 1992: Laborious negotiations and a breakthrough

1992 - 1995: New linkages and the conclusion of the water conventions

1995 - present: WFD & Negotiations on further deepening of the Western ScheldtSource: Meijerink, 2008

3. Issue linking

- complex- requires a broad

approach (space, time, sectors)

- may cause delays

- but may be the only way of reaching stable and enduring agreements


Meuse

Scheldt

search term in title, 1998-2007 research papers citations

water AND conflict NOT cooperation 91 317

water AND cooperation NOT conflict 30 96

water AND cooperation AND conflict 11 28

132 441

Web of Knowledge database (isiwebofknowledge.com)


Source: Gupta and Van der Zaag, 2008


Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008

Water may be a cause of conflict

Water may also be a cause for cooperation

Source: Wolf et al., 2003




Pressure on water is increasing sharply and rapidly:- economic growth and diets (e.g. meat)- biofuels require water- other impacts of global and climatic changes- land grab is also a water grab




What can we, as scientists, professionals and educators, do?

We can, and should, promote awareness of the cooperation potential of water




“Since wars beginin the minds of men,

it is in the minds of menthat the defences of peace

must be constructed”

Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution, November 1945

Peaceful cooperation between riparians is possible!

This requires an appreciation of:

the entire river system;

our own aspirations with respect to the river;

how we are tied to, and depend on, neighbouring riparians;

the aspirations and perspectives of neighbouring users;

the benefits of cooperation, data sharing and joint infrastructure development;

training at river basin scale to build a new generation of water professionals who adopt a basin perspective.

6. Concluding remarks

References

Dombrowsky, I., 2010. The role of intra-water sector issue linkage in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts. Water International 35(2): 132-149.

Goor, Q., C. Halleux, Y. Mohamed and A. Tilmant, 2010. Optimal operation of a multipurpose multireservoir system in the Eastern Nile River Basin. Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss. 7: 4331–4369

Grey, D., and C.W. Sadoff, 2007. Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development. Water Policy 9: 545–571

Gupta, J., and P. van der Zaag, 2009. The politics of water science: On unresolved water problems and biased research agendas. Global Environmental Politics 9(2): 14-24.

Meijerink, S., 2008. Explaining continuity and change in international policies: issue linkage, venue change, and learning on policies for the river Scheldt estuary 1967-2005. Environment and Planning A 40: 848-866

Sadoff, C.W., and D. Grey, 2002. Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international rivers. Water Policy 4: 389-403.

Van der Zaag, P., 2007. Asymmetry and equity in water resources management; critical governance issues for Southern Africa. Water Resources Management 21 (12): 1993-2004

Wolf, A.T., 1999, Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict. Natural Resources Forum 23: 3-30

Zeitoun, M., and N. Mirumachi, 2008. Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and cooperation. International Environmental Agreements 8: 297–316

Useful websites:

http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/index.shtml

http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/

http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/

Thank you!

www.unesco-ihe.org

1585: Fall of Antwerp against the Spanish1648: Peace of Münster1839: Separation Treaty – NL commits to free access to the Port of Antwerp (under

pressure by London en Paris)

1967: Belgium proposes the construction of Baalhoek and Bath canals, allowing greater and faster access to Port of Antwerp

1968: NL link Baalhoek and Bath canals to:water quantity and water quality of the Meusewater quality of the Scheldt

1974: Regionalisation of the Belgian water policy1975: Package deal: the three draft Belgian-Dutch water conventions on the five issues

1975: Wallonia opposes draft conventions: it would pay while Flandres would benefit1977: Belgium proposes to discuss deepening of the navigation channel in the Western

Scheldt1983: NL links deepening of the Scheldt to the water quality and quantity issues of the

Meuse

1985: Belgian and Dutch ministers agree to start simultaneous negotiations on: water quantity and water quality of the Meuse, construction of Baalhoek canal, and deepening of the Western Scheldt (Bath canal and the Meuse reservoirs are removed from the negotiations)

1992: Talks on linking the negotiations to the modernisation of Albert canal; Flanders disagrees.NL considers compensating Wallonia

1992: UN-ECE convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water courses and Intl. Lakes

1992: Belgian regions receive treaty-making competency1992: Dutch decide to de-link Scheldt- and Meuse issues

Scheldt

Source: Meijerink, 2008

1992: Establishment of a multilateral negotiation commission on water quality conventions on Scheldt and Meuse

1992: Establishment of a bilateral Flemish-NL negotiation commission on deepening of the of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt and the distribution of the Meuse water (Flandres diverts Meuse water to Antwerp via Albert Canal)

1993: Both commissions reach agreements on draft conventions1993: Flandres proposes to link deepening to the negotiations on the alignment of the HSL

train1995: After almost 30 years, all conventions are signed, including an agreement on the

HSL

1997?:Flandres requests NL to a further deepening of the navigation channel of the Western ScheldtNL links the further deepening to outstanding HSL issuesEnvironmentalists demand an EIA for the deepening

2000: European Water Framework Directive leads to a new Scheldt Convention in 2002 replacing the 1995 Convention, covering the entire basin (including tributaries)

2001?: Environmentalists consider ontpolderen an adequate compensation measure for loss of ecological values caused by the further deepening of the navigation channel.

2002?: Innovation: “morphological dredging” limits the negative ecological impact of dredging

2003?:Ontpolderen is made part of the agreement to deepen the navigation channel2005: Agreement over four new Scheldt Conventions2006: Flemish government approves Scheldt Conventions2007: Ratification by the Flemish parliament; approval by NL parliament (Tweede Kamer)2008: Ratification by the NLparliament (Eerste Kamer)2008: NL MP proposes to drop the requirement of Ontpolderen from the agreement 2009: NL Administrative Court forces the Dutch government to abide by the earlier

agreement2010: ????

Scheldt

Source: Meijerink, 2008




Mekong River

Mekong River Commission Summit, 5 April 2010

3. Issue linking


Source: Mul et al., 2010

Pangani river - Tanzania

Source: Komakech et al., submitted

3. Issue linking


Source: Komakech et al., submitted

Source: Mul et al., 2010

water conflicten in een globale context onderken wederzijdse afhankelijkheden! pieter van der zaag...

Documents

water users

water asymmetry

water conflicten

clean water

water allocation local

local customary water

immediate water benefits

water rationality benefit