WARFAREINTHE

MEDIEVALWORLD

BrianToddCarey

JoshuaB.AllfreeTacticalMapIllustratorJohnCairnsRegionalMapIllustrator

FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2006byPen&SwordMilitaryDigitalEditionbyPen&SwordDigital2011Copyright©BrianToddCarey,JoshuaB.AllfreeandJohnCairns,2006,2011ISBN9781848846326TherightofBrianToddCarey,JoshuaB.AllfreeandJohnCairnstobeidentified

asAuthorsoftheWorkhasbeenassertedbytheminaccordancewiththeCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.ACIPcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryAllrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanicalincluding

photocopying,recordingorbyanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpermissionfromthePublisherinwriting.Pen&SwordBooksLtdincorporatestheImprintsofPen&SwordAviation,Pen&SwordMaritime,Pen&SwordMilitary,WharncliffeLocalHistory,Pen&SwordSelect,PenandSwordMilitaryClassicsandLeo

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PREFACEANDACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Researching, writing andillustrating this book was aseven-yearodyssey.The ideaof writing a two-volumesurvey of warfare in westerncivilization –Warfare in theAncient World and WarfareintheMedievalWorld–came

to me while doing a book-search for two undergraduatecourses at the AmericanMilitary University. Unableto find a suitable text, Idecided to write my own. Isoon recognized that mynarrative required a visualcomponent, and computer-generatedmapswere notmyforte. Luckily for me, I wasexposed to some wonderfulmapsgeneratedbytwoofmy

best and brightest students.US Army Master SergeantJoshua Allfree joined me astactical illustrator early onand his abilities as bothcartographer and militaryhistorian were invaluable.Later on we were joined byJohnCairns, a physicsmajorand professionalcartographer,whowastakingmy one-hundred levelwestern civilization course at

Front Range CommunityCollege-LarimerCampus.Hiscomputer-generated maps ofthe Persian Empire, HellenicGreece, and Imperial Romeknockedmysocksoffandhegraciously agreed to assistJosh and me in thisundertaking. Both of thesegentlemen believed in myvision and this project yearsbeforeapublisherwasfound.For that I will be forever

grateful.We could not have

completedtheprojectwithoutthe collaboration and supportfrom a few notable people.Wewould first and foremostlike to thank Pen and SwordBooks, especially ourmanaging editor RupertHarding and our copy-editorMerle Read. Without theirgenerous support andguidance this endeavour

would simply have beenimpossible. Colorado StateUniversity history professorsRosenberg, Jordan,LongandKnight each saw andcommented on an early draftand their comments weregreatly appreciated, as werethe comments of KenDanielson. Peter Glatzassisted with proofing theregionalmapsinaproductionenvironment, while Paul

Wessel at the University ofHawaii and Walter H.F.SmithatNOAAprovidedtheGMT mapping system. WewouldalsoliketothankJonaLendering fromhttp://www.livius.org for hisassistance with plates.Finally, no labour of love isever possible without theunwavering support fromourfamily and friends. Werobbed them of hours and

hours of our time, and nowthey can see what it was allabout.

BrianToddCareyLoveland,Colorado

KEYTOMAPS

INTRODUCTIONMilitary equipment andtactical organization in pre-modern western civilizationunderwent fundamentalchanges between the rise ofcivilization in Mesopotamiain the late fourthmillenniumbceandtherevivalofEuropein the seventeenth century oftheCommonEra.Duringthis

four and a half millenniumspan, the art of warfarereacheda sophisticated level,with commanders fullyrealizing the tacticalcapabilities of shock andmissile combat in largebattlefield situations,situations where perhaps150,000mentookthefieldatthesametimealonganarrowfront. On a battlefield wherethe force-to-space ratio was

so high, the ability toorchestrate tens of thousandsof infantry and cavalrybecame necessary forultimate victory. Modernprinciplesofwar,suchastheprimacy of the offensive,mass and economy of force,were understood by ancient,classical, medieval and earlymoderngenerals,andappliedonbattlefields throughout theperiodunderstudy.

Warfare in the MedievalWorld is the second volumeof a two-volume study. Itcovers the development ofwarfare from the rise ofByzantium in the earlymedieval period through totheThirtyYearsWar(c.500–1648 ce), following volume1, Warfare in the AncientWorld, which surveyed theevolution of warfare on thebattlefields of the Near East

and Europe between thebeginningof theBronzeAgeand the fall of the WesternRomanEmpire(c.3000bce– c.500 ce). Through anexploration of fifty-fourselectbattlefieldengagements(thirty-threebattlesinvolumetwoandtwenty-onebattlesinvolume one), it is thisauthor’s intention to surveythe changing tacticalrelationshipsbetweenthefour

weaponsystems–heavyandlight infantry, and heavy andlight cavalry – focusing onhow shock and missilecombat evolved on thebattlefields of the Near EastandEurope.

OverviewofWarfareintheMedievalWorldIneasternEuropethetorchofRoman imperialism waspassed to Constantinople for

another thousand years. TheByzantine Empire (337–1453) enjoyed its greatestterritorial expansion in thecentury after the fall of theWestern Roman Empire.Emperor Justinian shored upthe eastern frontiers andbriefly won back Italy andparts of north Africa andSpain, but, after his death in565, later emperors wouldlose these lands to the

expansion of Islam in theseventhcentury.Facedwithamounted and highly mobilefoe, Byzantine emperorsincreased the percentage ofcavalry to infantry in theirarmies, then fusedheavyandlight cavalry into one systemby giving bows to some oftheir heavily armoured shockcavalry.InByzantinewarfareexclusive cavalryengagementsoftentookplace

(Dara, Tricameron,Manzikert) while combinedarmsalsocontinuedatahighlevel, with light infantrytaking an important placebeside cavalry in militaryoperations,asseenatTaginaeandCasilinum.But centuries of defensive

action against assaults fromthe Bulgars, Muslims andwesternEuropeans took theirtoll, forcing the Byzantine

emperors to rely increasinglyon mercenaries. By theeleventh century Byzantiumfaced a new and dangerousthreat from the east, theSeljuk Turks, who foughtfrom horseback as lancersand archers. The ByzantinelossatthebattleofManzikertin 1071 robbed the EasternRoman Empire of its primeconscription lands andprecipitatedacall forhelp to

the west. In 1095 the FirstCrusadewasborn.InwesternEuropethefallof

the Western Roman Empireushered in the early MiddleAges (c.500–c.1000), a timewhen victorious Germanicsuccessor kingdomsconverted toCatholicismandconsolidated politically, withthe Franks in Gaul emergingas the most powerful newkingdom in western Europe.

Frankish rulers faced newthreats as Muslim raiderscrossed the Pyrenees andpillaged France. One suchMuslim expeditionary forcewas soundly defeated in 732at Tours by Charles Martel,layingthefoundationsfortheCarolingian dynasty thatwould produceCharlemagne,thefirstholyRomanemperorintheWest.But atCharlemagne’sdeath

in 814, Europewas besiegedby a new wave of invasionsthat lasted over 200 years.Muslim, Magyar and Vikingraiders and invaders struckthe whole of ChristianEurope. From their bases innorth Africa, the Muslimsattacked the southerncoastline of Europe, whileMagyar horsemen swept infrom the east and settled inwhatisnowHungary,raiding

deepintocentralandwesternEurope until their defeat in955 at the hands of theGerman king Otto I atLechfeld. Of these newinvasions, the Viking attackswere the most devastatingand widespread. Masters ofship-to-ship battles such asthebattleofNisa,thesefierceScandinavian warriors rowedup the riversandestuariesofEurope in their longships,

raiding and then invadingterritories as far west asIreland and as far east asRussia, creating cultural andmartial synthesis along theway.In response to this ‘Second

Age of Invasions’, westernEuropean monarchiesdeveloped an art of warunique inworldhistory in itsreliance on heavy cavalry asthedominantweaponsystem.

Needing thekindof strategicmobility only cavalry couldprovide, western Europeancommanders initiated agradual transformation in thecomposition of medievalarmies. Consequently, heavycavalry replaced infantry asthe decisive arm. Themounted knight and lancer,with his stabilizing stirrup,expensive panoply and well-trained horse, gradually

became the centrepiece of acombined-arms army whereall other weapon systemswere subordinated to heavycavalry.The decentralization of

political authority in westernEurope also had a profoundeffect on the character ofmedievalwarfare.Insufficientresources meant large-scalebattles such as those seen inthe classical period did not

take place, and when battlewas joined, the participatingarmies rarely included morethan a few thousandmen. Intheselimitedwarsofattrition,battle was often avoidedbecause theoutcomewas toounpredictable. Instead,medieval warfare revolvedaround the construction andcontrolofcastlesandfortifiedtowns or the destruction ofthe enemy’s economic

resources. In fact,during this‘Age of Castles’, warfareconsisted of perhaps 1 percent battles and 99 per centsieges.TheNormansmastered this

strategy of combining castlebuilding and pitched battlesin campaigns in Italy andEngland. In Italy, DukeRobert Guiscard of Apuliaandhissuccessorscarvedouta Norman state in southern

ItalyandSicily,thensettheirsights on expanding, at theexpense of Byzantium, inAlbania. At Durazzo,Guiscard defeated animpressiveByzantineinfantryhost with his heavy cavalrysupportedbylightinfantry.InEngland in 1066, the Anglo-Saxon king HaroldGodwinson successfullydefeated the Norwegian kingHarald Hardrada at Stamford

Bridge, but proved unable tomaster William, duke ofNormandy, at Hastings. Theduke used these samesophisticated combined-armstacticstosecurethethroneasWilliam I. William’s victoryinitiated an Anglo-Normandynasty and hundreds ofyearsofsouredAnglo-Frenchrelations. His successorswould add to his conquests,bringingWalesunderEnglish

hegemony and making warwithIrelandandScotland.Through the high Middle

Ages (c.1000–c.1300), heavycavalry lancers ruled thebattlefields of westernEurope, giving rise to theideals of chivalry andreinforcingthesocialpositionof the knightly class. Here,cavalry engagements,supported by infantry,became the norm, as

illustrated by the Frenchvictory over an English-sponsoredimperialistarmyatthe battle of Bouvines in1214.Butthetacticalrealitiesfaced by the mountedaristocracy in the Near Eastand the British Isles showedthe weaknesses of heavycavalry. In the Holy Land,Latin knights faced asophisticated Islamiccombined-arms system and

learned first-hand atDorylaeum,Hattin andArsufthe dangers in confrontingcomposite-bow-wieldinginfantry and horse archers inopen terrain. Similar lessonswere learned in theReconquista in Spain at thebattles of Sagrajas in 1086and Las Navas de Tolosa in1212.As western European

crusaders were learning new

tacticallessonsintheLevant,eastern and central Europewas brutally attacked by themost successful wave ofsteppewarriors,theMongols.Under the charismaticleadership of Genghis Khan,Mongol light and heavycavalry swept out of CentralAsia and conquered northernChina and the KhwarizmianEmpire inTransoxiana.AfterGenghis Khan’s death in

1227, his successorscontinued his conquestswestward, pushing first intoRussia,destroyingtheKievankingdom, and then intoPoland and Hungary. TheMongols, who reliedexclusively on cavalry,perfected shock and missilecombat from horseback andvanquished numericallylarger Christian armies atLiegnitz and Sajo River.

European heavy cavalrytactics, alwaysconfrontational, fell prey tothe traditional steppe-warriorgame of luring an attackerwitha retreat. Islamicarmiessufferedsimilarfates.ButtheMamluksinEgyptfoughtfirewith fire, using their ownheavy and light cavalry armsto finally blunt Mongolwestward expansion at AinJalutin1260.

In the late Middle Ages(c.1300–c.1500) the300-yeardomination of the mountedknightwaschallengedby thereturn of a more balancedcombined-arms tactical mix,one which featured lightinfantry archers and heavyinfantrybattlesquaresagainstheavy cavalry. The Anglo-Norman campaigns againstthe Welsh, and later againstthe Scottish, showed the

potential of light infantryarchers against enemyinfantry formations, and,more ominously, againstheavy cavalry. King EdwardI’s victory at Falkirk wassimilartotheearlierbattlesofHastingsandDurazzo,whereheavy cavalry and archersworked together againstdense heavy-infantrypositions. But the unusualaspectofthebattleofFalkirk

is in the steadfastness of theScottish infantry formations,aharbingerofthingstocome.One example of heavyinfantry’sability tomeetanddefeat enemy heavy cavalryand light infantryattackscanbeseeninthelatercampaignsof the Anglo-Scottish Wars,most notably the Scottishvictory over the English atBannockburnin1314.Nineteen years later, the

roles were reversed. Thevictory of the Englishmonarch Edward III againstthe Scots at Halidon Hill in1333 introduced the Englishdefensive tactical system tomedieval warfare, a systemthat relied heavily oninfantry. Later Englishmonarchs would perfect thistactical system in theHundred Years War (1337–1453)andhelpbreaktheback

of the dominance of heavycavalry. On the continent,twoEnglishkings,EdwardIIIandHenryV,werevictoriousagainsttheFrenchduringthiswar, utilizing light infantryarchers and dismountedheavy cavalry in a defensiveposture against the repeatedcharges of French lancers,withgreatsuccessatCrécyin1346andAgincourtin1415.Meanwhile, in the Swiss

Alps,farmer-militiamenweretraining with speciallydesignedpolearms to fight inclose order againstHabsburgand Burgundian heavycavalry, winning a string ofdecisive victories in thefourteenth and fifteenthcenturies at Morgarten,Laupen, Sempach, Murtenand Nancy. The success ofthe Swiss battle squarebrought first employment as

mercenaries in foreignarmies, then emulation byenemies. By the close of themedieval period, heavyinfantry battle squares andlight infantry archers werecommonfeaturesinEuropeanarmies. By the beginning ofthe early modern period(c.1500–c.1750), the fourweapon systems wereoperating together again in anew combined-arms

synthesis.The addition of well-

articulated heavy infantry,basedontheSwissmodel, tothe armies of France,Germany and Italy in thesixteenth century marks thereturn of a balancedcombined-arms tacticalsystem to western Europe.But the integration of thissuperior heavy infantry intoEuropean doctrine coincided

with the introduction ofreliablehand-heldgunpowdertechnologies. The sixteenthcenturywitnessedthegradualreplacementof longbowsandcrossbows with the muzzle-loadingarquebusandmusket.Althougharchersgavewaytomusketeers, pikemenpersisted as a tactical entityuntiltheinventionoftheringbayonet in the eighteenthcenturyfusedheavyandlight

infantry together, eliminatingthe need for the defensivecharacteristicsofthepike.The interest in all things

classical that was thehallmark of the Italian andnorthern EuropeanRenaissance spilled over towarfare as a renaissance intactical doctrine took place.Commanders in the earlymodern period reread theclassicaltextsandrecognized

the value of a balancedcombined-arms tacticalsystem,one that incorporatedthe new technology ofgunpowder within a well-disciplined and professionalrankandfile.Inthesixteenthcentury’sItalianWars(1494–1559), France fought againstthe imperialist powers ofSpain and the Holy RomanEmpire for mastery of theItalian peninsula, and in the

process, all partiesexperimented with the ratioof musketeers andarquebusierstopikemen.Thisexperimentation led to animperialist victory at thebattle of Pavia against theFrench in 1525 and thegradual adoption of theSpanish tercio, whichcombined shock and missileunits in the same formation.Tactically, Pavia showed the

prowess of heavy infantrypikemen and light infantryarquebusiers workingtogether in the open fieldagainst enemy cavalry andbattle squares. In thisengagement, artillery playedlittle part. So one-sided wasthe battle of Pavia that thedecisive engagement all butdisappeared from Europeanwarfare for more than 100years.

Wanting to maximize ‘shotover shock’, Prince MauriceofNassauinthelatesixteenthand Swedish king GustavusAdolphus in the earlyseventeenth century exploredthe Roman art of war andexperimented with linearformations,winning victoriesagainst theimperialists intheThirty Years War (1618–1648) at Breitenfeld andLützen. Consequently, new

model armies emerged withthe position of light infantrygunners ascending as theproportion of light infantryrose at the expense of heavyinfantry, anticipating the roleof firearms in modernwarfare.With theadditionofgunners to the tacticalmix,anew age of warfare wasdawning, one that drew onthecontributionsoftheforty-eight centuries of western

warfareundersurveyinthesevolumes.

RelevanceoftheCombined-ArmsTacticalSystemThe history of combined-arms tactical systems in thewestern world witnessed awatershedevent in thefourthcentury bce. Warfare beforethe conquest of Persia byKing Alexander III of

Macedon was characterizedby the limited use ofcombined-arms forces.Bronze Age armies inMesopotamia and Egypt andtheearlyIronAgeempiresofAssyriaandPersiadidutilizelimited co-operation betweenfarmer-militia infantry forcesand their chariot-bornearistocratic masters. But forthe most part, Near Easterninfantry levies were not

trained to fully participate ineffective offensive actionagainst enemy chariots, andlater, against cavalry. Theirrole remained primarilydefensiveonthebattlefield.Across the Aegean in

Greece, the invention of theheavy infantry battle squarein the seventh century bcewitnessed for the first timecitizen-militia trained to fightcollectively in an offensive

manner. The Persian WarsbetweenPersiaandtheGreekpoleis exposed the lightinfantry and light cavalry ofAsia to theheavy infantryofEurope, creating a newcombined-arms synthesis.The conquest of the Greekcity-states by Philip II ofMacedon in the fourthcentury bce fused theconqueror’s strong traditionof heavy cavalry with the

Greek world’s new traditionoflimitedcombined-armsco-operation. The Macedonianking Alexander the Great’svictories at Granicus River(334bce),Issus(333bce)andGaugamela (331 bce)representahighpoint inpre-modernwesternwarfarewiththe Macedonians fieldingheavy and light infantry andheavy and light cavalry in afully integrated and balanced

combined-armsarmy.Tactically, utilizing a

combined-armssystemmeantbringing to thebattlefield thecapabilitiesofbothshockandmissilecombat.Intheperiodsunder study, this meant theability to kill in closeproximity in hand-to-handengagementsusinghand-heldweapons (shock) or at adistance using slings,javelins, spears, bows and,

later, handguns (missile).Modern military historiansdescribetacticalsystemswithshock capabilities as heavy,while tactical systems thatutilize missiles are describedas light. Heavy weaponsystems, both infantry andcavalry,areconsideredheavybecause of their protectivefactor. Because they woremore armour, heavy infantryandheavycavalrywerebetter

able to perform their shockrole as well as being betterprotected against lance andarrow,eventhoughthisaddedprotection sacrificed tacticalmobility. Heavy weaponsystems relied on collectiveeffort to be effective, andcollective effort requireddiscipline and training. Thedegree of discipline andtraining determined theoffensive capability or

articulation of the units incombat.Articulated tactical

formationssuchas theGreekand Macedonian phalanxwere capable of someoffensive tactical mobility,keepingcloseorderduringanoffensive march and thenstriking in a frontal attack.Buttheclassicalphalanxwasnotcapableofattackinginalldirections,norcoulditprotect

its own flankand rear.Well-articulatedtacticalformationssuch as the Roman legion,medieval heavy cavalrybataille and Swiss battlesquare were capable of greattactical flexibility andresponsiveness,wheelingandattacking or defending inmany directions. Lessarticulated or unarticulatedformations such as thePersian sparabara, Germanic

hundredorScottishschiltron,because of their lack of drilland discipline, performedpoorly in offensive shockaction, preferring to remainon the defensive in staticformations. Hand-to-handshock combat rarely lastedvery long because of theenormous physical andemotional strain oncombatants. Mostengagements lasted only a

few minutes, with totalexhaustion setting in afteronly fifteen or twentyminutes of uninterruptedcombat. If a battle lasted anafternoon or longer, thenmultiple engagements tookplace, compounding theemotional andphysical strainof the event on thecombatants.Light infantry and light

cavalry weapon systems

relied on a missile weaponsystemthatdealtoutdeathatadistance.Theselighterunitswerelessarmouredthantheirheavier counterparts, andconsequently had greatertacticalmobility.Archersandjavelineers,whethermountedornot,didnothavetofightinclose order to be effective:insteadtheyusuallyfoughtinopen formation where theycouldbestuse theirmobility.

Because of this tacticalmobility, light units wereoften used by ancient,classical, medieval and earlymodern commanders inguerrillarolesandasphysicalprobes (skirmishers) againsttheir less mobile but betterprotected heavy counterparts.But thismobility did little toprotect them when shockcombat ensued. Unable towithstand hand-to-hand

combat with enemy infantryand mounted shock troops,these light units often retiredthrough the ranks of theirheavier companions to act asflank and rear protectionduringtheengagement.Each weapon system had

strengths and weaknesses asillustrated in the diagramexplaining the tacticalcapabilities of the fourweapon systems in ancient

and medieval warfare. Withsome or all of the weaponsystems present and co-operatinginacombined-armssynthesis, a general of thecalibre of Alexander theGreat, Hannibal Barca,William the Bastard, BatuKhan or Gustavus Adolphusproved irresistible on thebattlefield.Still, it should be

remembered that the mere

presenceof a combined-armsarmyunderthecommandofageneral who had showedbrillianceonthebattlefieldinthe past did not guaranteevictory. History is repletewithexamplesofoutstandingcommanders who fell victimtowhat the Prussianmilitarytheorist Carl von Clausewitzcalled‘friction’inhisseminalwork On War, published in1832. Although Clausewitz

was a student of Napoleonand his campaigns, hisappraisal of what has beencalled the ‘fog ofwar’ holdstrueinanyera.Frictionreferstotheaccidents,uncertainties,errors,technicaldifficultiesorunknown factors on thebattlefield, and to their effecton decisions, morale andactions in warfare. ToClausewitz, ‘Action inwar islike movement in a resistant

element. Just as the simplestand most natural ofmovements, walking, cannoteasilybeperformed inwater,so in war it is difficult fromnormal efforts to achieveeven moderate results.’Friction, Clausewitz tells us,‘is the force that makes theapparentlyeasysodifficult’.

Figure1. TheFourWeaponSystems.(a)AncientWeaponSystems.Anillustrationofgeneralrulesofdominanceinconflictsbetween

differentancientweaponsystems:(1)heavyinfantryisgenerallydominantwhendefendingagainstheavycavalry;(2)heavycavalryis

generallydominantwhenattackinglightinfantryorlightcavalry;(3)lightinfantryisgenerallydominantwhendefendingagainstlightcavalry;and(4)lightcavalryisgenerally

dominantwhenattackingheavyinfantry.Dominancebetweenheavyandlightinfantryvariesaccordingtotheperiodandunittypeinvolvedintheaction.BasedonArcherJones,TheArtofWarintheWesternWorld(UrbanaandChicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1987),schematic1.2.(b)MedievalWeaponSystems.Anillustrationofgeneralrulesofdominanceinconflictsbetween

differentmedievalweaponsystems:(1)heavyinfantryisgenerally

dominantwhendefendingagainstheavycavalry;(2)heavycavalryisgenerallydominantwhenattackinglightinfantry;(3)lightinfantryis

generallydominantwhendefendingagainstlightcavalryorattacking

heavyinfantry;and(4)lightcavalryisgenerallydominantwhenattackingheavyinfantryorheavycavalry.BasedonArcherJones,TheArtofWarintheWesternWorld(UrbanaandChicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1987),schematic2.1.

Thegreat commanderswhofought, won and sometimeslostthebattlesthatshapedthehistoryofwesterncivilizationunderstood the repercussions

of frictionwhenmakingwar.Theyunderstoodthatthebeststrategies, bravest soldiers,most modern equipment andingenious tactics did notalways carry the day.Ancient, classical, medievaland early moderncommanders recognized thateach engagement carried thepossibilityofvictory,withallits spoils, or defeat andpossible death, enslavement

or the extermination of theirsoldiersandfamilies,andlossof homeland. Warfare, tothesemen and their cultures,wasmorethan,inthefamousstatementbyClausewitz,‘thecontinuation of politics byothermeans’.Warfare in thepre-modern world wasinstead, in the words of theBritishmilitaryhistorianJohnKeegan, ‘an expression ofculture, often a determinant

ofculturalforms,andinsomesocieties, the culture itself’.Andintheperiodunderstudyhere, a period without theGeneva Conventions andformal rules of war, thedistinction between how‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’peoples fought was oftenblurred, with all sidesroutinely killing or maimingcombatants and non-combatants alike, and

enslaving or ethnicallycleansingentirepopulations.This monograph is by no

means comprehensive. It isthe second part of a two-volume introduction to thedevelopmentoftheartofwarduring western civilization’sancient, classical, medievalandearlymodernperiods.Bypulling togetherbothprimaryand secondary sources, it ismy hope that this synthetic

work will help myundergraduate students at theAmericanMilitaryUniversityand armchair militaryhistorians alike betterappreciate the sophisticatednatureofpre-modernwarfareand the importance oforganizedviolenceinshapingwestern civilization’s historyand culture. The storycontinues with the rise ofByzantium in the early

medievalperiod.

CHAPTER1

THEEARLYMIDDLEAGES:THERISEOFCAVALRYIN

EASTERNEUROPE:BYZANTIUMAT

WAR

Rome’sSecondMillennium:TheEarlyByzantineArmyAlthoughtheWesternRomanEmpire officially ended withthe deposition of RomulusAugustulus in 476, theEastern Roman or Byzantine

Empire (337–1453) lasted amillennium longer. TheByzantines, who calledthemselves Rhomaioi (Greekfor ‘Romans’), continued tobe associated with theachievements of the RomanEmpire, even though theircapital was Constantinopleand their court languagewasGreek. During thismillennium, the EasternRoman Empire faced

numerous challenges frombarbarian invasion andIslamic expansion, yet theByzantineEmpirewasalmostalways ready to fight, andoften for its very existence.The long Byzantine survivalwas due in part to theremarkable performance of abalanced combined-armsarmy.The composition of the

Byzantinearmydifferedfrom

thatofitsRomanpredecessorin that cavalry, rather thaninfantry, would take adominant position. Thisswitch in emphasis probablyaroseasaresultofprolongedmartialcontactswiththeNearEast. The most formidablethreat to the eastern part ofthe Byzantine Empire camefrom the successors of theParthians, the SassanidPersians, who fought, like

their forerunners, almostexclusively with light andheavycavalry.Thefateofthetriumvir Marcus LiciniusCrassus (c.112–53 bce) atCarrhae in 53 bcedramatically demonstratedtheinadequacyoftheRomaninfantry-basedtacticalsystemfor dealing with Parthiancavalry on its own terrain.For this reason, someByzantine heavy cavalry,

called clibanarii orcataphracts, carried bows.Introduced in the secondcentury by the Romanemperor Trajan (r. 98–117)andwidelyusedintheeastinthe last years of the RomanEmpire, the cataphractfunctioned as a heavilyarmoured lancer or as amountedarcher,fusingheavyand light cavalry into oneweapon system. With the

adoption of the stirrup sometimeinthelatesixthcentury,thecataphractbecameforthefirst time a true lancerbecausehecouldnowusethesynergyofthehorseandriderand aim through his target,instead of jabbing down orloosening his spear withevery pass as classical heavycavalry had done forcenturies.Second to cavalry in

importance in Byzantinewarfare was light infantry.Byzantine light infantryworevery little body armour andcarriedacompositebowwitha quiver of forty arrows, asmall shield and an axe forclose combat. Infantry notskilled with the bow carriedjavelins. Warfare againstmounted archers in the eastillustratedtheeffectivenessofthese foot bowmen over

enemy horse archers becauselightinfantryfiredbowswitha greater range from a morestableplatform,theground.Byzantine light infantry

weresupportedinthefieldbyheavyinfantrymodelledafterclassical infantry. Byzantineheavy infantry wore mail orlamellar armourandhelmets,and carried a large roundshield. Equippedwith a longspear and sword, Byzantine

heavy infantry normallymassed in phalanxes four,eightorsixteenranksdeeponthe battlefield. Byzantineheavy infantry generallyformed up as a second linebehindthecavalry,relyingonthe cataphracts to break upthe enemy formation beforefollowingup,orinthecentrewithcavalryonthewings.By the early sixth century

theByzantinearmy’s combat

readiness had decayedsignificantly. The palatini,comitatenses and limitaneiwerereplacedbyanewarmyorganizationcomprisingthreecategories of troops, thenumeri, foederati andbucellarii. The numeri werethe regular troops of theempire, consisting of bothinfantry and cavalry units,though their combatcapabilities had severely

eroded in the previous twocenturies.The foederatiwerenowapurelymercenaryforcemade up of barbarian units,most notably the Huns. Thebucellarii were armedretainers ofByzantine nobleswho took an additional oathof fealty to the Byzantineemperor.

CavalryversusCavalry:TheBattles

ofDaraandTricameronThe height of Byzantinepower and territorialexpansion took place only acentury after the fall of theWestern Roman Empireduring the reign of Justinian(r. 527–565). Justinianordered Byzantine armies tobeatoffPersianattacksontheeasternfrontiersoftheempire

while also regaining parts ofItalyfromtheOstrogothsandnorth Africa from theVandals, briefly restoring aGreco-Roman empire in theMediterranean basin (Map1.1). Trained as a soldier,Justinian never tookcommandinthefieldonceheassumed the throne; insteadhe relied on the battlefieldgenius of his generalsBelisariusandNarsestofulfil

histerritorialaspirations.Born inThracearound505,

Belisarius apparently joinedthe Byzantine army as ayouth and rose quicklythroughtheranksoftheroyalbodyguard, becoming a talland charismatic officer. Hisfirst command came in 529against the Sassanid Persiansin Mesopotamia. Justinianhad recently created a newfield army of Armenia to

assisttheArmyoftheEastinhis war with Persia. Theemperor placed the 24-year-oldBelisariusincommandofthe Army of the East andcharged himwith concludingthewarwiththePersianking,Kavadh. A flashpoint on thefrontiers was the stronglyfortified border Byzantinetown of Dara. In 530Belisarius led his army of25,000mentoDaratokeepit

from being besieged by amassive Persian host of40,000 warriors. Dara hadbeenreinforcedbyJustinian’spredecessor the emperorAnastasius (r. 491–518), andwas the lynchpin of theMesopotamiandefences.

Map1. TheConquestsofJustinian.

WhenBelisariusarrived,hearrayed most of his heavyinfantry behind a bridgedtrench just outside the walls

of the city, with a screen oflight infantry staff-slingersand archers supported byHunnic horse in front of theearthworks. He then dividedhis Greek and allied heavycavalry equally and placedthem on the wings, orderinghalf of the horses to bebardedandtheotherhalfnot.Belisarius probably had theforward cavalry mountsarmoured so that they could

receive the enemy’s attack,and kept the rear horsesunencumbered so that theymightpursuetheenemymoreeasily if given the chance.The right wing wascommandedbyCountJohnofArmenia, a man ofconsiderable talent whoseresolvewouldbeinstrumentalin many of the younggeneral’s victories. Finally,Belisarius held his

bodyguard, a reserve ofclibanarii,behindtheinfantryand kept a hidden contingentof Hunnic horse behind anearby hill, ready to chargethePersianrightwingonceitengaged the Byzantine leftwing.The attacking Persian host

was quite impressive.Personally led by KingKavadh, it was a combined-arms force in the traditionof

great classicalMesopotamianarmies of the past, completewith a reincarnation of the‘Immortals’, an elite band ofPersian heavy cavalry, andwarelephantsintherear.ThePersian army was arrayed intwodenselines,withtheelitePersiancavalryplacedonthewingsofeachline,backedbytheir own clibanarii andsupported by detachments ofPersian and Arabian light

horse. The forward Persiancentre consisted of lightinfantry slingers, javelineersand archers, while behindthem marched the conscriptheavy infantry. SeeingBelisarius’ strong defensiveposition behind the trench,Kavadh decided to open thebattle with a cavalry attack,ordering both of his wingsforwardagainsttheByzantinehorse(Map1.2(a)).

The king’s Immortalcavalry, backed by Persianand Arab horse, madeprogresson thePersianright,crossing the defenders’ ditchand pressing the Byzantineheavyhorsebackwards.Butaco-ordinated counter-attackby 600 Hunnic cavalry fromtheleftcentreandthesuddenappearance of the reservebarbarian horse from beyondthe hill changed the tactical

situation(Map1.2(b)).Struckin the flank and rear by theonce hidden Hunnic cavalry,theImmortalsandtheiralliesfell back in disarray. At thesame time, the Immortal-ledcavalry at first enjoyedsimilar success on the otherflank, pushing the Byzantineheavy cavalry on the rightwing back against the citygates before Count Johncould rally the defenders. It

seemed as though thePersianswere about to enjoya double envelopment whenBelisarius, noticing thePersian left was nowdetached from its centre,ordered1,200Huns towheeland strike the flank of thevictorious Persian left wing.Belisarius seized themomentandlaunchedhiselitecavalryreserve against thebeleagueredPersianleftwho,

attackedonthreesides,brokeand ran for their lives, sweptfrom the battlefield by Johnand his reinvigorated cavalry(Map1.2(c)).Belisarius quickly

recognized his fortunes hadchanged. The remainingPersian army in front of himwas without a left wing toprotectthemassofinfantryinthe centre. The Byzantinegeneral ordered his mounted

bodyguard and the Hunnichorse to attack the enemy’sunprotected left flank,shattering the infantryformation with repeatedheavy cavalry charges andclibanarii and light cavalrymissile fire (Map 1.2(d)).After a brief pursuit,Belisarius rallied his men.Persian casualties were high,withsome8,000mendeadonthe battlefield. King Kavadh

escapedthebattle.Through adroit use of the

defensive, Belisarius waitedfor his enemy to attempt adouble envelopment, thendefeatedoneflank,routedtheother, and then scattered thecentre. The battle of Daraillustrated the dominance ofthe cavalry arm inByzantinetactics. Byzantine infantry,thoughpresent,playedonlyasupporting role. Belisarius

won by neutralizing hisopponents’ superiority ininfantry by placing his ownfootmen behind a formidableentrenchment, thereby takingboth forces’ infantry out ofthe fight. After that, well-timed attacks by Byzantinecavalry carried the day. Theemperorwaspleasedwithhisyoung general’s victory,giving Belisarius the title ofMaster of Soldiers for the

East.

Map1.2. TheBattleofDara,530.(a)PhaseI:KingKavadhopensthe

battle,launchinghiscavalryagainsttheenemyhorsestationedontheByzantinewings(1).ThePersiansmakeheadwayontheirleft,pressingbackCountJohn’sByzantinecavalry

(2).(b)PhaseII:TheByzantines’Huncavalryfromboththeleftcentreandtheconcealedreservecounter-attackthePersians’rightwing(1),drivingtheImmortalsandthealliedcavalryback(2).Ontheoppositeflank,

BelisariusrealizesthatthePersianhorsearewithoutsupportfromtheirmainbody,andorderscavalryfromtherightcentreandtheelitereserveintoaction,supportingCountJohn’sbeleagueredhorsemen(3).The

Persianhorsemenbreakandflee(4).(c)PhaseIII:Belisariusordershisright-flankcavalrytowheelagainstthePersianmainbody’sleftflank(1),

addingtheweightofhiselite

bodyguardandremainingcavalryreservetotheeffort(2).(d)PhaseIV:RepeatedchargesbyByzantineclibanarii,accompaniedbylightcavalrymissilefire(1)shattersthePersianmainbody,whichbreaksandfleesindisarray(2).Belisariusrallieshisforceafterabriefpursuit.KingKavadheludeshiswould-becaptors(3),leavingsome8,000deadonthe

field.

After Dara the Persianssufferedseveralmoredefeats,and in 532 Kavadh’ssuccessor agreed to a peace

withByzantiumwithnotimelimit, the poorly named‘Perpetual Peace’. By theunusual terms of thisagreement Justinian was topay the Persians 11,000pounds of gold toward theupkeep of the Caucasiandefences, and in returnByzantium could keep thefortressatDara,butnotasitsheadquartersinMesopotamia.Both sides would return

strategicstrongholdscapturedin the decades-old war.Finally, Persia swore eternalfriendship and alliance withthe Byzantine Empire. Thetreaty would last less than adecade.In 532, the same year the

‘PerpetualPeace’wassigned,JustiniansentBelisariusandasmall expedition made upmostly of soldiers from theArmy of theEast to conquer

theGermanickingdomoftheVandals, located in what isnow modern Tunisia. Thereasonfor theinvasionwasarevolution in Carthage. TheVandal king Hilderic wasdethroned by Gelimer, thegreat-grandson of Gaiseric,the Vandal chief who sothoroughly sacked Rome in455thatthenameofhistribehas rung down the centuriesas a name for destroyers of

publicproperty.Hildericwasa vassal of Justinian, and hisappeal for aid from theByzantine emperor becamethe pretext to launch anexpedition to bring northAfrica under direct Greekrule.SailingfromConstantinople

to a forward base in Sicily,Belisarius transported hisexpeditionary force on 500ships manned by 20,000

sailors and escorted by 92warships. InSicily hewaitedfor an intelligence report onthe whereabouts of theVandal fleet, learning that itwasinSardiniaputtingdowna rebellion instigated byJustinian. With theformidable Vandal navyoccupied, Belisarius set sailfor north Africa in earlySeptember 533, landing hisarmy of 10,000 infantry and

5,000 cavalry south ofCaputvada (modern RasKapudia in Tunisia), 130miles south of Cape Bon.Afterdisembarkinghisarmy,Belisarius built a fortifiedcamp and then sent heraldsinto the countrysideexplaining that the Greekexpeditionary force was notthere to punish thepopulation, but bring thepretender Gelimer to justice.

This must have worked, forBelisarius proceededunmolested northward up thecoast toward the ancient cityof Carthage. He sent anadvance guard of 300 horsecommandedbyCountJohntoscreenhismarch.SixhundredHunnic foederati cavalrycovered themain army’s leftflank, while the fleetshadowedontheright.On13September, John’s van

reached the defile of AdDecimum (the tenthmilestonefromCarthage).When word of the Greek

vanguard’s advance onCarthagereachedGelimer,heputHilderic and his relativestothesword,andpreparedtoattacktheinvaders.Gelimer’sstrategy was a risky one,relying on the principles ofmanoeuvreandconcentration.He instructed his brother

Ammatus, the commander inCarthage, to sally forth andengage the Byzantine van,whilehetookthemajorityoftheVandal host and attackedthe rear of Belisarius’ mainforce. The third element ofGelimer’s strategy was asimultaneous attack by hisnephew Gibamund, whowould move over the hillsfrom the west and attack theinvaders’ left flank. But

success would require acareful co-ordination of nottwo but three columns, adifficult feat for any army inanyage.Whattookplacenextwasa

product of unfortunatetiming. On 13 September,Ammatus left Carthage andstruck the Byzantine vanbefore Gelimer andGibamund were in position.Ammatus was mortally

wounded and his forcespanickedandfled.Gibamundstrucknextandwasroutedbythe Hunnic flank guard. Thethird Vandal column,confused by the trek throughhilly terrain, missed the rearof the Byzantine main armyaltogether and instead struckthe front of the Byzantinehost, nowunprotectedby theabsence of Count John andhisvanguard,whichwasnow

making its way to sackCarthage. Gelimer’s suddenattack pushed theByzantinesback,anditlookedasthroughthe tide had turned in thefavour of the Vandals whenGelimer discovered hisbrother’s dead body on thebattlefield. Stopping hispursuit to bury Ammatus,Gelimer lost the momentumin the battle. Belisariusregrouped and counter-

attacked,driving theVandalsfromthebattlefield.Belisarius entered Carthage

on 15 September and begantoreconstructitsdefencesforhis own use. Gelimerretreated west 100miles andrecalled his brother Tzazonfrom Sardinia,where hewasputting down the rebellion.Once reinforced, Gelimermarched on Carthage,stopping18milesshortofhis

target at the village ofTricameron. Gatheringintelligence on his enemy,Gelimer realized that therewere strains betweenBelisarius and his Hunnicallies. Vandal spies offeredtheHunsgreatrewardsiftheywould turn against theByzantines during the nextengagement.ButunknowntoGelimer,Belisariuslearnedofthis intrigue and offered the

Huns a larger bribe if theystayed true. The Hunsaccepted Belisarius’ offer,though the general realizedthat the loyalty of hisfoederati was now inquestion.Uncertain when his

coalition might fracture,Belisarius decided to bringthe battle to the enemy. Bythis time he faced an enemyarmy of around 50,000 men

(mostly cavalry), or aboutthree times the size of hisinvading force. In mid-December he sent nearly allof his cavalry (4,500 horse)under Count John towardTricameron, following thenextdaywithhisinfantryanda500-horsereserve,campingsomedistancefromGelimer’sposition. The next morningthe Vandal commander ledhis army out of their

encampment and stumbledupon Count John and hiscavalrypreparinglunch(Map1.3(a)).Insteadofseizingthemoment and attacking,Gelimer waited for theByzantinestomountup.Johndeployed men in threedivisions,takingcommandofthe centre, then sent amessenger to the mainByzantine camp (Map1.3(b)). Belisarius

immediately led his 500cavalry to reinforce John,leaving the Byzantineinfantry to catch up at asteady march. Meanwhile,Gelimer ordered his owncavalry tomirror the enemy,deploying his horsemen intothree divisions and givingcommandof thecentretohisbrother Tzazon. Gelimerordered his troops to forsakethe bow for the sword, in

essencefavouringshockovermissile warfare in theupcomingfight.The battle of Tricameron

began after a lengthy pausewhenCountJohnandasmallcontingent of selectedhorsemen crossed a brookand charged the Vandalcentre, only to be rebuffed(Map 1.3(c)). John attackedagain with a slightly largerforce and was beaten back a

secondtime.Perhapsthinkinghimself charmed, Johnattacked a third time, thistime with all of his guardsand spearmen yelling at thetop of their voices (Map1.3(d)). In themêlée,Tzazonwas killed. Arriving on thebattlefield,Belisariusorderedthe remaining two cavalrydivisionstoattacktherapidlycollapsing centre,precipitating a general rout

(Map1.3(e)).Withthewholeof the Vandal cavalry indisarray, the Huns joined inthe pursuit, pressing theremaining Germanic horsebackintotheirfortifiedcamp(Map 1.3(f)). The battle wasnot very costly in lives.Byzantine losses were lessthan 50 dead, while theVandalslostaround800men.

Map1.3. TheBattleofTricameron,533.(a)PhaseI:Gelimer’sVandalcavalryadvancefromtheirfortifiedcamp(1)andencounteraforceofByzantinehorseunderCountJohndispersedwhilepreparingtheirmiddaymeal(2).Inexplicably,

GelimerallowsCountJohn’sforcestoformforbattleunhindered.Count

JohnordershistroopstomountandsendsamessengertoBelisariusinthemainByzantinecamprequestingreinforcements(3).(b)PhaseII:

CountJohndeployshisoutnumberedforceintothreedivisions,amove

mirroredbyGelimer,whoordershisbrotherTzazontotakecommandoftheVandalcentre.Gelimerordershistroopstostowtheirbowsandusetheirswordsinpreparationfortheimpendingclash.(c)PhaseIII:CountJohnopensthebattlebychargingacrossthebrookseparatingthetwoforces(1).TheVandalsrebuffthe

attackerswhoretreattotheirstartingpoint(2).TheByzantinesregroupand

preparetolaunchanotherassault.Belisariusapproachesthebattlefieldwithacontingentofcavalry(3),

havinglefttheByzantineinfantrytofollowasquicklyastheycan.(d)PhaseIV:Gatheringadditional

reinforcements,CountJohnlaunchesathirdattack(1).Tzazoniskilledinthemêlée(2)andtheVandalcentre

beginstogiveway(3).(e)PhaseV:Arrivingatthesceneoftheaction,Belisariusordersthetworemainingdivisionsintothefray(1).TheVandalformationcollapsesfromthecentreandtheyfleetotherelativesafetyoftheirfortifiedcamp(2),

closelypursuedbytheHunniccavalry

(3).Belisariusordersahalttothepursuit,notwishingtoassaulttheVandalpositionuntiltheByzantineinfantry(4)arrives.(f)PhaseVI:AstheByzantinesbegintoencirclethecamp(1),Gelimerpanicsand

abandonshisposition(2).TheVandalcavalryfollowsuit(3),andthe

Byzantinesenterthecampandbegintoplunder,losinganysemblanceofcohesion.FortunatelyforBelisarius,thecollapseoftheVandalforcesprotectshisnowdisorganizedarmy

fromcounter-attack.

KnowinghecouldnotstormtheVandal campwithout hisfoot soldiers, Belisariuswaited patiently for hisinfantry to arrive. Gelimerpanicked as he watched theGreeksbegin to surroundhiscamp. Silently, he mountedhis horse and slipped out of

the noose, escaping to themountains in the west.Leaderless, theVandals soonfollowed, abandoning theircamp to the Byzantines.Belisarius’ troopsentered thecamp and, breaking ranks,began to plunder. Inmoments, Belisarius’victorious army disintegratedinto a mass of thieves,illustrating theweaknessofamostlymercenary force.Had

the Vandals managed aspirited counter-attack at thismoment, there was littledoubt in the mind of theByzantinehistorianProcopiusthat the invaderswould havesuffered a defeat. It wouldtakeCountJohnanotherthreemonths to hunt down andcaptureGelimer.Belisarius defeated the

Vandals in two battles,sendingbacktheVandalking

Gelimer and his treasury toConstantinople, then addingthe surviving Vandals asfoederati tohisnewArmyofAfrica. In 535 Justinianordered his brilliant youngcommander to invade Italyand attack the Ostrogothicking, Vitiges. Over the nextfive years Belisariusconquered the peninsula,capturing the Gothic capitalat Ravenna and all of Italy

southof thePovalley.WhenJustinian recalled him toConstantinoplein540tofightthe Persians after the‘Perpetual Peace’ failed,Belisarius left behind a newArmy of Italy and broughtwithhimtheOstrogothickingand treasury. But adevastating epidemic ofbubonic plague hit theByzantine Empire hard, andJustinian faced various

rebellions over the next tenyears in north Africa, Italyandtheeast.Inthemeantime,Belisarius had fallen out offavourwiththeemperor,whodismissed him for plotting toseize the throne. It was 552before the treasury hadrecovered enough to send anewarmytoreconquerItaly.

ByzantineCombinedArmsinAction:The

BattlesofTaginaeandCasilinumJustinian replaced Belisariuswith his most trusted courtadvisor, the septuagenarianeunuch Narses, a man withless than two years of actualmilitary service. NarseswouldattempttowrestleItalyaway from the Ostrogoths,onceandforall.Agenerationbefore, under the rule of

Theodoric theGreat (r. 493–526), the Ostrogoths hadcreated a strong Germanicking-dom, one thatsubscribed to a hereticalversion of Christianity calledArianism. A year afterTheodoric’s death, Justinianwas raised to the Byzantinethrone, succeeding his uncleJustin I (r.518–527).For thenext quarter of a century, hepursuedhisreconquestofthe

Mediterranean,payingspecialattention to Italy. TheByzantine emperor wasconvinced that he wasdivinelyordainedtobringthewaywardregionbackintothefold of Orthodoxy whileimposingGreekhegemonyonthepeninsula.Fortwentyyearsthearmies

of Byzantium fought theGoths throughout Italy,burning towns and cities and

pillagingthecountryside.Butthe composition of theByzantine expeditionaryforce changed as time wenton as mercenaries began tofill the ranks, replacing thenumeriandbucellarii.By thesummerof552Narsesledanarmyofover20,000men,butonlythecorewereByzantine,the rest being barbarianfoederati made up ofLombard,Hunnic,Armenian,

Persian and Arabmercenaries.Keeping a largetreasury in reserve topayhistroops if the pillaging driedup, Narses moved hismultinational army fromRavennatowardtheforcesofthe new Ostrogothic king,Totila, in central Italy.Hearing that Totila wasadvancing toward him,Narses made camp nearmodernScheggiaonthecrest

ofapassover theApenninesandwaited.Totila left Rome and

marched to the village ofTaginae (near modernGubbio), only 13miles fromwhere Narses was camped.Because theGoths possessedsuch a small standing army,Totila was forced to pull hisgarrisons from nearby citiestoswellhis ranks, in theendcreating a host somewhat

smaller than the invadingarmy. At Taginae, Narsesdispatched a Greek herald toTotila demanding hissurrender. In response, theOstrogothic king broke campthe next morning andadvanced to within twobowshots(perhaps300yards)oftheByzantinearmy.Both commanders desired

battle, forming their armiesacrossanarrow, levelvalley.

In typical Germanic fashionwhen cavalry was present ingreatnumbers,Totilaarrayedhis horsemen some distancein front of his infantry, withthe intent of relying onrepeated cavalry charges tobreaktheenemylines(Gothicinfantry rarely reached thefront lines except to dispatchthe enemy or assist in thepursuit). Narses arrayed histroops in a concave

formation, placing his 8,000foederatiasheavyinfantryinbattle squares, thendismounting some of hisByzantinehorsetostrengthenhis phalanxes. He then putsome 8,000 light infantryarchers on his flanks (4,000on each side), protected bypointedstakesorperhapsonaridge inaccessible frombelow. On the left and right,behindthearchers,helocated

his 1,000 heavy cavalrycataphracts,armouredlancersalsoequippedwithbows.Hisconcave array created, ineffect, a dangerous killingzoneforanyenemytrying toattacktheByzantinecentre.Anxious to protect his

vulnerable left flank, Narsesdispatched fifty archers tooccupya small,detachedhillon the left side of his line,where they took up position

(Map 1.4(a)). When Totilatried to take the hill with acontingent of heavy cavalry,the fifty held their groundagainandagain,beatingbackthe Gothic cavalry’snumerous charges withmissile fire. With the hillsecured, Narses dispatchedanother 1,000 horsemen tothe extreme left of his leftwing just beyond thecontested hill. This cavalry

forcewould act as a reserve,and, according to Procopiusin his Gothic War, ‘at themoment when the enemyinfantry began action [theByzantinecavalrywould]getbehind them immediately…and place them between twoforces’.As the morning wore on,

Narses left the initiative toTotila, but the Gothic kingrefused to attack until the

arrival of 2,000 cavalryreinforcements (Map 1.4(b)).As he waited, he entertainedthe troopsonboth sideswithhis outstanding equestrianskills, parading between thelines in his golden armour.Once the reinforcementsarrived, Totila changed intothe armour of a privatesoldier and joined the ranksoftheGothiccavalry.After eating a small lunch,

Totila finally ordered thecavalry to charge theByzantine centre, ignoringthe Greek archers on bothsides.Butthefoederatiheavyinfantry, buttressed withdismounted heavy cavalry,held. The halted Gothiccavalry then received a rainof arrows from the 8,000Byzantine archers on theflanks, horses and riderskilled alike by the hundreds

(Map 1.4(c)). To aggravatethe situation, the attackingcavalry soon foundthemselves pressed betweenthe Byzantine defenders andtheir own approachinginfantry. As the coup degrâce, Narses ordered hisheavy cavalry reserve frombehind the hill to attack theflank of the approachingGothic infantry, rolling uptheir line and driving them

from the field (Map 1.4(d)).Surroundedandfacingcertainannihilation, the Gothiccavalry fled the battlefield,cutting their way throughtheir own infantry. KingTotilawasmortallywoundedleaving the battlefield, anddied in a peasant’s hutnearby. Some 6,000Ostrogoths perished in thebattle, and those that werecapturedweremassacred.

The battle of Taginaeillustrated the power of acombined-arms tacticalsystem working in concertagainst attacking shockcavalry and infantry. Unableto penetrate the defendingByzantine phalanxes, theGothiccavalryfounditselfatthe mercy of the Greekarchers.Moreover,thefailure(or perhaps inability) of theOstrogoths to attack and

scattertheByzantinebowmenon the wings, either bycavalry charge or infantryattack, gave the Byzantinesthe ability to attack withmissiles and wear down theGothic cavalry. But theOstrogoths’ mistake ofleaving the light infantryarchers unmolested was notunique in western militaryhistory.Frenchheavycavalrylancerswouldmakethesame

mistake 800 years lateragainst English longbowmenatthebattleofCrécy.Finally,Narses’ order to use hiscavalry reserve to attack theGothic infantry at apropitious time shows asophisticated grasp of tacticsand a keen understanding ofthe tactical tendencies of hisenemy.After the battle of Taginae,

Narsespursuedtheremaining

Goths to Rome then farthersouth to Naples, killing theirnew king and continuing hiscampaign of extermination.Finally, a trucewas called atMonte Lettere, and the fewsurvivingGothswereallowedtoleaveItalyandsettleinanyotherbarbariankingdomtheywanted.HavingtakenItalyfromthe

Ostrogoths,Narsesnextfaceda force of perhaps 15,000

Franksraidingfromthenorthin 554. Blocking the Franks’route of escape, Narses metthe raiders at Casilinum nearCapua in south central Italywithanarmyof18,000men.Here,asatTaginaetwoyearsbefore, Narses dismountedsome of his own heavycavalry to strengthen hisheavy infantry, placing themin three lines. On his flankshe placed themajority of his

heavy cavalry cataphracts.The Frankish army faced byNarses was similar toGermanicarmiesfacedbytheRomanscenturiesearlier.

Map1.4. TheBattleofTaginae,552.(a)PhaseI:AsTotilaarrivesonthe

fieldanddeployshisforces(1),Narsesdispatchesasmallcontingentofarcherstoadetachedhillto

supporttheByzantineleftflank(2).AcontingentofGothiccavalryattemptstoseizethehill(3)butisrebuffedbythearchersfiringdownfromtheheights(4).Narsesdispatchesareserveforceofcavalrytothe

threatenedarea(5)andstandsfast.TheinitiativepassestoTotila,buttheGothiccommanderdecidestoawaitthearrivalofadditionalcavalry

forces(6)beforeattemptingageneralassault.(b)PhaseII:His

reinforcementshavingarrived,Totilalaunchesanattackagainstthe

squaresofByzantineheavyinfantryanddismountedcavalryinthecentre

(1).UnmolestedbytheGothichorsemen,Narses’archersbegintoloosevolleysofarrowsintothe

enemy’stightlypackedranks(2)astheOstrogothinfantryapproachthefight(3).(c)PhaseIII:TheByzantinearcherscontinuetoshowerthekillingzonewitharrows(1).Thisunrelentingfireinflictshundredsofcasualties,andthesituationgrowsworseastheGothicinfantryattempttopressahead(2).ConfrontedbyresoluteByzantinedefenderstotheirfrontandcrowded

frombehindbytheirownfootsoldiers,theOstrogoths’mounted

elementbegintorapidlylosecohesion(3).(d)PhaseIV:NarseslauncheshiscavalryreserveagainsttheOstrogothinfantry’srightflank(1),whichbeginstorollupasthefootsoldierspanicandbegintoflee(2).TheByzantinearcherycontinuestoexactaheavytollontheGothichorse,whichstampedethroughtheirowninfantry(3)astheyjointherout.KingTotilaismortallywoundedinthefinalaction,dyingina

nearbyhut.

Fromtheearlysixthcenturytothebeginningoftheeighthcentury, the Franks and

surrounding Germanickingdoms fought similarly.Infantry was by far themostprevalent weapon system,with Germanic infantryfighting in unarticulatedbattle-square formations orcolumns. Most Frankishsoldiers were armoured inleather or, at best, mail, andcarriedaroundorovalshield.Although Germanic nobilitywould most certainly be

armedwith either the single-edgedscramasaxoradouble-edged long sword, theprimary weapon of allGermanic infantry, includingthe Franks, was the spear.Medieval sources identify aunique Frankish spear calledanangon,whichwasnotonlyspecial in its design but alsoinitsuseinwarfare.Agathiasdescribes the weapon as aunique barb-headed spear of

moderatelengththatcouldbeused ‘if necessary forthrowing like a javelin, andalsoinhand-to-handcombat’.Besides the spear, Frankish

infantry also employed afrancisc (sometimesfrancisca) or throwing axewhich, according toProcopius, ‘at a given signaland at first encounter, wasthrown at the enemy’. TheFrankish infantry’s ability to

use the spear and axe foreither missile or shockcombat created a fusion oflight and heavy infantry notunlike the fusion seen in theclassical period with theRoman legionary. Thedifference here was in thenature of battlefieldarticulation. The Romanlegionary was a professionalsoldierwhofoughtinalinearformation capable of great

tactical flexibility, while theFranks in the early medievalperiod were a militia whocontinued to attack inunarticulatedformations,withmissile troops screening thebattle square or firingoverheadfromtherear.In the sixth century, the

Franks did employ a smallnumber of heavy cavalrylancers.TheGaulshadalongtradition of fielding lancers,

with the Romans oftenemploying Gallic heavycavalry as auxiliaries. Butthese lancers, devoid ofstabilizing stirrups, were notthe masters of the medievalbattlefield yet. Diffusion ofthe stirrup from central AsiatomedievalFrancewouldnottake place until the mid-eighth century, withwidespreadusebytheFranksonlyintheninthcentury.

Except for the use of thefranciscfromhorseback,lightcavalry was almost non-existent in early Germanicwarfare. When horses wereemployed, it was usually forreconnaissanceorasmountedinfantry.Thetraditionoflightcavalry in medieval westerncivilization comes almostexclusivelyfromcontactwithnomads from the Eurasiansteppes, with the Magyars

(Hungarians) perhaps themost famous example ofChristianized light cavalryhorse archers. Still, heavilyforested western Europeproved less than ideal forlight cavalry, a weaponsystemwhichrequiresagreatdealof realestateandfodderto be successful. Also,mounted archery was a skillthat took years in the saddleto perfect, a pastime more

suitedtoTurkishandMongolsteppe warriors thanGermanic agriculturalistswestoftheAlps.At Casilinum the Frankish

raiders formedup theirbattlesquares opposite theByzantines, then charged theGreek centre (Map 1.5(a)).The ferocious attack of theGermanic warriors broke thefirst two lines of Byzantineinfantry,despite thepresence

ofdismountedheavycavalry.As the Franks engaged thethird and final line, Narsesordered forward hiscataphracts on the flanks(Map 1.5(b)). Threatened bythis double flankingmanoeuvre,theFrankshaltedtheirchargeandformedintoadefensive square against theheavily armoured Greekheavy infantry (Map 1.5(c)).But the cataphracts did not

charge the Frankish battlesquare; instead, theyemployed their bows toshower the Franks witharrows. Unwilling to breakformation for fear of beingrun down by thosecataphracts with lances andswords, the Frankish squareslowly withdrew to the rear.In their retreat, the Frankishformation lost cohesion, andthe Greek heavy cavalry

charged, completelyoutflanking and breaking upthe square (Map 1.5(d)). Ahorrible carnage ensued.Agathias tells us that theByzantines lost only eightymen. For the Franks, onlyfivemensurvived.The battles of Taginae and

Casilinum demonstrated theversatility of the combined-arms Byzantine army. AtTaginae, Narses used heavy

infantry to stop the Gothiccavalry, then used hispreponderance of lightinfantryarcherstoweardownthe Germanic horsemen. AtCasilinum, Narses used hisheavy infantry to resistFrankish heavy infantry,bringing his hybrid heavycavalry to bear, first toshower the infantry squarewith arrows, then to scatterandrundownenemyinfantry

when the formation broke.The composition of theByzantine army and itsrelianceona fusionofheavycavalry and light infantry asthe predominant tacticalsystem gave the EasternRomanEmpire the flexibilityto meet the many differentfightingstylesofitsenemies.Narses’victoryatCasilinum

was absolute, and Italyemerged out of two decades

of Byzantine occupationruined by war, famine andplague. The largest cities,such as Milan, Rome andNaples, were nearlydepopulated, and thecountryside’s agriculturaleconomy was devastated.Eastern Roman rule wouldonly last another fourteenyearsbeforethefinalwaveofGermanic invaders, theLombards, occupied the

northern two-thirds of thepeninsula, ending foreverJustinian’s dream of GreekruleoverItaly.

TheByzantineArmyinTransition:ThemesandTagmataJustinian’s reign was thehigh-water mark for theByzantine Empire. After hisdeath in 565, the EasternRoman Empire faced crisis

after crisis. Constantlybesieged by the Slavs andBulgars in southern Europe,PersiansinMesopotamia,andfromthemid-seventhcenturyonward, Islam from AfricaandtheLevant,theByzantineEmpirefounditsmilitaryandfiscal resources relentlesslystretched. Still, despitedefeats that deprived it of allits African and Asianpossessions except Asia

Minor, theByzantineEmpiremaintaineditselfforcenturiesas a formidable easternMediterraneanpower.

Map1.5. TheBattleofCasilinum,554.(a)PhaseI:Narsesformshisinfantry,reinforcedbydismounted

heavycavalrymen,intoathree-rankformationflankedbymountedheavycavalry.Thesecataphractsusethebowastheirprimaryweaponratherthantheusuallanceorsword.TheFranksformoppositeinseveralunarticulatedbattlesquares.Theyopentheactionbychargingthe

Byzantinecentre.(b)PhaseII:TheFranks’ferociousattacksuccessfullypenetratesthefirsttworanksof

Byzantinefoot(1).Astheyengagethelastlineofinfantry,Narsesordershiscataphractsintoaction.TheByzantinehorsemenpressinwardtowardstheenemyflanks(2).(c)PhaseIII:

FearingachargebytheByzantine

horsemen,theFrankishinfantrypresstogetherintoalargedefensivesquare(1).Insteadofcharging,however,thecataphractsopenapunishingfireintotheflanksandrearofthetightly

pressedFrankishsquare(2).Unabletoreplytothisattackwithout

looseningtheirformationandopeningthemselvestoaByzantineheavycavalrycharge,theFranksslowlyattempttowithdrawfromthe

tighteningnoose(3).(d)PhaseIV:TheunarticulatedFrankishformationlosescohesionasitretreats(1),aneffectprobablyheightenedbythe

presenceoftheByzantinecataphractsontheirflanks.Narsesordersthe

cataphractstoexchangetheirbowsforlancesandswords,andtheheavycavalrychargeintotheflanksoftherapidlycollapsingFrankishsquare(2).TheensuingslaughterresultsinthenearannihilationoftheFrankish

force.

Unable to sustain aprofessional standing army,EmperorConstansII(r.641–668)settledhismobilearmiesin specific districts calledthemes (from which thetactical unit thema gets its

name).Theneworganizationof themes introducedregionalized army groupsunder the command of asenior general or strategos.Thethemesnowactedasbothregionalfrontiertroopsandasmobile field armies. Outsideof military organization, thethemes were also animportant part of imperialsocial structure. The soldiersofaparticularthemewerethe

legal holders of the landitself, a development thatcame in the formof imperialland grants within theparticular region, similar tothe land grants during theearly Roman Empire.Although thesoldiersdidnotwork the fields or run farmson a full-time basis, theirownership brought about apersonal stake in the defenceoftheirrespectivetheme.The

theme became more than amilitary district; it was aneconomicandsocialentityaswell.Beginning in the mid-

seventh century, soldiers ofthe themes supportedthemselves from land grantswithin their districts becausethe state’s only remainingmeans of supporting itssoldiers seems to have beengiving them land, most

probably from imperialestates.Forthemostpart,thethemes acted as a defensiveforce, but later emperorswould take an interest inregaining lost territory.Emperor Constantine V (r.741–775)createdseveralelitecavalry units called tagmata,first as a reaction to arebellious theme in north-west Anatolia, then foroffensive campaigns against

theArabsandBulgars.The basic administrative

and tactical unit of theByzantine army from theseventh century was thebandum, consisting of about400soldierscommandedbyatribune, and laterby a count.The banda were aboutequally divided into infantryand cavalry, with thedominant weapon systembeing heavy cavalry. Light

infantry archers andjavelineers usuallyaccompanied the heavyinfantry,actingasskirmishersand missile support. Five toeight banda (2,000–3,200cavalry and infantry) formeda turma, twoor three turmae(4,000–9,600 soldiers)constitutedathema,andthreeor four themae togetherbecame a Byzantine fieldarmy, usually numbering

25,000 to 30,000 men. Theentire Byzantine army wasnotverylarge,probablyneverexceeding 150,000 men intotal. For all practicalpurposes, the thema replacedthe legion as the premierstrategicunitofmanoeuvreinByzantinewarfare.The Byzantine army

differed from its Romanpredecessorinonesignificantway – the level of

professionalism in itsmilitary. Although thesoldiersof the themabecameincreasingly a defensivemilitia force, the core of theByzantine army wereprofessional soldiersorganized in homogenizedcavalry or infantry unitscalled tagmata, equal to thesize of the thema. Thesesoldierswere thebest-trainedtroops in the empire, serving

as Constantinople’s garrisonandasthechiefexpeditionaryforce for the emperor.Whenthe emperor went oncampaign, the tagmata andlocal themae combined tocreateafieldarmy.For the next 300 years

Byzantine field armiesenforced a conservative,careful strategy of limitedmilitaryaims, seizing land intheBalkansfromtheBulgars,

and territories in Anatolia,Syria and Armenia from theMuslims. But by the turn ofthe millennium, the overallprofessionalism of theByzantine army droppedprecipitously, forcingemperors to rely increasinglyon foreign mercenaries,especially Russo-Swedishsoldiers called theVarangianGuard. The Byzantines werehiring small bodies of these

mercenaries for expeditionsas early as 911, with theVarangian Guard itselfinstitutedbyEmperorBasilIIin 988. The Varangianslacked military lands andproved very loyal toByzantineemperorswhopaidthem well. By the beginningof the eleventh century,emperors added to theirpayrolls Normans, GermansandTurks,servingundertheir

own officers in units withtheir own organization. Asthe themes declined incombat efficiency, thesemercenaries began to replacethe Byzantine army ratherthanmerelycomplementit.

HeavyCavalryversusLightCavalry:TheBattleofManzikert

In the eleventh century, theByzantine Empire faced anew crisis on its easternfrontiers with the emergenceof a new and dangerousconvert to Islam, the SeljukTurks. The Seljuks, like theParthians before them, reliedonlightcavalryhorsearchersas their primary weaponsystem. These Turks provedirresistible on the battlefield,conquering theMuslimstates

in what had been the north-west corner of the SassanidPersian Empire andcontinuing their traditions ofraids into and warfare withthe Eastern Roman Empire.This conflict between theByzantine army and Seljukinvadersculminatedinoneofthemost important battles inwesterncivilization,thebattleof Manzikert in 1071, theresults of which would

forever weaken a greatempire and become a casusbelliforthecrusades.The Byzantines were very

familiar with the tactics ofsteppe light cavalry. Withvery littleornobodyarmourand carrying only a curvedsabre and sometimes ajavelin, the Turkish warriorrelied on his short compositebow,aquiverofthirtytofiftyarrows, and the mobility

provided by his horse. Hisshort powerful bow wasrecurved in shape andconstructed in three parts: athin central stave of wood(often maple, cornus ormulberry) laminated withsinew on the back and hornon the belly. This compositeconstructiongavetheTurkishbowapowerfuldrawweight,whiletheshortrecurvedesignallowed thesteppewarrior to

shoot the arrow quickly, inany direction and at greatdistance. Furthermore, hisarchery skill was assisted byhis novel equipment andridingposition.CentralAsianwarriors used a short stirrupor ‘forward seat’, putting therider’s weight over thehorse’s shoulder instead ofsquare on its back. Thisriding stance was verycomfortable over rough

terrainandfacilitatedarcheryfrom horseback. Seljukwarriors rode a hardy breedof steppe ponies. Thesemounts possessed acombination of excellentqualities, including strength,stamina and the ability tosubsistonverylittlefood.Like the Parthians before

them, theSeljukTurks reliedon hit-and-run attacks fromhorseback, striking from a

distance with their powerfulbows, and seldom mixingwith the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. The Turkishhorse archers were adept atthe tactic of hovering justwithin bowshot of theirenemy, then taking flightwhen their enemy offeredbattle, twisting their torsosandfiringarrowsbackwardattheirpursuers inwhat isnowcalled the ‘Parthian shot’. If

the pursuers seemedvulnerable in any way, thefleeingTurkswouldsuddenlycounter-attack, swarmingtheir enemy and killing bothmen and horses. OneByzantine commentator andchronicler of the FirstCrusade, Princess AnnaComnena (the daughter ofEmperor Alexius IComnenus), described herfather’s respect for Seljuk

tactics:He [Alexius Comnenus]knewfromlongexperiencethat the Turkish battle-linediffers from that of otherpeoples … but their rightand left wings and theircenter formed separategroups with the ranks cutoff, as it were, from oneanother;wheneveranattackwas made on right or left,the center leapt into action

andalltherestofthearmybehind, in a whirlwindonslaught that threw intoconfusion the acceptedtradition of battle. As forweapons they use in war,unlike the Kelts [Franks]they do not fight withlances, but completelysurround the enemy andshoothimwitharrows;theyalso defend themselveswith arrows from a

distance. In hot pursuit theTurk makes prisoners byusing his bow; in flight heoverwhelms his pursuerwith the sameweapon andwhen he shoots, the arrowin its course strikes eitherrider or horse, fired withsuch a tremendous forcethat itpassesclean throughthebody.SoskilledaretheTurkisharchers.The Seljuks excelled in the

feigned retreat. Sometimes,their retreats lasted manydays, designed both to weardowntheirenemiesanddrawthem away from their basesand towards a largerbodyofsteppe warriors. Once theirenemytired,theTurkswouldwheelandstrikeorspringthetrap.To cope with the mobility

andfirepowerofsteppehorsearchers, Byzantine doctrine

prescribed always keepinglight infantry bowmen nearthe cavalry, never fightingwithuncoveredflanksorrear,andneverpermittinganarmyto disperse. ‘They were likefliesthatcouldbebeatenoff,but not driven away.’ TheByzantines long understoodthe importance of effectivecombined-arms co-operationwhen dealing with enemylight cavalry. But the overall

declineoftheByzantinearmyalso affected the quality ofByzantine generalship,leading to the militarydebacle in Armenia at thebattleofManzikertin1071.From the late1050s,Seljuk

nomadicpartiesweremakingraids deep into ByzantineArmenia. The Seljuk Turks,who took their name from asuccessful chieftain (Seljuk,sometimes Saljuk), separated

from a larger Turkish tribeknown as theOghuz inwhatis today modern Kazakhstanand struck south-westwardinto eastern Persia in the1040s, converting to SunniIslamalongtheway.By1055the Seljuks had taken theAbbasid capital at Baghdad,forcing theMuslim caliph tobestow upon the Seljuksultan, Tughril-bey, the titleof ‘king of the East and the

West’. The Seljuks nowcontrolled Transoxiana andallofPersia,butcontinuedtopress westward where theirpresence alarmed both theByzantine Empire, withinterests inArmenia, and thepowerful Muslim Fatimiddynasty (909–1171) centredin Egypt. The Fatimids, whopractised the rival Shia formof Islam, possessed land inthe Levant stretching from

the Nile delta to Syria. Tocomplicate things for theinvading Turks, the FatimidsandByzantinesmaintainedanuneasy truce, allowing theGreekstodealwiththreatsinItaly and the Balkans, whilethe Egyptians became richcontrollingthelucrativetradecoming into the easternMediterranean. This balanceof power would change withthearrivaloftheTurks.

By the late 1060s SeljukTurks were migrating intoAnatolia proper. As theymoved past the borders andintoByzantine territory, theyforced their sultan, AlpArslan (Turkish for ‘Lion’),to intervene in the region.This provoked a Byzantinemilitary response. In early1071 Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072) set out to consolidatehis frontier, attacking several

Byzantine towns andcapturing the fortress ofManzikert along the way(Map 1.6). The sultan wasvery familiar with Byzantinetactics,havingsuffereddefeatat the hands of the EasternRomans three times,andwaswell aware of theircapabilities.

Map1.6. ApproachestoManzikert,1071.

The new Byzantine

emperor, Romanus IVDiogenes (r. 1068–1071),inherited a difficult strategicposition. In the west, theNormans threatenedByzantinepossessionsinItalyandtheBalkans,while in theeast, Turkish raiding intoByzantine Armenia andeastern Anatolia forced theemperor to organize punitiveexpeditions against themarauders. In both 1068 and

1069 Romanus campaignedagainst the Turks, surprisingthem at Sebastea (modernSivas) and clearing them outof the western province ofCappadocia, before beingforcedtoretreatafteradefeatnear Akhlat, close to LakeVan. In 1070 Romanus wasforced to deal with Normanincursions in the west,leaving his nephew, ManuelComnenus, in charge of his

forcesintheeast.ButManuelwas taken prisoner by AlpArslan’s own brother-in-law,Arisiaghi,whobegantohatcha plot with his captive tooverthrowthesultan.Manuelconvinced Arisiaghi to go toConstantinople, where theduplicitousTurkagreedtoanalliance. When Alp Arslanasked for the traitor’sextradition and was refused,thesultanpreparedforwar.

The Byzantine emperorwelcomed the prospect ofwar. Believing the Turkishsultan to be in Persia in thesummer of 1071, Romanus,an able general who hadalready tasted victory againsttheTurks earlier in his reign(twice against Arslan),assembled an army ofperhaps 30,000 men atErzerum,some80milesfromManzikert in Armenia, with

the intention of retaking thecity andneighbouringAkhlatand using them as bases ofoperation for a campaignagainstAlpArslan in Persia.Romanususedhisinfantrytoreduce captured cities in theborderlands,whileemployinghis cavalry to search for thesultan’s forces. Arslanlearned of the Byzantineemperor’s advance onArmeniaastheTurkisharmy

encamped at Aleppo innorthern Syria. The sultanimmediately turned his armyaround and headed for theArmenianfrontier.In mid-August 1071 an

advanceportionoftheSeljukTurkish army met the mainByzantine army andskirmished near Lake Van.The Byzantine emperorretook Manzikert from theTurks, and hearing that the

advance guard of Arslan’sarmy was in the area,dispatched an army of alliedCuman or Russian heavycavalry to meet them. TheTurkish commander, seeingthatnumberswerenowontheside of the Byzantines,withdrew. Whether thiswithdrawal was a feignedflightwillneverbeknownforcertain, but the pursuingByzantineswerecaughtinthe

signature horse nomadambush, a sudden counter-attack by light cavalry horsearchers that captured theByzantine commander andforced the remainingByzantine army to retreat indisarray.BythetimeRomanus’main

army arrived on 18 August,theTurkishadvancearmy, intrue Seljuk fashion, wasnowhere to be found. The

main Byzantine army thenreturned to camp, whereduring the night the Seljuks,joined now by Alp Arslan’smainarmy,returnedinforce,setting up their own camp 3miles away. Seeing thatRomanuspossessedthelargerarmy, the following morningthe sultan offered a peaceembassytotheemperor,whobluntly rejected it. Romanuswanted to settle the Turkish

problem with a decisivemilitary victory,understanding that raisinganother army to meet theSeljuk threat would be bothdifficultandexpensive.After the failed parley

between the two rulers,Romanus advanced againsttheSeljukTurksatmiddayon19Augustwithhisarmouredandmountedarmyarrayedinasinglelineonabroadfront,

backedbya strong rearguard(Map 1.7(a)). The front lineconsisted of heavy cavalryfromthevariousthemes,withRomanus himselfcommandingfromthecentre.The second line consisted offoreign mercenary cavalryfrom Germany, Normansfrom Italy, and troops fromeastern frontiers. The secondline was commanded byAndronicusDucas, a relation

of Romanus’ predecessor,Constantine X Ducas (r.1059–1067). The Byzantinearmy was without anysignificant light infantrybecause Romanus committedthisarmtoasiegeelsewhere.The absence of archers tosupport his cavalry unitsviolated the central canon ofwarfare against steppe lightcavalry.

Map1.7. TheBattleofManzikert,1071.(a)PhaseI:Romanusformshisarmyintwolines,thefirstunderhispersonalcontrolandthesecondunderAndronicusDucas(1).HeordershisheavycavalryforceforwardagainsttheSeljukhorsearcherstohisfront

(2).(b)PhaseII:Thepursuitcontinuesforseveralhours,sweeping

throughandcontinuingbeyondtheabandonedSeljukcamp(1).Alp

Arslan’smountedbowmeneasilykeeptheheavierByzantinehorsemenatadistancewhilecontinuouslyharassingRomanus’flanks(2).(c)PhaseIII:Hisarmytiringandnightfall

approaching,Romanusordershisarmytobreakoffthepursuitand

returntocamp;however,theorderislateinreachingthewings,which

continuetoadvance,separatingthemfromtherestofthearmy(1).Whentheyfinallyreceivetheorderandbegintopullback,theirformationsarelooseandgapsareapparentintheirlines(2).TheTurksquicklyseize

thisopportunityandintensifytheirattacks(3).(d)PhaseIV:Recognizingtheprecariouspositionofhiswings,Romanusordershisarmytoface

aboutandattacktheenemy.Theunitsunderhisimmediatecommandobey(1),buttheemperorisbetrayedbyAndronicus,whospreadsarumourthatRomanushasbeenkilled.Thetraitorleadsthesecondlinebacktocamp(2),abandoninghiserstwhile

comradestotheirfate.(e)PhaseV:AlpArslantakes

advantageofthesuddendepartureofhalfofhisopponent’sforcesandtheapproachofnightfalltosurroundtheByzantines(1).Therightwingfalls

first,attemptingtofacetwosidesatonce(2).Theleftwing,separated

fromRomanusandtheunitsfromtheByzantinecentre,fightscourageously,butfinallybreaksunderthehailofarrowsarcingoutofthedeepeninggloom(3).(f)PhaseVI:TheTurkspresscloser,encirclingtheremnantsoftheByzantinecentre.Romanus,surroundedbyhisVarangianGuard,isoverpoweredandcaptured.The

survivorsfleeingthefieldarepursuedthroughthenight,andbydawntheprofessionalcoreoftheByzantine

armyhasbeendestroyed.

InthefaceoftheByzantineheavy cavalry advance, theTurkish centre retreated,easily keeping their distanceon their lightly burdenedmounts. On the wings, theTurks attacked theByzantineflanks, showering the Greekcavalry with arrows.

Although Turkish missilesprobablydidnotkillmanyofthe armoured riders, thehorses did suffer and manyriders lost their mounts.Moreover, Byzantinecataphracts no longerpossessed the skill ofmounted archery present inearlier centuries, and provedno match for the moreexperienced Turkish lightcavalryhorsearchers.

The Byzantine advancewent on for several hours,overrunning the abandonedSeljuk camp (Map 1.7(b)).But as evening approached,Romanus commanded histiredarmytoturnaroundandreturn to camp. TheByzantine centre obeyed, butthewingsdidnot receive theorder in time, andwhen theydid, failed to keep a tightformation. With breaks

appearing in the line, theTurkishhorsearcherspressedtheir attack (Map 1.7(c)).Romanus countered byordering the first line to turnaroundagainandthreatentheharassing bowmen. But thesecond line, commanded byDucas, refused to stop andface the enemy as ordered.AfterspreadingarumourthatRomanus had been killed,Ducas led the second line

backtocamp,abandoningtheemperor and half theByzantine army to its fate(Map1.7(d)).As darkness fell on the

battlefield, the Seljuk Turkstook full advantage of thereserve’s disappearance tosurround those whoremained. Enveloped by theSeljuk horse archers,Romanus’ rightwing tried toface both ways, but

disintegrated under a hail ofarrows. The left wing, nowisolated from the centre,fought bravely, but finallybroke (Map 1.7(e)). TheTurks then concentrated onthe centre. Here, Romanus,surrounded by his VarangianGuard, was finallyoverpowered and captured(Map 1.7(f)). The remainingByzantine units fled thebattlefield, followed by a

close and bloody pursuit thatcontinued throughout thenight. By dawn, the Turkshad destroyed the flower ofthe Byzantine professionalarmy.Although the Byzantine

defeat can be attributed inlarge part to the politicalinfighting of the Byzantinenobility,onemajorfactorwasRomanus’ frantic attempt atengaging the Turks in a

pitched battle. The Turkscontinued to retreat and pullback in the face of thenumerically superiorByzantinesuntil theybecamespread out and unorganized.This thinning of theByzantineformationsallowedthe Turks to successfullyenvelopRomanus’army.The battle of Manzikert

demonstrated what theByzantines had long known,

that heavy cavalry could notcope with light cavalrywithoutlightinfantrysupport.Although light cavalry didnot have a great margin ofsuperiority in mobility, itsmodest advantage enabled itto refuse battle while stillemploying its bows againsttheslowerheavycavalry.Justas Greek light infantrypeltasts avoided shockcombat with heavy infantry

hoplites while wounding andkillingthemwithmissiles,sotheTurkishhorsearchershaddefeated Byzantine heavycavalry. When Romanusoffered battle against theTurks without light infantrysupport,hewas ignoring500years of Byzantine doctrine,and sending his army to itsdestruction. The defeat atManzikertmarked theendofthe traditional Byzantine

army, an army already inserious decline. With thedestructionofRomanus’ firstline came the destruction ofthe tagmata regiments andeastern themae, forcing lateremperors to rely even moreonmercenariestosupplementtheirmanpowerneeds.The sultan later released

Romanus for a healthyransom to be paid over fiftyyears and a treaty ceding the

border region from AntiochinSyriatoManzikert.Buttheemperor’s enemies seizedpower in Constantinople inhis absence. Romanus wascaptured and blinded in theensuingcivilwar,hiswoundsmortal. The new Byzantineemperor,ConstantineX’ssonMichael VII, proved unabletostemthemassivemigrationofSeljukTurksintoAnatolia– the traditional conscription

landsfortheByzantinearmy.Anatolia would be lostforever to the Greeks. TheEastern Roman Empire, nowpracticallydefenceless,fearedfor its very existence.Desperate times called fordesperate measures, and in1095 Emperor Alexius IComnenus (r. 1081–1118)appealed to Urban II (pope1088–1099) for westernassistance. This appeal led

directly to the formation oftheFirstCrusadein1095.Inthewakeoflosingnearly

half the Byzantine army atManzikert, the Seljuk Turksseizedmuch of Anatolia andthe Levant, including thecities of Antioch, Damascusand Jerusalem. Alp Arslanwas killed in 1072 whilecampaigning in Transoxiana.He was succeeded by hisseventeen-year-old son

Malikshah, a capable leaderwho ruled for twenty years.Malikshah finished what hisfather had begun, pressingdeeper into Anatolia,destroying cities andethnically cleansing orenslaving hundreds ofthousands of Byzantinecitizens. Despite theseadvances, the Seljuk Empirewas already in decline.AfterMalikshah’s death in 1092,

Seljuk nobles fought amongthemselves. It was thisfragmentation that allowedtheRomanCatholiccrusaderstoestablishthemselvesintheLevant.The Byzantine army,

deprivedoftheterritoryfromwhich it drew much of itsmanpower and horses for itscavalry,continueditsdecline.ThoughByzantine appeals inthe late eleventh century to

the west for militaryassistance helped initiate thecrusades, even these alliesturned against the EasternRoman Empire’s long-terminterests. In 1204 theVenetians, backed by acrusader army, conqueredConstantinople, installingtheir own candidate on thethrone. The result of theFourthCrusadewastheLatinkingdom of Constantinople

thatstretchedfromGreece toAsia Minor. Even whenByzantine rule was re-established in 1261, theempire remained weak foranother two centuries untilthe Ottoman Turks finallycaptured Constantinople in1453, ending a thousandyears of Byzantinecivilization.

CHAPTER2

THEEARLYMIDDLEAGES:INVASIONANDRESPONSE:THERISEOFHEAVYCAVALRYIN

WESTERNEUROPE

TheRiseoftheFranksandtheBattleofToursThe fall of the WesternRomanEmpirein476createda power vacuum in westernEurope into which two verydifferentbodieswerepulled–the Roman Catholic Churchand various Germanic

kingdoms. The strongest ofthese new kingdoms, that ofthe Franks, occupied theterritory that is today theNetherlands, Belgium andnorthern France. In 496 theFrankishkingClovis(r.480–511) converted toCatholicism and hissubsequent alliance with thepapacy brought the CatholicChurch’s organizationalcapabilities to the Germanic

kingdom. Sanctioned by thepopeandalliedwithCatholicmissionaries, Frankish kingsand nobles spreadCatholicism and civilizationeastoftheRhineandusheredinthreecenturiesofFrankishcultural and politicaldominance in westernEuropeanaffairs.By the middle of the

seventh century the Frankishgovernment was so

decentralized that wealthyand prominentmenwho hadearlier received politicalappointments now viewedtheir positions as hereditary,creating in effect a self-perpetuating noble class.Serving the labour needs ofthese dukes, counts, baronsand knights was anunderclassofpeasants.Bytheend of the seventh century,most peasant farmers lost

their land to the nobility andbecameserfs,withonlyabout10 per cent of Frankishfarmers remaining freelandholders.Eventually, a succession of

weak Frankish kings underthe Merovingian dynasty(c.500–751) led to thepractice of actual powerbeing wielded by a royalofficial known as the majordomus or mayor of the

palace. Through this officethenextFrankishdynasty,theCarolingian, rose to power.One of the early mayors,Charles Martel (d. 741),earnedhismilitaryreputationas an ardent campaigner,consolidating the power ofhis office and expandingFrankish hegemony inAustrasia and Neustria inwhatisnowroughlynorthernFrance and north-west

Germany (Map 2.1). Hewasable to defeat a Neustrianarmy near Malmedy (716),and again near Cambrai(717).But themayor faced anewchallengetohisrulewiththe expansion of Islam intotheIberianpeninsula.

Map2.1 MerovingianandCarolingianFrance.

Islam exploded out of theArabian peninsula in thedecades after the death ofMuhammad in632.Within ageneration, Muslim armieshad destroyed the SassanidPersianEmpireandtakenhalfof the Byzantine Empire’spossessionsaway.By661thenew ruling dynasty inDamascus, the Umayyads,continued to push eastwardtowards the Indus River and

westwardacrossnorthAfrica,reachingMoroccointheearlyeighth century. During thistime of unprecedentedmilitary success, Islamic lawdevelopedtheconceptofDaral-Islam (the ‘House ofIslam’) and Dar al-Harb(‘House of War’). Inaccordance with the Koran,Christians and Jews inoccupied zones were placedunder a protected status as

Dhimmis or ‘People of theBook’ because all threereligions shared Hebraicorigin. Their worshippingrights protected, Christianand Jews in Umayyadterritorieshadonly topayanadditional poll tax in returnfor military protection –theoretically they could notbe raided or attacked in anyway. Still, despite Islam’scultural magnificence and

tolerant attitude towardChristianandJewishsubjectsalreadywithin their territory,Muslim leaders continued tothirst for more conquests tofill their coffers, therebyexpanding the Dar al-Islamto new regions. Thisexpansion extended intosouth-western Europe withfar-rangingconsequences.In 711 anArab-ledMuslim

army crossed the Strait of

Gibraltar from north Africaand quickly conqueredVisigothic Spain. This initialinvasionforcewasanarmyofoccupation, consisting of12,000 Berber foot soldiersand only 300 cavalry.1Within a year of thisconquest, theMuslims beganraidingnorthofthePyrenees.These initial raids wererelativelyminor,butin732alargeMuslimarmyledbythe

dynamic and populargovernor of Spain, Abd ar-Rahman, crossed thePyrenees and invadedAquitaine.After crushing theduke of Aquitaine’s armynearthecityofBordeaux,theinvading army advancednorth along an old Romanroad toward the city ofOrleansinBurgundy.The constitution of Islamic

armies varied by region and

purpose. Abd ar-Rahman’sarmy was not an army ofoccupation,but rathera largeexpeditionary force ofbetween 20,000 and 25,000cavalry,supportedbyasmallcontingent of infantry. Thehigh percentage of cavalrypresent indicates a raidingrather than occupying force,rebuttingapopularbeliefthatthe Muslims were bent onincluding western Europe in

their empire. It consistedmostly of recently convertedBerbersandotherMoors, ledbyArabs.Ridinghighonthetide of a century of militaryvictory and territorialconquest, this Muslim armywas driven by religiousfervour that translated into aseemingly irresistiblemilitarism. The pace ofIslamic conquest forced theArabs to include more junds

or regional armies in theirranks.Thesejundsfoughtforbooty more than ideology,swelling the ranks of Islamicarmies in times of victory,and evaporating in times oftrouble. The Muslim armythatmarchedtowardFrankishterritory in 732 was a well-armed, disciplined andexperienced army ofplunderers.Islamiccavalryintheeighth

century comprised both lightand heavy units and wasrelatively lightly armouredand mobile. Heavy lancersbalancedbystirrupswerenotyet common in north Africaso mounted shock combatconsisted of charges withsword and light lance. Andunlikeclassicalheavycavalryand their Byzantinecounterparts, Muslim heavycavalrymenwerecomfortable

dismounting and fighting onfoot next to their infantry.Light cavalry were alsopresent, using tribalweaponssuch as javelins and bows astheir primary offensive arms.ButthefamousIslamichorse-archer using the powerfulcomposite short-bow wasmostly a product of Islamicconversions of Eurasiansteppe nomads,most notablytheSeljukTurks,andwasnot

a decisive factor in thisexpedition north of thePyrenees.During battle Muslim

horsemen usually arrayed inthree formations (centre, andrightandleftwings)madeupof dense masses of tribalcontingents,thenchargedasawild unarticulated mass,striking as heavy cavalryshock troops with theirswords and light lances.

These mounted troops oftenattacked at dawn, whileinfantry attacks werelaunched during cover ofdarkness or from ambushduring the warmest andcoldest time of the year.Heavy infantry fought inunits eight to eleven ranksdeep, with light infantryarchersontheflanksorinthefront, shouting the Islamicbattle cry ‘Allahu Akbar’

(‘God is great’) as they mettheenemy.Iftheinitialattackfailed to break up enemyformations, the Muslimtroops would retreat and re-form, then attack again in anunarticulatedcharge.Word of the Muslim

invasion reached CharlesMartelwhilehewasengagedinoperationsalong theupperDanube River, forcing himback toAustrasia to evaluate

the situation. The duke ofAquitaine, who escaped thedebacle at Bordeaux, urgedthe mayor to move southimmediately to intercept theMuslims, but Charles,perhaps knowing somethingof the nature of Muslimarmies, wanted to wait untilthey were over-encumberedwith plunder. Islamic armieshad a tendency to acquirelarge amounts of treasure,

slowing the pace of the raid.And Muslim commanderswere reluctant to discouragelooting because the majorityof their troops fought solelyforthatpurpose.AstheladenMuslimarmynearedPoitiers,the Frankish mayor readiedhisarmytomeetit.Charles Martel’s army

included his loyal nobles,theirretainersandservants,aswell as Neustrian and

Austrasian allies, thoseAquitanianswhohadescapednorth to fight, and a largenumberofinfantryconscriptsswelling the ranks to protecttheirhomes.Thetotalnumbervariesfrom30,000to80,000,but only 15,000 to 20,000wereactuallymounted,anditwas this mounted contingentthat actually rode toward theArab forces in early October732. Most, if not all, of the

Frankish nobles and theirretainers were mounted,which gave Charles thestrategicmobilityherequiredtomovefromAustrasiatothearea near Tours in pursuit oftheMuslimarmy.The Frankish army that

faced the Muslim horsemenatTourswasintheprocessofevolution. It was no longerthe purely infantry force thatmet Narses at Casilinum in

554, nor was it a force thatfought from horseback.Charles Martel’s army wasprimarily a force ofmountedinfantry who dismounted tofight.Oncedismounted,thesetroops fought in the samedense, unarticulated fashionas they had centuries earlier,with men from the sameestate or towns standingtogether and feudal vassalsgatheredaroundtheirlords.

Still, Martel did possesssomeheavycavalryas shocktroops, perhaps asmany as afew thousand. The wealthiernoble horsemen wore mailhauberks and helmets, andcarried round convex shieldsandusedtheirlongswordsasfrequently as their lances forattack, while lesser vassalswore little or no protection,usuallyjustahelmet,carryingashieldandemployingalight

lance, long sword orscramasax. These lessarmouredheavycavalryoftenusedjavelinsaswell,creatinga fusion of heavy and lightcavalry.Stirrups,ifpresentatall, were certainly not acommon feature on Frankishcavalry in the early eighthcentury.Whenwidelyusedinthe early ninth century,stirrups would revolutionizemounted shock combat and

lead to the dominance ofheavy cavalry on Europeanbattlefields.As Charles secretly moved

his army to intercept theinvaders, the Muslims haltedtemporarily by the fortifiedcity of Poitiers. Leaving partofhisarmytoinvestthecity,Abd ar-Rahman advanced tothe Loire River, near Tours,plunderingenroute.Thesackof Poitiers undoubtedly

provided the Arabcommander’s army with agreat deal of plunder, addingtotheconsiderableamountoftreasure acquired since theinvasion began. But theMuslim army becamedisorganized while besiegingPoitiers. Discipline wassufferingbecauseofthegreedfor spoil, and the army wastotally oblivious to theapproaching Franks. Abd ar-

Rahman was preparing tobesiege Tours when hisscouts suddenly discoveredCharles Martel’s armymarching toward the city.Rather than expose hisplunder to danger, Abd ar-Rahman dispatched it southin a wagon train, then liftedthe siege of Tours andwithdrew slowly back toPoitiers. Martel pursued theretreating Muslim army,

almost certainly with hismountedcontingent.For six days the Muslims

withdrew, fighting delayingactions and pressing forPoitiers. Using his superiormobility, Martel finallyoutmanoeuvred the Arabgeneral by bringing hismounted army parallel to theMuslims’ escape route,forcing Abd ar-Rahman tooffer battle. The Muslims

made camp between Toursand Poitiers, probably nearCenon on the Vienne River.The Franks encamped neartheMuslimsandpreparedforthecomingengagement.As dawn broke, Charles

Marteldeployedhistroopsonsome high ground, forminghisdismountedinfantryintoanumberoflargeunarticulatedbattle squares (Map 2.2(a)).Charles realized hismounted

warriors were no match fortheskilledMuslimhorsemen,andsohedismountedmostofthem to strengthen his battlesquares. He did, however,maintain a small contingentofcavalryinordertocountertheMuslims’greatermobilityand plug breaches in hisinfantry lines. The Frankishmayor harboured a realisticfearthathisconscriptinfantrywould break under the

ferocity of Muslim charges,so he placed his veteranheavy infantry in the veryfront ranks of the battlesquares to better resist theMuslim mounted attacks.Martel’s battle squares wereprobably very similar to thedefensive shield wallformations that the Anglo-Saxons used against Normanheavy cavalry charges 334years later at the battle of

Hastings.The Muslims opened the

battle just after dawn withseveral cavalrycharges (Map2.2(b)). These attacks weresubsequently repeated allalong the lines, but theirpiecemeal nature made littleimpression on the Frankishshield walls. The Muslimsenjoyed much more successusing their horse archersagainst the lightly armoured

or unarmoured conscripts inthe centre of Charles’s battlesquares. Throughout themorning and afternoon,groupsofMoorsandBerbersthrew themselves again andagain at the Frankish lines,but the defenders’ shieldwalls held (Map 2.2(c)).Unable to co-ordinate aunified and cohesive chargeagainst the Franks, Abd ar-Rahman lost many of his

horsemen in small unitcharges. As eveningapproached, the exhaustedFrankishveteransinthefrontranks began to fail and theMuslims opened severalbreaches in the lines, cuttingtheirway into the vulnerablecentreoftheFrankisharmy.At the very moment when

the battle seemed to beturning in favour of theMuslims,wordspreadamong

those hacking their way intothe Frankish centre that theFranks were looting theircamp.Whetherbyaccidentordesign, a contingent ofFrankish horse rode aroundthe Muslims’ left flank andrear and began attacking theraiders’ tents and wagons.More concerned with theirwartreasurethanthebattleathand, the Muslim attackwavered, with some

horsemen breaking awayfrom the fighting in order torush back and protect theirthreatenedbase(Map2.2(d)).Sensing a change of fortune,Charles ordered his troopsonto theoffensive.The forceand suddenness of theFrankish counter-attacksurprisedAbdar-Rahmanandhe was left exposed as heattempted to rally hisretreating troops. Frankish

horsemen found the Arabgeneral and killed him (Map2.2(e)). News of Abd ar-Rahman’s death turned afrantic Muslim withdrawalinto a general rout. Asdarkness fell, a furiousFrankish counter-attackforcedtheMuslimarmybackintoitscamp.The Franks returned to the

protectionof theirowncampandspentanuneasynighton

constant alert to a Muslimnocturnalattack.But, totheirgreat surprise, the Franksdiscovered the next morningthat the Muslims had fledduring the night, abandoningall their plunder. In all,perhaps 10,000 Arabs werekilled at Tours. Most of theMuslim wounded wereofferednoquarter,giventheirprevious record of murderand pillage in Christian

territories.Frankishcasualtieswent unrecorded, but wereprobably moderate. Charlesrefused to pursue the fleeingMuslims, preferring insteadto take the treasure forhimselfandhisarmy.Charles Martel’s victory

overtheMusliminvaderswasa near-run thing. Still, thebattle illustrated howcompetent a commander theFrankish mayor was. He

understood the strength andweaknessesofhisownarmy,and those of his enemy. Onword of the Muslimexpedition, Martel quicklyorganized and dispatched anintercepting force, mountingit for greater strategicmobility. Once battle wasoffered, Martel showed hisunderstanding of the weaponsystems. Unwilling to meetthe more experienced

Moorish and Berber cavalryon the field, he dismountedhisowntroopsandplacedhisveterans in theforwardranksoftheshieldwalls,givinghistroopstheabilitytowithstanda full day ofMuslim cavalrycharges.Mostimportantly,heseized the initiative when hesawtheMuslimchargefalteron word of a successfulFrankish flank attack on theMuslim camp. This

decisiveness changed themomentum of the battle andcarriedtheday.

Map2.2. TheBattleofTours,732.(a)PhaseI:Finallyforcing

Abdar-Rahman’sMuslimarmytoofferbattleafterasix-daypursuit,CharlesMartel’sFrankisharmy

formsonhighground,hisdismountedheavyinfantryformingthefrontsofseveralunarticulatedbattlesquares.TheMuslimarmydeploysintothreesimilarlyunarticulatedwings

composedofheavyandlightcavalryaswellashorsearchers.TheMuslimarmyclosesthegapwiththeFranksdeployedonthehillside(1).(b)PhaseII:Abdar-Rahmanopenstheaction,chargingtheFranksacrossthebreadthoftheirline(1),buttheassaultlacksco-ordination,beingexecutedbysmallunitsofhorsemen

ratherthanlarger,morecohesiveelements.Theattackscontinuethroughtheday,andthoughtheFrankishshield-wallsstandfirm,casualtiesamongtheunarmouredFrankishconscriptsinthecentreofthesquaresbegintomountastheMuslims’horsearchersmaketheirpresencefelt(2).(c)PhaseIII:Asnightfallapproaches,theMuslimattacksbegintoweakentheveteranFrankishheavyinfantry(1).Gaps

begintoappearintheline(2)throughwhichMuslimcavalrymakeseveralbreaches,penetratingintothecentreoftheFrankishbattlesquares.WhilethebattleragesbetweenAbdar-

Rahman’shorsemenandCharles’sinfantrysquares,aportionofthe

FrankishcavalryreserveswingspasttheMuslimleftandrearandstrikesthetreasure-ladententsandwagonsoftheMuslimbaggagetrain(3).(d)PhaseIV:Aswordthattheirplunderisinjeopardybeginstospread,

Muslimcavalrymenturnawayfromthebattleareaandmovetoprotecttheirthreatenedbase(1).Recognizinghisgoodfortune,Charlesordershisarmytocounter-attack(2).(e)PhaseV:Thespeedandferocityofthe

Frankishcounter-attackcatchesAbdar-Rahmanbysurpriseandthe

Muslimleaderiscaughtandkilledby

Frankishcavalry(1)whiletryingtorallyhisretreatingarmy.Newsofhisdeathturnswithdrawalintorout,andtheIslamicforcesfleebacktotheremainsoftheircamp(2).Asnightfalls,Charlesorderhisarmyinto

camp,planningtorenewtheattackinthemorning,butdaylightfindsthe

Muslimforcesgone,havingabandonedtheirplunderandfled.

The Frankish victory atTours was also a greatstrategicvictoryforChristianEurope,bluntingasignificant

raiding expedition intosouthern Gaul. However, thevictory in itself did not savewestern Europe from theonslaught of Islam. CharlesMartel would face otherMuslim raiders in southernFrance, and a persistentIslamicpresencenorthof thePyrenees would not bevanquished until his sonPepinIII(‘theShort’)pushedtheMuslimsfromSeptimania

in 759. The armies ofChristianity and Islamcontinued to battle south ofthe Pyrenees for anotherseven centuries,with the lastIslamicoutpostofGranadainSpainsurrenderingtoIsabellaand Ferdinand in January1492.ThebattleofTourswasalso

a great political victory forCharles Martel, securing hispositionasthemostpowerful

man in France. TheCarolingians controlled theoffice of the mayor of thepalace from the mid-seventhcentury until 751, when thepope crowned Martel’s sonPepin(r.751–768)asthenewFrankishking,sanctioninganofficial change of dynasty.The Carolingian dynastyruled France until 987. Theascent of Pepin’s sonCharlemagne to the Frankish

throne in 768 ushered in thefirst post-classical empire inwesternEurope.The grandson of Charles

Martel, Charlemagne (fromCarolus magnus in Latin,‘Charles the Great’ inEnglish) built on theaccomplishmentsofhisfatherand grandfather. During hisforty-six-year reign between768 and 814, Charlemagneundertook an unprecedented

fifty-fourmilitarycampaigns,greatly expanding theterritory of the Frankishkingdom. And even thoughthe Frankish army wasrelatively small compared toarmiesof theclassicalperiod(modern estimates vary from5,000 to 35,000 men,excluding attendants), it wassufficient to carve out thelargest state western Europehad seen since the fallof the

WesternRomanEmpiresome300 years earlier. Hisimpressive military andpolitical achievements evenwonhimthetitleof‘emperoroftheHolyRomans’fromthepapacy on Christmas Day800.Charlemagne’s campaigns

took him to many areas inEurope. In 773 he led hisarmy into Italy, crushing theLombards and crowning his

son king of Italy. Four yearslaterCharlemagnecrossedthePyreneesintonorthernSpain.This campaign proveddisappointing. Despite theannihilation of his rearguardat Roncesvalles by theBasquesin778,Charlemagneand his successors weresuccessful in eventuallyestablishing the SpanishMarch, a string offortifications in Catalonia

which served as a defensivebulwark against Muslimraiding and a future base ofoperations for the Christianreconquest of Spain in theeleventhcentury.Charlemagne was more

successful in his easterncampaigns in Germany. In787 he invaded Bavaria andbrought that regionunderhisrule. In 790 his Frankisharmies marched east along

the Danube and met andutterly eradicated the AvarempireintheBalkans,seizingwealth accumulated in twocenturies of raiding andaddingittohisowntreasury.Perhaps Charlemagne’sgreatest success came inFrisiaandSaxony,aregioninnorthern Germany betweenthe Rhine and Elbe rivers.Beginning in 772,Charlemagnesethissightson

the conquest and conversionof these regions, butresistance was fierce(Charlemagne campaigned inSaxonyin772,785,792–793and798–803).Itwasnotuntil804, after eighteen annualcampaigns, that Saxony wasfinally pacified and added totheCarolingiandomain.Charlemagne never

developed a regular standingarmy; instead, he relied on

feudal levies to raise hisforces. It did not take theemperor long to assimilatenew regions into hismilitarymachine. Just twoyearsafterbringing Saxony into thekingdom, Charlemagnecreated a sliding scale ofmilitary contributions,orderingfiveSaxonvassalstoequip a sixth to campaign inSpain, and two to equip athird for Bohemia, while all

were required to campaignagainst regional threats. In807 he issued a capitularydecreeing all nobles in therealm holding a benefice (alease of land)were obligatedtoundertakemilitary service.Ifanoblefailedtomusterforwar, he risked theconfiscation of his estate.Charlemagne perfected thissystem to thepointwherehecould raise several annual

leviesandconductoperationson multiple fronts, includingGermany, Bohemia, BrittanyandSpain.The composition and

equipment of Charlemagne’sarmy was also continuouslyevolving. Initially, theCarolingian army comprisedmostly infantry, but ascampaigningtookhimfartherand farther from his base inAustrasia, Charlemagne soon

relied increasingly onmountedtroopsoverinfantry.His numerous capitulariespoint to the raised status ofcavalry. Between 792 and793 he issued regulationsrequiring vassals to have ahorse, shield, lance, sword,dagger, bow, quiver andarrows.Inotherroyaldecreeswealthiernobleswereorderedto come towarwearingmailand were asked to bring

rations for three months ofservice and clothing for six.Furthermore, these greatermagnates were to makecertain their own vassalscame on campaign with astandardized panoplyconsisting of shield, spear,bowandtwelvearrows.Evenattendantswererequiredtobearmedwithbows.Charlemagne’s military

success was not founded on

the decisive engagement;indeed history records himpresent at only three battlesduringhis lengthy reign.TheCarolingian emperor’ssuccesswas insteadbasedona well-trained andexperienced feudal fightingforce wearing down theenemy through a strategy ofattrition, and the ability toraise several armies forannualcampaignsindifferent

regions. He also recognizedthe impending threat to hisempire, building andgarrisoning forts along hisborders with the Muslims,Danes and Slavs. He evenwent so far as to try tomaintain his superiority inmilitary equipment bythreatening the forfeiture ofallpropertytoanyonesellingmail hauberks to foreigners,and death to any who

exported Carolingian swordsoutofthecountry.Finally, perhaps

Charlemagne’s greatestmilitary legacy was hisemphasis on cavalry as aninstrument of strategicmobility. And though thestirrup-stabilized lancer,probably present in limitednumbers duringCharlemagne’s reign, did notrevolutionize battle tactics in

thelateeighthandearlyninthcenturies, heavy cavalry’simportanceasthecentrepieceof the Carolingian tacticalsystem was a harbinger ofthings to come. As we shallsee, several events in theninth and tenth centurieselevated the position of thisshock cavalry on thebattlefieldsofwesternEuropeandledtotheirdominanceinmedieval warfare – the

invasions of the Muslims,Magyars and Vikings, andEurope’sresponse,theriseoffeudalism and heavycavalry’s adoption of thestirrup.

TheNinth-andTenth-CenturyInvasions:Muslims,MagyarsandVikingsatWar

The early medieval periodwitnessed themigrations andinvasions of numerouspeoples into Europe. TheincursionsofGermanictribeshad been part of thedissolution of the WesternRoman Empire in the fifthcentury. Later, the expansionof Islam across north AfricaandintotheIberianpeninsulathreatened Carolingiancivilization and ended any

hope of making theMediterranean a Christianlake. But in the ninth andtenth centuries westernEurope was besieged by anew wave of invasions ofseveral non-Christianpeoples. One old enemy, theMuslims, attacked from thesouth,and twonewones, theMagyars and Vikings,attacked from the east andnorth(Map2.3).

The first wave of Islamicexpansion ended under theAbbasid Caliphate (750–1258) in the middle of theeighth century, creating anempire which stretched fromSpain to Persia. Gradually,Muslim commanders beganto utilize sea bases in theiroccupied territories in northAfrica, Spain and southernGaul to attack the southerncoastline of Christianized

Europe. They invaded andoccupied Sicily in 827 andraided Italy, even threateningRome in 843.Muslim forcesalso destroyed Carolingiandefences in northern Spainand conducted raids intosouthern France, attackingmerchants and religiouspilgrimscrossingtheAlps.TheMagyarswereaFinno-

Ugric speaking people fromwestern Asia with many

similarities to the Turks.WhenintheninthcenturytheByzantine emperors bribedthem into attacking theBulgars, the latter in turnencouraged a people knownasthePechenegstoattacktheMagyars. Consequently, theMagyars were forced intoeastern and central Europe,andestablishedthemselvesinthe Carpathian basin. Fromtheir bases in Hungary, the

Magyars launcheddevastating raids westwardinto Germany, France andItaly, some thirty in all,between the years 898 and955. The Magyars fought asthey had on the Eurasiansteppes, as fast-moving andlightly equipped horsearchers. Abbot Regino ofPrum noted the Magyars‘killed few with their swordbut thousands with their

arrows’.Asmounted raiders,the Magyars sought slavesand moveable wealth and,liketheMuslimsandVikings,werequick to takeadvantageof their enemy’s politicaldissension. In Germany,Saxony andBavariawere hithardest,andbothregionspaidtribute to the raiders in the920s. But fortunes reversedfor the Magyars in the 930sand 940s, and by the early

950s they were poised forwhat would be their finalraiding expedition intowesternEurope.

Map2.3 TheMuslim,MagyarandVikingInvasions.

In 954 a massive Magyararmy of over 50,000 menswept through Bavaria andcentral France as far west asAquitaine. The Magyars hadcomewestasthealliesoftherebel Duke Conrad ofLotharingia, but their raidsfartherwestshowedtheirtrueinclinations. Thistransgression across southernGermany aroused the newking,Otto I, into action.The

sonof theSaxonkingHenryI, ‘the Fowler’ (r. 919–936),Otto wanted to repeat hisfather’s decisive victoryagainst the Magyars at thebattle of Riade nearMerseburg in 933. Ottoassumed the throne in 936andspentthefirstyearsofhisreignputtingdownrebellionsin Bavaria, Franconia,Lorraine and Saxony, andshoring up the frontier with

theMagyars. But the size ofthe Magyar incursion in 954convincedtheGermannoblesto put aside their differencesand rally around the royalstandard. Otto put an armyinto the field in the latesummer of 954, but failed tolocate the enemy before theend of the campaigningseason. The Magyar hostretreated to Hungary andwinteredonfamiliarsoil.

In late June 955 theMagyars returned to raidBavaria again with a largearmy, though historians areunsure precisely how large ahostitwas.33LedbyLel,theMagyargyula or general, theinvading army laid siege toAugsburg on 8 August, butabandoned thecityafteronlyone day when news reachedhim of Otto’s approachingarmy. Instead of playing to

theinherentstrengthsoflightcavalry and avoiding a set-pieceengagementastheyhadthe summer before, theMagyarsmovedtothenearbyLech River and made camp,seemingly inviting a pitchedbattle.OttoapproachedtheMagyar

position from the north-east,making camp upriver fromthe invaders. His army wasmade exclusively of heavy

cavalry units pledged to himby his vassals in Bavaria,Saxony, Franconia, Swabiaand Bohemia. Even DukeConradcametrue,addinghisbanner to the German king’scause.Otto’sarmynumberedbetween 7,000 and 8,000men, a purposefully smallmounted force capable ofstrategic surprise and greattacticalmobility.Hehopedtouse this small but better

armoured cavalry army todefeathismorenumerousbutlighter protected enemy, justashisfatherhaddonetwenty-two years earlier at Riade(Merseburg). The strategy ofrelying on the strategicmobility of cavalry to huntdown invading raiders hadservedCharlesMartelwellatTours in 732, and it wouldalsobeastrategyusedbytheFrench in their conflict with

English raiders during theHundred Years War in thefourteenth and fifteenthcenturies. Ordering his mento fast and pray the nightbefore the battle, and joiningthematMassonthemorningof 10 August, Otto mountedhis army and trotted towardthe Magyars through brokenterrain in order to counteractMagyar light cavalryskirmishers.

Like all medieval armies,the order of march wasdictated by nationality,battlefield reputation andpersonalrelationshipwiththeleadinglord.Onthisday, thevanguard was held by threedivisions of Bavarians,followed by the Franks(commanded by the nowamicableDukeConrad).OttocommandedtheSaxonsinthemiddle of the column,

followed by two divisions ofSwabians and the Bohemiancavalry in the rear, chargedwith escorting the army’sbaggage train. Each divisionhad a strength of roughly1,000 men. As the Germanhost rode down the easternbankof theLechRiver, theyfailed to notice a Magyarlight cavalry force riding inthe opposite direction on thewestern bank, hidden by

banksovergrownwithfoliage(Map 2.4(a)). The MagyarlightcavalrycrossedtheLechand attacked the rear of theGerman column, rainingarrows on the Bohemiansguardingthebaggage,andtherout spread to the twoSwabiandivisions,whobrokeandfled(Map2.4(b)).Insteadof pressing their advantage,the victorious Magyars thenstopped to pillage the

baggage train, giving Ottomuch needed time to redresshis lines. The German kingorderedDukeConradandhisFranks out of column and tothe rear, where they quicklyran down the dismountedpillagers, then, forgoingpursuit, returned to assisttheir comrades in the majorengagement (Map 2.4(c)).With his rear now protected,Otto ordered his army from

column into line of battle,gamblingthattheweightofaheavy cavalry charge wouldoverwhelm his opponent andwintheday(Map2.4(d)).

Map2.4. TheBattleofLechfeld,955.(a)PhaseI:KingOtto’sGermanhost

(includingacontingentofFranksundertheMagyars’erstwhileallyDukeConrad)movestowardsgyulaLel’sinvadingarmythroughbrokenterrainalongtheLechRiver.Ontheoppositebankandscreenedbytheruggedterrain,aMagyarlight

cavalryforcemovestostriketherearoftheGermancolumn(1).(b)PhaseII:Strikingswiftly,theMagyarhorsearchersrouttheBohemiancontingentguardingtheGermanbaggagetrain(1).ThepanicspreadstothetwoSwabiandivisions(2)andthe

MagyarspausetopillagetheGermanwagons(3)ratherthanmountapursuit.(c)PhaseIII:Ottoorders

ConradandhisFrankishcontingentoutofcolumntoattackthenow

dismountedMagyarpillagers(1),whoareswiftlydestroyed(2).(d)PhaseIV:Withtherearofhiscolumnnowsecure,Ottore-formshisarmy(1)and

theGermancolumncontinuestowardstheMagyarposition(2).

(e)PhaseV:Ottoordershisarmytodeployfromcolumntoline(1).Lel’sMagyarcavalryfollowssuit,slightlyoverlappingtheGermanflanks(2),thegyulaplacinghismostreliable,better-armedhorsemeninthefrontrankofhisformation.(f)PhaseVI:Seekingaquickdecision,eachsidecharges(1),theGermansdepending

ontheirheavierweightandgreatershockpower,theMagyarscountingontheirgreaternumbersand

manoeuvrabilitytogainvictory.Astheopposingranksconverge,the

MagyarslooseavolleyofarrowsintotheGermanranks(2)butfailtocheck

theirenemy’sadvance.Otto’shorsemenincreasetheirgaittoafullchargeastheyclosewiththehorsearchers.(g)PhaseVII:Beforethehorsearcherscanlaunchasecond

volleyofarrows,Otto’sheavycavalrycrashintotheirranks(1).AsthelightlyarmouredMagyarcavalry

begintogivewayundertheonslaughtofthearmouredGermanlancers,Lel

ordersaportionofhisarmytofeignretreat(2),hopingtoinduceapursuitonthepartofindividualknightsandturnthetablesonhisfoe.(h)PhaseVIII:TheMagyarrusefails,andunderrelentlessGermanpressureLel’sforcesbegintobreakandflee(1)fromthebattlefield.ManyoftherefugeesdrowninattemptingtocrosstheLechinanefforttoescape;thosethatattempttohideinthearea’sforestsarebetrayedbythelocalpeasantryandarecaptured.

AstheGermanheavyhorsearrayedforbattle,Lelorderedhis own larger contingent ofcavalry to mirror the enemyformation, slightlyoverreaching the German

frontage. The gyula placedhis most loyal and best-equipped troops in theforward line and theremainder of his horse in asecond line. Magyar lightcavalry, like the Scythiansand Parthians before andTurks and Mongols after,fought primarily as horsearcherswithcompositebows.In hand-to-hand combat,Magyar warriors wielded

sabres with a slight curve ormaces, and wore very littlearmour, if any at all. Lelknew his light cavalry wereno match for the Germanheavycavalryinfrontofhimin shock combat, but he didenter thebattleoutnumberinghis enemy five to one.Wanting a decisiveencounter, both armies rodetoward a fateful collision(Map2.4(f)).

Otto’s heavy cavalry keptgood order as they closedwith theenemy, transitioningfrom a trot to a gallop to afullchargejustbeforecontactwith the oncoming Magyarlightcavalry.Atthismoment,Otto is said to have shouted:‘They surpass us, I know, innumbers, but neither inweapons nor in courage.Weknowalso that theyarequitewithout the help of God,

which is thegreatest comfortto us.’ As the two armiesclosed, theMagyars let looseavolleyofarrowshaftsatthechargingChristians,nodoubtthinning their ranks a little,but theGermanlineheldandreached the enemy before asecond volley could belaunched (Map 2.4(g)). TheMagyar formation began tocollapse under the weight oftheGermanheavyhorse,and

Lel ordered a portion of hislight cavalry to fall back inthe signature steppe warriormock retreat, but theChristiannoblesfailedtotakethe bait (Map 2.4(h)). TheMagyar lines collapsed ashorse and rider scrambled toget out of the way of thecharging lancers, only to bepushed into the Lech.Fighting continued for someten hours. Casualty figures

are not given for either side,though probably the Germanrearguard suffered heavily inthe first exchange, and it isknownthatDukeConradwasslain by a Magyar arrowpiercing his throat, hisreputation redeemed. Thosefew Magyars who escapedtheriverattempted tohide inthe countryside, only to bepointed out to the pursuingGermans by local peasants.

Instead of ransoming theMagyar princes and noblesback to their vassals as wascustomary for the time, Ottoordered them hanged, thensenttherestofthebarbariansbacktotheirhomelandminusearsornoses.The Magyars were crushed

at the battle of Lechfeld byOttoI,avictorythatwonhimthe title of holy Romanemperor, an honour

sanctioned by bothByzantium and the papacy.German holy Romanemperorswoulddominatethepolitical affairs of centralEuropeforthenexttwoandahalf centuries. The battle ofLechfeldalsoendedonceandfor all Magyar raiding inwestern Europe. By the endof the tenth century theMagyars had converted toRoman Catholicism and

settled down to establish thekingdom of Hungary. UnderKingStephenI(r.997–1038)and his descendants, it grewinto a powerful Christiankingdom,onethatwouldbearthe brunt of other nomadicinvasionsfromtheeast,mostnotably the Mongols andOttomanTurks.By far themost devastating

andwidespreadattacksoftheperiodcamefromtheVikings

of Scandinavia. The Vikingswere a Germanic peoplebased in Norway, Swedenand Denmark, and theirmovements constitute thefinal wave of Indo-Europeanmigration. Warriors, traders,superb shipbuilders andsailors, the Vikings in theirtrademark longships pushedsouth from their homelandand attacked the whole ofEurope. Norwegian Vikings

moved into Ireland andwestern England, while theDanes attacked easternEngland, Frisia and theRhineland, and navigatedrivers to enter westernCarolingian territories.Swedish Vikings controlledthe Baltic Sea and pushedinto Slavic areas in easternEurope. Moving into north-western Russia, the Swedessailed up and down that

region’s rivers to Novgorodand Kiev, and establishedfortified ports in these areas,ultimately influencing thedevelopmentofearlyRussiancivilization.SailingdowntheDnieperandDonriverstotheBlackSea,theymadecontactwiththeByzantineEmpireasboth traders and raiders, andthe Byzantine emperor evenhired Russo-SwedishVikings, the Varangians, as

his personal bodyguard. TheVikings also sailed west andsettledintheFaroes,Iceland,Greenland and, for a shorttime,NorthAmerica.The Viking age of

expansion and conquest hadits beginnings in a culturepermissive of ship-basedraiding. The shore raid orstrandhogg was an age-oldViking tradition, one wherewarriors would beach their

longship, roundupcattleandsheep,thensailoff.ThisformofmedievallivestockrustlingwasevendoneinScandinaviaitselfuntilitwasoutlawedbythe centralized monarchiesthat rose in the ninth andtenth centuries, forcing thestrandhogg into foreignwaters. Incursions againstcontinental Europe and theBritish Isles brought moreopportunities, with Vikings

returning from their seasonalraidswithyoungwomenandhealthy youths for thethrivingslavetrade.Early Viking raids were

carried out normally in thesummer, with Scandinavianwarriors sacking coastalvillages and towns,destroying churches andmonasteries, and easilydefeating local, mostlyinfantry-basedmilitias.Inthe

first decades of the ninthcentury, Viking raidinginvolved small numbers ofshipsandwasmostlydirectedagainst Europe’s coastline.ButthedeathofCharlemagnein 814 and the chaos thatfollowedundertheweakruleof his son and successorLouis the Pious offered anattractive target for Vikingmarauders.Asnewsspreadofthe wealth and vulnerability

of the Frankish interior,Vikings appeared in greaternumbers. By the 830s largerDanish fleets werethreatening England as wellwith seasonal raids. Duringthe winter of 840–841, theNorwegian Vikings switchedfrom seasonal raids towintering in enemy territory,stayingforthefirsttimeonasmall island off the coast ofIreland. When the

Carolingian empire eruptedinto civilwar at the death ofLouis the Pious in 843,Vikings set up permanentbases at the mouth of theLoire and Seine rivers, thenlaunched raids inland,sometimes on ships,sometimes on capturedhorses.The size of Viking armies

also varied depending on theperiod. Early ninth-century

raids consisted of a fewlongships and maybe 100warriors. But by 865 Vikingactivity in western Europewas concentrated in a ‘GreatArmy’ made up of fleets ofhundreds of ships carryingthousands ofVikingwarriorsand led by severalScandinavian kings. Between865 and 879, and againbetween 892 and 896, the‘Great Army’ plundered

England, with the Danesoccupying an area known asDanelaw in north-easternEngland. AcceptingChristianity, the Danes wereeventually assimilated intothe larger Anglo-Saxonkingdom,givingtheirgreatestwarriors,thehuscarles,totheEnglish king as bodyguards.On the continent the ‘GreatArmy’ devastated Flanders,raided deep into the Rhine

valley,andevenlaidsiegetoParis in the winter of 885–886withperhapsasmanyas40,000 men and 700 ships,thoughprobably thenumbersinvolvedweremuchsmaller.But as widespread as the

Viking raiding and invasionwas, the Vikings were, infact, not particularly good atwinning battles. Many oftheir victories came fromattacking soft, undefended

targets such as churches andmonasterieswellstockedwithecclesiastical treasures andMass wine. When regionalarmies finally organized andoffereddetermined resistancein the late ninth century, thefortunes of the Vikingschanged. In England theSaxon king Alfred the Great(r. 871–899) built wallsaround his towns, creatingburhs, and founded the first

English navy in 875 tointerceptDanishfleetsatsea.In France cities were walled(or if dilapidated by neglect,re-walled), and fortifiedbridges were constructedacross major rivers to closeaccess to the interior.Unaccustomed tofortifications, the Vikingsusuallymovedon.Moreover,when battle was offered bythe defenders of a realm, the

Vikings often preferrednegotiationsorwithdrawal toaset-pieceengagement.At the beginning of the

ninth century, Vikingwarriors were not the well-armoured, disciplinedfighting machines of legend,but rather traders and raiderswho became well off aspirates. As word of the firstVikingsuccessspreadamongtheir countrymen, more and

more Scandinavians enteredthe marauding profession.The core component ofmostVikingarmieswascomposedof freemenbondi (sometimesdrengs, thegns or yeomen).The bondi were the standardinfantry levy units of thearmyandconsistedofnormalViking men such as farmersand labourers. The bondicould be organized into thesmaller ‘pirate bands’ or

raiding groups or into largerinfantry blocs when attachedto a royal army or largeterritorial force.These troopsrangedinfightingability,andastheVikingageprogressed,many men gave up theirfarms to become full-timewarriors. Besides making upthe bulk of the normalinfantry, some of the bondiperformed a skirmishing roleand would have most likely

been armed with bows orothermissileweapons.There was no standardized

Viking panoply, but typicalViking arms and armourconsisted of sword orbattleaxe,spear,anda round,wooden shield 30 to 40inches in diameter with acentral iron boss. Chiefs andveterans might also wear aleather helm or metalspangenhelm (a forerunner to

the Norman conical helm)and ring-reinforced leatherjerkin or mail hauberk.Vikings, like their Germanicforebears,preferredtheswordas their primary offensivearm, though the expense ofthis weapon often forcedwarriors to use axes andspears. The very best swordswere imported fromFrankishlands (despite Carolingiancapitularies threatening

capital punishment if armssellers were caught), thoughScandinavian craftsmenusually fitted them withornate hilts and grips ofprecious metal, bone, hornand walrus ivory. Vikingsword blades were usuallypattern-welded and double-edged,averaging32inchesinlength, with a shallow fulleron each side to reduce theweightoftheseheftyblades.

Battleaxes and spears werealso used by Scandinavianwarriors.Theaxe,whichhadbeen nearly abandoned inwarfareintherestofEurope,found favour again in thehandsofVikings.Threetypesofbattleaxewereusedduringthis period: the skeggox or‘bearded axe’, so-calledbecause of its asymmetricalblade and used in the eighthcentury; an intermediate type

usuallyreferredtoasa‘handaxe’; and the breidox or‘broad axe’, first seen at theend of the tenth century andmadefamousbythehuscarlesat thebattleofHastings.Thebroadaxetookitsnamefromthe blade’s distinctivecrescent shape, large size(usually 12 inches along itscurvededge),and5foothaft.This long-hafted axe alsobecamethesignatureweapon

oftheVarangianGuard.Viking spearswere of light

and heavy varieties: theformer were thrown asjavelins and had narrowblades and slim shafts,whilethelatterwereusedforshockcombat and had broad, leaf-shaped blades and thicker,often iron-shod shafts. Bothtypes of spear blade weresocketed and some had shortside-lobes jutting out just

above the socket. This lasttypeisoftenreferredtoastheViking ‘winged’ spear.Finally, archery also held animportant, if ancillary, placein Vikingwarfare, as can beseen by the role missile-fireplayedinbothlandandnavalengagements. The bowsthemselves were of varioustypes, including short andlong varieties of self-bows.Composite bows were also

used, perhaps because ofcontactswithsteppepeoples.In battle the Vikings

attacked and defended intypical Indo-Europeanfashion. Offensively, theyutilized the ‘boar’s head’wedge array, concentratingtheshockimpactoftheattackon a small frontage with theaim of breaking through theopponents’ formation. Oncethe enemy’s line had been

breached, Viking warriorsbrokeintoindividualcombat,cutting and slashing withtheir swords, or swingingtheir two-handed axes.Defensively, the Vikingsformed a shield wall five ormore men deep, standingclose enough to lock shieldsand presenting a frontage ofonly 11/2 feet per man. Iflight infantry archers andjavelineerswerepresent,they

usually stood behind theircompanions and fired overtheir heads at the enemy.Vikings rarely used cavalryas a tactical system; insteadthey mounted infantry forstrategic mobility anddismountedforbattle.

AVikingBattleatSea:TheBattleofNisaThe primary instrument of

Scandinavian overseasaggression was the longship.Long,narrow-keeledandflat-bottomed vessels withbeautifully carved archedprows, the first longshipscarried around thirty-fivewarriors.Theyweremadeofoakusingclinkerconstruction(overlapping planks heldtogether with clinch bolts)with a mast amidships andonebankofoarsoneachside.

Controlled with two steeringoars, these vessels hadshallow draughts making itpossible for them tonavigateup rivers and alongcoastlines,givingtheVikingsunprecedented strategicmobility. The Gokstad ship,builtinthesecondhalfoftheninth century, was over 76feet long and 12 feet wide,anddrew less than34 inchesofwater, giving it the ability

tosailupriversandestuariesinto shallow waters only 3feet deep. Longships werealso easy to beach andportage over short distancesusingrollersandmanpower.After 1000, the

Scandinavians built largerwarships, known asdrekkarsor ‘dragon ships’, capable ofcarrying perhaps as many aseighty warriors on raidingexpeditions, invasions and,

curiously, large navalengagements against rivalViking fleets. These larger,taller vessels wereparticularlysuitedforthelastpurpose because, unlikelongships,drekkarshadhigh,planked decks fore and aft,fromwhicharrowsandspearscouldberaineddownontheiropponents’decks.Apparentlydifficult to manoeuvre inbattle, these medieval

dreadnoughts weresometimes lashed together‘stem to stem and stern tostern’tocreatelarge,floatingbattlefields of oak, canvasand rope. Often dozens ofViking ships were tiedtogether, with the largerdrekkarsplacedinthemiddleofthelineasacommandpostfor kings and commanders,while unfettered longshipsprotected the flanks of the

tethered vessels. Acontemporary historian, SaxoGrammaticus, explains thebenefits of lashing shipstogetherforcombat:Havingorderedtheshipsina line, they joined themtogether with grapples, sothat being bound togetherthe fleet might easily ridedown any enemy in itspath. And when they werebrought together for this

purpose, they were joinedtogether solidly, for flightor victory, as it would notbe possible for anyone tobreak free from hiscolleagues. Thus theyplanned to make theirweakness strong by thistactic.Not built for ramming,Viking ships could notduplicate the tactics of theancient triremes, and so

medieval sea battles usuallyconsisted of closing on anopposing vessel, grapplingthe two ships together andthenfightinginclosequartersuntil one side was defeated,theenemyshipcapturedor,ifdamaged,scuttled.Inthecaseof large engagements, oneside chose to take thedefensive by lashing theirships together, while theattacking navy either moved

in on the tethered flotilla asindividual ships, grappling,clearing and cutting awayshipsonebyone,orattackedasatetheredarmadaitself.Inthese ship-to-ship battles, theVikings attempted to matchlarger ships to smaller andfavoured missile fire frombows and spears over hand-to-hand shock combat.Because of the nature of thisattrition warfare, Viking sea

battles tended to drag on farlonger than engagementsfought on land, often takinghourstoconclude.

Map2.5. TheBattleofNisa,1062.(a)PhaseI:Fromhis70-oardrekkar,KingHaraldIIIHardradaleadsa

300-shipNorwegianfleettoanappointedlocationtobattleKingSveinnEstridson’sDanishfleet.(b)PhaseII:TheDanesfailtoarriveattherendezvousattheappointedtime,leadingHardradatobelievetheyhaverefusedthechallenge.Heordershalfofhisfleet,containinghismilitiatroops,toreturnhome(1).The

Norwegianfleet,reducedinnumberbutcrewedbyHardrada’sfinest

warriors,continueson(2).(c)PhaseIII:AshalfofHardrada’sfleetsailsoutofsight,theDanessuddenlyappear,300strong(1).Hardrada

preparestofight,orderingmostofhisremaininglongshipstobelashed

togethersidebyside(2).Twogroupsofvesselsremainuntetheredto

protecttheNorwegians’flanks(3).(d)PhaseIV:EstridsonfollowstheNorwegianleadandorderstheDanishfleettocloseupandropetogether(1).TheDanishkingseizestheinitiativeandordershisfleettorowtowardstheenemy(2).Hardradaordershisforcetofollowsuit(3),andthetwosidesslowlyclosewitheachotherasdaylightbeginstofade.

(e)PhaseV:Theopposinglinesclash,andtheairisfilledwitharrowsasDanishandNorwegianarchersplytheirdeadlytrade.Thefightcontinuesthroughthenight,andneithersideis

abletogainadecisiveadvantage.(f)PhaseVI:ThedeadlockisbrokenwhenoneoftheNorwegianflank

elementsunderthecommandofEarlHakonIvarssonsailsaroundthemainbattleanddrivesoffthesmallerDanishvessels(1).Severalhours

later,Hakonreinforcesafailingflank(2)anddrivesbacktheDanes.TheNorwegiansoffernoquarterand

begintocleartheDanishvessels(3),boardingSveinnEstridson’sflagshiplast(4).Bydawn,seventyofthe

tetheredDanishlongshipsareclearedofopponentsandtheNorwegiansarevictorious,thoughSveinnEstridsonis

abletoescape.

One such long sea battletook place at Nisa on 9August 1062 between thefleets of King Harald IIIHardrada of Norway andKing Sveinn Estridson ofDenmark. This was thesecondbattlebetweenthetworival monarchs and seems to

have been joined by mutualconsent. Hardrada, unhappyabout being unable toconquer Denmark despitesuccessful annual raids,hoped for a large decisivevictory over Estridson.Having raised a large armyfrom the whole of Norway,Hardrada placed the men on300ships,leadingthearmadafrom his own seventy-oardrekkar (Map 2.5(a)). He

sailedtotheappointedspotatthe prearranged time andwaited for his Danish foe toarrive, but Estridson’s fleetwas not there. Believing theDanes had refused battle,Hardrada dismissed the halfof his ships containing themilitiatoreturntotheirfarmsandpreparedforanotheryearof raiding (Map 2.5(b)).Thosewarriorswhoremainedwere the veterans of

numerous raids, and somemay have fought atHardrada’s side during hisdays in Russia andByzantium. One of theVarangian Guard’s moredistinguished soldiers,Hardrada spent most of histwenties in the Byzantineemperor’semployment,risingtobecomethe‘leaderofallofthe Varangians’ and thenreturning to Norway to

becomekingin1047.But as half of the

Norwegiannavysailedoutofsight, the Danish fleetappeared, 300 ships strong(Map2.5(c)).Refusingtofleefromhisnumericallysuperiorenemy,Hardrada ordered hisremaining ships lashedtogether, placing his own‘dragonship’ inthecentreoftheline.Unfetteredlongshipsprotected the flanks,

includingthewarshipsofEarlHakon Ivarsson. Mirroringthe Norwegians, Estridsonordered his warships ropedtogether in a line, his ownshipinthecentre,andseizingthe initiative, rowed againstthe enemy (Map 2.5(d)). Asthe tethered Danish lineslowly rowed forward,Hardrada ordered his ownNorwegian fleet to meet theadvancing Danes. The two

bound Viking armadasclashed as the sun began toset.According to both Danish

and Norwegian sources, thebattle lasted into andthroughout the night, withboth sides evenly matched(Map 2.5(e)). The prominentrole of missile warfare inship-to-shipcombatisevidentfrom a poem written aboutHardrada’s prowess as an

archer:Norway’skingwasbendingHis bow throughout thatnight,RainingashowerofarrowsOn the white shields ofDenmark,Bloodyspear-pointsopenedHolesinironarmour;Shields were pierced byarrowsFrom Harald’s deadlydragon.

Hardrada’s prowess with abow was not unusual, andViking sources tell us thatnumerousVikingheroesdiedby missile fire, includingHarold Bluetooth, KingHakon and, ironically,perhaps Harald Hardradahimself.The turning point came

hours into the battle whenEarl Hakon Ivarsson orderedhis warships from their

flanking position to sailaround themain battle groupand prey on smaller andweaker Danish vessels(2.5(f)).Hours later,Hakon’swarships buttressed a failingflank,forcingtheDanesback.Sveinn Estridson’s warshipwas the last boarded. Noquarter was given and thoseDanes not killed jumpedoverboard. By dawnEstridson’sfleetwasdefeated

andnofewer thanseventyofthe Danish king’s tetheredshipshadbeencleared.Estridson escaped the

slaughterbyjumpingintothewater and swimming forHakon Ivarsson’s ship.Donning a disguise, theDanish king was brought onboardand inexplicably led toshore on Hakon’s order,eventually escaping back toDenmark. Though initially

recognizedas theheroof thebattle, the earl was quicklycondemnedbytheNorwegianking and exiled. Ultimately,the battle of Nisa provedindecisive.Twoyearslater,in1064, the twokings signed apeace treaty ending years ofNorwegian raiding, andKingHarald Hardrada looked tothe west for new lands toconquer. In 1066 a massiveNorwegian fleet set sail for

England in the last greatinvasionoftheVikingage.

ResponsetoInvasion:TheRiseofHeavyCavalryinWesternEuropeWhen the Carolingian worldbegan to disintegrate in theface ofMuslim,Magyar andViking raiding and invasionin the ninth and tenth

centuries, a new socialorganizationarosetomeettheforeignthreats.Intheensuingchaos, distances were toogreat, communication tooprimitive, the aristocracy toofirmly entrenched, and theFrankish army too small andunwieldy for the Carolingianmonarchy to assume strongleadership in defending therealm.Military responsibilitydescendedmore andmore to

the aristocracy, who werebetter able to protect theirregions from the suddendepredations of foreignraidingandinvasion.WesternEurope’s response to thissecondwaveofinvasionswasthe development of asophisticated socialorganization known tohistorians as feudalism (fromthe Latin word feudummeaning‘fief’).

Feudalism contained twocomponentparts–apersonalelementcalled vassalage andapropertyelementcalled thebenefice. The practice ofvassalage was derived fromGermanic society and wasbased on a warrior chiefattractingfollowerstohimselfon certain conditions,primarily military. It wasgrounded in the practice ofthe comitatus, the following

of a great chief, which wasdescribed by the Romanauthor Tacitus in his workGermania. In Germanicpractice, this relationshipbetween chief and followerswas one between socialequals.Bytheeighthcentury,one who served a lord in amilitary capacity was knownasavassal.Feudalism also contained a

property element, which was

ultimately fused with thepersonal element ofvassalage. In the late Romanperiod it became customaryfortheownersoflatifundiatohire retainers towork for theowner, with the lordproviding a grant of land orbenefice as payment. In thechaos of the early medievalperiod, the latifundiabecamethe medieval manor, thehereditary possession of

greater and lesser Germaniclords. From the seventhcenturyonward,thesemanorswere increasingly worked byserfs rather than peasants,poor agriculturalists whotraded manual labour forprotection against Muslim,VikingandMagyarraiders.Because of the expense of

the knight’s panoply and thetime and practice required tobecome a skilled equestrian

and lancer, the medievalheavy cavalryman needed tobe economically supported.Consequently, lords whowanted the services of thisnew and expensive weaponsystemwererequiredtogranteach vassal a benefice, apiece of land from theirhereditary possessions thatprovided the vassal’seconomic support. In returnfor this grant of land the

vassalprovided the lordwithmilitaryservice.By theninthcentury, the benefice becamethe fief as it acquired newcharacteristics involving theexercise of political power.The fief differed from thebenefice in that the vassalenjoyed the rights ofjurisdiction or political andlegalauthoritywithinhisfief.In theeighthcentury,under

theCarolingianmayorsofthe

palace, the personal elementofvassalagedevelopedtothepoint where vassals wereholding benefices. Thiseconomic arrangementemerged out of the mayor’sneed for a specializedwarrior, the heavycavalryman.Heavycavalryintheearlymedievalperiodwasgradually evolving.Merovingian heavy cavalrypresent at thebattleofTours

in 732 used franciscs fromhorseback and loosed theirspears during passes. Butduring the reign of the age’smost powerful monarch,Charlemagne(r.768–814),animproved heavy shockcavalry made its appearancein western Europe utilizinglarger horses, standardizedarms and armour, andemphasizing the sword andlanceasitsprimaryweapons.

The stirrup-stabilized heavycavalryman also made hisappearance during the reignof Charlemagne, but not insufficient numbers to affectcavalry tactics. The realimpact of the stirrup onmedieval warfare would notbe felt until afterCharlemagne’sdeathin814.The stirrup, which was

believedtohaveoriginatedinChina, was probably

introduced to the west sometimebeforetheeighthcenturyeither by the Byzantines, theMuslims,ortheAvars.Whencombinedwith a saddle builtup at the pommel and cantlefor longitudinal support, thestirrupweldedriderandhorsetogether. Rather thanthrusting out himself, thelancer now held his weaponatrestinthecrookofhisarm,usingthecombinedweightof

his body and his chargingmount to deliver a blow ofunprecedented violence.Utilizing the energy of thehorse and the new-foundstability provided by thestirrup, this new heavycavalry used its spears aslances to defeat its enemiesand secure a position at thetopofthesocialhierarchy.The Franks became famous

for the irresistible charge of

theirheavycavalry,and theirtactics spread fromFrance toall of western Europe. Theappearance of the stirrup-stabilized horsemen alteredthe balance of power amongthe four weapon systems.This change was especiallyimportantbecauseitappearedat a time when westernEuropean armies could nolonger field well-articulatedheavy infantry to oppose the

lancers.With themarriageofstirrup and heavy cavalrylancer, the dominant weaponsystem of the Middle Ageshadmadeitsappearance.The rise ofmedieval heavy

cavalry can be traced in thetechnological evolution ofarms and armour, with thecentrepiece of the knight’soffensive arsenal being hissword. The evolution of thecavalry sword in Europe

dates back to the Romanspatha andGermanic swordsof antiquity, long narrowweapons designed forslashingratherthanthrusting.In the Germanic world, thesword was a symbol ofmanhood,sometimesgiventoa boy at birth or at hisnaming, or presented at hismajority as a symbol of hisrite of passage from child towarrior.Theseweaponswere

often given personal namesandbecameheirloomspassedon from generation togeneration. InCharlemagne’smanycapitulariesthatrefertoweapons,theswordisalwaysprominent and was oftenrepresented as thecavalryman’s primaryweapon.Evidence of the primacy of

the sword in the Carolingiancavalryman’s panoply can be

seen in the disappearance ofthe francisc and single-edgedscramasax in the eighthcentury, replaced by the 44inchlongsword,bettersuitedby its reach for combat onhorseback. The mail shirtlengthened to cover the hips,andmailgreavesorchaussesalso appeared. The roundshield gave way to a kite-shaped shield in order toprotect the equestrian’s leg.

These changes offeredsuperior protection for theknightagainsthisunmountedfoes, while giving him thenecessary reach to kill them.By 1000, all of the essentialelements of knightlyequipmentwereinplace.

CHAPTER3

THEHIGHMIDDLEAGES:HEAVYCAVALRYDOMINANT

TheNormanConquestsofEnglandandItaly

In the ninth and early tenthcenturies, a second age ofinvasions besieged westernEurope, threatening the re-emerging civilization of theLatin kingdoms. From thenorth came the Vikings andfrom the east, the Magyars,while Muslim pirates stillplagued the Mediterranean.One western Europeanmonarch’s solution to thisdevastating raiding was to

utilizean‘ifyoucan’tdefeatthem,employ them’ strategy.In 911 the Frankish kingCharles the Simple did justthat,concludinga treatywitha Norwegian chief namedRolloandaskinghimtosettleat the mouth of the SeineRiver, in effect creating aViking buffer state innorthern France. Rolloconverted to Catholicism,married Charles’s daughter,

and founded Normandy, the‘landoftheNorthmen’.Soon,theNormans assimilated intoFrench culture, exercisingtheir untamed militaryprowess within theframeworkoffeudalism.Armed with long swords

and protected by theirtrademarkconicalhelm,mailhauberk and kite shield,Norman knights became anirresistible juggernaut on the

battlefield. By the middle ofthe eleventh century, theNormans were the pre-eminent heavy cavalry inwestern Europe. As Normanmilitary power grew, so didtheirpoliticalaspirations,andsouthernItalyandSicilyweretheir first conquest. At firsttheNormanscametoItalyasmercenaries, serving theByzantines against theMuslims or fighting for

Lombard noble familiesagainst the Greeks. Fromtheir first success at Salernoin 1016 to the unification oflowerItalyandSicilyintothekingdom of the Two Siciliesin1129,NormanstrengthwassufficienttodrivetheGermanemperor Henry IV out ofRomeandtakePopeGregoryVII under their protection.The Normans evenconsidered the conquest of

the Byzantine capital ofConstantinople.But Norman conquests

would not be limited to theMediterranean. The Normanlord William the Bastard(c.1028–1087), seventh dukeof Normandy and directdescendent of Rollo, laidclaim to the English throneafter the death of theAnglo-Saxon king Edward theConfessor. The duke of

NormandymadegoodonhisclaimbycrossingtheEnglishChannel in late September1066withanarmyof11,000Norman,Breton andFlemishmen, challenging Edward’ssuccessor, King HaroldGodwinson, at the battle ofHastings in south-eastEngland.Theautumnof1066proved

to be a difficult time for thenew Anglo-Saxon king, a

monarch who awaited twoinvasion fleets to challengehis throne.InJanuary,onthevery day Edward theConfessor was laid to rest,Harold Godwinson, earl ofWessex,wasproclaimedkingof the Anglo-Saxons by theWitan or Grand Council inLondon. But Harold realizedhis claim would not gouncontested.InNorway,KingHarald Hardrada wanted to

re-establish the Viking claimto the English throne. ThevictorattheseabattleofNisaonly four years before,Hardrada intrigued with thenew Anglo-Saxon king’sbrother, Tostig, thedisgruntled earl ofNorthumbria. In order toreinstate Tostig in northernEngland and establish afootholdforfurtherconquest,Hardrada launched an

invasionfleetof300ships inmid-September. The Vikingfleet entered the HumberRiver and disembarked aforce of 9,000men 10milessouth-east of York, theirintended target, where theywere joined by Tostig’ssupporters(Map3.1).On20September,Hardrada

met and defeated an Anglo-Saxonarmyofperhaps4,000menatFulfordGate.Thecity

ofYork quickly surrendered,and Hardrada pulled out ofthe city to the safety ofRiccall, east of York, wherehis fleet was anchored. Thenewsof theEnglishdefeatatFulford reached Godwinsonin London, where he waswaiting to see which of thetwo expected invasion forceswould strike first, theNorwegianinthenorthortheNorman in the south.Harold

immediately gathered amounted force of 8,000 menandmarchednorthtoYork.Harold Godwinson’s army

consisting of 2,000 of hispersonal bodyguard, thehuscarles, and perhapsanother 6,000members fromthe Select Fyrd, a body ofAnglo-Saxon nobles andfreeman organized since theViking invasionsof theninthcentury to defend England.

The core of Godwinson’srapid deployment force wasthe huscarles, made up ofDanish volunteers, Saxonhousehold troops andprofessionally trained andequippedrelationsofthekingandearls.Protected like theirViking forebears in ring-reinforced leather jerkins ormail, these soldiers woreconical helms and carriedlarge 3 foot round shields or

kite shields. The huscarles’primary offensive arm wasthe large Viking broad axe,with its characteristic 5 foothaft, swung with both handsin an overarm motion fromtheleftsideinordertohittheopponent on the unshieldedside. As secondary weapons,the huscarles used shortspears and javelins, thrustoverarmorthrown.

Map3.1. TheVikingandNormanInvasionsofEngland,1066.

Besides his huscarles,chosen members of theAnglo-Saxon armyknown asthe Select Fyrd accompaniedHarold. The Select Fyrdconsisted of both a trainedwarrior class of thegns(similartotheVikingbondi),landowners of 100 acres ormore who were obligated to

serve in the Anglo-Saxonarmy during wartime or amilitary emergency once peryear, and of trained peasantsor fyrdmen, paid per termserved, usually two monthsper year. The thegns andfyrdmen fought side by sidewith no class distinction in aheterogeneousmix,defendingAnglo-Saxon England sincethe battle of Maldon in 991.In battle, the huscarles,

thegnsandfyrdmenfoughtasinfantry, using horses forstrategic mobility anddismounting for combat.Anglo-Saxon tactics owedmuchtoearlierGermanicandViking trends towardunarticulated infantry andthereislittleevidencethattheAnglo-Saxons possessed atrue heavy cavalry arm priorto1066.The huscarles and Select

Fyrd were supported oncampaignbythelocalpeasantmilitia, sometimes called theGeneralFyrd orGreat Fyrd.These levies usually foughtlocally toprotect theirhearthand home, but as soldiersthey were the leastdependable element of theAnglo-Saxon army.When incombat, the General Fyrdusually occupied the rearranks behind their more able

and better-armed comrades.The placement of peasantleviesintherearhadchangedlittlesincelateantiquitywhenthe Franks and Goths foughtwiththeexperiencedwarriorsin front, forming the outeredge of the boar’s headformation, and the lesser-armouredtroopsbehind.Unencumberedbytheslow-

marchingGeneral Fyrd, longsupply lines, or a baggage

train, Godwinson’s mountedarmy traversed 190 milesfromLondon toYorkshire injust five days, arriving inTadcaster, 10 miles south ofYork (see Map 3.1). Sealingoff Tadcaster in order tomaintain strategic surprise,Harold moved into Yorkundercoverofdarkness,thenmarchedintheearlymorninghours of 25 September the 8miles toward Stamford

Bridge, where Hardrada andTostig awaited negotiatorsfrom York (Map 3.2(a)). AstheEnglisharmymovedoverand down the hill towardStamford Bridge, Hardradawas caught completely offguard. One third of theViking armywas left behindin Riccall, while many ofthose men present at thebridge were without helmetsor armour. Hardrada

dispatched messengers backto Riccall to bringreinforcements, thendeployed a small detachmentofsoldiersasadelayingforceontheYorksideofStamfordBridgedirectly in thepathoftheEnglishadvance.As the English column

crashed into the Vikingrearguard, Hardrada rushedhismenacrossthebridgeandformed them up in a shield

wallon a ridgedominating ameadow, about 300 yardsfromtheDerwentRiver(Map3.2(b)).Despite thevalourofthe Viking rearguard(according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, one loneNorsemankilledfortyAnglo-Saxons on the bridge beforebeing overwhelmed), theEnglisheventuallygainedthebridge and spilled out overintothemeadowontheother

side. Harold re-formed hislines, then attacked up theridge(Map3.2(c)and(d)).At first, the Vikings held

their ground behind theirshield walls, but then,deceived by a feignedwithdrawal,Hardradahimselfbroke ranks and, leading hisown huscarles, launched apremature counter-attack(Map 3.2(e)). It is at thismoment that Hardrada may

have taken an arrow in thethroat. Nevertheless, thehuscarles surged and buriedthe Norse king under a furyof English blades. Even thelate arrival of a relief forcefrom Riccall could not turnthe battle in the Vikings’favour. As darkness neared,the surviving Norse werepursued by remountedEnglish troops back to thewaiting Viking fleet at

Riccall, where, with theirbacks up against theirlongships,theyweredrownedor slaughtered (Map 3.2(f)).When King Harold roundeduptheNorsesurvivorsof thebattleandplacedthemaboardtheir captured Viking shipsfor the triphome,only24ofthe original 300 ships wereneeded tocarry themback toNorway.Harold Godwinson won a

decisive victory over theNorsemen at StamfordBridge, forever ending thethreat of another Vikinginvasion force on Englishsoil. After the battle, thebadly injured Anglo-Saxonarmy limped back to York,where, on 1 October whilerestingandenjoyingavictoryfeast, news arrived thatWilliam the Bastard hadlanded at Pevensey on 28

September with 11,000 men.Unwillingtolet theNormanspillage his subjects in south-east England, Godwinsongathered his weary butundefeated army and rodesouthtodefendhiscrown.

Map3.2 TheBattleofStamfordBridge,1066.(a)PhaseI:HaraldHardradaandhisNorwegianarmy,accompaniedbyTostig,thebrotherofthenewlycrownedAnglo-Saxonking,HaroldGodwinson,awaitapartyofnegotiatorsfromYorknearStamford

Bridge(1).TheunexpectedappearanceofanAnglo-Saxonforce

underGodwinson(2)setsoffaflurryofactivityintheVikingcamp.

Hardradadeploysarearguard(3),ordershisarmytothefarsideoftheDerwentRiver(4)anddispatchesa

messengertoRiccallforreinforcements(5).(b)PhaseII:

HeavilyoutnumberedbytheEnglishcolumn(1),theVikings’hard-fightingrearguardisinexorablydrivenbacktoandacrossthebridge(2).Theirvaliantstandhaspurchasedprecioustime,allowingHardradatobeginformingashieldwallonaridge

dominatingariversidemeadow(3).(c)PhaseIII:FinallyovercomingthelastremnantsoftheVikingrearguard,

theEnglishforcespouracrossthebridge(1)andforminthemeadow(2)astheinvadersfinishformingtheirshieldwall(3).(d)PhaseIV:Haroldlaunchesanattackuphill(1)againsttheVikingshieldwall(2),butthedefendersholdtheirground.

(e)PhaseV:HaroldordersafeignedretreatandHardradatakesthebait.TheVikingsbreaktheintegrityoftheirshieldwallandpeltdownthe

slopeaftertheirfoes(2).Theyaremetbyaflurryofarrows(3),and

Hardradamayhavefallenatthispointinthebattle,anarrowpiercinghisthroat(4).AVikingreliefforce

fromtheirfleet’sanchorageatRiccall

arrivestoolate(5)totipthescalesintheNorsemen’sfavourasHaroldordersanAnglo-Saxoncounter-attack.(f)PhaseVI:Asnightfall

approaches,theEnglishforcesregaintheirmountsandlaunchapursuit(1).ThefleeingNorwegians(2)arefinallybroughttobayatRiccall,wheremanyaredrownedorslaughteredattheedgeoftheriver.Haroldgathersthesurvivorsandplacesthemaboardcapturedlongshipsfortheirreturnvoyage.Outoftheoriginalinvasionfleetof300,only24shipsareneeded

forthistask.

King Harold covered the190 miles from York toLondon in five days, atestimony to the strategicmobility of medieval armies(seeMap3.1).InLondon,heordered his army to resupplyandputoutacalltoarmsfortheGeneralFyrd.Butreports

thatWilliamwasravagingtheEnglish countrysidecompelledHaroldtocutshorthis recruitment and move towhereWilliamwaswaitingatHastings. On 13 October,Godwinson arrived atCaldbec Hill, 8 miles fromHastings, and put out a callforthelocalfyrdtojoinhim.Bynightfallhisforcetotalledperhaps8,000men,including2,000huscarles,and2,000 to

3,000 troops from the thegnsandSelectFyrd.Thebalanceof the army came from thelocal peasant militia orGeneralFyrd.Godwinson most likely

plannedtoconductasurpriseattack against William, buthis arrival atCaldbecHill solate in the day cost him theinitiative in this campaign.Without surprise, Haroldrecognizedhis exhaustedand

relativelyinexperiencedarmycouldnotlaunchasuccessfulattack against William’sforcesatHastingsinthesamemanner that brought himvictory against Hardrada atStamford Bridge.Understanding the extremevulnerability of hisunarticulatedinfantryarmytoNorman shock cavalry onlevel ground,Harold decidedtotakethedefensivewiththe

hope of exhausting theNormans.On themorningof14 October, Harold orderedhis Anglo-Saxon army toSenlac Hill, deploying hisinfantry along a 1,100 yardfront straddling the only exitroad from Hastings, therebyblockingWilliam’s access totheEnglishheartland.William the Bastard’s

scouts discoveredGodwinson’s army on the

evening of 13 October, theninformed the duke that theywere approaching. Afterspendinganight inhis campat Hastings on full alert,William gathered a force ofabout 8,000 troops (leaving3,000 men to garrisonHastings) and struck out intheearlyhoursof14Octoberin search of the Anglo-Saxons. The invading armyapproached Senlac Hill

deployed in column just asHaroldwasfinishinghisowndeployment. The largestcontingent of William’sarmy, the Bretons, anchoredhis left, while the Normanstookuppositioninthecentre,andtheFranco-Flemishalliesformed up on the duke’sright.WhereasHarold’sarmywas

an infantry forcemade up ofsome8,000

spear-, axe-, sword- andjavelin-wielding troops,William’s army was a truecombined-arms force,consisting of 4,000 infantry,3,000 mounted knights and1,000 bowmen. Williamarrayed his forces in threelines. In the first line heplaced his archers andcrossbowmen, in his second,hisheavyinfantry,andinthethird line, his heavy cavalry.

The Norman commanderunderstood the power of thecombined-arms tacticalsystem, and he intended toemploy his forces inrecognition of each arm’sstrengths.Godwinson arrayed his

army on Senlac Hill in ashield wall seven ranks deepacross a front 1,100 yardswide. In typical Saxonfashion, he placed his best

troops, the huscarles andthegns, in the front ranks(Map 3.3(a)). Behind theseexperienced warriors heplacedhisSelectFyrd,andinthe rear were the levies oflocalmilitiafromtheGeneralFyrd.Haroldcommanded theEnglish from a small hillbehind the lines, surroundedby members of his personalbodyguard,thehuscarles.ThebattleofHastingsbegan

at mid-morning whenNormanlightinfantryarchersmoved slowly up the slopetoward the English position,then opened fire on theEnglish shield wall (Map3.3(b)). William hoped thathis archers would thin theranksoftheEnglishline.TheNorman arrow barrage didnot break up the Englishinfantry,andWilliamorderedhis archers to withdraw and

his heavy infantry into theattack. As the Normaninfantry advanced uphill, itcameunderattackbyahailofjavelins, spears and slingbullets. Fierce fightingensued when the invaderscrashed into the Englishshield wall. As the infantryclashed, William ordered hiscavalry to attack, but themounted knights failed topenetrate the English lines

(Map 3.3(c)). On William’sleft theBretons,whomet theEnglish line first, becameconfused and disengaged inordertoregroupatthebottomofthehill.The apparent flight of the

Bretons forced William todisengagehiscentreandrighttocoverhisexposedleftflank(Map 3.3(d)). The Englishright, which repulsed theBretons, broke ranks and

counter-attacked down thehill. At this moment the restof William’s army began towaver, and rumour spreadthatWilliamhadbeenkilled.To rally his men, Williampersonally led his bodyguardinto ameadow and lifted hisconical helm, reassuring hismen that he was still alive.The duke of Normandy thenordered his centre to wheelleft and pursue the Anglo-

Saxon counter-attack, cuttingit off from any support fromthe ridge (Map 3.3(e)).Godwinson watchedhelplesslyfromSenlacHillashundreds of his men weresurroundedandslaughtered.AtmiddayWilliamordered

another assault againstGodwinson’s shield wall.Once again, the continentalarchersattemptedtobreakupthe Anglo-Saxon line, and

once again the infantryattacked, but the shield wallheld (Map 3.3(f)). Williamhimself led the cavalrycharge,andhadhishorsecutoutfromunderneathhim.Butat the end of the secondattack, theEnglishheld firm,andtheNormanswithdrewtotheir original position downthehill.During the afternoon, both

sides regrouped and rested

(Map 3.3(g)). Although thetwoNormanassaultshadnotbreached the Anglo-Saxonline,theattacksweretakingatollontheEnglishdefenders.William’s use of alternateshock and missile attackscaused casualties anddemoralized a force thatreceivedbothformsofattackpassively. Without lightinfantry and a cavalry arm,Godwinsonhadnochoicebut

to remain on the defensiveand absorb the Normanattacks.Some time in the late

afternoon,Williamassembledhis forces forone lastassaulton Godwinson’s position.This time, William orderedhis archers to target the rearranksoftheshieldwallwheretheGeneralFyrdwaslocated.This angle of attack allowedthe archers to continue their

shower while the Normaninfantry and cavalry engagedthe enemy. As the Normanarchersraineddeathdownonthe Anglo-Saxon rear,William ordered his infantrytoattackupSenlacHillagain,closelyfollowedbyacavalrycharge.Withdaylight fading,the English line began tofalterundertheattack.

Figure3.3 TheBattleofHastings,1066.(a)PhaseI:AsHarold

Godwinsonputsthefinishingtouchesonhisarmy’sdeploymentintoa

seven-rankshield-wall,WilliamtheBastard’sinvadingarmydeploysfromcolumnintolinefacingtheEnglishpositionsonSenlacHill.(b)PhaseII:Atmid-morning,Williamordershis

archersforward,hopingtothintheEnglishranksandweakentheshieldwall(1).AsitbecomesapparentthattheNormanarchersarefailingto

breakupHarold’sformation,Williamordersthemtowithdraw(2)and

ordershisheavyinfantryintomotion(3).(c)PhaseIII:AsWilliam’sinfantrycollidewiththeEnglishshieldwall(1),thedukeordershisheavycavalryforward(2).Evenwiththeadditionalweighthurledagainstthem,theEnglishfailtobreak.

William’sBretonforcesonhisleft(3),havingbeenengagedlongerthan

theircomrades,begintolosecohesionandwithdrawinanattemptto

regroup(4).(d)PhaseIV:TheBretonwithdrawalforcesWilliamtobegintodisengagehislineinanattemptto

protecthisnowexposedleft(1),asthevictoriousEnglishrightbreakrankstopursuetheBretonsdownthehill(2).TheapparentflightoftheBretonsandareportthatWilliamhasbeenkilledcausetheNormanarmyto

begintowaver(3).Atthismomentofcrisis,Williamshowshimselftohismentodisprovetherumour,and

rallieshisforces(4).(e)PhaseV:Williamwheelshis

centreandencirclestheover-extendedandunsupportedEnglish(1),

destroyingthemandsnuffingouttheir

counter-attack(2).(f)PhaseVI:Havingregroupedhisforces,at

middayWilliamordershisarcherstoattackHarold’sshieldwallyetagain(1),followedbyanotherinfantry

assault(2)andcavalrycharge(3),thelatterledbythedukehimself.NoneofthesemanoeuvressucceedinbreakingtheEnglishline,andtheNormanswithdrawtothebaseofthehill.(g)PhaseVII:Asthedaywearson,bothsidesregroup(1).Harold’sEnglisharmyhasabsorbedagreatdealof

punishmentwithoutinflictingmuchinreturn.Williamordersanother

assault,thistimeorderinghisarcherstotargettheEnglishrear(2).This

shiftintrajectoryallowstheNormaninfantryandcavalrytopresstheirattack(3)andtheybegintomakeinroadsintheEnglishshieldwall.

Duringthisattack,Haroldisstruckintheeyebyanarrowandfalls

wounded(4).(h)PhaseVIII:AbandofNormanscutsitswaythroughtoHarold’spositionandkillstheking(1).Nowbreachedinmanyplaces(2),theEnglishshieldwallbeginsto

disintegrateaswordoftheirleader’sdeathspreads.Althoughsmallgroupsofhuscarlesfighttothedeath,theEnglishforcesbegintofleethebattlefield(3),andthevictoriousNormansoverruntheridge.

All along theEnglish front,Norman infantry and cavalrywere penetrating the shieldwall. It was at this momentthat an arrow struck KingHarold in theeye.AsHarold

lay wounded, a group ofNorman knights fought theirway to his headquarters andkilled him (Map 3.3(h)).News of the king’s deathspread quickly through theAnglo-Saxon ranks, breakingthe defenders’ morale.Although small handfuls ofthehuscarlesfoughtontotheend, a general rout ensuedand theNormansoverran theridge.

The battle for Senlac Hillprovedtobeadeadlystrugglebetween Anglo-Saxoninfantry and a Normancombined-arms armyutilizing heavy cavalry as itscentrepiece. But one mustremember that heavy cavalrydid not win this battle byitself, but in co-operationwithheavyandlightinfantry.In fact, the battle was onlywon when William stopped

usinghisarchers,infantryandknights piecemeal and usedthem in concert for the finalassaultonSenlacHill,killinga king and destroying theflower of Anglo-Saxonnobility. William ofNormandy emerged from thefray as William theConqueror,andonChristmasDay 1066 was proclaimedKingWilliamIbytheAnglo-SaxonWitan.

The complete conquest ofEnglandwasnotimmediatelyachieved by the victory atHastings. William facedscattered Saxon resistanceuntil 1069. During theconquest, William ordered aNorman motte-and-baileycastlebuiltineveryimportantborough (perhaps 550 ofthese fortificationswerebuiltbetween1066 and1087) andappointedaNormanvassalto

serve in each district as hisgovernor. William wascareful to take title to thewhole of England and makehis vassals swear an oath ofpersonal loyalty to him inreturnfor their fiefs.WilliamensuredthattheNormanformof centralized feudalismwould replace the patchworkof earldoms that haddominated Anglo-SaxonEngland for centuries. He

also extended his control tosouthern Scotland in 1072,initiating centuries of borderwarswith theScots.Becausehe and his heirs retained thetitle of the duke ofNormandy, at his death in1087,William left anAnglo-Normanempirethatwouldbea source of conflict betweenEngland and France forcenturiestocome.The Norman conquest of

England in 1066 waspreceded by the Normanconquest of southern Italyand Sicily beginning in theearlyeleventhcentury.Atthistime, the southern half ofItaly was in a state of nearanarchy. Although the areawas nominally underByzantine control, most oftheinhabitantswerenotloyalto their Greek landlords.Norman adventuring in

southern Italy was firstrecorded in 1017, when aman named Melus rebelledagainsthisByzantinelordsinBaro with the aid of 250Norman knights. Melus andhis forces met the Byzantinegovernor at the battle ofCannae, and were soundlydefeated.OnlyafewNormanknights survived the battle.Despite this inauspiciousentrance into Italian affairs,

the Normans were in greatdemandinItalianarmies,andbegan arriving on thepeninsula in large numbers.Normanknightswerehiredasmercenaries by Lombardian,Langobardian and Byzantinerulers, often fighting onopposing sides for whateverlord would pay for theirservices.In 1030 a Norman knight

named Rainulf was given a

castle and benefice by theduke of Naples as paymentfor helping him back intopower. In the followingdecades, several moreNorman knights becamelandholders,whilesomeevenbecame lords in their ownright. Before long, theLombards, who regrettedinviting theNormans to Italyinthefirstplace,werejoinedbythepapacy,theByzantines

and theHolyRoman Empirein trying to prevent thecreation of a strong NormanstateinsouthernItaly.But inthe end, their efforts failedwhen a combined Germanand Lombard army wasdefeated by the Normans atthebattleofCivitatein1053.After Civitate, control ofsouthern ItalyandSicilywasfirmly in the hands of theNormans.

One of the primaryarchitects of these conquestswas Robert Guiscard (1016–1085), a Norman adventurerwho built an army from theground up out of localbrigands. By 1057 GuiscardwasthedukeofApulia.Overthenextquarterofacentury,Guiscardsolidifiedhispowerbase in southern Italy andSicily, then turned hisattention toward the east and

Byzantium.In 1081 Guiscard crossed

theAdriaticand laid siege tothe coastal city of Durazzo(ancientDyrrachium)inwhatisnowAlbania.Helandedhisforce on a small peninsulawest of the mainland andmade camp at the citadel ofDyrrachium. To aid thebesieged city, the newByzantineemperor,AlexiusIComnenus,senta largerelief

force consisting of mostlymercenaries and Serbianallies, with only a sprinklingof native Byzantine troops.The emperor planned toattacktheNormancampfromthree directions: from thenorth across a swamp anddownthepeninsula, fromtheeast across a bridge, and bysea from the south. Butbefore the Byzantines couldconverge on the Norman

camp, Guiscard sallied fromthe camp across the bridgeand burned the span behindhim to prevent the flight ofhisownmen(Map3.4(a)).The Byzantine vanguard,

consisting of Varangianmounted heavy infantry,wasthe first to arrive on thebattlefield. Theseunarticulated infantry menwere armed and armouredlike their Scandinavian

cousins the huscarles with 5foot hafted broad axes andprotected by conical helms,mail,androundshieldsslungon their backs. Thecommander of the vanguard,Nampites,was given a smallcontingent of light cavalryarchers by Alexius to useagainst the Normans. Theemperororderedhisvanguardcommander to use this lightcavalry to break up the

Norman lines, then exploitthe tears with follow-upinfantry attacks. Nampitesdisregardedtheseorders.Without waiting for the

main force to arrive,Nampites ordered theVarangians to dismount andboldly attack the right wingof theNorman linesbefore itarrayed for battle, drivingboth foot and horse into thesea (Map 3.4(b)). The

element of surprise favouredNampites in much the sameway it had favouredGodwinson at StamfordBridge. Still, Guiscard wasquicktoturnhisflankandhecounter-attacked thevanguard with a cavalrycharge,cuttingoffthegreaterpart of the relief force, andsurrounding and isolating theremaininginfantryonasmallhill near the coast by the

deserted Chapel of StMichael (Map 3.4(c)). Here,like the battle of Hastings(but on a smaller scale), theNormans made good use ofheavy cavalry and lightinfantry archers withalternating shock andmissileattacks.

Map3.4 TheBattleofDurazzo,1081.(a)PhaseI:RobertGuiscard’sNormanarmymakescampatthe

citadelofDyrrachiumandlayssiegetothetownofDurazzo.TheEmperorAlexiusdispatchesaforcetoattacktheinvadersthroughtheswampstothenorthoftheenemycamp,acrossthebridgetotheireast,andfromthe

seatotheirsouth.GuiscardlearnsoftheapproachoftheVarangianvanguard(1)andordershisforceacrossthebridge(2),burningthespanbehindthemtopreventretreat.(b)PhaseII:Disregardinghisorderstouseanattachedelementofmounted

archerstobreakuptheenemyformationsandtowaitforthearrivalofthemainbody,Nampiteslaunches

animmediateassaultwithhisdismountedVarangianinfantryagainsttheNormanright(1).Hitbeforebeingfullydeployed,theNormanhorseandfootaredrivenintothesea(2).(c)PhaseIII:

Guiscardquicklyrefuseshisflankand

launcheshisheavycavalryinachargethatcutsoffmanyofthe

Varangians(1).Lackingthetacticalcohesionoftheirfoes,manyof

Nampites’menareslain.Thosenotkilledinthecounter-attackfleetoasmallhillandthechapelofStMichael(2).(d)PhaseIV:Guiscard’sforcessurroundthechapel(1).ThesurvivingVarangianinfantryareburntaliveastheyseekshelterinthebuilding(2).WhentheByzantines’mainbody

finallyarrives,itrefusestoengagethevictoriousNormansandleavesthe

area.

After the majority of the

Varangianswerekilledbythecombined-arms efforts of theNormans, the remainingnorthmenwereburnedoutofthe chapel. At Durazzo, theVarangian infantry werekilled to the last man (Map3.4(d)). When the otherByzantine mercenaries andalliesarrived, they refused toengage the victoriousNormans, and left withoutstriking a single blow. The

battle of Durazzo showedagain the inferiority ofmedieval infantry in combatagainst feudal cavalrysupportedbylightinfantry.By looking at the Norman

successes in England andsouthern Europe, we can seehow sophisticated medievalcombined-arms tactics werein the eleventh century. Inboth regions, Norman heavycavalry was the dominant

featureineachsuccess,butitby no means acted alone.Although combined-arms co-operation was limited in themedievalperiod, itwasoftenessential to the success of abattle. Light infantry archersassisted Norman heavycavalry at Hastings andDurazzo, and in both casesarchersprotectedthemountedknights and wore down theenemyranks,causingtearsin

the enemy formation thatcould be exploited by theirownlancers.Though the Normans made

good use of the availabletactical systems, the classicaldefinition of combined armswasnot inwideusebyothercommanders in the highMiddle Ages. As the periodcontinued, thevalueof usingcavalry and infantry in co-operation would be lost on

most medieval commanders,leading to the dominance ofheavy cavalry in westernEuropean warfare.Furthermore, this dominanceon the battlefield wasreinforced by the mountedaristocracy’s pre-eminentposition in medieval society,a position that increasinglyplacedthemilitiafootsoldierasasecond-classcitizen,onethatwouldbeused as fodder

on the battlefield. Perhapsmost significantly, theabilityof medieval heavy infantrymilitia to resist thearistocratic heavy cavalryalone virtually disappearedfrom the battlefields ofwestern Europe for nearly300 years. Heavy cavalry’sdominance in medievalwarfare would persist untilthe thirteenth century whenthe application of light

infantry tactics in co-operation with well-articulated heavy infantrybattle squares returned tochallenge the knight’sposition at the top of themilitaryorder.Medieval culture revolved

around the knightly class,whosehereditarymembershipwas primarily defined by theability to fight as shockcavalry. Indoctrination into

this military caste began atpubertywithalongresidencyand training among peers inthehouseholdofagreatlord.After learning the necessaryskills of horse management,etiquette, and mounted andunmounted combat, thesquirewasdubbedaknightathis majority in either anelaboratechurchceremonyoronthefieldofbattle.Trainingusuallybeganaround theage

of twelve. The young squirewastaughthowtochooseandlookafteramount,aswellashow to ride. He was alsoinstructedintheuseofawidevariety of weapons such asthe spear, sword and shield,axe, mace, and flail, as wellas unarmed combat such aswrestling. Once he couldmanage a horse, he learnedhow to hunt, a valuable skillwhich taught the use of

terrain and available cover,and select lines of advance.Mounted combat wasemphasized. As a knight heentered a martial fraternitythat valued individual valourand honour gained throughbattle over co-operation withone’s peers and socialinferiorsonthebattlefield.Thisemphasisonindividual

warfare can best be seen intheemergenceoftournaments

in the early twelfth century,essentiallymedieval job fairswhere knights could showtheirwaresandbuildmilitaryreputations.Here,theskillsoffighting on foot and onhorseback in jousts wereperfected.Aknight’sprimarygoal was to capture anopponent and ransom himback to his vassals, therebygaining both capital(weapons,armour,horsesand

money) and reputation. In1177 the English knight andfuture regent of England,William Marshal (1146–1219), made a tour of thetournament circle with aFlemish knight namedRogerde Gaugi. Within one ten-month period the pairdefeated 103 knights, takingtheir horses, harness andequipment as their spoil.Theseearlytournamentswere

veryrealisticandparticipantswereoftenmaimedor killed,which led to a moreformalized and lessdangerous tournament in thelatermedievalperiod.The growth of tournaments

in the early twelfth centurywas but another attempt tocontain the martialatmosphere thataccompaniedthe expansion of feudalwarfare in the high Middle

Ages. In the absence ofstrong, centralizedmonarchical authority, aculture of violence emerged.Civil disputes and criminalcases alike ceased to beadjudicated by the enfeebledroyalpowerandwereinsteadsettled by the sword. Theunarmed segment of thepopulation, the church andthe peasants, increasinglybecame victims. The

prevailinganarchystimulatedaresponsefromthestrongestinstitution of the medievalperiod, the Catholic Church,which launched twomovements designed to limitand contain the warrioraristocracy’s violentbehaviour.In the ‘Peace ofGod’ (first

pronounced in 989), theChurch threatened spiritualsanctionsagainstanyonewho

plundered or violated achurch, struck an unarmedmember of the clergy orrobbed a peasant. Theprohibition was laterextended toknights attackingmerchants or pilgrims anddestroyingmillsorvineyards.Early in the eleventh centurythe second movementemerged.The‘TruceofGod’asked the mountedaristocracy to forgo the

pleasureofwaronThursdays,Fridays, Saturdays, Sundaysandholy days, and to refrainfrom acts of violence at alltimesinandaroundchurches.Although how much the

Church’s sanctions curtailedtheknightlyclass’sbehaviouris debatable, their impact onthe mounted warrior’spsychology and on theinstitutionofknighthoodwassignificant. The collective

oaths helped create a class-consciousness that includedacknowledging a personalresponsibility to the CatholicChurch and to the unarmedpopulation. In fact, byprohibiting attacks on theclergy and the poor, theChurchwasadvocatinganewknightly mission as activeprotectorofboth.Moreover,theoathstakento

enforce the Peace and Truce

of God married theinstitutions of war andreligion in western Europeand helped establish how thearistocraticheavycavalrymandefined himself. Theseperceptions became codifiedin the high Middle Ages inchivalry (after chevallerie,meaning ‘skill on horseback’in French), essentially afusion of Germanic andChristian cultural elements

into a new code of honour.From the eleventh centuryonward, chivalry wasreinforced by the religiousceremony of dubbing toknighthood, the adoption ofdistinguishing emblems andblazons (and the science ofheraldry to develop andinterpret these symbols ofstation),andtheemergenceinthe twelfth century of courtpoets known as troubadours

to sing thepraisesofknightsliving,pastandlegendary.Perhaps the most

conspicuous example of themarriage of religion andwarfare in medieval Europecan be seen in the rise ofmilitary orders dedicated tofighting the enemies ofChristendom in Church-sponsored holy wars knownascrusades.Beginning in thetwelfth century, thesemilitia

Christior‘soldiersofChrist’fought the infidel incrusadesin Spain, the Holy Land andeastern Europe with variousdegreesofsuccess.Ineachofthese regions, the KnightsTemplars, KnightsHospitallers, TeutonicKnights, and the Spanishorders ofCalatrava, SantiagoandAlcantaraperformedtheirmilitary duties with amonastic discipline in stark

contrast to the oftenuncontrollable individualismoftraditionalknights.

TheCrusades:LatinHeavyCavalryintheEastIt was the energetic papalreformer Gregory VII (pope1073–1085) who firstsanctioned lay knights asmilitiaChristitofightagainstthe infidel, focusing the

martial energies of themounted aristocracy awayfromoneanotherand towardtheperceived threatof Islam.HedidthisinpartbecauseofChristian successes againstMuslims inSicily andSpain,andbecauseofanewwaveofIslamic territorial expansionthat threatened the veryexistence of Byzantium afterthe loss atManzikert.Unlikeprevious popes who

advocated peace, Gregorydiscarded this pacifistideology in favour of the‘theory of the two swords’.Gregory believed, as thetemporal representative of StPeterandtheVicarofChrist,that the pope held twoswords:aspiritualbladetobedrawnbyhisownhand,andasecularonetobedrawnathiscommand by nobles andknightsservingas‘soldiersof

Christ’.Moreover,Gregoryaddeda

powerful spiritual incentive:‘taking up the cross’ andgoing on crusade granted theknight a papal indulgence,essentially a total remissionof sins both past and future.Gregory’s vision of theChristian soldier who winssalvation by military actionprovided the ideological andpsychological motivation for

crusade.All thatwas neededwas a casus belli, and thatwas provided by theByzantine emperor’s call forhelp to Gregory’s successorandprotégé,PopeUrbanII.In the late eleventh century

the Byzantine EmperorAlexiusIComnenusappealedto Pope Urban II to use hisinfluence in western Europeto dispatch military aid inorder toassist theemperor in

recovering the AnatoliandistrictslostafterthebattleofManzikert. Urban II seizedupon this request to justify amuchmoreambitiousproject,therecoveryoftheHolyLandfrom control of the MuslimSeljukTurksandArabsintheregion. At a Church councilatClermontincentralFrancein November 1095, UrbanpreachedtheFirstCrusadetonobles and commoners alike,

unleashing a river ofenthusiasm that exceededeven thepope’sexpectations.This ‘call to arms’ initiatedcultural andmilitary contactswith the Levant that pulledthe Latin kingdoms out offeudal warfare in westernEurope and directly againinto the streams of Eurasianhistory.The armies of the First

Crusade (1095–1099) were

led by a half-dozen Frenchand Norman nobles,including Hugh ofVermandois, brother ofKingPhilip I of France;Robert ofNormandy, brother of KingWilliam II of England; andBohemondofTaranto (eldestsonofRobertGuiscardandaparticipant at Durazzo in1081) and his very capablenephew Tancred. Joiningthese Norman lords from

England, France, Italy andSicily were Raymond of StGilles, count of Toulouse,and Godfrey of Bouillon,duke of Lower Lorraine.Within eight months ofUrban’s sermon atClermont,thousandsofknightsandtensof thousands of infantryenlisted under the banners ofthese great regional princes,and, together with thousandsof religious pilgrims, set out

bylandandseafortheirbaseof operations atConstantinople. They arrivedin the Byzantine capital inlate1096.When the soldiers of the

First Crusade first set offfrom Constantinople for theHoly Land in the spring of1097,theirinitialcontactwiththe Seljuk Turks reinforcedtheir belief in the superiorityofmountedshockcombat. In

June the crusaders besiegedthe Seljuk capital at NicaeaonLakeAscania, justeastofthe Sea of Marmara in AsiaMinor. When the sultan ofNicaea returned fromArmenia to relieve the city,his Turkish cavalry wasbeaten back by the moreheavily armoured Europeanknights. Pressing their siege,the crusaders breached theouter walls. But when they

began their attack thefollowing morning, theknights found that theTurkish garrison hadsurrendered to the Byzantineemperor during the night.Denied pillaging rights overthe city, the crusaders set offsouth-east acrossAsiaMinorintwocolumnsaboutequalinsizeandaboutaday’smarchapart.Bohemond of Taranto

commanded the first column,consistingmostlyofNormansfromFranceandItaly.Adaybehind marched the secondcolumn, mostly Lorrainersand Provençals, led byRaymond of Toulouse andGodfrey of Bouillion. Thefirst column came out of theforested mountains ofBithynia alone and founditself harried by SeljukTurkishhorsearchers.On30

June, Bohemond’s crusaderscamped at the ruined city ofDorylaeum in centralAnatolia, then resumed theiradvance the followingmorning.

Map3.5 TheBattleofDorylaeum,

1097.(a)PhaseI:UponreceivingwordofanapproachingTurkisharmy,Bohemonddispatchesamessengertolocatethesecond

crusadercolumn(1).Heordershisinfantrytomakecamp(2)andreadieshiscavalrytolocatethefoe(3),butbeforetheycanestablishtheircampordeployforaction,thelarger

Turkisharmyisuponthem(4).TheTurksencircletheLatincamp(5),and

theirinitialassaultpressestheChristianknightsbackintotheirinfantry(6).(b)PhaseII:The

encirclingTurkslaunchhit-and-runmissileattacksagainstthe

beleagueredcrusaders(1)allaround

theperimeter.SomeoftheFranksgrowrestlessandsmallgroupsofcavalryattempttopursuetheir

tormentors(2)whoeasilyoutdistancetheheavierhorse.Thecrusader

cavalrymen,cutofffromtheirinfantrysupport,areeasilysurroundedandcutdownbytheSeljuks(3).(c)PhaseIII:Gapsbegintoappearinthe

crusaders’linesandtheTurkslaunchasabrechargeintothegaps(1).JustasBohemond’sforcesbegintodisintegrate,thesecondcrusader

columnunderGodfreyandRaymondarrivesonthefield(2).TheLatinheavycavalrystriketherearofthe

Turkishformationandbegintorollup

theirleftflank(3).(d)PhaseIV:Recognizinghisopportunity,

BohemondlaunchesmountedchargesfromwithinthecampagainsttherapidlydisintegratingTurkishflank(1)asGodfrey’sandRaymond’sfreshforcessurgeforward(2).Unabletore-formandhard-pressedfromfront,rearandflank,theSeljukarmyis

transformedintoanincoherentmassofindividualsseekingnothingmorethansurvival.Thecrusadersshownoquarterandinflictperhapsasmanyas3,000causalitiesastheremnantsoftheTurkisharmyfleethefield(3).

After marching a short

distance, the crusaders’scouts reported a largeTurkish army advancing onthem. Recognizing thenumerical superiority of theapproaching Turks,Bohemond sent a messengertofindthesecondcolumnandordered his infantry to makecamp, since – and in typicalmedievalfashion–hejudgedhis footmen to be tacticallyineffective against the

mounted enemy warriors(Map 3.5(a)). But before thecamp could be set up andbefore the Christian knightscould deploy, the largeTurkish host appeared andencircled the crusaders,pushingtheknightsbackintothe infantry. A Europeaneyewitness to this attackstated: ‘After we had setourselves in order the Turkscameuponus fromall sides,

skirmishing, throwing dartsand javelins and shootingarrows from an astonishingrange.’After a while, some of the

Frankishlancersgrewrestlessand attempted mountedsortiesagainsttheSeljuklightcavalry. But the Latin heavycavalry could not reach thefaster Turkish horse archers,who rode off only to rapidlycut back and swarm the

pursuing knights, separatingthe hapless European heavycavalry from their infantrysupport(Map3.5(b)).Forsixhours, the remainder ofBohemond’stroopsheldtheirground while Turkish horsearchers wore down thecrusaders, killing men andhorses. A contemporarydescribed the scene, statingthe crusaders were ‘crushedoneagainstanotherlikesheep

pennedupinafold,hopelessand panic-stricken, we wereshutinbytheTurksoneveryside’. Under a shower ofTurkish arrows, the crusaderlinebegantoformgaps.At midday, the Turks

organized a light cavalrysabre charge into the rapidlydisintegrating crusader force(Map 3.5(c)). At thatmoment, Frankish knightsfromthesecondcolumnrode

upandstrucktheSeljukflankand rear. Bohemond’smessengers had found thesecond column encampedsome 6 or 7miles away.Onreceiving the news, Godfreyand Raymond immediatelymountedupand,leavingtheirinfantry to guard the camp,spurredoffforthebattlefield.The arrival of the Christianheavy cavalry completelysurprised the formed Turkish

cavalry,whohadneglectedtoreconnoitre the secondcolumn’smarch.TheSeljukshadno time to turnandforma new front. The charge ofthousands of crusader heavycavalry struck the Turkishcentre from the rear, rollingup the horse archers’ leftflank. Seeing the arrival of arelief force, Bohemondorderedanattackthemomenthisalliesappearedat therear

of the enemy, catching theTurkishleftwingbetweenthetwo Christian forces (Map3.5(d)).Thecrusaderknights’charge was incrediblydecisive, inflicting perhaps3,000casualtiesontheTurks.Christian losses were about4,000menintotal.The one-sided victory won

at Dorylaeum became amodel battle for thecrusaders, with the heavy

casualties inflicted on theTurks only reinforcingwestern prejudicesconcerning the strength oftheir heavy cavalry. For theTurks, theshockof losingsomanyoftheirlightcavalrytothese strange medievaljuggernauts would delay afully organized militaryresponse on their part, butreorganizetheywould.After completing their

march across Anatolia, theforces of the First Crusadesplit into two armies, oneunder Baldwin of Boulogneand Tancred going on toestablish Christian rule overEdessa in Armenia inMarch1098, and the other underBohemond of Taranto andRaymond of Toulousemarching south down theeastern coast of theMediterranean toward the

HolyLand.Thissecondarmynearly starved beforecapturing Antioch in aprotractedsiegeinJune1098.By the time the crusadersstood before Jerusalem inmid-June1099, their fightingstrengthwas reduced to only14,000men.

Map3.6 TheCrusaderStates.

Under the leadership ofGodfrey of Bouillon, thecrusaders began a siege ofJerusalem, building threelarge siege towers andlaunching attacks against thecity’sdefences.Afterdifficultfighting, thecrusaders finallybreached the walls on thenightof13 July, putting tensof thousandsofMuslimsandJews to the sword. A monthlater,thecrusadersconfirmed

their grip on the Holy Citywhen they defeated a reliefarmy sent from Egypt at thebattle of Ascalon. AtAscalon, a crusader armysurprised the Egyptian campatdawnon12August.Inthemêlée that followed, theentire Muslim army wasshattered.Bytheearlytwelfthcentury, the crusaders hadcarvedoutfeudalpossessionsin the Levant consisting of

thekingdomofJerusalem,thecountyofTripoliinLebanon,the principality of Antiochand the county of Edessa inArmenia(Map3.6).Once settled in, the

crusadersadoptedadefensivestrategy centred on theseizure of existing fortifiedplaces such as Muslim andByzantine-era castles andwalled cities. This strategywas coupled with an

aggressive castle-buildingprogramme, dotting theLevant with literally dozensof new castles over theduration of the twelfth andthirteenth centuries. Despitetheir prolific use offortifications, the crusaderscontinued to rely heavily ontheir field armies to defendagainst Muslim counter-attacks. But becausemanpower was an almost

irreplaceable commodity, thecrusaders avoided pitchedbattles whenever possible.Battle was offered only as alast resort or when the oddsseemed overwhelmingly inthecrusaders’favour.

TheMuslimCounter-Crusade:TheDominanceofLatinHeavyCavalry

ChallengedIt did not take long for theMuslim counter-crusade tobegin. As early as 1101 theSeljuk Turks effectively cutthe land-bridge betweenConstantinople and the HolyLand,forcingthecrusaderstosend supplies andreinforcements by sea. Thechallenges of maintainingLatinpossessionssofarfromwestern Europe forced the

crusaderstoseeknewwaystomeet their manpower needs.Here, the use of a newincarnation of the ‘soldier ofChrist’ and employment ofindigenoustroopswouldplayincreasing roles in thedefenceofthecrusaderstates.After the First Crusade the

bulk of the responsibility formaintaining the Christianpresence in the Holy Landwasbornebymembersofthe

military orders,with the firstKnights Templars arriving inthe Holy Land around 1118as protectors of Christianpilgrims. Templarssubscribed to the monasticvowsofchastity,povertyandobedience, but were givencarte blanche to kill theinfidel because their enemieswere the enemies of Christ,and their murder was ‘nothomicide but malicide’.

Within a few decades, theKnights Hospitallers andTeutonic Knights joined theTemplars in the region,recruiting new members inwestern Europe and buildingimportant fortifications andmaintaining garrisons inSyria,LebanonandPalestine.As the twelfth centuryunfolded, the role of themilitaryordersinthedefenceof the Holy Land expanded,

with the discipline anddedication of the warrior-monks marking them as theelite shock troops in anycrusadingarmy.Furthermore, to supplement

their numbers and readdressthe tactical disadvantage toSeljuk horse archers, thecrusaders hired Turcopoles,indigenous mercenaries whoservedthewesternknightsasmounted archers and other

types of light cavalry. Thesetroops, often the product ofChristian and Muslimmarriages,becameastandardfeature of crusading warfare,serving as large nativecontingents in the armies oflay rulers and the militaryorders, while often retainingtheirownofficers.In1144theIslamiccounter-

crusade intensified when aSeljuk Turkish army overran

the county of Edessa,provoking Pope Eugenius IIItopreachtheSecondCrusade(1146–1148).Thereliefeffortwas organized byBernard ofClairvaux (later St Bernard)andjoinedbyKingLouisVIIof France and the holyRomanemperorConradIIIofGermany. Islam’s militaryresponse to the SecondCrusadewould be to reapplylight cavalry tactics against

the invading crusaders, thistime with favourable results.Ironically, this tactical lessonwas taught on the site of thefirst crusader victory. At thebattle of Dorylaeum II in1147, Conrad lost nearly hisentire expeditionary force tothe Islamic ruler Nur ed-Din’s mounted Seljukbowmen.OnlyConrad and afew knights fought theirwayout of the ambush and

returned safely to Nicaea.With this defeat, the SecondCrusadefizzledout.After the Second Crusade,

the crusader states wereincreasingly threatened fromthenorthandeastbyNured-Din’s forces, while those ofthe Kurdish general Saladin(1138–1193),hisnephewandlieutenant, threatened fromthe direction of Egypt. AfterNur ed-Din’s death in 1174,

Saladin became the greatestof the Muslim generals,reunifying Syria and Egyptunder theAyyubidSultanate.With the crusader states nowsurrounded by a unitedMuslim power, Saladinpressed home his militaryadvantage.In 1187 Saladin’s army

besieged Tiberias on the Seaof Galilee. The new king ofJerusalem, Guy of Lusignan,

stripped the defences ofPalestineinordertoassemblealargearmyof1,200knights,2,000Turcopolelightcavalryand 10,000 infantry atSephorie for a reliefexpedition to Tiberias. On 3July the army marched outfrom Sephorie and, afteradvancing about 10 miles,was surrounded by Turkishhorse archers (Map 3.7(a)).The crusader column

continued its march underharassment, with the vanadvancing within 3 miles ofTiberias and the Sea ofGalilee, a destination withadded importance because ofthe toll the summer sun wastakingontheChristianforces.To make matters worse, thecrusaders needed to cross arangeofhillsabout1,000feethigh before they coulddescend to the lakeshore. To

meet this threat, Saladinarranged the largest force hehad assembled to date, acombined-arms army of18,000 infantry and cavalry,across the crest of this rangeandwaited for thecrusaders’advance.At the rear of the crusader

column, members of theKnights Templars andHospitallers becameseparatedfromtherestofthe

army. Fearing the loss of hiseliteshockcavalry,KingGuyordered the army to encampwhere it stood (Map 3.7(b)).After spending an uneasynight under a barrage ofTurkish arrows,Guy tookupthe march again on themorning of 4 July, but thistime not across the passtoward Tiberias, but northtoward the village of Hattinand the closest source of

water.

Map3.7 TheBattleofHattin,1187.(a)PhaseI:KingGuyof

Jerusalem’sarmydepartsSephorieandheadstowardsTiberiastoraise

Saladin’ssiegeofthatcity(1).Afterabouta10-milemarch,thecrusadersfindthemselvessurroundedbyfast-movingTurkishhorsearcherswhoopenasteadyharassingfireagainsttheLatincolumns(2).Agapbeginstoopenbetweenthecrusaders’centrecolumnandtheelitecavalryoftheTemplarsandHospitallersintherear(3).(b)PhaseII:Guydecidestomakecampforthenight(1),toallowhisrearguardtocloseupwiththerestofthearmy.Thecrusadersspenda

restlessnightpunctuatedbyshowersofTurkisharrows(2).Meanwhile,

Saladin’scombined-armsforceawaitstheadvanceoftheChristianforces

(3).(c)PhaseIII:RatherthanmovingtorelieveTiberias,GuyturnshisforcestowardsthenearbyvillageofHattininhopesoffindingwater(1).TheTurkishhit-and-runattackscontinue(2)andthecrusader

infantry,wearyandthirsty,break(3)andbegintodrifttowardstheHornsofHattin(4).(d)PhaseIV:Onceagain,theTemplarandHospitallercavalryareheavilyengaged(1),forcingGuytohalttoallowthemtoclosewithhismainbody(2).CountRaymondofTripolidecidesnottowaitandleadshiscavalryina

breakouttothenorth(3),scatteringtheencirclinghorsearchers(4).(e)

PhaseV:ThesurvivingcrusaderinfantryontheHornsareeasilydestroyedbySaladin’sforces(1),whichthenturntheirattentiontothebeleagueredknights(2).TwiceduringthedayGuyordershiscavalryto

chargetheTurksinanefforttobreakout(3),buttonoavail.AstheLatincasualtiesmount,Guyfinallyordershismentodismountandsurrender.

Thekingiscapturedandanirreplaceablecrusaderarmyis

destroyed.

As the crusaders advanced,Saladin’swarriorssurrounded

the Christians again. Thirstyand disheartened, thecrusader infantry broke awayfromthemountedknightsandclambered up a pair of hillscalled the Horns of Hattin(Map 3.7(c)). Meanwhile, atthe rear of the column, theTemplars and Hospitallerswere again heavily engaged,forcingGuy to halt a secondtimesoasnot toseparatehismain force from the elite

cavalryofthemilitaryorders.One of Guy’s commanders,Count Raymond of Tripoli,refused to sit and wait. Herallied his knights andcharged the Turkish archers,burstingthroughandescapinginto the northern hills (Map3.7(d)).Turkish troops easily

overcame Guy’s infantry onthe hills, then turned towardthekingofJerusalemandhis

remainingknights.Twice thecrusaders attempted amounted charge through theTurkish lines and twice theircharges failed (Map 3.7(e)).Aftertakingheavycasualties,Guy ordered his knights todismount and surrender. Theking of Jerusalem wascaptured,andalargecrusaderarmy, such as could not befielded again from localresources, was destroyed,

paving the way for furtherIslamicinroadsintoChristianlands. The defeat of theChristianforceatthebattleofHattin precipitated the fall ofAcre, Jaffa, Ascalon, Gaza,Jerusalem and some fiftycrusader castles. By 1188only the Christian cities ofTyre andAntioch held on tospur Europe to anothercrusade.In the space of two years,

Saladin undid what theFrankish invaders struggledalmostacenturytobuild.ButthefalloftheHolyCitytotheinfidel gave new force toPopeGregoryVIII’spleas tothewesternworldforanothercrusade,thethird.Inresponseto Saladin’s success, thekings of England and Franceand theholyRomanemperorjoined together in a call toarms to free the Holy Land

again.The Third Crusade (1189–

1192)beganpoorlywhentheholy Roman emperor,Frederick I Barbarossa (r.1152–1190), drowned in ariver crossing in Anatolia in1190 attempting to open aland route to theHoly Land.ButKingRichardI(r.1189–1199) of England and KingPhilip II Augustus (r. 1180–1223)ofFrancecontinued to

the Levant by sail. TheAnglo-French force ofperhaps 30,000 menrecoveredAcre in July1191,butquarrelsbetweenRichardandPhilip caused the Frenchking and some of his troopsto return home, leavingRichard in charge of leadingthe remaining army torecoverJerusalem.Second only to Edward III

asEngland’sgreatestwarrior-

king, Richard researched thedisastrous march to TiberiasthatledtothedefeatatHattinand vowed not to make thesame mistakes. For his ownmove south to recaptureJerusalem, he hugged thecoast,resupplyinghisarmyofperhaps 1,200 knights and10,000 infantry by sea usingItalian merchant ships (Map3.8(a)). To protect his armyfrom Saladin’s troops, the

English king organized hisforces into a sophisticatedcombined-arms formation,one that offered mutualsupport.King Richard divided his

infantry and cavalry intotwelve groups, each withabout 100 knights protectedby heavy and light infantry.He then formed the twelvegroups into five unequaldivisions. In the vanguard,

Richardplaced theTemplars,theirTurcopole light cavalry,and foot soldiers.Next cameRichard’s own subjects,Bretons, Angevins, NormansandEnglish, followed by theFrench and Syriancontingents. In the rearguardrode theKnightsHospitallersand their Turcopoles andinfantrysupport.The crusaders’ order of

movement placed the supply

columns next to the shorewhere they could beresuppliedbytheItalianfleet,with the twelve groups ofcavalry riding inland,protected by heavy and lightinfantry on the outside,formingacontinuouscolumn.The march south from Acreto Jaffa was slow anddisciplined.Restdays,alwaysnear a water supply andwherethefleetcouldbringup

foodandwaterandrescuethewounded, alternated withmarches.As soon as the crusader

advancebegan,Muslimhorsearchers shadowed thecolumn, harrying theChristians. But the hit-and-run tactics which servedIslamic light cavalry so wellagainst the Europeans in theFirst and Second Crusadesand at Hattin did not bear

fruit against Richard’scombined-arms army. WhenSaladin’s mounted bowmenapproached within short-bowrange, they suffered terriblelosses to Richard’s lightinfantrycrossbowmenlocatedin the outer column. Firingfrom the ranks of shieldedheavy infantry, the Englishcrossbowmenoutranged theirTurkish counterparts, killinggreat numbers of Saladin’s

men.On the evening of 6

September, the crusaderscamped in the cover of amarsh next to the beach just10 miles north of Jaffa.Morning revealed a Muslimarmy in the 2 mile gapbetween the Forest of Arsufand the Mediterranean Sea.Believing he could push thecrusadersintothesea,Saladinlaunched an ambush with

20,000troops(perhapshalfofwhomwerecavalry)fromtheForestofArsufacrossafront2 miles wide. As Muslimmounted and unmountedarchersshotarrowsattherearof the crusader column, theIslamiclancerscharged(Map3.8(b)). The Hospitallers inRichard’s rearguard lost agreat many horses andeventually found themselvespushed back into their own

ranks. Restraining his men,theEnglishkingtriedtowaituntiltheenemy’shorseswereexhausted, but the heat andcasualties among therearguarderoded thewarrior-monks’ patience. BeforeRichard could command anattack, the Hospitallers andFrench knights in hisrearguard passed throughtheir infantry and charged(Map3.8(c)).

Map3.8 TheBattleofArsuf,1191.(a)PhaseI:KingRichard

ordershisarmytomakecampontheeveningof6September(1).The

followingmorningthefivedivisionsofcrusadersmoveoutonceagain(2),

theirmarchparalleledbytheItaliansupplyfleet(3).HavingfaileduptonowindisruptingtheLatinadvancewithtraditionalhit-and-runtactics,Saladingathersacombinedarmsforceof20,000andlaunchesan

ambushagainstthecrusadercolumn(4).(b)PhaseII:Thecrusaders’rearguardisstruckfirstasarchers,bothhorseandfoot,attackthemovingcolumn(1).Asthemissilefirebeginstodisruptthemarch,theIslamic

lancerschargetheirfoe(2).Richardordersthecrusaderstocontinue

moving,hopingthatSaladin’shorseswilltireinthefierceheat.(c)PhaseIII:Astheirranksbecomecompressed

underenemypressureandcasualtiesfromheatandTurkisharrowsmount,theHospitallersandFrenchknightsintherearguardlosetheirpatienceandmountacounterchargethroughtheirinfantryscreen(1)asthecolumncontinuestomarchtowardsthe

villageofArsuf(2).(d)PhaseIV:Asthecrusaders’leadelementsreachArsuf,Richardordersthecavalryofhiscentredivisionstochargethe

Muslims(1).TheflatterrainandcloseproximityofSaladin’sforcesfavourtheLatinheavycavalry.TheMuslimsbegintobreakunderthecrusaderattacksandbegintobepushedbacktowardstheforest(2).(e)PhaseV:

Thecrusaderslaunchyetanothercharge(1),ledbyRichardhimself,whichpushestheMuslimsbackintotheforest(2).Pressedbetweenthe

difficultterrainandtheLatincavalry,Saladin’sarmyisdefeated,losing32

emirsand7,000soldiers.

As the crusader vanguardreached the protection of thegardens of the city of Arsuf,Richard ordered a secondcharge, sending the centredivisionsagainsttheMuslims

(Map3.8(d)).Theflat terrainand close proximity of theenemy created ideal battleconditions for the crusaderheavy cavalry who pursuedthe enemy for about a mile.Crusader knights attackedthree times, with Richardhimself leading the thirdcharge that swept theMuslims back into the forest(Map 3.8(e)). PressedbetweentheChristiancolumn

and the forest and unable toget out of the way of thecharging knights, 32 emirsand7,000Muslimsdied.The battle of Arsuf

demonstratedagainthepowerof a heavy cavalry chargeagainstunarticulatedinfantry.The crusaders’ success atArsuf, like the Normans’ atHastings and Durazzo, wasaccomplishedinnosmallpartbecause of heavy cavalry’s

close co-operation with lightinfantrycrossbowmenandtheheavy infantrywhoprotectedthem. But the crusaders’experience in the Holy Landalso revealed weaknesses inthe lancers’ capabilities.Heavycavalrywasvulnerableto missile attack from bothmounted and unmountedenemies. How individualwestern European kingdomsaddressed this vulnerability

would lead to changes in therelationship between heavycavalry and the otherweapons systems, andultimately to the demise ofthemedievalknight.Between 1097 and 1291,

soldiers from the Latinkingdoms of western Europeconquered the Holy Land,carving out territories andmodelling them after feudalpossessions in their

homeland. But the militarysuccess of the First Crusadedid not last. Succeedingcrusades in the twelfth andthirteenthcenturiesattemptedto win back territories lostbetween the Second andThird Crusades, but withlimited success. In 1291 thelast European possession inthe Holy Land, the port cityof Acre, fell again to theMuslims.

The impact of the crusadesonthewayEuropeansfoughtwasfar-ranging.ContactwithByzantiumandtheNearEastaffected western Europeanfortification and siegecraft,leading directly to theconstruction of castlecomplexes and ways toreduce them. Tactically, theinvading mounted cavalrywould meet their greatestchallenge in the incumbent

weapon system of the NearEast, light cavalry. Theconflict between these twocavalries would teachvaluable lessons to thewestern Europeans about thestrengths and weaknesses oftheir own mounted shockcombatandtheimportanceofcombinedarmswhendealingwithenemylightcavalry.Butthese lessons were not onlylearnedintheLevant.Onthe

Iberian peninsula, Christiancommanders adapted to thenoveltacticsandtechnologiesof the Moors in their four-and-a-half-century strugglewith Islam known to historyas the Reconquista, or‘Reconquest’ofSpain.

TheCrusades:TheReconquistainSpainandPortugalIn the early summer of 711,

Muslim invaders from northAfrica had crossed the Straitof Gibraltar and attacked theIberianpeninsula.ThisArab-ledBerberarmycrossedfromMorocco to the southernmosttip of Spain, landing on ahuge rock the Arabs namedJebelTariq(‘RockofTariq’),after their commandinggeneral, from which themodern-dayGibraltar derivesits name. General Tariq ibn

Ziyad’s military expeditionwas the latest of a series ofIslamic conquests thatbroughtlandsstretchingfromMorocco to Persia under thebanneroftheCrescentMoon.Although Tariq was an

Arab,hecommandedanarmythat was made up mostly ofBerbers, a north Africanpeople recently converted toIslam. After gathering moreArab reinforcements from

north Africa, the Muslimarmy swept north, defeatingthe army of the ChristianVisigothic king Rodrigo atGuadelete in July, thenmarched north again andseizedtheChristiancapitalatToledo. Visigothic resistancemelted away and by 714nearlytheentirepeninsulalayunder Arab rule. The Arabconquerors quicklyestablishedanIslamicstatein

what they called Al-Andalus,known to historians asMoorishSpain.After the rival Abbasid

dynasty ended the UmayyadCaliphate in Damascus in750, the surviving Umayyadruler set up an independentcaliphate in Spain, but washeld in checkby theSpanishMarch put in place byCharlemagneinthe770s.Butas the Carolingian Empire

began to lose its power andinfluenceinthemiddleoftheninth century, this SpanishMarch became vulnerable toMoorish attacks. ChristianBarcelonawassackedin852,and the Spanish Marchfractured into what wouldbecomethesmallerkingdomsof Aragon, Navarre, CastileandLeon.In 1031 the Umayyad

Caliphate disintegrated into

twenty-three small andrelatively weak states, calledthe Taifa kingdoms. Nolonger threatenedbyastrongcentralized Islamic state tothesouth, thesmallChristiankingdoms in northern Spainwere finally able to attemptexpansion. In 1064 the dukeof Aquitaine joined theCatalonians and Aragoneseand attacked Barbastro,cutting its water supply and

taking the city after a forty-day siege. The Christiansmassacred the Muslim menand enslaved their womenand children. And althoughBarbastrowas retakenby theMuslims, this attack isusually considered theopeningphaseoftheSpanishReconquista.Whatbeganasaregional conflict eventuallyevolved into a pan-Europeancrusading movement,

completewithmilitaryordersandpapalsponsorship.Like Carolingian France,

Christian Spain adoptedfeudalism in an attempt tomeetitsmanpowerneeds,butthe term ‘feudal’ should beusedsparinglyhere.Althoughtherewas an institutionalizedrequirement for lords toprovide troops for theirmonarchs, it was a far cryfrom the strict Frankish

feudal system developednorthofthePyrenees,mostlybecause of its unevenapplication by the variousSpanish kingdoms. TheSpanish rulers in Aragon,Navarre, Castile and Leonmaintained the right tosummon armies in times ofneed, but the overalleffectivenessofthesepeasantlevieswas suspect, and thesemonarchs’ reliance on

mercenaries (both ChristianandMuslim) began to take atoll on the combateffectiveness of their armies.However, through the use ofmilites (professional, full-time soldiers, armed withlance and spear) andcaballeros villanos (non-noble knights supported bytermed benefices), theseSpanishkingscreatedcapablearmies for the reconquest of

central and southern SpainandPortugal.As the Christians pushed

south of the sierras and ontothehighplains, long-distanceraiding or cabalgadasincreased in importance.Military campaigns involvedraidingandthebesiegingandcapture of cities. And onceland was liberated from theinfidel, these same Christianmonarchs used captured

castlesand fortified townsorbuilt new ones to pacifyrecentlyconqueredlandorasbases to launch raids deeperinto enemy territory. Thisexpanding Spanish frontierbecame, in the words of onewell-respected historian, ‘asocietyorganizedforwar’.Eventually, as towns were

liberated, they were dividedby their new Christianlandlords into cabalerias

(cavalry portions exemptfrom taxation) and peonias(infantryportionswheretaxeswerepaid), andareasof landwere granted to settlers(peones)whowerewillingtoprovide the assignedobligation. Peones whobecame rich enough couldbecome caballeros villanos.The numerous MuslimAndalusian troops whoremainedtoserveinChristian

armies were simply listed asnon-noble cavallers orhorsemen.Withaccesstomorelandto

support cavalry, thecomposition of the Christianfeudalarmybegantochange,with lords fielding morecavalry at the expense ofinfantry. Spanish lords didutilize Frankish-style heavycavalry, but added a lighterversion to their tactical mix.

These light cavalry mountswere thoroughbreds (jinetes)equipped with low saddles,shorterstirrups,andspeciallyshaped palate bits forincreased control (andthereforemobility).Thisnewbit allowed for neck reining,which gave the rider morecontrol over his mount. Theshort stirrup and low saddledifferedfromthoseofknightsfrom the rest of Europewho

sat securely straight-leggedon high saddles, a positionideal for shock combat usinglances. This new Spanishlight cavalry’s short stirrupand low saddle also allowedforquickremounting,andthesmaller and faster mountswere better suited to counterthe lighter and more agileMuslim light cavalry horsearchers and mountedjavelineersthatusedthekarr-

wa-farr (simulated flight) astheir best offence. This newChristian light horsewent sofar as to adopt a similarfeigned retreat, known to theSpanishastorna-fuye.TheChristiansfoughtwitha

combined-arms tacticalsystem which includedunarticulated heavy infantry,light infantry bowmen andjavelineers, northernEuropean-styleheavycavalry

and the new, Moorish-inspired light cavalry.Christian troopswereusuallybetter armoured than theirMuslim counterparts, withnoble and non-noble militesand cavallers wearing mailhauberks, separatemail coifsandmetalhelmets,andarmedwith maces, cavalry axes,sword and, if properlysaddled,lances.The Islamic forces engaged

againsttheSpanishChristianswere primarily cavalry, withmounted soldiersoutnumbering the footsoldiers. Muslim andChristian light troops, bothmounted and unmounted,used javelins (weaponsdiscarded north of thePyrenees after the Vikingage) and powerful compositebowseffectively,butMuslimlight cavalry and light

infantry generally went towar unarmoured. TheMuslims also utilized anancient Berber strategy ofusing camel laagers as ascreen from which to launchattacks (the smell of Berbercamels confused Christianhorsesuntrainedtoworkwiththistypeofanimal),andwerestill using stationary infantryphalanxes as a defensiveformation, supportedby light

infantry bowmen andjavelineers. North AfricanBerber troops, like Mongolwarriors centuries later,werealso trained to manoeuvresilently to the sound ofmassed drums, a sightwhichno doubt unsettled theirChristianadversaries.

TheBattlesofSagrajasandLasNavasdeTolosa

In the last decades of theeleventh century, Christianarmies swept south intocentral Spain and Portugal,but they were soonchallenged by a resurgentBerber power from northAfrica, the Almoravids(1085–1147). Berberinvolvement was initiallyspurred in 1085 by KingAlfonsoVIofCastile-Leon’scapture of the Muslim

stronghold of Toledo. TheMuslim ruler of Seville, al-Mu’tamid (r. 1069–1091),appealed for aid from northAfrica, and the Almoravidssent troops to blunt furtherChristian expansion. TheAlmoravid commander,Yusuf ibn Tashufin, movedhis army from his securedport of Algeciras in northAfrica to Badajoz in Castile.Shortlyafterlanding,Yusuf’s

ranks were swollen by al-Mu’tamid and his Moorishcontingents from Granada,SevilleandMalaga.King Alfonso, now

besieging Saragossa, wasforced to lift his siege andraise an army for a fossato(major expedition). Inaddition to his levies fromCastile and Leon, Christiancontingents were sent by theking of Aragon. A Castilian

mercenary force under thecommandofAlvarFanezwasrecalled from Valencia, andindividual knights fromelsewhere in Christendom(France and Italy) arereported to have joinedAlfonso’s banner. After ayear of preparation, the twoforcesmet at Sagrajas on 20October1086.Therearenopreciserecords

on the size and composition

ofeachhost,buttheMuslimsprobably possessed superiornumbers. Yusuf, not trustingal-Mu’tamid and hisAndalusian contingents,placed them in front of hisownAlmoravidtroops,withaditch and a small hillseparating the two Muslimforces. Perhaps Yusufintended his unreliableMoorish allies to slow downor diffuse the Christian

assault, and then counter-attackwithhissuperbBerberarmy.TheChristianscampedabout3milesaway.Betweenthe two hosts lay theGuadianaRiver.For three days the armies

watched,waitedandobservedeach other’s tacticalcapabilities, as heraldsattempted to negotiate a dayfor the battle (contemporarysourcesdonottellusifadate

was reached). Finally, beforedaybreak on 23 October (aFriday, theMuslim sabbath),the Christians crossed theriverandattackedtheforwardMoorish formation in twowaves, the first wave ofAragonese commanded byFanez, and the second byKing Alfonso himself (Map3.9(a)). Al-Mu’tamid’sAndalusian contingentsbarelyhadtimetoformaline

when the Aragonese crashedinto their ranks. Withinmoments, most of theMoorish line crumbled andfled south-west in thedirection of the nearestMuslim fortress at Badajoz,withFanezandhismeninhotpursuit. Only the Sevillians,under the command of al-Mu’tamid,heldtheirground.

Map3.9 TheBattleofSagrajas,1086.(a)PhaseI:Afterthreedaysofmutualobservationbythetwoarmies,theChristianforces,organizedintotwowaves,launchanattackacrosstheGuadianaRiver(1).AlvarFanez’sAragonesemercenariesstrikeal-

Mu’tamid’sMoorsinthefirstMuslimline(2).TheAndalusians’formations

arebroken,withtheexceptionoftheSevilliansunderal-Mu’tamidhimself,

andfleetowardstheMuslimstrongholdatBadajoz(3).(b)PhaseII:FanezandhisAragonesecavalrysetoffinpursuitoftheMoorsfleeingtowardsBadajoz(1).KingAlfonsoordershislargerSpanishcontingenttochargetheAlmoravidlinebeyondtheprotectiveditch(2).AstheMuslimlinegivesway(3)andAlfonsopressesontotheBerbercamp(4),Yusuf

ordershisreservesintoactionusingdrumsignals.AbuBakrleadsa

divisionofMoroccansintoactiontoassistal-Mu’tamid(5),whileYusuf

sweepspasttheChristians’

unprotectedflanktofallonAlfonso’scamp(6).(c)PhaseIII:Learningoftheattackonhiscamp,Alfonsohastily

conferswithhissubordinatecommandersandordersareturntotheChristiancamp(1).TheSpanishforcessufferheavycasualtiesfightingtheirwayback(2)butsucceedin

reachingtheircampwheretheyformanewline(3).AsAlfonsoorganizeshissurvivingknightsintoadefensiveline,Fanezreturnsfromhispursuit(4),onlytoabandonthekingafterquicklyassessingthegrimsituation(5).(d)PhaseIV:EmboldenedbythedefectionofFanez’smercenaries,thenowreinforcedMoorishforcesfrom

thefirstlinelaunchacounter-attack(1).TheMuslimforcesaresoon

joinedbysomeoftheAndalusiansthathadearlierfledtowardsBadajozinanapparentkarr-wa-farr(2).ThesituationgrowsincreasinglydesperateforAlfonso.Asnight

approaches,YusufspotsagapintheSpanishline(3)andordersinhiselite

‘BlackGuard’(4).Alfonsoiswounded,buttheking’sbodyguardralliesandcarrieshimoutofthefraytothesafetyofanearbyhill(5).TheMuslimforcessacktheChristiancampasthekingandsome500

survivorsmanagetoescapethesceneoftheirdefeatundercoverof

darkness.

With the majority of theMoorish line routing, KingAlfonso ordered the second,larger Spanish force intoaction (Map 3.9(b)). Thesebetter-armed and moreheavily armoured Christiancavalry pushed through theremnants of the firstMuslimformation and hit the secondAlmoravidline,smashingthe

Berberfront,thencrossedtheditch to strike the Berbercamp beyond. At thismoment,Yusuforderedmostof his reserves into the fray,orchestratedbydrumbeats.Adivision of Moroccantribesmen under thecommand of Yusuf’slieutenant Abu Bakrreinforced al-Mu’tamid,while Yusuf himself sweptaround the Christian flank

and fell on Alfonso’s camp.When the king of Castile-Leonlearnedofthisattackonhis rear, he held a hastywarcouncil and decided toremove himself from hisprecarious position (Map3.9(c)). Despite heavycasualties, the Spanishknightsfoughttheirwaybackto their camp and formed anewline.About the same time

Alfonso had re-establishedthe line in frontofhis camp,Fanez returned to thebattlefield, only to leaveagain after appraising thesituation.The flightofFanezand his mercenariesinvigorated the Muslim firstline, who counter-attackedaggressively, soon joined bymanyoftheAndalusianswhohad originally fled towardBadajoz in an apparent karr-

wa-farr (Map 3.9(d)).Alfonso nowwas confrontedwith the very real possibilityof being surrounded andannihilated, and as theafternoon waned, theChristian position becamemore desperate. Finally,Yusuf saw a gap in theSpanishranksandorderedhiselite ‘Black Guard’ into thefray. This reserve was madeup of 4,000 black Africans,

whocuttheirwaythroughtheChristian lines and severelywoundedAlfonso.Theking’sbodyguard successfullyrallied, and in the confusionwhich often accompaniesnightfall on a battlefield,pulled their fallen king to anearby hill as the Muslimssacked and burned theChristian camp. Under thecover of darkness, Alfonsoand 500 of his knights,most

of whom were wounded,escaped.Despite their predominance

in heavy cavalry, theChristians were unable tocarry the day at Sagrajas.Here,theindividualinitiative,skill and courage of theChristianknightswereunableto overcome the sheernumbers, steadiness andtenacity of their Muslimadversaries. The retreat of

Fanez complicated mattersforAlfonso,whohad to facethefull forceofYusuf’s furywithoutanyrelief.The Christian defeat at

Sagrajas gave the Muslimscontrol over southern Spain,though they failed to presstheir advantage. Yusufreturned to north Africa tocopewithasuccessioncrisis,leavingonly3,000cavalry toassist al-Mu’tamid in

consolidating his newpossessions. Alfonso, beatenbut not broken, made a playfor Valencia in 1087, thistimewiththefamousSpanishmercenary Rodrigo Diaz deVicar (c.1040–1099), knownto history as ‘El Cid’ (fromthe Arabic for ‘The Lord’),on his side. The Cid wasactually under Muslimcontract during the battle ofSagrajasprotectingthecityof

Saragossa, but he came backto the Christian cause onlymonths after the Spanishdefeat.Christian successes in

Valencia forced al-Mu’tamidtoappealonceagaintoYusuffor aid, and the Almoravidleader crossed to the Iberianpeninsula again in the springof 1089, laying siege toAledo. In response, Alfonsoraised a new royal army for

anotherfossatoandcalledforthe Cid to join him inrelievingthecity.ButthetwoChristian armies failed toconvergeontheMuslimforceas planned, and Alfonsoblamed the Cid for themishap. Now without royalsponsorship, the Cid movedup the Spanish Levant andcaptured numerous coastalcities, Christian and Muslimalike. The Cid’s successes

ended only at his death in1099, but while he lived heembodied the martial andpolitical skill required tosurvive and even flourish inlate eleventh-century Spain.Although essentially amercenary who fought forboth Christian and Muslimrulers, he became a nationalhero forSpain.His legend isimmortalized in thePoem ofthe Cid, the earliest and

greatest surviving literaryepic of Castilla, composedseveral decades after hisdeath. As time went on, hislife became surrounded byheroic and pious legends. Intheprocess,Rodrigo themanwas transformed into ‘ElCid’, the legend whoseexploits against the Muslimssymbolized the spirit of theage.The first decades of the

twelfth century witnessed aresurgenceinmilitaryactivityin Spain, spurred on by themilitarysuccessesoftheFirstCrusade and the recapture ofJerusalem in the Holy Land(Map 3.10). As westernEurope ‘took up the cross’and went on crusade, manylay nobles and knightsoffered their military serviceto the Christian monarchs intheSpanishMarch insteadof

making the long journey totheLevant.Eagerforsuccesson two fronts against Islam,the papacy gave permissionfortheKnightsTemplarsandHospitallers to establishthemselves in Iberia, and by1156theSpanishhadcreatedtheir own military order, theKnights of Calatrava, topolice the area south of theGuadianaRiver.But by the 1140s,

Almoravid power was indecline, and a new northAfrican caliphate, theAlmohads (1147–1220s),became a force in Iberia. In1147 the Almohads crossedthe strait and capturedSeville,while that same yearEnglish,GermanandFlemishcrusaders captured Lisbonafter an extraordinary siege.For thenexthalf-century, theAlmohads sparred with the

Christians for control ofcentralSpain.TheChristians,now led by King AlfonsoVIII of Castile (1158–1214),managed to make headwaywith the assistance of theSpanish military orders(Knights of Calatrava,Knights of Santiago, formedin 1170, and Knights ofAlcantara, formed in 1176),capturedCuencain1177,andpushedsouthtoPlasenciaand

Trujillo. Routed by theAlmohadsatAlarcosin1195,Alfonso would avenge thisdefeatatLasNavasdeTolosain1212.

Map3.10 SpainandPortugalduringtheReconquista.

The Christians resumed theReconquista against MoorishterritoryinthesouthofSpainat the beginning of thethirteenth century. Alfonsosevered a peace treaty withtheAlmohad caliph, al-Nasir(known to Christians asMiramamolin), and raided asfarsouthasGranada.In1212al-Nasirbroughtalargearmy

acrossfromMorocco,landingin Seville, and prepared todefend his realm against theChristianinvaders.The Christian host that

gathered in Toledo in thespring of 1212 was amultinational armyorganizedunder the papal banner ofInnocent III (pope 1198–1216), the greatest of thepapal monarchs. BesidesAlfonso,thekingsofAragon,

Portugal, Leon and Navarrealso joined thearmy,makingthe campaign a nationaleffort. Knights and soldierssoon flocked in fromFrance,ItalyandevenasfarawayasGermanytoswelltheranksofAlfonso’sarmy.ByEasteranarmy of perhaps 30,000heavy cavalry and infantryprepared to march south toface a Moorish and Berberarmy that probably

outnumberedthem.On 20 June the crusaders

leftToledoandheadedsouth.As the Christian armymarched, the Frenchcontingent broke away and,seeking plunder, attackedMalagon on 24 June,massacring the garrison. Aweek later, the French brokeranks again and capturedCalatrava, the seat of powerof the military order of the

same name. But Alfonsodenied the French pillagingrights and instead returnedthecitytothecrusaderorder.Infuriated by the king ofCastile’s decision andfrustrated by the lack ofplunder, all but 130 knightsof the French contingentabandoned their bishops andreturnedhometoFrance.Encouraged by this

desertion, al-Nasir left his

baseatJaenandmovedtothefoot of the Losa canyon toblock the Christian advance.With the assistance of ashepherd, the crusadersdescended down a narrowdefile into the plain of theMesa del Rey to thewest oftheMuslimvanguard,forcingal-Nasir to take a strongdefensive position on theslopes of a nearby hill (Map3.11(a)).TheAlmohadcaliph

formed his infantry intosquare, placing his heavyinfantryinthefirstrank.Nextcame light infantry withspears, javelins and slings.Archers stood in the rearranks. Al-Nasir placed hisAndalusianheavycavalryandBerber lighthorsemenon thewings.Shallowrockyravinesnow separated the two hosts.Both armies spent the nextday, Sunday 15 July,

preparingforthebattleahead.Alfonsoorganizedhis army

in typical medieval fashioninto three divisions, with areserve.Thecentrewasmadeup of men from Castile andLeon under the command ofDiego Lopez de Haro. KingPedro II of Aragoncommanded the left wing,buttressed by Knights ofSantiagoandCalatrava,whilethe right was under the

bannerofKingSanchoVIIofNavarre.Alfonsoremainedintherearwiththeremainderofthe knights of the militaryorders, forming the reservedivision.The crusaders opened the

battleofLasNavasdeTolosaon the morning of 16 Julywithaseriesoffrontalheavycavalry charges all along theline led byDiegoLopez, butthe Almohads repulsed the

Christian heavy horse (Map3.11(b)). Later in themorning, the Muslimscounter-attacked in a viciousassaultwith theirAndalusianand Berber horse, but thesetroops were held up in abrilliant defensive stand bythe Spanish light infantry,who thinned their rankswithmissilefirefromslings,bowsand crossbows, allowing theChristian knights to re-form

(Map3.11(c)).What happened next turned

the tide of the battle. Adispute between al-Nasir’sAndalusianandBerbertroopsled to thedesertionenmasseoftheAndalusiancontingent.Taking advantage of thiscrisis, Alfonso ordered hisreservestojointhetwowingsunder Pedro II and SanchoVII (Map 3.11(d)). Thisaction shattered theAlmohad

line, with Sancho breakingthroughtheMuslimdefendersand reaching al-Nasir’smagnificent gold-embroidered tent. Despite avaliant effort by the caliph’sAfrican‘BlackGuard’,armedin traditional fashion withspearsand largehideshields,the knights of Navarre rodethem down and seized theroyal pavilion (Map 3.11(e)).Al-Nasir fled the field and

escaped back to Jaen, wherehe would be dead within ayear. The Muslim army heleftbehindwasannihilatedasthe Spanish line surgedforward. Almohad lossesweresubstantial–perhapsasmuch as a third of the entirearmy–thoughthisisdifficultto ascertain because of theoutrageous claims ofcontemporary Christianchroniclers and the desertion

oftheAndalusiantroops.

Figure3.11 TheBattleofLas

NavasdeTolosa,1212.(a)PhaseI:

Withtheassistanceofalocalguide,thecrusaderarmyunderKingAlfonsoVIIIofCastiledebouchesfroma

narrowpassontotheMesadelReyandapproachesal-Nasir’sAlmohadhostfromthewest(1).Al-Nasir

reorientshisforcesfromnorthtowesttomeetthisthreatandplaceshis

armyinastrongdefensiveposition(2)onahillsidefacingtheChristian

forces.Separatedbyaravine-dottedplain,bothsidesspendaday

preparingforbattle.(b)PhaseII:Thecrusadersopentheaction,DiegoLopez(1)leadingaseriesofheavycavalrycharges(2)againstthe

Almohadpositionsonthehillside.TheSpanisheffortstodislodgeal-Nasir’sforcesarehandilyrepulsed(3)andtheMuslimspreparetolaunchtheir

ownattacklateinthemorning.(c)PhaseIII:Thechargeofthe

AndalusianandBerberhorse(1)ismetbyashowerofmissilefirefromtheSpanishlightinfantryscreen(2).Thehailofslingstones,arrowsandcrossbowboltsdrivestheMuslimcavalryback(3)andbuysthetimethattheChristianheavycavalrymenneedtore-form(4).(d)PhaseIV:Thetidesuddenlyturnsagainstal-NasirashisAndalusiancavalrydesertshisarmy(1)afteradisputewiththeBerberlighthorsemen.Seizingtheopportunity,Alfonsoordershis

reservestobolstertheSpanishwings(2).(e)PhaseV:Thecrusaderssurge

forwardagainstthenowweakenedAlmohadwings(1).KingSancho’srightwingsmashesthroughtoal-Nasir’spersonaltent(2).Al-Nasir’s‘BlackGuard’failstocheckthe

Navarreseonslaughtandscatters(3).Al-Nasirfleesthefield(4)andtheremainderoftheMuslimarmyiscrushedasthecrusaderlinesurges

forward(5).

Christian casualties arestatedat twenty-fiveor thirtyknights, a farcical numberwhen one takes into

considerationtheferocityandduration of this battle.Christian casualties musthave been heavy, especiallyamong the military orderswho historically had bornethe brunt of the fighting.Despite the difficult terrain,the crusader victory owedmuchtotheheavierarmsandhorsesoftheChristianforces,butwasnodoubtsealedwiththe desertion of the Moorish

Andalusian contingent. Still,the Christians won using acombined-arms effort, withheavy cavalry providing theoffensive punch whileinfantry held fast againstMuslimcavalrycharges.The Spanish victory at Las

Navas de Tolosa was themost important of theReconquista, leading tocontinued success incampaigns on the Balearic

Islands (1229–1235),Cordoba (1236), Valencia(1238) and Seville (1248),while in the west, thePortuguese pushed south andreachedtheAlgarvecoastlineby 1248. After 1224 theAlmohadEmpirefellapartina civil war complicated byreligious and racial hatreds.Within forty years of thevictory at Las Navas deTolosa, the Christians

controlled the whole ofAndalusia, leaving onlyGranada in the south to theMuslims. In 1492 the city ofGranada fell to the Spanishmonarchs Ferdinand andIsabella, ending 800 years ofMuslimruleinSpain.

MedievalHorseBreedingandLogisticsThe foundation of medieval

heavy cavalry was thewarhorseitself.Thehorsehadto be a warrior in its ownright, capable of entering thechaos of battle at a chargewithout panicking at thesoundsandsmellsofwarfare.Itneededtobestrongenoughtocarryafullyarmouredmaninto the fray and fierceenough to take an aggressivepartinthebattle.Suchhorsesweredifficulttofindandthey

did not occur naturally, butfrom a process of selectivebreedingandtraining.During the classical period,

Greek and Roman horsebreedersspeciallybredhorsesfor entertainment andwarfare. Horse riding wasintroduced into the GreekOlympic games as early as648 bce, and Greek friezesindicatetheexistenceoflargeand lighter breeds

characteristic of Eurasianstock. In fact, Alexander’sown horse, Bucephalus,whichdiedinIndiaattheageofthirty,wasalmostcertainlyof Bactrian descent. Thepopular Roman pastime ofchariot racing required aspecial breed from the northAfricanprovinceofNumidia,whileRomancavalrymountswere acquired from as farawayasTransoxiana.

But because a variety ofhorse breeds had reached theMediterranean basin in theclassicalperiod, it shouldnotbe thought that the supplyofquality horses was assured.Generations of carefulbreeding for size, speed andcontrollability could bequickly lost if any stallionthat was not speciallyselectedcoveredagoodmare.Andifqualitymaresmatedat

will, the result could bedisastrous. In the lateRomanand early medieval periods,the introduction ofuncontrolled breedingdestroyed hundreds of yearsofselectedgenetics,resultingin horses unsuited formountedwarfare.In the early medieval

period, most riding horseswere what would now beconsidered ‘cold-blooded’

mounts, relatively heavy-boned,slowandunresponsivetocommands.Mountsof thisperiod were of medium size(between 14 and 15 hands,and 800 and 1,000 pounds),with no particularlydistinguishing features. Buthorse breeding evolvedthroughout the medievalperiod, with stables inwesternEurope interbreeding‘hot-blooded’breedsfromthe

east, such as the Arabian,withwesternmounts. Islam’sexpansionacrossnorthAfricaandintotheIberianpeninsulain the seventh and eighthcenturiesbroughttheArabianbreed into Moorish Spain.From the eleventh centuryonwards, Norman contactswith Spanish breeders (bothChristian andMuslim) led toan influx of superiorwarhorses north of the

Pyrenees. Even William theConqueror was known tohave ridden at least oneexcellent Spanish horse atHastings. Norman contactswith Muslim breeders inSicilyandsouthernItalyalsoaugmented their selection ofwarhorses.After the crusades, larger

Anatolian and Iranian‘Nisaean’ breeds wereintroducedtowesternEurope.

Theresultofthesesystematicbreeding policies was asuperior mount, the destrier,with the finest destriersincluding Arabian bloodacquired via Andalusian orother Spanish breeds. As aresult,destrierswerefarmoreexpensive than any othermount, costing between 700and 800 timesmore than thecheapesthorse.The destrier itself was

usuallyastallion,andthesizeof the warhorse increasedthroughout the high MiddleAges, reaching its largestproportions in the fourteenthcentury. Although historiansand hippologists argue aboutthe dimensions of the typicalwarhorse, the magnus equusor ‘great horse’ of the lateMiddle Ages was a sturdysteedof17hands(asopposedto the 12 or 13 hands of

average horses) and 1,200 to1,300 pounds, capable ofsupporting its own bardingand a knight in full platearmour. But the addedencumbrance took its toll.Horses suffered fromincreased fatigue anddehydration, and the practiceof targeting horses, earlierconsidered ‘bad war’, wasnow becoming commonplaceonabattlefieldwhereknights

were increasingly encased ina metal carapace.Consequently, medievalcavalrymen required moremounts when they went oncampaign.By the middle of the

thirteenth century, a singleknight was supported by aretinuecalledcollectively thelance garnie, consisting oftheknighthimself,amountedsquireandtwomountedlight

infantry archers. The squirecarried the knight’s armouron a packhorse, and alsotended to the knight’swarhorse, which was neverridden unless in battle. Withsixormorehorsesattachedtoevery knight, no mountedexpedition of any size couldrely on finding sufficientforageontheway,forcingthearmy to carry its own fodderand increasing further the

numberofhorsesrequired.Military expeditions and

battles in medieval westernEurope were much smallerthan those of the classicalperiod, and the well-organizedprofessionalsupplysystem that supported theRoman war machine wasabsent in the localized anddecentralized environment ofmedieval Europe. Fewregions could sustain armies

forprolongedperiodsoftime,and with poorcommunications, troopsweredependentforsupplyonfixedpoints, usually magazineslocated in castles or walledcities. Because obligatoryfeudal service was for shortperiods during the warmermonths, campaigns wererarelylong,exceptforsieges.When on campaign, earlymedieval armies either lived

off the countryside or,because of poor logisticalsupport,theyevaporated.But logistics improved by

the high Middle Ages, withthe emergence of importantpolitical leaders capable ofmarshalling significantresources for militarycampaigns. For instance,William of Normandy built700 ships, including 200horse transports, for his

invasionofEngland in 1066.During the crusades, Latinarmies in theNearEastwererequired to march longdistancesoverbarrencountry,forcing the westernEuropeans to learn logisticalorganization or perish. Infact, during the First andSecond Crusades, more mendied from starvation or lackoffodderfortheirhorsesthanfrom any other single cause,

includingMuslimswordsandarrows. King Richard I ofEnglanddemonstratedakeengrasp of logistics during theThirdCrusadebyestablishingan intermediate supply baseon Cyprus, by exploiting thelogistical potential of seapowerinhismarchfromAcretoAscalon,andbyhisrefusalto besiege Jerusalemwithoutadequate logistics. Richard’sLevantine campaign,

distinguished by his brilliantcombined-arms tactics at thebattle of Arsuf in 1191,reveals the sophistication ofmedievalsupplyandsupport.Medieval logistics, like

medievalwarfareasawhole,suffered from a lack ofcentralized authority. Butmedieval warfare didcontinue to benefit fromRomancivilization.Networksof Roman roads and bridges

were maintained andexpanded, while old Romanwalls were incorporated intomedievalfortifications.Whencentralized authority waspresent, medievalcommanderswere capable ofamazing feats, such assupporting an amphibiousassault against England andlarge expeditionary forces tothe Near East and northAfrica.

CHAPTER4

HIGHMEDIEVALWARFARE:THE

MONGOLINVASIONOFTHEWEST

‘StormfromtheEast’:TheMongolArtofWar

AsIslamwasembroiledwithits counter-crusade againstthe Christian infidel in theHoly Land, a new, moreominous threatwasemergingfrom the east. Mongol andTurkish tribesmen, under thecharismatic leadership of theMongol warlord Temuchin(1167–1227), were massingfor the greatest conquests inhumanhistory.GenghisKhan(the title Temuchin took in

1206) and his powerfulnomadic confederation sweptout of Mongolia andconquered northern Chinaand Korea by 1216, thenspread westward acrosscentralAsia to invadePersia.By the end of 1221 GenghisKhanhadcrushedtheIslamicKhwarizmian Empire inTransoxiana and invaded theUkrainian steppes. There, in1223, a combined army of

Kievan and allied Asiannomads turned back theMongolinvadersat thebattleof Kalka River. GenghisKhandied in 1227before hecould avenge this defeat, buthe had already created thelargest contiguous landempire yet seen in humanhistory.The secret of theMongols’

military success was acombination of strategic

mobility,effectivetacticsandthe quality of the Mongolwarrior and mount.Consisting entirely of lightand heavy cavalry (with theexception of some auxiliaryunits), theMongol armywasorganized on the decimalsystem. The largestmanoeuvre unit was thetuman, consisting of 10,000men. Three tumans (30,000men) normally constituted a

Mongol army. The tumanitself was composed of tenregiments or minghans of1,000 men each. Eachminghancontainedtenjagunsorsquadronsof100men.Thejagunwas further subdividedinto ten troops of ten mencalled arbans. This noveltacticalflexibilityallowedtheMongol army to strike withthe speed and force of ahurricane,confusingandthen

destroying its enemies, thendisappearing back into thegrasslands like its Scythian,MagyarandSeljukforebears.Though often described as a‘horde’ of warriors by theircivilized adversaries, theMongol army was usuallymuch smaller than that of itsopponents.Infact,thelargestforce Genghis Khan everassembled was less than240,000 men, sufficient for

his conquest of Transoxianaand north-west India. TheMongol armies which laterconqueredRussiaandeasternEurope never exceeded150,000men.The typical Mongol army

was a pure cavalry forceconsisting of about 60 percent light cavalry and 40 percent heavy cavalry. Thesetwo weapon systems co-operated in anunprecedented

manner to bring to bear thestrengthsofmissileandshockcombat against the enemy.Mongol light cavalry wererequiredtoreconnoitreforthearmy,actasascreenfortheirheaviercounterpartsinbattle,and provide missile firesupport in attacks, andfollow-up pursuit once abattle was won. These lighthorsemen were armed incharacteristic Asiatic fashion

with two composite bows(one for long distance andone for short), two quiverscontaining at least sixtyarrows, two or three javelinsandalasso.TheMongolcompositebow

was larger than most of itscentralAsian cousins,with ahefty pull of up to 165poundsandaneffectiverangeof350yards.Quiverscarriedarrows for many purposes:

lightarrowswithsmall,sharppoints foruseat long ranges,heavier shafts with large,broad heads for use at closequarters, armour-piercingarrows,arrowsequippedwithwhistlingheadsforsignallingand incendiary arrows forsetting things on fire. TheMongol warriors were soadeptatmountedarcherythattheycouldbendandstringthebow in the saddle and then

loose the arrow in anydirectionatfullgallop.The Mongol light trooper

usually did not wear hardbody armour, though he didoften wear a paddedgambeson and employ awickershieldcoveredinthickleather. In combat, hereplaced his thick woollencap with a simple hardenedleather or iron helmet ifavailable. Mongol heavy

cavalrywerebetterprotected,withwarriorswearingleather,mail or lamellar cuirass andmetal helmet, and theirmounts wearing leatherbarding.Theprimaryweaponof theheavycavalrymanwasa 12 foot lance, thoughcurved and straight sabresand small battleaxes andmaces were also presentamong the elite.Allwarriorswererequiredtowearalong,

looserawsilkundershirtnextto their skin for addedwarmth and protection. If anenemy arrow penetrated thesteppe warrior’s body, itwould usually fail to piercethe silk, instead carrying theresilient fibrewith it into thewound.Bysimplypullingonthesilk,afieldsurgeoncouldeasilyextractthearrow.Military service was

compulsory for all Mongol

adultmales under the age ofsixty, and like all steppesocieties, there was no suchthing as a civilian. Nearlyborn in the saddle and raisedto be effective mountedhunters and herders, theseMongolwarriorswere inuredto the hardships of theEurasian steppes, facingextremes in weather andlackingtheluxuries,richfoodand soft mattresses of

sedentary living. This harshlifestyle forgedwarriorswithstrong minds and bodies,capable of almostsuperhumanendurance in thesaddle. On the march, eachtuman had its own herd ofremounts following behind,with each steppe warriorhaving at least threeremounts. This allowed himto ride at speed for days,slowingonly to tapavein in

the weakest horse fornourishment. Mongoltrooperswere responsible fortheir own food andequipment, cutting down thesize of the supply train andvirtually abolishing the needtomaintainabasecamp.Thehorsesthemselveswere

alsoveryhighlytrained,withMongol warriors preferringmares over stallions aswarhorses. The Mongols’

original mounts were whatare known today asPrzewalski’s horses, thickand strong beasts with broadforeheads, short, powerfullegs, and a reputationthroughout the steppes fortheir courage and stamina.Broken and ridden hard fortheir first two years, thesehorses were then put out topasture for the next threeyears to develop a herd

mentality. Afterwards, theywere trained for warfare.After the fall of Khwarizm,these horses were crossbredwith the larger, hot-bloodedArabian breeds, creating alarger mount of between 14and 15 hands, with some aslarge as 16 hands. Thesewarhorses were treated ascomrades-in-arms. Horsesridden in battle were neverkilledforfood,andwhenold

or lame, were put out topasture to live out their lastdays. When a warrior died,hismountwas sacrificedandburied with him so that hewould have a companion fortheafterlife.Mongol commanders

understood the importanceofthe principles of surprise,offence and manoeuvre inmilitaryoperations,ofseizingandmaintaining the initiative

inbattle,evenif thestrategicmissionwasdefensive.Whena Mongol army was oncampaign, each tumanusually advanced quickly ona broad front, maintainingonly courier contact inbetween the 10,000-horsedivisions. To facilitate goodcommunicationbetweenfieldarmies and headquarters,permanent staging posts oryamswereestablishedbehind

advancing armies atapproximately 25 mileincrements. These yamstations acted as a kind ofpony express for theMongols,givingcommandersthe ability to send messagesback and forth at the rate of120milesperday.When theenemy was located,information concerning hisstrength, complement,position and direction of

movement was relayed backto headquarters, and in turndisseminated back to localcommanders. Onceintelligence had beengathered and the plan co-ordinated, the main forceconvergedandsurroundedtheadversary, while otherelements continued toadvance and occupy thecountry behind the enemy’sflank and rear, threatening

their linesofcommunication.Iftheenemyforcewassmall,it was simply destroyed, butif it proved formidable, thenMongol generals usedmanoeuvre, terrain and theirenemy’s predilections to bestadvantage.If the enemy army was

stationary, the Mongolgeneral might command hismain force to strike it in therear, or turn its flank, or

engage and then feign aretreat,onlytopulltheenemyinto a pre-planned ambushusing an elite light cavalrycorpscalled themangudaior‘suicide troops’ (anhonourable title more than ajobdescription).Thefunctionof the mangudai was tocharge the enemy positionalone, and then break ranksand flee in the hope that theenemy would give chase. If

the enemy pursued, theMongols would lead theminto terrain suitable forambush.If theenemy’spositionwas

notpreciselyknown,themainMongolarmyadvancedalonga broad front in severalroughly parallel columnsbehind a screen of lightcavalry. The main forcegalloped along in five ranks,the first two of which were

heavy cavalry and the lastthree light cavalry. Ridingwayoutinfrontandoneitherflankwerethreeseparatelightcavalry detachments. Whenthe enemy was encountered,the Mongol army reactedquickly. The contactedoutriders automaticallyshifted to protect the mainforce as it wheeled to meetthethreat.Oncethevanguardwas engaged, the light

cavalry in the main forcegallopedthroughtheranksofthe heavy cavalry and joinedtheotherhorsearchers.Whattook place next was aclassical employment ofmissile and shock combatreminiscent of the battles ofCarrhae and Dorylaeumcenturiesearlier.Co-ordinating the attack in

an unnerving silence withoutbattle cries or trumpets

(signalsweregivenbyflags),the Mongols began theirassault with light cavalryriding up and down theenemy’s front lines,showering his ranks withwell-aimed javelins andarrows. Once light cavalrymissile-fire had thinned theenemy’s ranks, the horsearchers broke away to eitherflank, leaving the heavycavalry to drive in the final

blow.Mongollancersusuallyadvanced at a trot and insilence.Itwasonlyatthelastpossible moment that thecharge was ordered bystriking the great naccara, alarge kettledrum carried by acamel. With a single blood-curling scream, the Mongolheavyhorseattacked.In combat, the Mongols

would close in from manydirections if possible, taking

advantage of any disorder orconfusion their swarmingtactics created. The famousthirteenth-century Italianmerchant and EurasiantravellerMarcoPologivesusa description of Mongoltactics, though he called theMongolsbythegenericnameofTartars:WhentheseTartarscometoengageinbattle,theynevermix with the enemy, but

keep hovering about him,discharging their arrowsfirstfromonesideandthenfromtheother,occasionallypretending to fly, andduring their flight shootingarrows backwards at theirpursuers, killing men andhorses, as if they werecombating face to face. Inthis sort of warfare theadversary imagines he hasgained a victory, when in

fact he has lost the battle;for the Tartars, observingthemischieftheyhavedonehim, wheel about, andmake them prisoners inspite of their utmostexertions. Their horses areso well broken-in to quickchanges ofmovement, thatupon the signal given theyinstantly turn in everydirection; and by theserapid maneuvers many

victories have beenobtained.Sometimes, Mongols wouldeven send out smalldetachments to start largeprairie fires or set fire tosettlements to deceive theenemyormaskmovements.Another area of success for

theMongolwarmachinewasits ability to reduce walledcities, thereby leaving noenemy strongholds in the

wakeoftheirconquests.Afterinitially developing a trainusingChinesesiegeweapons,equipment, techniques andoperators, the Mongols soonmade their ownimprovements and developedtheir own techniques. TheMongols were also quick toinclude in their siege trainweaponsencountered in theirconquests.FromtheChinese,the Mongols adopted the

torsion-operated light andheavy catapult, and from theKhwarizm, they adopted thetension-operated ballista andacentralAsianversionofthetrebuchet, a powerful engineoperatedbycounterpoise.Like all cavalry-based

armies, the Mongolspreferred an open fieldengagement over siegewarfare.Butifanenemycityrefused to open its gates,

Mongol generals hadnumerous ways to gainaccess. Siege weapons,towers and battering ramswere brought to bear, but ifthese techniques provedineffective, the Mongolswouldoftenattempttosetthecity on fire, compelling theinhabitants either be burnedalive,ortoopentheirgates.Ifthe wall was breached, afavouritebutruthlessMongol

tacticwas toherdcaptives infrontoftheirowndismountedtroopers, forcing thedefenders to kill their owncountrymen in order to bringfireontheattackers.Once theMongols took the

city, it was pillaged and itsgarrisonand inhabitantswereoften put to the sword.Genghis Khan routinelyeradicated entire populationsin his campaigns against the

Khwarizmian Empire,depopulating and destroyingBalkh, Merv and Nishapuralong the way.Men, womenand children were separated,distributed like cattle amongthe tumans, and decapitated.Their heads were thenstacked in pyramids to serveas monuments to Mongolcruelty and warnings to thesteppe warriors’ enemies.Even the dogs and catswere

killed. The Mongols sparedprisoners, artisans, engineersand men of military age sothat they could assist in thenext siege, digging trenches,buildingrampartsoractingasfodderfortheassault.The Mongols used their

catapults, ballistae andtrebuchets not only againstcity walls, but also againstenemy field positions. Theseartillery pieces shot

containersfilledwithburningtar to create smoke screens,or firebombsandgrenades tocreate tears in the enemy’slines. The Mongols alsoperfected a medieval versionof a ‘rolling barrage’, withcavalryunitsadvancingundercatapultandballista fire.TheMongols even made use ofrudimentary rockets madefrom bamboo wrapped inleather,thoughtheseweapons

were very inaccurate andunreliable.

TheMongolInvasionofEurope:TheBattlesofLiegnitzandSajoRiverGenghis Khan’s second sonand heir, Ogotai, ordered aMongol army of betweentwelve and fourteen tumanswestward into Russia again.

InDecember 1237 aMongolarmy led byGenghisKhan’sgrandson Batu Khan sweptdown on the city of Riazan,takingthecityafterafive-daysiege.TheMongols favouredwinter operations, using thefrozen marshes and ice-covered rivers to enhancestrategic mobility. Over thefollowing year, the Mongolsproceeded to lay waste tonorth-western Russia,

destroying cities, towns andvillages.At the same time, another

MongolarmycommandedbyBatu Khan’s chief of staff,Subotai, pushed into south-west Russia, taking Kiev inDecember 1237. Russianprinces, under the leadershipof Alexander Nevsky (sonamed after his victory overtheSwedesatthebattleoftheNeva in 1240), repelled the

Mongol assaults againstNovgorod and Pskov, buteven these late successescouldnotturnthetideagainstthe steppewarriors.With theKievan kingdom destroyedandsouthernRussiaoccupiedby the Golden Horde, theprincipalities of northernRussia finally submitted toMongol rule and becameclient states. Althoughpractice of the Eastern

Orthodox religion wasallowed to continue, Russiawould remain under Mongolruleforthenext200years.

Map4.1 TheMongolInvasionof

Europe.

AftersubduingRussia,BatuKhan extended the Mongolconquests westward in athree-pronged attack againstPoland, Hungary andRomania (Map 4.1). InPoland, the northern armyunder Batu’s lieutenantsBaidarandKadansackedandburned Krakow on PalmSunday 1241. Bypassing

Breslau, they converged onthe city of Liegnitz (modernLegnica),whereHenry, dukeof Silesia, had collected aformidable armymade up ofmilitia Christi (TeutonicKnights, Templars andHospitallers) and Polish andGermanlayknightsandmen-at-arms to bar the way intothe Holy Roman Empire.Confronting the Mongols onaplainsouthofLiegnitz ina

place since known as theWalstadt or ‘chosen place’,Henry’s army of around25,000mentookuppositionson level ground with hismounted knights in the vanand his large infantry hostbehind.The Mongols faced an

experiencedChristianarmyatLiegnitz. For over a century,GermanCatholicshadpushednorthandeast from theHoly

Roman Empire, often at theexpense of Slavic princes.The German eastward drivewasnotsponsoredbyroyalorpapal policy, but rather amovement led by localnobles. German militarygainswere consolidated by amassive eastward migrationof German peasants whowere settled in numerousagrarian villages.Consequently, regions such

as eastern Germany andwesternPolandwerenotonlyconquered,theywerebroughtwithintheCatholicfold.Spearheading these

campaigns were the militaryorders, led by the TeutonicKnights based in Prussia.Never as influential as theTemplars and Hospitallers intheHolyLand,theKnightsofthe Teutonic Order found apurpose in the spread of

Catholicism to pagan andOrthodox Christian areas incentral Europe, and later, theBalticstates.Welltrainedandwell armed with sword andlance, andprotectedby long-sleeve mail hauberks, flat-topped great helms andshields, the military ordersfunctioned as the elite shocktroops of these Balticcrusades. They builtnumerous castles to subdue

thecountrysideandusedtheirskills as heavy cavalry indevastatingannualcampaignsagainst infantry-basedmilitias superior in numbersbut inferior in tacticalcapabilities. The Mongolswouldprove tobe a superioropponent.ThebattleofLiegnitzbegan

on the morning of 9 April1241 when Duke Henryordered his German heavy

cavalry to charge theapproaching nomadic lightcavalry,onlytohaveitbeatenback by flights of Mongolshafts (Map 4.2(a)).Undeterred, Henry ordered asecond, larger charge,committing the remainder ofhisheavyhorse,includingthePolish knights and themilitaryorders.Butthistime,the Mongol light cavalrywheeled and took flight.

Emboldened, the Christianheavy cavalry pressed theattack, pursuing the horsearchers off the battlefield(Map4.2(b)).Butthingswerenot as they seemed for theChristian nobility. As theknights became strung out,the pursued mangudaiwheeled their more agilemounts and reverseddirection, peppering theChristian heavy cavalry with

arrows,aiming their shafts atthe well-armoured knights’mounts (Map4.2(c)).Toaddtotheconfusion,theMongolsset up a smoke screenbetweenHenry’sinfantryandhis trapped knights, hidingthe two forces from oneanother. As Henry watchedfrom among his infantry, theMongol horse archers andlancers emerged from thesmoke and attacked his

footmen, routing theChristian infantry (Map4.2(d)).

Map4.2 TheBattleofLiegnitz,1241.(a)PhaseI:DukeHenry’sChristianforcessallyforthfromLiegnitztoconfronttheadvancingMongolsontheplainoftheWalstadt(1).Henry

ordershisGermancavalrytochargetheenemyhorsearchers(2),buttheyaremetwithahailofarrows(3)

whichforcethemback.(b)PhaseII:Henryordersasecondchargewithhisremainingheavycavalry(1),

includinghisPolishknightsandelitemilitaryorders.TheMongollighthorsemenwheelandretreat(2),andarepursuedbytheslower-movingChristianknights,openingagap

betweenthemselvesandtheirinfantry(3).(c)PhaseIII:IntryingtoclosewiththeswiftlymovinghorsearcherstheChristianknightsbegintolosetheircohesion,andtheirformationsbecomestrungout.TheMongol

bowmenquicklyreversedirectionandengagetheknights(1).MoreMongolcavalryjointhefray(2)andapproachtheChristianinfantryundetected

becauseofasmokescreensetbetweenthemandtheircavalry(3).(d)PhaseIV:AsHenrywatches,Mongolhorsearchersandlancersemergefromthecloudsofsmokeandploughintohisinfantry,whichquicklybegintorout(2).Thedukeiscutdownashetriestofleethebattlefieldwithsomeofhisbodyguards(3),andthesurviving

Christiansareeasilypickedoffbythefast-movingMongolcavalry(4).

Duke Henry was killed

trying to escape with threebodyguards, his men pickedoff one by one by Mongolhorse archers. Henry pushedhis mount until it collapsed,and he tried to run in hisarmour until the steppewarriors rodehimdown.Theday ended with his head ontheendofapike,whichwasthencarriedaround thewallsof Liegnitz. Althoughaccurate casualties do not

exist for this engagement,whatisknownisthatmostofthe crusaders, together withthePolisharistocracyandtheflower of northern Europe’sknightly class, lay dead onthe Walstadt. The Mongolscutoff anearof every fallenChristianwarrior tomake anaccurate body count. Ninebags of ears were collectedfrom the European dead andsent toBatuKhan as tribute.

The battle of Liegnitz inPoland would be the first ofthree Mongol victories incentralEuropeinaone-weekspan, each of themcharacterized byunprecedented strategicmobilityandtiming.While Baidar and Kadan

were sweeping throughPoland, Batu Khan’s centralarmy was moving across theCarpathian Mountains and

into the Hungarian plain atbreath-taking speed, movingatsome60milesperdayoverrough terrain and throughdeepsnow.HoveringclosetoPest, Batu taunted theHungarianking,BelaIV,andan army of perhaps 80,000men, including European-styleheavycavalry(includinghis own elite shock troops,the Knights Templars) andeven some light cavalry

nomadic mercenaries. Bela’sarmy was huge, and bymedieval standards, quitegood, and he felt he had alargeenoughhosttomeettheMongol invasion. Butunknown to the Hungarianmonarch, it was 9 April, thesame day as the debacle atLiegnitz, some 400 miles tothe north-west. A day later,the southern Mongol armystormed Hermannstadt and

destroyed the army ofTransylvania.Unawareofhisstrategic position betweentwo victorious Mongolarmies,Bela tookBatu’sbaitandmovedawayfromPestinsearchofadecisivebattle.As the Hungarians

advanced, the Mongolsretreated slowly ahead ofthem for two days. Batu andSubotai rode ahead of thearmytoinspectthebattlefield

where theengagementwouldtake place. On the afternoonof10April,theMongolsrodeovertheheathandcrossedtheonly stone bridge over theSajo River and continuedanother 10 miles westwardinto thewoods (Map 4.3(a)).BelaarrivedattheSajointheevening, then sent 1,000Hungarian horsemen acrossthe bridge to reconnoitre thewoods. Finding nothing but

Mongol horse tracks, theyreturned to guard the bridgeas the remainder of theHungarian army made itscamp on the heath (Map4.3(b)).Foraddedprotection,Bela drew hundreds ofwagonsinacirclearoundthetents, securing them withropes and chains. If theMongolswishedtoattacktheHungarian position, theywould have to cross a lone

bridge guarded by 1,000horsemen and then penetrateamakeshiftwagonfortress.

Map4.3 TheBattleofSajoRiver,1241.(a)PhaseI:KingBelaIV’sHungarianarmypursuesaMongolarmyunderBatuKhanfromthevicinityofPesttotheconfluenceof

theSajoandTiszarivers(1).UnbeknownsttoBela,Batuand

Subotaihadalreadyreconnoitredtheareaandchosenitasabattlefield.Thefaster-movingMongolhorsemencrosstheonlybridgeovertheSajo

anddisappearintotheforest(2).Belaordersareconnaissanceintothethicketsonthefarsideoftheriver,buttheHungariansfailtolocatetheirfoeandreturntothesouth-westbankoftheriver.(b)PhaseII:Postingadetachmentatthebridge(1),Bela’sarmyestablishesacamp(2)andencirclesitwithwagonschainedtogetherforadditionalprotection.Meanwhile,Batuandhisofficers

surveytheenemypositionsfromahilltopoverlookingthefield(3).

Thoughconfidentinthestrengthofitsposition,Bela’sarmyisactually

boxedinbymarshestotheright,theSajotothefront,andtheforestsoftheLomnitzandDiosgyortotheleftandrear.(c)PhaseIII:Asnightfalls,BatuordersSubotaitotake30,000horsementhroughthehillyterrainto

theSajo(1),wheretheyaretoconstructabridgeacrosstheriver.BatumovestheremainderofthearmyintopositiontoattacktheHungariansacrossthestonebridge(2).(d)PhaseIV:BatuordershisMongolhorsearchersintoaction(1),butBela’s

heavycavalrydetachmentisabletoholdthemoffbecauseofthenarrowapproachatthebridge(2).ThebravestandoftheguardsbuyssufficienttimefortheHungarians’mainforcetosortiefromthecampandadvancetothebridge(3).Inthemeantime,Subotai’sforcebeginsitsbridging

task(4).(e)PhaseV:UnabletoovercometheirHungarianopponentsacrossthenarrowbridge,theMongolsemploysevenlightcatapultsasfieldartillery(1),hurlingincendiariesintothe

ranksofBela’sforce(2).TheensuingdisordercreatesanopportunityforBatuandtheMongolstoswarm

acrossthecontestedspan(3)andbegintodeployontheheath.(f)PhaseVI:Batuslowlydeployshisforces(1),fixingtheHungarians’attentionuponhisarchersandsubtlyarranginghisformationinsuchawayastoleavetheHungariansvulnerabletoSubotai’sundetectedforce

approachingfromthewest(2).BelalauncheschargeafterchargeintothenumericallyinferiorMongolranks(3),andthesteppewarriors’linesbegintothin.Inexplicably,Batu

ordershissurvivingarcherstobegintoencircletheHungarianheavy

cavalry(4).(g)PhaseVII:AsBatu’sdepletedranksformacrescent-shaped

formationtoconfrontBela’ssuperiorforce(1),Subotai’sfresharchersappearbehindtheHungarian

formationsandbegintoformtheirowncrescent(2),threateningtoencircletheheavycavalry.AstheMongolarrowsraindown,Bela

realizeshehaslosttheinitiativeandordersawithdrawal(3)tohisfortifiedcamp.(h)PhaseVIII:Pressinghometheirattack(1),theMongolsbringuptheirfieldartillery(2)andbeginlaunchingincendiariesintothe

fortifiedcamp(3).TheHungariansattempttochargethesiegemachines,butaredrivenback.Afterseveral

hoursofpounding,Hungarianmorale

beginstocollapseasMongollancersbegintomassforthecoupdegrâce(4),butagapopensduringthismovement(5)andatrickleofHungarianfugitivesthroughthis

openingsoonbecomesaflood.Bela’sclosestfollowersremainandare

slaughtered.TheHungariansurvivorsfleeingthroughthegorgetowards

PestarehunteddownbythemercilesshorsearchersandtheChristianarmy

iseffectivelydestroyed.

Looking down from ahilltop above the Hungarianencampment, Batu and hisofficer corps surveyed theterrain. On the right of theChristian position were the

marshes of the Tisza, aheadofthemwastheSajo,andontheirleftandbehindthemthehills and forests of theLomnitz and Diosgyor. Hemust have felt as though hehad his enemy ‘trapped likecattle in a corral’. The onlyescape route was back westthroughthegorgefromwhichtheycame.When night fell, Batu

ordered Subotai to take

30,000 cavalry through thehills and quickly build awooden bridge across theSajo beyond the heath (Map4.3(c)). The movement ofsuch a large force shouldhave alerted the Hungariandefenders, but Bela’s scoutsdetected nothing. Batu’sstrategy was a simple one:engage the Hungarian king’sfront, while Subotai secretlymoved into position and

attacked the rear. The battleof Sajo River began justbefore dawn on 11 Aprilwhen Batu with 40,000 menlaunched a cavalry attackagainstthestonebridge(Map4.3(d)).King Bela’s guard held the

bridge until reinforcementsarrivedfromthecamp,anditseemed as though the denseranksofdefenderscouldholdoutforeveragainstthenarrow

column of Mongol cavalry.But Batu solved the problemby bringing up seven lightcatapults to bombard the farside of the bridge withincendiaries and grenades(Map 4.3(e)). Confused bythe tactical use of siegeartilleryonthebattlefield,theHungarian ranks drew backfrom the bridge in disorder,allowingtheMongolhorsetocross the stone bridge safely

behinda‘rollingbarrage’.Batu Khan’s steppe

horsemen pushed off thebridge and formed up on thecentre of the heath slowly,consciously turning theHungarian army andorientatingitsothatSubotai’sforce could strike it in therear (Map 4.3(f)).Outnumbering the Mongolforce arrayed in front of himbytwotoone,Belalaunched

wave after wave ofHungarian heavy cavalrycharges against the nomads.For two ferocious hours, theMongols fought off theHungarian nobility withmissile fire, but casualtieswere high. At this moment,Batu inexplicablyorderedhisdangerouslydepletedrankstostretchoutintoahalfcircleasif to surround the Christiantroops(Map4.3(g)).Andjust

astheHungarianheavyhorsewere preparing to finallybreak through the thinMongol line, Subotai arrivedonthebattlefieldandarrayedhis fresh 30,000 cavalry in amatching half circle behindthe defenders. As the twocrescents convergedbehindarain of arrows, theHungarians realized that theyhad lost the initiative, andwithdrew in good order back

into their fortifiedcamp.TheMongols surrounded thecircled wagons and pressedtheirattack.Batu now ordered Mongol

artilleryforwardtopoundtheHungarian encampment withincendiaries (Map 4.3(h)).Sensing this danger, Belarallied enough knights tochargethesiegeweapons,butthey were driven back.Consequently, the Hungarian

encampment suffered severalhoursofpounding,withmostof the tents burned and theintegrity of the wagonfortification wrecked. AsHungarian moraleplummeted, Mongol heavycavalrylancersbegantomassforthecoupdegrâce.Buttheconcentration of Mongollancers created a gap in theattackers’linesinfrontofthegorgetothewest.Seizingthis

opportunity,afewHungarianhorsemenmadea run for thegorge and escaped. Soon,many others followed,throwingdowntheirarmsandarmour to lessen the burdenon the mounts. With awholesalecollapse imminent,onlytheTemplarsandBela’smostfaithful troopsstayedtoprotect the camp. Formed upin a wedge, these bravesoldiers were cut down by

Mongol missile fire thensmashedby thefinalMongolheavy cavalry charge.Sharing the fate of theirbrothers-in-arms two daysearlier at Liegnitz, theTemplarsdiedtotheman.Meanwhile, the runaway

column was beginning tostretchoutovertheheathandthroughthegorge, justas theMongols had planned. Nowthe Hungarian rout took on

the characteristics of aMongol hunt, with horsearchers riding on both sidesofthecolumn,pickingofftheridersonebyonewitharrow,lance or sabre. Soon, theheath became a sea ofriderlesshorses, and the roadfor30milesbacktoPestwaslittered with Christian dead.ThebattleofSajoRiver costthe Hungarians dearly.Conservative estimates place

thenumberofdeadat60,000men, or three-fourths of theentire army. Belamiraculously escaped fromthe battle unrecognized,fleeing across the foothillsandtakingafreshhorsefromhisfaithfuleachtimehisownfaltered. He made his waysouth, ending his days inexileinCroatia.The battles of Liegnitz and

Sajo River illustrated all the

characteristics of Mongolsteppe warfare, includingfeigned retreat, ambush andencirclement. Theseengagementsalsoshowedtheinherent strengthof lightandheavy cavalry tacticalsystems working together,first to wear enemy forcesdown,andthentofinishthemoff. The Russians, Poles andHungarians all failed torecognize the theory behind

theMongolattacks,believingerroneously that their well-armed and armoured feudalheavycavalrycouldmeetandbeat the combined-armstacticsofthesteppewarriors.Withoutalargecontingentoflight infantry to fend off thenomadic horse archers, theChristian armies could notnegatetheirenemy’smobilityandfirepower.BecauseoftherelativebrevityoftheMongol

campaigns ineasternEurope,the Russians, Poles andHungarians did not have thetime to adjust to the steppewarriors’ tactics in the samewaytheLatincrusadersdidintheir campaigns againstSeljuk light cavalry in theLevant. The crusaders’understanding of the properuse of combined arms,especially the use of lightinfantry to neutralize light

cavalry, would have beenessential hadwestern Europebeen forced to defend itselfagainst prolonged Mongoldepredations.After destroying the flower

ofHungarianchivalryatSajoRiver, the Mongols returnedto Pest and burned the city.Thesteppewarriorsthenrodeupanddowntheeastbankofthe Danube River terrorizingthe countryside and

depopulating entire regions.One favourite ruse was topromise the Christianpeasantry protection if theyharvestedthecrops,thenoncethe work was done, theMongols killed them. Theyeven used Bela’s royal seal,captured from the camp, toforge proclamations toprevent the mustering of anew army. For eightmonths,the threeMongol armies laid

waste to central Europe,sackingBudaandthreateningVienna.Mongol detachmentsseekingBela even penetratedsouth and west until theyreachedtheAdriatic.With both pope and holy

Roman emperor mobilizingEurope to resist furtherwestward penetrations, theMongols disappeared asquickly as they came. InDecember1241, thedeathof

Ogotai forced Batu andSubotai to return to the newMongolcapitalatKarakorumto elect a new great khan,ending forever the Mongolthreat to Europe. The lastgreat Mongol invasion wasdirected at the Near East inthe second half of thethirteenthcentury.

TheMongolInvasionoftheNearEast

Mongolhostilitiesresumedinthe Near East in 1256 underGenghis Khan’s grandsonHulagu, but this time thetarget was Islam. Years ofsuccession problems inKarakorumhad disrupted themomentum of Mongolconquests, and the westernEurasian khanswere anxiousto spread Mongol hegemonyacrosstheEuphratesandintoSyria and Egypt. The new

greatkhan,Mangu, rewardedHulagu’s fidelity in thesuccession fight with newlyconquered lands centred inPersia and Khorasan, thenchargedhimwithsubjugatingthecaliphinBaghdadandthedestruction of the lastremaining great power in theNear East, the MamlukSultanateinCairo(Map4.4).Asaprelude tohis attackonSyria and Egypt, Hulagu

decided to isolate the twosmaller independent Islamicpowerswhichstoodoneitherside of Syria’s eastern flank,theIsmailiOrderofAssassinsin the north and theAbbasidCaliphateinthesouth.

Map4.4 TheMongolInvasionoftheNearEast.

The last caliph inBaghdad,al-MustasimBillah,waslittlemore than a figurehead forthe once-powerful AbbasidCaliphate, a ruler whosepower had been eroded byhundreds of years of outsideinvasion and internal civilwar. The Abbasid revolutionof 750 was followed by along process of political

disintegrationasoneprovinceafteranotherbrokefreeofthecaliphs in Baghdad. By themid-tenth century, the localPersianaristocracytreatedtheArabic caliphs as puppets.Acentury later, in 1055, theSeljuk Turks conqueredBaghdad, and then turnedtheir military might againstthe Byzantine Empire withdevastating results,culminating in the victory at

Manzikert in 1071. Seljukpower declined in the earlytwelfthcentury in thefaceoftheLatincrusades,butbythe1190s Islam had blossomedagainunder the leadershipofSaladin, recovering in Egyptand Syria under theAyyubids, with Ayyubidcontrolultimatelyusurpedbytheir own soldier-slaves, theMamluks,in1250.But even as the thirteenth

century witnessed thesuccessful Islamic counter-crusade against Christianpossessions in Palestine andLebanon, Islam itself wasunder siege by a powerfulsect known as the IsmailiOrder of the Assassins. Thisradical Shi’ite sect hadterrorized orthodox Islamfrom their mountainfortressesinnorthernIranfornearly 200 years, using

political murder andsubterfuge in an attempt tooverthrow the existing Sunniorder. Though their maintargets were the rulers ofIslam, their daggers alsofound some victims amongthe Latin crusaders, whobrought their name and fameback to Europe, givingChristendom the term‘assassin’forthefirsttime.Drawingonassistancefrom

troops from the GoldenHorde, Hulagu Khan enteredPersia in 1256 with an armyof over 100,000 men and avery substantial siege trainmanned by a thousand crewsof Chinese engineers. TheIsmaili mountain fortresseswere his first objective. AstheMongolmilitarymachinereduced castles inMazanderan,MeimundezandAlamut,thelastmasterofthe

Assassins, Rukn ad-Din,threwhimselfonthemercyofMangu Khan, journeying tothecourt inKarakorum,onlytobedeniedanaudience.Hewas murdered on the wayback to Persia, kicked todeath by his escorts. ByFebruary 1257 over 100 oftheIsmailis’castleshadbeendemolished, their inhabitants,including women andchildren, slaughtered. The

MongolshadaccomplishedinmeremonthswhattheIslamicworldhadtriedtodofor twocenturies: end the Assassins’reignofterror.Hulagu next sent letters to

the caliph of Baghdad,orderinghimtodismantlehiswallsandcometothekhan’stent and swear allegiance.Mustasim refused, replyingthat many armies had failedagainst Baghdad in the past.

Unfortunately, centuries ofneglect had left the city’swalls dilapidated, and itsgarrisonofsome50,000menwere ill-equipped and poorlytrained.Thecaliphalsofailedto heed the warnings of hisgenerals to conscript moresoldiers.AndeventhoughhispositionastheAbbasidcaliphgave him the politicalauthority to summonassistance from the whole of

Islam, the only two regionalpowers left,SyriaandEgypt,refused to assist him. Finallyrecognizingthegravityofhissituation, the caliph orderedthe walls repaired only oneday before the Mongolsarrived. His patience at anend, Hulagu commanded theMongol army to converge infourcolumnsonBaghdad. Inresponse,Mustasimorderedaforce of 20,000 cavalry to

delay the steppe warriors’advance.AstheMuslimarmyapproached, the Mongolsbroke the dikes on the banksof the Tigris River, floodingthe garrison’s camp andcutting off their line ofretreat. Only a few Muslimwarriors survived the floodand the engagement withHulagu’s vanguard, returningtothecitywiththethrongsofrefugees.

Aditch and rampart havingbeen dug around Baghdad’swalls, Hulagu ordered thebombardment to commenceon 30 January 1258. Afterseven days of uninterruptedbarrage with the trunks ofpalm trees, foundation stonesand shot, the caliph offeredhis submission, but the khanwouldacceptnothingshortofunconditional surrender. Onthemorningof6Februarythe

Mongols stormed andcaptured the entire easternwall. Over the next sevendaysthecitywaspillagedandits libraries, universities,mosques and palaces burned.The garrison was put to thesword,andthecaliphandhisthree sons were sewn up inPersian carpets and trampledto death under the hooves ofMongol horses. Baghdad,once the cultural and

intellectual centre of theIslamic world, lost a fewhundred thousand of itsinhabitants. The carnagewasso great that the Mongolswere forced to abandon theircamps because of the stenchofdecomposingcorpses.With the Assassins and

Abbasids now destroyed,HulaguKhannow turnedhisattention toward Syria. Hisrankshadactually swelled to

perhaps 300,000 troops withthe addition of new tumansand new Muslim vassals,including a contingent of16,000 Christian crusaderssent by King Hayton ofArmenia. Faced with anoverwhelming army, thesultan of Syria turned indesperation to the Mamluksforassistance,buthiscryfellon deaf ears. In Cairo, thenew Mamluk sultan Kotuz

had no intention of helpingthe Syrians. Instead, heexecuted the khan’sambassador and prepared forthe impending Mongolinvasion.

CavalryversusCavalry:TheBattleofAinJalutIntheautumnof1259Hulagucrossed the Euphrates andpushed into Syria, then

moved toward the crusaderstatesintheLevant.ThoughaBuddhist, Hulagu wassurrounded by Christians athiscourt.Hisseniorwifewasa Christian, and so was hisfavourite commander, Kit-Boga.Hulaguwas pragmaticwhen it came to addingknowledgeable assets to hiscampaign, and the crusaderswere well versed in warfarein the Levant. Many of the

Latin crusaders in thenorthern principalitiesrecognized that resistance totheMongol hordewas futile,andjoinedthesteppewarriorsin their war against SyrianMuslims, hoping that thealliance would return toChristian control theirgreatest prize, Jerusalem.When King Hayton I ofArmenia rode south to jointhekhan,hewasjoinedbyhis

son-in-law Count BohemondVI of Antioch and Tripoli.This would be the onlywestern European army evertomarchbesidetheMongols,though other westerncommanders would seekMongol support. Joined bythese additional Christiancrusaders, Hulagu besiegedAleppo, taking the city andmassacring its inhabitants.The victory proved to be a

mixed blessing. Hulagurewarded Hayton andBohemond with territoriesthathadbeenwonfromthemby the Muslims over theyears, but the popeexcommunicated thepairandtheirsoldiersforfightingwiththeinfidel.By late March 1260, other

terrified Muslim citiescapitulated, includingDamascus. Syria was now

under Mongol rule andHulagu took the title IlkhanofPersia.Hulagunextlookedtoward the Mamluks inEgypt.ButjustasthedeathofOgotai had saved westernEurope from further Mongolincursions,newsarrivedfromKarakorum that the greatkhan, Mangu, had died ofdysentery, forcing Hulagu toreturn to Mongolia. TheIlkhan postponed the attack

onEgypt andwithdrewmostof his army into Azerbaijan,leaving his general Kit-Bogaand three tumans (30,000men) behind to control thenewlyconqueredterritoriesinSyria.In Cairo, SultanKotuz saw

the departure of Hulagu’smain army as an opportunityto strike with a numericallysuperior force against theMongol rearguard. Kotuz

pulled together a large armyof perhaps 120,000 men,including Mamluk soldiersfrom Egypt, and fugitivesfrom failed Islamiccampaigns (Bedouintribesmen and Turcomans).Wanting to add to hisnumbers and secure his linesof communication, Kotuzsent a letter to the Latincrusaders,askingthemtojoinhim.Thecrusaderswere torn

bytheoffer.Thegrandmasterof the Teutonic Knights inAcre argued that an alliancewiththeMongolswasstillthebest policy, while others,fearingexcommunicationandmilitary reprisals by theirEuropean comrades-in-arms,chose the middle ground,offering the Mamluk armysafe passage and logisticalsupport in their expeditionintoSyria.

The Mamluk vanguard leftCairo in late July under thecommand of Kotuz’s verycapable general, Baybars.Like most of his Mamlukbrothers,BaybarswasbornaKipchackTurkonthesteppesof southernRussia,wherehewascapturedbytheMongolsasayouth;hewasthenresoldtoanemirinEgypt(Mamlukis Arabic for ‘slave’). There,he was trained as a young

manintheEgyptiantraditionas awarrior slave, perfectinghis skills as a rider, archer,lancer and swordsman. TheFatimid (909–1171) andAyyubid (1171–1250) rulersof Egypt were the first tobuildarmiesofslavesoldiers,andsome,likeBaybars,evenrosetopositionsofpowerandinfluence, commanding thearmiesofcaliphsandsultans.But in 1250 the Mamluk

slaves usurped the power oftheir Ayyubid masters andfoundedadynastythatwouldlast over two and a halfcenturies.After years of arduous

training,theseyoungMamlukwarriorslaveswouldgraduateandbefreed,thenbeenrolledinto theirmaster’s householdas his elite personal soldiers.One fourteenth-centuryMamluk training manual,

entitledWishof theWarriorsof the Faith, showed ablending of nomadic andcivilized military practices,placing an emphasis onvarious tilting techniquesandmounted archery, andillustratingtheimportancetheMamluks placed on bothheavy and light cavalry. Aselite soldiers, theseMamlukswere dressed in mail orlamellar armour and wore

conical iron helmets withmail coifs, protected verysimilarly to Persian, Greekand Byzantine cataphracts.Their shieldswere small andround, perfect for warriorswho used both shock andmissile combat fromhorseback.TheMamluksalsoutilized European-stylestraight and double-edgedswordsandmaces,muchliketheircrusaderneighbours.

When news of theMamluks’ approach reachedKit-Boga, he prepared tomeet the Islamic army, but arebellioninDamascusslowedhis progress. Meanwhile, theMamluks moved north andcampedoutsideAcre,and,aspromised, received crusaderassistance. Mongol spiesreportedbacktoKit-Bogaonthe size and complement oftheIslamicarmy,and though

he recognized that he wasoutnumbered nearly five toone,heleftDamascuswithanarmy of some 25,000 men,mostly Christians and madeup of Mongols, Georgiansand Armenians. On 3September 1260 he crossedthe Jordan River and rodealong the plain of Esdraelonbetween the mountains ofGilboa and the hills ofGalilee. Entering the valley

where David slew Goliathnear the village of Ain Jalut(‘Goliath’s Spring’), Kit-Boga’sMongolarmymettheMamluk vanguard underBaybars(Map4.5(a)).The Mongol cavalry

charged the Mamluk van,which broke under theferocityof thesteppewarriorattackand fledup thevalley.Kit-Bogagave chase, but theMongols were falling for

their own ruse. Baybars wasplaying the traditional steppewarrior game of luring anattackerwitha retreat.Byallaccounts, his forces foughthard, though he stillanticipatedthathisvanwouldnot be able to meet Kit-Boga’s charge. TheMongolspursued the broken vanguardto where Kotuz and a largeforce of Mamluks werearrayed across the valley

ahead of them (Map 4.5(b)).Butevenwithvastlysuperiornumbers, Sultan Kotuz wastoo cautious to attack theMongol flanks.Understanding his tacticalsituation, Kit-Bogacommitted himself toengaging the entire Mamlukhost,pressingintotherearoftheMamlukvanasitreachedits lines, then ordering theremainder of his army to

wheel right and run theMamluk front rank towardKotuz’s left wing. Baybarsescaped, but his van wasdestroyed and the left wingcrumbled under the Mongolsweep. For most of themorning, the sultan trieddesperately to regain his leftflank, pulling men acrossfrom the right wing andcovering with shock andmissile countercharges,

whittling away at theMongols(Map4.5(c)).Eventually, Kotuz was able

to regain his flank, and withhis more numerous cavalrynow on either side of theMongols, the moment wasrightforafinalattack.Takingoff his helmet so that histroops could recognize him,Kotuzrodeoutinfrontofhisbodyguard and led the finalcavalry charge (Map 4.5(d)).

The Mongol army foughtwell, withKit-Boga orderinghis men to fight to the lastman, but eventually it wasoverwhelmed by theMamluks’ superior numbers.Mongol battlefield casualtieswere around 1,500 warriors,while the rest scattered inflight. Local peasants joinedin the slaughter, burning thefugitives alive as they hid infields. Those few who

escaped travelled north andsought sanctuary with KingHaytoninArmenia.AlthoughMamluk casualties wentunrecorded, they wereprobably moderate. Kit-Boga’sheadwasimmediatelysent back to Cairo with thefirst news of the Mamlukvictory. Kotuz enteredDamascusintriumph.The Mamluks won at Ain

Jalut using a combination of

superior numbers and ruse,finallydestroyingthemythofMongol invincibility. TheMamluks’ Turkish originsgave them a familiarity withthe tactics of their steppewarriorenemy,whiletrainingas Egyptian slave soldiersshowed them the benefits ofwell-armouredheavycavalry,a tactical system closelyassociated with civilizationsin the Near East. When the

two forces met at Ain Jalut,the Mongols faced an armythatmirrored its own tacticalcapabilities, and unlike theChristian armies defeated inRussia and eastern Europe,the Mamluks possessedtactical symmetry. Ain Jalutalsomarkedtheascentof theMamluks as the next greatregional Islamic power.Within a year, Baybarsassassinated Kotuz, seizing

the throne as sultanofEgyptand Syria. Taking advantageof discord among theirenemies, Baybars’descendants defeated andexpelled the last of thecrusaders in Acre in 1291,ending their 200-yearoccupationoftheLevant.Eventually, the Mongol

rulersintheMiddleEasttookon the attributes of thepeoples they had conquered.

Mongol elites converted toIslam, Persian influencebecamepredominantatcourt,andcitiesbegantoberebuilt.Bythefourteenthcentury,theMongol Empire all acrossEurasiabegantodisintegrate.But the damage to the oldIslamiccentreswasdone.TheAbbasid Caliphate had beenextinguished and the newcentre of Islamic civilizationwas now in Cairo. The

Mamlukdynastycontinuedtoflourish until defeat byNapoleon at the battle of thePyramids in 1798. Havingregained the throne after theFrench withdrawal, it wasfinally defeated by theOttomanTurksin1811.In Russia, Mongol

suzerainty also began tounravel during the fourteenthcentury when Christianprinces challenged Mongol

rule. When a Mongol armywas dispatched to reassertorder, a Russian army underGrand Prince of MuscovyDmitri Ivanovich (r. 1359–1389)defeateditatthebattleof Kulikovo Field in 1380,destroying the mystique ofMongol military power inRussia.Gradually,theprincesin Muscovy rose topredominance using theirclose relationship with the

Mongol khans to increasetheirwealthandexpand theirpossessions.

Map4.5 TheBattleofAinJalut,1260.(a)PhaseI:Kit-Boga’sMongolcavalryencountersBaybars’advanceguardoftheMamlukarmynearthevillageofAinJalut.Thesteppe

horsemenlaunchaferociouscharge(1)andtheMamluksbreakandfleebackuptheJordanRivervalley(2).Kit-Bogagiveschase,fallingforwhatisanormalMongolruse–drawinganenemyintoatrapthroughfeignedretreat.(b)PhaseII:ThefleeingMamluksurvivorsdrawnearertotheirmainforceunderKotuz(1),butthesultaniswaryoftheMongolsand

standsfast,eventhoughheoutnumbersthesteppewarriors.Kit-Bogaorderspartofhisforceforward(2)tocrushtheenemyvanguardwhileanotherelementsweepsright(3)toassaulttheMamluks’leftflank.

Baybarsmanagestogainthesafetyof

theMamlukmainbody(4),buttheremainderofhisforceisdestroyed.(c)PhaseIII:Kotuzpullstroopsfromhisrightflank(1)andrushesthem

acrossthefieldtobuttresshisassailedflank(2).Formostofthemorning,the

MamlukstradechargeandcounterchargewiththeirMongolopponents(3),slowlyerodingthestrengthofKit-Boga’soutnumberedforceandregainingtheleftflank.(d)PhaseIV:TheMamluks’superior

numbersenablethemtoworkcavalryforcesaroundtheMongol’sflanksandrearandtrapthesurvivors(1).Kotuzridesoutinfrontofhis

bodyguardandremoveshishelmetto

identifyhimselftohistroopsasheleadsafinalcharge(2).Kit-Bogaordershismentofighttotheendbuttheyarequicklyoverwhelmed,withfewescapingtofightanotherday.

By the reignofPrince IvanIII (r. 1462–1505), a newRussianstatewasborn. Ivan,later known as ‘the Great’,annexed other principalitiesand took advantage ofdissension among theMongols to throw off their

yokeby1480.HeinvadedthelandsoftheLithuanian-Polishdynasty and added territoriesaround Kiev, Smolensk andChernigov to his newMuscovite state. During hisreign, the Romanov dynastywas born, and the gravity ofRussian civilizationwas nowcentredinMoscow.

CHAPTER5

LATEMEDIEVALWARFARE:THERETURNOFLIGHT

INFANTRYTheApexofChivalryandtheBattleofBouvines

Knights in the high and latemedieval periods(c.1000–c.1500) fought onthe battlefields of Europe intwo very different ways,mounted or dismounted. Onthe continent, especially inFrance, Germany, Hungaryand Spain, mounted shockattacks were favoured overdismounted warfare. Inmounted combat, a typicalheavy cavalry formation was

drawn up in a continuousshallow line, three or fourranks deep, with 1,000 to2,000cavalrydeployingwitha frontage of perhaps half amile. This arrangement ofheavy cavalry formed whatwas called a bataille (fromwhich the word battle isderived). Each bataille wasbroken down into smallertactical units called banners.These were usually recruited

through family, lineage orfeudal relations, and weresupposed to stay groupedaround a battle flag or aleader (calledabanneret), orwere united by a commonwarcry.By the eleventh century,

heavy cavalry articulationwas refined to the pointwhere the units were socloselyformedthatthehorseswere touching each other in

formation.IntheChansondegeste we read: ‘The Baronsaresocloselypackedas theyadvance that if you throw aglove on their helmets itwould not fall to groundwithin a mile.’ Othercontemporaryreferencesstatethatifa‘glove,appleorplumhad been thrown amongstthem,itwouldnothavefallento the ground but on thevertical lances’, for example,

or that ‘the wind should notbe able to blow through’ thelances. Even allowing forpoeticexaggeration,medievalheavy cavalry units werecapable of manoeuvring andfighting in extremely closeorderonthebattlefield.Close order within heavy

cavalry formations facilitatedgreater tactical command,control and communication,and prevented victims from

escapingbetween thepassingchargers, presenting anopportunity for medievalhorsemen to mow downinfantry with lances, maces,swords,axesandhooves.Theheavy cavalry bataille rarelyengagedtheenemyinasingleclash, but banner by banner,often beginning from theright. A banner’s chargebegan slowly, taking care tokeep in line, then picked up

speed until the moment ofcontact. It was best to haveroom beyond the target inorder to follow through withmomentum. When heavycavalry faced unformedinfantry, it attempted toisolateanddestroyit.Still, good order and a

uniform charge were notnatural to noble heavycavalry.Thefightingethicofthe medieval knight was

based on personal fame,personalhonourandpersonalcourage. To fight with peersand social superiors in a co-ordinated charge oftenmeantsubordinating the possibilityofpersonalvalourtoagroup.In fact, the natural trend ofknightsonthebattlefieldwasfortheindividualtobreakoutof rank and dash forward, asillustrated in the battle ofArsuf in 1191. These two

contrastingstylesofmountedwarfare, discip-lined andundisciplined,wereillustratedinoneofthepivotalbattlesofthe high Middle Ages, thebattleofBouvinesin1214.Bouvines was a significant

turning point in the decades-old conflict betweenEngland’sAngevinEmpireinwestern France and theambitions of the Capetiandynasty. The origins of the

recent struggle reached backto1204,whenthegreatestofthe Capetian kings, Philip IIAugustus of France,successfully seized Angevinlands inNormandy,Brittany,Anjou, Maine, Poitou andTouraine, greatly reducingthe size of King John ofEngland’s continentalpossessions. Distressed, Johndecided to resurrect thestrategy of his father, Henry

II, and older brother RichardI, and seek allies in theprinces of the lands betweenFrance and Germany, mostnotably Ferrand, count ofFlanders, Renaud ofDanmartin, count ofBoulogne, and Henry I ofBrabant, whose daughtermarried Otto IV ofBrunswick, the nephew ofKingJohn.Otto claimed to be king of

Germany and holy Romanemperor, and became evenmore personally involvedwhenPhilipsupportedarivalclaimant to the imperialthrone, one Frederick II ofHohenstaufen. Frederick wasa man handpicked by thepowerful Pope Innocent III,the same pontiff whoextended the papal banner tothe Spanish victors at LasNavas de Tolosa in 1212.

Innocent’sinfluencealsoheldsway in England. The popehadplaced thecountryunderinterdict when John refusedthe pontiff’s candidate forarchbishop of Canterbury.The interdict lasted sevenyears and weakened themonarch’s standing amonghis people and hismagnates.Desperate for papal aid afterthelossofhisAngevinlands,John willingly did what no

English monarch had donebefore and made England apapalfief.With the civil war in

Germany between Otto andthe Hohenstaufensstalemated, John intriguedwith Otto to recover his lostterritories in France, forcingPhilip to head off thecoalition by invadingEngland. Unfortunately forPhilip, the French fleet was

destroyed in the battle ofDamme in May 1213.Relieved, John prepared hisowninvasionofFranceashisallies skirmished againstFrance’snorthernandeasternflanks throughout the wholeof 1213. Finally, on 15February 1214, the Englishmonarchmarshalled an armyof mercenaries (his Anglo-Norman barons would notfollow him) and landed an

expeditionary force at theportcityofLaRochelleinthetraditional AngevinstrongholdofAquitaine.Once in France, John

dispatched WilliamLongsword,earlofSalisbury,to bring the coalition intoaction. Next, John movednorthandspentthebeginningof the campaign subduingPoitou and incorporating alarge number of Poitevan

knights into his army. HethenmovedintoBrittanyandcapturedNantes inmid-June.To block John’s advance,Philip ordered an army ofsome 800 knights and moreinfantry under the commandof his son Prince Louis tointercept the English king ashe was besieging La Roche-au-MoineinAnjou.Whenthetwo hosts met, John’s newlyacquired Poitevan knights

refused to fight their Frenchoverlord. Enraged, Johnwithdrewfromthecampaign.Still, John’s efforts did tiedown the prince and hiscontingents, thus weakeningthe French king as hisenemies assembled atValencienneson23July.Philip marched into

Flanders wielding fire andsword, reaching the city ofTournaion26July.Hisarmy

consisted of 1,400 knightsand 5,000–6,000 infantry.That same day, seeminglyunawareoftheFrenchking’sproximity, Otto ordered hisallied army of similarstrength (around 1,400knights andperhaps asmanyas 7,500 foot) to encamp atMortagne, 7 miles south ofPhilip.When the French andalliedpicketsdiscoveredhowclosetheirarmiesweretoone

another, the leaders of eachhost were forced takeimmediateaction.That evening Philip held a

war council to consider anattack, but was advised thatthe ground near Mortagnewasnot suitable formountedcombat. The French decidedtowithdrawwesttoLille.Itispossible that Philip wasmanoeuvring in order todelaytheconflict,hopingthat

some of the allied forceswouldevaporatebeforebattlewas joined. The followingmorning, a Sunday andsabbath day (27 July),Philip’sarmybrokecampandmarched in column towardLillealongthewell-preservedRoman road. One strategicvariable lay in the Frencharmy’s path, the bridge overthe River Marque atBouvines, 25 miles west of

Tournai.Thisbridgeactedasachokepoint,andcrossingitwas a potentially dangerousbut necessary manoeuvre. Itis estimated that the Frencharmywouldhavebeenstrungout in column for about 5milesasitcrossedthebridge,presentinganattractivetargetto the coalition army. Thisopportunity was not lost onOttoandhiscommanders.As the French army was

breaking camp on Sundaymorning, Otto called a warcouncil todecidewhat todo.He and Renaud of Boulognewerereluctant to fighton thesabbath, but after someheated debate, the Germanemperor ordered his army topursue the French, marchingonaparallelRomanroadthatjoined theTournai–Lille roadjust east of the bridge atBouvines in the hope of

attacking the French in thevulnerable position ofcrossingthespan.Inexplicably, Philip was

initially unaware of hisenemy’s intentions, whichwere discovered only aftertwo of his vassals, theviscount of Melun andBishop Guerin of Senlis,observed the movement ofthe allied army and reporteditspursuittotheFrenchking.

Guerin, who was Philip’scommander-in-chief and amember of the HospitallerOrder, returned to report tothe king, while the viscountmoved on to occupy thenorth-westerly road toBouvinesinanefforttodelayandharassthecoalitionarmy(Map 5.1(a)). The Frenchking was eating lunch andresting near the bridge atBouvines when he learned

that the rearguard of hisarmy, under the commandofOdo, dukeofBurgundy,wasengaged with leadingelements of the imperialforces, including Flemingcrossbowmen, light cavalryandknights.By this time themajority of the French hosthad already crossed thebridge.Philip was in a difficult

position. If he continued his

march to Lille he placed theduke of Burgundy and hisrearguard in peril, and theFrench king could not affordto lose his best cavalry.Moreover, if his rearguardwere annihilated, his entirearmy would be placed injeopardy. Perhaps fearingthis, Philip decided to turnandfight.Hecommandedthebridge widened to speed thereturn of elements that had

already crossed. Gathering asizeable force of cavalryaround him, King Philipheadedofftowardstheenemy(Map5.1(b)).When Otto and his allies

arrived they found Philip’scavalry already arraying forbattle. It was mid-afternoon,and the sun shone on theshoulders of the French andintheeyesofthewest-facingcoalition. Philip used his

cavalry as a screen for hisslowly deploying infantry,knowing that if the alliedarmy attacked his own as itrecrossed the bridge, allwould be lost (Map 5.1(c)).On the right, the duke ofBurgundy’s rearguard wasreinforced by BishopGuerin’s horse, forming anew contingent of 600–700knights. Philip commandedthe centre, mounted on his

steednext to thefleur-de-lys.There is littleevidence thatathirddivisionon the leftwasever fully constituted beforethe battle began, thoughGuerin took great pains tomakesurethathehadenoughcavalry to protect his flanks.ThebishoparrangedalloftheFrench knights in adisciplined line so that theycould fight on one front, yetstaycloseenough together to

maintain cohesion as heavycavalry.Wary of this large number

of French heavy horse, theGerman emperor hastilydeployed his army fromcolumn into proper battleform, with its expandingfrontage constantly mirroredbytheFrench.Thetotalfrontextended to about 1,000yards. Otto created a similarcavalryforceonhisownleft,

made up of knights fromFlanders and Hainaut andcommanded by CountFerrand, to screen his owndeployments. Otto placedhimself and his knights andfoot in the centre. CountRenaud of Boulogne andWilliam Longsword, earl ofSalisbury, commanded therightwing.There isevidencethat special combined-armstactics were used here.

Renaudputhisheavyinfantryinto a circle or square tworanksdeep,thenlaunchedhiscavalrythroughanopeninginthe formation in order towithdraw under cover of theinfantry’s spears. This co-ordination between infantryand cavalry indicates apreponderance of infantry inthisdivision.

Map5.1 TheBattleofBouvines,1214.(a)PhaseI:AfterlearningoftheproximityofOtto’sarmy,PhilipordersamarchfromTournaitoLille(1).AstheendofthecolumnnearsthebridgeatBouvines,aforceundertheviscountofMelunandBishopGuerin(2)detecttheapproachoftheimperialforce(3).Guerinrushesbackto

Bouvinestolocatetheking(4),whileOdo,dukeofBurgundy,orderstherearguard(5)todetourontothe

MortagneroadtosupportMelunandconfronttheapproachingenemy(6).(b)PhaseII:Guerinfindsthekingnearthebridge(1)andPhilipquicklyassessesthesituation.Hedirectsthebishoptotakecommandoftherightwing(2),consistingofOdo’s,Melun’sandGuerin’sowntroops,ordersthebridgewidened,anddirectstherestofhisarmytocrossbackovertheriveranddeploy(3)tomeetOtto’simperial

forces(4).(c)PhaseIII:Philipdeployshiscavalry(1)toscreenhisinfantrycolumnsastheyarrive(2).

Ontheimperialleft,thecavalryofCountFerrandofFlanders(3)

performthesamedutyfortherestofOtto’stroopsastheymoveontothefield(4).CountRenaudofBoulogneandWilliamLongsword,earlof

Salisbury,commandOtto’sdeployingtroopsontherightwing(5).OntheFrenchright,BishopGuerinformshiscavalryintoatightlyarrayedlinearformation(6)andopenstheaction,launchinghislightlyarmoured

sergeantsagainsttheFlemishlines(7).(d)PhaseIV:TheFlemishnoblesrefusethechallengeofferedbythecommonsergeants,whoareturnedbackbycrossbowfire(1).Thesightof

thefleeingsergeantsprovestootemptingatargetandmanyoftheFlemishknightschargeoutas

individuals(2),tiringthemselvesandtheirhorsesfornoperceivablegain.Totheleftofthisaction,theimperialdeploymentiscompletedasOttotakes

commandofthecentre(3)andRenaud’sinfantryontherightformsanenclosurefromwhichthecavalrycanoperatewithameasureof

protection(4).Philip’sinfantryslowlymovesintoposition(5).

(e)PhaseV:GuerinordershisknightsforwardinaseriesofchargesagainstthetiredFlemings(1),oneofwhich,underMelun,penetratestheenemy’s

linecompletelyandreturnsbackthroughit(2).Ferrand’sformationsbegintobreakundertherepeatedattacks(3),andthewoundingand

subsequentsurrenderofthecount(4)hastensthedisintegrationoftheleftwing.Meanwhile,Ottolauncheshiscentredivision(5)astheFrench

infantryfinishesdeploying.Thefootsoldiersareshaken(6)andPhilipsurvivesaclosecallasGerman

knightsandinfantrypenetratetohisposition(7).(f)PhaseVI:TheFrench

regroupandPhiliplaunchesacountercharge(1)thatcutsthroughthecoalitioninfantry.ItistheGerman

emperor’sturntocomeunder

personalattack(2)asOtto’sbodyguardnarrowlysucceedsin

savinghimfromdeathorcapture.Tothesouth,theFlemishwingcollapses(3)andthebattlebeginstoturninfavouroftheFrench,thoughRenaud,launchingsalliesfromwithinthewallsofhisinfantryformations(4),continuestoresistontheimperial

right.

(g)PhaseVII:TheFrenchlaunchaconcertedcombined-armsattack

againstRenaud’sposition(1),andthecount’sdivisionfinallycollapsesundertheintensepressure(2).This

isthefinalstraw,andthecoalitionforcedisintegrateandroutfromthefield(3).Philipordersapursuitofonly1mile(4),notwantingtorisklosingvaluableprisonersasnightfall

fastapproaches.

Oncehisflanksweresecure,Bishop Guerin seized theinitiative and sent a

contingent of 150 sergeants(lightly armoured horsemenofnon-noblebirth)forwardtoharass the Flemings. TheFlemish knights despisedthesecommonersandrefusedto come out against them(Map 5.1(d)). Since thesergeants’ horses were notprotectedbybarding,manyofthese mounts were killed byalliedinfantry,probablyfrommissile fire. Then a few

Flemishknightslefttheranksoftheirdivisiontoparticipateinthemêlée,ridingdownthesergeants as they fought onfootorattemptedtoretreat.Acontemporary of the battle,Philippe Mousket,commented on the Flemishcavalry,‘noonewasinorder,everyone charged as theywished’.Thebishop’sploytogoadhisenemyintobattlebyoffering men beneath their

station to fight workedmarvellously. Consequently,many of the Flemish knightswere already tired when therealbattleopened.After the sergeants were

repulsed by the Flemishhorse,Guerinorderedaseriesofdisciplinedcavalrychargesby his nobles and theirhandpicked knights,beginning with knights fromChampagne under Pierre de

Remi, followed by the countof St Pol, the count ofBeaumont, Matthew ofMontmorency, and the dukeof Burgundy, who wasunhorsedandthenrescuedbyhis knights surrounding him(Map5.1(e)).TheviscountofMelunandhismensucceededinpenetrating theenemylineand charging back through it– a sure sign the Flemishwere weakening under the

repeatedattacks.The disparity in discipline

betweentheFrenchandalliedforces was evident. In thewords of another eyewitness,AnonymousofBethune:The king [Philip] put hisechelons in formation andthey rode forward. Youcould see among themnoblemen,muchricharmorand many noble banners.The same was true for the

opposite side, but I musttell you that they did notride as well and in asorderly a manner as theFrench, and they becameawareofit.Thebetter-orderedformationsofFrenchknightscarriedoutmany devastating attacksagainst Ferrand’s moreloosely packed formation.After three hours of thesesteady charges, the French

finally cut their way throughto the wounded count ofFlanders. Ferrand’s surrendertook the fight out of histroops, and the imperial leftwing soon began todisintegrate.Meanwhile, Philip’s

infantry had arrived on thebattlefield and had only justtakenpositioninfrontoftheirliege when Otto and hiscentre division attacked. The

levies were thrown back andthe German emperor’sknights broke through andthreatened Philip’s position.Philip’s bodyguardcountercharged, but in theconfusion some of Otto’sinfantry broke through andunhorsed the Frenchmonarch.Hewas saved onlywhen another French knight,Pierre Tristan, dismountedand offered his mount to his

king. As the Frenchbodyguard fought their wayto protect Philip, he leaptquickly into the saddle andwaswhiskedawaytotherear.The French decided to give

as good as they got andcounter-attacked, pressingtheir way deep inside thecoalition lines and reachingthe German emperor’sposition (Map 5.1(f)). AFrench nobleman, Gerard la

Truie, tried to kill Otto withhis dagger, but the blowglanced off the emperor’smail and struck the royalmount in the eye. Enraged,the horse sprung up andbolted, then fell again somedistance away. AnotherFrenchknight,GuillaumedesBarres, reached the emperoragain,butcouldnotprisehimfrom his saddle. Theemperor’s bodyguard pulled

theFrenchnoblemanfromhishorse. Fighting now on footas theGermans pressed him,Guillaumewassavedonlybythe timely arrival of fiftyFrenchknights.One modern historian

describes the battle ofBouvines as actually ‘twobattles within a battle, acavalrybattletothesouthandageneralmeleetothenorth’.After the capture of Ferrand

and the subsequent collapseof the imperial leftwing, thebattlebegantoturninfavourof the French. In the north,themêléebecameafluidtug-of-warwith rapidly changingfront lines,ascanbeseenbyfirsttheFrenchkingandthenthe German emperorthreatened with death orcapture. But within thisconfusion there existed adetermined defence led by

Renaud of Boulogne. Asstatedabove,Renaudorderedhis infantry force of about700menintoadouble-rankedcircle or square, then placedhis mounted knights withinits centre. These knightssallied out to attack theFrench only to return to thesafety of the infantryformation. This combined-arms arrangement workedwell until the whole

formation was overwhelmedby 50 French knights and2,000 of their supportinginfantry (Map 5.1(g)).Contemporary chroniclers donot tell us precisely wherethis last stand took place.After the collapse ofRenaud’s division thecoalition effort fell apart.Philip gave the order topursue the enemy for onlyone mile. Night was falling

and the French king wasafraid that if he gave chasesome of his importantprisoners might escape. TheFrench succeeded incapturing131enemyknights,including 5 counts and 25bannerets.The battle of Bouvines

provides an excellentexample of the variety oftacticsused inhighmedievalwarfare. The battle opened

with a purely cavalryengagement between thewell-disciplined French rightwing and Ferrand’s unrulyknights. BishopGuerin’s useof orderly small-unit attacksto dictate the tempo of thebattle was brilliant, slowlywearing down his enemywhile probing forweaknesses. The next phasesaw a general mêléeshowcasing combined-arms

operations with French andcoalition knights attackingwith the support of footsoldiers, as well as infantryworkingincloseco-operationdefensively with heavycavalry under Renaud deDanmartin.Politically, the battle of

Bouvines reshaped thebalance of power in westernEurope. King John, thoughnot physically present at the

battle, lost both coin andprestige. As a consequence,many of his barons rebelledand accepted the claims ofPrinceLouisofFrancetotheEnglish throne (a seriousclaim, since many of thesebarons were Norman Frenchin both outlook and culture).These barons seized Londonon17May1215,andbyJune1216 Louis was governingfromLondon.John’sdeathin

1216 did not end therebellion, which was finallyputdownbyEngland’sregentand greatest knight WilliamMarshal (holding power forthe nine-year-old Henry III)atthebattleofLincoln.KingPhilipwas the overall

winner at Bouvines. Hisbattlefield success translatedintoincreasedhegemonyoverFlandersandconsolidationofcontrol over formally

Angevin lands.Coupledwithlands taken in 1204, Philip’sroyalpossessions tripledasaresult of Bouvines. Manyhistoriansmarkthisvictoryasthe beginning of centralizedFrench rule in the medievalperiod. Still, these gainswould not stand without achallenge. A century later,another English monarch,EdwardIII,wouldonceagainclaim these French

possessions and initiate theHundredYearsWar.

TheTransitionalThirteenthCenturyThe thirteenth centurywitnessedagradualriseintheimportance of light infantry.As the crusaders returnedfrom the Levant to westernEuropean battlefields, theybrought with them a newappreciation for the

effectivenessoflightinfantry,an appreciation that wouldraise the position of archersand crossbowmen on thebattlefield, but in varyingdegrees. In England, Anglo-Norman border wars againstthe Welsh and Scotsproduced a profound respectfor the range and power ofthe longbow, while on thecontinent, well grounded inchivalry and feudalism,

Italian crossbowmenmercenarieswouldbeutilizedas a subordinate arm toFrench and German nobleheavycavalry.Light infantry archers and

crossbowmen were notuncommon in westernEuropean warfare before thethirteenth century. Lightinfantry was easilyconscripted because the bowwas a peasant weapon used

for hunting (and poaching),andthecrossbowwasapoint-and-shoot mechanical devicethat took a short time tomaster,anidealcharacteristicfor use by city dwellers. ButthehighMiddleAgeswastheplateau of chivalry, a timewhen themounted noblemanlancer ruled the courts andbattlefields of westernEurope.Inthissocialclimate,weapons systems of the

commonman,nomatterhoweffective, were looked downupon in a contempt born offear. So powerful was thisfear that the medievalperiod’s most powerfulinstitution, the CatholicChurch, passed legislation atthe Second EcumenicalLateran Council in 1139anathematizing all who usedthecrossbowandbowinwarsbetweenChristians (later, the

killingofinfidelswithmissileweapons was acceptable). Inmany ways the CatholicChurch was bowing to thedemandsofanobleclasswhofeared death by arrows andbolts from a distant,anonymouskiller.The basic construction of

the crossbow was a smallbow attached to a stock thatprovided a groove for thebolt.Thebowstringwasheld

in place when cocked by asimple trigger mechanism.Early crossbows used awooden bow, and the stringcould either be drawn byhand or with the aid of asimple claw or goat’s foot.But by the thirteenth centurythe crossbow had evolvedwith the addition of acompositebowmadeofhorn,sinew and glue. Thecomposite crossbow required

a stronger cockingmechanism,aproblemsolvedwith the invention of thewindlass. The windlass usedpulleys attached at the buttendofthestocktoawindingmechanism which, whenhooked onto the bowstringand wound, would draw thestring to the trigger. By thefifteenth century the bow ofthe crossbow was madeentirely of metal, increasing

its power, range and ballisticimpact. With a maximumrangeofalmost500yardsandthe ability to pierce the bestplate armour, the metalcrossbow became the mostdangerous non-gunpowdermissile weapon in use bymedievallightinfantry.Although medieval

commanders recognized theimportanceofcombinedarmsinwinningon thebattlefield,

commanders differed in howthey respected and employedlight infantry. On thecontinent,crossbowmenwereoften favoured over archersbecause of the small amountof skill required to operatetheir weapon. The Frenchcrown regularly employedItalianmercenaries renownedfor their skill with thecrossbow. In England, KingEdwardI(r.1272–1307)first

conquered the Welsh, thenassimilated their nativeweapon,thelongbow,intohisarmy, creating a verydangerousweaponsystemforuse against the Scots andlater, by his successors,againsttheFrench.

TheWelshandScottishCampaigns:TheLongbow,theSchiltronandthe

ReturnofInfantrytoWesternEuropeThe Welsh longbow was aselfbow, constructed from asingle,carefullyshapedpieceof wood, usually yew. Thebow received its name fromits unusual length (up to 6feet 4 inches). It couldachieve a maximum drawweightof185pounds,thoughdraw weights of between 60

and 160 pounds were acommon range. Thesepowerfullongbowscouldhurlsmall-headedarrowsasfaras300 yards, depending on thesize and weight of thearrowhead. Moreover, theskill required to shoot alongbow was substantial. Tomastertheweapontookmanyyears and constant practice,and a fully trainedlongbowman was a

formidable military assetcapable of piercing mailconsistentlyandplatearmourat short ranges, and attaininga rate of fire of up to twelvearrows per minute, far fasterthan a crossbow. Thisextraordinary rate of fire,combined with the sheernumbersofarchersemployedbyEnglishmonarchs,createda ‘killing zone’ – a narrowfrontedareaaround200yards

deep into which severalthousand arrows could belaunched per minute. These‘killing zones’ wereinstrumental in Englishvictories in the Anglo-Scottish conflicts and theHundred Years War againstFrance.In response to the

vulnerability of mountedlancers to the arrows andboltsoflightinfantry,knights

began to use metal plates tostrengthen their mail armourat particularly vulnerablepoints (such as the shin andknee), creating a transitionalarmour known as platemail.But as the threat of enemymissiles became moreprevalent, heavy cavalrymenadded more and more platesuntil a complete suit of platearmour was worn by thebeginning of the fifteenth

century. Knightly weaponsalso changed in response tothis new plate armour.Swords became shorter andwider, and often hadreinforced, sharp points forthrusting,ratherthanslashingattacks. There was also amovement away from edgedweapons toward contusionweapons, such as the mace,flail and hammer, andpiercingweapons,suchasthe

military pick – weaponsbettersuitedtoattacktheflatprotectiveplatesencasing thearistocraticwarriors.KingEdwardI’scampaigns

inWalestaughthimvaluabletactical lessons in how toemploy light infantry againsta stubborn guerrilla army.Beginning in 1276, heemployed southern Welshlongbowmen against theircousins in the north. Earlier

attempts by Anglo-Normankings to quell the WelshMarches failed because theNorman heavy cavalry wasseverely restricted in themountainous terrain ofSnowdonia in northernWales. To overcome therebellious Welsh, Edwardassembled a large force oftroops with few cavalry andmany bowmen, spearmen,carpenters and diggers. The

English king quickly putdown the rebellion andinitiated an ambitious castle-building project to dominatenorthern and central Wales,including the spectacularEdwardian castle complexesatFlint,Caernarfon,Harlech,Conwy and Beaumaris.Though over the next twodecades Edward would facemultiple rebellions by theWelsh, his effective

combination of castlebuilding and an infantry-basedarmywouldeventuallysubdue them. With Walesunder English control,Edward looked north for hisnextadversary.Medieval Scotland, like

Wales,was a rugged countrywith strong feelings ofindependence. Since theNorman Conquest, theEnglish and Scottish had

fought a tug-of-war for theborder regions of CumbriaandNorthumbria.Butinsteadof local chiefs squabblingover land, Anglo-Normankings increasingly faced aScottishkingdomunifiedandadopting Norman social,political and militaryinstitutions. Moreover, theScots were consistently abletofieldlargearmiesandcarrythe war far beyond the

borderlandsand intoEnglanditself(Map5.2).The Scottish were fierce

warriors who fought informations called schiltrons(sometimes schiltroms).These battle squares andcircles were very similar tothe boar’s head formation ofthe earlymedieval period, inthat both formations wereunarticulated and, being amilitiaformation,inexpensive

to operate. The schiltronplaced countryman besidecountryman, each holding along infantry spear or pikebefore him to discourageenemyheavycavalrycharges.The schiltronworked best asa defensive formation, and,like most medieval infantryarrays, its offensivecapabilities were limited,though there is evidence thatScottishcommanderswielded

the schiltron successfully atpropitious times. BecauseScottishwarriorsweremostlypeasants, the quality of theirarms and armour variedgreatly. Most likely, a front-line pikeman was protectedby amail hauberk or paddedgambeson and wore a kettlehelm or iron cap, while hispoorer comrades, lackingbody armour, stood behindhim in the schiltron. The

Scots also possessed someNorman-modelled heavycavalry and light infantryarchers, and, as a combined-arms army, they presentedEdward with more of achallenge than had the raid-and-ambush tactics of theWelsh.

Map5.2 TheAnglo-ScottishBorder

Wars.

The war in Scotland beganwell for Edward I. In 1296theEnglishcapturedBerwickand massacred the Scottishgarrison.Thenextyear,whileEdward fought the French,theScots rebelled, decisivelydefeating an English army atStirling Bridge and raidingnorthern England. Edwardturned his full attention to

Scotland in the summer of1298, invading the lowlandswith a large army consistingof 3,000 heavy cavalry andover 13,000 infantry, ofwhichsome10,000werelightinfantryarchers.Marching overnight from

Edinburgh into Stirlingshire,scene of the 1297 disaster,Edward’svanguardattackedaScottish muster point atFalkirk on 22 July (Map

5.3(a)).Asthemajorityofthesurprised Scottish cavalryfled, William Wallace, theScottish commander, orderedthe remaining infantry intofourschiltronsandpositionedthem on a hill behind soft,swampy ground, braced fortheinevitableEnglishcavalrycharge.Wallace then arrayedhis light infantry bowmenbetweentheschiltronsandontheirflanks.

Map5.3 TheBattleofFalkirk,1298.(a)PhaseI:AdvanceelementsofEdwardI’sarmyattackaScottishmustersiteatFalkirk(1),scatteringmostoftheScottishlightcavalry(2).WilliamWallaceorderstheinfantrytoformfourschiltrons(3)onahillsidefrontedbysomemarshyterrainanddeployshisarchersontheflanksand

intheintervalsbetweentheschiltrons(4)inanticipationofanEnglishheavycavalrycharge.(b)PhaseII:The

Englishvanguardcharges(1).Unabletoshakethetightlypackedranksoftheschiltrons,theheavycavalrymensucceedindrivingofftheScottisharchers(2).Edwardarrivesonthefield(3)andstopshisknightsfrommountingasecondcharge.Thekingordershisarchersforward(4)tosoftenupthebristlingpikecircleswithmissilefire.(c)PhaseIII:

Subjectingtheschiltronstoadeadlyhailofarrows,thelongbowmensoonopengapsintheScottishformations(1).Edwardordershisheavycavalry

tochargethroughtheopenings(2)andtheslaughterbegins.(d)PhaseIV:TheunarticulatedScottishinfantryarequicklydestroyed,unabletoresistthearmouredhorsemenassailing

theirflankandrearfrominsidetheirformerlyinvulnerableformations.Withoutthecohesionaffordedbythetightranksoftheschiltron,the

Scottishsurvivorsareslaughtered(1),whileWallacemanagestoescapeintothewoodswithafewofhisfollowers

(2).

The English vanguard didcharge, dispersing the

Scottish light infantry butfailing to tear the fourschiltrons (Map 5.3(b)). Asthe English knights wereforming up for a secondcharge, Edward arrived andcalled instead for hislongbowmentocomeforwardand fire on the enemy battlecircles. Under a deadly rainof arrows, the Scottish linesgaped, creating openings forthe armoured horsemen.

English knights penetratedthe schiltrons, andslaughtered the Scots withlance and sword (Map 5.3(c)and (d)). Wallace and a fewof his men escaped into thewoods. Edward’s menrelentlessly hunted down theScottish rebels, and Wallacehimself was finally capturedat Glasgow in 1305. Hewashanged, then drawn andquartered at Tyburn. But

although Scotland was underforeign occupation, thepeople remainedunconquered.AfterWallace’smartyrdom, Robert ‘theBruce’(laterKingRobertIofScotland) rallied hiscountrymen and continuedthewar.King Edward I’s victory at

Falkirk was reminiscent oftheearlierbattlesofHastingsand Durazzo, where heavy

cavalry and archers workedtogether against dense heavyinfantry positions. But theunusualaspectofthebattleofFalkirkwas the steadfastnessof the Scottish infantryformations.Here theScottishschiltrons held their groundand withstood repeatedEnglishcavalrycharges,onlyto be finally defeated by acombined-arms attack byEnglish light infantry and

heavycavalry.Falkirk standsas a harbinger of battles tocome in the fourteenthcentury,whereheavyinfantryalone in a defensive postureheld its own against themounted aristocracy andotherinfantryformations.The high Middle Ages

(c.1000–c.1300) saw closeco-operation between heavycavalry and the subordinatearms of heavy and light

infantry, a co-operation thatbrought victory to medievalcommanders time and timeagain. But the late MiddleAges (c.1300–c.1500)witnessed a closer co-operation between heavy andlight infantry against thedominant weapon system ofthe age, heavy cavalry. InEnglandandScotlandandonthe continent, heavy infantryincreasingly provided the

defensive backbone to lightinfantry’s deadlycounterpunch or took adecisive offensive role incombat.One example of heavy

infantry’sability tomeetanddefeat enemy heavy cavalryand light infantryattackscanbeseeninthelatercampaignsof the Anglo-Scottish Wars,specifically the battle ofBannockburn in 1314. After

the death of Edward I in1307, his ineffectual son andheir, Edward II (r. 1307–1327), abandoned the waragainst Scotland. During thenext seven years Robert theBruce united Scotland underhis rule and forced theEnglish out of all castlesnorth of the Tweed River,except Berwick and Stirling.When the latter Englishstrongholds came under

siege, Edward II marchednorth with a strong army ofover 20,000 men, including2,500mountedknights,3,000light infantry longbowmenand nearly 15,000 footsoldiers.To meet the English

invasion, King Robertfollowed the example ofWallace at Falkirk anddeployed his 5,000–6,000heavy infantrymen in three

schiltrons echeloned to theleft behind amarsh andon ahill (Map 5.4(a)). Robertanchored his left flank in apatchofdensewoodsandhisright flank on a bend in thestream. For a reserve, theBruce held back a force of500heavycavalry.On themorningof24June,

Edward II offered battle. Toattack the Scots the Englishhadtobringtheirmuchlarger

army across the burn, orbrook, and a marshy areadotted with pools of water.JustastheEnglishcompletedthistaskbutbeforeEdwardIIcould deploy his cavalry orinfantryacrossthe2,000yardfront, Robert changed hismind and ordered an attackon the still forming Englishformation, ‘executing thatrarity in war, an infantryattack on cavalry’ (Map

5.4(b)).As the three Scottish

schiltrons steadily advancedover the mile that separatedthem from the Englishcavalry still forming up infront of their own infantry,one group of English lancersbroke away andcountercharged the Scottishschiltrons.InthewordsoftheLanercost chronicler: ‘Thetwohostscame together, and

thegreatsteedsoftheknightsdashedintotheScottishpikesas into a thick wood; therearose a great and horriblecrashfromrendinglancesanddying horses, and they stoodlocked together for a space.’TheEnglishcavalry,haltedinfront of the pressing Scottishpikemen,provedincapableofeffectinganything.Meanwhile, as the other

Scottishschiltronscameupto

engage, Edward sent hislongbowmen around theScottish left flank. But KingRobert,whoservedatFalkirkand knew well the potentialoflongbowfiretodestroythecohesiveness of hisschiltrons,committedhis500reservecavalry to the taskofdispersingtheEnglisharchers(Map 5.4(c)). With nolongbowmentomenacethem,all of the Scottish pikemen

joined battle, pressing theEnglish cavalry back intotheir own immobile infantryhemmed in between theretreating English horse andthe marsh pools they had tocross to reachattackposition(Map 5.4(d)). With the rearinfantryranksuselessandthespears of the Scots creatinghavoc among the crampedmen and horses of theinvaders, the English army

finally broke. AlthoughEdward himself barelymanaged to escape capture,his army suffered greatly.Exhaustedbytheirattackandbogged down in the marshyground along the burn, theEnglish were cut down ordrowned by the victoriousScots(Map5.4(e)).Itwasthegreatest losseversufferedbyEnglish knighthood in asingle day. The Scots

reportedly lost only twonoblemen,butalargenumberofpikemen.

Map5.4 TheBattleof

Bannockburn,1314.(a)PhaseI:

PreparingtomeetEdwardII’sEnglishinvaders,KingRobertdeployshisheavyinfantryinthreeschiltronsandhishorseasareserve(1).Edward’sarmycrossesthe

Bannockburn(2)andmustpickitswaythroughamarshyareadottedwithpoolsofwater(3)beforeitcandeploytofacetheScottishforcesonthehillside.(b)PhaseII:Robertreconsidershisbattleplanand

decidestoattackthestill-deployingEnglish.TheScottishschiltronsslowlyadvancedownthehillsidetowardsEdward’sposition(1).OnegroupofEnglishcavalrychargestheoncoming

pikemen(2)andthetwoforces

collide,splinteringlanceandpike,buttheinfantrycontinuetheirinexorableapproach.Edwarddispatcheshis

archersaroundtheScottishleftflank(3)inanattempttochecktheenemy.(c)PhaseIII:Recognizingthethreattohisflank,RobertordershiscavalryreservetochargetheEnglisharchers(1)whoarequicklydispersed(2).Theschiltronspressforwardandthe

Englishcavalrybegintoslowlygiveground,unabletoshakeRobert’sinfantrymen.(d)PhaseIV:

Confrontedbytheslowlymovingwallsofbristlingpikes,theEnglishcavalryispressedtotherear(1),buttheirwithdrawalishamperedbytheir

owninfantry(2)whoareunabletoretirequicklybecauseofthemarshypoolsalongtheBannockburn.TheEnglishformationsrapidlylose

cohesionbecauseoftheterrainandthecrushingweightoftheScottishinfantry.(e)PhaseV:AlthoughthefrontranksofRobert’sschiltronsarethinnedbythedesperateEnglishcavalry,theScottishformationscannotbechecked,pressingthe

invadersdeeperintotheswamp(1).TheEnglisharmyfinallybreaksandattemptstofleethefield(2),butmanyarecutdownordrownedinthe

attempt,thoughEdwardmanagestoescape(3).

The battle of Bannockburnis unusual in the annals ofmedieval western Europeanwarfareinthatcavalryservedasasubordinatearmtoheavyinfantry. By dispersing theEnglish light infantry andremoving thevery real threatof a rain of wooden shafts,the Scottish heavy cavalryallowed their pikemen tosuccessfullymoveagainstthe

English lancers. AtBannockburn, the Englisherred by placing themselvesbetween a determined enemyand dangerous terrain,presenting theBrucewith anopportunity to change thetenor of the battle with anoffensive charge. But in thenext major battle it was theScots that suffered fromoverconfidence and arefinementinEnglishtactics.

In1333EdwardII’ssonandheir, thebrilliantyoungKingEdward III (r. 1327–1377),tookadvantageofacivilwarin Scotland and laid siege toBerwick. On 19 July aScottish relief army ofperhaps 14,600 menencountered the twenty-year-old English monarch’s armyof 10,000 troops besiegingthe castle at Berwick. TheScots,under thecommandof

Lord Archibald Douglas, theregent foryoungKingDavidII, seized the nearby highgroundatHalidonHill.Aware of the numerical

superiority and superiorposition of his foe, EdwardIII positioned his troopsacross from Halidon Hill onflat ground in a concaveformation, placing his heavyinfantryinthecentre,andhislightinfantrylongbowmenon

theleftandrightflanksandinthe gaps between hisinfantrymen(Map5.5(a)).Hethen dismounted his knights‘against the ancient traditionof their fathers’ to reinforcehis infantry, creating for thefirst time what would becalled the English defensivetactical system, a combined-armsformationthatmatedthesuperior defensivecapabilities of heavy infantry

with the powerful offensivepotential of light infantryarchers.The Scots, emboldened by

their earlier success atBannockburnandrecognizingthat Berwick could not berelieved until the Englishwere defeated in open battle,took the offensive andmarched down Halidon Hilltoward theEnglish formation(Map 5.5(b)). As the Scots

descended the hill, Edwardorderedhisarchers to fireonthe massed Scottish infantry,creating disorder in theirranks and aiding in theirslaughter (Map 5.5(c) and(d)).TheLanercostchroniclerwrites: ‘Now the Scotsapproaching in the firstdivision were so grievouslywounded in the face andblindedbythehostofEnglisharchery … that they were

helpless,andquicklybegantoturnawaytheirfacesfromthearrow flights and to fall.’Still, many of the Scottishinfantry reached the Englishlines, where fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued, but inthe end, the Scots wereunable to break the Englishline (Map 5.5(e)). As thebattle continued, more Scotspressed from below, only tobe targeted by Edward’s

longbowmen. Finally, theScottish infantry routed andEdwardorderedhisknightstoremount and pursue thefleeing troops as far as 8miles (Map 5.5(f)). Perhapsasmany as 10,000Scotsmenlost their lives at HalidonHill, including the general incharge and regent,ArchibaldDouglas. English casualtieswere paltry in comparison,estimated at under twenty

men, including only oneknightandoneman-at-arms.ThroughoutthehighMiddle

Ages close combined-armsco-operation between heavycavalry and light infantryserved Norman and Englishcommanders well. Successesat Hastings, Durazzo andFalkirk all demonstrated theeffectiveness of shock andmissile tactics against staticinfantry defensive positions.

But the return of lightinfantryandtheemergenceofdisciplined infantryformationsand the revivalofaggressive infantry tacticsgave medieval commandersnew tools to fight with. Thebattle of Halidon Hill marksthe beginning of the Englishdefensive tactical system.Edward III and later Englishmonarchs would perfect thistactical system in the

HundredYearsWarandhelpbreak the back of thedominance of heavy cavalry.Edward’suseofthelongbowat Halidon Hill, with itsoutstanding range, rate offire, and impact power, alsoillustrated the possibilities ofcombining light infantrybowmen with dismountedknightsandheavyinfantryina purely defensive capacity.Using this combined-arms

approach,Edwardwonallhismajor land battles againstFrance and Scotland,including Halidon Hill(1333), Crécy (1346),Neville’s Cross (1346),Poitiers (1356) and Najera(1367), and in each caseagainst numerically superiorforces.

Map5.5 TheBattleofHalidonHill,1333.(a)PhaseI:MarchingtothereliefofBerwick,theScottishregent,LordArchibaldDouglas,seizes

controlofHalidonHill,justwestofthecastleandcity(1).KingEdwardIIIrecognizesthethreatfromthe

numericallysuperiorScotsandarrayshisforcescarefully,interspersing

archerswithhisinfantry(2),movinghisknightsintoasupportingposition(3)andorderingthemtodismount(4).(b)PhaseII:RecognizingthathewouldhavetodefeattheEnglishinbattletoassistthebeleagueredfortressgarrison,LordArchibaldordershisScottishinfantrydownthehillattheEnglishline(1).(c)PhaseIII:Edwardordershisarcherstoopenfireonthedenselypacked

infantryapproachingacrosstheplain(1).TheScottishranksaredisrupted(2)asmenbegintofall,buttheypresson.(d)PhaseIV:Thedeadlyrainofarrowscontinues(1)andtheScottishformationsbegintolosecohesion(2)

asthedeadpileeverthickerupontheground,andsomebegintoseek

survival(3)ratherthansharethefateoftheircomrades.

(e)PhaseV:AstillsizeablenumberofScottishinfantrymanagetoclosewiththeEnglishline(1)butareunabletomakeanyimpressiononEdward’stroops.Thearcherscontinuetofire(2)andmoreandmoreScotsbegintorout(3).(f)PhaseVI:TheremainingScottishinfantrybreakandrout(1).Edwardordershisknightstoremount(2)andthehorsemenpursuethefugitivesacrosstheplain(3).Theregentiskilled(4),asaresome

10,000Scotsmen.

TheHundredYearsWarThe conflict that came to beknownas theHundredYearsWar (1337–1453) betweenEngland and France beganwhen the English KingEdward III, the grandson of

the French monarch Philipthe Fair, laid claim to theFrench throne when theFrenchKingCharles IVdiedwithout a male heir. Tofurther complicate matters,Edward was also a majorlandholder in France, withtitles and possessions datingbacktotheNormanconquestofEnglandin1066.Piracyinthe English Channel andterritorialdisputesinGascony

actedasaprimerforthewar,whichbrokeoutinMay1337andlasteduntil1453.The Hundred Years War

pitted the English defensivecombined-arms tacticalsystem against the moreorthodox and offensivelyorientated French continentalsystem. Though the Frenchwayofwarwasinappearancea combined-arms system, itsover-reliance on heavy

cavalry lancers precludedthemfromfullyutilizingtheirlight infantry. Two majorcampaigns during the war,Crécy and Agincourt,exemplify the differencesbetween the two systems. Inthese campaigns the Frenchcontinued to use what hadbeensuccessful forcenturies,while the English showed anamazing ability to adapttacticallyoverthelongwar.

Incontrasttothecontinentalsystem, the army that theEnglish King Edward IIIbrought to France wasessentiallyaprofessionalone,madeupofknightsandwell-paid, highly motivatedfreemen. These freemenwere, for themost part, lightinfantry longbowmen whohad perfected their archeryskills over years ofcampaigning in the Anglo-

Scottish Wars. But theEnglish combined-armstactical systemwasused inadefensive capacity on thecontinent, relying on theinevitability of the heavycavalry charge to seal theirenemy’s fate on thebattlefield. The Frenchnobility did not disappointthem.English nobility became, in

essence, the backbone of the

English defensive tacticalsystem by dismounting toreinforce the infantry,bolsteringmoraleandputtingtheirnobleselvesinthesamedanger as the commonsoldier. The English werevery fond of dismountingdefensively because theirpreferredmethodofattackonthe continent, the mountedraid or chevauchée,encumberedtheEnglisharmy

with treasure, slowing itdown sufficiently for aFrencharmytointercept.Thechevauchée was intended todestroy French resources,damage the enemy’s prestigeandenrichEnglishsoldiers.An unusually detailed

description of a medievalarmy advancing into enemyterritory comes from theChanson des Lorrains,written in theearly thirteenth

century:The march begins. Out infront are the scouts andincendiaries. After themcome the foragers whosejob is to collect the spoilsandcarry themin thegreatbaggagetrain.Soonallisintumult. The peasants,having just come out totheir fields, turn back,uttering loud cries. Theshepherds gather their

flocks and drive themtowards the neighbouringwoodsinthehopeofsavingthem. The incendiaries setthevillageson fire and theforagers visit and sackthem. The terrifiedinhabitants are eitherburned or led away withtheir hands tied to be heldfor ransom. Everywherebellsringthealarm;asurgeof fear sweeps over the

countryside.Wherever youlook you can see helmetsglintinginthesun,pennonswaving in the breeze, thewhole plain covered inhorsemen. Money, cattle,mules and sheep are allseized. The smoke billowsandspreads,flamescrackle.Peasants and shepherdsscatterinalldirections.The above description is byno means specific to the

medieval period. The armiesof Thutmose, Alexander,Hannibal, Caesar andGenghis Khan operatedsimilarly in enemy territory.The fourth-century Romancommentator Vegetius tellsus ‘the main and principalpoint in war is to secureplenty of provisions foroneself and to destroy theenemy by famine. Famine ismoreterriblethanthesword.’

EventheEnglishKingHenryV, the commander atAgincourt, is rumoured tohave said that ‘war withoutfire is like sausage withoutmustard’. Protecting thespoils became central to thesuccess of any militarycampaign. During theHundred Years War, whentheFrenchdidcatchuptotheencumbered English army,the commanding monarch

wouldorderhismen to seizea defensible position andprepare for the Frenchonslaught.The difference in character

between the continentalsystem and the Englishdefensive system issignificant. The former wasbased on knighted heavycavalry, favouring theoffensive and elevating theindividual on the battlefield.

The English system wasbased on freemen infantryreinforced by dismountednobility, favouring thedefensive and effectivecombined-arms co-operation.Though social tensions didexist, the relationshipbetween the English nobilityand their freemen was aprofessional one, based onrespect for each other’smartial capabilities. The

relationship between theFrench nobility and theirmen-at-arms was oftenantagonistic,with the Frenchknights treating their lightinfantry mercenaries andconscripts as littlemore thanfodder.These two tactical systems

clashed numerous timesduring the Hundred YearsWar (Map 5.6), with theFrenchsufferingdefeatatthe

hands of Englishlongbowmen right from thebeginning of the conflict atthe naval battle of Sluys(1340), and at Morlaix(1342), Auberoche (1345)and St Pol de Leon (1346).But of all the campaigns ofthe 116-year war, the battlesat Crécy in 1346 andAgincourt in 1415 stand outas powerful demonstrationsof the dominance of the

English tacticaldoctrineoverthe French heavy-cavalry-based system. Crécy andAgincourt reveal how theFrench failed to adapt overthedurationofthewartothetactics of the invadingEnglish.

Map5.6 EnglandandFranceintheHundredYearsWar.

TheEnglishTacticalSystemTested:TheBattlesofCrécyandAgincourtEngland’s first great landvictoryovertheFrenchintheHundred YearsWar came atthebattleofCrécyinwesternFrance in August 1346. A

navalvictoryovertheFrenchatSluys sixyears earlierhadgiven the English commandof the channel, affordingEdward III the chance topursuehishereditaryclaimtothe French throne in a directchallenge to Frenchsuzerainty. On 12 July,Edward landed near thewesterntipofNormandyandset off on a raidingexpedition.Edward’sstrategy

was three-pronged: to pillageNormandy and evade Frenchattempts at interception, todraw off French forcesmenacing Englishpossessions in the south, andto rendezvous with an alliedFlemish army invadingFrance from the north-east.Afterasuccessfulchevauchéeacross Normandy, Edwardfinally turned east andapproached the Seine River

near the large city ofRouen.HerehefoundthattheFrenchmonarch,PhilipVI (r.1328–1350),hadarrivedinthecityfirst and nowblocked all thefords and bridges across theriver.MarchingeasttowardParis,

with the French armyfollowing on the oppositebank, Edward won a bridgenear Poissy by brilliantfeinting and counter-

marching, only to be beatento the Somme River atAmiens by Philip’s army.Unable to secure a bridgeacross the Somme andtrapped between anadvancing French army andthe river,Edwardwas forcedtoriskcrossingthewaterwayat low tide. A blockingFrench force on the oppositebank further complicated thecrossing. Ordering his

rearguard to hold off theFrench army moving in forthekilldowntheleftbankofthe Somme, Edwardcommanded his vanguardarchers to wade across theriverandsecureabridgeheadthrough which the Englisharmy could pass to safety.Unable topursue theEnglishbecause of the rising tide,Philip was forced to recrossthe Somme farther upstream,

givingEdward time to findasuitable defensive positionfromwhichtofightthebattlehenowknewwasinevitable.Treasure-laden and

exhausted after a 300-milelong chevauchée, KingEdward’smenretreatedtothesmall village of Crécy,pursued by a numericallysuperior French army. Earlyinthemorningof26August,Edward drewup his armyof

8,500 men (two-thirds ofwhom were light infantrylongbowmen) in a defensiveposition on a low hill facingthe road where the Frenchwouldapproach(Map5.7(a)).Edward arrayed his heavyinfantry and dismountedknightsinthreebattlesontheforwardslopeof theeast riseoftheCrécy–Wadicourtroad.Therightbattlewasunderthenominal command of the

king’s eldest son, the futureEdward IV, the prince ofWales,thenaseventeen-year-old, while the earl ofNorthamptoncommandedtheleft corps. Edwardcommanded the centredivision,andused thenearbywoods as rear protection andhisbaggagewagonsforflankprotection, while a windmillprovidedhiscommandpost.The village of Crécy’s

steep, terraced hillsideallowed theEnglishmonarchtodeployhis longbowmentobest advantage on the flanksoftheheavyinfantryline.Tofurther protect themselvesagainst enemy cavalrycharges, the longbowmenspent the day preparing thebattlefield by digging ditchesanddrivingiron-shodwoodenstakesintothegroundinfrontof their positions. These

makeshift obstacles usuallyhad the added benefit offunnellingenemycavalryintothe dismounted cavalry andinfantry ranks, allowingarchers to rake the mountedattackers’flanks.The pursuing King Philip

divided his army of 20,000into eight divisions formarching, placing his 6,000Genoese crossbowmen in thevanguard. The French,

expecting a long chase,weresurprised to find the Englisharmyarrayedforbattleonthehillside.Sinceitwasnowlateintheday,Philipgaveordersto defer action until the nextmorning. But the Frenchknights, seeking personalglory, insisted on an attack,eventhoughmostofthemainarmy had yet to arrive,depriving the noblemen ofmost of their supporting

cavalry and infantry (exceptfortheGenoesecrossbowmenwho arrived in the van).Unable to control his troops,Philipgavetheordertoattack(Map5.7(b)).The Genoese crossbowmen

were sent forward first toexchange fire with theEnglish archers, but thecrossbowmen lacked theprotection of their pavises,largerectangularbodyshields

thatwerestillonthebaggagewagons. The medievalchronicler JeanFroissart tellsus that the Englishlongbowmen:Then advanced one stepforward, and shot theirarrowswithsuchforceandquickness,thatitseemedasif it snowed. When theGenoese felt these arrows,which pierced their arms,heads, and through their

armor, some of them cutthe strings of theircrossbows, others flungthem to the ground andturned around andretreated.Unprotected and unable tomatch the rate of fire of thelongbowmen, the Genoesewereoutshotandforcedbackdowntheslope(Map5.7(c)).As the Italian light infantryfell back, the French heavy

cavalry rode them down indisgust on their way up thehill(Map5.7(d)).The English longbowmen

next turned their arrows ontheadvancingFrenchknights.Underawitheringbarrageofarrows, none of the Frenchcavalry from the first chargereachedtheEnglishline:For the bowmen let flyamong them at large, anddid not lose a single shaft,

for every arrow told onhorse or man, piercinghead,orarm,or legamongthe riders and sending thehorses mad. For some[horses] stood stock still,andothersrushedsideways,and most of all beganbacking in spite of theirmasters, and some wererearing and tossing theirheads at the arrows, andotherswhentheyfeltthebit

threwthemselvesdown.Sothe knights in the firstbataille fell, slain or sorestricken,withoutseeingthemenwhoslewthem.The second charge failed aswell, as the heavy cavalry’sbarding proved incapable ofstopping the longbow’s shaft(Map5.7(e)and(f)).

Map5.7 TheBattleofCrécy,1346.(a)PhaseI:KingEdwardcarefullyarrayshisarmyonaterracedslopenearCrécy,diggingditchesinthe

fieldtothefront(1)todisruptcavalryattacksanddrivingstakesinfrontofthearchers’positions(2).Woods

protecthisrear(3),hisbaggagetraincoverstheleftflank(4),anda

windmill(5)providesthekingwithaviewoftheapproachingfoe.(b)PhaseII:KingPhilipVI’sarmyapproachestheEnglishposition.

Philipattemptstoorderadelayuntilthenextday,whentheremainderofhisarmywillbeup.Someofhis

knightshalt(1),butmostoftheotherspressforward(2)inasearchforgloryandPhilipgivesin,unabletocontrol

hisnobles.Heordershisleadformations,Genoesecrossbowmen,forward(3),eventhoughtheirpavises,largerectangularbodyshields,areloadedonbaggage

wagonsfartotherear.(c)PhaseIII:AstheGenoesecrossbowmen

approachtheEnglishlines,Edward’slongbowmenletfly(1).Anearlierrainstormhaddampenedthestringsofthecrossbows,whiletheEnglishwereabletoeasilyunstringand

protecttheirsfromtheelements.This,coupledwiththealreadygreaterrangeofthelongbow,resultsin

disasterfortheunprotectedGenoese.Withouttheirpavises,theylose

heavilytotheEnglisharrowstormandsoonbreakfortherear(2).(d)PhaseIV:Disgustedwiththe

performanceoftheirfoot,theFrenchknightsridedowntheGenoese

fugitives(1)astheyadvanceuptheslopetowardstheEnglishposition(2).

(e)PhaseV:Theiradvancedisruptedbytheditchesdugbytheenemy

archers(1),thefirstFrenchchargeisgreetedbycloudsofEnglisharrows(2).Tightlypackedandpressedfrombehindbytheircomrades,theFrenchofferalargetargettothelongbowmenandthecasualtiesswiftlymount.(f)PhaseVI:TheFrenchcontinue

launchingchargesagainsttheEnglishposition,thearcheryfirefunnellingtheirremainingforcestowardsthecentreofthefield.(g)PhaseVII:

FrenchknightsmanagetoclosewiththeEnglishlineseveraltimes,butwithlittleeffect,thoughtheyoungBlackPrincefindsheisarepeated

targetforenemyattacks(1).TheFrenchhavelaunchedperhapsasmanyasfifteenassaultsontheEnglishlinewithoutmakingan

impressionontheirfoe,allthewhilesufferinggreatlyfromthemercilesslongbowfire(2).(h)PhaseVIII:TheFrenchsurvivorsfinallyturnand

retreat(1),unabletoshakeEdward’sforcesontheridgeline.IncontrasttoPhilip’sheavylosses,theEnglish

sufferlittleinthebattle.

With the archers on theflanks, the French chargeswere funnelled towards thecentre of the English lineswhere Edward’s son, theteenage ‘Black Prince’,

commanded. The princehimself became the target ofmany direct attacks, anddespite being ‘compelled tofightonhisknees’,heandhismen held their positionagainst the continualonslaughts of French cavalry(Map 5.7(g)). In all, theFrenchheavycavalrychargedthe English position fifteentimes, and though someFrenchhorsemendidmanage

to meet the defenders’ lines,Edward’sdismountedknightsand heavy infantry provedirresistible to the cavalrycharges(Map5.7(h)).When the mists cleared on

themorningof27Augustandthe last of the French weredrivenaway,Edwardallowedhis men to break ranks andstrip the dead. In spite of anumerical superiority of twoto one, theFrench lost 1,500

knightsandsquires,includingthe king of Bohemia, theduke of Lorraine, 10 counts,83 bannerets and perhaps asmanyas16,000men-at-arms.Englishcasualtieswerestatedas two knights, one squire,and 40 infantrymen andarchers.Sixty-nine years later, in

1415, another English king,HenryV(r.1413–1422), faced a strategic

situationsimilartothatwhichEdward III met at Crécy.Afterdecadesofconflict, theFrench were beginning toadjust to the Englishdefensive tactical system bydismounting the majority oftheir nobility and attackingthe invadingEnglishon foot.Throughout the remainder ofthe Hundred Years War, theFrench knight strapped onmore plate armour to defend

himself from enemy arrowsand bolts, and adoptedheavierandshorterhammers,maces, flails and staffweapons(halberds,billhooks,glaives, military forks andpoleaxes) more suitable fordismounted heavy infantry.Because theseweapons oftenrequired two hands to beeffective, the shield wasdiscarded for practical use,only surviving for heraldic

display.A man of unlimited

ambition and great militaryskill, King Henry decided totakeadvantageofthepoliticaldivision inFranceandreviveEdward III’s claim to theFrench throne. Henry thenassembled an army atSouthampton, and on 13August 1415 landed it nearthe mouth of the Seine andbesieged thecityofHarfleur,

which capitulated on 22September.Afterprovidingagarrison for Harfleur, Henryset out on 8 October forCalais with a small army ofabout 6,000 men (5,000longbowmen and 900dismountedknightsandmen-at-arms)andaweek’srations,enough for the 100-milemarch(seeMap5.6).But the French,

conspicuously absent from

the siege of Harfleur, chosethen to attack the invadingEnglisharmy.Unabletocrossthe SommeRiver because offlooding and Frenchdefences, the English wereforced to swing inland ontheir return journey toCalaisand cross at Amiens. Thedelay allowed the pursuingFrencharmytoblockHenry’spath, forcing the Englishmonarcheithertocontinueto

trytoevadetheFrench,ortostand and fight. Henrydecided to fight. On theevening of 23 October heordered his small army,hungry, tired and sick fromdysentery, to make campsouth of the villages ofTramecourt and Agincourt.The larger French armyencamped between the twovillages, north-west of theEnglishposition.

For days before the twoarmies camped, Frenchcontingentshadbeenarrivingto swell the ranks of thedefending army. By theevening of 23 October, itnumbered perhaps 25,000men, a huge army for theperiod. The constable ofFrance, Charles d’Albret,commanded the large Frenchhost in name, but hisleadership was undermined

by the presence of so manydukes and counts that hispositionwasmore analogousto a president of an unrulywarcouncil thanabattlefieldgeneral. And though theconstable, aware of theeffectiveness of the Englishlongbowmen, wanted toreceive Henry’s army in adefensive engagement, thedukes and counts of Franceconvincedhim tomove from

the defensive and attack theEnglish.The resulting French battle

plan advocated a combined-arms approach, first sendinglight infantry archers andcrossbowmenforwardagainstthe English right flank whileheavy cavalry chargessimultaneously attacked theEnglish rear in a doubleenvelopment. Finally,dismounted French knights

andtheirmen-at-armsweretoengage theEnglish centre onfoot as allied light infantryarchers and crossbowmenpinned down the enemylongbowmen. Attacked fromall directions andoverwhelmed by superiornumbers, the English centrewould collapse; the Frenchwouldwintheday.The narrow frontage forced

the French to array in three

batailles, one behind theother. The first divisioncontained 8,000 heavyinfantry, 4,000 archers and1,500 crossbowmen,commanded by the constablehimself. Behind this stood asecondheavyinfantrybatailleof similar size. The thirddivision contained the heavycavalry, a formidable forcebetween 8,000 and 10,000knights andmountedmen-at-

arms.Realizing the size and

complement of his foe,KingHenrychoseapositionat theend of a muddy, ploughedfield between two patches ofwoods inorder tonarrowthefront to 800 yards, therebymitigating French numericalsuperiority. Conforming totheEnglishdefensive tacticaldoctrine so successfuldecades earlier at Crécy and

Halidon Hill, Henry placedtwo divisions of dismountedcavalry and foot soldiers inthe centre and his lightinfantrylongbowmenoneachflank. His centre numberedabout 900 men, includingmany great lords fromEngland and their armedretinues.Henrysplithis5,000archers into two equaldivisions of 2,500, thenplaced them on the flanks of

the small centre of heavyinfantry.Both armies arrayed for

battleabout1,000yardsapartat around eight in themorning. As the French sataround their standards eatingbreakfast and forgiving eachother for old quarrels, KingHenry was deliberating withhis war council. The councilagreedthattherewasnothingto be gained by waiting to

attack. English troops werealready weakened by hungerand disease, and, unlike theFrench who were in friendlyterritory,therewasnochanceof gathering much neededsupplies. Believing the onlyoption was to attack, Henryordered his tiny force toadvanceagainsttheenormousFrench host (Map 5.8(a)).Exercising great care in theirslow advance over ground

soddenfromautumnrain,theEnglish army moved withinbowshot of the French,perhaps 220–250 yards fromthe enemy.Once in position,the longbowmen made anirregular hedge of sharpenedstakes, then took positionbehind it in preparation forenemy cavalry charges. Asthe French reacted to theaudacity of the Englishadvance, Henry ordered his

longbowmen to fire into theenemyvanguard (Map5.8(b)and(c)).Under a rain of longbow

shafts, the Frenchcrossbowmen in the vanhastily returned fire, thenretreated back through theranks of their heavy infantryand effectively out of thebattle (Map 5.8(d)). Theinitial heavy cavalry chargeagainst the English archers

also did not go as planned.The two flank charges wereseriously disorganized andundermanned, and could notbe directed at the invaders’flanksbecausetheyrestedonwoods. Instead, the Frenchhorsemen attacked theEnglish light infantry acrossthe recently ploughed, rain-soaked field, chargingheadlong into the archers’stake defences. Although

only three French knightsdied in this attempt at theEnglish lines, the retreatingmountsmadeeasytargetsforEnglish bowmen. Maddenedhorses bolted from thebattlefield or,worse, into the8,000 men of the nowadvancing French firstinfantrydivision,causingittolose its cohesion. Exhaustedby the clinging mud, theFrench infantry had little

momentum when theyreachedtheEnglishline.Andthough the dismountedFrench knights and theirheavy infantrymen didmanage to meet the Englishcentre in hand-to-handcombat, their numberssufferedfrombeingculledbydevastating longbow fire(Map5.8(e)).Moments later the second

French division joined in,

numbering perhaps 6,000knights, but on the narrowand congested front theirnumbers were no advantage.The closely packed soldierscould not wield theirweapons, and those who felltothegroundcouldnoteasilyregain their feet because ofthe weight of their platearmour. Henry then orderedhis agile and unencumberedarchers into the mêlée.

Dropping their longbows, thearchersdrewaxesandswordsand sallied out from behindtheir stakes to meet thedismounted French knights(Map 5.8(f)). As the thirdFrench division looked on,refusingtoenter thefray, theEnglish army pressedforward, killing, beatingdown or capturing all whoopposedthem.Inanengagementperhapsa

half-hour in duration,thousands of French knights,squires and common soldierswere killed, and some 2,000French notables surrenderedto the English. While theEnglish were sorting out theliving from the dead, theircampwassackedbythelocalFrench militia (Map 5.8(g)).Fearing that he was beingattackedfromtherearwhileathird French division of

several thousand menremained in front of hisposition, Henry ordered themassacreofallprisoners.HisEnglish knights refused theignoble act and themassacrewascarriedoutbyonesquireand200ofhisarchers.Manyimportant Frenchmen weremurdered, including theconstable, three dukes andseven counts. Since Henryreturned to England with at

least 1,000 noble prisoners,hemusthavecalledahalt tothe slaughter. Nevertheless,Henry’s actions at Agincourtdemonstrated a coldlyprofessional approach towarfare, one decidedlydifferent from the stereotypeofachivalrousmonarch.

Map5.8 TheBattleofAgincourt,1415.(a)PhaseI:KingHenryV

ordershistired,sickandhungrymentoarraythemselvesforbattle(1),hisdismountedmen-at-armsinthecentreflankedbylongbowmen.TheFrenchreadytheirbivouacbetweenthe

villagesofAgincourtandTramecourt,separatedfromtheEnglishbya

ploughedfield(3)borderedwithwoods.Henryseizestheinitiativeandordershismenforward(4).(b)PhaseII:TheEnglishadvancetoapointwithinbowshotoftheenemy,theirflanksprotectedbythewoods

approachingtheedgeofthefield(1).Henry’sarchersareorderedtodrivestakesintothegroundinfrontoftheirpositions(2)todefendthemselvesagainsttheinevitableFrench

onslaught.(c)PhaseIII:TheFrenchadvance(1)behindascreenof

crossbowmen(2),andHenryorderstheEnglisharcherstoopenfire(3)ontheapproachingfoe.(d)PhaseIV:Afteranineffectivereturnoffire,the

Frenchcrossbowmenretreatthroughtheranksoftheinfantryfollowingthem(1),unabletowithstandtheEnglishlongbowfire.TheplannedFrenchflankattackfailsaswell,astheEnglishflanksareprotectedbythe

trees,forcingthehorsementoapproachthearchers’stake-linedfronts(2).Lackingstrength,andhamperedbythewet,ploughed

ground,theknightsretreat(3).TheEnglisharrowsfindtheirmarkintheFrenchmounts,andthemaddenedhorsesplungeintotheranksofthe

oncomingfoot(4),severelydisruptingtheadvance.

(e)PhaseV:Theirformationsinruins

fromthedeadlylongbowfire,remnantsoftheFrenchfirstdivision(1)managetoengagetheEnglishcentre,butwithlittleeffect.Right

behindthemaretheheavyinfantrymenoftheseconddivision(2),butthenarrowfrontageandtheaddedcongestioncreatedbythe

incessantarcheryfirefromtheflanksnegatetheirnumericaladvantage.(f)PhaseVI:Unabletoeffectivelywieldtheirweaponsinthetightpressof

menandslippingintheslickmud,theFrenchcannotmaintainacohesivefront.Henryordershisarcherstodroptheirbowsandattacktheirdisadvantagedfoewithaxesand

swords(1).Astheslaughterontheflanksescalates,theremaining

Englishmenpressforward(2),killingorcapturingthousands.TheheavycavalryoftheFrenchthirddivisionlookson(3),unwillingtoadvanceinto

themêlée.

(g)PhaseVII:WhiletheEnglishgatherprisoners(1),alocalmilitia

forceattackstheEnglishcampand

baggagetrain(2).FearinganattackfromtherearwhilestillfacedwithafreshdivisionofFrenchheavycavalry

tohisfront,Henryorderstheprisonersslaughtered(3).TheEnglishknightsbulkandtheorderisfinallycarriedoutbyasquireand200

longbowmen,thoughthereisevidencetosuggestthatHenryorderedahalttothemassacreatsomepoint.TheFrenchthirddivisiondoesnotattackandtheEnglishwinavictoryagainst

heavyodds.

The English victory atAgincourt was astonishing

considering the odds againstthe invaders. Outnumberedperhaps four to one andfighting on perfectly open,flat ground, the Englishdeviated from the defensivedoctrine so successful atCrécy and Halidon Hill andbrought the battle to theFrench.Oncewithinbowshot,English archers swept theFrenchlightinfantryfromthefield, then concentrated their

fire on the cavalry charges.Here, the sodden terrainslowed the attacks and thosehorses that did make theEnglish line failed tonegotiate the archers’ stakes.Intheend,thebattlewaswonin a contest betweendismounted knights and theirinfantry allies, a battle thatfavoured the agile and lessencumbered English lightinfantryman-turned-shock

trooper over his well-armouredFrenchadversary.HenryVwentontoconquer

Normandy and negotiate theFrenchcrownforhisdynasty.In1420he signed theTreatyof Troyes and married theFrench princess Catherine ofValois (daughter of theperiodically insane CharlesVI,whoagreedtotakeHenryV as his regent andsuccessor). But sickness

overtook thebrilliantEnglishking,resultinginhisuntimelydeath in 1422 at the relativeyoung age of thirty-five.CharlesdiedonlytwomonthsafterHenry,andthefutureofFrancewasagaininquestion.The final phase of the

HundredYearsWariscloselyassociated with the reign ofthe French monarch CharlesVII. After the death of Joanof Arc in 1431, Charles

continued to press hisadvantage. He made peacewith Burgundy in 1435,denying England its mostpotentally on the continent.He liberated Paris from theEnglish a year later, after afourteen-year occupation.After their defeat atFromigny, the English lostBayeux and Cherbourg, andconsequently their traditionalbastion of Normandy. The

French went on to dislodgethe English from theirstronghold at Bordeaux inGascony,thesameregionthatsparkedtheconflict116yearsbefore. By 1453 only Calaisremained as an Englishpossession.After the success of the

HundredYearsWar, Englishlongbowmen foundthemselves a wantedcommodity in the ranks of

continental armies. Thisrecognition of the power andimportance of missileweapons in combat wouldsolidify the return of lightinfantry tactics throughoutwestern Europe. No longerwas the light infantry armsubservient to heavy cavalry:by the end of the HundredYears War it had fullyreturnedtoEuropeanmilitarydoctrine. But without well-

articulatedheavyinfantry,thereturn of a balancedcombined-arms tacticalsynthesis was stillincomplete.WhiletheAnglo-French struggle was underway, another tacticalawakening was taking placeintheSwissAlps,onewhich,when combined with thereturnoflightinfantry,wouldforever destroy thedominance of heavy cavalry

inwesternEurope.

CHAPTER6

LATEMEDIEVALWARFARE:THE

RETURNOFHEAVYINFANTRY

TheRiseoftheSwissBattleSquareAlthough medieval

commandershadlongknownthe importance of footsoldiers as the backbone oftheir defensive formations,the return of heavy infantrycapable of well-articulatedoffensive action began withthe Swiss, who rediscoveredthis weapon system in theirstruggle with the AustrianHabsburgs and the duchy ofBurgundy. As early as thebeginning of the fourteenth

century, the Swiss haddeveloped heavy infantrywhofought inabattlesquarethatrivalledthebestfromtheclassical period andprofoundly affected thedevelopment of Europeanwarfare in the late MiddleAgesandbeyond.Fighting on foot came

naturally to the poor Swissmountaineers, suiting boththe rugged terrain of their

homeland and their limitedresources. Isolated from thefeudalmainstreamofwesternEurope by the Alps andorganized into small ruralvalley communities, theSwiss subscribed to the oldGermanic tradition wherebyall able-bodied men wereexpected to participate intheir Waldstaaten or forestcanton militia (Map 6.1).Also in the old Germanic

tradition, Swiss cantonalsocieties were organizedaround clans, with clanleaders and aldermen servingon local councils that ruledthrough laws of their ownmaking.Consequently,Swisssocietywasmoredemocratic,less rigid and moreunstructured than medievalsocieties elsewhere. But asthe Middle Ages waned, thedemocraticidealsofthepoor,

rural forest cantons cameunder attack by the periodicencroachments of theneighbouring Habsburgs ofAustriaandBurgundianlordswho wanted to impose theirown feudal structures on theSwisscantons.Forced to take up arms to

maintain their self-determination, the Swissdeveloped a militia-basedtactical system shaped by

their own social andeconomic realities. LikeclassicalGreekcitizenmilitiaof two millennia before, theSwiss adopted the battlesquareorphalanx,basedonasimple, distinctive heavyinfantry doctrine and drilledthemselves in its application.Before the late medievalperiod, these cantonal armieswere essentially defensive indesign and capability, but as

the fourteenth centuryunfolded, Swiss militiasgainedthetraining,disciplineand experience necessary foreffective offensive action,and the Swiss heavy infantrytacticalsystemwasborn.

Map6.1 TheSwissWars.

The Swiss phalanx went

throughaperiodofevolutionin size, composition andarmament during its history.TheearlySwissphalanxwascomposed of two or morecantonal contingents, calledbanners, because this iswhere the standards of thecontingents were displayed.Eachbannerwascommandedby its own officers and wasdivided into subunits calledfahnleins, or ‘little flags’, of

between 50 and 150 men.Fahnleins were furthersubdivided into ten-mansquads called rotten orsections. In the earlyfourteenth century, when theSwissConfederationwasstillsmall, the cantonal phalanxcontained perhaps 900 heavyinfantrymen arrayed in aformation of 30 ranks by 30files. But as more cantonsjoined the confederation in

the late fourteenth andfifteenth centuries and anational army was born, thesize of the battle squareincreased to 50 ranks by 50filesandaround2,500men.ThearticulationoftheSwiss

phalanx was excellent, withthebattlesquareorganizedindeep files. Before the battleof Laupen in 1339, thenormal configuration ofSwiss forces was the keil or

wedge formation. Thistactical array was less awedge than a column,narrower than it was deep.When attacked by enemycavalry, the pikemen in thekeil faced outwards andloweredtheirpikes,creatingabristlinghedgehogthatwouldbe difficult to approach onhorseback. By the battle ofLaupen, this formationevolved into a true battle

square, with the columnsbecoming squarer as thewidth of the formationincreased.By simply following the

man ahead, the Swiss battlesquare could maintain itsintegrity, avoiding gaps likethe smaller Roman manipleof theclassicalage.And likelegionaries in the Romanmaniple, Swiss infantrymendid not form a line on the

battlefield, but usuallyarrayed in three squares inechelonor inachequerboardformation reminiscent of theRoman quincunx. Thesesquares consisted of avanguard or Vorhut, smallerthanthemainbodyandoftenincluding skirmishers armedwith crossbows or handguns;a main body or Gewalthutmuchlargerthantheadvanceguard; and a rearguard or

Nachhut, which was usuallysmallerthanthemainbodyaswell. The Swiss drilled,marched and even advancedto the attack to the sound ofthe drum, with someauthorities stating that thetroops marched in cadence.Swiss drill was sophisticatedenough to defend the squarein all directionswhenhalted,but unlike usually immobilemedieval heavy infantry, the

Swiss stressed the offensive,and the militias drilledconstantly to improvearticulation, producing abattle square comparable tothe Macedonian phalanx inmanoeuvrability,cohesiveness and shockpower.Initially unarmoured and

with no shield, the earlySwissmilitiamanfoughtwithahalberd,abroad-headedaxe

withan8foothandlethathadapointforuseasashortpike,and a spike opposite the axebladetohookacavalrymen’sreins or puncture his armour.Thisweaponproveditsworthon the battlefields ofMorgarten, Laupen andSempach in the fourteenthcentury, but subsequentbattlesinthefifteenthcenturybetween the Swiss phalanxand enemy formations

showed the weakness of theshort-hafted halberd as anoffensive weapon, especiallyagainst well-armouredcavalry charges. The Swissinfantrymanrespondedtothisthreat by adopting a long-haftedpike10to18feetlongwith a 10 inch longspearhead, giving him aformidable reach. By 1425the pike was replacing thehalberd as the primary

offensive weapon of theSwissarmy.Bytheendofthefifteenth century over two-thirds of the Swiss infantrywere armed with thispolearm.Whenarrayedinadefensive

posture for battle, the Swissinfantry square utilized thefirstfourranksofpikementocreatea‘hedgehog’orhollowsquare formation, levellingtheir pikes outward on all

four sides to discouragecavalry charges. Each of thefiveranksheldtheirpikesataslightly different angle toachieve the hedgehog effect,with the first rank kneelingdownandholding theirpikesnear the ground, the secondrank stooping down andsupporting thebuttwith theirright foot, the third rankholding the pike at waistlevel, and the fourth rank

levelling thespearheadat theenemy’s head. The menbehind these ranks held theirpikes sloping upward to thefront to protect the squarefrom missile fire. If thephalanxwas advancing in anoffensive manoeuvre, allpikeswereheldatchestlevelwith the spearhead pointedslightly downward for adownwardthrust.As their military and

economic fortunes improved,Swiss infantry graduallyarmoured themselves withsteel caps and breastplates,thoughnostandard-izationofarmour ever took placethroughout the rank and file,andinfantryintheinteriorofthe square continued towearleather jerkins or paddedjackets. Better protected, thearmoured pikemen becamethe major offensive element

of the phalanx, though somehalberdiers were retained inthe centre of the square,where they could attack anyenemy, cavalry or infantrythatbreachedthepikewall.The Swiss tactical system

also recognized the need forancillary weapon systems tosupport the pikemen andhalberdiers in battle. Lightinfantry crossbowmen, andlater handgunners, were

usually deployed asskirmishers in front of thevanguard of the main force,engaging the enemy toprovide time for the mainheavy infantry force todeploy from column tosquare.Oncethephalanxwasin position, the light infantryusually retreated between thefiles and formed in the rearwheretheyactedasflankandrear protection. Also, by the

beginning of the sixteenthcentury, the Swiss stationedwithin the phalanx specialshocktroopsarmedwithtwo-handedswords,morningstars(maces topped with a bristleof long, sharp spikes) andLucerne hammers (polearmssimilar to the halberd, butwithathree-prongedhammerforthestrikingareainsteadofan axe blade). Their missionwas to rush out of the pike

wallandengagetheenemyinclosequarterscombat.As the Swiss gained more

experience in raisingconscriptarmies,andasthesearmies grew in size andtactical complexity, strictregulations were introducedgoverning military service.By the mid-1400s threedifferentkindsoftroopswerein existence: the Auszug orelite forces, composed of

mostly unmarried menbetween the ages of eighteenand thirty; the Landwehr, orprimary combat force,composedofmenwillingandabletoleavehomeiftheneedarose; and theLandsturm, orlevée en masse of all able-bodied men, a reserve forcecalled to arms only in anemergency. The Swiss werealso the first army of theperiod to repair damaged

weaponsandarmourandtakeresponsibility over soldierswounded in battle and theirwidows and children. By1500 the professionalism ofthe Swiss army wasunsurpassedand‘freegroups’of Swiss troops foundthemselves a wantedcommodityasmercenaries inforeignarmies.

HeavyInfantry

versusHeavyCavalry:TheBattlesofMorgarten,LaupenandSempachAsearlyas1315atthebattleof Morgarten, the Swissdemonstrated the ability oftheir well-trained heavyinfantry militia to defendtheir homeland against theheavy cavalry of theirAustrian neighbours. For

more than twenty years thetensions between the Swissforest canton of Schwyz andthe Austrian Habsburgsstewed as the Austrianmonarchy attempted to bringthe region under Habsburghegemony. When the holyRoman emperor Henry VIIdied in 1314, the citizens ofthe canton of Schwyzdeclared their support for theBavarian candidate, forcing

Duke Leopold of Austria toassemblea feudalarmy fromHabsburg lands in Swabiaand friendly Swiss cities. InNovember 1315 Leopoldprepared to march into thehighforestcantonofSchwyzand squash the growingrebellion before it spread tootherareasofthecountry.ThehostthatDukeLeopold

assembled at Zug wascomposed of between 2,000

and 3,000 men altogether,including perhaps 1,500mountedknightsandanequalnumber of squires, lightinfantry crossbowmen andlevied unarticulated heavyinfantry. Confident in theabilityofthissizablearmytodealwiththepeasantuprisingin the upland valley ofSchwyz, Leopold placed hisarmy in columns andmarched south down the

eastern shore ofLakeAegeritowards the city of Schwyz(Map 6.2(a)). This route ranthrough a narrow passbetween steepmountains andthe lake itself, presenting anexcellent place for anambush.Knowing theAustrianroute

in advance, the Schwyzcommander WernerStauffachermarchedanarmyof between 2,000 and 4,000

men (mostlyhalberdierswitha few crossbowmen) to aridgeaboveLakeAegeri thatoverlooked the narrowmountain road below. Theroad itself snaked between asteep hillside that led to theridgeandasteepbankwhichledtothelakebelow.Tobestexploit the terrain,Stauffacher sent a smalldetachment of engineers tothe road to hastily build a

timberandrockwall.Hethenreinforcedthisblockingforcewith his light infantrycrossbowmen, stationingthem behind the makeshiftobstacle in order to stop theAustrian heavy cavalry fromquickly overrunning thedefensive position. Afterblocking the mountain road,the Swiss commander hidmostofhismen inashallowravine atop the ridge until

Leopold’s vanguard ofAustrian heavy cavalryappeared.Stopped by the timber and

rock wall, the Austrianvanguardbegan topileup asthe rest of the columnmarched and trotted forward.Aware of his precariousposition but believing hefaced only a small delayingforce, Leopold ordered theknightsinthefrontbatailleto

dismount and attack theSwiss position and removetheobstacle(Map6.2(b)).Asthe defending crossbowmenfended off the approachingdismounted knights frombehind the wall, the mainbody of Swiss attacked fromthe ridgeline. At firstthrowing rocks and rollingtree trunks down the slope,theSwiss followedupwithasudden and violent infantry

attack. The Swiss phalanxmoved out of the ravine andacross the edge of the ridge,then descended withgathering momentum on thefirst division of the Austriancolumn trapped by theextreme terrain and thedensity of its own army onthe road below (Map 6.2(c)).Moments later, the Swisshalberdiers were inside theranks of the enemy cavalry,

dismembering bodies andkilling horse and dismountedknightalike(Map6.2(d)).

Map6.2 TheBattleof

Morgarten,1315.(a)PhaseI:An

AustrianarmyunderDukeLeopoldadvancesalongtheshoreof

LakeAegeri(1)toputdownapeasantuprisinginSchwyz.ASchwyzarmycommandedbyWernerStauffacher

waitsinambush,aforceofcrossbowmendeployedbehinda

makeshiftwalloftimberandstone(2)blockingthenarrowroad,and

anotherofhalberdiersinashallowravineatoptheridgeline(3)lookingdownthesteepslopetowardstheapproachingenemy.(b)PhaseII:Leopoldordershisvanguardto

dismount(1),reducetheblockadeandkillthedefenders.TheSchwyzcrossbowmenopenfireonthe

advancingAustrians(2)astheremainderofLeopold’smenbegintobunchuponthenarrowpath(3).Highabovethecongestedcolumn,Stauffacher’smenrollbouldersandtreetrunksdownthesteepslopeintotheAustrians(4).(c)PhaseIII:TheSwissphalanxemergesfromthe

ravineandadvancesdowntheslope(1),gainingmomentumastheychargetheleadAustriandivision(2).TheAustriancolumnbecomesevenmorecompressedasthepressurefromtherearunitsincreases(3).(d)PhaseIV:TheSwissinfantryfighttheirwayintothemidstoftheAustrianranksandbeginslaughteringbothmanand

beastwiththeirhalberds(1).Leopoldisforcedtofighthiswaythroughhisowntroopstoescape(2).(e)PhaseV:TheSwisshalberdiersbegintocuttheirwaythroughtheremainingAustriantroops,manyofwhomaredrivenintothelakeanddrown.TheSwisstakenoprisonersintheaction,helpingtoestablishareputationfor

ferocityinbattle.

The Swiss heavy infantryhacked and hewed their waythrough the Austrianvanguard, then began

working their way down thecongestedcolumn toward thesecond bataille whereLeopoldhimselfcommanded.Unable to push past thetimber wall, the duke wasforced to literally fightthrough his own knights andinfantrytoescapethetrap.Asthe battle raged,manyof theAustrianswereforcedoff theroadanddrownedinthelakebelow (Map 6.2(e)). Leopold

escaped,butperhaps1,500ofhis knights and infantrymendied. Chronicling the battlesome twenty-five years later,themonkJohnofWinterthurwrites: ‘It was not a battle,but a mere butcher of DukeLeopold’s men; for themountainfolkslewthemlikesheepintheshambles:noonegaveanyquarter,buttheycutdownall,withoutdistinction,until there were none left to

kill.’From the battle of

Morgartenonward, theSwisswould pride themselves intheir battlefield brutality.Breaking with the longmedieval tradition ofransomingenemyknights,theSwiss offered no quarter totheir foes on the battlefieldandanyprisoners takenwerekilledlater.Theresultof thisdeliberate psychological

warfarewasa reputation thatstruck terror into theirenemies, adding to themystique of this emergingtacticalsystem.The battle of Morgarten

marks the return of well-articulated heavy infantry towestern Europe after athousand-yearabsence.Aidedby terrain, tactical surpriseandparity in numbers,Swissheavy infantry took the

offensive and destroyed acombined-arms feudal armywithout the use of heavycavalry. And though thevictory had as much to dowith Leopold’s stupidity inallowing himself to beambushed as it did withexcellence in Swiss tactics,thebattledidillustratewhatawell-disciplined andmotivated peasant infantrylevy could do against the

flowerofAustrianchivalry.The Swiss victory at

Morgarten established thethreeforestcantons(Schwyz,Uri and Unterwalden) as amilitary confederation to bereckoned with. Within ageneration after Morgarten,the rebellion against theHabsburgs developed into aunion of city republics andrural republics, spreadingdown into the lowlands.

These forest cantons enteredinto an alliancewith the cityofLucerne in1319, resultingin the origins of a Swissconfederation capable ofchallenging foreignhegemony.Overthenextfewdecades,Swisssuccessonthebattlefield stimulated thecause for Swiss nationalism,spurring the alliance’senemiestoopenaggression.When in 1339 the city of

Bern, the largest and mostimportant urban communitysouthoftheRhine,threatenedan alliance with the SwissConfederation, Bern’senemies to the west inBurgundy marched eastwardand laid siege to the city ofLaupen, 10 miles south-westof Bern. The Burgundianstook advantage of years ofcivil wars to extend theirboundaries at the expense of

the Swiss, going so far as tosupportSwisslordsunwillingto join the growingconfederation. Under thecommandofCountGerardofVallangin, the besiegingBurgundian armywas joinedbylocallordsandtheirlevies,swelling to perhaps 12,000infantry and 1,000 mountedknights.Dismayedat the strengthof

this coalition, the Council of

Bernaskedtheforestcantonsforaid,offeringthembothanalliance and monetarysubsidies. Unwilling totolerate a strong Burgundianpresence inSwissaffairs, theforestcantonsjoinedwiththeBernesemilitiaand,usingthecover of the forest, movedundetected to a spot veryclose to Laupen. On theafternoon of 21 June, theSwiss army assumed a

defensive position on theBramberg, a grassy hill 2mileseastofthebesiegedcity(Map6.3(a)).The Swiss force was

commanded by anexperienced Bernese knightnamed Rudolf of Erlach andnumbered 6,000 men,including1,000menfromtheforest cantons. Believing theenemywould sooner or laterhave tobreak their siege and

challenge an army at theirbacks, Erlach arrayed 1,000halberdiers from the forestcantons on the left, justoutside the skirts of thewoods along the crest of thegentler slope of theBramberg. The Swiss centreconsisted of three 900-manBernese phalanxes armedwith long infantry pikes,unusual weapons for Swissmilitia at this early date.

These three battle squareswerearrayed30menwideby30 men deep. On the right,Erlach placed a largerBernese battle square 2,000strong, arrayed 50menwideby 40 men deep. Finally,Erlach deployed a smallcontingent of light infantrycrossbowmen, supplementedby a few medievalhandgunners, in front of thephalanxes and in the gaps

between the battle squares.To distinguish themselvesfrom their enemy on thebattlefield, the Swiss sewedwhite crosses on theirclothing, an emblem lateradopted as the nationalsymbol.CountGerardwassurprised

by the sudden appearance oftheSwissreliefarmy,butwasgrantedtimetoarrayhisownnumerically superior forces

when the Swiss took adefensive position on theBramberg. He placed all ofhis 1,000 heavy cavalry onhis own right wing oppositethe confederate halberdiers,intending to charge up thegentler slope of the hill andthen turn the Swiss flankinward. The count thenplaced his 12,000 heavyinfantry in the centre andright wings. Anchoring the

centre were a cadre of well-equippedheavyinfantryfromthecoalitioncityofFreiburg,while the left was occupiedwith a large contingent ofunarticulated infantrydescribed by contemporarychroniclers as ‘raw and ill-armedbands’.Thebattle ofLaupenbegan

late in the afternoon whenCount Gerard ordered ageneral assault up the

Bramberg toward the Swissposition. As the mass ofcoalitioncavalryand infantryclimbed the hill, Erlachordered his light infantryforward to meet the attackwith bolts and shot (Map6.3(b)). After some initialskirmishing, the Swisscrossbowmen andhandgunners filtered backthrough their heavy infantrysquares.As the light infantry

made its way to the back ofthe phalanxes, several ranksofthecentreBernesephalanxbroke and ran for theprotection of the woods.Undeterred, Erlach orderedhis entire army downhill toengage the enemy (Map6.3(c)).

Map6.3 TheBattleofLaupen,1339.(a)PhaseI:TheSwissarmy

deploysalongthecrestoftheBramberg,justeastofLaupen(1).Halberdiersfromtheforestcantonsareontheleft,threeBernesepike

squaresinthecentre,andamuchlargersquareofBerneseinfantryisontheright,screenedbyandinterspersedwithlightinfantry

crossbowmenandafewhandgunners(2).TheBurgundiansinterrupttheir

siegeofthetownandarraythemselvesoppositetheenemyreliefforceonthelowhill(3).Gerardordersageneraladvance(4).(b)

PhaseII:TheSwisscrossbowmenandhandgunnersopenfireonthe

advancingtroops(1)andthenfallbackthroughtheirinfantrysquares(2),re-formingtotherearoftheirphalanxes.SeveralranksofBerneseinfantrybreakandrunforthewoods

totherear(3).(c)PhaseIII:ErlachorderstheSwissinfantrytocharge(1),andthecoalitionandFreiburgerinfantryscatter(2).OntheSwissleft,thecharginghalberdiers(3)collidewiththeoncomingheavycavalry.Unliketheinfantry,thehorsemenwithdrawingoodorderandre-form(4).(d)PhaseIV:TheBurgundianheavycavalrychargethehalberdiers(1),whoquicklyformahedgehog(2)againsttheassault;however,the

short-haftedhalberdsfailtoprovidemuchprotectionagainsttheknights.Erlachordershisinfantrysquarestowheellefttoassisttheirbeleagueredcomrades(3),catchingtheenemyin

theflankandrear.(e)PhaseV:TheSwisscharge(1)shatterstheenemycavalry.Manyarekilledandthe

survivorsscattered(2).Swisslossesarelightandarealmostentirelyfromamongtheranksofthehalberdierson

theleft.

The Swiss halberdiers fromthe forest cantons clashedhead-on with the massedheavycavalrydirectlytotheirfront. Though the Swissinfantry’s downhill charge

shattered the Freiburger andcoalition infantry in thecentre and on the left, thewell-trained Burgundianfeudal heavy cavalry on therightfellback,re-formedandcounter-attacked the forestcanton halberdiers, strikingthe square’s front, flank andrear. Under attack, thehalberdiershaltedandformeda hedgehog, lowering theirweapons and facing their

formation in all fourdirections to repel repeatedcharges by feudal cavalry(Map 6.3(d)). But the short-hafted Swiss halberd, idealforinflictinghorriblewoundsagainstenemyfootandhorseduring theoffensive,wasnotasefficientasthelong-haftedpike in keeping enemycavalry at bay when in adefensiveformation.Seeing the beleaguered

halberdiers, Erlach orderedhis victorious Bernesephalanxes to wheel 90degrees and strike the heavycavalry attacking the forestcantonunitsontheSwissleft,catchingtheenemyhorsemenin the flank and rear withcomplete surprise andshattering the enemy horse(Map 6.3(e)). And thoughcasualties were generallylight where infantry clashed,

the flank attack againstcoalition cavalry causedheavy casualties, withperhaps as many as 1,500noblesandcommonersdying.Three counts and eightybarons and bannerets werekilled, along with severalhundredoftheirmen-atarms.Thevictorsdisplayedtwenty-seven feudal banners andseventy crested helms astrophies when they returned

home the next day. Swisscasualtiesweremoderate andalmost entirely among themenoftheforestcantons.At the battle of Laupen,

Swiss militia demonstratedthat it could win a battleunder less favourablecircumstances than the battleofMorgarten, specifically onan open field againstunarticulated heavy infantrysupported by feudal cavalry.

The Swiss victory at Laupenalso illustrated the tacticalmobility and capacity of thebattle square to defendagainst all-round attacks,even when the defenderswere wielding short-haftedhalberds.Havingbegunasadefensive

alliance between three forestcantons in 1307, the SwissConfederation had, by 1386,grown into a formal political

andmilitaryalliancedesignedto safeguard Swiss nationalindependence from intrusionby the house of Habsburg.The city of Lucerne joinedthe confederation in 1332,while Zurich joined in 1353,Zug andGlarus in 1352, andBern in 1353. As the SwissConfederation grew andbecamemoreconfident in itsmilitary capabilities, it beganto challenge Habsburg

possessions south of theRhine.In1386theSwisstooktheoffensiveandattackedthesmall town of Sempach,sacking Habsburg fortressesand laying to wasteagriculturalareas loyal to thelocal Habsburg lord, DukeLeopold III, nephew of theLeopold defeated atMorgarten.In the summer of 1386

Leopold raised a formidable

armyof4,000men,including2,500 feudal infantry and1,500 knights andmercenaries, and marchedintoSwitzerlandtopunishtheLucerners and regain his lostterritory. He marched onSempach and surrounded thecity, entrapping its garrison,then continued further alongthe road to intercept anySwissreliefforcesmovingineast from Zurich. The

strengthoftheSwissarmyinand around Sempach wasbetween6,000and8,000,andthe vanguard marching onSempach consisted ofbetween1,500and2,000mencomposed entirely of thelevies from Lucerne. As thetwohostsmovedtowardeachother, neither army deployedadvancescouts.Aroundnoonon 9 July, lead elements oftwo armies stumbled into

eachotheronahillside road,amileandahalfnorth-eastofSempach, near the village ofHildisrieden(Map6.4(a)).Immediately after making

contact with the Austrianvanguard,theSwissdeployedfor battle on a piece of levelground halfway up theterraced slope of themountainside. Meanwhile,the Austrian army, marchingin three batailles, was strung

outincolumnwhentheirvanmadecontact.The first corpswasAustrianandcommandedby John of Ochenstein, thesecond corps by the dukehimself,andthethirddivisionwas composed of Alsatian,Swabian and hiredmercenaries under thecommand of the count ofHohenzollern.Well aware ofthe Swiss phalanx’s abilityagainst mounted attacks,

Leopold ordered the knightsof the first division todismount and fight as heavyinfantry (Map 6.4(b)). Hebelieved his heavy cavalry’slances would make excellentinfantry spears, outreachingthe enemy’s halberds, andthat their superior platearmourwouldprotectthemintheir assault against the lessprotected Swiss militiamen.The remaining two Austrian

divisions remained mountedandreadytochargetheSwissinfantry square once it hadlostcohesion.Believing the entire Swiss

army was in front of him,Duke Leopold commandedhis light infantrycrossbowmen to harass theSwiss phalanx, then orderedhisdismountedknightsupthehill to attack the weakenedSwiss battle square (Map

6.4(c)).Wielding their lancesasinfantrypikes,theAustrianknightswaded into theSwissformation.Soon,Swisslossesmounted and the phalanxbegan to collapse. As theLucerne banner fell intoAustrian hands, Leopoldprepared to order a generalcavalry charge against thedisintegratingSwisssquare.But before the Austrian

duke could order the cavalry

to the attack, the main bodyof the Swiss army appearedovertherisenear thevillage.Led by the men of Uri, theSwiss army immediatelymoved from line of columnintotheattack,smashingintothe flank of the dismountedknights (Map 6.4(d)). Thesudden assault wasdevastating. Fresh andsuperior in numbers, theSwisshalberdiershackedand

hewed into the Austrianknightswhowere themselvesbecoming exhausted afterfighting for an hour in platearmour.Watchingtheknightsof his first division beingtrampled under the Swissassault,Leopoldjumpedfromhis horse and ordered themounted and dismountedknightsofhissecondcorpstofollowhimintothefray.

Map6.4 TheBattleof

Sempach,1386.(a)PhaseI:

Marchingnorth-eastfromSempach(1),DukeLeopold’sAustrianarmyisunawareoftheapproachofaSwissforcemovingtowardshimonthe

sameroad(2).TheSwissvanguardandtheAustrians’firstdivisionspoteachotherandbegintodeploy(3).(b)PhaseII:RecognizingthethreatfromtheSwissphalanx,Leopoldordershisleaddivisiontodismount(1)anddeployslightinfantrycrossbowmen(2)tofireintotheSwissbattlesquare

tobeginchippingawayattheformation(3).(c)PhaseIII:TheSwissbattlesquarebeginstolosecohesion

(1)andLeopoldordershisdismountedknightsintothefight(2).TheAustriansinflictheavylossesontheSwiss,andLeopoldreadieshismountedknightsforacharge(3)tofinishoffthedisintegratingphalanx,

butbeforethedukecanorderhishorsemenforward,theSwissmainbodyappearsovertherisetowardsHildisrieden(4)andheadsdowntheslopetowardstheaction.(d)PhaseIV:TheSwissquicklydeployfromcolumnintobattlesquare(1)andsmashintotheflankandrearofthedismountedfirstdivision(2).Fatiguedafteranhouroffightingandfacedwithaseeminglyunstoppablemassoffreshhalberd-wieldinginfantry,theAustriansbegintorout(3).Leopoldleapsfromhishorseandordershisdivisionforwardagainstthisnewmenace(4).(e)PhaseV:BeforeLeopoldcanlaunchhiscounter-

attack,theSwisswheeltheirsquareinadevastatingassaultontheAustrianflank(1).ThoughtheAustrianknightsfightbravely,theyaregraduallyovercomebytheSwisshalberdiers(2).ThecountofHohenzollern,commandingtheAustrianreserve,panicsandordersaprecipitate

retreat(3),causingthesquiresandpagestendingtotheseconddivision’shorsestolooktotheirownsafetyand

fleeaswell,abandoningtheirmasters,includingDukeLeopold,tocertaindeathatthehandsoftheSwiss

infantry(4).

But before the counter-attackof theAustrianseconddivision could form, theattacking Swiss phalanxturned 90 degrees and strucktheAustrians(Map6.4(e)).Inthe swirling mêlée, DukeLeopold and his knightsfought well, but in the endthey were overcome byenemy halberdiers.Watchingthe disintegrating situationfrom a distance, the

commander of the Austrianreserves lost his nerve andturned and fled the field.Once the third division left,the squires and pages whoweretendingthehorsesofthesecond division also fled,abandoning those knightswho were able to disengagefrom the mêlée. Exhaustedand outnumbered, theseknightswerecutdownwherethe Swiss found them.

Austrian casualties were1,800 men, including theduke himself, three counts,five barons and sevenbannerets. Swiss losses wereabout 120 men and mostlyamongthevanguard.When the corpses of the

fallen at Sempach wereexhumed in 1898,archaeologistsdiscoveredthatalmost all of the Austriandead had been killed by

having their skulls split openby halberds. Leopold’stacticalcalculationtohavehisdismounted knights use theirlances as infantry pikesagainst Swiss heavy infantryhalberdiersproveddisastrous.If the halberd was too shortfor an effective defenceagainstenemyheavycavalry,in close quarter combat itworked murderously wellagainst the lance. At the

battleofLaupen,Swissheavyinfantry proved they couldbeat the knight on his horse,while at the battle ofSempach they proved theycouldbeathimdismountedasheavyinfantry,onfairgroundandwithnogreatdisparityinnumbers.AstheSwissexpandedtheir

confederation, they began tothreaten the power of theHabsburg dynasty. In the

spring of 1444 the Habsburgemperor Friedrich III askedthe French king Charles VIIfor assistance with thegrowing Swiss alliance.Charles dispatched a hugearmy of 40,000 men topenetrateconfederateterritorythrough Alsace, securingBasle as a bridgehead. Onreceivingnewsofaninvasionarmy, the confederate city ofBern sent a small

reconnaissanceforceof1,200mennorthwardtoobservetheFrench army.But at theBirsRiver near the small hospitalof Saint Jacob, the Swissarmy was confronted by theentireFrenchhost.Refusing to retreat, the

1,500 Swiss infantrymengrouped immediately intothree squares, levelled theirpikes and launched an attackintotheFrenchlines.Inwhat

became known as the battleof Saint Jacob-en-Birs, theSwiss squares made aprofound impression whenthey attacked aFrench army,even though they wereoutnumbered perhaps fifteento one. French cavalryassaults on the flanks of thebattle squares halted theSwiss, then the French usedtheir crossbowmen to weardown the immobile squares.

After five hours of rebuffingenemy cavalry charges, theSwiss managed to withdrawto the small hospital ofSaintJacob,whichwassurroundedby a wall high enough tooffer some protection. Thedisciplined Swiss stood theirground and, in the face ofartillery barrages andcrossbow bolts, sufferedheavycasualties.Asthewallsof the hospital were reduced

to rubble, the French footstormed the courtyard. In thebitter hand-to-hand combatthat followed, theSwiss diedto aman. Like the Spartans’defence at the battle ofThermopylae nearly twothousand years earlier, theSwiss stand at Saint Jacob-en-Birselevated the statusofthe battle square in westernEuropeanwarfare.

TheBurgundianWars:ANewCombined-ArmsSynthesisversusSwissHeavyInfantryThe reputation of the Swisstactical system was furtherenhanced in campaignsagainstthedukeofBurgundy,Charles the Bold (r. 1465–1477). Charles had operated

with impunity against theFrench crown following hisdefeat of King Louis XI ofFrance (r. 1461–1483) atMonthlhéry in 1465. AfterCharles’s follow-on victoriesat Liège (1466) andBrustem(1467),heturnedhisattentionto the Swiss on his easternfront. Here, the growingSwiss Confederationprovided the militaryopposition to his plans. In

order to weaken the Swiss,the duke of Burgundyplanned to divide andconquer, cutting a paththrough the alpine alliancewith the most modern armyhecouldassemble.To meet this objective,

Charles fielded a well-financed combined-armsarmy of 30,000 men,consisting of Burgundianheavycavalry,Flemishheavy

infantrypikemen,Italianlightinfantry crossbowmen,German arquebusiers andmounted light infantryEnglish longbowmen.Traditionally, Burgundianarmies were small, withmercenaries making up atleast30percentofanyforce.But Charles’s grandambitions required a largerfighting force, and beginningin the early 1470s, the duke

strove to create permanenttroops in mixed units(companies) of heavycavalry, heavy infantry andlight infantry archers,crossbowmen andhandgunners, supported bythe most modern artilleryavailable.Gunpowder technologies

appeared on the battlefieldsofwesternEuropesometimeinthemiddleofthethirteenth

century.Gunpowderwasfirstutilized as a weapon by theChinese prior to 1000 ce,where it was made intobombsandrockets.Thelikelyconduit of diffusion fromChina was through Islamiclands to Byzantium or toSpain, then north of thePyrenees to western Europe.References to gunpowderweaponry were included inarmouries in Lille, Lucca,

Aachen,LondonandSienainthelate1330sand1340s,andit appeared at the sieges ofTournaiin1340andCalaisin1346–1347,andperhapsevenatthebattleofCrécyin1346.The first cannon made in

Europe, in the earlyfourteenth century, werevase-shapedtubeswhichfiredhuge darts like those shotfromtheoldRomanballistae.Overtimethedartsgaveway

to round stone or metalprojectiles and the barrelsevolved into a straight tube.But over the next 150 yearsgunpowder weaponryunderwent a spectacularevolutionary process as gunsbecamelessfrequentlyforgedand more frequently cast,increasingbothreliabilityanddurability. Theseimprovements also allowedgunsmiths to make their

weapons both much largerand much smaller, with thelargestgunsbeingcapableofdestroying medieval castleand city walls, and thesmallest weapons eventuallybeing handheld by a newbreed of light infantryman,the medieval handgunner.Thoughpoorconstructionandan elementary firingmechanismmade early smallarms an unreliable weapon

system in the late medievalperiod, the light infantryhandgunner wouldincreasinglyplayaroleonthebattlefieldnexttoarchersandcrossbowmen in the finalwarsoftheperiod.As gun barrels became

longerandtheartandscienceof casting iron improved,specialized siege artillerycalled bombards began tohave a devastating effect on

medievalfortifications.Theseearly cannon were expensiveto build and operate, anddifficult to transport, and tobeeffectivetheyneededtobejust yards away from thetarget wall. Once in place,bombards fired stone shotweighing as much as 900pounds, breaching walls andreducing towers almost atwill. In 1409 the duke ofBurgundy purchased two

bombards that could hurlstonesweighingbetween700and 900 pounds. The ‘DulleGriet’ or ‘Great Bombard ofGhent’ was a forged ironcannonover16feetlongwitha25inchcalibre.Itcouldfirea stone shot weighing morethan 750 pounds. Thesecumbersome weapons couldbeaimedinoneoffiveways–byplacingafixedmountonterrain at the desired angle;

bymountingthecannononafixedaxle toprovide itsaim;by using the terrain and axletogether to aim the weapon;by using a rock or wall toadjust the aiming angle; andfinally,byaddingacalibratedaiming mechanism to themounttochangetheangleofattack.Butchanges in the fifteenth

century improved the rangeand impact power of siege

artillery. In theearly1400saprocess called ‘corning’began to be used whenmaking gunpowder, mixingbrandy, vinegar or evenhuman urine into the blackpowder to form it into tinypellets. Air flowed betweenthe pellets allowing thepowder to burn much fasterand more evenly, greatlyincreasing the power ofgunpowder weapons. By

1450 siege artillery furtherimproved when stone shotwas replaced by cast-ironballs, which had less‘windage’ (space betweenprojectile and the interior ofthe bore) and thereforeattained greater muzzlevelocity and impact energy.During this time, cannonwere made in all differentbore sizes, with little or nostandardization until the late

fifteenthcentury.Initially, gunpowder

weapons had more of animpact on sieges than theydid on the battlefield. Butwith the adoption of smallerfield artillery in the fifteenthcentury, medievalcommanders had at theirdisposal another kind ofmissile platform to menaceenemy formations. Theseguns began to appear more

frequently on the battlefield,includingmany battles undersurvey here: at Agincourt in1415, at Grandson andMurtenin1476,andatNancyin 1477. But medieval fieldartillery still suffered frombeing too largeandunwieldyto move easily on thebattlefield, and thereforeoftenbecameineffectiveaftertheinitialstagesofthebattle.True field artillery did not

makeitssuddenanddramaticappearance until the finaldecade of the fifteenthcentury, when the Frenchinvaded Italy. Here, thesenewguns,mountingnewandlightercast-bronzecannonontwo-wheeled carriages pulledby horses, gave the Frenchunprecedented tacticalmobility against enemyformations and entrenchedartillery positions. But

France’s artillery supremacyon the battlefield was soonreversedbydramaticSpanishimprovements in infantrysmall arms and tactics. As aresult, field artillery declinedinimportanceinthesixteenthcentury, except in the attackand defence of fortificationsandinnavalwarfare.To assist in the transition

fromamedieval toamodernarmy, Duke Charles

published three detailedmilitary instructions orordinances every year from1471 to 1473, standardizingthe use of uniforms, armourand weapons for each man,and grouping them underconductorsincompanieswitha designated hierarchy ofnumbered banners. By 1473these Compagniesd’ordonnance numbered 900men, based on a nine-man

lance of heavy cavalrymadeup into four squadrons, witheach squadron supported by25 men-at-arms, 25 lighthorse, 25 valets and 75mounted light infantryarchers, further supported bycontingents of 25crossbowmen, 25 pikemenand 25 handgunners, all onfoot.Unable toachieve thesenumbers with recruitment,Charles continued to employ

foreignmercenaries.After conquering Lorraine,

Duke Charles marched intoAlsaceandtookthesurrenderof the city of Grandson inFebruary1476.Hisexecutionof the garrison theresolidified Swiss opposition,andon2Marchareliefarmyof 10,000 men arrived toblock the Burgundianinvasion. Recognizing heoutnumbered the Swiss army

three toone,Charlesplanneda defensive engagement, onethat would capitalize on theconfederation’s aggressiveway of fighting. Afterlaunching two heavy cavalrycharges into the unyieldingSwiss ranks, the dukeprepared for the inevitable, aSwissheavyinfantrycounter-attack into his own centre.Employinga tactic similar tothose used at Marathon and

Cannae, Charles ordered hiscentre to pull back in thehopes of crushing theadvancingSwisssquares inadouble envelopment. Butdespitesuperiornumbers, theBurgundian duke’s men losttheir nerve and the plannedretreatofthecentrebecamearout. Pressing forward withmurderous efficiency, theSwiss mowed down the rearof the fleeing army, killing

300 invaders, and capturedthe Burgundian camp andover 400 artillery pieces.Swiss casualties were 200men.

Map6.5 TheBattleofMurten,1476.

(a)PhaseI:PausinginhissiegeofMurten,Charles

theBoldconstructsadefensive

position,theGrünhag(1),inanticipationofaSwissreliefarmy.AsthedaysdragonwithoutanysignoftheSwiss,theBurgundiandefencesarelightlymanned,asmostofthe

troopsremainincamptothewest.(b)PhaseII:TheSwissreliefforcefinallyappears,burstingfromtheforestand

headingfortheundermannedGrünhagtotheirfront.TheSwiss

screenoflightinfantryskirmishers(1)isfollowedbyanadvanceguardof

pikemen(2),amainbody(3)andrearguard(4)ofhalberdiers,andissupportedbyaforceofalliedcavalry

(5).(c)PhaseIII:TheSwissskirmishersandthefirstranksofthepikesquaresufferheavylossesastheycomeunderconcentratedfirefromtheBurgundianarchers,crossbowmen,handgunners,andlightartillery(1)astheSwissbattlesquaresmanoeuvreacrossthefield(2).ThealliedcavalryontheSwissleftpreparetoattacktheBurgundianhorsetotherightoftheGrünhag(3).(d)PhaseIV:AtimelymanoeuvrebytheSwissvanguard(1)succeedsinflankingtheGrünhagandtheBurgundiancentrebeginstobreak

(2).TheSwisshalberdiersrollforward(3),cuttingoffanypossibleescapetothesouthastheBurgundianheavycavalrybreakandflee(4)undertheassaultbythealliedhorsemen.(e)PhaseV:AstheBurgundiancentredissolvesintodesperatebandsoffugitives(1),thealliedcavalryjoinintheattack(2).TheSwissshownoquarterastheywadeintotheremnantsofCharles’sarmy,andasortiebytheMurten

garrisonstrikestheBurgundianforceintherear,contributingtothe

ensuingmassacre.

Despite the rout atGrandson,Charlesquicklyre-formedhisarmyandresumedhis invasion of confederateterritory. It took severalmonths to piece together hisartillery train, but with thiscompleted, Charles movedhis army and on 9 June laidsiege to the walled city ofMurten, recently reinforcedbyagarrisonof500Bernesemen and, ironically, the

majority of the capturedBurgundian artillery. Overthe next week, the capturedartillery had a devastatingeffect on the Burgundianassaults, but on 17 June,Charles ordered his heavybombards to be broughtforward, and the besiegerssuccessfully breached thesouthern walls. But even aneight-hour infantry assaultagainst the damaged walls

could not overwhelm theSwiss defenders, and on 19June, Charles halted theattacks and turned hisattention to the east,where alarge Swiss army wasexpected to emerge in reliefofMurten.

Map6.6 TheBattleofNancy,1477.

(a)PhaseI:DukeCharlestheBoldofBurgundydeployshissmallarmyinadefensive

positionbehindashallowstreamsouthofNancy(1),hisleftflankanchoredontheMeurthe,andhisrightonheavilywooded

terrain.TheSwissarmy’smainbodyandrearguardapproachthe

Burgundianfront(2),fixingCharles’sattention,whiletheadvanceguard

advancesundetectedthroughthetreesontheSwissleft(3).(b)PhaseII:ThesuddenappearanceofaSwisssquarefromthewoodsontheirflank(1)takestheBurgundiansbysurprise.

Unabletoreorientthemselvestomeettheferociousassault,therightflankbeginstorollup(2).Atthesametime,theSwissmainbodysmashesintoCharles’scentre(3),quicklyoverrunningtheoutnumberedBurgundians(4).(c)PhaseIII:Overwhelmedbythetwo-prongedattack(1)andgreatlyoutnumbered,theBurgundianarmyisshattered(2).DukeCharleshimselfisfelledbyaSwisshalberdierinthemidstofthe

slaughter(3).

CharlestheBoldorderedhistroops to prepare for the

defensive, and construct aditch and palisadeentrenchment known as theGrünhag, manned by lightinfantry and artillery (Map6.5(a)).Heintendedtousehisbowmen, handgunners andfield artillery to create akilling field, then exploit thechaos with his flankingcavalry. But 21 June passedwithout the arrival of theSwiss, forcing Charles to

standdownhisarmy.Finally,on 22 June, a large Swissrelief force of 25,000 menexploded out of the woodsand into the undermannedBurgundian defences (Map6.5(b)). At the time of theSwissarrival,only2,000lightinfantry manned theBurgundian centre, with1,200 heavy cavalry insupport.The rest of thedukeof Burgundy’s troops were

eating in the camp somedistanceaway.Advancing from the north-

east through theBirchenwaldforest, the Swiss army wasconcealed until itwas only amile away from theBurgundian lines. The Swissattacked from a column ofthree battle squares,supported by a vanguard of5,000 light infantryskirmishers, protected by a

contingent of 1,200 heavycavalry on the left. Behindthe van, 12,000 Swiss heavyinfantry made up the centresquare, followed by another7,000 heavy infantry in therear.The threeSwisssquaresmarched in echelon,with thecentre and rear squares setback and to the left of thevanguard.Behind the Grünhag, the

Burgundian men-at-arms

(includingmercenaryEnglishlongbowmen)were ready fortheimpendingattack,andthefirst wave of the Swissvanguard suffered heavycasualties from concentratedcrossbow, longbow and lightartilleryfire(Map6.5(c)).Foramoment, themomentumofthe initial Swiss assault waschecked, but shrewdmanoeuvring by part of theSwiss vanguard allowed the

attackers to bypass theearthworks and turn theenemy’s flank. With theGrünhag in friendly hands,the centre and rear squaressurged westwards to cut offanyBurgundianretreat tothesouth(Map6.5(d)).MeanwhileontheSwissleft

flank, the 1,200 allied heavycavalry scattered theBurgundian horse, thengallopedontoattackthenow

fleeing Burgundian centre.TherewasnoescaperouteforCharles’s new model army,and the Swiss, pledging noquarter, took no prisoners(Map6.5(e)).A timely sortieby the Swiss garrison inMurten aggravated theBurgundiansituation,strikingthe broken army in the rear.In the ensuing massacre, theduke lost 12,000 men, cutdown or drowned in nearby

Lake Murten. Swisscasualties were light, only410 men. The Burgundiansalso lost their artillery park,with the Swiss profiting bytheacquisitionofanother200guns.CharlestheBold’sthirdand

final battle against the Swisstook place at Nancy inJanuary 1477. Driven out ofSwitzerland in theautumnof1476, the duke took up a

strong defensive positionbehind a shallow streamsouth of the city of Nancy,the capital of Lorraine, onceagain blocking the likelyangle of attack with hisartillery(Map6.6(a)).Buthisarmy was by now onlyaround 12,000 men. Thesudden appearance of themain Swiss force of 20,000from the woods took theBurgundiansbysurprise,with

thevancirclingtotheleftandattacking the Burgundianflank (Map 6.6(b)). In a co-ordinated strike, the Swissfell on Charles’s troops,wielding their pikes andhalberds. Attacked on twosides by overwhelmingnumbers, 7,000 Burgundianswerekilled,includingCharleshimself, his head split openby a halberd stroke (Map6.6(c)). In less than a year,

the Swiss defeated threeBurgundian armies. Thebattle of Nancy ended thepower of Burgundy forever,allowing Charles’s othernemesis, King Louis XI ofFrance, to finally incorporatethe duchy and its innovativemilitary institutions into hiskingdom.Despite a relatively

balanced combined-armstactical system, the

Burgundian duke’s newmodel army was unable to‘match the discipline of theSwiss or cope with the élanof their assaults’. Charles’sfailure stemmed from takingon the best heavy infantry inEurope. Swiss militia armieswere large and quicklymustered, but they could notstay in the field for long.Charles’s aggressive strategyof seeking battle brought his

armies into conflict with amotivated enemy fighting toprotect its homeland.Nevertheless,hiscombinationof horse, foot and artillerywas to become a model forEuropeanarmiesforcenturiestocome.After the death of Charles

the Bold at Nancy in 1477,the Swiss acquired areputation for invincibilitythat lasted until the battle of

Marignano in 1515. Theycreated a heavy infantryweaponsystem that coulddomore than passively resistcavalry charges or engage insieges. Disciplined andrelativelywellarticulated,theSwiss battle square wascapable of offensivemanoeuvre and all-rounddefence. And like Englishlight infantry longbowmen,Swiss heavy infantry found

themselves a wantedcommodityonthebattlefieldsof Europe, with Swissmercenaries soon employedas mercenaries in armies alloverthecontinent.Impressedwiththesuccessof theSwissbattle square in the warsagainst Burgundy, Louis XIadded 6,000 Swissmercenaries armed withhalberd and pike to his ownarmy in 1479, and in 1497 a

cadreof100Swisselitewereofficially organized as theFrench king’s personalbodyguard, the Garde desCent Suisses. In Italy theSwisshiredthemselvesouttoItalian mercenarycommanders or condottieri(from the Italian termcondotta, the contractnegotiated between Italiancity-states and militaryentrepreneurs). Moreover,

this innovation in heavyinfantry bred imitation, andother nations developed theirown pikemen modelled onthe Swiss. The Germans hadthe most success with theirLandsknechts, who alsofoughtabroadasmercenaries.Bythecloseofthemedieval

period, the Swiss method offightingwouldbediffused toall of western Europe.Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–

1527), writing in the early1520s, found that all infantryimitated the Swiss. By themiddle of the sixteenthcentury, French, Spanish,German and Italian armiesusedwhathasbeendescribedas theSwisswayofwarfare,even if they adopted theSwiss phalanx in modifiedform. Pikemen, increasinglysupported by light infantryhandgunners, remained a

persistent tactical entity onEuropean battlefields wellintotheearlymodernperiod.

CHAPTER7

THE‘MILITARYREVOLUTION’ANDEARLYMODERN

WARFARE

FromMedievaltoEarlyModernWarfare:The

MilitaryRevolutionoftheSixteenthCenturyWarfare in westerncivilization was transformedin the sixteenth century. Theintroduction of newer, morepowerful firearms with theability to penetrate anyarmour in common useradically altered infantry andcavalry tactics. New infantry

and cavalry tactics broughtwiththemchangesinmilitaryorganization, and a newemphasis on order anddiscipline and the collectivetraining needed to bring itabout. Careful training wasessential if an infantry battlesquarewasnottodisintegrateinto a stumbling mass ofindividuals,unable to resistadetermined onslaught ofenemylance,pikeorshot.

To gain the knowledgenecessary for this greaterbattlefield articulation, earlymodern tacticians andcommandersmined the long-neglectedtreatisesofclassicalRomanandGreek‘professorsof tactics’, most notablyAelian,VegetiusandLeo.Ofthethree,Vegetius’treatiseofRoman military wisdom wasthe most widely read andavailable in the sixteenth

century,havingbeenreadforcenturies. His work earned anew lease of life withMachiavelli’s publication ofThe Art of War in 1521,which leaned heavily on thefourth-centuryRomanauthor.Aelian’stranslationintoLatinin 1550 added a newdimension to the study ofRoman tactics, for unlikeVegetius, Aelian’s work waswritten during the reign of

Trajan at the height of thePax Romana and focused onthe infantry tactics thatmadethe Roman army the mostwell-articulated in thehistoryof pre-gunpowder westerncivilization. Inspired byclassical tactical doctrinesand armed with new martialtechnologies, battlefieldcommanders initiated a‘military revolution’ in theearlysixteenthcentury.

Centraltothesuccessofthis‘military revolution’ was thewidespreadavailabilityofthearquebusand themusket, thefirst effective and reliableinfantry firearms used inlarge numbers. In thefifteenth century, thematchlock ignition devicewasinventedtomakeignitionmore reliable and aimingmore accurate. With amatchlock, the handgunner

pulled the trigger, raising thelowerendoftheserpentineorcock while the upper endholding the match in itsclamp was lowered into thepan.This featureallowed thehandgunner to lookwherehewas pointing while firing.Stocks were shortened andfiredfromtheshoulderratherthan the breast, giving thegunnerabetterlineofsighttohis target.Butbecauseof the

open pan exposed to theelements, matchlocksfunctioned only in calm anddryweather,andthenecessityof having the matchsmouldering before andduring combat createdunusual battlefield hazards,compromising nightoperations and threateningfriendlypowdersupplies.In the early sixteenth

century a new mechanical

ignitiondevicewas invented,calledawheellock.Thiswasa vast improvement over thematchlockbecauseitreplacedthe smouldering match withanignitionsystemthatstruckpyriteor flintagainst steel toproduce a spark that ignitedthe priming powder in thepan. This unprecedentedreliability also allowed forone-handed firing, makingthe wheel lock pistol the

preferred weapon of cavalryand special units after the1520s. But the expense anddelicate construction of thewheel lock made itimpractical for general issue,and the matchlock arquebuscontinued to be the primaryinfantry weapon in thesixteenthcentury.The matchlock arquebus

was a muzzle-loading,smooth-bore gun that was 4

feet in length, weighedbetween 9 and 15 pounds,andfiredaleadballweighingless than an ounce at amuzzlevelocityofabout800feetpersecond.Thearquebusnowdeliveredamuchheavierpunchatcloserangethanthelongbow, though the bowremained superior in rate offire for another 350 years,until the invention of therepeating rifle in the

nineteenth century. But thearquebus was limited by itsrelatively low power ofpenetration at longer ranges,forcing gunsmiths to developthemusket,aheavierweaponwith improved ballisticproperties.The Spanish musket, first

usedintheItalianWarsinthe1530sasadefensivepositionweapon, was also amatchlock and smooth-bore,

but was 6 feet in length andweighed about 20 pounds. Itwas a crew-served weaponthatfireda2ounceleadball,andhadabarrelsoheavythatit required a barrel rest forfiring. Though the musket’sincreased powder improvedthe lead ball’s velocity, itseffective range still remainedwell under 200 yards. Boththe arquebus and the musketrequired a few minutes to

reload (two shots in threeminutes was consideredexceptionally good by the1570s), and accuracy was sopoor that the typicalmarksman could not reliablyhit a man-sized target atranges above 75 yards. Still,the arquebus and musketcould penetrate any practicalthickness of armour on thebattlefield, making lightinfantry firepower an

increasingly important factorinearlymodernwarfare.

TheItalianWarsandtheRiseoftheSpanishTercioBy the last decades of thefifteenth century, Europeantactical systems werebecoming very specialized.TheEnglishdemonstratedthevalueoflightinfantryarcherson thebattlefieldsofwestern

Europe, and though theyalone had effectivelongbowmen, all armiesintegrated crossbowmen andhandgunners into theirtactical mix. Heavy infantrywas also experiencing arenaissance with the rise ofthe well-articulated Swissbattle square, while itsimitators were beginning todiffuse to other Europeanarmies. In theMediterranean

basin, Spanish and Italiancommanders reintroducedinfantrywhousedswordsandshields in a mannerreminiscent of the Romanlegionaryatwar.Still,despiteregional tacticalspecialization, all Europeanarmies had one thing incommon–theplate-armouredheavy cavalryman remainedthe fundamental weaponsystem of late medieval

warfare,whethermounted ordismountedforbattle.But the increased use of

foreign mercenaries withinnational armies alsoaccelerated tactical synthesis,as regional weapon systemsand tactical perspectivesrubbed shoulders with oneanother on the battlefields ofEuropeaseitherfriendorfoe.Though this so-called‘military revolution’ was

actually an evolution takingthe duration of the earlymodern period to complete,by the beginning of thesixteenth century newtechnologies and tacticswerebecoming more common.Over the course of thesixteenth century a newcombined-arms tacticalsynthesis emerged, marryingthenew trends ingunpowdertechnologies with increased

co-operationbetweeninfantryandcavalry.The mixing of these

regionalweapon systemsandtactical perspectives was afeature of the longinternationalconflictbetweenFrance and regional powersin Italy known as the ItalianWars(1494–1559)–seeMap7.1.Theoriginof thesewarslay in thehereditaryclaimofthe French kingCharlesVIII

(r. 1483–1498) to thekingdom of Naples. In theautumn of 1494 Charlescrossed the Alps with anarmy of 25,000 men andinvaded theItalianpeninsula.Allied with Lodovico SforzaofMilan,theFrenchkingmetlittle opposition as hemarched south, routing theMedici from Florence,advancing on Rome, andfinally marching into Naples

and expelling the Spanishadministrationthere.Charles used his modern

professional army and state-of-the-art field and siegeartillery, mounted oncarriages for greater tacticaland strategic mobility, tosmash all opposition.Unaccustomed to thisaggressive style of warfare,theItaliancondottieri left thefield of battle and withdrew

behind the traditional safetyof city and castlewalls, onlyto have Charles’s modernartillery reduce the medievalwalls in a few hours. ButFrench dominance in Italyeventually failed because ofits excessive reliance onSwiss pikemen, heavycavalry and siege guns.Though possessing a limitedcombined-arms tacticalsystem, the French army did

not adapt fast enough to thechanging technologies andtacticsof theperiod. In earlymodern warfare, the armywilling to experiment withhandguns as a supplement toheavy infantry pikemenwouldwintheday.TheemergenceofFrancein

the beginning of the ItalianWars as the dominantpolitical and military powerin western Europe forced its

neighbours to take action. In1495aSpanisharmyenteredsouthern Italy to expel theFrench, only to suffer adecisivedefeatatthebattleofSeminara at the hands of theduke of Nemours. Followingthis defeat, theSpanish armywas modernized bystrengthening its heavycavalry, by hiring Germanheavy infantry Landsknechtsand, most importantly, by

adding companies of lightinfantry equipped witharquebus and musket. TheSpanish improved on theshock and defensivecapabilities of the battlesquare by combiningswordsmenwith thepikemenandhalberdiers,so thatwhentheir infantry met enemypikemen,theswordsmenwonthebattlebygettingundertheenemypikes,oftenbyraising

themontheirshieldsandthenengaging with edgedweapons.

Map7.1 TheItalianWars.

The Spanish commanderGonsalvodeCordova,knownas ‘El Gran Capitan’ to hisfollowers, avengedhisdefeatat Seminara by taking themeasure of the duke ofNemours again, this time atthe battle of Cerignola inApril 1503. The Spanisharmy continued to evolvewith the introduction around1505 of the colunela, theforerunner to the modern

battalion. This consisted of1,000 to 1,250 men (mixedpikemen, halberdiers,arquebusiers and sword-and-buckler men) organized intofive companies. It was acombined-arms tacticalsystem integrated into onebattle square under thecommand of a cabo decolunela(chiefofcolumn),orcolonel.In the colunelas, the

pikemen and halberdiersformed a square witharquebusiers massed on itsflanks in formationsasmanyas sixteen ranks deep. Thearquebusier at the head ofeach file practised an earlyform of the countermarch,firing his weapon and thenretiring to the rearof the fileand reloading as he workedhis way up the file to fireagain. Unfortunately, lack of

co-ordination betweengunners and the constantmoving within the ranksmade concentration of volleyfire impossible, while theearlyfirearm’sshortrange,itsslow rate of fire, and thevulnerability of earlyhandgunners to enemy shockcavalry and heavy infantryexacerbated the light infantrygunner’sproblem.ThebattleofCerignolawas

ahallmarkbattleinacenturywhere tacticians searched fora combined-arms synthesisthat could win victories onthebattlefield.Thetwomajorpowersoftheera,FranceandSpain, experimented withnew martial technologies,tactical formations and fieldfortifications designed tomitigate the effects ofartillery. This penchant forexperimentation can be seen

in the various outcomes ofmajor battles during the firstthree decades of the ItalianWars. In 1512 the Spanishsufferedadefeatat thebattleofRavenna,adefeatthatmayhavecausedthemtoabandonthe sword and buckler infavour of an infantry forceequipped entirely withpikemenandhandgunners.ASpanish victory in 1513 atMotta was the result of this

increased light infantryfirepower, though old shocktactics,specificallya‘pushofthepike’,wonthedayfortheSpanish at Novara later thatyear. French artillerydominated the battlefield atMarignano in 1515, openingup the Spanish squares forFrenchcavalry toexploit.Tocounter the superior Frenchartillery, the Spanishincreasingly took up position

behindfieldfortificationsandrelied on greater missile fireto carry the day. This tacticensuredvictoryatBicocca in1522, when some 3,000enemySwisswereshotdowninfrontoftheSpanishlines.After Bicocca, the French

also began to rely ondefensiveearthworks,butthistactic backfired at the battleofPavia in 1525.The ItalianWars had entered a new

phaseknowntohistoryastheFranco-Habsburg Wars(1521–1559),andtheelectionof Charles V, duke ofBurgundy, kingofSpain andarchduke of Austria as holyRoman emperor in 1519made the Habsburg ruler thestrongestmonarch inEurope.His territories surroundedFrance, whose own king,Francis I (r. 1515–1547),declaredwaronthenewholy

Roman emperor, choosing,like his predecessors,northern Italy as hisbattleground.FollowingtheFrenchdefeat

at Bicocca in 1522, theFrench position in Italycollapsed. Francis retookMilaninlate1524,thenwenton to besiege Pavia and its5,000-man garrison inOctoberwith a Franco-Swissarmy of 28,000 infantry,

6,000 cavalry and 53 cannon(Map 7.2(a)).But the Frenchsiege was weakened by thedetachment of a column toattack Naples and thedesertion of some 6,000Swissinfantry.Animperialistrelief force of 23,000German, Spanish and Italiantroops and 17 guns arrivedandimmediatelysetupcampacross from their enemy’sfortified position, further

compounding Francis’sproblems.Butthereliefarmy,under the command ofFerdinando Francescod’Avalos, was also undersome stress, threateningmutiny because of lack ofpay. Ferdinando realized heneeded to attack before hisarmy evaporated. Notwanting tohavehismenandhorses shot to pieces in afutile assault against the

French entrenchment,Ferdinando decided to pullhisadversaryfrombehindthesafety of his own defencesand attempt an audaciousturningmovement.During the stormy night of

24 February, Ferdinandomarchedhisarmynorthalongthe eastern side of theVernaculaBrook,crossedthewaterwayandhadhissappersmake three breaches through

the walls of the enclosedMirabelloPark (Map 7.2(b)).Theimperialistsfiledthroughthe holes and drew up in aline of battle as dawn brokeon 25 February. Ferdinandoplaced his infantryarquebusiers on the flanks,his pikemen and cavalry inthe centre, and awaited theinevitable counter-attack.French scouts alerted theking, who ordered his army

into the park. First to arrivewere some 2,000 cavalryaccompanied by small fieldartillery, setting up acrossfrom the imperialist left.Behind them advanced 5,000mercenaryLandsknechts in alargebattlesquare,supportedby additional Swiss heavyinfantry, both of whomdeployedinthecentre.

Map7.2 TheBattleofPavia,1525.(a)PhaseI:FrancisI’sFrencharmyissituatedinitstrenchesandcamps(1)surroundingthecityofPaviaanditsimperialgarrison,aswellasintheparkofMirabello(2).Animperialarmy,commandedbyFerdinandod’Avalos,arrivestoconfrontthe

Frenchandentrenchesontheeastern

sideoftheVernaculaBrook(3).(b)PhaseII:Ferdinandodecideshisbest

chanceforvictoryistodrawFrancis’sarmyoutoftheirtrenches.Theimperialarmysetsoutduringanight-timestorm,headingnorthalongthewallenclosingtheMirabellopark(1).Engineerscreatebreachesinthewall(2),andtheimperialarmy

deploysinsidetheparkgrounds(3).FrenchscoutssoonreportthemovetoFrancis,andtheFrencharmydeploysintotheparktoconfrontthefoe(4).(c)PhaseIII:TheFrenchopenthebattle,engagingtheimperial

formationswithartilleryfire(1).Acavalrychargeislaunched(2)against

oneofthebreachesinthewallthroughwhichtheimperialistsaretryingtomovetheirartillery(3).(d)PhaseIV:WhiletheFrenchhorsemen

contendforpossessionoftheimperialists’cannon(1),Francispersonallyleadshisgendarmesinacharge(2)againstpistol-armed

imperialcuirassiers(3).TheattackbogsdownandFrenchlossesmountasthegendarmesfindthemselves

fixedbytheenemy’spikemen(4)andsubjectedtomurderousfirebythe

imperialarquebusiers(5).(e)PhaseV:Francis’sSwissinfantryadvanceagainsttheimperialists’lines(1),butarealsothrownbackbythe

fireofthearquebusiers(2).LandsknechtsinthepayoftheFrenchkingindefianceoftheemperortrytheirhandnext(3),butfarenobetteratthehandsofSpanishpikemenandtheirsupportingarquebusiers(4).Thecombined-armstacticsoftheimperialarmyinflicthorrificcasualtiesonFrancis’stroops.(f)PhaseVI:ThedesperatesituationintheMirabellogrowsbleakerfortheFrenchasthePaviagarrisonsalliesoutagainstthenowundermannedFrenchlines(1).TheFrenchtroopsandtheiralliesbreakinthefaceofoverwhelmingodds(2)andthekinghimselfiscaptured(3)ashissurviving

gendarmesaresurroundedbyimperialistsoldiers.

The battle of Pavia beganwhen French field artilleryopened fire on the attackingimperialist squares, followedby a cavalry charge againstone of the breaches whereimperialistartillerywasbeing

hauled onto the battlefield(Map 7.2(c)). At the sametimeFrancis personally led adetachment of heavy cavalrygendarmerie (a French termfor heavy horse) againstimperial light horsecuirassiers (pistol-wieldingcavalrymen), repulsing themwith some casualties.Ultimately,theFrenchassaultfaltered when many of theking’shorsemenwereheldin

by the imperialist pikemenand then shot to pieces byarquebus fire. The failedcavalry assault was followedby an attack by allied Swissmercen-aries, who were alsothrown back by thearquebusiers(Map7.2(d)and(e)).A final offensive by theLandsknechts was defeatedby a combined-arms force ofSpanish pikemen andhandgunners.Atthismoment,

Pavia’sgarrisonsalliedoutofits gates and attacked theFrench siege lines (Map7.2(f)).Imperialist casualties were

verymodest in this two-hourengagement, with only 550killed.TheFrenchlost13,000menwithanother6,000takenprisoner. King Francis wascapturedduringthemêlée,hiswell-armoured gendarmerieshot down all around him.

Tactically, thebattleofPaviashowedtheprowessofheavyinfantry pikemen and lightinfantryarquebusiersworkingtogether in the open fieldagainst enemy cavalry andbattle squares. In thisengagement, artillery playedlittle part. The imperialistvictory once again delayedFrenchaspirationsinnorthernItaly and inaugurated a longperiod of Habsburg and

Spanishcontrolintheregion.So one-sidedwas the battle

of Pavia that the decisiveengagement all butdisappeared from Europeanwarfare for more than 100years. It would not returnuntil thebattleofBreitenfeldin1631.Historianshavecitedmanyreasonsforthischange:the defensive superiority ofcombiningfirearmswithfieldentrenchments; a new

generation of fortificationscalled trace italiennecharacterized by low, thickwalls to defeat siege guns;‘and the spread of militaryentrepreneurship fromnorthern Italy beyond theAlps’.After Pavia, the Spanish

took the next logical step inthe evolution of battlefieldformations by mixing heavyandlightinfantryinthesame

arrangement, creating by1534 a new tactical systemcalledthetercio.TheSpanishtercio eventually becamestandardized at about 3,000men divided into threecolunelas of 1,000 men(twelve companies of 250men apiece), integratingpikemen and arquebusiersinto one battle square andcreating the most formidabletactical system in Europe.

Like the well-articulatedSwissbattlesquare,theterciowas capable of bothwithstanding cavalry attacksintheopenfieldandchargingan enemy from any directionwith lowered pikes, butunlike the Swiss square, thetercio had an organiccomplement of light infantrygunners. On the battlefieldthe pikes were massed in asquare formation of three

lines, probably each with afront of fifty or sixty men,twenty files deep. The massof heavy infantry pikemenwas supported by squareclumpsofarquebusiersat thefour corners. This dense butmanoeuvrable battle squarehad a frontage of about 150yards and was about 100yardsdeep.As firearms became more

reliable, the Spanish also

increased the proportion oflight infantry arquebusiersand musketeers to pikemenwithin the tercio, giving theformation greater missilecapabilities. But the earlygun’s extremely slow rate offire meant that the lightinfantry gunners requiredextra protection whilereloading. The pikemenwould provide this aid inreturn for protection against

enemy gunfire and cavalryattacks. As the Englishauthority on tactics RobertBarret put it in hisworkTheTheorike and Practike ofModerne Warres in 1598:‘any troupe of shot, thoughnever so brave and expert,beinginopenfield,havingnostand of pikes, or other suchweapons, nor hedge, ditch,trench, or rampier, to relieveor [secure] them, could not

long endure the force ofhorse, especially Launciers’.Quite simply, without theadvantage of terrain or theprotectionofastandofpikes,handgunnerswould be sweptfromthebattlefieldbyenemycavalry.Atfirsttheratioofpikemen

to handgunners was three toone, but as the sixteenthcentury wore on and theeffectiveness and reliability

of firearms improved, theratioofgunnersincreasedandthe Spanish abandoned theoffensive capabilities of thesword and shield entirely infavour of the defensivecapabilityof thepike.As thecentury progressed and theSpanish tercio was adoptedby other armies in westernEurope, commandersexperimented with the ratioof shot and pike.By the end

of the sixteenth century, thenumber of light infantrygunners in the tercio nearlyequalledthenumberofheavyinfantry pikemen. Onceagain,theEnglishmanRobertBarretwrites:As the armed pike is thestrength of the battell, sowithoutquestionistheshotthe furie of the field: buttheonewithouttheotherisweakened the better halfe

of their strength.Thereforeof necessitie (according tothe course of warres inthesedayes)theoneistobecoupled and matched withthe other in suchconvenient proportion, thatthe advantage of the onemayhelpethedisadvantageoftheother.Bythe1650smostunitswerecomposedofshotandpikeinaratioofthreeorfourtoone.

And although archers andcrossbowmen gave way tohandgunners early in theperiod,pikemenpersistedasatactical entity until theinventionof the ringbayonetin the eighteenth centuryfusedheavyandlightinfantryinto one weapons system,finally eliminating the needforthepike.But the dominance of the

denselypackedinfantrybattle

square, especially againstheavy cavalry, did not gounchallenged, offering as itdid an easy target to enemyfield artillery and handguns.At the battles of Ravenna in1512,Marignanoin1515andBicocca in 1522, gunfireinflictedseriouscasualtiesonthebattlesquares.Theimpactof a single cannonball oftenkilled one or twodozenmenin a densely packed

formation, while injuringdozens more. At Ravenna,one shot allegedly killedthirtyinfantrymen.

Figure7.1 EarlyModernWeaponSystemsUsingReiters.Anillustrationofgeneralrulesofdominancein

conflictsbetweendifferentearlymodernweaponsystemswithcavalryorganizedwithReiters:(1)cavalryorganizedasReitersisgenerallydominantintheattackagainstbothheavyandlightinfantry;(2)lightinfantryisgenerallydominantintheattackagainstheavyinfantry.Cavalryorganizedinthetraditionalmanner(withoutReiters)resultsinthesamerelationshipsgenerallygoverningmedievalwarfare.BasedonArcherJones,TheArtofWarintheWestern

World(UrbanaandChicago:UniversityofIllinoisPress,1987),

schematic3.2.

The true effects of firearmsand artillerywere not felt byin the men they injured,maimed and killed – theywere also psychological. Aneyewitness at the battle ofMarignano struggled to findthe words to express theemotional shock when theFrenchfiredontheadvancingSwisswithartilleryandhand-held guns: ‘thus the enemyengaged and let off all their

guns of all calibres and alltheirhand-heldfirearms.Thatwas such a thing that onemight have thought that theskies had opened with everyfuryandtheheavenandearthwerebreakingapartundertheenemy fire.’ Thepsychological effects ofartillery and arquebus firehelped break up the battlesquare even faster thencasualties alone. By the

sixteenth century itwas sucha common problem that theSwiss prescribed the deathpenalty for any infantrymanwho left the battle squareunderfire.Although heavy cavalry

lancers continued to have aplace in early modernmilitary doctrine, thegunpowder revolution alsohad an impact on Europeancavalry.TheSpanishbrought

toItalylightcavalrygenitors,horsemenwhotradedintheirjavelins for bulky crossbowsand arquebuses. Ultimatelyunsuccessful on thebattlefield, genitors wereused for strategicreconnaissance,screeninganddisrupting enemycommunications. During thisperiod of tacticalexperimentation,theGermansdeveloped a new kind of

cavalry armoured in abreastplate and high, heavyleatherboots,andarmedwiththreewheel-lockpistols.Thisnewmercenary light cavalry,called Schwarzreiters or‘blackriders’becauseoftheirblack armour andaccoutrements, attackedenemy formations using therevolving tactics of thecaracole.To execute the caracole,

these reiters, as they weresoon called, trotted towardtheirenemyinalineofsmall,dense columns, each severalranksdeepandwithintervalsof about two horses’ widthbetween files. In a tacticreminiscent of the Parthianshot, the reiters fired theirthree muzzle-loading pistols,then swung 180 degrees andfiled to the rear to reload.Usually the caracole tactic

was employed before ageneral advance as a meansof disrupting enemy cavalryand infantry formations (seeFigure7.1).But the timeandawkwardness of reloadingwhile mounted meant thecaracole was a very difficultmanoeuvre to carry outeffectively, and, like lightcavalryfromtheclassicalandmedievalperiod,itwaseasilydisruptedbyanenemyheavy

cavalrycountercharge.

EarlyModernLogisticsLogisticswasalsoaffectedbythe ‘military revolution’ ofthe early modern period asarmies grew in size andtechnological complexity.Theprocurement,marshallingand deployment of thehuman, animal and naturalresources necessary to wage

war in this new era weredaunting.Newrecruitshadtobe clothed and trained, andhorses bred, broken, fed andtransported to the front lines.Saltpetre, charcoal andsulphur needed to beconverted into gunpowder;grain ground and baked intobread;rawtimberformedintopikestaffs,shiphullsandguncarriages; and hemp woveninto rope and canvas.

Moreover, to make cannon,copper and tin needed to bemined and smelted intobronze, while ordnance,edged weapons, armour andships’ fittings required hugesuppliesof ironore, fuel andlabour. Finally, legions ofworkersmovedearth, timber,mortarandstone toconstructa new generation offortifications(trace italienne)and port facilities. To meet

these needs, logisticianswrestled with different waysto best serve the army athomeandoncampaign.In the sixteenth century,

armiesweresuppliedmuchasthey had been in theMiddleAges, through the use ofmagazines, supplemented bybaggage trains and foraging.But as the size of the earlymodern army increased, sodidtheburdenofsupplyingit

for war, a burden therudimentary science oflogistics could not keep upwith. Unable to provide the‘umbilicalcords’necessarytosupply a large army oncampaign in hostile territory,kings and commanders alikesought control of thecountryside through theconstruction or capture offortresses and fortifiedoutposts.Infact,thisinability

to consistently supply largenumbers of men and horsesprobably contributed to theriseinthefrequencyofsiegesandanemphasisonpositionalovermanoeuvrewarfare.The changing technological

nature of warfare alsocomplicatedlogisticalsupply.Not only did commandershave tomeet the basic needsofprovidingbreadfortensofthousandsofmenand fodder

for thousands of horses, theyalsohadtoresupplystoresofgunpowder, and repair orreplace small arms andartillery. This often caused acontradiction in supplyimperatives. Armies neededtostayclose to the fortressesthat housed their gunpowderand shot and the ovens thatbakedtheirdailybread,whilealso seeking the foragenecessarytokeeptheirhorses

from starving. And largearmies required staggeringamounts of food and forage.An army of 30,000men and10,000 cavalry horses and10,000 other horses wouldconsume45,000daily rationsofbreadand200tonsofdriedfodder or 500 tons of greenfodderperday.During the Thirty Years

War (1618–1648), supplysank to the level of plunder

and pillage as armiesoperated for years in hostileregions, living off the landwithlittleornoregardforthewelfare of non-combatants.Plague and war-related foodshortages added to themisery, often killing morepeoplethantheactualbattles.Aftermid-century, theriseofstronger centralized states,embodied in Louis XIV’sFrance, developed the tools

and resources necessary tosupply larger armies on themarch.Unfedorunpaid,earlymodern armies mightevaporate,orworse,turntheiranger on the countryside.This reliance on ‘umbilicalcord’ supply would continueuntil the late eighteenthcentury when the FrenchRevolution and NapoleonicWars reintroduced theconcept of an army foraging

for its supplies, thereby, inthe words of one recentauthority on early modernlogistics, ‘liberating it fromthetyrannyofsupplylines’.Likearmiesinthemedieval

period, early modern armiesincreasingly relied on watertransport to supply theirneeds. Spain, the sixteenthcentury’s pre-eminentmilitary power, pioneereddeep-water maritime

technologies and thenprojected force across theworld’s oceans, carving outcolonies in the New Worldand Asia. In Europe,intermarriage and inheritanceintertwined Spanish andHabsburg possessions,forcing theSpanish throne toprotect its interests in ItalyagainstFrenchencroachment,in the Netherlands against aProtestant revolt, and in

central Europe and theeasternMediterraneanagainstOttomanexpansion.

TheDutchTacticalSystemandtheThirtyYearsWarThe dominance of Spain inwesternEuropean affairs andtheSpanishtacticalsysteminsixteenth-century warfarerequired its enemies to seeknewways tomeetanddefeat

the tercio on the battlefield.One of Spain’smost capableadversaries was a youngnobleman from theNetherlands, Maurice ofNassau (1567–1625), whogained prominence in thatcountry’s war of liberationagainst the Spanish. Thesecond son of William theSilent of Orange, Mauricewasgrantedthetitleofprinceof Orange after his father’s

assassination in 1584, androsetothepositionofadmiralgeneralandcaptaingeneraloffive provinces within theUnited Provinces. In thiscapacityMaurice instituted anumber of military reforms,including thefoundingof thefirst military academy tofurnishhisarmywith trainedofficers, emphasizing drilland discipline. In fact, thereintroductionofdrillintothe

Dutch armywas an essentialelement of the Orangeistreforms and a basiccontribution to the modernmilitarysystem.Maurice recognized the

successes of the Spanishtercio in recent decades andendeavoured to create ameans to defeat the Spanishbattle square. Like othercommanders of his day, theprinceofOrangewasinspired

by the classical period,gleaning ideas from authorssuch as Leo, Aelian andVegetius. To defeat thetercio, he abandoned thebattle square and adopted alinear formation on theRomanmodel.Indoingso,hemaximizedfirepowerthroughthe elongation of formationsand rapidity of loading.Maurice’s reforms utilizedfamiliar hallmarks from the

classical period, specificallyintelligent leadership,unquestioning obedience,loyalty to the unit, andimprovements in tacticaldeployment and mobility.Because of manpowershortages and financialrestraints,hewasforcedtodomore with less. To meetmuster, foreign mercenaries(mostly French, German,English and Scottish) were

hired and paid well, givingthe Dutch army ‘aproficiency, discipline,cohesion, andmaneuverability unknown intheWestsinceRomantimes’.Maurice also reduced the

size of the standard tacticalformationtobattalionsof550men consisting of heavyinfantry pikemen and lightinfantry arquebusiers.Originally using a heavy

infantry formation ten mendeep, Maurice finallydeployed his pikemen fivedeep with a frontage of fiftymen. This shallow arraymeant more Dutch pikemencould face the enemy, andnonefoundthemselvesoutofaction in the centre of adenselypackedbattle square.To each side of his heavyinfantry,theprinceofOrangeplaced his light infantry

arquebusiers, arranging themfourabreastandtendeep.Healso included in this tacticalarrayaboutsixtyarquebusiersas light infantry skirmishers.He arrayed the battalion inthree lines, allowingcommanders to commitreserves of balanced infantryunits when and wherecircumstanceswarranted.Like the Romans, Maurice

emphasized drill and

discipline above all othermartialvirtues.Hecompelledhis arquebusiers to practisemotions required to load andfire their matchlocks, whiledrilling his pikemen in theproper application of theirpolearmswhenmarchingandin battle. Although this kindofinstructionwasnotentirelynew, what was new to theearly modern period was hisemphasis on unit cohesion

and simultaneous drill. Sincehishandgunnerswere trainedto move in unison and inrhythm,allwerereadytofiretheir weapons at the sametime.Thismadefiringvolleyseasier, creating a greatershockeffectonenemyranks.Maurice also emphasized

marching in cadence toprecisecommands,givinghissoldierstheabilitytomoveinprescribed patterns, forward

orback, leftor right,shiftingfromcolumntolineandbackagain. But perhaps the mostimportant manoeuvreinstituted by the prince wastherefinementoftheSpanishcountermarch. In the Dutchcountermarch, the first rankof arquebusiers andmusketeers fired theirweapons, then wheeled andmarched between the files ofthemenstandingbehindthem

to the rear, reloading theirweapons in unison to theprecise commands of anofficer. Meanwhile, thesecond rank discharged theirweapons and repeated themanoeuvreuntilall tenrankshad rotated through and thefirst rankwas ready again tofire. With practice, thecountermarch allowed theDutch battalion tocontinuously fire at enemy

formations, giving anadversary no time to recoverfromtheimpactofonevolleybefore another volley hithome.Onehistorianratestheincrease in firepower in thenew Dutch battalion on theorderof100percent.Dutch battalions were each

capableofbetter independentarticulation on the battlefieldbecause of their bettermanoeuvrability, and a high

proportion of officers andnon-commissionedofficerstoenlistedmen.Mauriceplacedhis battalions in achequerboard formationreminiscent of how theRomans deployed theirlegions. But linearformations, whether classicalor early modern, sufferedfrom an increasedvulnerability on their flanks.To solve this problem,

Maurice utilized cavalry onthe wings to protect hisinfantry’s flank in the sameway the Macedonians andRomanshaddone2,000yearsearlier.The contributions of the

Swedish king GustavusAdolphus (r. 1611–1632) tomodern combined-armswarfare are manifold andrepresent a watershedbetween the traditionalheavy

cavalry and polearm-basedtactical systems of the lateMiddle Ages and the newarticulated gunpowder-basedlinear formations that woulddominate the battlefields ofthe west until the nineteenthcentury. Gustavus’ssignificance lies in hissuccesses as a battle captainutilizing this new tacticalsystem in his campaignsagainst the Poles and

Russians, and in theSwedishphase of the Thirty YearsWar (Map 7.3). Thewholesale adoption of theDutch tactical system byEuropean armies after thePeace ofWestphalia in 1648is eloquent testimony to thepower of the ‘Lion of theNorth’s’tacticalsynthesis.The cornerstone of

Gustavus’s tacticalinnovations came from

lessons learned by theDutchin their war of liberationagainst the Spanish ageneration before. When theyoung Swedish kingGustavus Adolphus adoptedtheDutch tactical system, hemodified it tomaximize shotover shock. He changed thebattalion configuration,arranging his pikemen sixdeep and thirty-six across,with ninety-six arquebusiers

on each side in six ranks.Furthermore, he substitutedthe heavy arquebus for alightermatchlockmusketandgave each of his soldierspaper cartridges containingmeasuredamountsofpowder.He then put these newtechnological advances togood use by instituting thetacticofvolleyfire.Volley fire consisted of all

six ranks of musketeers

loading their weapons, thenreducingthesixrankstothreeby filling the intervalsbetween themen ahead. Thefirst rank knelt, the secondstooped and the third stood,and all three firedsimultaneously. By thismeans, Gustavus usedrotation offensively,with theback three ranks movingforward through stationaryreloaders. The Swedes

became so skilled at thismanoeuvre that their infantrybattalions could dischargetwo volleys per minute.Though a proponent of lightinfantry, Gustavus did notdispensewithoffensiveshocktactics, and his pikemencontinued to advance evenduring the countermarch,contributing to the finalimpact. But at close range,the rolling fire of the

countermarch was replacedbyasingledevastatingvolleyfired simultaneously by allthreeranksofmusketeers.To support his light and

heavy infantry, Gustavuschanged cavalry doctrine,abolishing the widely usedtactic of the caracole infavour of arming his cavalrywith sabre and committingthem against infantry whenshockactionseemedlikelyto

succeed. He also created theworld’s first dragoons,arming them with carbines,wheel lock pistols and, later,withsabres,effectivelyfusingheavy and light cavalry intoone weapon system. Theyoung king’s fascination forshot over shock can also beseen in his integration ofsmall, horse-pulled artilleryinto battalions. Firingcannonball, grape or canister

shot, these four-pounderswere light enough to bemanoeuvred with thebattalion on the battlefield,concentrating firepowerwhereitwasneededmost.

Map7.3 TheThirtyYearsWar.

Gustavus Adolphus, aProtestant king, entered theThirty Years War in thesummerof1630.Thewarhadbegun twelve years earlierwhen aCalvinist rebellion inBohemia in 1618 led toimperial repression by theHabsburg ruler and holyRomanemperorFerdinandII,sparking a war betweenCatholics and Protestantsacross Germany. Denmark

intervened on the side ofGerman Protestant states in1626, but by 1629 imperialforceshaddefeatedtheDanesandpushedimperialpowertothe shores of the Baltic Sea.Because the holy Romanemperordidnothave a largearmyhimself, imperialforcesweredrawnfromtheleviesofgreater lords within theempire, men such as theelector Albrecht von

Wallenstein,or fromSpanishtroops provided by his royalcousinKingPhilipIV.With the Swedish king’s

arrival in Peenemünde on 4July 1630, themomentumofwar began to switch to theanti-imperialforces.Overthenext year, Gustavus’s forcesoverran the Germanic Balticstates of Pomerania andMecklenberg, then pushedsouth into Brandenburg in

April 1631. The brutalsacking of ProtestantMagdeburg in May of thatyear by the seasonedcommander Jean ‘t Serclaes,count of Tilly, and hisimperial forces pushed theregion of Brandenburg intoGustavus’s camp. Aftersecuringcontributionsandtheright to recruit soldiers inBrandenburg, the Swedesmoved south into Saxony to

forage for supplies and meetreinforcements from Italy.Recognizing the need todefeat the Swedish invasion,Tilly turned north andmarched to meet the anti-imperialforces.The initial meeting took

place in late July 1631, butGustavus’s strongly fortifiedpositionatWerben inabendintheElbeRiverdiscouragedTillyfromfighting.Thelatter

skirmished, fired his cannonand withdrew 20 miles fromthebattlefield. In lateAugusthe seized the initiative,marching south and layingwastetoSaxonyinanattemptto discourage the elector ofSaxony from joining theSwedes. Gustavus quicklymarchedtojoinhisarmywiththat of the elector and moveagainst Tilly. In mid-September, the count’s army

of 35,000men offered battleon level ground between thelittle villages of Breitenfeldand Stenburg, a few milesnorth-east of Leipzig. Afterjoining theelectorofSaxonyon the march, Gustavusarrived the night before thebattle, andorderedhis newlycombined army of 42,000mentosleepinformation.The Swedish king arrayed

his two armies side by side,

placing the elector’s army ofsome 17,000 on the left andhisown25,000troopsontheright. Subscribing to themodifiedDutchlineartacticalsystem reminiscent of theRomans,Gustavusformedhis500-man infantry battalionsintwolines,placingareserveof infantry and cavalrybetween the two, and areserveofcavalrybehind thesecond line.HisalliedSaxon

army consisted of traditionalbattle squares protected bycavalry on each flank.Because the Swedish andSaxon hosts deployed asseparate armies, thecombined forces had cavalryinthecentreaswellasonthewings.The battle of Breitenfeld

began on the morning of 17September 1631 whenGustavus ordered an attack

and the Swedish and Saxonarmies marched toward thecount of Tilly’s alreadyformedposition(Map7.4(a)).The imperialist army wasarrayed in a traditionalmanner in 50 by 30 manterciosarrangedinagroupofthree, with the centre squareslightly forward of the othertwo. Outnumbered byperhaps 7,000 troops, Tillywas forced to spread out his

armyinonelinetomatchtheSwedish front. He had noreservebeyondsomecavalry.As the two sides closed,

their artillery firedcannonballs through theopposing ranks. In anaudacious move, Tilly tookthe offensive, ordering thecommander of the imperiallight cavalry reiters on hisleft, Count Pappenheim, tocharge the Swedish cavalry

on the right wing (Map7.4(b)). Anticipating thisattack, Gustavus placedadditional heavy cavalrysupported by light infantrymusketeers to defend againstthe reiters. The Swedishcavalryheldtheirgroundandreceived the imperials’ pistolattacks, counter-attackingwith their own musketeervolley fire and short sabrecharges. Advancing seven

times to repeat the caracolemanoeuvre,theimperiallightcavalrywereunabletoscatterthe Swedish musketeers,instead being forced back bytheir heavy cavalryprotectors.Afterdefeatingtheseventh attack, CountPappenheim ordered hisimperial cavalry to withdrawfromthefield.While Tilly’s cavalry

unsuccessfully attacked the

Swedish right wing, heordered the battle square andcavalry on his right to attackthe Saxons, keeping theremainder of his infantry inreserve.The imperial cavalryeasilyroutedtheSaxonhorse,and the experienced Tilly,seeinganopportunitytopushhome a victory, ordered hiscentre square to cross thefield obliquely and enter thefrayagainst theSaxons(Map

7.4(c)). Demoralized andwithout cavalry support, theSaxon infantry broke andfled, pausing only to quicklyloot their Swedish ally’scampastheyleft.With the rout of the Saxon

army, Tilly had defeated 40per cent of his enemy’sforces, and in doing soexposed Gustavus’s army toanattackagainst the flankofthe remaining Swedish

infantry formations. But asTillyreorderedhisinfantryinan attempt to roll up theSwedish flank, theProtestantking and his talentedsubordinate General GustavHorn quickly formed theflexible and well-drilledinfantry of the second lineintoabattlearraytomeettheimperial attempt to attack itsflank. Completing theredeployment manoeuvre in

only15minutes,theSwedishline faced the count’sinfantry.Thenextphaseofthebattle

began with a cavalryengagement, with theSwedishcavalryontheking’sleftdrivingoff theremainingimperial cavalry. As theinfantry closed, Gustavus’snewmodelarmy,withitssix-rank-deep linear array anddisciplined volley fire, began

to have an impact on theenemy battle squares (Map7.4(d)). The imperialarquebusiers and musketeers,fifty files wide and thirtyranks deep, used thecountermarch to maintain asteady rate of fire, but theseranks withered under theconcentration of volley fireand follow-up cavalry sabrecharges and heavy infantrypikeattacks.

Map7.4 TheBattleof

Breitenfeld,1631.(a)PhaseI:

GustavusAdolphusordershisSwedisharmy(1)andthatofhisally,JohnGeorgeofSaxony(2),forwardagainstthecountofTilly’simperial

army.Thefirstshotsoftheengagementarefiredbytheopposingartillery(3)asthetwosidesclose.

Tillyopenstheaction,orderingCountPappenheim’slightcavalry(4)tochargetheSwedishhorseon

Gustavus’srightflank(5).(b)PhaseII:Theimperialreiterslaunchaseriesofcaracolesagainstthe

Swedishheavycavalry(1),whichtheSwedesanswerwiththeirownsabrechargessupportedbyvolleyfirefromthemusketeers(2).Pappenheimfinallyorderstheimperialhorsetoretreat(3).Meanwhile,theimperialcavalryontherightflankchargetheirSaxonopponents(4)anddrivethem

fromthefield(5).TheimperialinfantrysquaresonTilly’srightareonthemoveaswell(6),andJohn

George’sSaxons,leftwithoutcavalrysupportandfacingTilly’soncominginfantry,breakandfleefromthefield(7).(c)PhaseIII:Tillyordershiscentregroupofterciostomove

obliquelytotherighttoreinforcetheimperialsuccess(1).Theimperialists’right-flankinfantryre-formsandpreparestorolluptheSwedishleft(2),butGustavusandGeneralGustavHornquicklyredeploythesecondline

tofacethisnewthreat(3).TheSwedishcavalrycharges

Fürstenburg’simperialhorse(4),

drivingthemfromthefield(5).(d)PhaseIV:TheimperialsquarescomeunderheavyfirefromtheSwedishlightartilleryandGustavus’slinearinfantryformations(1).Theimperial

troopsreturnfireusingthecountermarch,buttheSwedishvolleyssoonbegintooverwhelmTilly’s

soldiers,whonowcomeunderattackfromSwedishpikemenandchargesfromtheSwedishheavycavalry(2).(e)PhaseV:TheimperialistarmyisshatteredbythecombinedeffectsofSwedishinfantry,cavalryand

artillery;Tillyorderswhatisleftofhisarmytoretreat(1).

Tilly’s infantry, exposed toartilleryand infantry fireandcavalry attacks, took heavycasualties (Map 7.4(e)).Faced with the devastatingfire of the excellent Swedishguns, easily manoeuvred ontheirlightercarriages,andhisown captured imperial guns,Tilly ordered his troops toretreat. Imperial casualtieswere 7,600 killed, comparedto 1,500 Swedes and 3,000

Saxons. Furthermore, theSwedes took an additional6,000 imperial soldiersprisoner, though many ofthesemeneventuallyenlistedin the Swedish forces. Tillythen retreated west over theWeser River, leavingBohemiaandtheMainvalleyexposed to Saxon andSwedishadvances.The battle of Breitenfeld

illustrated the dominance of

shot over shock in infantryengagements inearlymodernwarfare. The Swedish linearformation, with its broadfront and volley tactic,allowedforaconcentrationoffire against the relativelynarrow front of the imperialbattlesquare,which,utilizingthe countermarch, couldreturn fireonlyone rankatatime. The battle alsodemonstrated the importance

of combined-arms co-operation between lineararrayed infantry and theirheavy cavalry comrades.Gustavus’s more innovativelinear formation, only sixranks deep, was far morevulnerable to flank and rearattack than Tilly’s moretraditional battle squaretercios, with their all-rounddefence capabilities. Thelinear tactical system’s

vulnerability placed a highpremium on winning cavalryengagements. Short sabrecharges assisted Gustavus’sinfantry againstPappenheim’scaracoletacticsatthebeginningofthebattle,and later vanquished theremainder of Tilly’s horseafterthecounthadturnedtheSwedish flank. And as theearlymodernperiodworeonand the pike gradually

disappeared in favour oflinearinfantryformations,theimportance of cavalryincreasedonthebattlefield.After the defeat of imperial

forces at Breitenfeld, manyGerman Protestant princesrallied to the Swedish side.Gustavus advanced deepersouth into Germany, takingWürzburg in October andFrankfurt inDecember 1631.In 1632 he planned to attack

Bavaria and then conquerAustria. Count Tilly waskilledtryingunsuccessfullytostop the Protestant invasionof Bavaria, forcing EmperorFerdinand II to reappoint aformer general in the ThirtyYears War, the BohemianmilitarycommanderAlbrechtvon Wallenstein, as overallgeneraloftheimperialarmy.Wallenstein immediately

threatened Saxony, forcing

the Swedish king to returnnorthwards and meet thethreat to his newly acquiredallied territory. Whatfollowed over the autumn of1632 was a chess game ofpositional warfare, withneither side willing to attackitswell-fortifiedopponent.AtAlte Vista near Nuremberg,GustavuswasunabletodriveWallenstein’s forces fromtheir heavily fortified

position. Moving to the cityof Naumberg, Gustavus dugin thoroughlyandawaitedanimperial attack. Wallensteinmistook theentrenchment forthe Swedish king’s wintercamp, and began to dispersehisarmyfortheseason.Withhis own army evaporatingfrom lack of supplies, theSwedish king decided toattack the weakenedimperialistarmyatLützenon

16November1632.Gustavus reached

Wallenstein’s position late inthe afternoon the day beforethe battle with an army ofabout 19,000 men, of whomapproximatelyone-thirdwerecavalry. Imperial forceswereabout 16,000 strong, halfbeing cavalry. Gustavusdeployed his troops in twolines, ordering his mixedinfantry in the centre andhis

cavalry, along with lightinfantry skirmishers, on thewings. He placed his fieldgunsinthecentreasascreenfor his infantry. His strategyutilized his superiority incavalry. The king placed hisbest cavalry on his right,planning to charge theimperial army’s open leftflank and then roll up theenemy infantry’s flank andrear.

Recognizing the Swedishking was willing to offerbattle, Wallenstein calledback his lieutenant-generalCount Pappenheim and his3,000 cavalry from a nearbytown, anddug in defensivelybehind a raised road.Wallenstein placed his rightflank on the village ofLützen,arranginghisartilleryon a nearby rise where itcould command the field

below, and covered his leftflank with a shallow stream.He ordered his men into atraditional formation, placinghis infantry in the centre andcavalry on thewings.But hemoved away from tacticalorthodoxy by emulating hisopponent and adoptingsmaller formations less thanten ranks deep, and arrayedthem in two lines. He alsoorderedhiscavalrytodiscard

the caracole manoeuvre andcopy the Swedish shockattack. Finally, he adopted acombined-arms approach tohis defence, placingmusketeers with his cavalryand some lightgunswithhisinfantry.Preparing for the Swedish

assault,Wallensteindeepenedaditchinfrontofhispositionandwaited for Pappenheim’sreinforcements. Like the

battle of Breitenfeld a yearearlier, Gustavus arrayed hisarmy the night before andplanned to attack theimperialist forces first thingin the morning before thearrival of the count and hiscavalry, an event that wouldeventheforces.But on the morning of the

engagement, a fogenshrouded the battlefield,delaying the Swedish assault

untilmidday(Map7.5(a)).Toopen the battle Gustavuslaunched a cavalry assaultagainst the imperial left andcentre. But just as theSwedishcavalryhaddefeatedthe opposing horsemen,Count Pappenheim arrivedandstoppedtheSwedesfromrunninguptheimperialflank(Map 7.5(b)). Moments afterappearing on the field,Pappenheim was mortally

woundedby a cannonball. Inthe centre, Gustavus himselfled an infantry attack,pushing back the opposingmusketeers.Thoughwoundedby a shot in the arm, hewasabletosecureaditchinfrontof Wallenstein’s position.Still, the imperial line heldand Gustavus was shot twomoretimesinthebackandinthe head, and died in themêlée (Map 7.5(c)).

Meanwhile, the Swedishcavalrycontinuedtopressonthe imperial left, forcingWallenstein to order theItalian commander OttavioPiccolomini to replace theinjured Pappenheim andrepulse the Swedish cavalryattack. After having sevenhorses shot from under him,he was finally able tostabilizethesituationthere.

Map7.5 TheBattleofLützen,1632.(a)PhaseI:Densefogacross

thebattlefielddelaysGustavus’sattackagainstWallenstein’spositionsuntilmidday.TheSwedishkingordersacavalrycharge(1)againstthe

enemy’sleftflank,scatteringthescreenofmusketeersliningtheditchalongtheLeipzig–Lützenroad(2),andthreateningtorollupthe

imperialists’line(3).(b)PhaseII:JustastheSwedishcavalrygaintheupperhand,CountPappenheim

arriveswithcavalryreinforcements(1),stabilizingthesituationand

repulsingGustavus’shorsemen(2),thoughthecountismortallywoundedbyacannonballshortlyafterarrivingonthefield.Inthecentre,Gustavuspersonallyleadsaninfantryattackandgainstheditchinfrontof

Wallenstein’sposition(3).(c)PhaseIII:Gustavusiskilledduringthe

fightingintheditch(1)infrontoftheimperiallines,andWallenstein’scentreholds.TheimperialgeneralordersOttavioPiccolominitotheleft(2)andtheflankisstabilized(3).(d)PhaseIV:Seekingtoavengetheirfallenking,theSwedeslaunchaninfantryattackontheirleftthat

capturesthetownofLützen(1)andwrestscontroloftheartilleryparkonWindmillHill(2)fromtheimperialists(3).(e)PhaseV:Asnightdescends,Wallensteinordersaretreat(1)astheSwedesconsolidatetheirgains(2).

Bothsideshavelostaboutone-thirdoftheirforcesintheaction.

WiththeSwedishkingdeadand the imperial centreholding, it looked as ifWallensteinhadwontheday.Butastrongattackontheleftby Swedish soldiers bent onavenging the death of theirking captured the town ofLützen and the nearbyartillery park on the rise,forcingWallenstein to retreatby cover of darkness (Map7.5(d) and (e)). Both sides

lost about one-third of theirforces.Wallenstein withdrewhisarmytoBohemia,leavingSaxony to the Swedes andtheir Protestant allies. Afterthe death of Gustavus,Swedish influence in theThirty Years War waned. In1635 France entered the waragainsttheHabsburgs,endingthe emperor’s goal of acentralized and religiouslyhomogeneous empire. Order

was restored to Germany in1648 with the Peace ofWestphalia, ending ageneration of religiouswarfare.Although the battle of

Lützen was strategicallyinconclusive, its significanceliesinWallenstein’sadoptionof many of Gustavus’stacticalinnovations.Aftertheconclusion of the Swedishphase of the Thirty Years

War in 1634, Europeanarmies increasingly utilizedtheir cavalry in shock action,though missile fire in theform of pistol shot was toremainanimportantancillaryweapon for Europeanhorsemen. But Gustavus’smost important legacy washis revolution of infantrytactics, dispensing with theSwiss-style battle square andmaking the linear infantry

formationthestandardforhisnew model army. Hereintroduced a well-articulated line-basedcombined-arms tacticalsystem to the art of war inearlymodernEurope,onenotseen for well over amillennium.Gustavus brought to the

defence of Protestant Europea brilliant syncretism of oldandnew,makingefficientuse

of the best technologyof theday, including improvedmatchlocks, carbines, wheellock pistols, pre-measuredpaper cartridges and lightartillery. Building on theclassical reforms of MauriceofNassau,Gustavuscreatedanew model national army,complete with uniforms,twenty-year enlistmentcontractsandanefficienttax-collecting apparatus. He was

a tactical visionary, fullyrecognizing the ‘Age ofGunpowder’hadeclipsed the‘Age of Polearms’. His lightinfantry’sadroituseofrollingand volley fire from a linearformationsetaprecedentthatwould last as longasmuzzleloading, well into thenineteenth century. Hechanged cavalry doctrine tobettersupportinfantry,andheutilized mobile artillery in

directsupportofthebattalionin awayNapoleonwouldbeproud of. Perhaps evenmoreimportantly, Gustavussucceeded in converting thethousands of mercenaryofficers he used in hiscampaigns in Germany intolike-minded soldiers. Afterhis successes at Breitenfeldand Lützen, these samesoldiers and their adversarieswouldreturntotheirownsoil

and build national armiesbased on the innovations ofthe young Swedish king andtheDutchtacticalsystem.

Conclusion:The‘WesternWayofWar’andDecisiveBattleThe level of violencewitnessed during the ThirtyYears War is a gruesome

illustrationofwhathistorianshave labelled the ‘westernway of war’. GustavusAdolphus, like Belisarius,William the Conqueror andHenry V before him,understood that a decisiveengagementonthebattlefieldwas the surest way offurthering his political aims.AndwhileSwedishforcesdidmanage to kill one-third oftheir imperialist enemy, this

understanding cost Gustavushis life and the lives of one-third of his army at Lützen.When western armies madewaragainstoneanother,suchcasualty figures were notunusual.Asdescribedintheprevious

volume, Warfare in theAncient World, Europeanshave practised a form oforganized violence thatplacedapremiumondecisive

battle since classical Greektimes. Greek hoplitesspecializedinaformofbrutalconfrontational combat thatbeatdownor carvedup theirenemies, often againstnumerically superior armies.The Romans continued andperfected this lethality inarms. Roman legionsconquered and protected aMediterranean empire thatlastedhalf amillennium.But

the Western Roman Empirefinally succumbed to internalrot andexternal invasionandmigration, while the EasternRoman Empire continued asthe Byzantine Empire foranotherthousandyears.The Byzantine martial

experience built upon thetraditions of the late RomanEmpire, though there was achange in emphasis frominfantry to cavalry.

Justinian’s commanders,Belisarius and Narses, usedByzantine combined arms toconqueranewMediterraneanempire. Here, this Byzantinebrand of western warfareblunted Persian advances atDara in Armenia anddestroyed Vandal andFrankish aspirations atTricameron in north Africaand Casilinum in Italy. AtCasilinum, Byzantine troops

slaughtered their Frankishfoesnearlytotheman.In western Europe the

Germanic armies, whichfilled the power vacuum leftby the collapse of theWestern Roman Empire,represented a decline inmartial capabilities. By thetime the end came, centuriesof ‘barbarization’ had erodedthe combat efficiency of theRoman legion, and with the

end of the professional armycame the end of well-articulated heavy infantry,replaced by the Germanicmilitia system and itsunarticulated battle squares.These Germanic warriorscould fight with greatferocity, as the battles ofAdrianople and Châlonsillustrate, but they initiallylackedthemilitaryandsocialorganization and support to

mountthekindoflarge-scalecampaigns witnessed in theclassicalperiod.Over time, old Roman

territory and Germanic triballands were transformed intoGermanickingdoms,withtheFranks in what was RomanGaul becoming the pre-eminent regional power. Themost successful Frankishcommanders adhered to thedoctrine of decisive battle in

thewestern tradition.CharlesMartel soundly defeated anaggressive Muslim raidingexpedition at Tours using abold fighting strategy andconfrontationaltactics,killingtheMuslimgovernorofSpainand securing a new Frankishdynasty. His grandsonCharlemagneundertookfifty-four military campaigns andexpandedFrankishhegemonyintonorthernSpain,Brittany,

Bavaria, and Frisia andSaxony. Charlemagne wellunderstood the value of‘spear-tip diplomacy’, andused the threat of militaryengagement and annihilationtoenforcehispoliticalwill.After Charlemagne’s

passing in 814, a ‘SecondAge of Invasions’ besiegedChristian Europe. Magyarsand Vikings attacked fromthe east and north, plunging

the continent into over twocenturies of chaos. TheMagyar threat was finallyextinguished by the GermankingOttoIalongthebanksoftheLechRiver in a set-piecebattlewhichpittedtheflowerof Catholic chivalry againstskilled central Asianhorsemen. Otto’s militaryvictory brought profoundpolitical changes. After thedestruction of the Magyar

army, the remnants of theraiders converted toChristianity and created thekingdom of Hungary, whilethefeatensuredOtto’srisetoholy Roman emperor. TheVikings, like the Magyars,were master raiders,preferring ‘smash-and-grab’tactics over decisive battle.But as the Viking age woreon, some Scandinaviancommanders adopted the

latter brand of warfare whilecampaigning. One of theperiod’sgreatestwarriorsandkings,HaraldHardrada, useddecisive battle effectively tosecure political position andmilitary reputation. Trainedin the ‘western way of war’while serving as captain ofthe Varangian Guard inConstantinople, Hardradawould risk it all and failseeking a decisive

engagement against Anglo-Saxon king HaroldGodwinson at StamfordBridge. His defeat thereendedhis lifeand theVikingage of invasion, andweakened his opponentGodwinson enough thatanother political opportunistand brilliant commander,William, duke of Normandy,could seize the initiative andtakeEnglandfromtheAnglo-

Saxon ruler at the battle ofHastings.Bytheeleventhcentury,the

Normansemergedasthepre-eminent military power inmedieval Europe. DukeWilliam of Normandybecame King William ofEngland because of decisivebattle.Hisone-dayvictoryatSenlacHillkilledtheEnglishking and broke the back oftheEnglish army, paving the

way for a successfuloccupation. In Italy theNorman adventurer RobertGuiscard foughthisway intotitle and carved out adukedom at the expense ofpapal and Byzantine lands.Guiscard’s mastery oforganized violence isillustrated by hisoverwhelming victory overByzantine forces atDurazzo,avictorywhichwitnessedthe

foolhardy gallantry of theVarangian Guard and theirextermination by Normancombined-arms efforts.Normanfortunescontinuedtogrow in southern Italy,whileother Normans sought fameand fortune ‘taking up thecross’intheHolyLand.Military success and failure

during the crusades was alsoa product of decisive battle.When theByzantineemperor

RomanusIVDiogenessoughtbattle against the Seljukleader Alp Arslan atManzikert, he was seeking amilitarysolutiontotheSeljukthreat. His defeat thereprecipitated the loss of mostofAnatolia,afatalweakeningoftheByzantineEmpire,andbecamethecasusbelliforthecrusades. When the Catholicarmies answeredPopeUrbanII’s call to arms in 1095, the

Norman-led armies thatcrossed Anatolia andshattered the Seljuk Turks atDorylaeum brought withthem western-styleconfrontationaltactics,tacticswhich relied on the primacyof heavy cavalry shockcombat. Most historianswould agree that theappearance of the secondcrusader column saved theentireexpeditionand that the

victory at Dorylaeum was anear-run thing. Still, thedestruction of the Seljukforce allowed RomanCatholic crusaders to carveout numerous principalitiesand usher in a 200-yearoccupation of Syria andPalestine.Not all of the practitioners

of the ‘western way of war’were Christian. The greatMuslim general Saladin

showed his mastery ofdecisivebattleattheHornsofHattin, destroying the maincrusaderarmy(completewithits elite Templars andHospitallers) in the HolyLand and taking JerusalembackforIslam.ThisChristianreversal led to the formationof the Third Crusade, whereKing Richard I of EnglandmetandvanquishedSaladin’stroops near the Forest of

Arsuf. This battle, thoughtactically decisive, did notalter the strategic balance ofpowerenoughinPalestineforthe English king to evenattempt a siegeof Jerusalem.WithRichard’sfailuretotakeback the Holy City forChristendom, the tide hadturned against the crusadersin the Levant. Islam wouldslowly take back the HolyLand in the thirteenth

century, oblivious to a newand more dangerous stormfrom the east – the Mongolinvasions.Genghis Khan forged a

military machine in thethirteenth century thatsecuredthelargestcontiguouslandempireinhumanhistory,stretching from Korea toPoland. The success of theMongol art of war relied onthe decisive cavalry

engagement and a keenunderstandingoftheenemy’stacticalpredilections.Mongolwarriorsweremastersofbothmanoeuvrewarfare and ruse,and used the reputation ofsteppe warriors as ‘hit andrun’ specialists againstcivilized armies. WhenMongol cavalry engagedDuke Henry’s Christianforces at Liegnitz, they werecounting on the knights’

penchant for confrontationalbattle to work against them.The Mongols were notdisappointed. Wheeling andretreating in front of theChristian lines, the Mongolhorse archers goaded theChristian heavy cavalry intopursuit,openingagapandtheopportunitytostrikehardandfinish off the western army.At Sajo River the Mongolcommander Batu Khan took

themeasure of King Bela ofHungary, and destroyed theChristianarmyusingbrilliantcombined-arms attacks. Bothof these decisive battlefieldvictories allowed theMongolstoextendhegemonyinto easternEurope,with thesteppewarriorsmaintainingastranglehold on Russia for100 years before the grandprince ofMuscovy Ivan ‘theGreat’ defeated them at the

battle of Kulikovo Field in1380.The Mongols enjoyed

similar success in south-westAsia before the Mamluksblunted their progress at AinJalut, southofLakeTiberias.Mongol penetrations into theIslamic west destroyed boththe Ismaili Order of theAssassins in northern Iranand theAbbasidCaliphate inBaghdad in 1258, and,

pushing west past theEuphrates, threatened theMamluk sultanate in Cairo.The cavalry of the Mamluksultan Kotuz, versed in bothsteppe and civilized cavalrytactics, fought fire with fireand sucked the pursuingMongols into an ambush.Once the two sides wereengaged, thebattle itselfwasdecided by a series ofconfrontational cavalry

charges, with the Mamluksfinally scattering theirMongolenemytothewind.The ‘western way of war’

acquired new weapons andtactics in the late medievalperiod. In England, KingEdward I faced Welsh lightinfantry longbowmen whilepacifying northern Wales,thenincorporatedthisformofwithering missile fire in hiswars against the Scots (see

the battle ofFalkirk,Chapter5). Edward’s grandsonEdward III had similarsuccess against the Scots atHalidon Hill and the Frenchat Crécy, as did Henry V atAgincourt. All of theseEnglishmonarchsunderstoodthe value of showering a‘killing field’ with arrowshaftstothinouttheranksofopposing heavy cavalryknights before shock combat

ensued. Light infantryarchers, dealing out deathfromadistance,addedanewbrutal dimension to westernwarfare,presaging theriseoflight infantry gunners in the‘ageofgunpowder’.The medieval western way

ofwaralsowitnessedareturnto classical themes. In theAlps, Swissmilitia drilled ina new form of phalanx,resurrecting a lethal form of

heavy infantry capable ofmeetingandbeatingthefinestchivalry in Christendom.Swiss successes atMorgarten, Laupen andSempach in the fourteenthcentury illustrate theeffectiveness of this newmodel battle square. Usinghalberds, pikes and polearmsofallsorts,theseSwissheavyinfantrymen hacked,bludgeoned and thrust their

waytobattlefieldvictoryandtheir cantons’ self-determinationusingaformofparticularly ferocious shockcombatwherenoquarterwasgiven to knight or commonwarrior, nor expected inreturn. Their reputationestablished, Swiss soldiersfound employment as bothmercenaries and emulatorsamong other national armies,spreading their brand of

western war to other regionsofEurope.New martial technologies

also had an impact on thedevelopment ofwestern-stylewarfare in the late medievalperiod, chief among themgunpowder. Though it wasinvented inChina, itwas theEuropeans who ultimatelyfullyrecognizedgunpowder’sfull potential and set out toproduce the first generation

of western artillery andhandguns. Siege guns helpedbring an end to the ‘age ofcastles’ and centralize theauthority of monarchs allover Europe, while lightinfantry handgunners, armedwith matchlocks andarquebuses, challengedmedieval crossbowmen andarchers for the premierposition of distance killer,ushering in a new age of

western warfare wheremissile, not shock combat,was the preferred means ofkilling.By the time the Peace of

Westphaliain1648endedtheThirty YearsWar a new ageof organized violence haddawned. State-sponsoredwarfare fought withprofessional armies wasbecoming the norm in theseventeenth century.

Standardization of weaponsandtactics,broughtonbythesuccess of the Spanish andDutch tactical systems,changed the lethality andscope of European warfare.For the first time since thefall of Rome, battles wereconsistently fought betweenarmiesoftensofthousandsofcombatants. And once again,victory was determined by abalanced combined-arms

tactical system utilizingcavalry in support of anascendantinfantry,onewherethe correct application ofshock and missile-basedtechnologies by brilliantcommanderswon theday. Inthe seventeenth century andbeyond, the dual heritage ofthe‘westernwayofwar’anddecisive battle would helpwesterncivilizationreachoutand dominate the rest of the

globe.

GLOSSARYOFMILITARYTERMS

angon:(4th–8thcenturies)Aunique,barb-headedFrankishspearofmoderatelengththatcouldbeusedbothasajavelinorinclose-quartercombat.arban:(12th–14thcenturies)Thesmallestunitinthe

Mongolarmy,consistingof10men.Tenarbansmadeupajagunorsquadronof100men.Tenjagunsmadeupaminghanorregimentof1,000men,whiletenminghansmadeupatuman,thelargestmanoeuvreunitintheMongolarmy(10,000men).

arquebusier:(15th–16thcenturies)Alightinfantryhangunnerwhofiredan

arquebus,anearlysmooth-borefirearmignitedbyamatchlock,andlater,awheellockmechanism.

articulation(tactical):Amilitarytermdescribingtheoffensivecapabilityoftroops.Unarticulatedtroopsusuallylackedthedrillanddisciplinetomarchandfightincloseorder,andthereforeusuallyfoughtinstatic,defensiveformations.Well-

articulatedtroopswerecapableofoffensiveactioninclose-ordercombat.

Assassins,IsmailiOrderofthe:(1094–1256)AradicalShi’itesectwhichterrorizedorthodoxIslamfromitsmountainfortressesinnorth-easternMesopotamiafornearly200years,usingpoliticalmurderandsubterfugeinanattempttooverthrowtheexisting

SunniorderintheNearEast.Itsvariousleaderstookthetitle‘TheOldManoftheMountain’.TheIsmailiOrderwasdestroyedbytheMongolsin1256.Auszug:(15th–16thcenturies)EliteSwissheavyinfantrycomposedmostlyofunmarriedmenbetweentheagesofeighteenandthirty.bandum(pluralbanda):(7th–15thcenturies)Thebasic

administrativeandtacticalunitoftheByzantinearmyfromtheseventhcentury.Itconsistedofabout400soldierscommandedbyatribuneand,later,byacount.Thebandawereaboutequallydividedintoinfantryandcavalry,withthedominantweaponsystembeingheavycavalry(historiansbelievethatcavalrymadeup20to40

percentofaByzantinearmy,dependingonwhereitwascreatedandwhereitwasoperating).

banner:1.Astandardorbattleflag.2.Asubdivisionofthemedievalbatailleformation.Eachbataillewasbrokendownintoelementarytacticalunitscalledbanners.Thesewereusuallyrecruitedthroughfamily,lineageorfeudal

relations,andweresupposedtostaygroupedaroundabattleflagoraleader(calledabanneret),orwereunitedbyacommonwarcry.

‘barbarization’:Theinfiltrationofnon-Romanpeoples(typicallyGermanictribes)intoRome’sterritoryandpolitical/militaryinstitutions,dueasmuchtoRomanpolicyastothe

effortsoftheGermanictribes.BarbarizationchangedtheconceptofRomancitizenship,resultinginaweakeningofthesocial,culturalandpoliticalfoundationsoftheempire.

barding:Aprotectivecoveringformounts.Itcouldbeoffeltorleatherorevenform-fittediron,andwasdesignedtobalanceprotectionwithmobility.

Althoughhorsesweremostoftenbarded,camelsandevenelephantscouldbecoveredforwar.

bataille:Adivisioninamedievalarmy.Medievalarmiesweretypicallyorganizedintothreebatailles.Onthemarchtheyformedavanguard,mainbodyandrearguard.Theorderofmarchwasusuallydictatedbynationality,

battlefieldreputationandpersonalrelationshipwiththecommandinglord.

bombard:(14th–16thcentury)Atypeofearlycannon,firingstoneshotweighingasmuchas900pounds.bondi:(8th–11thcenturies)Vikinginfantryleviesthatconsistedofordinarymensuchasfarmersandlabourers.Thebondicouldbeorganizedintothe

smaller‘piratebands’orraidinggroups,orintolargerinfantryblockswhenattachedtoaroyalarmyorlargeterritorialforce.Thesetroopsrangedinfightingability,andastheVikingageprogressed,manymengaveuptheirfarmstobecomefull-timewarriors.Theywerealsosometimesknownasdrengs,thegnsoryeomen.

bow(selfandcomposite):Theselfbowwasmadeofasinglepieceofwood,perhapsthemostfamousbeingtheEnglishlongbow.Thecompositebowwasarecurvebowconstructedofwood,hornandtendonsfromoxen,carefullylaminatedtogethertocreateabowofsuperiorstrength,rangeandimpactpower.

breidox:(10th–12th

centuries)Along-haftedVikingbattleaxe.The‘broadaxe’wasfirstseenattheendofthe10thcenturyandmadefamousbythehuscarlesatthebattleofHastingsin1066.Ittookitsnamefromtheblade’sdistinctivecrescentshape,largesize(usually12inchesalongitscurvededge),and5foothaft.Thislong-haftedaxealsobecamethe

signatureweaponoftheVarangianGuard.bucellarii:(4th–6thcenturies)TheseunitswerearmedretainersofByzantinenobleswhotookanadditionaloathoffealtytotheByzantineemperors.Theyusuallyconsistedofveryhighqualitycavalry.

burh:(9th–11thcenturies)Awalled,fortifiedsitebuiltusingearthandtimber

construction.BurhswereusedbytheAnglo-SaxonkingAlfredtheGreatasawayofprotectingsouth-westEnglandfromVikingmarauding.cabalerias:Landgrantsexemptfromtaxation.DuringtheReconquista,aslandswereliberatedbyChristianmonarchs,cabaleriasweregiventoloyallordstosupportthe

cavalrynecessaryforwarfare.cabalgadas:Long-distanceChristianraidingagainstpredominatelyMuslim(Moorish)targetsduringtheSpanishReconquista.caballerosvillanos:ASpanishtermfornon-nobleknightssupportedbytermedbenefices.These‘commoner-knights’wereusedbyChristiankingsand

noblesinthefrontierwarsagainsttheMoorsduringtheReconquista(‘reconquest’)ofSpainandPortugal.

caracole:(16th–17thcenturies)Acavalrymanoeuvreinearlymodernwarfare.Toexecutethecaracole,reiterstrottedtowardtheirenemyinalineofsmall,densecolumns,thenfiredtheirthreemuzzle-loadingpistols.

Afterdischargingtheirweapons,theythenswung180degreesandfiledtothereartoreload.Usuallythecaracoletacticwasemployedbeforeageneraladvanceasameansofdisruptingenemycavalryandinfantryformations.

cataphracts:(7thcenturybce–15thcenturyce,fromtheGreekword‘coveredover’)Chain-orscale-mailed

heavycavalryfromtheNearEastwhoemployedthetwo-handedkontosinshockcombat.Thiskindofclose-orderheavycavalryoriginatedinPersiaandbecamethesignaturetacticalsystemforlatercivilizationsfromthatregion(Persians,Parthians,RomansandByzantines).

cavaller:ASpanishtermforanon-noblehorseman.

chevauchée:AFrenchtermfirstencounteredinthe12thcenturyforamountedraidintendedtodestroyanenemy’sresourcesandenrichtheraidingarmy.ThistacticwasusedwithgreatsuccessbytheEnglishinFrenchterritoryduringtheHundredYearsWar.

chivalry:(11th–16thcenturies)1.(afterchevallerie,meaning‘skill

onhorseback’inFrench)AfusionofGermanicandChristianculturalelementsintoanewcodeofhonour.Fromthe11thcenturyonward,chivalrywasreinforcedbythereligiousceremonyofdubbingtoknighthood,theadoptionofdistinguishingemblemsandblazons(andthescienceofheraldrytodevelopandinterpretthesesymbolsof

station),andtheemergenceinthe12thcenturyofcourtpoetsknownastroubadourstosingthepraisesofknightsliving,pastandlegendary.2.Agenerictermfornobleheavycavalryfromanyperiod.clibanarii:HeavilyarmouredcavalryintheRomanandByzantinearmies.Theselancersandmountswereprotectedbycomposite

chain-andscale-mailarmour.AstheRomanEmpireworeon,theseunitsformedanincreasinglyhigherproportionofRomancavalryandbecamethedominanttacticalsystemofthelaterByzantineEmpirecomitatenses:(4th–6thcenturies)UnitsofthelateRomanandearlyByzantinefieldarmycomposedofmixedregularandbarbarian

regimentsnotspecificallytiedtofrontierprovinces.Theyoftensupportedlimitaneiandbucellariioncampaign.comitatus:ApracticeinGermanicsocietieswhereawarleaderorchiefattractsfreedwarriorstohimselfontheconditiontheleaderwouldbringgloryandwartreasure.Thispracticewasbetweensocialequals.The

comitatusinfluencedtheevolutionofvassalageintheearlymedievalperiod.Compagniesd’ordonnance:(15thcentury)ThefirstFrenchstandingarmy,raisedinthefifteenthcenturybythedukeofBurgundy,CharlesVII.By1473thesecompaniesnumbered900menbasedonanine-manlanceofheavycavalrymadeupintofour

squadrons,eachof25men-at-arms,25lighthorse,25valetsand75mountedlightinfantrylongbowmen.Theseunitswerefurthersupportedbycontingentsof25crossbowmen,25pikemenand25handgunners,allonfoot.Aseachmanwaswellpaidandprovidedwithrations,thesecompanieshadnoneedtoforage,andowedtheir

loyaltysolelytothecrown.condottieri:(14th–15thcenturies)MercenariesemployedbyItaliancitystatessuchasFlorence,PisaandMilan,whoservedunderacontractcalledacondotta.TheseunitswererecruitedfromalloverEurope.

conicalhelm:Anopen-facedhelmetfavouredbymanyarmiesinwestern

civilizationandcharacterizedbythewayittaperedofftoapoint.Thishelmetprovidedexcellentprotectionbecauseitofferedaglancingsurfaceforblows.TheAssyrians,Germanictribes,VikingsandNormansusedvariationsofthisdesign.

countermarch:(16th–17thcenturies)Anearlymoderninfantrymanoeuvreusedto

createvolleyfire.Thefirstrankofarquebusiersandmusketeersfiredtheirweapons,thenwheeledandmarchedbetweenthefilesofthemenstandingbehindthemtotherear,reloadingtheirweaponstogetherinunisontotheprecisecommandsofanofficer.Meanwhile,thesecondrankdischargedtheirweaponsandrepeatedthemanoeuvre

untilalltenrankshadrotatedthroughandthefirstrankwasreadyagaintofire.Withpractice,thecountermarchallowedtheDutchbattaliontocontinuouslyfireatenemyformations,givinganadversarynotimetorecoverfromtheimpactofonevolleybeforeanothervolleyhithome.

cuirass:Atypeofmetal

armourwhichusuallyincludesabreastplateandback-plateheldinpositionbyeitherpinsorleatherstraps.Itgaveexcellentprotectionofthetorsowhilefreeingthearmsforcombat.ItwasverypopularinGreeceandRome,andcontinuedinpopularityuntiltheearlymodernperiod.

cuirassiers:(16th–17thcentury)Atypeofearly

modernlightcavalry,namedaftertheirbreastplates,whospecializedinpistolfire.Thesehorsemenusedwheellockpistolsinthecaracolemanoeuvre.Seereiters.

Daral-Harb:(Arabicfor‘HouseofWar’)AccordingtotraditionalIslam,therealmoftheworldwheretheinfidellives.

Daral-Islam:(Arabicfor‘HouseofIslam’)

AccordingtotraditionalIslam,therealmoftheworldwhereMuslimsandprotectedpeopleslive.

destrier:(11th–16thcenturies)AheavywarhorseusedbyChristianknightsduringthehighandlatemedievalperiods.ThefinestdestriersincludeArabianbloodacquiredviaAndalusianorotherSpanishbreeds.Thedestrierwas

usuallyastallion,reachingitslargestproportionsinthe14century.Themagnusequusor‘greathorse’ofthelateMiddleAgeswasasturdysteedof17handsand1,200to1,300pounds,capableofsupportingitsownbardingandaknightinfullplatearmour.drekkar:(8th–11thcenturies)ThelargesttypeofVikinglongship,knowntohistory

asa‘dragonship’.Theselarger,tallervesselshadacrewofperhaps80warriorsandwereparticularlysuitedforlong-rangeraidingandinvasion.Drekkarshadhigh,plankeddecksforeandaft,fromwhicharrowsandspearscouldberaineddownontheiropponents’decks.Difficulttomanoeuvreinbattle,drekkarsweresometimes

lashedtogether‘stemtostemandsterntostern’tocreatelarge,floatingbattlefieldsofoak,canvasandrope.

fahnlein:(13th–14thcenturies)Asubunit(‘littleflag’)oftheSwissphalanx,consistingofbetween50and150men.TheearlySwissphalanxwascomposedoftwoormorecantonalcontingentscalled

abanner.Eachbannerwascommandedbyitsownofficersandwassubdividedintosubunitscalledfahnleins.Fahnleinswerefurthersubdividedinten-mansquadscalledrottenorsections.

flail:Anearlyagriculturalimplementusedtothreshgrainwhichwasmodifiedforwar.Essentiallyaspikedball(sometimesmultiple

balls)andchainattachedtoahaft,theflailbecameacontusionweaponofchoiceforbothinfantryandcavalryduringthemedievalperiod.foederati:(4th–6thcenturies)BarbarianalliesofRomewhoretainedtheirGermaniccommandersandwereallowedtoroamwithintheboundariesoftheempire.Eventually,thesebarbarianunitsbecame

indistinguishablefromregularRomanandByzantineunits,whoadoptedGermanicarms,armourandtactics.fossato:ASpanishtermforamajormilitaryexpedition.DuringtheReconquista,Christianmonarchswouldpulltogetheratemporaryarmyorhostforamilitarycampaign.

francisca:(4th–8thcenturies)

AfinelybalancedFrankishaxeusedbothonfootandfromhorsebackasaclose-quarterweaponorthrownasamissile.GardedesCentSuisses:(15thcentury)EliteSwissheavyinfantrywhoservedastheFrenchmonarch’spersonalbodyguard.ThishiringsignifiedthedominanceoftheSwissheavyinfantrytacticalsysteminlate

medieval/earlymodernwarfare.gendarmerie:AFrenchtermforlance-wieldingheavycavalry.

GeneralFyrd(GreatFyrd):(9th–11thcenturies)Anglo-Saxonmilitia.Theseleviesusuallyfoughtlocallytoprotecttheirhearthandhome,butassoldiers,theyweretheleastdependableelementoftheAnglo-Saxon

army.Whenincombat,theGeneralFyrdusuallyoccupiedtherearranksbehindtheirmoreableandbetter-armedcomrades.SeealsoSelectFyrd.genitors:(15th–16thcenturies)Spanishlightcavalrywhotradedintheirjavelinsforbulkycrossbowsandarquebuses.Ultimatelyunsuccessfulonthebattlefield,genitorswere

usedforstrategicreconnaissance,screeninganddisruptingenemycommunications.Gewalthut:(14th–16thcenturies)ThemainbodyinaSwisscolumn.Itwasusuallylargerthanthevanguard(Vorhut)andtherearguard(Nachhut),whichwasusuallysmallerthanthemainbody.TheSwissdrilled,marchedandeven

advancedtotheattacktothesoundofthedrum,withsomeauthoritiesstatingthatthetroopsmarchedincadence.

‘GreatArmy’(Viking):AScandinavianarmymadeupoffleetsofhundredsoflongshipscarryingthousandsofVikingwarriorsandledbyseveralScandinaviankings.Between865and879and

againbetween892and896,the‘GreatArmy’plunderedEngland,withtheDanesoccupyinganareaknownasDanelawinnorth-easternEngland.gyula:AMagyar(Hungarian)termforgeneral.

halberdiers:(13th–16thcenturies)Soldierscarryingpolearmswithbladedoraxe-shapedheadsswunginclose-quartercombat.The

SwissbecameespeciallyadeptwiththisweaponintheirwarsagainsttheAustrians.Asthelatemedievalperiodworeon,thehalberdierwasslowlyreplacedbythepikemanasthedominanttacticalsystemoftheSwiss.

hauberk:Chain-mailarmourwhichcoveredthebodyandarms.Itwasconstructedwithtensofthousandsof

roundmetallinks.Itdatesbacktotheclassicalperiodwhereitwasusedbybothbarbarianandcivilizedpeoples.Itbecameverypopularinthemedievalperiod.

heavycavalry:Well-armouredhorsemenwhouseshockcombatastheirprimarywayoffighting.Heavycavalryreliedoncollectiveefforttobe

effective,andcollectiveeffortrequireddisciplineandtraining.FamousexamplesofheavycavalryfromhistoryarethecataphractariifromPersia,clibanariifromRomeorByzantium,andmedievalknights.

heavyinfantry:Well-armouredfootsoldierswhouseshockcombatastheirprimarywayoffighting.

Likeheavycavalry,collectiveeffortwasrequired.FamousexamplesoflightinfantryareGreekhoplites,Macedonianphalangites,Romanlegionaries,SwissAuszugorGermanLandsknechts.

host:Anarmypulledtogetheronatemporarybasis.

huscarles:(10th–11thcenturies)Membersofthehouseholdofa

Scandinavian(laterAnglo-Saxon)kingorlord,oftenidentifiedasbodyguardsandknownfortheirprowesswithlong-haftedbroadaxes.

‘Immortals’:Adivision(myriad)of10,000Persianheavyinfantrysonamedbecausewhenamemberofthiselitegroupfell,hewasimmediatelyreplacedbyapreviouslyselectedman.jagun:(12th–14thcenturies)

Atermforacavalrysquadronof100menintheMongolarmy.Seearban.

javelineer:Alightinfantrymanwhowieldsajavelin.Commandersoftenusedtheselighttroopsasskirmishersorforscreeningthedeploymentoffriendlyheaviertroops.jihad:(Islamicholywar)IntheIslamicfaith,literally‘tostruggleinthewayofGod’.

The‘greaterjihad’isthepersonalstruggleofaMuslimtomaintainhisorherfaith.The‘lesserjihad’isholywar,orspreadingIslamintonewterritories.JihadwasofteninvokedbyMuslimrulerstorallypoliticalormilitarysupportinmuchthesamewaytheCatholicChurchusedtheconceptofthecrusade.jinete:(11th–16thcenturies)

AlightSpanishcavalrymountequippedwithlowsaddles,shorterstirrups,andspeciallyshapedpalatebitsforincreasedcontrolandmobility.ThisnewSpanishlightcavalry’sshortstirrupandlowsaddleallowedforquickremounting,andthesmallerandfastermountswerebettersuitedtocounterthelighterandmoreagileMuslimlightcavalry.

junds:(fromthe7thcentury)Atermfornon-ArabIslamicunitsrecruitedlocally.ThepaceofIslamicconquestforcedtheArabstoincludemoreoftheseunitsintheirranks.Theyfoughtforbootymorethanideology,swellingtheranksofIslamicarmiesintimesofvictory,andevaporatingintimesoftrouble.karr-wa-farr:(simulated

flight)AtacticusedbyIslamiccavalryinSpainandPortugaltolureenemycavalryintopursuit,onlytobeambushedinterrainfavourabletotheMuslims.TheSpanishadoptedasimilarfeignedretreatcalledtorna-fuye.keil:(13th–14thcenturies)ASwissbattlesquareorganizedindeepfiles.Thistacticalarraywaslessa

wedgethanacolumn,narrowerthanitwasdeep.Whenattackedbyenemycavalry,thepikemeninthekeilwouldfaceoutwardsandlowertheirpikes,creatingabristlinghedgehogthatwouldbedifficulttoapproachonhorseback.

kiteshield:(10th–11thcenturies)Acavalryshieldwhoseuniqueshapehelped

protectaknight’slegwhileheattackedfromhorseback.ItiscloselyassociatedwiththeNormansandisseennumeroustimesontheBayeuxTapestry.kontos:(1stcenturybce–6thcenturyce)Along,two-handedthrustingspearusedbyheavycavalry(cataphractariiorclibanarii)fromParthia,Persia,Romeand

Byzantium.laager:Anencampmentcreatedbydrawinganarmy’sbaggagewagonsintoacircleorsquare.Thistemporaryfortificationwasoftenusedwhencampinginhostileterritoryorservedasabaseofoperationsorrefugeinbattle.

lamellararmour:Atypeofcompositearmourconsistingofashirtof

laminatedlayersofleathersownorgluedtogether,thenfittedwithironplates.Itwaspopularwithbothbarbarianwarriorsandthesoldiersofcivilization.

lance:1.Aspearusedfromhorsebackasashockweapon,usuallyinconjunctionwithabuilt-upsaddleandstirrups.2.Anameforasmallunitofknightswhousuallyfought

withinabanner.lancegarnie:(13th–15thcenturies)Theretinueofaknight,usuallyconsistingofamountedsquireandtwomountedlightinfantryarchers.Thesquirecarriedtheknight’sarmouronapackhorse,andalsotendedtotheknight’swarhorse,whichwasneverriddenunlessinbattle.

Landsknechts:(15th–16th

centuries)Germanmercenaries,knownfortheirflamboyantcostumes,whofoughtinaphalanxusingpikes.ThesetroopsoriginallyemulatedSwissformationsandwerecapableofoffensiveactionagainstotherinfantryformations,andcoulddefendthemselvesfromheavycavalryattacks.

Landsturm:(15th–16th

centuries)ASwisslevéeenmasseofallable-bodiedmen.Itwasareserveforcecalledtoarmsonlyinanemergency.

Landwehr:(15th–16thcenturies)TheprimarycombatforceoftheSwissheavyinfantry,composedofmenwillingandabletoleavehomeiftheneedarose.

levéeenmasse:Amass

conscriptionofable-bodiedmenforwarfare.

lightcavalry:Lightarmouredhorsemenwhousedmissilecombatastheirprimarywayoffighting.Theselighterunitswerelessarmouredthantheirheaviercounterparts,andconsequentlyhadgreatertacticalmobility.Famousexamplesoflightcavalryarethevarioushorsearchers

fromtheEurasiansteppe(Scythians,Parthians,Magyars,TurksandMongols)andSpanishgenitors.

lightinfantry:Lightarmouredfootsoldierswhousemissilecombatastheirprimarywayoffighting.Likethelightcavalry,theyenjoyedgreatertacticalmobility.Famousexamplesoflightinfantryare

Thracianpeltasts,RhodianslingersandEnglishlongbowmen.limitanei:(4th–6thcenturies)Theseunitswereamilitia,retiredlegionariesmusteredtodefendtheirhomeland.Intimesofemergency,limitaneicouldbepromotedintothefieldarmy,receivingthetitlepseudocomitatenses.Thecomplementofthesenew

unitswasaboutone-thirdofa1st-centurylegion.

longship:(8th–11thcenturies)AVikingwarship.Long,narrow-keeledandflat-bottomedvesselswithbeautifullycarvedarchedprows,thefirstlongshipscarriedaround35warriors,thoughlatershipsknownasdrekkarscouldcarryacomplementof80men.Theyweremadeofoak

usingclinkerconstruction(overlappingplanksheldtogetherwithclinchbolts)withamastamidshipsandonebankofoarsoneachside.Controlledwithtwosteeringoars,thesevesselshadshallowdraughtsmakingitpossibleforthemtonavigateupriversandalongcoastlines,givingtheNorse,DanesandSwedesunprecedentedstrategic

mobility.longsword:Atypeofswordusuallylongerthan30inchesinlengthandwieldedasacut-and-slashweapon.ItbecamepopularatthebeginningoftheIronAgeforbothinfantryandcavalry.

mace:Oneoftheearliestweapons.Essentiallyalong-handledimplementwithaspikedorflangedballatthe

tip.Itwasaveryeffectivecontusionweaponandbecameaweaponofchoiceagainstplatemailandfullplateinthehighandlatemedievalperiods.mangudai:(12th–14thcenturies)Mongol‘suicidetroops’(anhonourabletitlemorethanajobdescription).Thefunctionoftheseelitecavalrytroopswastochargetheenemy

positionaloneandthenbreakranksandfleeinthehopethattheenemywouldgivechase.Iftheenemypursued,theMongolswouldleadthemintoterrainsuitableforambush.

militaryorders:(12th–16thcenturies)OrderssanctionedbythemedievalpapacytoprotectpilgrimsonthewaytotheHolyLand.Thesewell-armedandwell-trained

warrior-monksormilitiaChristi(‘knightsofChrist’)becametheshocktroopsforChristiancommandersduringthecrusades.VariousordersemergedinthisperiodalloverEuropeandtheLevant,includingtheKnightsTemplars,KnightsHospitallers,KnightsofCalatrava,KnightsofSantiagoandTeutonicKnights.

milites:AmedievalLatintermforknights,soldiersor‘men-at-arms’.minghan:(12th–14thcenturies)AcavalryregimentintheMongolarmyconsistingof1,000men.Seearban.

missilecombat:Aformofwarfarewhereparticipantsuserangedweapons(slings,bows,javelins,throwingspears)againsttheenemy.

Suchcombatisusuallyperformedbylighttroops(infantryandcavalry).

motte-and-bailey:(10th–13thcenturies)ReferringtoatypeoffortificationusedbytheNormansintheirsubjugationofEngland,WalesandIreland.Themottewasamoundofearthbuiltupandusuallytoppedoffbyawooden(sometimesstone)tower.Thebailey

wasanenclosureprotectedbyaditch,anearthbankandwoodenpalisade.Sincetimberwasplentiful,thesecastleswereeasytoconstruct.ItisestimatedthathundredsofthesefortificationswereerectedinthefirstdecadesoftheNormanconquestofEngland.

musketeer:(15th–17thcenturies)Amusket-

wieldinglightinfantryman.Thistypeofsoldierusedthefirstreliablehandguninhistory,amuzzle-loadedsmooth-boreweapon.

naccara:(12th–14thcenturies)Alargekettle-likedrumcarriedbyacamelandusedbyMongolcommanderstoorchestratetheirarmy’smovements.Mongollancersusuallyadvancedatatrotandin

silence.Itwasonlyatthelastpossiblemomentthatthechargewasorderedbystrikingthenaccara.Nachhut:(14th–16thcenturies)TherearguardinaSwisscolumn.ItwasusuallysmallerthanthemainbodyorGewalthut.

Normans:OriginallyfromScandinavia,thisVikingculturesettledinNormandyatthebeginningofthe10th

centuryandadoptedbothCatholicChristianityandfeudalism.Overthenext200years,NormanwarriorssuccessfullyinvadedandcarvedoutstatesinItaly,EnglandandtheLevant.Theyweremastersofheavycavalryshocktacticsandbuiltcastles(firstmotte-and-baileyandlaterstone)todominateconqueredregions.

numeri(sing.numerus):(2nd–6thcenturies)ARomantermreferringtoirregularunitsfromacommonethnicbackgroundemployedtopatrolthelimes,theguardedandoftenfortifiedborderinfrontierregions.ItwasalsoappliedtosomeunitsofcavalryinthelateRomanEmpireandearlyByzantineperiods.palatini:(4th–6thcenturies)

MilitaryunitsinthelateRomanEmpireandearlyByzantineperiodwhichwereofahigherstatusandprestigethanthecomitatenses.Theyoftenformedpartofthefieldarmies.

‘Parthianshot’:Astandardnomadiclightcavalrymanoeuvrewherehorsearchersbreakformationandgalloptowardanenemy

formationfiringarrows,thenwheelrightandretreat,firingovertheirshouldersbackattheenemy.ThemanoeuvreisnamedaftertheParthians,thoughallsteppearcherspractisedit.The‘Parthianshot’wasoftenusedinconjunctionwiththefeignedretreat,pullingenemycavalryintopursuit,thenambushingthemfarfromtheircamp.

pavise:Atallbody-shieldusuallyusedtoprotectlightinfantrymissiletroops(archers,slingersand,later,crossbowmenandhandgunners)fromattack.Theshield’sall-bodyprotectionmadeitidealforsieges.

PeaceofGod:(firstpronouncedin989)RomanCatholicspiritualsanctionsdesignedtomitigatethe

violenceofthehighMiddleAges.Thislegislationtargetedanyonewhoplunderedorviolatedachurch,struckanunarmedmemberoftheclergyorrobbedapeasant.Theprohibitionwaslaterextendedtoknightsattackingmerchantsorpilgrims,anddestroyingmillsorvineyards.peonias:Infantryland-grants

madeduringtheSpanishReconquista.Christiankingsgrantedlandtosubjects(peones)whowerewillingtoprovidetheassignedobligation.Peoneswhobecamerichenoughcouldbecomecaballerosvillanos.

phalanx:Aclose-orderheavyinfantryformationwithspearmenarrangedinrankandfile.Thisformationwas

capableofdevastatingoffensivepowerthroughthecollisionandpushofitssoldiers.ThereisevidencethatthisformationdatesbacktoBronzeAgeMesopotamia,thoughitwascertainlyperfectedbytheGreeksandMacedoniansduringthearchaic,HellenicandHellenisticperiods,andresurrectedinthelatemedievalperiodbythe

Swiss.pikeman:Aheavyinfantrymanarmedwithalong-haftedthrustingspear(usuallyover12feetinlength)whooftenfoughtinrankandfileinaphalanx.

platearmour:(15th–17thcenturies)Latemedievalarmourconsistingentirelyofmetalplatestoencasetheknight.Thiswasdoneinresponsetothevulnerability

ofmountedlancerstothearrowsandboltsoflightinfantry.Contrarytopopularbelief,thisveryexpensivearmourwascustom-fitandallowedthewearerverygoodmobility,thoughhemayhavesufferedfrompoorventilation.

plate-mailarmour:(13th–17thcenturies)Atransitionalarmourinlate

medievalEuropeusingmetalplatestostrengthenchain-mailarmouratparticularlyvulnerablepoints(suchastheshinandknee).Thiswasdoneinresponsetothevulnerabilityofmountedlancerstothearrowsandboltsoflightinfantry.Thisarmourwasverycumbersome.

polearm:Along-haftedheavyinfantryweaponpopular

throughoutthehistoryofwarfare,designedtobeusedwithtwohandsagainstinfantryandcavalryformations.

poleaxe:(14th–16thcenturies)Ashort-haftedinfantryweaponpopularintheLateMiddleAges.Itwasusually5feetlongwithametal-sheathedshaftmountedwithanaxe-headtothefrontandahammeror

picktotherear.Thisweapon’sversatilityallowedittobeusedforcutting,crushingorpiercingattacks.pseudocomitatenses:(4th–6thcenturies)ThetitlegiventounitsoflimitaneiwhowereattachedtofieldarmiesinthelateRomanimperialandearlyByzantineperiods.Reconquista:Thenearly800-yearprocessofChristianarmiesreconqueringthe

IberianpeninsulafromIslamicoccupation(711–1492).Thiscounter-crusadeintensifiedinthemid-11thcenturywhenChristianarmiessweptsouththroughcentralSpainandPortugalseizingterritory.Theearly13th-centuryChristianvictoryovertheAlmohadsatLasNavasdeTolosa(1212)brokethebackofIslamiccontrolofmuchof

southernSpain,withthelastMuslimstrongholdatGranadaholdingoutuntil1492.reiters:(16th–17thcenturies)Germancavalrywearingbreastplatearmourandhigh,heavyleatherboots,andarmedwiththreewheel-lockpistols.Thisnewmercenarylightcavalryattackedenemyformationsusingtherevolvingtacticsofthe

caracole.rotten:(13th–14thcenturies)ThesmallestsubunitoftheSwissphalanx.Seefahnlein.

schiltron(schiltrom):(13thcentury)AScottishinfantryformation.Thesebattlesquaresandcirclesplacedcountrymanbesidecountryman,eachholdingalonginfantryspearorpikebeforehimtodiscourageenemyheavycavalry

charges.ItwasemployedbytheScottishintheirwarsofindependenceagainsttheEnglish.Schwarzreiter:(Germanfor‘blackrider’)AspecifictypeofGermanreiterarmouredinablackbreastplate.Seereiters.

scramasax:Asingle-edgedsidearmfavouredbyIndo-European(GermanicandScandinavian)warriorsin

theclassicalandearlymedievalperiods.Oftencalledasax,thisutilityknifecouldtakeonthedimensionsofashortsword.

SelectFyrd:(9th–11thcenturies)AbodyofAnglo-SaxonnoblesandfreemanorganizedsincetheVikinginvasionsofthe9thcenturytodefendEngland.

shieldwall:(9th–11th

centuries)AdefensiveinfantryformationusedbyAnglo-SaxonandVikingwarriorsstandingincloseorder,shieldsoverlappingtoformanunbrokenfront.Thisformationcouldalsoopenupenoughtoallowwarriorsroomtothrowspearsandjavelins,andwieldspears,axesandswords.

shockcombat:Aformof

warfarewhereparticipantsuseclose-quarterweapons(swords,axes,maces,thrustingspears)againsttheenemy.Thiscombatisusuallyperformedbyheavytroops(infantryandcavalry)andmostofteninwell-articulatedformations.

shortsword:Atypeofswordusuallyshorterthan30inchesinlengthandwieldedasathrustingweapon.Itis

thefirstsworddesigninhistoryandbecamepopularforinfantryatthebeginningoftheBronzeAge.

skeggox:(8thcentury)AnearlytypeofScandinavianbattleaxe.Theskeggox(‘beardedaxe’)tookitsnamefromtheasymmetricalshapeoftheaxeblade.Vikingaxesusuallybeganasdual-purposeimplementsusedasbothtoolsand

weapons.Later,theVikingswoulddevelopaxesusedexclusivelyforwar(seebreidox).spangenhelm:AnIndo-Europeanopen-facedhelmetconicalinshapeandcharacterizedbyitscompositeconstruction.Itgetsitsnamefromthespangensormetalbands.Itconsistedofaframeworkformedbyasingle

headbandonwhichwereattachedsixormorespangens.Thisframeworkwasthenfilledwitheithermetalorhornplates,creatingastrongandcomfortablehelmet.ItwasusedbyGermanictribes,VikingwarriorsandNormansoldiersinthemedievalperiod.spatha:(1st–6thcenturies)Alongswordoriginallyused

byRomanandauxiliarycavalryand,later,infantry.Thoughthespathawaspointedforthrusting,itwasusuallyutilizedforcut-and-slashstrikes,emulatingthefavouredtacticsoftheGermanictribes.

spearman:Awarriorwhousesaspear.Aspearmancanbeheavyinfantryifheuseshisspearasashockweaponorlightinfantryif

hethrowshisweaponasamissile.

squire:(11th–16thcenturies)Aknightintraining.Indoctrinationintoknighthoodbeganatpubertywithalongresidencyandtrainingamongpeersinthehouseholdofagreatlord.Theyoungsquirewastaughthowtochooseandlookafteramount,aswellashowtoride.Hewasalso

instructedintheuseofawidevarietyofweapons,suchasthespear,swordandshield,axe,maceandflail,aswellasunarmedcombatsuchaswrestling.Oncehecouldmanageahorsehelearnedhowtohunt,avaluableskillwhichtaughttheuseofterrainandavailablecover,andselectlinesofadvance.Mountedcombatwasemphasized.

strandhogg:(9th–11thcenturies)AVikingshoreraidwherewarriorswouldbeachtheirlongship,roundupcattleandsheep,thensailoff.ThisformofmedievallivestockrustlingwasevendoneinScandinaviaitselfuntilitwasoutlawedbytheriseofcentralizedmonarchiesinthe9thand10thcenturies,forcingthestrandhoggintoforeign

waters.tagmata:(7th–15thcenturies)ThecoreoftheByzantinearmy,consistingofprofessionalsoldiersorganizedinhomogenizedcavalryorinfantryunits.Thetagmatawereequaltothesizeofthethema(4,000–9,600men).Thesesoldierswerethebest-trainedtroopsintheempire,servingasConstantinople’s

garrisonandasthechiefexpeditionaryforcefortheemperor.Whentheemperorwentoncampaign,thetagmataandlocalthemaecombinedtocreateafieldarmy.tercio:(16thcentury)ASpanishtacticalsystemcontaining3,000mendividedintothreecolunelasof1,000men(12companiesof250menapiece).It

integratedpikemenandarquebusiersintoonebattlesquare,creatingthemostformidabletacticalsysteminEurope.

thegn:(9th–11thcenturies)AmilitaryclassofAnglo-Saxonnobles.Theycouldbemembersofthehouseholdsofkings,orlessernoblesand/orlandownersof100acresormorewhowereobligatedto

serveintheEnglisharmyduringwartimeoramilitaryemergencyonceperyear.thema:(7th–15thcenturies)AByzantinedivisionofbetween4,000and9,600mencommandedbyastrategos.ThethemareplacedthelegionasthepremierstrategicunitofmanoeuvreinByzantinewarfare.Thesoldiersofaparticularfrontierprovince

(theme)werethelegalholdersofthelanditself,adevelopmentthatcameintheformofimperiallandgrantswithintheparticularregion,similartothelandgrantsduringtheearlyRomanEmpire.Althoughthesoldiersdidnotworkthefieldsorrunfarmsonafull-timebasis,theirownershipbroughtaboutapersonalstakeinthedefenceoftheir

respectivetheme.torna-fuye:(11th–16thcenturies)ASpanishtermforafeignedretreattacticfavouredbyjinetes.traceitalienne:(16th–17thcenturies)AnearlymodernEuropeanfortressspecificallydesignedtodefendagainstgunpowdertechnologies.Itconsistedofaringofpolygonalbastionsdesignedtoprojectfrom

slopedwallsandserveasascreenandgunplatform.Thebastionsystemwasenhancedbyditchesanddetachedforts.

TruceofGod:(pronouncedintheearly11thcentury)AsecondCatholicChurchsponsoredmovement,which,alongwiththe‘PeaceofGod’,wasdesignedtoreignintheviolenttendenciesofthe

knightlyclass.The‘TruceofGod’askedthemountedaristocracytoforgothepleasureofwaronThursdays,Fridays,Saturdays,Sundaysandholydays,andtorefrainfromactsofviolenceatalltimesinandaroundchurches.tuman:(12th–14thcenturies)ThelargestunitintheMongolarmy,consistingof

10,000men.Mongolcommandersoftenpulledtogethernumeroustumansasfieldarmies.Seearban.

turcopoles:(12th–13thcenturies)IndigenousmercenariesoftheLevantwhoservedwesternChristianknightsasmountedarchersandothertypesoflightcavalry.Thesetroops,oftentheproductofChristianandMuslim

marriages,becameastandardfeatureofcrusadingwarfare,servingaslargenativecontingentsinthearmiesoflayrulersandthemilitaryorders,whileoftenretainingtheirownofficers.turma:1.(4thcenturybce–3rdcenturyce)ThebasicsubunitofRomancavalryformuchofitshistory,consistingof30men.2.

(7th–11thcenturies)AByzantinecombined-armsforceconsistingofbetweenfiveandeightbanda(2,000–3,200cavalryandinfantry).

VarangianGuard:(10th–11thcenturies)Russo-SwedishandScandinavianmercenariesintheserviceoftheByzantineemperor.ManyoftheseVikingsreturnedtoScandinaviato

carveoutkingdoms.Vikings:Scandinavianwarriors,fromNorway,DenmarkandSweden.TheirmovementsconstitutethefinalwaveofIndo-Europeanmigration.Warriors,traders,superbshipbuildersandsailors,theVikingspushedsouthfromtheirhomelandintheirtrademarklongshipsandattackedthewholeof

Europebetweenthe8thand11thcenturies.Vorhut:(14th–16thcenturies)ThevanguardinaSwisscolumn,oftenincludingskirmishersarmedwithcrossbowsorhandguns.ThevanwasfollowedbyamainbodyorGewalthutmuchlargerthantheadvanceguard,andarearguardorNachhut.Waldstaaten:(medieval

period)Swissforestcantonmilitia.AccordingtoGermanictradition,allable-bodiedmenwererequiredtoparticipateintheself-defenceoftheircantons.

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