war texting weaponizing machine 2 machine

8/2/2019 War Texting Weaponizing Machine 2 Machine

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War TextingWeaponizing Machine 2 Machine

@[email protected]
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whois donb?
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whatis iSEC Partners?


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whyare we here?


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No, really.

Cellular enabled pill bottles

Track pill usage remotely

Email alerts when

Pill count is low

Pills havent been taken

When its time to take your pill
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Wait. That sounds bad.


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But, its helping people.

Alzheimers patients

Children with severe diseases

Physically disabled patients

Overworked security consultants
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Wait. That soundsgood.
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Everything will be a computer
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Examples?

Medical devices (personal, industrial)

Industrial monitoring

Automated Teller Machines

Industrial/Commercial Alarm Systems

Home Alarm Systems

Car security systems
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I would have owned ATMs, but


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Elegant Attacks Against M2M


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Attack methods

Firmware Over The Air (FOTA)

Long Range Baseband Compromise

Access Point Name (APN) Private Networkcompromise
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FOTA Hacking?


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FOTA

A methodology for

Devising a firmware patch/update

Securely packaging the patch/update

Shipping it OTA to be applied


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FOTA Attacks Benefits

Elegant

Mass compromise of multiple types of devices Multiple vendors use the same baseband

Negatives Very chip specific

Impacts the update lifecycle Requires specialized firmware Corner cases = potential detection FOTA compromise != Application compromise FOTA may not be used in specific M2M deployments
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FOTA Conclusion?


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So you thought baseband attacks were

local only, eh?


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Long Range Baseband Compromise Yep, Basebands have TCP/IP stacks Oh, and these too

HTTP FTP DNS ICMP

TCP client/server UDP client/server POP3 SMTP
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Long Range Baseband Attacks Benefits

Elegant

Mass persistent compromise Doesnt mess up firmware updates Backdoors are light weight Potential detection is slim to none

Negatives Very chip specific Requires zero-day Large time to deployment Target could be Java VM, could be C/C++
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Long Range Baseband Conclusion?


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APN Private Network Attacks?


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APN Private Network Attacks

Benefits

None

Negatives

Uninteresting

Boring Pointless

Repetitive

The Grugq would laugh at me
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You dont need to see a conclusion for

this one.


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So, what shouldwe do?
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Common M2M Example from Microchip


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Find Architectural Commonalities Baseband

modules must be approved

The approved list ispublic fewfeatures cant driveApplication Logic

Microcontrollers Small RAM Small Code Space (flash) Minimal security surface (if any)
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Find Architectural Commonalities Communication

Network Comm = Baseband

Peripheral Comm = uC

Comm between Baseband & uC = UART

Cryptographic Capability Onlysome Basebands provide HTTPS/SSL Usually only Java VM capable

uC is usually baked (or non-existent)
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Basebands Accept Hayes AT For network requests

AT+UHTTPC

AT^SISS

AT^USORF

For Incoming/Outgoing SMS AT+CMGL

AT^SMGL
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The PayloadMayBe Encrypted If the payload is encrypted

Finite ways the Application can generate a key

IMSI

GSM Timestamp

IMEI

Static Secret

Value from Network (Data or SMS)

Some applications dont even encrypt


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If encrypted, how do we analyze?


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How do we extract it? Use datasheet to find pins

Dont have the uC datasheet?

Most baseband datasheets are public

Use multimeter to

trace baseband UART -> uC UART

Trace VCC, VSS = Now you know 4 pins on your unknown uC

Scan leftovers for JTAG/etc


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How do we extract it? Logic Analyzer

Tap the UART pins

Find test pads, if available

Solder only when necessary (limit damage)

Most basebands will only talk

Async Serial 9600 8N1 Async Serial 115200 8N1

Process data at both speeds


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Next, we reverse.


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Its not always easy Difficult to determine crypto keys

Protocol may be dynamic

Nonces may get in the way
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Some light Hardware Hacking?


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Nothing too new Simple/Differential Power Analysis

Extract keys

Glitching Extract firmware

Bypass fuses to set DEBUG mode

Blue wire fixes Enable DEBUG mode

Add/remove resistors

Enable DEBUG mode


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Revenge (REVerse ENGinEering) uC are easy

Small code base

Predictable vectors Simple opcode architecture

Typicallyno MMU (used)
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The STM8 example stm8s207xx

24MHz clock

6KB RAM 128KB Flash

96 assembly instructions
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Disassembling & Emulating = Easy Few registers (X, Y, PC, SP, A, C)

Instructions are easy to decode

A common bit represents a type of memory access

No Store, just Load

Emulation requirements are minimal

Inject interrupts as desired Managing the Clock isnt complex

Simple buffer for UART bytes
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Releasable Tools GPLv2 License

This week

STM8 disassembler

STM8 emulator

At HITB KL

STM8 SWIM for GoodFET


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Point of Reverse Engineering? Determine vectors for communication

SMS

Internet Voice calls

Extract messages for Comm Channels Develop Protocol APIs


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With comm channel Identify commands

Build payloads

Assess delivery mechanisms

Essentially: Build a strategy for attack
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Building a Fingerprint


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Device Profiling Network fingerprint

Which network provider?

Is it allocated an MSISDN? Is voice allowed? Is SMS allowed? Caller ID? NPA NXX? HLR?

Physical fingerprint Recognizable SIM Baseband Capabilities


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Why Device Profile? SMS is Noisy

Hundreds of thousands of MSISDN

Decrease cost Evade SMS SPAM filters

Dont tip off your Target
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Simple Profiling Tools Scripts by donb and NickDE!

Hello, Carmen Sandiego :)

Snarf Caller ID Scan HLR

Build MSC databases


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Quick Example: iPad on AT&T Provider?

AT&T (MCC: 310, MNC: 410)

Caller ID? Billable name BAILEY DON

MSISDN & MSC

MSC location != NPA NXX Voice capability

Error
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Phew! Thats a lot of stuff!


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Overall Strategy? Identify target industry

Build doc library

Intercept initial command set

Attack hardware

Reverse engineer firmware

Extract commands Identify command channels

Devise network fingerprint

Attack!


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Case Study: Zoombak Tracking Device


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Zoombak Advanced GPS Tracker Sold in over 12,500 stores in USA

Smart Phone App (iPhone, Android, Blackberry)

2x as big as your 6th Generation iPod Nano Track your

Car

Family Pet

Valuables
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Zoombak Architecture Renesas SH microprocessor

Cinterion Wireless MC56

GR-520 GPS Module
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Intercept Initial AT Command Set Accepts SMS commands

Uploads data to Internet

Retrieves IMSI, IMEI, Network Timestamp, etc Monitors Base Station Info (RSSI, LAC, CI, etc)


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Zoombak Communication Channel Comm Vectors

SMS

Internet

Control Channel

Use SMSsubmit to ship the SMS via Kannel

Callbacks

SIM in GSM Modem


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Zoombak Network Fingerprint HLR

Caller ID

Voice capability MSC vs. MSISDN

Specialized SMS


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Fingerprint Result? 72% Success Rate

Several hundred Zoombak
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Zoombak Overall Result?


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Case Study: Car Security Module


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Strategy Target industry

Doc library

Intercept initial command set Attack hardware

RevEng firmware

Identify command channels Devise network fingerprint

Attack!


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Car Security Overall Result?


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Embedded Security is Hard.


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Dont make it harder Increase crypto usage

Ensure APN security

Use Nonces/Tokens Dont embed IP addresses in SMS ;)

Dont push insecure architecture

Require PKI/SSL Decrease Prices of Security uC

Atmel

ST


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All tools can be downloaded https://wartexting.org/

Simple Zoombak Scanner FindMe HLR/MSC snarfer

WhoIs Caller ID client

Soon to come (end of next week) STM8 Disassembler

STM8 Emulator


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Thanks to iSEC Partners, NCC Group, and Alex Stamos Mat Solnik Joe Gratz Nick DePetrillo Mike Ossmann Travis Goodspeed Patrick McCanna

Justine Osborne Heidi Cuda David Munson Robot insect image Mike Libby


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Even if my collar bones crush or crumble.

- Eminem

war texting weaponizing machine 2 machine

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