THirDOCIJMBKT I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O P H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y 8 S G O Y E B M M E N T :

Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1942.

$EGRET. . : Copy N^.

W . P V ( * 2 ) 4 3 .

January 28, 1942.

W A R C A B I N E T .

T H E I N D I A N P O L I T I C A L S I T U A T I O N .

I N connection with my memorandum on the above subject ( W . P . (42) 42) I circulate the following: telegram from the Viceroy. .

L . S . A . India Office, Jamiary 28, 1942.

: Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated January 21 . 1942.

(MostImmediate .) 104. S. H i s Majes ty ' s Government wil l wish for an apprec ia t ion of poli t ical

position here in the l ight of recent developments, par t i cu la r ly Bardol i Resolution, and for my suggestions as to policy which we should wisely adopt in the present circumstances. Text of J i n n a h ' s Resolution a t N a g p u r a n d of Bardol i Resolution and gist of discussions on the la t ter in A l l - Ind i a Congress Commit tee will" be available to you and need not be repeated here. ' ;

. 2 . Cabinet will have noted in Bardol i Resolution insis tent demand for full freedom ' ' ; reference to our system as " a r rogan t Imper ia l i sm which is i r id i s r

t inguishabie from Fascis t au tho r i t a r i an i sm " ; and deliberate misrepresenta t ion of our a t t i tude . Discussion of Resolution in Al l - Ind ia Congress Committee on 13th J a n u a r y was impor tan t as br ing ing out the real reluctance of subs tan t ia l elements to co-operate wholeheartedly whatever happens ; fac t t h a t the Resolution was gotJ;hrough af ter all on the assumption t h a t i t committed nobody to any th ing unless H i s Majes ty ' s Government conceded Congress demand, when the posit ion could be reconsidered; and extent to which elements in Congress were a f ra id to antagonise possible victors by he lp ing or coming to terms wi th us . Ra jagopa la ­chari added t h a t Bardol i Resolution " does not say what we want . The Br i t i sh Government know wha t we want . Therefore we need not re i te ra te i t , " and as usual w i th Congress pronouncements, there has been a number of competing public s ta tements by prominent Congressmen as to wha t exactly i t means.

3. I n effect Bardol i Resolution taken w i th discussion in A. I .C .C. represents reiteration of Congress demand for surrender by H i s Majes ty ' s Government to congress claims, ignor ing other par t ies and interests and the i r own obligat ions in the hope t h a t they will get Congress suppor t in fighting the war . I t s ma in importance is t h a t i t places us a t some tact ical d i sadvantage because of the ease with which i t c a n be misrepresented to our d isadvantage here and elsewhere, while i t has helped Congress machine by responding to s t rong feeling in the

I country t h a t non-violence is an impossible proposi t ion in present condit ions w i th Japanese next door. I t is impor tan t not to let ourselves be hypnot ised by Rajagopalachari and his appearance of reasonableness and plausibi l i ty . H e is endeavouring to concentrate spot l ight on himself and t o obscure the very significant dissident s t ra ins t h a t have emerged in discussions a t A . I .C .C . ; while Congress publici ty will continue to over-simplify the resolution and endeavour to present i t to the public quietly as offer to co-operate on reasonable terms.

4. The Moslem League a t t i tude , so fa r as I am aware, remains unchanged, with J i n n a h apprehensive t h a t H i s Majes ty ' s Government wil l allow themselves to be s tampeded by H i n d u s and Congress. J i n n a h has jus t informed Lumley

[ 2 3 3 8 2 - 2 ]

tha t he s tands firm on Pakis tan , and thinks tha t H i n d u s are out to get us to make a n engagement which would pre judge and rule out Pak i s t an , and, having obtained that , use i t as weapon wi th which to in t imida te Moslems. In all minori ty provinces the Moslems had sampled Congress rule, and were determined not to submit to any constitution which would instal l Congress domination over whole of country. H e does not th ink tha t Congress resolutions have materially altered thei r position, and thinks t h a t Secretary of State , in reply to a recent question in Par l iament , has made only possible answer. H e accepts without question t h a t we genuinely wan t to arr ive a t a settlement which must m e a n a transfer of power, but is afraid t h a t we may succumb to pressure, though he seemed, to Lumley, well satisfied wi th present a t t i t ude of H i s Majesty's Government.

5. Minorit ies, such as scheduled castes, and large body of opinion which is anxious to assist but knows t h a t i t can in no circumstances hope to exercise real control itself over political future, is watching line we shall take with uneasiness and uncertainty.

6. Issue is clearly of great importance, and we must consider i t dispassion­ately. I am quite ready to accept t h a t i t may be necessary for us to al ter genera] line of our policy towards' I nd i a af ter and as a consequence of the war . But I am clear in any event tha t policy as i t s tands (ult imate dominion s ta tus and t ransfer of real power to Ind ians a t centre, & c , and u l t imate implementing of arrangements covered by Declarat ion of Augus t 1940) is one which can only be succesfully implemented from a s t rong position. Our present position I would not regard as a strong one, and our prestige is undergoing some deterioration. I have to bear in mind further fact t h a t we are under warn ing t h a t we may lose Singapore, and that , as I have frequently informed Secretary of State , I am advised tha t I n d i a is a t present wholly insufficiently protected aga ins t at tack, and tha t direct a t tack on any considerable scale might produce an exceedingly difficult s i tuat ion to hold in terms of security in this country. I would not judge that there could wisely be any question allowing ourselves to be s tampeded into implementing either wholly or par t ia l ly our long-term policy in such circum­stances and a t present time. A n d if I am r igh t in th ink ing t h a t these are not circumstances in which implementation of our long-term policy is practicable, I am of opinion equally tha t there is very litt le if any th ing fur ther t h a t we can do wi th in our tether.

7. I develop this position fur ther below. I n doing so I concentrate on issue as affecting Centre. The Provincial aspects, though important , a re less so and not decisive in present argument.

8. Ma in propositions pu t forward for our consideration are e i ther— (a) I n effect, implementation of our long-term policy e i ther completely or to

a degree which would make i t impossible for us af ter the war to regain any ground given now, a n d which we thought i t desirable to retrace, e.g., the Congress demand for acceptance of complete independence for Ind ia , to be accompanied by positive immediate steps in evidence, and thei r demand (Bardoli Resolution) for a " Free independent Ind i a which only can be in a position to under take the defence of the country on a nat ional basis and be of help to the furtherance of larger causes tha t are emerging from the storm of wa r " ; or

(b) The Sapru type of proposal—elimination of Pa r l i amen ta ry control, Viceroy to have autocrat ic powers wi th wholly non-official executive responsible to him, &c.

9. To take second category first. Cabinet will be fully alive to the objections to the severance of Par l i amenta ry control, and will apprecia te t h a t the acceptance of Sap ru ' s propositions would compromise the post-war position beyond any question, while I do not myself believe tha t it would secure us the support of the major political par t ies . They represent a leap in the da rk from the solid platform of the Act of 1935 and w i th no guarantee of any reward . ' ' Home Rule for the Viceroy," which I have been disturbed to see tha t The Times has tended to support , ignores the impossibility of any Governor-General reconciling his diverse obligations, or disposing on a n autocrat ic basis of all the resources of this immense country, without Pa r l i amen ta ry sanction and control. W e have

already made a r rangements to meet the contingency, of a breakdown ,of all communications between London and Delhi . Indeed in any emergency i t mav ;

well be unavoidable t h a t the Governor-General should take immedia te responsi­bility for much about which he would prefer to have secured the pr ior consent of His Majesty 's Government. Bu t all th is is very different from a proposal to release the Governor-General and the Government of I n d i a from all s ta tu tory control by H i s Majes ty ' s Government and Pa r l i amen t . Nor do I believe t h a t any entirely non-official Council t ha t I could p u t together, unless i t h a d the full support of major i ty pa r t i e s (who have ref ra ined from suppor t ing Sapru) , would be better t han I have got a t the moment. S a p r u and h is fr iends ca r ry no real weight here. The inclusion of all or any of them would add noth ing to effectiveness of our prosecution of w a r ; and I th ink it qui te likely tha t we should be under strong pressure from them for concessions in th is direction or t h a t designed to show I n d i a n public opinion t h a t they really counted for something. I n a wholly Indianised Council I should be much concerned, too, lest the moment the w a r drew nearer to I n d i a we found ourselves under pressure to recall I n d i a n forma-' tions overseas for I n d i a 's local defence, and to close down despatch of war l ike supplies outside I n d i a in interests of conserving them for I n d i a herself. I would take tha t r isk very seriously if I h a d s t rong Congress element in Cent ra l Government, but it cannot be ignored even wi th a Centra l Government of moderates of S a p r u type.

11. So much for w h a t I might call a policy of nibbling, and of endeavouring to buy off opposition by concessions of grea ter or lesser importance, which would not, however, take us all the way to. our final objective. I h o w t u r n to wider suggestion t h a t we should, in effect, go the whole way a t once, accept demand for full independence and give tangible proof of rea l i ty of our doing so. I t seems to me to be out of the question to consider any th ing of the sort. A n d I imagine that tha t will be feeling of Cabinet also. On t h a t assumption we m a y take i t t h a t there is no possibility of giving satisfaction to Congress or securing their real and whole-hearted suppor t . I n my experience they a re ent i re ly ruthless polit icians; will t ake all they can get; will do their utmost to manoeuvre us into a position in which we make sacrifices t h a t are substant ia l and t h a t will increase the prest ige and power of Congress in th is country. B u t short of acceptance of their full demand no sacrifices however grea t can be relied on to keep them quiet,

12. I need not develop the unfor tuna te effect on those who genuinely sympathise wi th us in th is country, or on those to whom we have given under­takihgs, such as Moslem League, o r on the Pr inces , of al lowing ourselves to be stampeded into negot ia t ions wi th Congress or acceptance of Congress demand. Nor (while possibility of underground negot ia t ions can never be wholly ruled out) do I see any th ing to suggest t ha t Congress and Moslem League a re a t th is stage likely to un i te and get together in an expanded Council. J i n n a h h a d made clear to the Ed i to r of the Times of India t h a t he would regard as essential, firstly, 50 : "SO in any such Counci l ; secondly, t h a t representat ion of minor i t ies should be secured th rough h im and be under h is control, since otherwise minor i ty repre­sentatives would be absorbed by H i n d u element. (I need not e laborate difficulties which any such a r r angemen t would produce.)

13. My general conclusion, viewing th i s difficult ma t t e r w i th greates t detachment t ha t I can, a n d wi th full sense of i t s importance, is in these circum­stances t h a t we should s tand firm and make no fur ther move. I do not believe that any fur ther move a t th i s s tage will be likely to improve I n d i a 's contr ibut ion to the war. A s mentioned above, I th ink i t qui te possible t h a t fu r the r t ransfer of power migh t mean pressure on us for w i t h d r a w a l of I n d i a n troops and I n d i a n

, supply. I do not believe t h a t we could rely on a uni ted I n d i a (even a uni ted ^ British Ind ia , for Pr inces tend to be ignored to a dangerous degree in discussions

in press, &c.) solid behind us in fighting the war . I n d i a is hopelessly, and I . suspect irremediably, spl i t by racial a n d religious divisions which we cannot

bridge, a n d which become more acute as any real t ransfer of power by us d raws nearer. / ­

14. I take very seriously, too, in reaching my conclusions possibility t ha t further t ransfer would give marked encouragement to Quisl ing act ivi ty . Recent report from mi l i t a ry au thor i t ies in Eas te rn I n d i a is to the effect t h a t there is a large and dangerous potent ia l fifth column in Bengal, Assam a n d B i h a r a n d

Orissa, and that , indeed, potent ial i ty of pro-enemy-: sympathy and activity in Eas te rn I n d i a is enormous. S a r a t Bose has been a lesson. The activities of U Saw and T i n T u t (senior Civil Servant occupying a very responsible position) are another a n d a grave one. I know t h a t we are frequently u rged to do something to " t o u c h the heart of I n d i a " and our sympathies natura l ly lean in t ha t direction. But Cabinet will, I think, agree wi th me t h a t I n d i a and Burma have no natural association wi th Empire , from which they a re alien by race, his tory and religion, and for which neither of them has any na tu ra l affection, and both are in Empi re because they are conquered countries which had been brought there by force, kept there by our control, and which h i ther to it has sui ted to remain under our protection'. I suspect tha t the moment they th ink t h a t we may lose the war or take a bad knock, their leaders would be much more concerned to make terms wi th victor a t our expense than to fight for ideals to which so much lip-service is given, and I have been impressed by prominence given by Rajagopalachar i to doubts felt in A.I .O.C. as to wisdom of an tagonis ing possible

, ;victors. '. ' ' * 15. W h a t we have to decide, however, is Avhether in such circumstances,

whatever feeling of India , we intend to stay in this country for our own reasons, and whether I n d i a ' s place in Imper ia l communications is not so important , a t any ra te in war time, tha t we must hold on and must not rel inquish power beyond a cer ta in point . If we accept that I n d i a is too impor tan t at th i s stage for us to take any chances, then I would ra ther face such trouble as we may have to face here as a result of mak ing no concessions now in polit ical field than make con­cessions which are ill-advised and dangerous, and on which we might have to go back for reasons of Imper ia l security a t a la ter stage in the war .

16. I recognise to the full tha t Cabinet have to deal w i th much left wing pressure and pressure from academic theorists or sentimentalists , reflected even in papers so impor tan t as The Times. This batt le, if it is lost, will, however, be lost a t home and not in India , and if my suggestion tha t we make no move is accepted by yourself and by Cabinet it will be necessary to consider the best line to take to t ry to damp down activities of this order. You alone can judge how much significance is to be at tached to crit icism in the press and from left wing and liberal element in Par l iament . I would have judged i t myself to be largely a reflection of uneasiness at the t u rn things have taken in the F a r East , and to be based on the assumption, which I do not r egard as correct, t h a t by a generous gesture now we can uni te I n d i a behind us and get her solid moral support for the prosecution of the W a r ; - -—;—-—- —

17. His Majesty 's Government will na tura l ly wish to appea r as constructive as possible in any debate. I suggest, however, that the general line of any debate could properly be tha t we have responsibili t ies to discharge a n d pledges to honour, to ha rp again on the depth and real i ty of the I n d i a n differences; to insist tha t in no circumstances shall we go back on our pledges to Moslems; to bring out incompatibil i ty of Moslem League demands wi th those of Congress; to show the public how lit t le the Bardol i Resolution really means ; to lay particular emphasis on discussion in Al l - Ind ia Congress Committee; to repeat (it does not mat ter if i t bores people here) the meri ts of A u g u s t offer and reluctance of Congress to face up to i t ; to repeat t ha t it was Ind i ans themselves alone that made impossible in October 1940 something approx imat ing pre t ty closely to what Congress a re now asking for; to stress t h a t we have got in pract ice as national a Government and as good a nat ional Government as we can get in present circum­stances, in expanded Council ; and, as a possible constructive al ternat ive, to refer to the possibility of the federal scheme (which to my point of view secures defence, secures a degree (corrupt group) control, br ings in conservative (corrupt group) ly ^ element to which our under tak ings are so impor tant , and would be practicable consistently wi th maintenance of wa r effort). On these lines I should hope that we could ga in any ground which Congress have taken from us by appearance of readiness to co-operate on reasonable terms which at taches to Bardol i Resolution.

18. Above represents my own considered view. I have not yet consulted Governors, though I would expect general suppor t from them for policy of s tanding firm. I f there is any fur ther information which you o r Cabinet require to enable you to reach decision you will, I am sure, let me know.