war and the city

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new left review 44mar apr 2007121

stephen graham

WAR AND THE CITY

W

estern military strategy was long premised on the

avoidance of urban combat, with air strikes the preferred

method of subduing large conurbations. Cities were

seen as targets, not battlefields. But today, the cityscapesof the global South have emerged as paradigmatic conflict zones. Since

the end of the Cold War, Americas militarized thrust into the Middle

East and Central Eurasia has focused Pentagon planners attention on the

burgeoning Arab and Third World cities that are now deemed de facto

sites of current and future warfare for us forces. While the revolution

in military affairs emphasized overhead dominance, the losing battle for

the streets of Iraq has sharpened the Pentagons focus on battles within

the micro-geographies of slums,favelas, industrial districts and casbahs,as well as on globe-spanning stealth and surveillance technologies.1

For defence strategists, the October 1993 defeat of elite Army Rangers

by armed teenage boys on the streets of Mogadishu was seen as a wake-

up call. The civilian resisters inflicted 60 per cent casualties on the

American troops. But, as Mike Davis has pointed out, the us military

was initially slow to incorporate scenarios of Third World urban war-

fare into its training programmes. In 1996 the Army War Collegesjournal was warning that the future of warfare lies in the streets, sew-

ers, high-rise buildings, and sprawl of houses that form the broken

cities of the world.2 In 1999, a contributor to the Marine Corps Gazette

argued urgently that most military training sites were out of phase with

the urban sprawl that dominates critical areas of the world today . . .

We know we will fight mostly in urban areas. Yet, we conduct the vast

majority of our training in rural areasthe hills of Camp Pendleton,

the deserts of Twentynine Palms, the woods of Camp Lejeune, the jun-gles of Okinawa.3 A rand Report on the provision of military training


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122nlr 44sites, commissioned by the us Congress in the aftermath of the inva-

sion of Iraq, concurred:

us armed forces have thus far been unable to adequately reproduce the

challenges their soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen meet in the townsand cities of Iraq and Afghanistan . . . More than a decade after the demise

of the Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, too many urban

training sites, simulations and case studies still remind us of the Cold Warrather than Mogadishu, Iraqi towns and cities, or Afghan villages.4

A hidden archipelago of mini-cities is now being constructed across

the us sunbelt, presenting a jarring contrast to the surrounding strip-

mall suburbia; other Third World cityscapes are rising out of the deserts

of Kuwait and Israel, the downs of Southern England, the plains ofGermany and the islands of Singapore. Some are replete with lines of

drying washing, continuous loop tapes playing calls to prayer, wander-

ing donkeys, Arabic graffiti, ersatz minarets and mosques; on occasion,

civilian populations are bused in to wander about and role-play in Arab

dress. Others have slum or favela districts, with built-in olfactory

machines that can simulate the smells of death and decay. These are

the new training fields for the us and uk forces that will be dispatched

to Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah, Najaf or Karbalafor warfare, like therest of the world, is rapidly being urbanized. Unmarked on maps, and

largely unnoticed by urban-design, architecture and planning communi-

ties, these sites constitute a kind of shadow global-city system. They are

capsules of space designed to mimic the strategic environment of the

feral city, as one us military theorist has called itnow seen as a criti-

cal arena for future wars.5

Dress rehearsals

The construction of simulation military targets is not new. During

World War ii, streets of exact-replica Berlin tenements were created at

1 Mike Davis, The urbanization of Empire: Megacities and the laws of chaos, SocialText, vol. 22, no. 4, 2004, pp. 915.2 Maj. Ralph Peters, Our Soldiers, Their Cities, Parameters, Spring 1996; cited inMike Davis, Planet of Slums, London 2006, p. 203.

3 Col. Thomas Hammes, Time to get serious about urban warfare training, MarineCorps Gazette, April 1999.4 Russell Glenn et al., Preparing for the Proven Inevitable: An Urban Operations

Training Strategy for America, rand National Defense Research Institute, SantaMonica 2006, pp. xv, 263.5 Richard Norton, Feral Cities, Naval War College Review, vol. 56, no. 4, 2004.


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graham:War and the City123the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah, designed by the exiled German

architect Eric Mendelsohn. Alongside them stood a cluster of Japanese

wood and rice-paper houses created by Antonin Raymond, an American

architect who had worked in Japan and who scoured the us for authen-

tic types of Russian spruce for their construction.6 These buildings

were used by the us Chemical Warfare Corps to fine-tune the incen-

diary bombs that would raze Japanese and German cities. To ensure

accuracy, the tenements were filled with authentic German furniture,

and the buildings hosed to mimic the temperate climate of Berlin. Even

during the Cold War, a sense of spectacle ensured that atomic and

thermonuclear bombs were exploded near simulated suburban homes,

complete with white picket-fences, and families of mannequins placed

around the table having mock meals.7

The city replicas of the 21st century involve a different relationship to

political violence, however. Rather than rehearsals for urban annihila-

tion through total war, their purpose is to prepare ground troops for

military occupation and counter-insurgency warfare. An early example

of this new approach was the $14 million mock-Arab city constructed at

Israels Tzeelim base in the Negev desert. The site, known as Chicago,

was explicitly built to generalize the lessons of Israeli incursions intoPalestinian cities and refugee camps. The town is split into four quar-

ters, with apartment buildings, a marketplace, shops, a mosque and a

refugee camp. It is wired up with the latest surveillance equipment to

monitor the trainee Israeli soldiers as they practise blasting their way

into Palestinian homes. Grotesquely, a range of mechanical cut-out

caricatures of bearded Arab men, constructed by the prop department

at the Israeli National Theatre, are programmed to pop up in windows

and at street corners during live-fire exercises. Adam Broomberg andOliver Chanarin, two Israeli photographers who succeeded in making a

detailed study of the site, have reflected that:

It is difficult to pinpoint what it is about the place that is so disturbing.Perhaps its the combination of the vicariousness and the violence. Its as if

the soldiers have entered the enemys private domain while hes sleeping or

out for lunch . . . Its a menacing intrusion into the intimate.8

6 Mike Davis, Dead Cities And Other Tales, New York 2002, pp. 6584.7 Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, Princeton 2000.8 Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin, Chicago, Gttingen2007.


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124nlr 44It was here, the photographers report, that American Special Forces

were introduced to Arab realities in the run-up to the first Gulf War.

Full-dress rehearsals at the site have included an attempted assassina-

tion of Saddam Hussein and the battle for Fallujah.

Middle-Eastern cities have sprouted at military bases in the us over

the last few years, although in the assessment of the 2006 rand

Report these remain inadequate; casualty rates in urban combat for

untrained soldiers are around 2530 per cent. To address future Military

Operations on Urban Terrain training needs, the rand team recom-

mendations include the construction of four new cities, with more than

300 structures each.9 By 2010, the Pentagon plans to have over sixty

mout training zones around the world. While some will be little morethan air-portable sets of containers, others will be extensive sites that

mimic whole city districts, with airports or surrounding countryside.

One of the most important new urban-warfare training facilities is

Zussman Village at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Here a new 30-acre, $13 mil-

lion city is able to accommodate hundreds of role-playing insurgents,

who wear keffiyehs and are armed with ak-47s and rpgs, as well as 1,500

us military personnel, along with their tanks, personnel carriers andhelicopters. It is equipped with radio and tv stations that can broad-

cast in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian. Zussman Village includes mock

junkyards, mosques, cemeteries, petrol stations, sewers, electrical sub-

stations, train tracks and bridges. A Third World slum is currently

under construction by the railroad. To simulate a war-torn environment,

the site is deliberately smothered in mud, and the unmaintained sewer

system is filled with live possums and rats, as well as rubber snakes

bought from local toy shops. The synthetic odours of rotting bodies, rawsewage and contaminated water can be produced on demand.10 A speci-

ality is the use of vapourized propane that can be converted into aerial

fireballs, simulating the exploding cars and burning buildings troops

will encounter in Iraq. As explained by the Kentucky engineering firm

that provided the technology:

9 With the aim of being accessible to soldiers home districts, these will be located

at the existing Fort Polk base in Louisiana, at Fort Hood in Texas, in the Kentucky/

North Carolina/Georgia region and the American Southwest.10 Roxana Tiron, Army training site brings to life the horrors of war, NationalDefense Magazine, July 2001.


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graham:War and the City125Most of our military operations are conducted at night. When an explosion

occurs and a soldier is wearing night-vision goggles, his vision goes blank.He needs to learn how to react to this type of situation and resist the urge to

have his concentration lapse. Its human nature to take that second to stare

at a fire or explosion, but in combat, soldiers need to react quickly . . . Urbanwarfare has a much higher rate of casualties than in the open battlefield.

The action and the violence are much closer and much faster.11

The largest us urban-warfare complex of all, however, is emerging at

the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Eighteen

mock-Iraqi villages are being constructed in this 100,0000-acre site,

detailed down to kebab stands, and even mass graves created by

burying rotting bones from local butchers shops. Included in the

exercisescarried out by 44,000 Iraq-bound soldiers between 2003and 2005 aloneare 1,200 role-playing extras, dressed in Arab gear,

who impersonate Iraqi tribesmen, police and civilians. Two hundred

of these are Arab-Americans, mostly originating from Iraq itself.

Screenwriters are on hand to write character sheets for each partici-

pant, based on whether they are programmed to be friendly, neutral

or hostile towards the us forces.

In a mirror-image reversal of the more familiar global marketing con-tests in which cities parade their gentrification, cultural planning and

boosterism, here the marks of success are decay and an architecture

of collapse. Col. James Cashwell, a us squadron commander, reported

after an exercise in an urban-warfare training city at George Air Force

base in California that the advantage of the base is that it is ugly, torn

up, all the windows are broken [and trees] have fallen down in the

street. Its perfect for the replication of a war-torn city.12 Evaluating

existing mout sites for the features deemed most challenging inundertaking military operations within large, global-South cities, the

rand researchers awarded the highest points to those with clutter,

debris, filth, slums, shanty towns, walled compounds, subterranean

complexes and simulated government, hospital, prison, asylum struc-

tures, such as the Marines Twentynine Palms facility in California.13

An officer at the us Baumholder Base in Germany reported that sol-

11

Available at www.wareinc.com, under Turnkey Projects.12 J. R. Wilson, Army expands home-based mout training, Military TrainingTechnology, March 2003.13rand, Preparing for the Proven Inevitable, p. 243.


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126nlr 44diers repeatedly asked for donkeys, goats and other animals in the

mout training site to help simulate life in Iraqi cities.14 Some loca-

tions integrate multi-sensory systems for projecting special effects;

Fort Wainwright, Alaska can provide the smell of diesel fumes, burn-

ing rubber, even burning flesh.15

The rand Report also explored the possibility of appropriating entire

ghost towns within the continental usa that have been deindustri-

alized and largely abandoned. Attention has focused on the former

copper-mining town of Playas in southwest New Mexico, which has

already been used as a generic American suburb under simulated

attack to instruct anti-terrorist squads for the Department of Homeland

Security.16 The rand team suggests that Playas could be improved asa training site if the architecture of the abandoned town were modi-

fied to include walled compounds of the type that us troops in Iraq and

Afghanistan must at times isolate and clear. However, live-fire exercises

would probably not be possible, since the owners . . . would consider the

structural repair costs prohibitive.17 Despite being portrayed as a ghost

town, a few remaining residents cling on in Playas, making their living

mainly as extras in urban-war and terrorist exercises. A network of low-

population towns in North Dakota is also being considered for such arole, and the rand Report recommends further investigation into the

use of abandoned factories, offices, strip malls, schools, hospitals and

entertainment complexes.

Another proposal is to use densely populated metropolitan areas for

mout training, modelled on the Urban Warrior and Project Metropolis

exercises that took place between 1999 and 2000. In these, Marines

invaded Little Rock, Chicago, Oakland and Charleston, stagingmajor amphibious and airborne landings (also designed to generate

recruitment interest) before acting out the disablement of electricity,

communications, transport and water infrastructure in abandoned hos-

pitals and sewer networks. Such exercises will remain necessary, rand

14 Cited in Terry Boyd, Training site replicates Iraqi village, Stars and Stripes,26 July 2006.15 Associated Press, Urban combat training center will be Armys largest, Citizen

Review Online, December 2002.16 See Steve Rowell, Playas, New Mexico: A Modern Ghost-town Braces for the

Future, The Lay of the Land: Center for Land Use Interpretation Newsletter, vol. 28,Spring 2005.17rand, Preparing for the Proven Inevitable, p. 63.


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graham:War and the City127argues, because no purpose-built urban training site and no simulation

for many years to come will be able to present the heterogeneity and

complexity of a modern megalopolis. Nevertheless, this remains the

aim. The Reports most ambitious suggestion is for the construction of

a 20 x 20 km mega-mout complex, incorporating a complete 900-

building town, at the Twentynine Palms Marine base in the California

desert.18 Costing $330 million by 2011, such a complex would allow an

entire brigade to simulate taking a large Iraqi town, including port and

industrial facilities, with unprecedented levels of realism. For the first

time, air power could be integrated with ground forces, and live artillery

fire would be possible.

Virtual Baghdad

Electronic simulation technologies blend seamlessly into these physical

constructions. In the Urban Terrain Module at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, a

one-house space decorated in Middle-Eastern style is embedded within

a media studio, which can project digitally generated virtual humans

with suitably swarthy Arab features onto special screens inside the

house. The projects designers argue that the simulations at Fort Sill,

built with the help of Hollywood professionals, are so convincing thatthe borders between the virtualized and physical elements are increas-

ingly indistinguishable to us soldiers training there. In the near future

they hope the environments will be modified to project digital mapping

data from Iraq or other urban war zones, so that troops could rehearse

on the actual terrain that they would occupy somedaymaybe in a

future theatre of war.19

Beyond these hybrid or mixed reality simulations lies a universe ofpurely computerized ones. In these, electronic mapping and satellite-

image technologies of cities that us troops are about to attack or occupy

are used to provide digital renditions that can be experienced immer-

sively. In 2004, the Computer Science Corporation combined satellite

and laser-scanned imagery with digital pictures from the ground to

build much of Iraq, including all the major cities, into a virtualized real-

ity model, accurate to within one metre. This apparently allows trainees

18rand, Preparing for the Proven Inevitable, pp. 83, 152.19 Heidi Loredo, Hollywood magic prepares Marines for combat, Marines.Com,July 2004.


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128nlr 44to drive from Kuwait to Turkey via real-time models during war games.

Entirely lacking in even virtual people, these simulations render Iraq

as pure digital battlespace. The virtual models have such an impact on

troops that csc has to warn: if you put a door on the side of the building,

the soldier is trained for that. If he gets to the real environment and the

door is on the wrong side of the building, he can get killed.20

Much larger urban simulations are used for the war-gaming activities by

which us defence planners map out future combat scenarios. For one

of these, an 8-square-mile swathe of Jakarta that includes 1.6 million

buildings has been digitized and geo-specifically simulated in three

dimensions. It includes over a hundred thousand vehicles and civil-

ians, with their daily rhythms mapped in virtualized real time: roads arerelatively empty at night, but clogged with vehicles during rush hours;

traffic and civilian presence increases around mosques at the appropri-

ate times for daily prayers. Known as Urban Resolve, the simulation

has used some of the us militarys most sophisticated supercomputers

to project American forces into a full-scale war in the Indonesian cap-

ital in 2015. The same technology is now being adapted to provide a

virtualized rendition of Baghdad.21 One aim is to keep these compu-

ter simulations of urban battlefields constantly updated, using combatpatrols to report back on the latest destruction wrought by artillery or

aerial bombardment.

Army of gamers

The militaryindustrialentertainmentmedia complex has played a

central role in naturalizing the idea that American and allied forces should

be pitched in battle against the inhabitants of Arab and Third Worldcities.22 The two most popular video game franchises in 2005 were Full

Spectrum Warriorand Americas Army, developed respectively by the us

Marines and the Army. Both games centre overwhelmingly on the task

of occupying stylized Arab cities. Their immersive simulations work

20 Quoted in Harrison Donnelly, Geospatial data bolsters virtual training, MilitaryGeospatial Technology, vol. 4, no. 4, 2006.21 See Peter Wielhouwer, Preparing for future joint urban operations: The role of

simulation and the Urban Resolve experiment, Small Wars, July 2005.22 James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the MilitaryIndustrialMediaEntertainment Network, Boulder, co 2001.


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graham:War and the City129powerfully to equate these environments with terrorism and to stress

that they need pacification or cleansing by military means.

These video games also demonstrate the extent of the American enter-

tainment industrys commitment to a culture of permanent war.23

Unsurprisingly, when the citys inhabitants appear in these games they

are portrayed, almost without exception, as the shadowy, racialized

representation of the terroristfigures to be annihilated in a blurred

combination of military training and entertainment. In Americas Army,

the fictional country of Zekistan features stylized Islamic architec-

ture; buildings are either dark and menacing, or else in flames. Here

again, the only role for Arab cities is as a terrain for urban war. Complex

and self-reinforcing connections between war and entertainment inthe digital age deepen the long-established role of films and toys as

outlets for militaristic propaganda. An estimated 90 per cent of the

75,000 men and women who join the us Army each year are casual

video-gamers; 30 per cent consider themselves hardcore. Such is the

familiarity of most military recruits with Playstation controls that the

us Marines have even mimicked these in the consoles for their new

remote-control urban-surveillance vehicle, Dragon Runner, currently

being used on Iraqs streets.24

The extent to which us military managers have preferred to inhabit vir-

tualized Arab cities, rather than confront their social realities, is reflected

in the treatment of the increasing numbers ofus Iraq war veterans suf-

fering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The University of Southern

Californias Institute for Creative Technologies, a major player in the

crossover between war and entertainment, has adapted Full Spectrum

Warriorsimmersive simulations of Arab cities as the basis for treatingtraumatized soldiers. Patients are forced to go through recreations of the

events that have distressed them most: being inside mined or bombed

vehicles or helicopters, sitting out mortar attacks on their compounds,

or coming under attack while patrolling Iraqi streets. This allows

the war-zone experience to be replayed in what is called Virtual Iraq

Exposure Therapy, due to be extended to treatment centres across the

United States. The video-game features of the therapy are deemed by its

designers to resonate well with the current generation of war fighters,

23 Andy Deck, No Quarter: Demilitarizing the playground, Artcontext website, 2004.24 Noah Shachtman, Why War Is Really Just a Game, Wired, 24 May 2002.


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130nlr 44although one Navy psychologist stressed that it was important to make

sure that the simulations were not too realistic, since that might create

more trauma.25

Alien homelands

The complex constellation of urban-warfare simulations discussed here

work most powerfully as a collective. Their various physical, electronic

and hybrid manifestations operate, as do all simulations, by collapsing

the real with the artificed, to the extent that any simple boundary between

the two disappears.26 One effect, as we have seen, is to naturalize Arab

and global-South cities as little but physical battlespace, populated, when

peopled at all, by dehumanized and racialized terrorists that mustnecessity is one of the rules of the gamebe erased by Western, or

Israeli, military intervention. At the same time, the militaristic gloss and

relentless sanitization serve to produce an ideological reinforcement and

subliminal legitimation ofus foreign-policy imperatives.

A further dissolution of boundaries takes place in the piloting of the

armed Predator drones that are increasingly used in the us and Israeli

surveillance and assassination strikes, from Lebanon and the OccupiedTerritories to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The American pilots of these

machines are actually located in an anonymous trailer complex at Nellis

Air Base, on the edge of Las Vegas. They fly combat sorties without ever

leaving their desks. At the end of the work day, their commanding

officer explained, you walk back into the rest of life in America.27

In fact, the urban war-zone images produced by the simulacral collec-

tive speak just as much to the fragmenting landscapes and racializedpolitics of Americas cities. In addition to a simulated Middle East,

us defence planners programmes continue to factor in mock-ups of

American city districts, in which law-enforcement and National Guard

personnel undertake operations against civil unrest, terrorist attack and

natural disaster. us military simulacra still focus on Los Angeles as well

as on Baghdad, planning major operations to re-take American cities

25

See Rick Rogers, Military to try virtual combat stress remedy, SignOnSanDiego.Com.26 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Bloomington 1991.27 Quoted in Richard Newman, The joystick war, us News, 19 May 2003.


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graham:War and the City131from uprisings or social protests.28 The Los Angeles riots of 1992 appear

on military urban-warfare Powerpoints about lessons learned just as

often as Grozny or Mogadishu. Responding to the devastation of New

Orleans, one us Army officer talked openly about the need to launch

urban-combat operations to take back the city from insurgents who

were purportedly breeding anarchy and violence there, in an echo of the

language used about Fallujah or Baghdad.29 Attitudes of military and law

enforcement personnel towards crises in American cities seem strongly

influenced by urban operations in the Middle East.

Urban-war simulations help to demonstrate the shifts in us military

doctrine in much more explicit form. Pentagon theorists no longer

concentrate so exclusively on a planetary battlespace, over which thenetworked power ofus air and space platforms rules supreme: instead,

they have turned their attention to the spaces of the global South. In

addition, as Eyal Weizman has emphasized, both Israeli and Western

military planners now stress the need not just to occupy, but physically

to reorganize the space of colonized cities, so that high-tech weapons

and surveillance systems can work to their best advantage. Weizman

calls this design by destruction. As he puts it: contemporary urban

warfare plays itself out within a constructed, real or imaginary archi-tecture, and through the destruction, construction, reorganization and

subversion of space.30

Thus, as in Iraq, neighbourhoods can be wrapped in razor wire, circled

by biometric checkpoints and turned into de facto ghettos or camps

looking much like Palestinian villages. Areas deemed to be too dense

and complex to be penetrated by the gaze of drones, satellites and aerial

targeting can be physically bulldozed, as was Jenin in 2002. The infra-structural systems that sustain the life of cities can be destroyedas

28 Military simulacra also feature more directly in the fortunes ofus cities. Theirgeneration now involves important swathes of the us economy, especially in high-

tech metropolitan areas. Local economies such as Orlando, Florida or the beltway

in Virginia are now dominated by simulation corporations that blend military,research and entertainment dimensions. In Orlando alone there are around a hun-

dred military-simulator firms which generate some 17,000 jobs, and are starting to

rival Disney as a local economic force.29 Joseph Chenelly, Troops begin combat operations in New Orleans, Army Times,2 September 2005.30 Phil Misselwitz and Eyal Weizman, Military operations as urban planning, in

Anselm Franke, ed., Territories, Berlin 2003, pp. 27275.


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132nlr 44in the urbicidal assaults on Iraq in 1991 and Lebanon in 2006or

manipulated, to coerce resistant populations and political leaderships

into surrender through the forced immiseration of enduring urban life

without sewage systems or electricity; Gaza is, of course, the most notori-

ous instance. Once again, Israel provides the most influential paradigms

for the new trends in Western urban warfare.

Intimately tied to the entertainment industries, this mimetic collective

labours to produce the digital streets and immersive cityscapes of the

Arab world as Americas other. The key to these increasingly detailed

environments is, of course, the radical denial of the social and cultural

worlds, and lived urbanism, of these cities. The inculcation of racialized

aggression works rather to obliterate understanding of the real places, andbodies, destroyed by military assault. It is widely recognized that the crude

behaviour of the invading Anglo-American forcessearch-and-destroy

raids, arbitrary arrests, opening fire on demonstrationswas an

important factor in stimulating the resistance in Iraq.31

As the occupation of Iraq enters its fifth year, American forces still

control only a small fraction of Baghdad. At the start of 2007, Patrick

Cockburn reported, us troops with accompanying Iraqi units tried tofight their way into Haifa Street, less than a mile from the Green Zone.

They had been attempting to capture exactly the same terrain in March

2005. In March 2007 Ban Ki-Moons press conference announcing that

the security situation in Baghdad had improved sufficiently for the un

to expand its presence was punctuated by a rocket attack on the heart

of the Green Zone. Securing the city is a near impossibility, Cockburn

argues. Sunni insurgents and Shia militiamen are too well-entrenched

and, moreover, generally have more legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqisthan government forces.32 The us soldiers still attempting to take Haifa

Street four years after the invasion should recall Sunzis advice: Know

the enemy. But if they did, of course, they would not be there.

31 See Patrick Cockburn, The Abyss in Iraq, nlr 36, NovDec 2005.32 Patrick Cockburn, Nowhere to Hide, London Review of Books, 22 February 2007.

war and the city

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