walter weisskopf - the dialectics of equality

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American Academy of Political and Social Science

The Dialectics of EqualityAuthor(s): Walter A. WeisskopfReviewed work(s):Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 409, IncomeInequality (Sep., 1973), pp. 163-173

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The Dialecticsof Equality

By WALTER . WEISSKOPF

ABSTRACT:Equality and inequality are discussed from the

philosophical and socio-psychological,rather than from the

economic,point of view. Social inequalitiesare bearableonlyif they are felt to be legitimate and justifiable in terms of the

predominanthierarchyof values. Movements for equality arecaused by doubts about the legitimacyof existing inequalities.Modernindividualism, ibertarianismand

equalitarianismwere

a rebellion against the existing order. In premodern times,inequalitieswere justifiedby ascriptionand were derived frominherent characteristics,such as birth and caste. Industrial

society justified inequalitiesby achievement of economic suc-cess. This orientationis reflectedin the labor theory of value,as well as in marginalistvalue theory. In the Americancreed,equalitarianismwas combinedwith the acceptanceof inequal-ities through the principle of equality of opportunity which

justifies inequalities by the assumption of an equal start foreveryone. Under the impact of the great depression and ofthe organizational revolution, economic achievement was re-

placed by intellectual merit, knowledge and academic creden-tials as justification for inequalities. Under the impact of

growingdoubts about this kind of achievement,a new equali-tarian trend is under way, supported by the antigrowth andthe environmental protection movements, as well as by the

tradition of protection for the underprivilegedwhich was al-ways an intrinsicpart of the market economy.

Walter A. Weisskopf has been Professor of Economics at Roosevelt University since

1945; he was Chairmanof the Department of Economics (1945-1965) and is currentlya member of the Board of Trustees of Roosevelt University. Professor Weisskopf hasalso taught at the University of Omaha, the Central YMCA College in Chicago (1943-1945) and the Salzburg Seminar for American Studies (1952). Born in Vienna, hereceived a Dr. Juris degree in 1927 from the University of Vienna, but also studied at

the Universities of Cambridgeand Geneva. He served as a panel member of the WarLabor Board of Chicago (1943-1945); currently, he is a member of the American Eco-nomic Association, the Association for Humanistic Psychology and the Board of Editorsof the Journal of Humanistic Psychology. Professor Weisskopf's publications deal withthe interrelations among economics, philosophy and psychology and include The Psychol-ogy of Economics and Alienation and Economics.

163



THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

ECONOMICS developed during a

period in which segmentalizationbecame the rule in the social sciences.

The fragmentedapproach makes it dif-ficult for economists to deal with the

philosophical, psychological, social, po-litical and economic dimensions of

equality and inequality. Yet, the non-economic aspects should be discussed ifthe purely economic aspects of income

inequality are to be understood. The

very question of the economic effects of

equality or inequality of incomes en-

tails value judgments and transcends,therefore, the realm of economics as itis usually considered. An integrativeapproach must start with the recogni-tion that equality and inequality arerelated in dialectical interdependence:they are like two sides of the same coin;they give meaning to each other; onewould be senseless without the other.

THE DIALECTICSOF PARTICIPATION-

INDIVIDUALIZATION

The equality-inequality dichotomy isone of the many antinomies which besetthe human condition. It is related tothe antinomy of individualization and

participation; this is an existential an-

tinomy, a category of human existence.Man participates in his world, in his

environment. He is a part of awhole, a member of a larger entity.This participationis one of the existen-tial roots of the experience of equality.It is the root of the experience of the"I am one with the world," of the "Iam thou" and of the unity of all crea-tion. It underlies ideas such as "weare all children of God" and "we areall members of the brotherhood of

man."At the same time, man has the ex-

perience of individualization, separate-ness and distinctness-being one self,and not the other. This is the root ofthe experienceof the I versus the Other,

of existing as a person different fromother beings and persons. This is theexistential source of incomparability

and inequality and the idea of theuniqueness of personality-I am I;nothing and no one is, nor can be, likeme.

THE SOCIAL DIALECTICS OF EQUALITY

The antinomy of participation andindividualization is reflected in man'ssocial existence. Again, one finds cen-

tripetal and centrifugal tendencies. On

the one hand, men have an innate pro-pensity for solidarity, community and

integration and, on the other hand, for

separation, distinction and differentia-tion. Solidarity and communityare thebasis for the experienceof equality. Asa memberof a family, group, tribe, clanor nation, I am equal to other members;such membershipforms a common link

which generates the feeling of equalitywith other members. Each memberofa group has common traits with othermembers. The very concept of societyimplies an element of equality, consist-

ing in group membership, if nothingelse-for example, the concept that "weare all Americans." This element of

equality through group membership isenhanced by the inclusion-exclusion

principle. A group includes insidersand excludes outsiders; the equality ofthe insiders is underscoredby the in-

equality, inferiority, of the outsiders.The centrifugal force in society is re-

lated to individualization. In his ownlife history, and in the history of soci-

eties, the individual tends to emancipatehimself from the primordial ties withthe mother, the parents, the family, the

peer group, the home town and even thenation. Self-consciousness leads to a

split between individual and groupwhich tends to counteract the experi-ences of belonging and equality. Inso-far as the individual becomes psycho-

164



DIALECTICS OF EQUALITY

logically separated from the commu-

nity, the commondenominatoron which

equality rests is destroyed. Equality

requires comparability; when the indi-vidual becomes aware of his separate-ness and uniqueness, there is no basisfor either comparisonor equality.

THE HISTORICAL DIALECTICS OF

EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY

The conflict between equality and in-

equality is ineluctable in human exis-tence.

However,historical conditions

determine when and how this conflictbecomes conscious. Under certain his-torical conditions, there is little aware-ness of inequalities and, therefore, littledesire for equality; under other condi-

tions, existing inequalities are experi-enced as an intolerable burden and

strong equalitarian movements develop.In Western history, such a situation

arose in the eighteenth century; duringthis era, it was assumed that societygenerates unfreedomand inequalities of

power, status and wealth and, thus, de-

stroys the individual's natural state offreedomand equality. This intellectualscheme was developed in the eighteenthcentury, but had its roots in the thoughtof the Sophists, the Stoa and Romanlaw. According to this pattern-clear-est in the thought of Locke and Rous-seau-the individual surrendered hisnatural freedom and equality to thestate for the sake of economic coopera-tion and physical safety. This consti-tutes the famous social contract, whichassumes that the accomplishment ofcommon purposes necessitates the vol-

untary surrender of primary, natural

equalityand freedom to

social inequal-ities. This ideological scheme underliesmost modern thinking about equalityand inequality.

The scheme, however, is not borneout by history. Individualism,with itsclaim to freedom and equality, is a late

historical phenomenon. In all cultures,man is originally part of a group, inte-

grated into a community, linked with

others and hardly aware of his individ-ual existence. His ties with the groupare supported by religious belief,value systems and institutions whichare part of an uncritically and uncon-

sciously accepted natural order. Theindividual becomes aware of himself asa separate entity only when the stablestructure of beliefs, values and insti-tutions

beginsto

disintegrate. Then,consciousness awakens and existing in-stitutions are examinedby reason. This

process may confirm prevailing beliefs,values and institutions. But, sooner or

later, it leads to a critique of the exist-

ing order and to alienation from it.'This is the point where individual-

ism, libertarianism and equalitarianismemerge. Individualisticand equalitarian

thought owes its origin to an intellectualrebellion against the existing order;thus, they began as phenomenaof social

disintegration and change. Individual-ism implies a fundamentaldoubt in the

legitimacy and justice of the prevailingsocial hierarchy. All societies, with the

exception of a few small esoteric groups,requiresome hierarchyof organizationalstructure with superiority, subordina-

tion and a structure of authority, com-mand and obedience. Society, but not

community, is synonymous with some

unfreedom, inequality, suppression andrestriction of individuals. Originally,these restrictions were not experiencedas oppressive, because they were pre-sumed to be rootedin divine, or natural,order. When reason is applied to this

order, the hierarchy requires rationallegitimation and justification; it must

appear to conform to principles of jus-tice. In premoderntimes, such justifi-

1. Walter A. Weisskopf, Alienation and Eco-nomics (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971),p. 33 ff.

165




cation was based on ascription: differ-

entials of power, status and wealth were

derived from inherent characteristics

such as ancestry, birth or caste; peoplewere privileged or underprivileged be-

cause of what they were and not for

what they accomplished. During the

last four hundred years, modern West-ern industrial society replaced ascrip-tion by achievement: differences were

justified by the degree to which differ-

ent individuals attained social goals and

values. Ascriptive aristocracy was re-

placed by a meritocracy wherein merit

consisted of achieving that which soci-

ety valued most.

It is misleading both to identify in-

equalities based on achievement with

meritocracy and to maintain that in-

equalities based on ascription have

nothing to do with merit. The courtiersin ancient Egypt, the citizens of the

Greek Polis, the Senate and the peopleof Rome, the feudal lords-all groupswhose status rested on ascription-con-sidered themselves as the better, more

worthy and superiorones and, thus, de-

serving their privileges because of theirinherent merits. In a way, social hier-archies based on ascription are also

meritocracies; they rest on the convic-tion that the existing inequalities are

legitimate and just. After all, theGreek word aristocracy means the ruleof the best. The difference between

ascriptive and achievement-oriented

meritocracy lies in the yardstick formerit: in the case of ascription, it is

being and belonging to a group; in thecase of achievement, it is doing and

performing. Hierarchies based on as-

scription are also morerigid,

whereasthose based on achievement allow up-wards, and downwards, mobility; onecan never change what one is, but onecan change one's social position byachievement and performance.

Achievement replacing ascription as

the legitimizing principle went hand in

hand with a class struggle. The bour-

geoisie, in its struggle with the aristoc-

racy in England and with the Ancientregime in France, attacked the tradi-

tional ascriptive inequalities throughtheir demand for liberty and equality.The ideal of equality had the socio-his-

torical function of attacking the exist-

ing inequalities, but it led, in turn, to

new inequalities based on achievement.

EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY IN

ECONOMICS

The new inequalities are reflected in

the history of capitalism and economic

thought. The ideas presented by Max

Weber, in the Protestant Ethic and the

Spirit of Capitalism,show the transition

from the principle of ascription to the

one of achievement. The belief in pre-destination through the inscrutable

counsel of the Lord is ascriptive; one ischosen regardlessof one's merit. How-

ever, every Calvinist and Puritan tried

to prove his salvation by his economic

success,achievedby practicingeconomic

virtues: systematic, methodic, unrelent-

ing pursuit of gain combined with in-

tensive impulse control through hard

work, thrift, frugality and avoidance of

spontaneous enjoyment. Achievement

of economic success gradually replacedascriptive salvation; economic perform-ance became the source of individual

worth.It is important to understand that

this transition from an ascriptive to an

achievement-oriented ociety took placehand in hand with the emergence of

capitalism; thus, the way for a merito-cratic mobile

societywas

openedtwo

hundredyears ago. Meritocracy is notan invention of postindustrial society.2The achievementorientation of capital-

2. This seems to be the position of Daniel

Bell, "Meritocracy and Equality," Public In-terest 29 (Fall 1972), p. 29 ff.

166




ism was, and is, supposed to be merito-

cratic. Merit consists of living up to

the work ethic and thereforereaping the

rewardof one's performance. A changein the basis of merit distinguishes the

postindustrial meritocracy of the mid-

twentieth century from the bourgeois

meritocracy of the nineteenth; the eco-

nomic virtues have been replacedby the

intelligence quotient (IQ) and by ed-

ucational credentials.

The work and success ethos per-formed two historical functions: (1) it

destroyed the basis for ascriptive in-

equalities of the old order; (2) it also

provided a justification for the new in-

equalities of wealth and income in thenew order of the market economy. The

labor theory of value in economic

thought reflects this justification.The pure labor theory of value, as

formulated by Adam Smith and Ri-

cardo, justified the inequalities of in-come. This theory is essentially merito-

cratic: in an economy of independentproducers-without wage labor andwithout private property of land-

prices would reflect differences n effort,measuredby labor-time used in produc-tion; thus, those who work longer andharder would sell a higher priced prod-uct and receive a higher reward. The

classics used this theory to justify theexisting price system-therefore, Ri-cardo's desperate, although unsuccess-

ful, attempts to eliminate profits as adeterminant of price and his theory ofrent which interpreted land income asan effect, rather than a cause, of price.3Profit and rent are not earned throughlabor; therefore, they do not fit intothe moral

philosophyof the labor value

theory. Ricardo thus tried to provethat they were not causal for price dif-ferentials. If that were true, such dif-

3. Walter A. Weisskopf, The Psychology ofEconomics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chi-

cago Press, 1955), p. 51 ff.

ferentials would be caused only by dif-

ferences in labor-time used in the pro-duction of goods; such differentials

would be morally justified according tothe labor theory of value: more workleads to higher prices and incomes.

Marx used the same theory to casti-

gate the price system. In contrast to

Ricardo, he acknowledgedthe influence

of profits on prices. But to Marx, the

surplus value-profit-is an unearnedincrement which the capitalist did not

earn by his own labor. Therefore, a

profit economy leads to inequalitieswhich are unfairby the standards of thelabor theory of value. The union move-

ment and the modern women's libera-

tion movement use the same theory-asin the slogan "equal pay for equalwork"-to attain equality. Equality isbased on merit and is quite compatiblewith inequalities of unequal pay for un-

equal work.The labor theory of value was later

replaced by marginalist value theories.

Originally, they also containedthe seedsof moral justification of differentialsin

prices and incomes. When economists

state that in a competitive market sys-tem everyone's wage, or income, will be

equal to one's marginal value product,they actually state: "to each according

to his productive contribution." Thisis a meritocratic justification of eco-nomic inequalities.

In the twentieth century, economic

thought has become evermore value-neutral and value-empty. Few econ-omists today would openly try to justifywage and income differentials by their

proportionality to productive contribu-tion. Their

apologeticsfor the

existingincome distributionwould rest on func-tional grounds: inequalities are neces-

sary as incentives for increasing the

supply of scarce resources. However,the idea that higher income and wealthare deserved and caused by personal

167




virtues and higher contributions has

been absorbed by popular feeling and

vulgar economic philosophizing. Social

Darwinism is still very much alive;those who have succeeded in the com-

petitive struggle regard themselves as

the fittest and as better than others.This attitude underlies the Nixon ad-

ministration's attack on the welfare

state. The economy is viewed as a

meritocracy of the rich; they sup-

posedly deserve their exalted status.

EQUALITYOFOPPORTUNITY

The existing inequalities, however,had to be made compatible with the

equalitarian, individualistic and liber-

tarian tradition of the American creed.

The combinationbetween egalitarianismand justification of inequalities was

achieved by the idea of equality of op-

portunity. It contains an element of

equalitarianism; everybody is supposedto begin at the same starting line; but

the inequalities that emerge in the com-

petitive struggle are accepted. The ideaof equality of opportunity makes pos-sible the representation of the result-

ing unequal income distributionas just:because of initial equality, the resultinginequalities are supposedly based on

merit.4

The idea of equality of opportunitycan serve its purpose to justify existinginequalities only if one believes every-one has an equal start and accepts the

resulting inequalities as meritorious.Both beliefs are open to grave doubts.There are obvious flaws in the assump-tion of an equal start; differences n en-

vironment, background, education and

genes distribute the chances very un-

evenly, indeed. But the main source of

4. For a critique of the principle of equalityof opportunity, see J. H. Schaar, "Equality of

Opportunity and Beyond," in Equality, ed.

J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (NewYork: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 228 ff.

discontent is the conviction, ever grow-

ing in the twentieth century, that the

privileges of higher income and wealth

are not deserved-that the present formof the free enterprise system is not a

meritocracy. Corporate concentrationand market power made the inequalitiesin economic opportunities more visible.

The events of the great depression ofthe 1930s made it obvious that hardly

anybody is master of his economic fateand that economic success and failurehave little to do with individual merit.

Under these circumstances,the Horatio

Alger myth and the idea that the higherincome receiversare the fittest appearedto be ludicrous. These ideas were sup-posed to justify economic inequalities,but the underprivilegedand the intelli-

gentsia began to reject them. Peoplefeel that high incomes are not based on

just desert. As long as there was an

unspoken, implicit, oftenunconscious

consensus about the justice of income

differentials, equalitarianism remained

marginal, remedial and ameliorative.When this consensus evaporated, the

inequalitieslost theirpsychologicalbase.

They can then be maintained only bythe power structure of the existing in-stitutions.

MERITOCRACY

A more recent source of discontentwith the principle of equal opportunityis found in the changing character ofthe meritocracy. This term is not

usually applied to the merits of the richand successful, but to what Galbraithcalls the "technostructure"and the "ed-ucation-scientific estate." 6 Previously,merit was based on the virtues of the

work ethic and of the adventurous,suc-cessful entrepreneur. Since World WarII-in what is fashionably called

5. John K. Galbraith, The New IndustrialState (Boston, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin,1967), chps. 8 and 25.

168




the postindustrial society-merit anddifferentials in status and powerare attributed to the knowledge of

the highly educated and trained ex-perts with academic credentialswho are

supposed to have become the real deci-sion makers and power structure in

business, government and even politics.Under present conditions, this furtherrestricts the equal start necessary forreal equality of opportunity; highereducation and expertise are to manyeven less accessible than economic suc-cess. Equalitarianism, once directed

against the rich, is now directed againstthe status of those with credentials of

higher education and expert knowledge.Trying to justify the existing hier-

archy of status and poweras an intellec-tual meritocracy-as does the literarycrowd writing in the Public Interest 6is even less effective than the justifica-

tion of income differentials on the basisof the work ethic and entrepreneurialsuccess.

First, the trend towards a meritoc-

racy of the intellectual elite has aggra-vated inequalities in the economy. Ithas reenforced the dual economy: mi-

nority groups have been shut off fromthe mainstream of the economy; theydo not even benefit from expansionand

prosperity,because of their lack of back-groundand education. More and more,the better jobs require educational cre-dentials of achievement which theseminoritiesare unable to acquire. With-out the certificates they are not needed

by the economy. Therefore, they can-not improve their situation by organiz-ing and withholding their services-bystrikes.

Theyare not

exploited-needed, but underpaid-but discrimi-nated against-discarded, not in de-mand. This aggravates their unequalstatus because the system does not pro-

6. Public Interest 29 (Fall 1972), issue onequality.

vide any legitimate remedies: they arein the minority, therefore, they havelittle political power; they do not have

an equal start, therefore, they havelittle upwards mobility. A meritocracybased on IQ and academic credentialscondemns these groups to social in-

feriority.

However, the resentment against theintellectual elite is not confined to the

disadvantaged minorities. The resent-ment is also caused by doubts about thevalue and

meaningof

intellectual, whitecollar work. Recent interviews of bluecollar workers in the Boston area havethrown some light on this attitude.7After twenty years as a meat-cutter, ablue collar worker-who had beenforced to quit high school-became awhite collar bank clerk; however, heharbors an innate disrespect for edu-cated white collar work: "these jobs are

not real work where you make some-thing-it's just pushing papers." Hefeels a "revulsion against the work ofeducated people in the bank, and a

feeling that manual labor has more dig-nity." Children of blue collar workers,with more education than their parents:"feel that they have more opportunityopen to them than their manual-labor-

ing parents. At the same time they seetheir parents'work as intrinsically more

interestingand worthwhile.. .". Thesemen see "knowledgethrough formal ed-ucation as giving a man the tools for

achieving freedom. ... As things ac-

tually stand, however, certified knowl-

edge does not mean dignity . . . it isthe reverse, it is sham."

In part, this attitude is a heritage of

the industrial society in which produc-tion of goods was the main economic

activity. It is an attitude reminiscent

7. R. Sennett and J. Cobb, The Hidden In-juries of Class (New York: Alfred A. Knapf,1972), p. 21 if., from which the following quo-tations are taken.

169




of the Marxist glorificationof the man-ual worker as the only real productivefactor. However, this traditional belief

in the superiordignity of manual workhas become amalgamated with a more

recent distrust in expertise, intelligent

quotients, academic credentials and the

achievements of the intelligentsia, in

general. The growing resentment of

Middle America against the "best and

the brightest" seems to bear this out.

The issue of postindustrialsociety is not

merely intellectual meritocracy versus

equality, as sociologist Daniel Bell

maintains,but the growingdoubts about

the merits of the meritocracy.

Consideringthe kind of world the ex-

perts in science, technology and businesshave helped to create, these doubts are

not without justification. Yet, the

sourceof these doubts lies deeper. They

are-consciously or unconsciously-

connected with the basic problem ofpostindustrial society: the longing both

for a ground for legitimizing equalityand inequality and for the fusion oforder and freedom.8 The postindustrial,

meritocratic, intellectual elite owes its

high status to its mastery of a restric-tive intellectuality of a cognitive, ana-

lytical, measuringand technical nature.

They use instrumentalrationality which

can choose means, but can say nothingabout ends. This rationality has de-

stroyed a deeper philosophical kind ofreason which could deal with ends,goals, purposes and ultimate meanings.9

The merits of the meritocracy arebased on a rationality which makes it

impossible to establish standards for

any merits, whatsoever. Their highIQs and their academic credentials en-

able them to serve the existing order,

8. J. Kristol, "Capitalism, Socialism and

Nihilism," Public Interest 31 (Spring 1973),p. 15.

9. Weisskopf, Alienation and Economics,p. 37 ff.

but not to justify it, nor to replace it,

by one that can be accepted as legiti-mate by its citizenry. The hunger for

such legitimacy, called by Irving Kristolthe dominant political fact in the worldof today, cannot be satisfied by the

instrumental, technical intellect of the

experts. Therefore, their merits are not

accepted by the community.

Thus, today's egalitarian resentment

of the underprivilegedagainst the priv-

ileged is based less on need than on a

loss of the belief in the justice, legitima-tion and justification of existing in-

equalities. The traditional approachthat the starving masses resent the

abundanceof the rich has become, withsome notable exceptions,obsolete in our

relatively affluent society. The main

cause of egalitarian trends is the dis-

integration of the belief that the priv-

ileges of higher income, wealth and

education are based on just desert andmerit.

THE TRADITIONOF SOCIALPROTECTION

There is, however, another source of

egalitarianism which is related to pov-

erty. It does not originate with the

poor, the disadvantaged and the under-

privileged, but with society as a whole-or better, with the privileged groups.

This is the tradition of charity and com-passion and the idea that society has to

take care of those who cannot take careof themselves.

In the Middle Ages, the poor werealmost exclusively the impotent poorwho were not able to support them-selves. They were the object of charitywhich was, and is, a method of practic-ing a Christianvirtue and of assuagingguilt feelings of the privileged. In thefree market system, the impotent poorwere joined by the able-bodied poorand the unemployed. Variousmeasureswere used to force them into employ-ment but they were also made the ben-

170




eficiaries of charity and compassion

throughsome measure of relief-for ex-

ample, the allowance system of Speen-

hamland, 1795. Aside from trying tosolve socio-economic problems of pov-erty, this constituted an enlargementofthe group to which charity and com-

passion was extended from the phys-ically, to the economically, helpless.The reason for this extension was, and

is, the guilt feelings of the haves to-wards the have-nots. This is probablyone of the

strongestroots of

egalitarianwelfare measuresand of the orientationof social responsibility. Not only doesthe resentment of the underprivileged,but also the guilt feelings of the haves

grow when income differentialsare feltto be illegitimate; the less they feel thattheir privileges are deserved, the more

they feel obligated to ameliorate thesituation of the poor and underpriv-

ileged-for example, as in the 1930sin the United States. It was muchless the case early in the nineteenth

century when wealth was equated with

morality and poverty, with immorality.Thus, demands for a more equal dis-tributionof income originate not merelywith those who want more,but also withthose who feel badly about having more.

However, there is more to this trend

than the guilt feelings of the privileged.The free market system required, al-most from its beginnings, a protectionof society from the system's detrimentaleffects. As Karl Polanyi has pointedout, the free market tended to destroyman and his environment by treatinglabor and land as commodities.10 When

they are used or not used according tothe

vagariesof the

market, human be-ings and their natural habitat may be

injured or destroyed. A countervailingforce-which Karl Polanyi calls social

10. K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation(New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944), partII.

protectionism-was required, includingall types of social legislation and wel-fare measures. Social protectionism

forms a necessary counterweightagainstthe free market. Without it, the freemarket would lose its infra-structure,the supporting framework of a viable

society.Social protectionism, nourished by

the Christian tradition of charity and

compassion towards the underpriv-

ileged, rests squarely on the principleof

ascription:we

helpthe disadvan-

taged not for what they do or achieve,but for what they are-namely, human

beings in need. The ascriptive prin-ciple has never been completely aban-doned as the meritocrats maintain. Ithas been applied as a countervailingforce, as a balance against the ravageswrought by the inequalities of the mar-ket economy. Significantly, social pro-

tectionism was often supported by non-bourgeois, conservative groups, such asthe Tories in England and Bismarckand the Junkers in Germany,and by a

growingcivil service bureaucracy.

CONCLUSIONS

Where does this kaleidoscopicand di-alectical picture leave us, today? The

antinomicforces pulling towardsgreatereconomicequality, on the one hand, andthe counter-tendenciespushing back the

equalitarian trend to protect the exist-

ing order,on the other hand, are still atwork. If the equality-inequality dichot-

omy is an existential antinomy, the

struggle will not cease, whatever thestructure of our society and economy.

However, the two forces are never in astatic equilibrium; there are alwaystrends in one or the other direction.Surface appearances to the contrary,the pendulumwill probably swing in adirection of greater equality based on

ascription and away from income dif-

171




ferentials based on either financial or

educational achievement. One of the

reasonsis that economicgrowth,at least

in the developed countries, may becomeless and less desirable and possible.

Growingaffluence makes an increase inthe standards of living, in terms of

more and more income and wealth, less

attractive. This, in turn, may weakenthe resistance against measures towards

a more equal income distribution, such

as a guaranteedminimum income. The

economies of thedeveloped

countries

may turn towards an improvement of

the quality of life, which would imply a

weakening of the acquisitive ethos.

Time and energy-the really scarce re-

sources-may be increasingly devoted

to the production of psychic income in

the form of playful, artistic and con-

templative pursuits to satisfy the higherneeds and to games, circuses, fishing

and loafing to satisfy lower needs.The likelihood of such a development

is greatly enhancedby the dangerspre-dicted by the ecologists. If population

growth, exhaustion of basic resources,pollution and the problems of waste

absorption should actually set absolute

limits to economic growth, the basiceconomic orientation of the present eco-nomic systems will have to change.Mankind, especially in the West, willhave to turn to a life style which con-sumes less resources and leads to lesswaste than the present system. Thus,production and income, in the tradi-tional sense, will lose their importanceand a more equal distributionof incomewill be more acceptable merely becausethere will be fewer uses for money in-come. The basic values of life

maychange; market values will have to be

replacedby noneconomicvalues. Peoplewill have to pursue goals which willcost more time and energy, but less re-

sources, and will not generate detrimen-tal by-products. Friendship, love, en-

joyment of nature, contemplation,mere

loafing and so forth will have to become

more important than income and pur-

chasing power.This does not mean an end to in-

equality, but it will be based on differ-ent grounds than income and wealth.

Inequalities may be based on noneco-nomic-such as aesthetic, spiritual and

communal-standards. These differ-ences may be based on achievements

outside the economic dimension. In

the economicfield,

wemay

return to

the principleof ascription. Income will

have to be separatedfrom productionof

traditional goods and services; mean-

ingful activity will have to be defined

as more than the earning of income;and a guaranteedminimumto everyone,with strict regulation of what can be

producedand bought without ecological

dangers,will have to be instituted. The

realm of "goods" will have to be re-stricted and the realm of "bads"greatlyincreased. If all this sounds utopian, it

is; however, without utopia, there can

be no vision and no survival.

The problemof equality is ultimatelya philosophical, and not an economic,

question. Differences of status, wealth,power, natural endowment and socialfunctions are unavoidable in any soci-

ety. When people talk about equalityand human dignity, they really want

acceptance-I shy away from the wordlove, but that is what it is-in spite ofall differences. They want to be ac-

cepted and loved as they are, even in

spite of what they are. This love and

acceptance-Christian theology calls it

agape-is not primarily a creation of

any social system; it is needed to softenthe nonegalitarianharshness of society.This is the real meaning of the longingfor a classless society and for a pluralityof values. It is expressed beautifullyin the brilliant social science fiction ofMichael Young:

172




The classless society would be one which

both possessed and acted upon plural val-

ues. Were we to evaluate people, not only

according to their intelligence and theireducation, their occupation, and their

power, but according to their kindliness

and their courage, their imagination and

sensitivity, their sympathy and generosity,there could be no classes. Who would be

able to say that the scientist was superiorto the porter with admirable qualities as a

father, the civil servant with unusual skillat gaining prizes superior to the lorry-driver with unusual skill at growing roses?

The classless society would also be thetolerant society, in which individual differ-

ences were actively encouraged as well as

passively tolerated, in which full meaningwas at last given to the dignity of man.

Every human being would then have equalopportunity, not to rise up in the world in

the light of any mathematical measure, but

to develop his own special capacities for

leading a rich life.1"

This is, of course, a fable. But where,

today, would a description of the ideal

be found if not in a fable?

11. M. Young, The Rise of Meritocracy

1870-2033(New York: PenguinBooks, 1958),p. 169.

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walter weisskopf - the dialectics of equality

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