w14560
TRANSCRIPT
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NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DID ECONOMICS CAUSE WORLD WAR II?
Robert J. Gordon
Working Paper 14560
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14560
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138
December 2008
This paper is a review article of Tooze (2006) and related literature on the same topic and will appear
in the Journal of Economic History in March, 2009. I am grateful to Joel Mokyr for helpful suggestions.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
2008 by Robert J. Gordon. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including notice, is given to
the source.
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Did Economics Cause World War II?
Robert J. Gordon
NBER Working Paper No. 14560
December 2008
JEL No. H56,N14,N24,N54,N64,N70,N74,N80,N84
ABSTRACT
Historians have long recognized the role of economic resources and organization in determining the
outcome of World War II: the Nazi economy lacked the economic resources and organization to oppose
the combined might of the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. A minority view is that the Germans were defeated
not by economics, but by Hitler's many strategic and tactical mistakes, of which the most important
was the invasion of the Soviet Union. Compared to this debate about the outcome of the war, there
has been less attention to economics as the cause of World War II.
This is a review article of a new economic history of the Nazi economy by Adam Tooze which cuts
through the debate between economics and Hitler's mistakes as fundamental causes of the outcome.
Instead, Tooze argues that the invasion of the Soviet Union was the inevitable result of Hitler's paranoia
about the land-starved backwardness of German agriculture as contrasted with the raw material and
land resources of America's continent and Britain's empire. The American frontier expansion that
obliterated the native Indians provided Hitler with a explicit precedent, which he often cited, for pushing
aside the native populations in the east to provide land for German Aryan farmers.
Germany's agricultural weakness is summarized by its low land-labor ratio, but Poland and the Ukraine
had even less land per person. Thus simply acquiring the land to the east could not solve Germany's
problem of low agricultural productivity without removing the native farming populations. Far better
than other histories of the Third Reich, Tooze reveals the shocking details of General Plan Ost, theuber-holocaust which would have removed, largely through murder, as many as 45 million people
from eastern agricultural land. Tooze, like the Nazis before him, fails to emphasize that the solution
to Germany's agricultural problem was not acquiring more land for the existing German farm population,
but rather by raising the land-labor ratio by making the existing German land more efficient, mechanizing
agriculture and encouraging rural-to-urban migration within Germany.
Robert J. Gordon
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208-2600and NBER
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Introduction
Historianshavelongrecognizedtheroleofeconomicresourcesand
organizationindeterminingtheoutcomeofWorldWarII. Therewasneverany
doubtthattheeconomicresourcesoftheU.S.overwhelmedthoseofJapan,and
regardingthewaragainstGermanyapowerfulcaseassembledbyHarrison
(1998),Overy(1994),andmanyothershasarguedthattheNazieconomylacked
theeconomicresourcesandorganizationtoopposethecombinedmightofthe
U.S.,U.K.,andU.S.S.R.
Aminorityviewdisputestheprimacyofeconomicsindefeatingthe
GermansbypointingtoHitlersmanystrategicandtacticalmistakes,ofwhich
themostimportantwasinvadingtheU.S.S.R. Amongthemorepersuasive
counterfactualscenariosabouttheGermanwarasawholearethosedeveloped
byAlexander(2000)andTsouras(2006),whilemanyotherbooksexamine
alternativeoutcomesofparticularphasesofthewar,e.g.,ahypotheticalGerman
invasionoftheU.K.ordefeatoftheAlliesatDDay. Astrongcaseforthe
legitimacyofcounterfactualhistoryismadebyFerguson(1999).
WhiletheroleofeconomicsandofHitlersmistakesindeterminingthe
warsoutcomehasbeenexaminedextensively,lessattentionhasbeenpaidto
economicsasacauseofGermanaggression. ThisreviewarticleofAdamToozes
(2006)ambitiouseconomichistoryoftheNaziregimefindstheauthorsmost
significantcontributiontolieinhisintricateaccountoftheprewarweaknessof
theGermanagriculturalsectorasamotivationforHitlersdeterminationto
expandtotheeast. Hitlerwasparanoidaboutthelandstarvedbackwardnessof
Germanagricultureascontrastedwiththerawmaterialandlandresourcesof
AmericascontinentandBritainsempire. Landhungerwasone,ifnotthe
mostimportantimpulse(p.166). TheAmericanfrontierexpansionthat
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obliteratedthenativeIndiansprovidedHitlerwithaexplicitprecedent,whichhe
oftencited,forpushingasidethenativepopulationsintheeasttoprovideland
forGermanAryanfarmers. Itwasthelastgreatlandgrabinthelongand
bloodyhistoryofEuropeancolonialism(p.462). Toozedevotesfarmore
attentionthanotherrecenthistoriesoftheThirdReichtotheultimatelogical
conclusionofHitlerseasternlandhunger,thesocalledGeneralPlanOstthat
wouldhavedisplacedandperhapsultimatelykilledasmanyas40million
easternEuropeanstoprovidetheGermanswiththelandthatHitlercoveted.
Toozesprefaceproclaimsagrandambitionforthebook,tobringtothe
understandingof
Nazi
economics
the
same
major
leap
forward
that
he
claims
hasbeenachievedinpoliticalhistoryoverthelasttwodecades. Butthebooks
achievementsaccomplishonlypartofthisambition.Mostofwhatwelearn
abouttheprewaryears(193339)repeatswhatwealreadyknewbutnowinmore
detail. Toozestreatmentofthewaritself,193945,ismoresuccessfuland
containsafascinatingsetofanalysesthatenrichourpreviousideasaboutthe
conductandoutcomeofthewar. However,Toozeisnotthefirsttofocuson
Germanyslandshortageasabasiccauseofwar. Barkaimakesexactlythesame
point: HitlerprojectedintotheutopicdistanceavastagrarianGrossraumthat
wastobeconqueredbythesword,avisionthatcouldnotberealizedwithin
Germansfrontiersuntil1939(1990,p.157).
ThePrewarYears,193339
Whatwealreadyknewabouttheprewar1930scomesfromBarkai(1990)
andAbelshauser(1998),amongothers,andonthebigquestions,Toozereaches
thesameconclusions. TheGermanrecoveryfrom25percentunemploymentin
1932tolessthan5percentby1936/7wasachievedbyamoneyfinancedfiscal
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expansion. TheseauthorsaskhowandwhentheNazisbecameKeynesians
beforeKeynes,whenduringthesameperiodtheRooseveltNewDealwas
failingtobringtheUSunemploymentratedowntosingledigits. Allthree
authorstracetheideaforcreditfinancedexpansionbacktothepreviousWeimar
governmentandtotheNaziSofortprogrammcontainedina1932political
manifestothatwaswidelycirculatedinpamphletform...duringthecampaign
fortheJuly1932Reichstagelection(Abelshauser,p.129).
Toozeconfirmspreviousfindingsthatrelativelylittleoftheexpansionin
publicexpenditurestooktheformofpublicworksliketheautobahns,whileover
80percent
consisted
of
spending
for
rearmament.
Abelshauser
(1998,
p.
169)
callsthismilitaryKeynesianismonalargescale. Thecentralresource
constraintinthe1930swasforeignexchange,andthisshortageledtoabyzantine
systemofexportsubsidiesandimportcontrols.Whydidtheregimerefuseto
devaluetheReichsmark,particularlyin1936whenmostofitsneighbors
devalued? TheanswerssuggestedbyToozeandhispredecessorsmakelittle
sense. AccordingtoTooze,theNaziregimefearedtheconsequencesof
devaluationforservicingitslargeforeigndebt,butwhycouldtheNazisnothave
devaluedin193334andrepudiatedthatforeigndebt(afterall,theyimposeda
moratoriumonforeigndebtrepaymentasearlyasJune,1934)? Didtherefusal
todevaluerepresentafearofinflation?Whilethisexplanationmightseem
plausibleafterthetraumaof192223,itbecomeslessconvincingwiththepassage
oftimeastheGermaneconomyexpandedtowardfullemploymentduring1933
36withoutanysignificantinflation.
Didprivateconsumptionriseinthe1930sorwasitsqueezedbythe
shortageofforeignexchangeandthedemandsoftherearmamentprogram? The
readersearchesinvainamongToozesmanyfiguresandtablesforananswer.
Thereareonlyscatteredcommentsaboutparticularshorttimeintervals,e.g.
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therewasnogrowthinconsumergoodsproductionbetween1934and1936and
aflatleveloftextilesproductionbetweenearly1934andlate1935. Butwhat
aboutthepost1933periodasawhole?WemustturntoBarkai(AppendixTable
1,textp.232)tolearnthatpercapitarealconsumptionexpressedasanindex
numberwas88in1933,100in1936,108in1939,andfellbackto100in1942.
Abelshausers(1998,Table4.2)timeseriesofindustrialproductionofconsumer
goodsisquitesimilar(100in1936,110in1939,and95in1942). Boththese
authorscontradicttheimpressionprovidedbyToozethatconsumption
stagnatedinthe1930sandhighlightbytheirexamplethefrustratingtendencyof
Toozeto
present
data
over
only
afraction
of
the
relevant
number
of
years.
EvidentlytheNazieconomysucceededatleastuntil1939inexpandingthe
productionofbothgunsandbutter,orinAbelshauserspithyphrase(1998,p.
148)asmuchbutterasnecessary,asmanygunsaspossible. Thisresidual
increaseinconsumptionishardlysurprisinginviewoftheenormousamountof
initialeconomicslackin1933.
ThepreviousliteraturehasemphasizedtheNazipolicyofholdingdown
realwagesasacontributiontotherapidexpansionofemployment,theopposite
oftheperversewageincreasingpoliciesofRooseveltsNRA. Indeed,Barkai
showsthattheshareofGermanwageincomeinnationalproductdeclinedfrom
64to59percentbetween1932and1936,whiletheincreaseinprofitswasquite
spectacular(p.196). Likewise,Abelshauser(p.148)reportsthattheincome
shareofthebottomhalfoftheincomedistributionfellfrom25to18percent
between1928and1936. ButToozehasnothingtosayaboutthechangeinthereal
wage,onlyaboutthelowleveloftheGermanstandardoflivingasmeasuredby
howmanyminutesoflaborwerenecessarytopurchaseeverydayitemslike
cigarettesorcoffee(pp.1413). TheseindicatorsofrelativeGermanpovertyare
usedbyToozetosuggestthatGermanworkershadastandardoflivingonly
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onefourththelevelofAmericans.Hemakesnoattempttoachievea
reconciliationwithMaddisonsestimatesthattheratioofGermantoUSreal
GNPpercapita,afterdecliningfrom72percentin1913to65percentin1928,
jumpedto84percentin1938(seeHarrison,1998,Tables1.1and1.2). Granted
thatGNPincludesmorethanconsumption,particularlyinviewofrearmament
expenditure,butthegulfbetweenToozesonefourthestimateandMaddisons
muchhigherimplicitestimateseemstoolargetobridge.AmajorshareofToozesprewaranalysisisdevotedtoGerman
agriculture,inordertosupporthiscentralpointthateconomicscreatedthe
motivationfor
war.
The
Nazis
only
perceived
solution
to
inadequate
food
productionwasaneastwardexpansiontoobtainlebensraumbyforce. The1933
censusrevealedthatfully29percentofGermanemploymentwasinthe
agriculturalsector,andthattherewasgreatinequalityinlandholdings. Inan
attempttosqueezemoreproductionoutoftheseresources,asetofdraconian
priceandproductioncontrolswasputinplacein1933thatendedthefreemarket
inagricultureandextendedbureaucraticcontrolintoeveryfield,barnyard,and
milkingshedinthecountry(p.187).
TheNazisfocusonlebensraumwasdrivenbyaperceivedlandshortage.
Germanyhadonly2.1hectaresperfarmworker,comparedto12.8intheUS,3.8
intheUK,and2.8inFrance(p.176). YetboththeNazisandToozelookatthese
factsupsidedown. Theproblemwasnottoolittlelandbutrathertoomanyfarm
workers. GermanyhadfourtimesasmuchagriculturallandasBritainthatwas
cultivatedbyseventimesasmanyfarmworkers. Akeyaspectofeconomic
developmentisthemovementoffarmworkerstoindustrialandservicejobsin
thecities. TheNazisfailedtoseetheobvioussolution,programstoencourage
themovementofpeasantswithsmalllandholdingstoindustrialjobs,which
wereplentifulinthefullemploymenteconomyachievedafter1936. And
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Toozesfactsonlandlaborratiospreviewedtherequiredbrutalityoflebensraum;
prewarPolishfarmershadonly1.8hectaresperfarmworker,lessthanGermany
(p.176). SimplymergingPolandintoGermanywouldnothelp. Onlyby
expellingorexterminatingeveryoneofthe10millionPolishfarmersandthen
replacingthemwithlandlessGermanpeasantswouldthecombined
German/PolishlandlaborratiobebroughtuptotheBritishlevel. Thelow
land/laborratioandtheoveralllevelofpovertyintheUkrainecompoundsthe
Polishexample.
The193945War,theOccupiedCountries,andGeneralPlanOst
Thestoryofthe193945warisfamiliar,butToozemakessignificant
contributionsbyprobingdeeplyintothesourcesofGermanysresource
constraintsandtheirstrategicconsequences. Byearly1941theGermanshad
becomedependentonrawmaterialsimportedfromtheUSSR,andToozeposes
theircentralstrategicdilemma. ShouldGermanycontinuetorelyonthose
importsorratherinvadetheUSSR,ineffectgrabbingtheresourcesratherthan
payingforthem? OncetheUSSRwasconquered,Germanywouldbereadyfora
battleofthecontinents,startingwiththeoilsuppliesoftheMiddleEast. One
mustask,asToozedoesnot,whythedrivetotheMiddleEastforoilsupplies
didnottakeprecedenceovertheinvasionoftheUSSR? Rommelwasstarved
forsuppliesinNorthAfricain194142,andadiversiontohimofonlyafewof
thepanzerdivisionsallocatedtotheRussianfrontwouldhaveallowedthe
GermanstopushpastSuezintotheoilrichMiddleEastbymid1942.ThestandardinterpretationbyOvery(1995)andothersisthatthe
Germanslackedsufficientresourcestowinthewar,andthattheybungledthe
managementoftheresourcesthattheypossessed.WhydidtheAmericansand
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RussiansproducesomuchandtheGermansproducesolittle? InOverys
version,theGermansfailedtoappreciatetheAmericantechniqueofmass
productionandproducedtoomanyvariantsofweaponsatanunnecessarily
highlevelofquality. ProductionstagnateduntilAlbertSpeercametotherescue
inhistemporary194244economicmiraclethatachievedquantumleapsin
armamentsproductionuntilthatmiraclewascutshortbyAlliedbombing.
Indeed,ToozeconfirmstheconventionalwisdomthattheRussianproduction
miraclewaslargelyachievedatasafedistancebehindtheUrals(p.588).
Toozealterstheemphasisfrommismanagementtothemanydimensions
ofresource
shortages,
and
his
indictment
of
German
mismanagement
shifts
from
domesticarmamentsproductiontothebungledtreatmentoftheresources
availableinthewesternnationsconqueredinthe1940Blitz. TheGermanshad
greathopesthattheirownresourceshortageswouldberelievedfromthe
conquerednations,particularlyFrance. Buttheyforgotthatincentivesmatter.
FrenchfarmersweredemoralizedbyGermanconfiscationoffoodandbythe
neardisappearanceofenergy,bothpetrolandcoal. TheFrenchharvestdeclined
byhalfbetween1938and1941.Withoutfood,Frenchcoalminersreducedtheir
workeffortandatonepointwereinopenrebellion,andToozearguesthatin
nootheroccupationisproductionsorelatedtothefoodintakeofworkersasin
thecoalindustry. AndwithoutcoalGermanysongoingshortageofsteelwas
exacerbated. Strippingtheconquerednationsofrailroadwagonsmadematters
worse,asdidthecruelandabysmalconditionsinwhichslavelaborersfrom
France,Poland,andelsewherewereforcedtoworkinGermanysarmaments
factories. InfactToozecomesupwiththestunningfigureof7millionslave
workers,includingUSSRprisonersofwar,whodiedfrombarbaricconditions
whowouldotherwisehavebeenavailabletosupplementtheacutelabor
shortagesoftheReich.
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Toozessearchforthesourcesofunderproductionintheconquered
territoriesextendstothelackofimportedgrainsandoffertilizerduetothe
Britishblockade. SincetheconventionalwisdomisthatBritaincamecloseto
losingthewarasaresultoftheUboatattacks,Toozedeservescreditfor
pointingouttheconverse,thatcontinentalagriculturesufferedirreparablyasthe
resultoftheBritishblockade,apartialrepeatofthefooddeprivationthat
GermanyexperiencedduringWorldWarI(Offer,1989).
ToozereinforcesthesepointsbyshowinghowmuchmoreBritaingained
fromitsalliancewithAmericathanGermanygainedfromitsconquered
millions.The
initial
Congressional
Lend
Lease
appropriation
in
March,
1941
(at
aplausibleexchangerate)equaledtwofullyearsofdomesticGerman
armamentsproduction. Bytheendof1941theUKhadreceivednolessthan
5000aircraftfromtheUS,whileGermanyhadobtainedamere78aircraftfrom
FranceandtheNetherlands. Inadditiontosteel,oilwasthebindingconstraint
onGermanmilitaryadvances,andoneofthemoststrikingofToozesmany
novelcomparisonsisthatin1942Britain(despitetheuboatsinkings)imported
morethanfivetimesasmuchoilfromtheUSasGermanyimportedfrom
Romania. BritishplannersdisplayedincredulitythatHitlerwouldhave
invadedtheUSSRwithlessthanathirdofthepetrolstocksthattheBritish
consideredtheminimumtolerablelimit.
Toozereturnstothisthemewithevenmorestartlingcomparisonsabout
theyear1943,whentotalUSarmamentsproductionwas30timeshigherthanthe
contributionoftheconqueredterritoriestotheReich,andUSshipmentstothe
UKwerefourtimeshigher. AcriticalLendLeasecontributionwasthefleetof
400,000Dodgetrucks,whichcarriedtheRedArmytovictorywhiletheGermans
wereretreatingwiththeirarchaichorsedrawntransport. Resourceconstraints
alsounderminedtheentirerationaleoflebensraum. Yes,theUkrainehadagrain
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surplus,butitcouldhavebeenharvestedaftertheSovietsscorchedtheearth
onlybyamassivemovementoffarmmachineryfromGermanytotheUkraine,
whichwasbeyondtherealmoffeasibilityduetoshortagesofpetrol,notto
mentionofthemachinesthemselves.
ToozesmostoriginalcontributiontotheeconomicsofWorldWarIIishis
detailedaccountofGermanysplannedberholocaust,GeneralPlanOst(GPO),
whichcontinuesToozescentralthemethatGermanywasdriventowarbya
shortageofagriculturalland. Barelymentionedinpreviouslargescalehistories
oftheThirdReich,e.g.Burleigh(2000),GPOwastheplantodisplacemostofthe
nonGermanic
residents
of
Poland,
Belorussia,
and
the
Ukraine
by
German
ethnicswhowouldbeinvited(orforced)tooccupyhundredsofthousandsof
squaremilesoffertilelandfromwhichthepreviousoccupantshadbeen
removed. Andhowwouldtheyberemoved? Theplanimplicitlyassumed
forcedmarchestonowherealongwhichmostofthedisplacedpeoplewoulddie
throughnaturalwastage(p.476). Toozeestimatesthatthetotalnumberof
peopleforcedoutwouldhaveamountedtoanunbelievable45million,more
thanseventimesthenumberofrecordedvictimsoftheholocaust.
FortunatelyforthefutureofEurope,GPOprovedtobebothstrategically
andtacticallyimpossible. TheGermanfailuretocaptureMoscowinDecember,
1941,andthesubsequentSovietcounterattackconvertedtheGermaninvasion
fromatriumphantmarchintoadesperatestruggleforsurvival. Thetactical
failurewasdemonstratedinanexperimentalprojectinJuly,1942,todeportthe
entirePolishpopulationoftheZamo region. ThenumberofGermantroops
perdisplacedinhabitantturnedouttobeaninfeasiblylargenumber,andtensof
thousandsoftheinhabitantslearnedwhatwashappeningandfledinadvanceto
thewoods,escapingtheroundupsquadsofGermanpolice,troops,and
auxiliaries.
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ThetraditionaldebateaboutWorldWarIIisbetweeneconomicresources
andHitlersmistakesastheultimatesourceofAlliedvictory. Forabookon
economichistory,Toozeadmirablydevotessubstantialattentiontomilitary
strategyandtacticsandtheirinterplaywitheconomicresources. Perhapshis
mostimportantinsightisthattheGermanlogisticalsystemwasnotequippedto
penetratebeyond500kmintotheUSSR,andthatHitlercountedonthecollapse
oftheRedArmybeforethatpointwasreached. ButtheRedArmy,despite
losingmorethan3millionmentoprisonercampsandultimatedeathinthefirst
twomonths,didnotcollapse.
Toozeattributes
the
German
failure
to
capture
Moscow
not
to
Hitlers
mistakeofdivertingGuderianspanzerdivisionssouthtoKievinAugust,1941,
butrathertofundamentallimitationsofsupply. Germanfueltrucksconsumed
asmuchfuelintraversingamere500kilometersastheamountoffueltheycould
deliver(similarly,forthesamereason,Pattonsarmyranoutoffuelineastern
Franceinthefallof1944). ToozerightlydismissesplanningforBarbarossaas
wishfulthinking,andwhentheGermansfailedtotakeMoscowin1941,the
entireGermaneconomicplanningapparatuswasthrownintoastateofcrisis.
PartoftheoutcomewaspredeterminedontheinvasiondateofJune,1941;
Germanyhadmobilizedallofitsyoungmenfortheinvasion,withvirtuallyno
oneinreserve. TheUSSR,withdoublethepopulation,hadvasthordesbeyond
theUralswhocould,andultimatelydid,cometotherescueofMotherRussia,
initiallyintheMoscowcounterattackoflate1941andintheencirclementofthe
GermanSixthArmyatStalingradinlate1942.
WhenToozereviewsthepeacetimeyearsofthe1930s,hetellsusmostly
whatwealreadyknow. Buthisbookdeserveshighpraiseforwhatheteachesus
aboutthewartimeyears193945themselves. Theshortageswereendemic;the
harshtreatmentoftheoccupiedterritoriesstarvedthemwhiledeprivingthe
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Reichoftheexpectedresources;theBritishblockadehadteeth;andthelogistical
planningofthe1941invasionoftheUSSRwasbasedonabsurdlyunrealistic
assumptions. Further,lebensraumwasnosolutiontoGermanysinefficient
agriculturaleconomywithoutatacticallyinfeasibleberholocaust. Germany
marchedintoRussiawith3millionmen,2000tanks,and700,000horses. All
thosehorsesremainasymboloftheeconomicbackwardnessthatmotivated
Germanytogotowarandultimatelycauseditsdefeat.
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REFERENCESAbelshauser,Werner(1998). Germany: guns,butter,andeconomicmiracles,
inHarrison(1998),pp.12276.
Alexander,Bevin (2000). HowHitlerCouldHaveWonWorldWar II: The Fatal
ErrorsthatLedtoNaziDefeat. NewYork: ThreeRiversPress.
Barkai, Avraham (1990). Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy. New
Haven: YaleUniversityPress.
Burleigh,Michael(2000). TheThirdReich: ANewHistory. NewYork: Hilland
Wang.
Ferguson,Niall(1999). VirtualHistory: TowardsaChaoticTheoryofthePast,
inNiallFerguson,ed.,VirtualHistory. NewYork: BasicBooks,pp.190.
Harrison,Mark (1998). The Economics ofWorld War II. Cambridge andNew
York: CambridgeUniversityPress,
Offer,Avner (1989).TheFirstWorldWar: AnAgrarian Interpretation,Clarendon
Press/Oxford.
Overy,Richard(1995). Whythe
Allies
Won.
NewYork: Norton.
Tooze,Adam(2006). TheWagesofDestruction: TheMakingandBreakingofthe
NaziEconomy. LondonandNewYork,AllenLaneforPenguin.
Tsouras,PeterG.,ed.(2006). HitlerTriumphant: AlternateDecisionsofWorldWar
II. London: GreenhillBooks.