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dited by

HarvardUniversityPress

S VY OTS Y

ind in ocietyThe evelopment igherPsychological ProcessesMichael oleVera John SteinerSylvia ScribnerEllen Souberman

ambridge MassachusettsLondon ngl nd 978

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The spidercarries out operalions reminiscent of a weaverand theboxes which bees build in thesky could disgrace the work of manyarchitects. But even the worst architectdiffers from the most able beefrom the very outset in that before he builds n box out of boards hehas already constructedit in his head. At theend ofthe workprocesshe obtains a result which already existed in his mind beforehe beganto build. The architect not only changes the form given to him bynature withinthe constraints imposed by nature he also carries outa purpose of his own which defines the means and thecharacter ofthe activity to which he must subordinate his will

Karl Marx apital

It is precisely the alterationoj natureby men not nature as suchwhich is the most essential and immediate basis of humanthought.

Friedrich Engels Dialectics oj Nature

IntroductionMICH EL OLEND SYLVI SCRI NER

Educated as a lawyer and philologist Lev S Vygotsky had alreadymade s ev er al c on tr ib ut io ns t o l it er ar y c ri ti ci sm w he n h e began hiscareer as a psychologist following the Russian Revolution in 1917. Hewa s a student in the heyday of WilhcJm Wundt the founder of experimental psychology and William Jamcs the American pragmatist. Hisscientific contemporaries included Ivan Pavlov Vladimir Bekhterevand John B Watson popularizers of stimulus-response theories ofbehavior as well as Wertheimer Kohler KoHka and Lewin the found-ers of the e s t ~ l t psychology movement. The reader might c x p ~ c tthen that Vygot sky s w or k w il l p ro ve to be primarily of historicalinterest perhaps a s a g li mp se o f the way in which modern psychology sfounding fathers influenced Soviet psychology in postrevolutionaryR us si a. T he se e ss ay s a re c er ta in ly o f i nt cr es t f ro m the perspective ofintel1ectual history but they are not historical relics. Rather we offert he m as a c on tr ib ut i on t o q ua nd ar ie s and discussions in contemporarypsyc1lOlogyIn order to understand how the ideas in this volume can retain theirrelevance across the reaches of time and culture that separate us fromVygotsky we have repeatedly found ourselves reflecting upon the stateof European psychologywhichprovided the initialsetting forVygotsky stheories. We h av e a ls o f o un d it h el pf ul t o e xa mi ne t he c on di ti on o fpsychology and societyin postrevolutionalyRussia since they were th esource of the immediate problems facing Vygotsky as wen as a sourceo f i ns pi ra ti on a s l le and hi s c ol le agu es s ou gh t t o d ev el op a M ar xi sttheory of human intellectual functioning.

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IlItrr -:lioll2

NINETEENTHCENTURY BEGINNINGSUntil the latter half of tIle nineteenth century the study of man's

nature was the province of philosophy. The intellectual descendants ofJohn Locke in England had developed his empiricist explanation ofmind, which cmphl1si7.ed the origin of ideas from environmentallyp,. dlltI't SIII.o.;:Ilillll, . Till III:ijllr p l l I h l ( ~ 1 I I 01 p S Y ( l i l l l l l ~ i ( , : I 1 :Il1aly. is f ll rlhese British empiricists was to ueserjbe the Jaws of associatioll ( ywhich S i l l l p l l ~ sC lIsalions eomhillc to produce complex ideas. On thecontinent the fulluwers of Immanuel Kant urgucu th' lt ideas of space:lIld time and cOllcepts of qUilntity, quality, and relation originate in thehuman mind :lIul canllot he decomposed inln simplcr clements. Neitherside budged from its armchair. Both of these philosophical traditionswere opemting under the assumption, daUng from the,work of HeneDescar tes , tha t the seicnt if ic s tudy of mall cou ld apply only to hisphysical body. To philosophy was assigned the study of his soul.

While the conflict between these two approaches reilches down tothe present day, in the 86 s the terms of this discussion were changedirrevocably by the almost simultaneous publication of three books. Mostfamous was Darwin's Origin of Species, which argued the essentialcontinuity of man and other animals. One immediate consequence ofthis assertion was an effort by many scholars to establish discontinuitiesthat Sct human adults olF from (heir lowcr rc1iltives (hoth ontogencticallyalld phylogeneticaJIy). The second book WilS Gustav Fechner's DiePsyclwphysik, which provided'1 detailed, mathematically sophisticilteddescription of the relation between changes in specifiable physicalcvcnts and vcrbalizable psychic rcsponses. Fechner claimed no lessthan iln objective, qU

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reflexes (which built upon Sechenov) and Darwin's assertion of thecontinuity of man an d beast, they opened up many areas of animal andhuman hehavior to scientific study. In onc important respect, however,they agreed with their introspective antagonists: their basic strategy

. was In idelltify lhe simplc huilding blocks of human activity (suhstit u t i n ~ stimulus-response bonds for sensations) and then to specify theruil S hy whieh thcseclcll lcnls c O l l l h i l l ~ d to p roduce more COlllp] Xphenomena. This strategy led to a concentration on processes sharedhy animals amI hllmans all(l, again, lo a lleglN:t of h i ~ h c r process s-l lollght, language, ami volitional bchavior. 11le sccond Hnc of alt,\ckon descriptions of the contents of consciousncss came from a group ofpsychologists who objected to the one point UpOIl which Wundt andthe hchaviorists agreed: the

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n r . -:tion6

t ion meant a great deal. It included identification of the brain mechanMisms underlying a particular function; it included a detailed explicationof their developmental history to establish the relation between simpleand complex forms of what appeared to be the same behavior; and,importantly, it included specification of the societal context in whichthe behavior developed. Vygotsky s goals were extremely ambitious,pedlllps 1.1Ilrcnsollubly so. He did not achieve these goals (ns he wns wdlaware). But he did succeed in providing us with an astute and prescient:lllalysis of modern psychology.

A major reason for the continued relcvancc of Vygotsky s work isthat in 1924 and the following decade he constructed a penetratingcritiquc of the notion that an understanding of the higher psychologicalfunctions in humans can be found by a multiplication and complicationof principles derived from animal psychology, in particular those prin McipJts that represent the mech:l1lical comhination of stimlllusl espollSelaws. At the same time he provided a dC\ astating critique of thcorieswhich claim that thc properties of adult intellectual functions arise frOlnmaturation alone, or arc in any way preformed in the child and simplywaiting for an opportunity to manifest themselves.

III slressing the social origins of language :\Ild thinking, Vygotskywas following the lead of influential French sociologists, but to ourknowledge he was the first modem psychologist to suggest the mechanisms by whicll culture becomes a part of each,person s nature. Insistingthnt psychological functions arc a product of the brain s activity, hebecame an early advocate of combining experimental cognitive psychol0RY with neurology and physiology. Finally, hy claiming that all ofthese should be understood in terms of a Marxist theory of the history ofhuman society, he laid the foundation for a unified behavioral science.

MARXIST THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKContrary to the stewotype of Soviet scholars scurrying to make

their theorics conform to the Politburo s most recent interpretation ofMnrxism, Vygotsky clearly viewcd Marxist thought as a valuable scicntiflc rcsource from very early in his career. A psychologically relevantapplication of dialectical and historical materialism woulc.l he oneaccurate summary of Vygotsky s sociocultural theory of higher mentalprocesses.

Vygotsky saw in the methods and principles of dialectical materialism a solution to key scientific paradoxes facing his contemporaries. Acentral tenet of this method is that all phenomena be studied as processes

7

in motion and in change. In terms of the subject matter of psychology,the scientist s task is to recOnstruct the origin and course of developmentof behavior and consciousness. Not only does cvery phenomenon haveits history, but this history is characterized by changes both qualitative(changes in form and structure and basic characteristics) and quantitative. Vygotskyapplied this line of reasoning to explain the transfonnafion of elementary psychological processes into complex ones. Theschism t w ~ n natural scicntific studies of elementary processes :l.lIdspeculative reflection on cultural forms of behavior might be bridgedby tracing the qualitative changes in behavior occurillg ill the coursc ofdevelopment. Thus, when Vygotsky speaks of his approach as develop.~ e n t a I this is not to be confused with a theory of child development.The developmental method, in Vygotsky s view, is the centrul methodof psychological science.

Marx s theory of society (known as historical materialism) alsoplayed a fundamental role iJl Vygotsky s thinking. According to Marx,histor ica l changes in society and mater ia l life produce changes inhuman nature (consciousness and behavior). Although this generalproposition had been echoed by others, Vygotsky was the first to ). attempt to relate it to concrete psychological questions. In this effort he I \creatively elaborated on Engel.s concept of human labor and tool use J 0as the means by which man changes natureand inso doing transforms l

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reveals the close relationship between their fundamentally mediatednature and the dialectical, materialist conception of historical change.

Citations of Marxist classics were sometimes uscd to excess bycertain Soviet psychologists as they sought a meanS for building a Marxist psychology from the chaos of competing schools of thought. Yetin unpublished notes Vygotsky repudiated the quotation method ofrelating Marxism to psychology and made explicit the way in which hethought its basic methodological principles might contribute to theorybuiJding in psychology:

I don't want to discover the nature of mind by p ~ t c h i n g together a 1 1 ofquotations. want to find out how science has to be built, to approachthe study of the mind having learned the whole of Marx s method. . . In order to create such an enabling theory-method in tIle generallyaccepted scielltific manner, it is necessary to discover the essence ofthe given area of phenomena, the laws according to which they change,their qualitative and quantitative characteristiCS, their causes. isnecessary to formulate the categories and concepts that are specificallyrelevant to them in other words, to create one's own CapitalThe whole of Capital is written according to the following method: Marxanalyzes a single liVing cell of capitalist society for example, thenature of value. Within this cell he discovers the structure of the entiresystem and all of its economic institutions. He says that to a layman thisanalysis may seem a murky tangle of tiny details. Indeed, there.may betiny details, but they are exactly those which are essential to microanatomy. Anyone who could discover what a psychological cell -the mechanism producing even a single response-would thereby findthe ke y to psychology as a whole. [from unpublished notebooks] cmefuJ reading of this manuscript provides convincing proof of

both Vygotsky's sincerity and the fru itfu lness of the framework hedeveloped.

TH INTElLECTUAL AND SOCIAL S TIINGDevelopmental and historical approaches to the study of human

nature were not unique to Vygotsky in the Soviet Union in the 1920s.Within psychology, an older colleague, P. P. Blonsky, had alreadyadopted the position that an understandingof complex mental functionsrequires developmental analysis.' From B10nsky Vygotsky adopted thenotion that behaviorcan be understoodonlyas the history of behavior,llIonsky was also an early advocate of the view that the technologicalactiv it ies of people were a key to understanding their psychologicalmakeup, a view that Vygotsky exploited in great detail.

ntToul l on9

Vygotsky and many other Sovie t theoris ts of the day werc alsoheavily influenced by the work of wcstern uropean sociologists andanthropologists, like Thllrnwald and L e v y ~ n l l h l ~ who were interestedin the history of mental processes as reconstructed from anthropologicalevidence of the intel lectual act iv ity of primitive peoples . The scantreferences in this book arc a pale rcflection of the extent of Vygot. ky'sinterestin the development of mental processes understood historically.This a spec t o f his work received special a tt en tion in a publicationtitled Studies in the His tory of ehavior published jointly with A. nLuria in 1930. served as the impetus for Luria 's two expedit io lls toCcntral Asia in 1931 and HJ32 the resul ts of which were puhlishedlong after Vygotsky's dcath.

This his torica l emphasis was also popular in Soviet linguistics,where interest centercd on the prohlem of the origin of language and itsinfluence 011 the development of thought. Discussions in linguistics dealtwith concepts similar to Vygotsky's and also similar to the work of Sapirand \Vho1 f who were then becoming influential in the United States.

While an acquaintance with academic issues of the 93 s is helpfulto understanding Vygotsky's approach to human cognition, a consideration of sociopolitical conditions during this time in the Soviet Union isessential as well. Vygotsky worked within a society that put a premiumon science and had high hopes for the abili ty of science to solve thepressing economic and social problems of the Soviet people. Psycho.logical theory could not be pursued apart from the practical demandsmadeon scientistshy the government, and the broad spectrulll of y g o t ~sky's work clearly shows his conccrn with producing a psychology thatwould h:we relevance for cdueatioll and mcdical pradicr-. For Vygotsky,the Heed to carryon theorc ical work in an applied context posed nocontradiction whatsoev'er. Hc had begun his career asa teacher of l i t c r a ~ture, and many of his early art ic les had dealt with problems of e d u c ~tional practice, especially education of the mentally and physicnllyIlandicapped. He had been a founder of the Institute of DefectoIogy inMoscow, with which he was associat(.'d throughout his working life. Insuch medical problems as congenital blindness, aphasin, and severemental retardation Vygot:'iky saw opportunities both for und{,l stalldingthe mental processes of all people and for establishing p r o g r a l l l ~ oftreatment and remediation. Thus, it was consistent with his generaltheoretical view that his work shou ld be car ri ed out in a society thatsought the elimination of illiteracy aud th e [oundill/-{ of educatiollalprograms to maximize the poklltial of individual childrcn.

Vygotsky's participa tion itl the ddmtes surrotJll(ling the fOl lnulalion

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of a Marxist psychology embroilcd him in fierce disputcs in the late19205 and early 1930s. In these discussions ideology, psychology, andpolicy were intricately intertwined, as different groups vied for theright to represent psychology. With KorniIoy s ouster from the Instituteof Psychology in 1930, Vygotsky and his students werc for a brief time illthe ascendancy, but he was never r e c o ~ n i z e d as the official leader.

III the years just p rior to hili death Vygolsky Il cLured lind wrohextensive ly on prohlems of educa tion , o ften using the term pedol ogy, which roughly tmnslatcs as cducational psychology, In genemlhe was scornful of pedology that emphasized tests of intellectual abilitypatterned after the IQ tests then gaining prominence in western uropeand the United States. t was his ambition to reform pedology alongthe lines suggested in chapter 6 in this volume, but his ambition farexceeded his grasp. Vygotsky was mistakenly accused of advocatingmass psychological testing amI criticized as a Great Russian chauvinist for suggesting th lt nonliterate peoples (such as those living innonindustrialized sections of central Asia) had not yet developed theintellectual capacities associated with modem civilization. Two yearsfollowing his death the Central Committee of the Communist Partyissucd a decree halting all psychological tcsting in the Sovict UIlioll.At the same time all leading psychological journals ceased publicationfor almost twcnty years. A period of intcllcctual fermcnt and expcrimentation was a tan end.

But by no means did Vygotsky s ideas die with him. Even beforehis death he and his students established a laboratory in Kharkov headedby A. N. Leontiev (currently Dean of the Psychology Faculty at Moscow University) and latcr by A. V. Zaporozhets (now Director of theInstitute of Preschool Education). Luria completed his medical training in the lat tc r hal f o f the 1930s and wcnt on to car ry out his worldfamous pioneering work in developmental and neuropsychology. Manyof Vygotsky s fonner students hold leading positions in the Instituteof Defectology and the Institute of Psychology within the Soviet Acadcmy of Pedagogical Scienc( s, ns well as university dcpartmcnts of psychology such as that at Moscow University.

As inspection of any compendium of Soviet psychological researchwill show, Vygotsky conlinued and continues to influence research ina wide variety of basic and applicd,lfens related to cognitive processes,their development and dissolution. His ideas have not gonc unchallenged, eV{ln hy his s tudents, but they remain a l iv ing par t of Sovietpsychological thought.

VYGOTSKY S USE OF TIl EXPEHIMENTAL METHODVygotsky s references in the text to experiments conducted in his

laboratory sometimes leave readers with a sense of unease. He presents aJmost no raw data and summaries arc fjllite gelleral. W h e n ~ ;Irethe s ta ti st ical tests tha t record whether or not obscrvations reflectreal clrccts? What these studies prove? Do they in faet ( ltd ll}support to Vygotsky s general theories, Or is he, in spi te of his disclaimers, conducting psychology in a speculative manner without subjecting his central propositions to empirical test? Those stecpcd ill themethodology of experimental psychology as practiced in most AmericanInboratories may be inclincd to withhold the term cxperiment fromVygotsky s studies and consider them to be little more than interestingdemonstrations or pilot studies. And so, in many respccts, they werc.

We have found t uscfllI to kcep in mind the nature of the manuscripts that nrc the basis of this book. They do not constitute a report ofa series of research studies from which general propositions arc ex.

t r a p ~ l a t c d . Hather, in these writings Vygotsky was cOllccmed with presenting the basic principles of his theory and method. He drew upon thevery limited pool of empirical work available to him in order to iIIwi.tratc and support these principles. The description of specific studic. iis schematic ,md flndings arc oftcll given ns general conclusiolls ratherthan as raw data. Some of the studies referred to have been publishedin greatcr detail by his students and a fcw are nvaiJablc in English.1l

~ o s t studies, however, were conducted by students as pilot investigatIOns and were never prepared for publication. Vygotsky s laboratoryexisted for only a decade and his death from tuberculosis was expectedat allY time. The implications of his theory were so many and varicd,and t i ~ l e was so short, that all energy was c o n c e n t r ~ t e d on opcning upncw hnes of investigation rather than pursuing any particular line tothe fullest. That task remained for V y g o l ~ k y s students

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. . 1 h . . Methodology follows frommine the cOIH.llhons contro mg )c aV OL ,this objective: the experimental hypothesis predicts aspects of the StUllU-Ius materials or task that will determine particular aspects of the response; the experimenter seeks maximum control over,materials, task.and response ill order to test the prediction, QuantificatlOll of r e s p o n ~ e sprovides the basis for comparison across experiments and d r a W l ~ ginferenccs ahout cause-and-clrect relatiollships. The c x p c n m e l ~ t : short. is designed to produce a certain performance under condItionsthat maximizc its intcrprctahility,

1 01 Vygotsky. the object of experimentation is quite d i l f ~ r n t Theprinciples of his basic approach (presented in chapter 5 of tillS, volume)do not stem from a purely methodological critique of e s t a b h s h e ~ experimental practices; they ow from his theory of the n a t u r ~ of ,hIgherpsychological processes and the task of scientific explanation psychology, f higher psychological processes arise and undergo changesin the course of learning and development, psychology will only fullyunderstand them by determining their origin and mapping their ~ i s t o r yAt first si, ,ht it would appear th,lt sitch t,15k precludcs the expern.ncntalIllcllu)tl allll requires study of illdivi(hml behavior ov(,r long pCl lmIs oftime. But Vygotsky believed (and ingeniously demonstrated) that theexpcriment could serve an important role by m k n ~ visible p r ~ c ~ s s e sthat are ordinarilyhidden beneath thc sUlface of habitual bchavlOl, ewrote that in a properly conceived experiment the investigator couldcreate pro(;l'SSCS that tdcscopc the actual course of d e v c l o p m ~ n t of .agiven fUJlction, e called this method of ,investi,galion expenmental.genctic method, a term he shared with HeIllz Werner, an outstanding contemporary whose developmental, comparative approachto psychology was well-known to Vygotsky,To serve as an eITeetive means of studying the course of d c v e l ~ p -mcnt of proccss, the experiment must provide maximum opportumtyfor the subject to engage in a variety of activities that can, be observed.not J'ust rigidly controlh.:d, One technique Vygotsky effectJvcly used forI d 1f . to the task thatthis purpose was to introduce obstac es or I cu lCS III , disrupted routinc methods of problem solving, For cxamplc, ll s t u d y ~ing children s communication and the function of egocentne s ~ e e c hVygolsky scI lip a task situation that rcqllircd child,ren to engage l l cooperative

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Introdl14

not n stimulus-response learning theorist and d id not intend his ideaof media ted behav ior to be thought of in this context. What he didintend to convey by this notion was that in higher forms of human behavior, the individual actively modifies the stimulus situation as apart of the process of responding to it. It was the entire structure of thisactivity which produced the behavior that Vygotsky attempted to denotc by the term mediating.

Several implications follow from Vygotsky s theoretical approachand method of experimentation. One is that experimental results willbe qualitlfivc as well as quantitativc in nature. Dctailcd descriptions,hased on careful observation, will constitute an important part ofexperimcntal flllllitlgs. To some such fimlings may ~ c c m merely nncedotal; Vygotsky maintained that if carried out objectively and withscienti6c rigor, such observations have the status of validated fact.

Another consequence of this new approach to experimentation isto break down some of the barriers that are traditionally erected between laboratory and field: Experimental interventions and observntions mny often he as well or better executed in play, school, andclinical settings than in the psychologist s laboratory. The sensitive observations and imaginative interventions reported in this book attestto Ihis possibility.

Finally, an experimental met1lOd that seeks to trace the history ofthe development of psychological functions sits more comfortably thanthe classical method alongside other methods in the social sciences COIl-cerned. with history including the history of culture and socicty aswell as the history of the child. To Vygotsky, anthropological andsociologic

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iogTQ hical ote 6

where he gave a psychology course in the Ukrainian PsychoncuroJogi-cal Acauemy Not long before his ucath Vygotsky was invited to headthe department of psychology in the All Union Institute of Experi-mental Medicine He died of tuberculosis June 934

A R Luria

Part One ind in Society

asic Theorynd t

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J

Tool and Symbol hild Development

The primary purpose of this book is to characterize the uniquelyhuman aspects of behavior, and to offer hypotheses about the way thesetraits have been fanned in t he c our se of human history and the waythey develop over an individual s lifetime.

This analysis will be concerned with three fundamental issues: 1What is the relation between human beings and their environment.oath physical and social? 2) What new forms of activity were responsi-ble for establishing labor as the fundamental means of relating humansto nature and what arc the psychological consequences of these formsof activity? 3 What is t he n at ur e o f the relationship between the us.cof tools and the development of speech? None of these questions hasbeen fully treated by scholars concerncd with understanding animal

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Mind ociet J

poinled 0 1 \ , ill om :lppro:ldws to development wc coulinuc to use thebotanical analogy in our description of childdevelopment (for example,we say tha t the ear ly educa tion of chi ld ren takes p lace in a kindergartcn ).2 Recently .several psychologists have suggested that this botanical model must be abandoncd.In l esponsc to this k ind of cri ticism, modern psychology hasascended the lndder of scicnce by adopting zoological modc.ls as thehas is for a new general approach to understanding the development ofehildl ell . Onee the captive of botany, child psychology is now IllCSIllerized by zoology. The observations on which these newer modelsdraw come almost entirely from the animal kingdom, and answers toquest ions about chi ld ren are sought in exper iments car ried out onanimals. Both the results of cxpcriments with animals and the procedur es used to obt ain these results are finding thei r way from theanimal laboratory into the nursery.This convergence of child mul animal p s y c h o l o ~ y has contributedSignificantly to the sLmly of the hiological basis of humall heh.wior.Many links between child and animal behavior, particularly in thestudy of elemcntary psychological processes, have bcen established. Buta paradox has now emerged. When the botanical model was fashionable,pSycllOlogists emphasized the unique charactcr of higher psychologicalfunctions and the difficulty of studying them by experimental means.But this zoological approach to the higher intellectual proccsscs-thoscprocesses that are uniquely human-has led psychologists to interpretthe higher intellcctual functions as a direct continuation of corresponding processes in anim.ds. This style of theorizing is particularly apparentin the analysis of practical intelligence in children, the most importantllspccI of which concerns the child s lise of tools.

PIIACTICAL INTELLIGENCE IN ANIMALSAND CHILDI\ENThe work of \Volfgang Kiihler is particularly significant in the study

of practical intellige nce.3 ] Ie conducted many experiments with apesduring World War I, and nccasi(mally compared some of his ohs( rvaHom of c h i m p a n ~ e c s llehavior with particul:u kinds of responses inchildren. This direct ;lI1:llogy b twccli pmctical intelligencc in the childand similar response hy :lpes bccame the u i i n ~ principle of e x p e r i ~rlll lllal work ill l } u ~ rillHuhler s rescarch also sought to est;lblish similaritics betwecnchild and apc.4 Hc stmlied the W l Y in which young childrcn grasp ob-

Dna : iyll l lJOI III 1.1IlW u e v e W l m c l ~21

jects. t he ir ahi lit y to make detoul s whi le pur su ing a goal, a nd themanner in which they use primitive tools. nlese obscrvatiOlls, as wellas his experiment inwhich a young child is asked to remove a ring froma Slick, illustrate an approach akin to Kohler s. Buhler interpreted themanifestations of practical intelligence in children as being of exactlythe same type as those we afe familiar with in chimpanzees. Indeed,there is a ph l se in the life of the chi ld tha t Buhle r c.ksignaled tlwehimpanzec age (1 . 48). One ten-monthold infant whom he studiedwas ablc to pull n string to obtain a cookie that was attached to it. Theability to remove a r ing from a pos t by l if ting it rather than trying- topun t Sideways did not appear until the middle of tlw second ycar.r.Although these experiments were interpreted as supporl for thc analogybetween tI,e child and npes, they nlso led Buhlcl to the important discovery, which will be explicaled in laler sections, that the beginningsof practic:l1 intelligence in the child (he termcd it technical thinking ),as wclI as lhe : l c t i o l l ~ of the chimpanzee, :lrc independent of speech.

Charlotte Buhler s detailed observations of i nfallts during tlleirfirst year of life gave further support to this conclusion. Shc founc.l thefirst manifestations of practical intelIigence took place at the veryyoung age of six months. However, it is not only tool use that developsa t this point in a ch ild s h is to ry but also sys tematic movement andpcrception, the brain and hands-in fact, t he child s entire organism.Consequently, the child s systemof activit y is determined at each specificstage both by the child's llegree of organic development and by his or r degree of masten) in the use of tools.

Buhler established the developmentallyimportant principle thatthe beginnings of intelligent spceeh are preceded by technical thinking,and technical thinking comprises the initial phase of cognitive devclopmcnt. His lead in emphasizing the chimpanzee-like features of chilc.lrcn sbehavior has been followed by many others. t is in extrapolating thisidca that the (hlllgcrs of zoological models and analogies hetwccn humanand anima] behaviors find their clearest expression. The pitfalls areslight in research that focuses on- the preverbal period in thc child sdcvelopment, as Buhler s did. However, he drew a questionable conclusion from his work with very young chi ld ren when he s ta ted, Theachievements of the chimpanzee arc quile independent of languageand in the case of man, even in later life, technical thinking, or thinking in tenns of tools, is far less closely bound up with language andcOllcnpls than other forms of Ihinking. 7

Buhler proceeded from the assumption that thc relationship bctween practical intelligence and speech that characterizes the fen-

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sumed that the child 's mind contains all stages of future intellectualdevelopment; they exist in complete form, awaiting the proper momentto emerge.Not only were speech and practical intelligence assumed to havedifferent origins, hut their joint participation in common operationswas considered to be of no basic psychological importance (as in thework of Shapiro and Gerke) . Even when speech ,md the usc of toolswere closely linked in one operatioTl, they were stilI studied as separateproc('s:ws helonging to two completely differcnt classes of phenomena.At hest, thcir simultaneous occurrence was conshlercd a llSe }Uenceof accidental, external factors.The students of practical intelligence as well as those who studyspeech development often fail to recognize the interweaving of thesetwo functions. Consequently, the children's adaptive behavior and signusing activity arc treated as parallel phenomena-a view that lcads toPiaget's concept of egocentric speech,t: : He did not attribute animportant role to speech in the organization of the child's activities,nor did he stress its communicativc functions, although he was obligcdto admit its practical importance.Althoup;h practical intelligence and s ign use cal l opera te independently of cach other in young children, the oialecticalullity of thesesystcms in the human adult is thc very cssencc of complex h l l m a ~ ~ e havior. Our analysis accords symbolic activity a specific orgamzmgfunction that penctratcs the process of tool use nnd pl'Oduces fundamcntally new forms of lJehavior.

SOCIAL INTERACTION AND THE TRANSFOHMATIONOF PIIACTICAL ACTIVITYBased on the discussion in the previous section, and illustrated by

experimental work to be describcd latcr, the following conclusion Illayhe madc: the most significant moment in the course of intellectual de-velopment, whi h gil S hirlh to the purely hum n forms of prac/icalnd abstract illtelligence, occurs when speech nd practical activily,tu;o previotlsly completely independent lines of development, converge.Although children's use of tools during their preverbal period is comparable to that of apes, as soon as speech and t he use of signs a rei n c o r p o r h ~ l into any action, the action becomes transfonned and organized along entirely new lines. The specifically human use of tools isthus realized, going beyond the more limiteduse of tools possible amongthe highcr animals.

Toot alld SymlJollll L IlIW u V lOlmJcl l25

Prior to masterillg his own behavior, the child begins to master hissurroundings with the help of speech. This produces new relations withthc cnvironment in addition to the new organization of behavior itsclf.The creation of these uniquely human f01ms of behavior later producethe intellect and become the basis of productive work: the spccificallyhuman form of the use of tools.

Observations of children in an experimental situation similar tothat of Kc)hler's apcs show that the children nol only act in attemplingto achieve a goal but also speak. As a 11Ilc this speech arises spontaneously and cOIlt'illlles almost without illlClTlIplioll thronghollt the cxperiment. 1t incrcases alld is more pcrsisLenl every time thc situation becomes more complicated and the gonlm,orc difficult to attain. Attcmptsto block it (as the experiments of my collabomtor R. E. Lcvina haveshown) are either futile or lead the child to freeze up.

Levina posed practicalproblems for four- and f i v e ~ y c a l o l d childrensuch as obtaining a piece of candy from a cupboard. The candy wasplaced outof reachso the child could not obtain it dircctly. As the childgot more and more involved in trying to obtain the candy, egocentricspeech bcgan to manifcst itself as part of her activc striving. At firstthis spccch consisted of a description and analysis of the situation, butit gradually took on a pJanful character, reflecting possiblc paths tosolution of the problem. Finally, itwas included as part of the solution.

For example, a f o u r - a n d - a - h a l f - y e a r ~ o l d girl was asked to get candyfrom a cupboard with a stool and a s tick as possible tools. Levin;t'sdescription reads as follows: (Sl';llIUS on a stool, quietly looking. feelingalong a shelfwith stick.) On the stooL (Glances nt cxperimenler. Putsstick in other hand.) Is that really the candy? (Hesitates.) I can get itfrom that other stool, stand and get it. (Gets second stool.) No, thatdoesn't get it. I could usc the stick. (Takcs stick, knocks aUlle candy.) t will move now. (Knocks candy.) t moved, I couldn't get it withthe stool, bllt the, but the slick worked. 1;1

In such circumstances it seems both Batural and. necessary forchildren to speak while they act; in OU f rcseareh we have found thatspccch not only accompanies practical activity but also plays a specific Irole in carrying it out. Our experiments demonstmtc two importantfacts:

(I) A child's speech is as important as therole of action in attainingthe goal. Children not only speak ahout what they arc do ing; the irspeech and act-ion arc part of one lnd the same complex ]Jsyclwlo/ ,icalrmcHon, directed toward the solutio]} of the problem at hand.

(2) The more complex the action demanded by the situation and

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the lessdirect its solution, the greater the importance plnyrd by speechin the opera tion as a whole . Sometimes speech becomes of such vitalimportance that, if Jlot permitted to usc it, young children cannot accomplish the given task.

These observations lead mc to the conclusion that children solvepracticlll tllsks with tlle help 1 their speech, llS well as their eyes andhands. This unity of pcrccption, speech, and action, which ultimatelyproduces internalization of the visual field, constitutes the central subject matter for any analysis of th e origin of uniquely human fOnTIS ofbehavior.

To develop the nrst of these two points, we must ask: What is it that.really distinguishes the actions of the speaking child from the actionso f an ap e when solving practical problems?

Th e first thing that strikes the experimenter is the incomparablygreater freedom of children's operations, their greater indcpendencefrom the structure of the concrete, visual situation. Children, with theaid of speech, create greater possibi li tics than apes can accomplishthrough action. One important manifestation of this greater flexibilityis t h at t h e child is able to ignore the direct line between actor and goal.Instead, 11C engages in a number of preliminary acts, using w ha t w espeak ofas instrumental, or mediated (indirect), methods. In thc processofsolving a task thechild is able to include stimuli that do not liewithinthe immediate visual field Using words (one class of such stimuli) toc reate a speci ll c p lan. the chi ld ach ieves a much broader range ofactivity, applying as tools not only those objects that l ie near at hand,lJUt searching for llnd preparing such stimuli l can be us el ul i n t hesolution 1 the task, and planning lutl,re actions.

Second, the practical operations of a child who can speak bccomcmueh less impulsivc and spont:lIlcous than those of thc apc. The apetypically makes a ser ies of uncontrol led attempts to solve the givenproblem. In contrast, the child who uses speech divides th e activity intotwo consecutive parts. She plans how to solve the problem throughspeech and then car ri es out the prepared solution through overt activity. Direct manipulation is replaced by a eomplcx psychologicalprocess through which inner motivation and intentions, postponed intime, stimulate their Own development and realization. This new kind p.'iychologicnl.'itrudur(' is ahsent in apes, even in rudimcntary forms.

Finally, it is decisively important that speech not only facilitates thechild's effective manipulalioll of objects but also controls the chilcl s ownl]e1lavior Thus, with the help of speech children, unlike npes, acquirethe capacity to be both the subjccts and objectsof their ownbehavior.

.

Experimental invcstigation of the egoccntric speech of chiidwl} ellgnged in various l\(.tivities such as that illnstmted by Levina prouu

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Mind ,' ociety28

ear ly sta.gc speech accompanies the child s actions and reflects thevicissih.Idcs of problem solving in a disrupted and chaotic f orm. Ata later stage speech moves more and more toward the s tar t ing pOint ofthe process, so that it comes to precede action. funct ions then as anaid 10 a plan thnt has heen conccivcdhut not yet realized in behavior.All illlcrl s{ing analogy cnn be found in children s speech while drawing(5( ( also ehnptcr R Young childr( 11 name their drawings only aftertheyhavc completed. them; they need. to sec them before lhey call uecidewhat the) arc. As childrcn get older they can decide in advance whatthey afe going to draw. This displacement ofthe naming process signifiesn change ill the function of speech. Initially speech follows actions, isprovoked lIy l ld dominated hy activity. At a latcr stage, h o w ~ v e r whenspeech is moved to the starting point of an activity, a l w relation between word and action emerges. Now speech guides, determines, anddominates the course of action; the planning function of speech comesin to h ei ng in add it io n to t he already existing function of language toreflect the external world.15

Jus t as a mold gives shape to a substance, words can shape anact ivity into a structure. However, that s t ructure may be clHUlged orreshaped when children Jearn to use languagc in ways that allow thcmto go h(>yond previous experiences whcn planning future action. Incontrast to the notion of sudden discovery popular ized by Stern, weenvisage verbal, intellectual activity as a series of stages in which theemotional and communicative functions of speech nre expanded by theaddition of the planning function. As.'I. result the ehild acquires the ability to engnge in complex operations extending over time.

Unlike the ape, wll ich Kohler tel ls us is the slave of its own visualfield, children acquire an independence with respect to their concretesurroundings; tlu>y cease to ac t in thc immedintcly given and evidentspace Once ehilcessary operations.

Through repeated experiences of this type, children Jearn covertly(1IlC'lllnny) to plan their activities. At the same t ime they enlist the assist

: \ l l C ~ of another person in accordance with the requirements of thcprohlem posed for them. The child s ability to control another person sbehavior becomes a necessary part of thc child s practicnl activity.

Initially this problem solving in conjunction with another person isnot dif ferent iated with respect to the roles played by the chi ld and hishelper; it is a general, syncretic whole. We have more than once obst rved that in the courseof solVing a task, children get confused hecausethey hegin to merge the logic of what they are doing with the logic ofthe same problem as it has to be solved with the cooperation of anotherp( rson. Sometimes syncretic action manifests itself when children rcalizethe hopelessness of their direct eHorts to solve a problem. As in thecXiunpIc from Levina s work, children address the objects of their atten-

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tion cqually with words and sticks dcmonstrating thc fUlld Ullcntal andinseparable tie between speech and action in the child s activity; thisunity becomes particularly clear when compared with thc separation ofthese processes in adults.

In summary children confronted with a problem that is slightly toocomplicated for them exhibit a complex variety of responses includingdirect attempts at attaining the goal the use of tools speech directedtoward the person conducting the experiment or speech that simplyaccompanies the action and direct verbal appeals to t he object ofattention itself.

analyzed dynamically this alloy of speech and action has veryspeci6e function in the historyof the child s development; it alsodemonstrates the logic ofits own genesis. From the veryfirst days of the child sdevelopment his activities acquire a meaning of their own in system ofsocial behavior and being directed towards a definite purpose are refracted through the prism of the child s environment. The path fromobject to child and from child to object passes through another person.This complex human structure is the product of a developmental processdeeply rooted in the links between individual and social history.

The Develop11 wnt ofPerception nd ttention

The linkage betweell tool usc and speech affects scvef:ll psychological functions in particular perception sensorymotor operationsand attention each of which is part of a dynamic system of behavior.Experimental-developmental research indicates that the connectionsandrelations among functions constitute systems thatchange as radicallyin the course of a child s development as do the individual functionsthemselves. Considering each function in turn I will examine howspeech introduces qualitative changes in both its form and its relation tootllerfunctions.

Kohler s work emphasized the importance of the structure of thvisual field in organizing the ape s practical behavior. The entire processof problem solving is essentially determined by perception. In thisre Kohler had ample grounds for believing that these animals rbound by theirsensory field to a much greaterextent than adult humans.They are incapable of modifying their sensory field by means of voluntary effort. Indeed it would probably be useful to view as a general l wthe depend ence of all natural forms of perception on the structure ofthe sensory field.

However a child s perception because it is human docs not developas a direct continuation and flllther perfection of the forms of animalperception not even of those animals that stand ncarest to humankind.Experiments conducted to clarify this problem led us to tliscover somehasic laws that characterize the higher human forms of perception.

The first set of experiments concerned dcvelopmcntal stages ofpicture perception in children. Similar experiments descrihing specificaspects of young childrell s pcrccption and it s dcpcmlcllcc onlligh r

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4Internalization igherPsychological unctions

When comparing the principles regulating unconditioned and COilditiolled rdlcxcs, P:lVlnv uses Ihe example of a telephone call. One possibilit}' is for the Cill to conn('ct two points directly via II special line. Thiscorresponds to an Ullconditioned reflex. The other possibility is for thephone call to be relaY< d through II special, central station with the helpof temporary and limitlessly variable connections. This corresponds to aconditioned rellcx. The cer eh ra l cort ex , as the organ tha t closes thecOlldilioll('cl n ~ n e x dr(,llit, plays the r o l ~ of such central station.

l11c fundamcnlal message of our analysis of the processes that1JI111crlit, the crcntioll of signs (signalization) may be expressed hy amore gcncrnlized form of the same metaphor. Le t us t ake t-he ease oftying a kllot il. i il relllinder or drawing lotsas a means of decisiollm:lking.There is no doubt that in bolh eases a temporary conditioned connectionis formed, that is, a connl'ction of Pavlov's SCCOIH..l type. But if we wjshto gra.'i)l th(' essentials of wllat i.i happening: here. we a re forced to takeinto eOllsidt'ratioll I t only the functioll of the tc'lephonC' lIIl'dlanislll hutalso of the operator who plugged in :llIlllhus cOIlIlccleulhe I i l l ~ . In ourexample, the cOllllcction was cstahlish('d hy the persoll who t ied theknot. This fl atme d i s l i n ~ l l i s h s the higher forms of hehavior from thelower.

The in\,('lltion and use of signs as auxiliary meilns of solving a givenpsychological prohll'1ll (til I ('nwmhcr, comparc sOffi(,thing, report,choose, and so 011 is i ll lalogotls to the invention illld usc of tools in onepS\'cholngical rcspect. TIl(' sign acts as all inslTum('nt of psychological:\l:tivity ill a manner analogous 10 the role of a tool ill lahor. But thisallalogy, like' any otll('r.

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in l ~ i e l y54

becollle i s s o v l ~ in the gcncr:l concept of nrtifncts or artificial adaptations.\Ve seck to understand the hehavioral ro lc of the s ign in all i tsuniqucncss. This goal has ll10tivnted ottr empiricnl studies of how bothtool and sign usc are ll1uhmIly linked and yet separate in the child 'scultural development. e have mlopt('d three conditions as a startingpoint for this work. The first pertains to the analogy and common pointso f the two t y p l ~ of activity, the secoud clarifies their basic differences,and the third attempts to demonstrate the real psychological link existing between the one :md the other, or at least to hint at its existence.

As we have already noted, the busic analogy between sign and toolrests on the mcuiating function that characterizes each of them. Theymay, thercfore, from the psychological perspective, he SUbS\lmcd underthe smne category. \Ve can express the logical relationship betweenthc usc of signs and of tools using the schema in figure 4 which showseach concept subsumed under the more general concep t o f ind irec t(mediated) activity.

Mediated activity I/ -ISign I ITool IFigure 4

That concept, quite justly, was invested with the broadest generalmeaning by Hegel , who saw in i t a character is tic fea tu re of humanreason: Reason, he wrote, is just as cunning as she is powerful.. Hercunning consists principally in her mediating activity which, by causingob jec ts to act and react on each o ther in accordance with the ir ownnature, in this way, without any direct intcrfcrence ill thc process, carries out reasons' intentions, Marx cites that dcfinition when speakingofworking tools, to show that man uses the mechanical, physical, andchcmical properties bf objects so as to make them act as forces that affectother objects in order to fulfill his personal goals. >:This analysis provides a sound basis for assigning the use of signsto the category of mediated activity, for the essence of sign use consistsin man's affecting behavior through signs. In both cases the indirect(mediated) fUllction comes to the forefront. 1shall not define furtl.wr therelation of these jointly subsumed concepts to each other, or theIr relation to the more generic concept of mediated activity. I should only

ntern llz tmn01 lu l l r 1 yl:IIIJ1V61 5

liketo note that neither can, undcr anycircumstance, he considered isomorph ic with respect to the funct ions they per fo rm, nor can they beseen as fully exhausting the concept of media ted ac tivi ty . A hos t ofother mediated activities might bc named; cognitive activity is notlimited to the use of tools or signs.

On the purcJy logical p lanc of tue relat ion hetwecn the two concepts, our schema represents the two mcans of adaptation as diverginglines of medintcd activity. This divergence is the basis for our secondpoint. A most essential difference between sign and tool, amI the basisfor the real divergence of the two Jines, is the difrcrent w y that theyorient human behavior. TIlc tool's function is serve as the conductorof human influence on the object of activity; it is extern lly oriented;it must tead tochanges in objects. It is a means bywhich human extcrnalactivity is aimed at mastering, nnd triumphing over, nature. The sign, 011the other hand, changes nothing in the object of a psychologic.1 operation. is a means of intcrnal nctivity aimed at mastering oneself; thesign is intern lly oriented. These activities arc so different from eachother that the nature of the means they lise C:Ulllot he the same in bothcases.Finally, the third point pertains to the real tie between these activities and, hence, to the real tie of their development in phylo- and ontogenesis. The mastering of nature and the mas te ring of behav io r a remutually linked, just as man's alteration of nature alters mall'S ownnature. In phylogenesis we can reconstruct this link through fragmentarybut convincing documentary evidence, while in ontogenesis we cantrace it experimentaIIy.

One thing is already certain. Just as the first use of tools refutes thenotion that development represents the mere unfolding of the child 'sorganically predetermined system of activity, so the first use of signsdemonstrates that there cannot be a single organically predeterminedinfernal system of activity Lhat exists for each psychologic:l] function.TIle usc of artificial means, the transition to mediated activity, fundamcntally changes all psychological operations just as the use of toolslimitlessly broadens the range of ac tivi ties within which the newpsychological functions may operate. In this conte:.:t, we can usc theterm higher psychological {unction, or higher heh vior as referring tothe combination of tool and sign in psychological activity.

Several phases in the use of sign operations have been describedthus far. In the initial phase reliance upon external signs is crucial to thechild's elrort. nut through development these operations undergo cadical changes: the entire operation of mediated activity (for exnmple,

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memorizing) begins to takc place liS a purely internal process. Parnuoxically,lale stages of Ihe child's behavior appear 10 be the same asearly stages of memorizing, which were characterized by a directprocess. The very young child does not rely upon external means; ratherhe uses a natural, eidetic approach, Judging only from externalappearances, it scents that the older child has simply begull to memorizemore and better; that she has somehow perfectcd ano developed herold methods of memorizing. At the highest levels she appears to haveabandoned any reli:mcc upon signs. However, this appearance is onlyillusory. Developmcnt, as often happcns, proceeds here not in a circlebut in a spiral, passing through the same point at each new revolutionwhile advancing to a higher level.

We caIl the internal reconstruction of an external operation intenw/izlItion. A good example of this proccss may be found in theoevc1opm< nt of pointing. Initially, this gesturc is nothing morc than anunsuccessful attempt to grasp something, a movement aimed at a certainohject which designates forthcoming actiVity. The child attempts tograsp an object placed bc) 'olld his rench; his 1ll.U1ds, stretched towardthat object, remain poisl'd in the air. His 6ngers make grasping movcments. At this initial stage pointing is represented by the child's movement, which seems to bepointing toan object that and nothingmore,

When the Jllother comes to the child 's aid and realiz.es his movemcnt indicates something, the sihllltioll chang

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6 teraction between

Learning n evelopment

The problems encounteredin the psychological analysis of teachingcannot be correctly resolved or even formulated without addressing therelation between learning and development in school age children. et is the most unclear of all the hasic issues which thcapplicatioll ofchild development theories to educational processes depends. Needlessto say the lack of theoretical clarity docs not mean that the issue isremoved altogether from current research clforts into learning; not onestudy can avoid this central theoretical issue. But the relation betweenlearning and development remains methodologically unclear becauseCOncrete research studies have embodied theoretically vague criticallyuDevaluated and sometimes intemally contradictory postulates prem-ises and peculiar solutions to the problem of this fundamental relation-ship; and these of course result in a variety of errors.

Essentially all current conceptions of the relation between develop-ment and learning in children can be reduced to three majortheoreticalpositions.The st centers on the assumption that processes of child develop-ment are independent of learning. Learning is considered a purelyexternal process that is not actively involved in development. t merelyutil izes the achievements of development rather than providing animpetus for modifying its course.

In experimental investigations of the development of thinking inschool children it has been assumed that processes such as deductionand understanding evolution of notions about the world interpretationof physical causality. and mastery of logical forms of thought and ab-stract logic an occur by themselves without any influence from school

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JnICTU(;I IUU IJtHIVt: t :H 1 .. t:IUIU f:io U U t :v

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le'lrning:. All example o such theory s l'iaget's extremely c O l l l p l ~ x andinteresting theon-tical principles, which also ShllpC the l'xperimentalmclhouology he employs. The 11uestions Piagct lIses in the course of hisclinical conversations with chi ldren clear ly i llustrate his approach.When a five-year-old is i\skecl why doesn't the sun fall? it is assumedth,lf the chi ld has neither a r eady answer f or such a quest ion nor thegeneral capahiJilics for gcnerating olle. l w point of asking question.sthilt are so f ar beyond the rCilch of the child's il1tellectual skills is toel iminate the influence of previous experience lnd knowledge. Theexperimenter seeks to obtain the tcudcncies of chi ldren's thinking inpure form, entirely independent of learning.'Similarly, the classics of psychological literature, such as the worksby Dinet am] others, assume that development is always a prerequisitefor learning am] that if child's lIlental functions (intdlcctual operations)have not matured to the extent tlmthe is capableof learning n particularsubject , then no instruction wil l prove useful. They especially fearedpremature instmction, the t each ing of a sub ject befor e the child wasready for it effort was concentrated on finding the lower threshold oflcarning ability, the age at which a pnr ticulnl' k iml of knrning: firstbecomes possible.Because this :lpproach is hased on the premise that learning trails]>chilld dcvelopment, that development always oufnll lS learning, i tprecludes the notion that learning may playa role in thc course of thcdevelopment or m:itunltion of those functions activated in the course oflearning. Developmcnt Of maturatioll is viewed ns a p n . ~ c o n d i t i o n oflearning but never the result of it. To summarize this position: Learningforms a superstructure over development, leaving the latter essentiallyunaltered.

The second major theoretical position is that learning is development. This identity is the essence of a group of theories that are quitediverse in origin.One such theory is hased 011 the concept of reflex, an essentiallyold notion that has heen extensively revived recently. 'Whelher reading,writing, or arilhmclicis bdng considered, dcvdopmcnt is vicwed liS themllstery of conditioned reflexes; that is, the process of learning is completely and illseparably bJelH.led with the process of development. TIlisnotion was elaborated by Jumes, who reduced the learning process tohabit formation nud identified the lcarning process with development.

Helll :>; theories have: :It least olle thing ill cfUlllllOll with tlworiessHeh as Piagel 's: in both, development is conceivcd ofas thc elaboratiolland substitutiun of innate responses. As James expressed it, Education,

81in SllOJt canllot he hencr described than by calling it tIll: orga1lizatioliof acquired habits of conduct and tcndencies to hehavior:'z Develop-ment itself is n:ducetl prilnarily the accumulat ioJl of all possibleresponses. Any :lcquired response is considered either a more complexform ofor a substitute for the inllate response.

But despite the similarity between the first and second theoreticHIpositions, there is a major d i l r c n ~ l c e in their assumptiolls ahout the'temporal relationship between learning and developmental proCt SSCS.Theorists who hold the first view assert that developmcntal cycles pre-cede learning cycles; maturation precedes learning and i1l.o;lruction mustlag behind mental growth. For the second group of theorists, bothprocesscs occur simultaneously; learning and developmellt coincidc atall points in the same way thllt two identical geometricnll1gures coincidewhcn superimposcd. .

The third thcoretical position 011 the rclation betwcen learning anddcvelopment attempts to ovcrcome the cxtremes of Ilw other two hysimply combining them. A clear example of this approach is KoIfka'stheory, in which development is based 011 two inherently different bu trelated processes, cach of which inlluences fhe o t h c r ~ 011 the olle handis maturation, which depends directlyon tllc development ofthe nervoussystem; oil the otherhand is learning, which itself is also a dc\ elopmentalprocess.

Three aspects of this theory are new. First , as we alreadv 11oted isthe combination of two seemingly opposite vicwpoints, cad; of whichhas been encountered separately in the history of science. The very factthat these two viewpoints WI l he comhi ned into one theory indicatesthat they arc not opposing and mutually cxclusive but hn\'c somethingessential in common. Also new is t he jdea that the two processes thatmake up development : ire mutually dcpendent and intcractivC'. Ofcourse, the nature of the int er ac ti on is left virtually unexplored inKoUka's work, which is limited solely to very general remarks regardingthe relation betwecn these two processes. It is clear fllat for Kotrka theprocess of IlUltllratioll prepares and makes possible a sJlecific prm;e.

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ind in ociety

particular subjects for daily living, they were o f t he greatest value forth e pupil s l l e n t ~ development. varicty of studies have catJed intoquestion the soundness uf this idea. t h,IS becn shown that Icawing inone area has very little inlluence on overall development. Fo r example,reflex theorists Woodworth and Thorndike found that adults who, afterspecial exercises, had achieved considerable success in determining thelength of short lim s, had m:ule virtually 110 progress in their ahi li ty todetennine the length of long lines. These same adults were successfullytrained to estimate the size of a given t w o ~ d i m e n s i o n a I figure, bu t thistmining did not make them successful in estimating the size of a seriesof other two-dimensiomd ligurcs of various sizes and shapes.

According to Thorndike, theoreticians in psychology and educationbelieve that evcry particular response acquisition directly enhancesovcrall ahility in ef]lIal measure. Teachers believed and acted on thehasis of the thcnry lhat thc mind is a complex of abilities-powers ofobservation, attention, mcmory, thinking, and so forth-and that anyimpnlvcll1cllt ill allY specific ability results ill a gelleral improveillent illall abilities. According to this theory, if the student incrc.Iscd the attcntion he paid to Latin grnmmar, he would increase his abilities to focusattention on any task. Th e words accuracy, quick-wittedncss, abilityto rChsCrVi.ltioll may indicate. Fo r example, if, Ollt of a hundred individualswe choose ten who display the ability to detect spelling errors or toIlleasmC lengths, it is unlikely thatlhesc ten will display hctter ahiliti( sreg lTding, for example, the estimation of the weight of ohjects. In the

83

same way, speed and accuracy in adding numbers arc cntirely unrcl ltedto specd and accuracy in h e in g a h lc t o think up antonyms.

This research shows t ha t t hc mind is not a compl ex l work ofgeneral capabilities such as observation, attcntion, mcmory, judgment,and so for th , bu t a s et o f specific capabilities, c ac h o f which is, to someextcnt, independent of the others an d is developed independently.Learning is l llore than t l l ~ .wquisition of th e ability to think; it is llwacquisition of many specialized abilities for thinking about a variety ofthings. Learning does no t alter our overall ability to focus attcntion hu trather develops various abilities to focus attention on a var iety of things.According to this view, special training aJTeets overall development onlywhen i ts clements, mater ial, :md processcs are similar across specificdomains; habit govems us . Thi s l ea tls to the conclus ion that becauseeach activity depends on th e mater ia l with which t operates, th ec..lcvelopmcllt of consciousness is thc developmcllt of a s ct o f particular,independcnt capabilities or of a s et o f particular h ~ l i t s Impl Ovcmcntof one fUllctioll of cOlIseiollSIU SS or one aspcct of it activity call affedthe c..leveJopment of another only to the ext en t that thcre ar c elcmentscommon to both functions or aetivitics.

Developmental theorists such as Kofika a nd t h e Gestalt School-whohold to th e third theoretical position outlined earlier-oppose Thorndike s p oi n t o f view. They assert that the influence of learning is neverspecific. From their study of structural principles, they argue tllat th eICilrning process can nevcr he reduced simply to the formation of skillsbut embodies an inteIlectual o r de r t h at makes it possibl e to t rans fe rgeneral principles discovered in solving onc t as k to a v ari ct y of othertasks. From this p oi nt o f view, the child, while learning a particularopcration, acquires th e ability t o c re at e structures of a cer ta in typc,regardlcss of the diverse matcrials with which she is working and rcgardless of the particular clements involvcd. Thus, KOJlK:I docs not conceiveof l ea rn ing as l im it ed to a p rocess of Jlahit and skill aCfluisition. Th erelationship he posits between learning and devclopment is lIot that ofan iclclltity bu t of a more complex rcJ:ltionship. According to Thorndih ,learning anu. development coincide at all points, bu t for KolTkol, development is always a larger sct than learning. Schematically, the relationshiphetweell th e two processes could be depicted by two concentric circles,the smaIJer syrnbolizillg th c learning process and the hUgCT the developmental process evoked by learning.

Once a child hns Icarned to perform an operation, he thus ,Issimilatessome structural principle whose sphere of application is other than just

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the operalions of the type on whose hasis the principle was assimilated.Consequently, in making one step in learning, a child makes twosteps indevelopment, that is learning and development do not coincide. Thisconcept is the esscn tial aspec t of the thi rd group of theor ies we havediscussed.

ZONE OF PIIOXIMAL DEVELOPMENT,A NEW APPIIOACHAlthough we reject all three theoretical positions discussed above,

analyzing them leads us toa more adequateviewof therelation betweenlearning and development. The question to be f ramed in arr iv ing a t asolution to this problem is complex. It consists of two separate issues:first, the general relation between learning and development; andsecond, thc specific features of this relationship when children reachschool age. .

That children's learning begins long before they attend school isthe starting point of this discussion. Any learning a child encounters inschool always has a previous history. For example, children begin tostudy arithmetic in school, but long beforehand they have had someexperience with quantity they have had to dea l with opera tions ofdivision, addition, subtraction, and determination of size. Consequently,chi ld ren have the ir own preschool a ri thmetic, which only myopicpsychologists could ignore.

t goes without saying that learning as it occurs in the preschoolyenrs differs markedly from school learning. which is concerned with theassimilation of the fundamentals of scientific knowledge. Buteven when,in the per iod of her first ques tions, a chi ld ass imi la tes the names ofobjects in her environment, she is learning. Indeed, cnn it b e doubtedthat children learn speech from adults; or thnt, through asking questionsand giving answers, children acquire n variety o infOlmation; or that,through imitating adults and through being instructed ahout how toact, childrcn devclop an cntire repository of skills? Learning and devel-opment arc interrelated from the child's very first day of life.

\:o/fka, a lclllplillg to clarify thl' laws I c lihl I ~ a l l l i l l g and llwirrelation to mClltnl development, concentrates his attention on the sim-plest learningprocesses. those thnt occur in the preschool years. His erroris that, while seeing a similarity between preschool and school learning,he fnils to discern the difference he does not see the specifically newelemcnts that school learning introduces. lIe and others assume thatthe difference between preschool and school learning consists of nOll

systematic learning in one casc and systemntic learning in the other.But systematicness' is not the only issue; there is also the fact thatschool learning inh'oduces something fundamental1y new into the child'sdevelopment. In order to elaborate the dimensions ofschool learning, wewiIJ describe a new and exceptionally important concept without whichthe issue cannot be resolved: the ;t one of proximal cJevelopment.

A weIJ known ,lIld ~ l l I p i r i c : l l l y estahlished fact is that ll':ll llingshould be matched in some mannerwith thechild's developmcntal Icvel.For example, it has been established that the tcaching of reading, writ-ing, and arithmetic should be initiated at a specific age level. Onlyrecently, however, hns attention uecn directed to the fact that wecannotlimit ourselves merely to determining deveJopmentallevels if we wish todiscover the actual relutions of the developmental process to learningcapabilities. We must detennine at least two developmentnl levels.

TIle first level can be called the actual develo1mumtal level that is,the level of development of n child 's mentnl functions that hns beenestab lished as a resul t o f cer ta in a lready completed developmentalcycles. When we determine a child 's mental age by using tests, we arcalmost always dealing with the actual developmental level. In studiesof childreus mental development it is generally assumed that only thosethings that children can do on theirown are indicative ofmental abilities.We give chi ld ren a bat te ry of tests or a var ie ty of tasks of varyingdegrees of difficulty, and we judge the extent of their mentnl develop-ment on the basis of how they solve them and at what Icvel of difficulty.Onthe other hand, ifwe olTer leading qucstions orshow howthe problemis to be solved nnd the chi ld then solves it or if the teacher initiatesthesolution and,the child completes it or solves it in collaborntion withother children in shor t, i f the chi ld bnrely misses an independentsolution of the problem the solution is not regarded as indicative ofhismental development. This truth was famiIinr and reinforced by com-mon sense. Over a decade even the profoundest thinkers never CJ.ues-tioned th.e assumptioll; they never cntcrtained the notion that whatchildren can do with the assistance of others might bc ill SOJlle scnseeven more indicative of their mental development than what thcy cando alone.

Let us take a s imple eX:Ullple. Suppose I invcstigalc two childrenupon entrance into school, both of whom are ten years old chronologi-cally and eight years oldin tenns ofmental development. Can I say thatthey are the same age mentaJIy? Of course. What does this mean? Itmeans that they can independently deaJ with tasks up to the degree ofdifficulty that has been standardized for the c i g h t - y e l . 1 l ~ o l d level. I

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86s to p a t this point, people would imagine that the subsequent course ofmental development and of school learning for these children wiIJ bethe same, because it depends on their intellect. Of course, there m ay b eother f ac to rs , f or example , if one chi ld was s ick for half a year whilethe other WllS never absent from school; hut generally speaking, the {;lteof these chi ldren should be the same. Now imagine that I do not(('rmina/

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88pendellt activity of children, not their imitative activity, indicates theirlevel of mcnta l development. This view is expressed in all currenttesting systems. In evaluating mental development, consideration isgiven to only those solutions to test problems which the child reacheswithout the assistance of others, without demonstrations, and withoutleading qucstions. Imitatioll ilIlll learning are t hou ght of as p ur el ymec1mnical processes. Bllt rC'cently psychologists have shown that aperson can imita te only that which is withill hcr d c v c l o p l 1 l c l l t ~ l l levcl.For example', if a child is having difficulty with a prohlem in arithmeticalill the Ic.lchcr solves it Oil the blackboard, th e chi ld may g ra sp thesolut ion in an instant . ]Jut if the teacher were to solve a p roblem inhigher mathematics , the child would not be able to understand thesolution no matter how many times she imitated it.

Animal psychologists, and in particular Kohler, have dealt with thisquestion of imitation quite well.a Kohler's experiments'sought to determine whether prim.ltes arc capable of graphic thought. Th e principalquestion WitS whether primates solved problems indepclltlently orwhdhl r they merely imit:tledsolutions they had seen performed earlier,for example , watching other animals or humans use sticks and othertool and then imitating them. Kohler's special experiments, designedto determine what primates (.'ould imitate, reveal that primates can useimitation to solve only those problems that a re of t he same degrce ofdifficulty ns those they call solve alone. However, Kohler failed to takeaccount ofan important fact, namely, that primates cannot he tnught (inth e human sense of the word) through imitation, nor can their intellectbe developed, because they have nO zOlle of proximal development. primate canlearn a great deal through training by using its mechanicaland mental skills, hu t it cannot be made more intelligent, that is, itcannot be taught to solve a varie ty of more advanced problems independently. Fo r this reason animals arc incapable of J e a r n i J ~ g in t ~ l Chuman S IlSe the crill hllll/f/ll l t ~ ( / , i n g l J r c ~ w o S f . S a speCific socwlnature and lprocess which childrell grol into the illtellecluallifcthose around them

Children can imitate a variety of actions that go weIl beyond thelimits of thcir Own capabilities. Using imitation, childrcn arc capableof doing much more in coJleet ive activ ity or under the guidance ofadults. This fact, which seems to be of little significance in itself, is offundamcntnl importance in that i t demnllds n radical a lterat ion of thecntire doctrine concerning the relation hctween Icarning and development in children. Onedirect consequence is a change in conclusions thatmay be drawn from diagnostic tests of development.

FDrmerly, it was believed that by using tests , we detcrmine th emental developmcnt level with which education should reckon andwhose limits it s ho ul d n ot exceed. This procedure oriented learningtoward yesterday's development, toward developmental itages alreadycompleted. T he e rr or of this v iew was discDvered carlier in practicethan in theory. is demonstra ted most c lear ly in the teaching ofmentaJly retarded children. Studic i have established that mcntnlJyretarded children are no t very ('apable of ahstract thinking. From thisthe pedagogy of the special school drew the sccmingly correct conclusion that all teaching of such chi ldren shou ld be based Oil th cusc of concrete, Iookamldo methods. AmI yet a considerablc amountof experience with this method resulted in profound disillusionmcnt.It turned u that a teaching system based solely on concretcncssone that eliminated from teaching everything associated with abstractthinking-not only fai led to help retarded children overcome theirinnate handic.'lps but also reinforced thcir handicaps by accustomingchildren exclusively to concrete t i n k i n ~ and thus s l l p p r s s i n ~ herudiments of any abstract thought that such children sti ll have. Precisely becausc retarded children, whcn left to themselves, will neverachieve well-elaborated forms of abstmct thought, the school shouldmake ever y eIfort t o p us h t hem in that direction and to develop inthem what is intrinsical ly lacking in their own development. In th ecurrent practices of special schools for rctarded children, we can observe a bcneficial shift away from this concept of concreteness, one thatrestores lookand-do methods to their proper role. Concreteness is nOwseen as necessary and unavoidable only as n stepping stOlle for developingabstract thinking-as a means, not as an en d in itself.

Similarly, in normal children, learning which is oriented toward developmental levels that have already been reached is illcITcctive fromthe viewpoint of a child's overall development. It docs not aim fora new stage of thc developmental process b u t r a th er Ings behind thisprocess. Thus, th e notion of zone of pro.,imal dcvcloplllCllt elmhies usto propound a new formula, namely that the only good learning isthat which is in advance of development.

Th c acquisition of language can provide a paradigm for the elltireproblem of the relation betwecn Jearningand development. Lnnguagearises initiaIIy as a means of communication between the child and th epeople in his environment. Only subsequently, upon conversion tointernal speech, does , i t come to organize the child 's thought, tha t is,become an internal menta l function. Pinget and others have shownthat reasoning occurs in a children's group as an argument intended

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to prove one s own point of view before it occurs as all internal activitywhosc distinctive feature i s that the child begills to perceive and checkthe basis of his thoughts. Such observations prompted Piaget to conclude that communication produces the nced for checking and confirming thoughts, a process that is characteristic of adult thought. In thesame way tha t interna l speech