E-Filed Document Mar 15 2016 19:41:15 2015-CA-01555 Pages: 31

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

THE FORMER BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND MEMBERS OF MISSISSIPPI COMP CHOICE SELF-INSURERS FUND

vs.

MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION GROUP SELF-INSURER GUARANTY ASSOCIATION AND JOHN DOES 1-10

APPELLANT

NO. 2015-CA-01555

APPELL EE

BRJEF OF APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

SHANNON LAW FIRM, PLLC James D. Shannon (MSB#673 l ) Kathryn L. White (MSB# l 03250) Bennett L. Wilson (MSB#104774) 100 West Gallatin Street Haz lehurst, MS 39083 Phone: 601 -894-2202 Fax: 601-894-5033 kwhite@shannonlawfinn.com Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

Pursuant to Miss. R. App. P. 28(a)(1 ), the undersigned counsel of record certifies that the

following listed persons and/or entities have an interest in the outcome of the case. The

representations are made in order that the Justices of the Supreme court and/or the Judges of the

Court of Appeals may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal:

I . The Former Board of Trustees an Members of Mississippi Comp Choice SelJ-Insurers Fund, Appellant :

a. A&M Thinning Inc., 132 1 County Road 440, Quitman, MS 39335;

b. 4-H Logging, Inc. , 623 Melton Hatton Rd. P.O. Box Wiggins, MS 39577;

c. Allen Jones Jr. d/b/a Jones Logging, Inc., 552 Windsor Rd., Lorman, MS 39096;

d. Amjte County Poles & Piling, Inc. P.O. Box 280, Gloster, MS 39638;

e. Austin Inc-Randolph MS d/b/a Austin, Inc. 1453 Hwy 9 South, Randolph, MS 38864;

f. B&B Chip & Timber Co. , Inc., 221 SCR 35-9, Forest, MS 39074;

g. Capital S Trucking, LLC, Route 3 Box 243 PO Box 424, Eupora MS 39744;

h. Charles Henley Timber Company, 17299 Old Joe Moran Road, Kiln, MS;

1. Conaway Land & Timber, Inc., 1101 Cardinal Drive, Corinth, MS;

J. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. , 149 Auburn Dr. SW Brookhaven, MS 39629;

k. Cortez Byrd Logging, Inc., 555 Ellen Drive, P.O. Box 546, Brookhaven, MS 39602:

1. Desoto Logging, Inc. 941 South Magnolia Dr., Wiggins, MS 39577;

m. Desoto Treated Materia ls, Inc., 941 South Magnolia Dr. , Wiggins, MS 39577;

n. Franklin Lumber Company, 316 Mill Road , Bude, MS;

o. Greg Winstead Logging, Inc. 259 Tullis Road, Union, MS 39365;

p. Henry Logging, Inc., 357 Holly Bush Rd., Waynesboro MS 39367;

11

q. JR Logging. Inc. 283 Hwy 48, Sandy Hook, MS 39478;

r. Jack Batte & Sons, fnc., 22 1 SCR 35-9, Forest, MS 39071;

s. James Smith d/b/a James M Smith Sawmill, Route 3 Box 243, PO Box 424, Eupora MS 39744;

t. JeffWinstead dfb/a JeffWinstead Logging16931 Hwy 19 South, Philadelphia, MS 39350;

u. JLS Inc. d/b/a Howell and Odom Transportation, 181 l CR 272, Carrollton MS;

v. John_ Wedgeworth dfb/a John Wedgeworth Logging, 3198 SCR 504, Forest, MS 39074;

w. Johnny McCool Logging Company, Inc. d/b/a McCool Logging 315 Silver Creek Drive, Vicksburg MS 39180;

x . K.B. Nicholson Logging, Co. , Inc. d/b/a KB Nicholson Logging 91923 Hwy 42, Richton, MS 39476;

y. Kent Hillman Logging, inc., 4022 Forrest Breland Road , eely, Ms;

z. Kilgore Sawmill , lnc., 164 Sawyer Loop, Winona, MS ;

aa. Kiln Trucking, Inc. , 17299 Old Joe Moran Raod , Kiln, MS;

bb. L & L Logging, 276 Boumham Rd .. Oak Vale, MS 39656;

cc. Lincoln Lumber Co., Inc., 555 Ellen Drive, P .O. Box 546, Brookhaven, MS 39602;

dd. Lincoln Tie & Timber, LLC, 1240 West Industrial Park Rd., P.O. Box 547, Brookhaven, MS 3960 l ;

ee. Marion County Timber, Inc. 168 Ten Mile Creek Road, Foxworth, MS 39483;

ff. Orleans Furniture, inc. , 148 l Main Street, Columbia, MS;

gg. Owen Logging Company, inc. , 465 Thelma Andrews Rd. , Wiggins, MS 39577;

111

hh. Pearl River Valley Oppo,tunity, 756 Hwy 98 Bypass, P.O. Box 188, Columbia, MS 39429;

11. R&R Timber, Inc., 11 980 Road 171, Philadelphia, MS 39350;

JJ. Rials, Inc., 28090 Hwy 51 , Crystal Springs, MS 39059;

k.k. Richard Sisson Trucking, lnc. d/b/a Richard Sisson, 13 1 Airpark Dr. , Philadelphia MS 39350;

II. Rollin -Wells, LLC, 1911 Hwy 61 South, Woodville MS 39669;

mm. Scott Penn, Inc. , 304 Yandell Avenue, Canton MS 39046;

nn. Smith & Tie Timber ,LLC, Route 3 Box 243, PO Box 424, Eupora MS 39744;

oo. Southern Logging, Inc. 5411 Hwy. 567, Liberty, Ms 39645;

pp. Suzie Rawson d/b/a Howell and Odom Transportation, 1811 CR 272, Carrollton, MS·

qq. Tallahatchie Hardwood, lnc. , 500 North Market Street, Charleston MS;

rr. West Tennessee Land &Timber Inc. , 23 CR 607, Walnut, MS 39683; and

ss. Winona Hardwood, Inc. , 164 Sawyer Loop, Winona, MS.

2. Shannon Law Firm, PLLC

James D. Shannon, Esq.

Kathryn L. White, Esq.

Bennett L. Wilson, Esq.

Attorneys for the Appellant

3. Mississippi Workers' Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association,

Appellee

4. Wise Carter Child Caraway, PA

Andrew Sweat, Esq.

John D. Price, Esq.

Jennifer Scott, Esq.

Attorneys for the Appellee

IV

5. Honorable John A. Emfinger

Madison County Circuit Court Judge

SO CERTIFIED, th is the 15th day of March, 2016.

Isl Kathryn L. White

Kathryn L. White (MSB# l 03250)

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Interested Parties .... .. .... ...... ........................... .. ....... .. ....... ...... ...... ........................ 11

Table of Contents ........ .. ..... ........................... ...... ........... ............................. .. .. ... ..... ... ...... .. .......... vi

Table of Authorities .............. .. ...... .. ... .. ... .. .... ......................... .... ........... ....................................... vi i

Statement in Support of Request for Oral Argument ... ............. ... .. ...... ... ................................. 1

Statement of the Issues ..... ....... ..... ...... .......... ............. ... ........ .. .................. ........ .... ... .. .. ... .............. 1

Summary of the Argument. .... ... .......... ................ ............ .. ... ... ... ................ ... .... .. ....... .... ...... ... ..... l

Facts and Procedural History ... .. ............... .. ...... .. .... ......................... .. .. .. .......... .. ...... .............. ... ... 2

Standard of Review ............ .. ..... ....... .. ....... ................. ......... ...... ... .. ............................................... ?

Argument. ...... .......... ................................ ................................... ..... .. ........ ..... ........... ............ .. ...... ?

I. The trial court's Order granting Summary Judgment was error as the Guaranty Association is not entitled to discretionary function immunity ... ................... ......... .. .... ?

II. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice Fund and its claims by failing to adhere to statutory requirements and other mandatory regula tions .. ... .. ...... ... ......... ...... ........ .. ... ... ... ....... .. ...... .......... ...... .. ... ....... ... ..... 13

Ill. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice claims when it violated Mississippi Workers ' Compensation Commission General Rule 7 .... ...... ..... ...... .. ...................................... ... .... ......... .... ....................... .... ... .. ...... .. ....... 16

Conclusion ....................................... ... ....... .. ........... ...................... ... ..... .... .... ... ........................ ..... 20

Certificate of Service .... ...... .... ... ... ...... ... ........ ... ......... ................. ..... ........ .. .... ... ..... ...... .. ............... 21

VJ

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville. 158 So. 3d 1106, 11 11 (Miss. 2015) ............. .... ..... ... .. ......... 10, 18

Brantley v. City o_(Horn Lake, 152 So.3d 11 06 (Miss. 2014) .... ....... ....... ................. ..... .. ..... .passim

Brown v. Credit Ctr. Inc. , 44 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. l 983) .... .... ......... ............. ........ ................ .... 7

Busby v. Mazzeo, 929 So. 2d 369, 372 (Miss.Ct. App. 2006) ....... ... ................ ... ... ...... ....... ........... 7

Calonkey v. Amory Sch. Dist .. 163 So.3d 940 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) .......................... .. ........ ...... 16

City o.f Jackson v. Doe, 68 So.3d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 20 I I) . ..... .. .......... .... .. ... .... ............ ..... .. ... ...... 7

Little v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 129 So. 3d 132, 138 (Miss. 20 13) ........ passim

McGowan v. Miss. State Oil and Gas Board, 604 So.2d 312 (Miss. I 992) .............. ..... .. ............ 12

Mississippi Dep't ofEnvtl. Quality v. Weems, 653 So. 2d 266 (Miss.1995) ........... .. ....... .... ... ..... 12

Miss. Real Estate Comm. , ,,. White, 586 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1991) ............................. ................... I 2

Miss. Transp. Comm 'n v. Montgomery, 80 So. 3d 789, 798 (~ 31) (Miss.2012) .... .............. ......... 10

Mitchell v. City o/Greenl'ille, 846 So.2d 1028, 1029 (Miss. 2003) ................. ................... ...... .. . 7

Willing v. Est. of Benz, 958 So. 2d 1240, 1250 (Miss. App. 2007) ................... ....... ...... .. ............ 8

Statutes

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9( I )(d) ........ .... .. ......................... ......................... .... ..... .. .............. passim

Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-75(3) ...... .. ............... ... ....................... ... .... .. ..... ............... ..... .... .. ...... .......... 3

Miss. Code Ann. §71 -3- 15 I ............................ .................................................... ....... ............ passim

Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3-153 ...................... ....... .... ................ .... ............... ..... ... ... .. ..... ... .... .............. 3

Miss. Code Ann. 71 -3-1 57 ... ...... ...... .................... .. .......................... ........ ........................ .. ........ .. 3

Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3-159 .. .. ... ...................... ..... .. .................... ....... .... ............. ..... ... ...... ...... 14, 15

Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3-163 ....... ............... .. .. ... ..... ............... .. .... .. ................ ...... ....... ... 12, 16, 17, 18

Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3-1 65 ....... .. .... .... ..... ...... ..................... ...... ................ .. ......... .... ........ 13, 14, 15

Vll

Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-1 74 ..... ........ .. ..... ... .. .. .... .................................. ....... .... .... .... .... ......... passim

Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-1 81 ................ .. ...................... ............ .. .... .............. ....................... .. . passint

Rules

Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c) .. ......................... ................... .................. ..... .. .... .. ..... .. 1

MWCC General Rule 2 .... .......... .... .. ..................................................... .. .... ........................... 17, 18

MWCC General Rule 7(8)(6) ................................... ......... ................................... ...... ... .... .. . 17, 18

MWCC General Rule 7(b )( l 3) ...... ....................................... ... ................................... .. ......... 17, 18

Vlll

STATEMENT OF THIS ISSUES

I. The trial court's Order granting Summary Judgment was error as the Guaranty Association is not entitled to discretionary function immunity.

II. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice Fund and its claims by failing to adhere to statutory requirements and other mandatory regulations.

IIJ. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice claims when it violated Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission General Rule 7.

l X

ST A TEMENT lN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument is requested in thi s appeal because it is a matter of first impression

regarding whether or not the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty

Association 's overarchi ng function and underl yi ng actions are discretionary in nature and

therefore entitled to immunity under the MTCA. Therefore, this matter involves an issue of

general importance and oral argument will greatly assist thi s Honorable Court in the analysis of

the issues presented.

STATEMENT OF T HE ISSUES

I. T he trial court's Order granting Summary Judgment was error as the Guaranty Association is not entitled to discretionary function immunity.

II. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice Fund and its claims by failing to adhere to statutory requirements and other mandatory regulations.

Ill. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligen t in its handling of the Comp Choice claims when it violated Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission General Rule 7.

SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civi l Procedure 56(c) if a genuine issue of any mate1ial

fact alleged in the Second Amended Complaint remains then summary judgment is not proper.

Comp Choice sued the Guaranty Association alleging that the Guaranty Association was grossly

negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice fund and its claims. Additionally, that the Guaranty

Association failed to adhere to its statutory authori ty under Mississippi Code Annotated 71-3-

15 1 to 7 1-3-1 81, the Mississippi Workers ' Compensation General Rules and the Guaranty

Association 's own Plan o f Operation. The Guaranty Association filed a motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56(c), clai ming the protections of discretionary-function immunity under

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1 )(d) of the M ississippi Tort C laims Act.

Section I 1-46-9(1 )( d), provides immunity from claims " [b ]ased upon the exercise or

performance or the fai lure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of

governmental entity." Mis . Code Ann. § J l -46-9(l)(d). The Guaranty Association argues that

the duties imposed on them in handling the clai ms and taking over Comp Choice are

discretionary. However, Comp Choice argues that the applicable statutes and rules impose a

ministerial duty on the Guaranty Association to perform its duties and that the Guaranty

Association failed to follow its statutoril y mandated duties, fai led to adhere to the Mississippi

Workers' Compensation General Rules and failed to adhere to its own Plan of Operation in

performing the duties related to Comp Choice. Therefore, the issue before this Court is whether

the Guaranty Association is entitled to sovereign immunity based on the discretionary-function

exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. If not then the Guaranty Association is not

entitled to immunity w1der Miss. Code Ann. §l 1-46-9(1)(d).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has a long procedural hi story including previously being before the Mississippi

Supreme Court on other issues such as whether or not the Mississippi Workers' Compensation

Self-Insurer Guaranty Association (hereinafter "Guaranty Association') is an instrumentality of

the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission and whether the claims in the Complaint

must be made under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

The Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Lnsurer's Fund (hereinafter "Comp Choice") seeks

relief from an Order en tered by the Circuit Court of Madison County, Mississippi granti ng

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 27. The trial couti determined that the

functions of the Guaranty Association which were complained of by Comp Choice in its Second

Amended Complaint were discretionary in nature and therefore the Guaranty Association is

2

entitled to the discretionary-function immunity provided for under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9( d) .

R. at 316, Ex. 3.

Comp Choice was a group of employers who entered into agreements to pool their

workers' compensation li abi lities together for the purpose of qualifying as group self-insurers

pw-suru1t to Mississippi Code Annotated §7 1-3-75(3). As a group self-i nsurer approved by the

Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission and issued a Certificate of Authority, Comp

Choice was also a member of the Mi.ssissippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurer Guaranty

Association and subject to the provisions found in Mississippi Code Annotated §71 -3-151

through 71-3-181. The Guaranty Association was created by the Mississippi Legislature pursuant

to Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-151 et seq. which is known as the Mississippi Workers'

Compensation Commission Self-Insured Guaranty Association Law. Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-

151 to §71-3- 18 1.

On January 20, 2009, the Board of Trustees of Comp Choice consented to and executed a

voluntary surrender of their Certificate of Authority as a group self-insurer to the Mississippi

Workers' Compensation Commission. R. at 228. On February 24, 2009, the Mississippi

Workers' Compensation Commission entered an Order which declared Comp Choice a "self-

insurer in default" under Miss. Code §71-3-157 and Mississippi Workers' Compensation

Commission Genera l Rule 7. R. at 232, Ex. 5. lJ1 this same order, the Mississippi Workers'

Compensation Commission (hereinafter "Commission") turned over the responsibility for the

operation of Comp Choice's fund to the Guaranty Association. Id. The purpose of the Guaranty

Association is fo und in Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-153. It states in pertinent part that:

the purpose of Sections 71 -3-1 51 through 71-3-1 81 is to provide a mechanism for the payment of the covered claims under the Workers' Compensation Law, to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avo id financia l loss to claimants because of insolvency

3

of a self-insurers, to assist in the detection and prevention of self-insurer insolvencies, and to provide associations to assess the cost of such protection among self-insurers.

Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3-1 53 . It is pursuant to the Guaranty Association's administration and

handling of the Comp Choice Fund that Comp Choice based its causes of action in the Complaint

and subsequent Amended Complaints filed in this matter.

On May 28, 20 I 0, Comp Choice's Complaint was fil ed in the Circuit Court of Hinds

County, Mississippi . R. at 2. On October 29 2010, the First Amended Complaint was filed. R. at

3. On December 19, 2011 , this matter was transfen-ed from the Circuit Court in Hinds County,

Mississippi to the Circuit Court in Madison County, Mississippi. R. at 4. On June 22, 2012, an

Order was entered granting the Defendant' s Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

R. at 4. On November 1, 2012, Comp Choice fil ed an Amended Complaint. R. at 5. On April 2,

2013, that Amended Complaint was dismissed and Comp Choice was given twenty (20) days to

file an amended complai nt. R. at 6. On Ap1i l 22, 20 13, Comp Choice filed its Second Amended

Complaint. R. at 10, Ex.2. Comp Choice also filed an Interlocutory Appeal with the Mississippi

Supreme Court. R. at 6. An Order to Stay the matter in the Madison County Circuit Court was

entered on May 2, 2013. R. at 6.

The Mississippi Supreme Court granted the Interlocutory Appeal and briefing and oral

argument took place in this matter regarding whether or not the Guaranty Association is an

instrumentality of the Commission and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. On February

24, 2015, the Mississippi Supreme Comi rendered an opinion in the matter reversing the trial

court' s grant of the Motion to Dismiss and remanding the matter for further fact determination

regarding whether or not the Guaranty Association is an instrumentality of the Commission

entitled to immunity. R. at 7.

4

Following the Mississippi Supreme Court's Opinion, the stay was lift.ed on thi s matter in

the Circuit Court of Madison County, Mississippi . ln Comp Choice's Second Amended

Complaint Comp Choice alleged that the Guaranty Association acted negligently and in bad

faith in pe1fo1ming its dut ies. R. at 10, Ex. 2. Comp Choice alleged negligence, gross negligence,

a breach of fiduciary duty, that it was entitled to an accounting of its funds, bad faith, conversion

and intentional infliction of emotional di stress. Comp Choice alleged that the Guaranty

Association had a duty to them and that they breached the duty by negligently and improperly

wasting/spending Comp Choice's money; paying AmFed an exorbitant amount compared to

what Comp Choice's fonn cr administrator was charging to handle existing claims and to close

down the Fw1d; negligently, improperly, and wrongfully attempting to sell Comp Choice' s assets

at an inappropriate time; negligently, improperl y, and wrongfully withholding premium deposits

of approximately $300,000.00 belonging to the members of Comp Choice; negligently and in

bad faith conducting and paying fo r an unnecessary investigations out of Comp Choice's assets

needed for claims; negligently and in bad faith engaging in questionable hiring practices and

wasting assets of Comp Choice; negligently and in bad faith preparing premium audits without

detailed underw1iting data , for fai ling to follow statutory requirements in Miss. Code Ann. §71-

3-1 51, et. seq.; for exceeding the authority granted and purpose of the Guaranty Association

§71-3-151 , et. seq.; and violating General Rule 7. id.

On May 19, 20 15, the Guaranty Association filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and

on June 15, 2015 filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. R. at 27. The Guaranty

Association claimed all actions or inactions complained of involved the performance of

discretionary function s and therefore it is entitled to di scretionary-function immunity on all of

Comp Choice's claims. Comp Choice responded alleging that the functions complained of were

5

ministerial rather than discretionary as they were mandatory pursuant to statutes and regulations

and therefore the Guaranty Association is not entitled to immunity. R. at 178. Comp Choice

argued that summary judgment is not proper in this matter as there are material issues of

genuine fact remaining wi th regards to Comp Choice's all egations. Id.

A hearing was held on June 15, 2015 on the Guaranty Association 's Motion for Summary

Judgment. On July 23, 2015, the Judge conducted a telephonic conference with the parties

wherein he made an oral ruling granting the Guaranty Association's motion. During the course

of the argument before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties agreed that

the Guaranty Association is an instrumentality of the Commission and agreed to proceed on the

Second Amended Complaint. R. at Supp. Transcript, Pg. 3-5. Therefore, the remaining question

before the trial court was whether or not Comp Choice's claims against the Guaranty Association

fall under a discretionary or ministerial function. On September 9, 2015, the trial court entered an

Order granted the Guaranty Association's motion for summary judgment as to all of the

Plaintiff's claims, reasoning that the Guaranty Association was immune from suit because Comp

Choice's claims were based on the Guaranty Association's perfonnance of discretionary

funct ions w1der the MTCA, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9( I )(d). Comp Choice appeals this ruling

arguing that the trial coUit's September 9, 2015 Order granting Summary Judgment and

Judgment of Dismissal was error and that the functions complained of in Comp Choice's Second

Amended Complaint were ministerial rather than discretionary. R. at 322, Ex. 4. Furthermore,

that the Guaranty Association is not entitled to the discretionary function immunity provided in

Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-46-9(1 )(d). Id.

6

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

The Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides governmental entities immunity from liability

in certain situations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9. "This exemption, like that of qualified or

absolute immunity, is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability and,

therefore, should be resolved at the earliest possib le stage of litigation." Brantley v. City of Horn

Lake, 152 So.3d 1106 (Miss. 2014) citing Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 846 So.2d 1028, l 029

(Miss. 2003). Accordingl y, " immunity is a question of law and is a proper matter for summary

judgment." Id. However, th is Court applies a de novo review. Evidentiary matters are viewed in

light most favorab le to the nolUlloving party. Busby v. Mazzeo, 929 So. 2d 369, 372 (Miss.Ct.

App. 2006). The trial cou1t's ruling will be reversed if this Court finds that there are triable

issues of fact. Id. citing Brown v. Credit Ctr. Inc., 44 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983).

The Court reviews a trial court's application of the MTCA as well as a trial court' s ruling

on a motion for summary judgment de novo. City of Jackson v. Doe, 68 So.3d 1285, 1287 (Miss.

201 1).

ARGUMENT

I. The trial court's Order granting Summary Judgment was error as the Guaranty Association is not entitled to discretionary function immunity.

The trial court ened in ruling that the performance of functions by the Guaranty

Association as referenced in the allegations of Comp Choice's Second Amended Complaint were

discretionary in nature and therefore the Guaranty Association was entitled to the statutory

immunity provided in Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-46-9(1 )()d). Rather, as pointed out

herein, the Guaranty Association's overall function is ministerial. Fu,thermore, the more narrow

duties required by statute, the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Law and the Guaranty

7

Association's Plan of Operation are also ministerial functions in which it failed to adhere to in its

handling of the Comp Choice Fund and claims.

The Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides that governmental entities and their employees

shall be exempt from liab ility in certain situations. At issue in this case is the exception to the

waiver of sovereign immunity fo und in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 1 l-46-9(1)(d). The

Guaranty Association has alleged that all its actions and/or omissions which were harmful to

Comp Choice were "discretionary" in nature and, therefore, it is entitled to immunity under

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9( I )(d). Such is simply not the case as the Guaranty Association's

duties are ministerial for which no exemption applies. Miss. Code s 11-46-9(1 )( d) provides " ( 1)

A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment

or duties shall not be liable for any claim: (d) based upon the exercise or performance or the

failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental

entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused". The Guaranty Association 's

actions and inactions do not fit this statutory exemption. The Guaranty Association was grossly

negligent as it failed to adhere to ministerial functions in handling the Comp Choice Fund and

claims.

The case law is clear that governmental activities that are positively designated and not

reliant on judgment or discretion are ministeri al and, therefore, not immune from liability. An act

is ministeri al and not discretionary "[ifJ the duty is one which has been positively imposed by

law and its performance is required at a time and in a manner or under conditions which are

specifically designated, the duty performed under the conditions specified not being dependent

upon judgment or discretion." Willing v. Est. of Benz, 958 So. 2d 1240, 1250 (Miss. App. 2007)

( emphasis added).

8

The Mississippi Supreme Court effectively abandoned the old public-policy function test

that once applied to detc1mining whether a function is ministe1ial or whether discretionary

function immunity applies. In Little v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 129 So. 3d

132, 138 (Miss. 20 13), the Mississippi Supreme Com1 adopted a new test to determine if the

discretionary-function immunity applies to the governmental conduct. The Court held that it is

the function being fulfi lled, rather than the act performed in furtherance of that function, to

which di scretionary-function immunity does or does not attach. Id. Where a statute mandates the

government or its employees to act, all acts fulfilling that duty are considered mandated as well,

and neither the government nor its employees enjoy immunity. Id. at 136.

The Court in that case determined that, because the function of roadway maintenance was

mandated by statute, that function was ministeri al and immunity did not apply, despite the

discretion the Mississippi Department of Transportation enjoyed in deciding how and when it

would perform the acts of road maintenance. Id. " In that sense, the Court found that the

discretion in deciding whether to exercise a function or duty is where immunity attaches rather

than the discretion in deciding how to do it. " Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So. 3d 11 06,

1112-1 3 (Miss. 2014).

"To defeat a claim of discretionary-function immunity, a plaintiff must prove that an act

done in furtherance of a broad discretionary function also furthered a more narrow function or

duty which is made ministeri al by another specific statute, ordinance, or regulation promulgated

pursuant to lawful authority. Id. at 111 5. Immunity for governmental entities attaches either to

functions or duties, not to acts. id.

After analyzing the plain language of the discretionary function immunity statute, Section

11-46- 9(d), and it is clear directive that immunity attaches to.function rather than acts, as stated

9

in Little, the Mississippi Supreme Court fo rmally abolished the publ ic-policy function test. Id. at

111 2- 13 (iJiJ 19- 20). "Instead, it held that dete1m ining the overarching di scretionary function at

issue is only tbe first step in the analysis." Id. at 111 4 (ii 26). "The Court then must examine any

narrower duty associated with the activity at issue to determine whether a statute, regulation, or

other binding directive renders that parti cular duty a ministerial one notwithstanding that it may

have been performed with in the scope of a broader discretionary function." Id. at 11 15 (ii 26).

The Brantley Court went on to hold that "a plaintiff may defeat sovereign immunity, even when

a governmental entity's act fu rthered a discretionary function or duty, when the plainti ff proves

that the act also furthered a more narrow function or duty which is made ministerial by another

specific statute, ordinance. or regulation promulgated pursuant to lawful authority." Id. at 1115

(ii 28), Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, 158 So. 3d 11 06, 1111 (Miss. 2015).

The holding in Little stands for the p1inciple that all acts in furtherance of a ministerial

function Jack imrnunjty notwithstanding that the act itself may involve an element of discretion.

That said, while one statute may render a broad function ministeri al another statute or regulation

may render a duty involved with that function discretionary, thus allowing the performance of

such a duty to enjoy immunity. And clearly, the converse must be true, such that narrower duties

encompassed in a broad discretionary function may be rendered ministerial through statute or

regulation. Brantley at 1113.

Such was recognized by thi s Court in Montgomery. "Occasionally ... the Legislature wi ll

mandate that a political subdivision fulfi ll some particular fu nction, but then specifi cally set fo11h

that some portion or aspect of that function is discretionary. When that happens, acts fulfilling

the discretionary portion of the governmental function enjoy immunity."Miss. Transp. Comm'n

v. Montgomery, 80 So.3d 789. 798 ( 31) (Miss.2012).

10

This Court has not previously examined the governmental function applicable in this

matter to detennine whether immunity applies in the negligent handling of Comp Choice and the

claims. The Court should look at the overarching function of the Guaranty Association, rather

than the acts perfom1ed and determine that the Guaranty Association's actions and inactions

were fail ures to adhere to statutory requirements and regulations in perform ing their mandatory

functions.

The Guaranty Association has repeatedly stated that its serves no other purpose than to

perfom1 a governmental function in prior pleadings and oral arguments. For example, "[i]t is

self-evident that every legal enti ty established by the Legislature is for some governmental

purpose." Memo to GA's MSJ at Pg. 5, R. at 148. If the Guaranty Association was in fact created

by the Legislature to act as an agent for the Mississippi Workers ' Compensation Commission to

carry out its statutorily established activities than that governmental function cannot become

discretionary. By law, the Guaranty Association is required to administer the Comp Choice Fund

as it was determined to be a group self-insurer in default.

Here the overreaching function being perfo1m ed was the handling of Comp Choice and

its claims as required by Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-151 trough 71-3-1 81.The Guaranty Association

argues, that "[t]he Legislature intended the Guaranty Association to act as an agent of the

Commission and to carry out statutori ly established activi ti es, as indicated by the purpose of the

law creating and authori zing the Association:

to provide a mechanism for the payment of the covered claims under the

Workers' Compensation Law, to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid

fi nancial loss to claimants because of insolvency of a self-insurer, to assist in the

detection and prevention of self-insurer insolvencies, and to provide associations

to assess the cost of such protection amount self-insurers. Miss. Code Ann. §71 -3-

153.

11

See Memo to GA's MSJ at P.6, ,i2, emphasis added, R. at 149. These statutorily mandated

duties are what Comp Choice's allegation revolve around. This statute further demonstrates that

the Guaranty Association' s governmental function is ministerial in nature and therefore it is not

protected by the discretionary function immunity found in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1 )(d) . It is

apparent from the Guaranty Association 's own arguments that the purpose and function of the

Guaranty Association is min isterial and expressly provided by statute.

By failing to fo llow the clear statutory directives, the Guaranty Association has acted

arbitrruily and capriciously. Mississippi Dep 't of Envtl. Quality v. Weems, 653 So. 2d 266

(Miss.1 995). "The failure of an agency to abide by its rules is per se arbitrary and capricious ... "

Id. Governmental acts are generall y fou nd to be arbitrary and capricious when done in

contradiction to established law. See McGowan v. Miss. State Oil and Gas Board, 604 So.2d 312

(Miss. 1992); and Miss. Real Estate Comm., v. White, 586 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1991 ). This further

applies to actions taken in contradiction to statutes. Therefore, the Guaranty Association ' s failure

to follow its own Plan of Operation Mississippi Workers ' Compensation Commission's General

Rules and the applicable Mississippi Code was not only arbitrru·y and capri cious, but also grossly

negligent.

The Mississippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurer Guaranty Association Law, Rules

of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission and the Guaranty Association's Plan of

Operation impose ministerial duties on the Guaranty Association to handle the Comp Choice

fund and its claims. Taking those duties into considerat ion, it cannot be said that there are no

genuine issues of material fact wh ich remain . Specifically, genuine issues of material fact still

exist in this matter as to whether or not the Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in their

handling of the Comp Choice fund and claims. Therefore, Comp Choice has stated an adequate

12

claim and the trial court erred in granting the Guaranty Association's motion for summary

judgment. As such, summary judgment is not proper. This Court should reverse the trial court's

order and remand thi s matter for fu1t her proceedings.

11. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice Fund and its claims by failing to adhere to statutory requirements and other mandatory regulations.

The Guaranty Association violated Mississippi Code Annotated §71-3-1 74 and its own

Plan of Operation in faili ng to prove the assessment was necessary and in failing to timely

submit the plan for special assessments to the Commission. T he Guaranty Association must have

a plan of operation. Miss. Code Ann. 159. ot only is the plan of operation mandatory, there

are certain procedures which must be detailed within that plan. The plan of operation shall

contain: procedures whereby all the powers and duties of the association under Section 71-3-1 63

will be perfo1med, establish procedure for handling assets establish the amount and method of

reimbursing members of the board of directors, establish procedures by which claims may be

fi led with the association, and establish procedures for records to be kept of all financial

transactions of the association. Miss. Code Ann. §71 -3-165(3).

The Guaranty Association shall request special assessments when certain mandatory

conditions are met pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 71 -3-1 74 . The statute is clear that if an

association assumes any obligations of a group self-insurer and "payments of such obligations

exceed the assets of such association" it shall submit a plan for special assessment. See Miss.

Code Ann. §71-3- 174. Therefore, the assessment is only proper if the obligations of Comp

Choice exceed its remain ing assets. However, the Guaranty Association failed to demonstrate

thi s occurred prior to recommending the assessment as required by statute. Pursuant to Little, the

Court looks at the "function being fulfi lled, rather than the act performed in furtherance of that

13

function, to which discretionary-function immunity does or does not attach. Where a statute

mandates the government or its employees to act, all acts fulfilling that duty are considered

mandated as well, and neither the government nor its employees enjoy immunity." Little v.

Mississippi Department o.f Transportation, 129 So. 3d 132, 136 (Miss. 2013). All acts in

furtherance of this ministerial function lack immunity notwithstanding that the act itself may

involve an element of di scretion. Id. Moreover, there are no other more nanow statutes or

regulations which would render this duty involved as discretionary and entitle it to immunity.

See Brantley v. City of Horn lake, 152 So. 3d 1106, 1113 (Miss. 20 14). As such, no immw1ity

attaches to the Guaranty As ociation's function or acts in requesting the special assessment as it

was not done in compliance with the mandatory statute or plan of operation.

Additionally, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3-159 the Guaranty Association is

required to perform its functions under a plan of operation established and approved w1der

Section 71-3-1 65. Miss . Code Ann. §71 -3-159. This Plan of Operation must establish procedures

where by all of the power and duties of the association wi ll be performed, establish procedures

by which claims may be filed with the association, establish acceptable forms of proof of

covered claims, and contain additional provisions necessary or proper for the execution of the

powers and duties of the association. Miss. Code Ann. 71-3- 165(3).

The Guaranty Association did in fact adopt it owns Plan of Operation. Under Article XJ,

Assessments its states that :

lf the Association assumes obligations of a Member and this obligation exceeds the assets of the Association, the Association shall submit a plan of special assessment to the Commission within sixty (60) days.

Guaranty Association Plan of Operation at Page 20, R. at 221 , Ex. 7. The Commission entered an

Order turning over the responsibility of Comp Choice the Guaranty Association on February 24,

14

2009. R. at 232, Ex. 5. However, the Guaranty Association did not submit its plan of special

assessment wi thin sixty (60) days as required by its Plan of Operation. Rather, the Commission

did not enter an Order of Assessment until Apri l 19, 20 I 0, almost an entire year after the

Guaranty Association assumed responsibility for Comp Choice. R. at 24 1 Ex. 6. By failing to

follow these mandatory requirements, the Guaranty Association has injured Comp Choice and

caused it monetary damages.

When examining this claim under Little and Brantley, it is clear that the function being

performed is requesting the assessment as provided in Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-174 which is a

ministerial function for wh ich no immunity attaches. However, there is a more nrurnw regulation

in thi s matter which also must be examined. The Guaranty Association must have a Plan of

Operation and it must estab lish procedures to perform its functions under the plan. Therefore, the

Cour t should look at tl1i s funct ion and determine whether it is discretionary or minjsterial.

Whereas here, the statute mandates the government to act, all acts fu lfi lling that duty are

considered mandated as well, and the Guaranty Association will not enjoy immunity. See Little

v. Mississippi Department o.f Transportation, 129 So. 3d 132, 136 (Miss. 2013). The Court must

then go a step further and dcternune whether or not there is a more narrow statutory or duty for

which discretionary immunity mjght attach. See Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So. 3d 1106,

1113 (Miss. 2014). The Guaranty Association's own Plan of Operation which is statutorily

mandated also includes an applicable regulation. Thjs regulation also pertains to requesting the

specia l assessment and states that it shall be done within sixty (60) days. It is clear that the

actions or inactions in furtherance of this ministerial function Jack immunity as the function is

ministerial and therefore the Guaranty Association is not entitled to discretionary function

immunity for these action and inactions.

15

Mississippi Code Ann. §71 -3-1 59, §71-3-165 & §71 -3- 174 and the Guaranty

Association' s Plan of Operation impose ministerial duties on the Guaranty Association regarding

a plan of operation, an assessment and the handli ng the Comp Choice fund and its claims. Taking

those duties into consideration, it cannot be said that there are no genuine issues of material fact

which remain. Specifically, genuine issues of material fact still ex ist in thi s matter as to whether

or not the Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in their handling of the Comp Choice fund

and claims including in the improper and untimely request for assessments. Therefore, Comp

Choice has stated an adequate claim and the trial court erred in granting the Guaranty

Association 's motion for summary judgment. As such, summary judgment is not proper. This

Court should reverse the trial court's order and remand this matter for further proceedings.

III. The Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice claims when it violated Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission General Rule 7

The governmental function at issue is the grossly negligent handling of claims. This

function is imposed on the Guaranty Association by Miss. Code Ann. §71 -3-l 63(1)(f) which

requires that "the association shall handle claims through its employees or through one or more

other persons designated as servicing facilities." Miss. Code Ann. §7 l -3-163(f). Little holds that

this mandated function includes "all acts" carrying out that duty, even when they involve choice

or judgment, therefore the Court must find that the acts involving the hiring of AmFed to service

and admin ister the claims fal l under that function and, thus, are not immune from the Fund 's suit.

Calonkey v. Amo,y Sch. D ist., 163 So.3d 940 (Miss. Ct. App. 20 14) citing Little, 129 So.3d at

138.

The Guaranty Association is allowed to "employ or retain such persons as are necessary

to handles claims and perfonn other duties of the association." Miss. Code Ann. §7 l -3- 163(2)(a).

16

However, the Guaranty Association must also abide by the Mississippi Workers' Compensation

Commission Rules as the ·e rules "shall be in effect and shall apply to all claims or matters being

before the Commission as of the effective date of the Rules, and to all matters or claims

thereafter filed." MWCC Generaf Rule 2. Rule 7(8)(6) also applies in this situation as the

Guaranty Association was acting as a group self-i nsurer in handling the claims of Comp Choice.

It states:

a. No service company or its employees, officers or directors shall be an employee, officer, or director of, or have either a direct or indirect financial interest in, an administrator. o administrator or its employees, officers or directors shall be an employee, officer or director of, or have either a direct or indirect financial interest in, a service company. All contracts shall be made available to the Commission upon request.

b. The service contract shall state that unless the Commission approves otherwise the service company shall handle, to their conclusion, all claims and their obligations incurred during the contract period.

MWCC General Rule 7(B)(6). Rule 7(8)(13) defines an Administrator and a Service Company.

It states in pe1tinent part:

a. "Administrator" means an individual, partnership or corporation engaged by a workers' compensation group self-insurer's board of trustees to carry out the policies established by the group self-i nsurer's board of trustees and to provide day to day management of the group self-insurer.

c. "Service Company" means a person or entity which provides services not provided by the administrator. including but not limited to, (l ) claims adjustment, (2) safety engineering, (3) compilation of stati stics and the preparation of premium, loss and tax repo1is, (4) preparation of other required self-insurance reports, (5) development of members' assessments and fees , and (6) administration of a claim fund.

MWCC General Rule 7(8 )(13). 111e Guaranty Association hired AmFed to act as both the

Administrator and the Service Company over the Comp Choice fund and claims. Th.is is a clear

violation of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Law. Therefore, the Guaranty Association

was grossly negligent in its handling of the Comp Choice fund and claims. The Guaranty

Association has no choice but to adhere to the mandatory rules of the Mississippi Workers '

17

Compensation Com.mission. This ru le is mandatory and therefore is ministerial in nature rather

than di scretionary and the Guaranty Association's fai lure to abide by these requirements caused

Comp Choice damages.

The Court should analyze this claim by looking at the overarching function rather than

the acts. Brantley, l 52 So. 3d at 11 14. The function complained of is the grossly negligent

handling of the Comp Choice fund and its claims and not specificly the actions of handling the

individual claims. Miss. Code Ann. §7 1-3- 163(1 )(f) requires the Guaranty Association to handle

claims through its employees or servicing facilities . See Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-163(f).

Therefore, this is a ministerial duty for which no inununity attaches. However, there is another

statutory provision which is relevant in this matter, Miss. Code Ann. §7 J-3- l 63(2)(a) which

states that the Guaranty Association may employ others to perform this duty. See Miss. Code

Ann. §7 l-3-163(2)(a). If the Court detem1ines that this duty associated with the activity at issue

renders the duty discretionary, then the Court must look to see if there is any narrower duty

which would render the duty ministeri al. In this case, there is in fact a more narrow regulation

that applies.

Mississippi Workers ' Compensation Law, General Rules 2, 7(B)(6) & 7(8)( 13) apply in

this matter. These rules apply to the Guaranty Association as it is assumed responsibility for

Comp Choice and all its claims which are subject to the rules. See MWCC, Rule 2. Rule 7(B)(6)

states that no service company shall have the same employees, officers or directors or have a

direct or indirect financia l interest in the administrator. It further states that no administrator shall

have the same employees, officers or director or have a direct or indirect financial interest in the

service company. See MWCC, Rule 7(8)(6). Rule 7(8)(13) defines an administrator and a

service company. See MWCC Rule 7(8 )( 13). However, the Guaranty Association violated these

18

rules when it hired AmFed to act as the Administrator and the Service Company for Comp

Choice and its claims.

Consequently, whi le the Guaranty Association may have discretionary function immunity

as to the hiring of a service company to handle the claims, it is strictly forbidden by the

Mississippi Worker's Compensation Law to hire the same entity to serve as the Administrator

and the Service Company. "A plaintiff may defeat sovereign immunity, even when a

governmental entity's act furthered a discretionary function or duty, when the plaintiff proves

that the act also furthered a more narrow function or duty which is made ministe1ial by another

specific statute, ordinance, or regulation promulgated pursuant to lawful authority." Boroujerdi

v. City of Starkville, 158 So. 3d 1106 1111 (Miss. 2015). As outlined in Boroujerdi, Comp

Choice has shown that the acts complained of furthered a more narrow function which is made

ministerial by another regu lation.

Mississippi Code Ann. §71 -3-163 and Mississippi Workers' Compensation Law Rules 2,

7(B)(6) , & 7(B)(l 3) impose ministerial duties on the Guaranty Association regarding a plan of

operation, an assessment and the handling the Comp Choice fund and its claims. Taking those

duties into consideration, it can11ot be said that there are no genuine issues of material fact which

remain. Specifically, genuine issues of material fact sti ll exist in thi s matter as to whether or not

the Guaranty Association was grossly negligent in their handling of the Comp Choice fund and

claims including in the improper and untimely request for assessments. Therefore, Comp Choice

has stated an adequate claim and the trial court erred in granting the Guaranty Association's

motion for summary judgment. As such , summary judgment is not proper. This Court should

reverse the trial court's order and remand thi s matter for further proceedings.

19

CONCLUSION

The Guaranty Association itself recognizes that its duties are ministerial in nature when it

argued that the actions it took are envisioned by the statutes and rules that are the source of the

Guaranty Association's autho1ity. It is abundantly clear from a reading of the statutes, which

establish the Guaranty Association and give it its powers and duties, along with its Plan of

Operation and the Mississippi Workers ' Compensation Laws that there is no discretion granted

with regards to the Guaranty Association 's function or the actions and inactions complained of in

Comp Choice's Second Amended Complaint. The Guaranty Association's function is not

discretionary; therefore, immunity is not proper under Miss. Code Ann. § l 1-46-9(a)(d). There

are genuine issues of material fact remaining including whether the Guaranty Association

violated a ministerial duty established by statute, ordinance or regulation, which precludes

summary judgment on the grounds of immunity. As a result, this Honorable Cou11 should reverse

the tr ial court's Order granting the Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgn1ent.

1n the alternati ve, Comp Choice requests that this Court reverse the hial court 's grant of

the Guaranty Association 's motion for summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial

court for further proceed ings and di scovery to demonstrnte that the claims ari se out of the

Guaranty Association's grossly negligent performance or failure to perform an act which

" furthered a more narrow function or duty which is made ministerial by another specific statute,

ordinance, or regulation promulgated pursuant to lawful authority." Brantley, 152 So. 3d at 111 5.

The way the Court addresses discretionary-function immunity has vastly changed since Comp

Choice filed its Second A.mended Complaint. Comp Choice should be allowed to conduct

discovery to ascertain whether or not the Guaranty Association was fo llowing their Plan of

Operation as required by Miss. Code Annotated §7 1-3-1 63 in the handling of the claims and

20

Comp Choice's fund. Comp Choice prays for any additional relief to which this Court may deem

appropriate in the circumstances.

THJS, the 15th day of March, 2016.

SHANNON LAW FIRM, PLLC James D. Shannon (MSB#673 1) Kathryn L. White (MSB#I 03250) BeJU1ett L. Wilson (MSB# 104774) 100 West Gallatin Street Hazleh urst, MS 39083 Phone: 601-894-2202 Fax: 601 -894-5033

Respectfully submitted ,

THE FORMER BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND MEMBERS OF MISSISSIPPI COMP CHOICE SELF-INSURERS FUND, APPELLANT

By: Isl Kathryn L. White Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE

I , Kathryn L. W11ite, one of the attorneys for Appellant, do hereby certify that I have this

day served the forego ing Appellant's Brief with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system

which sent notification of such to the following:

John D. Price, Esq. Andrew Sweat, Esq. Jennifer Scott, Esq. Wise Carter Child Caraway, PA Post Office Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205

Muriel B. Ell is, Clerk Mississippi Supreme Court 450 High Street Jackson, MS 3920 l

2 1

and that I have this day served the foregoing by U.S. Mai l with postage prepaid on the following persons at this address:

Honorable John A. Emfinger Madison County Circuit Court Judge 128 West orth Street Canton, MS 39046

SO CERTIFIED, th is the 15th day of March, 2016.

Isl Kathlyn L. White

KATHRYN L. WHITE

22