volume two: symposia and invited papers || commentary on the papers of davis baird, peter kroes, and...
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Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael DennisAuthor(s): Allan FranklinSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1994, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1994), pp. 452-457Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192957 .
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Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Commentary on the Papers of Davis Baird, Peter Kroes, and Michael Dennis
Allan Franklin
University of Colorado
One important point that has emerged from recent work on the history and philos- ophy of experiment is that technology plays an integral role in experiment, and there- fore in science. Technology determines what experimenters can measure and how well it can be measured. For example, it was advances in technology that made possi- ble the early searches for gravity waves in the 1970s. The importance of technology, along with several new questions that its use raises, has been made quite clear in the papers presented in this session.
Davis Baird has suggested that we need to extend our concept of meaning in sci- ence to include both the literary mode and the material mode, as expressed in instru- ments and experimental apparatus. Peter Kroes has extended the discussion of a tradi- tional problem in philosophy of science, the distinction between the real and the artifi- cial and its relation to the scientific realism, to include complex modern apparatus. Michael Dennis has suggested that because technology requires substantial funding, attempts to secure such funding may have an important, and sometimes negative, ef- fect on experimental results.
I will begin my discussion with Davis Baird's discussion of Faraday's apparatus for demonstrating electromagnetic rotation. Unfortunately, the model itself wasn't available. Nevertheless, no one who has seen such an apparatus in operation can doubt that it tells us,quite clearly and obviously, something striking about the world. One would have a similar reaction to seeing Oersted's apparatus that showed that cur- rents exert a force on magnets. When the compass needle deflects when the current is turned on, we have learned something. These apparatuses convey both meaning and information. Baird is correct when he notes that for far too long philosophy of sci- ence, and science studies in general, have concentrated on the literary mode of mean- ing. His suggestion that there is also a material mode that should be considered is long overdue. I might suggest, however, that dealing with the material mode is likely to be quite difficult. Unlike Faraday, who sent working models of his apparatus to other sci- entists, we may not even be able to view a complex experimental apparatus. This will pose problems because not everything one learns from an apparatus is easily ex- pressed in words. Pictures and diagrams can help, but they cannot do the job alone. (I am not, of course, suggesting here that what we learn from an apparatus cannot be ex- pressed in words. I am, however, suggesting that it will require care and effort).
PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 452-457 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
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453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
453
There is a distinction that might prove useful in such discussions. It seems appro- priate to distinguish between an apparatus in which the apparatus itself is the phe- nomenon under investigation, such as Faraday's apparatus, and an experimental appa- ratus that is used to investigate another phenomenon. This might be made clear by the following example. Consider a large vat of superheated liquid hydrogen used to inves- tigate bubble formation caused by the passage of charged particles through the liquid. Contrast this with the same vat used as a hydrogen bubble chamber and used to inves- tigate neutrino interactions and the weak neutral current. In the former case, as with Faraday's apparatus, the phenomenon is directly and easily observable. In the latter case, although the events themselves are readilyobservable in the bubble chamber photographs, the production of an experimental result from this data is a complex process, involving considerable background knowledge. It is important to distinguish between data and experimental results in such discussions. (For a detailed discussion of this issue see Bogen and Woodward 1988).
I also note that there are often times when the literary and material modes of meaning are complementary. An anecdote may help. When Charles Sinclair and I were asked to build the first thin-plate (1 mil alurmnum) spark chamber at Cornell University, we had only an article from the Review of Scientific Instruments. We fol- lowed the instructions given in that paper and cooled down both the square lucite frame and the aluminum foil before gluing them together. (We had the use of a refrig- erated room that was also used for storing garbage. No analogy intended). When the material warmed to room temperature, the lucite expanded more than the aluminum giving us a taut, flat plate that could be used in the construction of a spark chamber. We learned about the use and construction of such chambers by doing. Thus, we learned that the technique wouldn't work for rectangular plate because the differential expansion of sides of different lengths produced ripples in the thin aluminum plates. We also learned which gases could be used in the chamber, what constituted adequate flatness of the plates, and what voltages were required. Once the chamber was built and we observed tracks of sparks produced by charged particles passing through the chamber there was no doubt that we had a working apparatus and that we had learned something about the world. Such spark chambers were then used to investigate other aspects of the world such as the photoproduction of p mesons.
Pace Derrida, Baird is correct. There is more in science than just the text, and the text interacting with other texts.
The distinction between data and experimental result leads quite naturally to Peter Kroes' discussion of technology and the distinction between the natural and the artifi- cial. Kroes contrasts the traditional view that technology or experimental apparatus reveals Nature with the criticism offered by Ian Hacking (1983) that the experimenter creates the phenomenon with the apparatus. This would seem to imply a form of rela- tivism. How can what is created really preexist in the world? I believe that Kroes is correct when he attributes a weak form of "creates the phenomenon" to Hacking. The weak form of the concept is that the experimenter creates the proper conditions for the phenomenon to take place, but does not create the specific characteristics of the phe- nomenon. (One might also speak here of the experimenter isolating, rather than creat- ing, the phenomenon). Kroes gives an example of this in his discussion the fact that objects fall freely at the same rate in a vacuum. The experimenter creates the vacuum in which the objects fall. In this case, however, we also have the same phenomenon il- lustrated naturally. Who can forget an astronaut simultaneously dropping a feather and a hammer on the moon, and observing that they fell at the same rate.1 Thus, there is a constraint on the falling bodies that is not created by the experimenter. We may create the conditions that allow the effect to be observed, but the world creates con- straints that we cannot change. Objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, regardless of their mass, no matter what we believe. This view of "creating the phenomenon" al- lows Kroes to argue for a kind of scientific realism based on the use of entities, such as electrons, as tools to investigate other phenomena. This doesn't mean that the elec-
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tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
454
tron is only a tool for furtherinvestigation. Kroes is correct when he notes that be- cause an entity is used as a tool, it doesn't mean that it is a tool.
I suggest, in addition, that we can have good reasons for belief in entities by ex- erimenting on them, not just with them. Consider an experiment to measure the K+e2
branching ratio , the fraction of all K+ mesons that decay into a positron and an elec- tron neutrino (Bowen et al. 1967). One needed a large supply of K+ mesons to detect that rare decay mode (approximately one part in 100,000). The experimental appara- tus detected an entity with a definite charge, a definite mass, and a definite lifetime. These three measurements were sufficient to identify the particle as a K meson, rather than some other elementary particle, and as a real entity. (Normally mass alone would be sufficient to identify an elementary particle). For those who doubt this, let us con- sider the question of whether or not there is a real "Bas van Fraassen." Suppose we observe an entity and measure or detect that it has a definite height, weight, hair color, gender, home address, and birthdate. Suppose, in addition, that these measurements match the information given on Bas van Fraassen's driver's license. Would we not then be justified in concluding not only that the entity exists, but that we were, in fact, observing the famous philosopher? The arguments that one gives for the reality of Bas van Fraassen are the same as those one gives for the existence of K mesons.
Throughout this discussion I have been relying on the validity and reliability of experimental results. Michael Dennis' paper attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of such results. In his discussion of the discord between Tuve's and Lawrence's re- sults on deuteron scattering, hesuggests that Lawrence's error (and to some extent that of the Cavendish group) was caused by a lack of care due to a desire for interesting results so as to secure funding for future experiments. To be fair, Dennis attributes this view to Tuve, but because he presents no alternative explanation I assume he agrees. I am not convinced. Even if one regards securing funds as a motive of the experi- menters, and it certainly was, the securing of funds does not depend solely on produc- ing interesting and spectacular results. Surely it also depends, and even more impor- tantly, on getting correct results. Scientists have no career interest in being wrong. No one is likely to receive further funding of their work if their results have been consis- tently shown to be wrong.
In the episode of Tuve and Lawrence and deuteron scattering we are faced with the use of a new apparatus to investigate a hitherto unobserved phenomenon. We can't calibrate the apparatus against other known phenomena, because such phenomena don't exist in these circumstances. Tuve attempted to use independent confirmation, the agreement between his results and those of Lawrence to support his result. This failed. Although Tuve attributes Lawrence's error to the desire for funding, I suggest another reason. These were difficult experiments using new technology and appara- tuses. It isn't easy to get correct experimental results, particularly in such circum- stances. In fact, it is difficult to get correct experimental results, period. The history of experimental physics is full of examples of discordant and incorrect results. Let us consider some cases from the same time period as the Tuve and Lawrence experi- ments, the 1920s and 1930s.
Consider the history of experiments on beta decay during the 1930s. (For details of this episodesee Franklin 1990, Chapter 1). In 1934 Fermi proposed a theory of beta decay. Although early experimental results gave qualitative support to his theory, more detailed examination of the results showed discrepancies, particularly in the number of electrons emitted at low energies. In 1935 Konopinski and Uhlenbeck pro- posed an alternative theory that seemed to fit the results better (Figure 1). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line. That is clearly the Konopinski-Uhlenbeck (K-U) modification. It was soon realized that energy loss by the electrons in the source was an important effect, one that could produce an incor- rect result. One needed to worry about the effect of source thickness. Further experi- ments were done with both thick and thin sources. As the sources were made thinner,
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1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
1 2 3 4 5 E+ I
Figure 1. "The (black) points marked 'K-U' modification should fall as they do on a straight line. If the Fermi theory is followed the (white) points should follow
a straight line as they clearly do not (Kurie et al. 1936)."
reduing energy loss in the source, the Fermi theory fit the results better than did the K-U theory (Figures 2, 3). Energy loss in the source had produced both incorrect re- sults and an incorrect theory choice. When the experimental error was corrected the decision was reversed. As Konopinski himself remarked, "Thus, the evidence of the spectra, which had previously comprised the sole support for the K-U theory, now definitely fails to support it (Konopinski 1943, 218)."
COPPER64 POSITRONS FE F:RMI AND KU :PLOTS
I THIN SOURCE 2 THICK SOURCE - 2
KU2
4- \(NS ) 1/2
(N)'12 2- F>\c~F,-(I' J- 2 - I
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 MeV
Figure 2. Fermi and K-U plots of positrons from thick and thin Cu64 sources. From Tyler (1939). As the source is made thinner the Fermi theory fits the
data better than does the K-U modification.
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This content downloaded from 185.44.78.113 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 09:34:35 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456 456
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
0.2- - 0.4
N )1/2 _ ( N)1/4
0 I I I F IKU o.I -- -- 0.2
.72 -
i I f i I Figure 3. Fermi and K-U plots for electrons from a thin source of phosphorus.
From Lawson (1939). The better theory is that which gives the better fit to a straight line, which is clearly the Fermi theory.
In another episode from the 1920s, Duane could not reproduce Compton's experi- mental results on the scattering of x-rays and ?-rays from electrons. (For details see Stuewer 1975). Duane did not observe the shift in the energy peak of scattered radia- tion that Compton had found. It was only after several years of further experiments, and even public debates between Duane and Compton, that it was realized that Duane's source was not strong enough and that his detector had insufficient resolution to see the effect. When the apparatus was improved, agreement was obtained. Other historical examples are easy to find.
One does not need to invoke the desire for future funding as an explanation of in- correct experimental results. Sometimes, particularly in the early stages of an experi- mental investigation, it is difficult to get correct results. Dennis is correct to note the importance of funding for large modern experiments involving complex apparatus and technology. I believe he is incorrect when he attributes incorrect results to a lack of care resulting from the desire for new and interesting results that would enhance the chances of such funding.
Note
1People often forget what the astronaut said at the time. It was, "I'll be damned." He was not expressing disbelief at the result, but rather illustrating the point that it is difficult to get experiments to work. When the experiment had been tried in a vacuum chamber on earth it hadn't worked. Electrical charging of the feather hindered its re- lease so that the expected equality of fall did not occur. To solve the problem the feather was coated with metallic paint, which would prevent a charge buildup. Unfortunately there hadn't been sufficient time to try the experiment with the new feather before the moon voyage. Hence the astronaut's surprise.
References
Bogen, J. and Woodward, J. (1988), "Saving the Phenomena," The Philosophical Review 97: 303-352,
Bowen, D.R. et al. (1967), "Measurement of the K+e2 Branching Ratio," Physical Review 154: 1314-1322.
This content downloaded from 185.44.78.113 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 09:34:35 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
457
Franklin, A. (1990), Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Konopinski, E. (1943), "Beta Decay," Reviews of Modern Physics, 15: 209-245.
Stuewer, R. (1975), The Compton Effect, New York: Science History Publications.
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