Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Volume 8, Issue 1 March 2017

Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the March 2017 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) “Sampler” – Civil Affairs in Stability Operations. The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lesson Report, and (4) links to additional references, reports, and articles that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges. This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Civil Affairs (CA) available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic - Observation - Discussion - Recommendation - Implications (optional) - Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective. You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments. If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account

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in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report. We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor. At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [ http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ https://sollims.pksoi.org ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

Disclaimer: All content in this document to include any publications provided through digital attachment is considered unclassified, for open access. This compendium contains no restriction on sharing / distribution within the public domain. Existing research and publishing norms and formats should be used when citing “Sampler” content and any publications provided.

Les Anglais, Haiti (13 October 2016) “U.S. Marine Staff Sgt. Matthew Drumsta, the civil affairs team leader with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force - Southern Command, deployed in support of Joint Task Force Matthew, coordinates with law enforcement and Hattian government representatives to receive relief commodities at Les Anglais, Haiti, Oct. 13, 2016. After six days of supply drop operations, JTF Matthew has delivered over 349,000 pounds of supplies […]. The task force, a U.S. Southern Command-directed team, is comprised of Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen deployed to Port-au-Prince at the request of the government of Haiti to support the U.S. Agency for International Development's disaster relief operations in Haiti during the critical early stages after the island country was struck by Hurricane Matthew.” (Photo Credit: Cpl. Kimberly Aguirre, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South)

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Civil Affairs in Stability Operations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD Pg. 1

“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons) 4 Lesson Report 5

1. Introduction 5

2. Lessons 6 A. Consolidating Gains (A Historical Perspective)

COL(R) Dennis J. Cahill 6

B. Making Civil Affairs (CA) an Integral Part of the Army Team COL Jay Liddick 10

C. Army Reserve Engagement Cell Civil Affairs Exercise Planner LTC Adam Martin 12

D. Ensuring Multi-National Military Coordination Center Forces are Ready for Next HA/DR Event – Lesson from the 2016 RIMPAC Exercise COL Blaise Zandoli, LTC Scott Moore, & 1LT Ryan Garcia

14

E. Interagency Partnership Center in Mogadishu, Somalia CPT Aleksandr Restrepo 16

F. Civilian Dislocation Related to Iraqi Security Forces Operations in Mosul (Oct 2016 – Feb 2017) LCDR James LeFevre

18

3. Conclusion 24

4. Command POC 24

Annex A. Additional Civil Affairs Lessons in SOLLIMS 25

Annex B. CA-Related RESOURCES & REFERENCES 26

Annex C. Organizational History & Structure of U.S. Army CA 27

Annex D. Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers 28

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“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons)

Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.

A. Civil Affairs forces provide a human-focused capability in stability operations that enable commanders at echelon to gain knowledge of the operational environment, be sensitive to changes in stability over time, and quickly execute operational branches and sequels to consolidate gains…[Read More ...]

B. Challenges of Civil Affairs (CA) include the newness of the capability and

the balance of its structure… [Read More ...]

C. An Army Reserve Engagement Cell (AREC) Civil Affairs (CA) planner must get involved as early as possible in the exercise planning process… [Read More ...]

D. Through its role in the Multi-National Military Coordination Center

(MNMCC) during the 2016 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, participating CA leadership recognized the importance of MNMCC personnel receiving humanitarian courses by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)… [Read More ...]

E. Establishment of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) /

Interagency Partnership Center (IPC) was a key Civil Affairs activity in Mogadishu, Somalia… [Read More ...]

F. Cooperation between military forces and humanitarian organizations can

mitigate dislocation and reduce the probability of humanitarian emergencies occurring during offensive operations. This lesson summarizes the civilian dislocation aspect of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) ongoing Mosul operations… [Read More ...]

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U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute U.S. Army War College

22 Ashburn Drive, Upton Hall Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

31 March 2017

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs (CA)

1. Introduction

Welcome to the March 2017 edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler – “Civil Affairs in Stability Operations.” According to Joint doctrine on Stability (JP 3-07), “Stability is needed when a state is under stress and cannot cope. In general, stabilization is usually the responsibility of the host nation (HN), Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development with support by the Department of Defense (DOD) conducting stability actions as necessary. Stability operations during a joint operation typically require the expertise of civil affairs in civil-military operations.” During civil-military operations, Civil Affairs (CA) units work with local populations, interagency partners, and international organizations. The various population-oriented tasks performed by CA personnel include foreign humanitarian assistance, support to civil administration, and civil information management. These tasks may fall within the sectors of stability outlined in the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) & U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)’s Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, such as governance and social well-being. CA personnel assess impacts of military operations on the population as well as impacts of the population on military operations, providing civil considerations for operations. While there are many points of view on CA – from other military branches, the interagency, and international partners – this Sampler is devoted specifically to understanding lessons from a CA perspective, featuring submissions from CA personnel. This Sampler first examines historical cases of CA before showcasing organizational challenges for the current integration of civil considerations into military culture. This publication then highlights lessons from recent/ongoing exercises and operations, many of which draw upon personal experiences of CA personnel working with interagency and international partners in the context of disaster relief, medical partnership, and displacement. Links to additional CA lessons can be found on page 25 along with a list of CA-related resources on page 26. Themes and recommendations are summarized following the lessons on page 24. Annex C provides a brief overview of the organizational history and structure of U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

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2. LESSONS

A. TOPIC. Consolidating Gains (A Historical Perspective) (2557)

Observation.

Civil Affairs forces provide a human geography-focused capability in stability operations that enable commanders at echelon to gain intimate knowledge of the operational environment, be sensitive to changes in stability over time, and quickly execute operational branches and sequels to consolidate gains.

Discussion.

DoDI 3000.05, Stability Operations, 2009, defines stability operations as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”

When U.S. forces prepared for Operation Torch in November 1942, little preparation was made for the consolidation of gains in North Africa upon achieving success against Nazi forces. Within three weeks of landing in Tunisia, LTG Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to GEN George C. Marshall, “There is an acute need for such a body [of civilian experts] because the success of future operations from this base will depend very largely upon the speed with which the economy of this country is rehabilitated, at least to the point of sustaining a majority of the population above the starvation level.” Four days later, he wrote GEN Marshal again: “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.” (United States Army in World War II Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, published by the Department of the Army's Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964.)

By the time U.S. forces landed in Normandy in June1944, the Army had built an extensive civil affairs capability that could provide commanders with a clear understanding of the noncombatant situation in the operational environment and organize local resources to address local issues so as to relieve commanders from using military resources to meet statutory and operational obligations to noncombatants.

In one example, a civil affairs detachment prepared exclusively for the eventual occupation of Munich, Germany. From the time it formed in England a year before entering Munich, the 52-man Military Government Detachment F-213 spent many days “poring over maps and air photos, consulting reference works,

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and studying the directives of Supreme Headquarters” and “knew Munich better than we did our own home towns.” (CASE STUDIES ON FIELD OPERATIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNITS, Training Packet No. 7, The Provost Marshal General’s School, 1 April 1950.) It continued to track changing conditions in Munich and was prepared to execute its mission regardless of which maneuver headquarters was assigned the mission to liberate Bavaria. By doing so, F-213 gave LTG Patton, whose 3rd Army was eventually given this mission, the ability to quickly establish military government within hours of the surrender of the city on 30 April 1945.

Immediately upon entering the city, members of F-213 “went out to see how nearly the situation in Munich corresponded with the estimate made in the operational plan. They visited the gas plant, the water works, the sewage plant, the electric power plant, and made estimates of the labor and materials needed to restore them to operation. They interviewed Cardinal Faulhaber and a representative of the Lutheran Bishop of Bavaria. They questioned educators and welfare workers.” Within 48 hours of their arrival, “(f)ood, fuel and clothing stocks were surveyed and placed under guard. Banks were closed and the directors told to report back later. Radio and newspaper facilities were seized, while a series of broadcasts from sound trucks was instituted to disseminate reports of world events to the news-starved people.” (The Provost Marshal General’s School.)

Forty-five years after the end of World War II, U.S. forces found themselves preparing for another operation to remove invading forces from a sovereign nation – Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait. While now a permanent part of Army structure, 96% of the civil affairs force was assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve and was not initially considered in U.S. Central Command plans for “restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government in place of a puppet regime,” as directed by President George H. W. Bush in National Security Directive 45 on 20 August 1990. U.S. government departments and agencies following the events in Kuwait became concerned about the potential post-conflict issues they would eventually face there and it soon became clear that “the scope of post-combat missions relating to the care of displaced civilians, restoration of order, and a return to normalcy—not only in Kuwait, but possibly in Saudi Arabia and Iraq—was likely to overwhelm the small, active duty Civil Affairs force assigned to the region.” (CASE STUDY NO. 4, COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES, The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination, Dennis Barlow, 2010.)

In October 1990, in response to a request to President George H. W. Bush from the Kuwaiti Government-in-Exile, the U.S. government agreed to provide restoration planning, advice, and post-conflict assistance to the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program. On 1 December 1990, fifty-seven specially selected Soldiers of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command and the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade – U.S. Army Reserve units that were mission-focused on the Central

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Command area of operations – were activated as a civil affairs task force in Washington, D.C. Known as the Kuwait Task Force, these Soldiers represented twenty civil affairs functional specialties and, in coordination with twenty-seven different U.S. government agencies, led the U.S. government’s support of the Government of Kuwait to develop long-term and high-policy issues relating to the restoration of the society of Kuwait. The Kuwait Task Force subsequently deployed to Saudi Arabia in January 1991; was assigned, along with other civil affairs units, to Task Force Freedom, a composite service-support unit commanded by the deputy commanding general of Army Central (3rd Army); and entered Kuwait City on 1 March 1991, 48 hours after the end of the short ground war.

Within one month of the end of the fighting, and as a direct result of the planning and execution efforts of the Kuwait Task Force, “50 percent of the telecommunications and transportation systems in Kuwait was restored, and 30 percent of the devastated electrical grid was repaired. More important was the fact that not one Kuwaiti died from thirst, starvation, or lack of medical attention after the liberation. Civil rights were immediately restored and, astonishingly, there were virtually no acts of retribution or vigilantism directed against suspected collaborators. The sheer volume of supplies coordinated by the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force in the first days was staggering: 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel, 1,250 tons of medicine, 12.9 million liters of water, 12,500 metric tons of food, 250 electric generators, and 750 vehicles.” (Barlow)

MG David Petraeus was not so fortunate when the 101st Airborne Division was unexpectedly given the mission to control the city of Mosul and the Nineveh Province in Iraq in April 2003. The Division had no maps of the city, no knowledge of how the city was organized or run under Saddam Hussein, and no plan to bring the city into post-war stabilization. When the Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team arrived in Mosul – the 3rd largest city in Iraq at the time – on 20 April 2003, “(t)he city of 1.7 million was a shambles – as much from looting as from war. The streets were in chaos, with police and other security forces nowhere to be seen. The city had no electricity, running water or garbage removal. Shops were closed. Most public buildings and factories lay in ruins. There was no administrative or economic infrastructure; the Baghdad based ministries which, under Saddam had controlled all economic activity, were not functioning. Those who had led the old Iraq had disappeared: political leaders, judges, university faculty, teachers, factory managers, ministry directors. Many of them were suspect, as members of the reviled former ruling Baath Party.” (Case study, The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq, Abridged, Kirsten Lundberg/Peter Zimmerman, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006.)

The U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs battalion attached to the 101st Airborne Division, likewise, was unprepared to operate in Mosul. Portions of the battalion maneuvered with the Division during combat operations and the remainder of the

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battalion consolidated with the Division in Mosul. Although as unfamiliar with the area as its supported unit, the civil affairs battalion quickly focused on post-combat operations and assisted the division commander, staff, and brigade combat teams as they set about the tasks to establish civil security, assess conditions, organize local industry, and reconstitute local governance in the city and throughout the province.

Recommendation.

1. Prepare for the early and continuous consolidation of gains when planning combat operations.

2. Identify the civil considerations (e.g., major populated areas; internally displaced persons operations; food, water, transportation, medical, government, and industrial capabilities; etc.) in the operational environment that that may pose challenges or be useful to U.S. Forces.

3. Designate civil affairs forces to focus exclusively on those civil considerations in specified geographic areas and to:

a. Conduct civil intelligence preparation of the battlefield before entering the area of operations.

b. Monitor changing conditions in these areas during military or crisis operations.

c. Develop and execute coordinated plans to consolidate gains and return areas to "normalcy" as soon as possible.

Implications.

If these recommendations are not implemented, maneuver commanders will struggle to gain and/or maintain situational understanding during critical periods of transition in unified land operations. They risk losing momentum and will likely miss opportunities to trigger operational branches and sequels designed to consolidate gains and facilitate future operations.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on readings, observations, and comparisons of stabilization activities in World War II, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lesson Author: COL(R) Dennis J. Cahill, Deputy Director, CA Force Modernization, USAJFKSWCS/SOCoE

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B. TOPIC. Making Civil Affairs an Integral Part of the Army Team (2556)

Observation.

Challenges of Civil Affairs (CA) include the newness of the capability and the balance of its structure.

Discussion.

In terms of Army history, CA is a new capability (i.e., approximately 165 years behind Infantry, Field Artillery, and Engineer Branches). The concept of Civil Affairs is outside of direct combatant to combatant interface. This makes the Civil Affairs capability an item outside of the normal considerations or concerns of combat arms commanders, and, thus outside the Army’s cultural norms (i.e., how we do things). The historical active to reserve component balance of CA (for decades hovering at 3 to 97%, respectively) further facilitates the lack of understanding of the capability, as it limits the Army’s daily interaction with and use of the capability.

My personal experience as a Civil Affairs officer, on five deployments and countless interactions with combat arms commanders, is that combat arms commanders have an initial skepticism of the value of Civil Affairs based on either a lack of knowledge about or previous bad experiences with the capability. However, my experience has also been that those same combat arms commanders can and will come to value the capability through regular, routine interaction with competent Civil Affairs personnel, when they are constantly present/involved members of the commander’s team.

The Army’s current doctrine presents both a challenge and opportunity for the Civil Affairs Branch. The Army’s current operational concept/doctrine (ADP/ADRP 3-0 published in NOV 16) is predicated on decisive action consisting of offensive, defensive, and stability operations being conducted simultaneously, unified action with partners, and consolidation of gains to achieve sustainable desired outcomes. Current Army culture will make implementation of this operational concept a challenge. Civil Affairs can and should be a central figure in helping the Army to be successful in implementing this operational approach by facilitating stability operations, identifying and collaborating with non-military partners, and leading the consolidation of gains effort for commanders.

Recommendation.

The Civil Affairs Branch must continue to fight to attain a healthy balance of active to reserve component structure. The size of the active CA component must be large enough to ensure daily representation in and support to all active component Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Divisions, and Corps (e.g., 30 to 70%, active to reserve ratio).

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Implications.

Failure to attain an active force size for CA that enables constant interaction with combat arms commanders/staffs and continual demonstration of the relevance of Civil Affairs perpetuates the capability remaining outside the threshold of combat arms commanders/staffs’ concern and culture. Such failure hinders the entire CA Branch.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on personal experience and observation accumulated over 12 years as a Civil Affairs Officer.

Additional Comments.

Doctrine referenced in this lesson are linked below:

ADRP 3-0 "Operations" (NOV 2016)

ADP 3-0 "Operations" (NOV 2016)

Lesson Author: COL Jay Liddick, CA, U.S. Army War College Student

________________________________________________________________

Combined Resolve VII Hohenfels, Germany (4 September 2016) Captain Greg Romero, a team chief with the 432nd Civil Affairs Battalion, discusses political reports with the mayor of Ubungsdorf, Henriette Feldman, during Exercise Combined Resolve VII. This exercise is a 7th Army Training Command, U.S. Army Europe-directed exercise, conducted at the Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels Training Areas, 8 August to 15 September 2016. It includes more than 3,500 participants from 16 NATO and European partner nations. (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Hector Corea, 302nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment / U.S. Army photo)

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C. TOPIC. Army Reserve Engagement Cell Civil Affairs Exercise Planner (2571)

Observation.

An Army Reserve Engagement Cell (AREC) Civil Affairs (CA) planner must get involved as early as possible in the exercise planning process.

Discussion.

Establishing Civil Affairs (CA) support to exercises is a challenge. Overcoming preconceived notions of what CA does and convincing the lead exercise planners of the value of CA in an exercise is the first step in establishing effective support.

After establishing a positive value to CA support, getting the administrative work complete to build and validate a requirement is also a challenge. Finding, formatting and typing the requirements so the lead planners can cut and paste into the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) and the Army Training Information Management System (ARTIMS) databases is the easiest way to ensure the submission of proper information.

Following the establishment of the requirement, participation in the Initial Planning Conference and Mid Planning Conference is important to establish proper utilization of the CA forces during the exercise. Without the CA planner, CA focused injects into the exercise will be unlikely to produce the desired response in the training audience.

United Accord 2017, a U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) exercise in Ghana, has a process to ensure training requirements and other Combatant Command (COCOM) objectives are met. This process involves an annual planning meeting at the COCOM to identify initial requirements and input them into the JTIMS data base. Involvement in this process is essential to ensure CA interests are properly articulated to the lead exercise planners. The lead planners for each exercise usually do not have much experience with Civil Affairs, so they appreciate assistance writing up the proper description of capabilities needed for the exercise.

Finally, another helpful tool is to create a power point packet for the participating Army Reserve Soldiers to give them enough information to be successful when they execute.

Recommendation.

1. Prepare the JTIMS and ARTIMS data to describe exactly what is needed for US Forces Command (FORSCOM) to source Army Reserve Civil Affairs units to

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support the mission/exercise. Emphasis must be placed on the readiness value to the unit.

2. Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) should include the participation of a CA planner during exercise planning conferences.

3. Provide an exercise packet to the Army Reserve unit tasked to participate in an exercise well in advance, to facilitate its preparedness for, and value to, the exercise.

Implications.

If the JTIMS and ARTIMS lines aren’t properly submitted, the Army Reserve will not source the exercise. If the CA planner doesn’t attend the planning conferences, the training value for the CA Soldiers will be much lower.

If a packet isn’t sent to the Army Reserve unit, it won’t be well prepared for the exercise and won’t provide the value expected by the lead exercise planners. This could lead to the planners not including CA in future iterations of the exercise.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on personal experience performing duties as an exercise planner for United Accord 2017.

Lesson Author: LTC Adam Martin, AREC/G9, US Army Africa

________________________________________________________________

Vicenza, Italy (28 September 2015) Maj. Gen. Tracy A. Thompson (center), commander for 412th Theater Engineer Command, discusses the current state of the Army Reserve Engagement Cell program and AREC teams assigned to U.S. Army Africa. (Photo Credit: Pfc. Craig Philbrick, U.S. Army Africa / (U.S. Army Africa photo by Sgt. Lance Pounds)

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D. TOPIC. Ensuring MNMCC Forces are Ready for Next HA/DR Event – Lesson from the 2016 RIMPAC Exercise (2569)

Observation.

Through its role in the Multi-National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) during the 2016 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, participating Civil Affairs leadership recognized the importance of MNMCC personnel receiving the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Supporting Humanitarian Action in Responding to Emergencies and Disasters (SHARED) course.

Discussion.

The 2016 RIMPAC Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) scenario was an earthquake in Southeast Griffon (notional friendly nation located at Oahu, Hawaii) resulting in massive casualties and extensive infrastructure damage at a scope far beyond Griffon's government’s capability to respond. Griffon declared a national emergency, requesting United Nations (UN) support. A Japanese Navy led Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) was stood up with support from eight countries: the US, Canada, Australia, Brunei, Chili, Colombia, Korea and the Philippines.

In order for the CJTF to support the Government of Griffin, an MNMCC was established to receive and process Requests For Assistance (RFA) that originate from the Humanitarian Military Operations Center (HuMOCC). UNOCHA facilitates the HuMOCC's operations managing the "trading floor," where the host nation government requests humanitarian assistance, and then coordinates responses and requests resources from the international community. Within the HuMOCC, USAID is the US agency that leads and coordinates the US Government's HA/DR response and support to the host nation.

Operating as a liaison between the CJTF, HuMOCC, and the affected nation, the MNMCC is staffed by US Army Civil Affairs personnel and partner nation military personnel who receive and action RFAs for the CJTF. However, multinational force members’ unfamiliarity with the humanitarian community’s processes, especially as they relate to non-complex HA/DR missions, can lead to misunderstandings and less efficient working relationships between the multinational force and the humanitarian community. Additionally, a lack of familiarization with coalition members' staff procedures can lead to a degree of separation between national militaries intended to work as a combined team. Thus, it is imperative that the MNMCC personnel understand the roles, responsibilities, functions, processes, and procedures of participating U.S. agencies, partners, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations to support the CJTF Commander's HA/DR effort.

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Recommendation.

Key Civil Affairs personnel should be required to attend the USAID JHOC and UNOCHA SHARED courses in order to be prepared for future real world HA/DR events.

Implications.

If this recommendation is not followed, personnel will require "on the job" training, and during a real disaster this will delay the responsiveness and effectiveness of military support to the humanitarian community and the host nation.

Event Description.

This lesson was submitted by 1LT Ryan Garcia covering insights provided by COL Blaise Zandoli and LTC Scott Moore, 351 CACOM, in regard to the 2016 RIMPAC exercise.

Lesson Authors: COL Blaise Zandoli (Chief), LTC Scott Moore & 1LT Ryan Garcia – 351 Civil Affairs Command, Functional Specialty Team ________________________________________________________________

RIMPAC 2016 / Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI, United States (12 July 2016) “U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 445th Civil Affairs Battalion set up a field hospital for Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2016. Twenty-six nations, more than 40 ships and submarines, more than 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel are participating in RIMPAC from June 30 to Aug. 4, in and around the Hawaiian Islands and Southern California. The world's largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity that helps participants foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans.” (Photo Credit: Still from Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Antonio Turretto Ramos, Commander, U.S. 3rd Fleet)

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E. TOPIC. Interagency Partnership Center in Mogadishu, Somalia (2565)

Observation.

Establishment of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) / Interagency Partnership Center (IPC) was a key Civil Affairs activity in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Discussion.

The 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion established the initial Interagency Partnership Center in Mogadishu, Somalia in July 2016. The goal of the IPC was to establish clarity for the Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), of all civil military activities in Somalia.

One of CJTF-HOA’s main partnerships was with the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided programs such as Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS+) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) that helped promote stability and community cohesion through infrastructure development and social and cultural activities.

Another major partner was the Early Recovery Group and Stabilization Advisors, who were members of the United Kingdom Mission Support Team (UKMST). The UK stabilization officers had a direct role to support the Federal Government of Somalia. Partnering with these UK officers allowed US Civil affairs officers to build and expand civil military relationships.

Special Operations Command Forward (SOCFWD) Civil Affairs (Active Duty) personnel provided access to areas/communities and facilitated project development and “train the trainer” events. For example, the Mogadishu Medical Seminar provided/shared best practices from US Army doctors/radiologists for 15 Somali doctors in a weeklong training event.

Likewise, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) training in Mogadishu allowed for weeklong discussion groups and sharing Civil Affairs expertise with Troop Contributing Countries in Somalia.

The IPC collaborated all these efforts with JTF-HOA’s Military Coordination Cell (MCC), which had a plethora of responsibilities. Fortunately, the MCC Chief was able to help facilitate balance and synchronization among the various agencies and foreign militaries (UK, European Union Training Mission, UN, USAID, State Department, and the CJTF-HOA chain of command).

One major factor that stood out the most was the ability of Civil Affairs and the IPC to build key relationships. Civil Affairs personnel don’t have all the answers, and a variety of projects/programs move at different speeds. Coordination was

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probably the most significant part of relationship-building and bringing everyone together to achieve results, even those that seemed insignificant.

Recommendation.

My recommendations are limited because of the ever-changing dynamics of leadership and priorities of effort. However, I recommend that civil-military relationships/partnerships continue to be developed in Somalia. Allow seasoned Civil Affairs officers with strong interpersonal skills to develop and strengthen these relationships.

Implications.

If this recommendation is not followed, then there will be loss of momentum in efforts to build key relationships with Somali officials, community leaders, and AMISOM forces.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on personal experience from July to October 2016 at CJTF-HOA.

Lesson Author: CPT Aleksandr Restrepo, Future Plans Officer, S6, 403rd CA Battalion

________________________________________________________________

Mogadishu, Somalia (6 September 2016) U.S. Army Maj. Andrew Mosier, 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion physician, center, shares medical practices with African Union Mission in Somalia medics during a mass casualty exercise, in Mogadishu, Somalia, Sept. 6, 2016. During the exercise, AMISOM and Somali medics worked as teams to treat life-threatening injuries such as severe blood loss and bullet wounds. (Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Benjamin Roughton, Combined Task Force – Horn of Africa)

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F. TOPIC. Civilian Dislocation Related to Iraqi Security Force Operations in Mosul, Oct 2016 – Feb 2017 (2568)

Observation.

Cooperation between military forces and humanitarian organizations can mitigate dislocation and reduce the probability of humanitarian emergencies occurring during offensive operations.

Discussion.

This lesson summarizes the civilian dislocation aspect of the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) ongoing Mosul operations. The lesson is limited to information currently available from open source reporting. A large volume of Mosul-related documents are available online (with hundreds of international organization (IO) and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports posted on ReliefWeb alone). Only a fraction of these available resources were reviewed in writing this lesson.

On 17 Oct 2016 the Iraqi government announced that operations to liberate Mosul from Islamic State (ISIS) occupation had begun.1 The population of Mosul prior to the 2014 ISIS takeover was 2.5 million.2 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated the population as of October 2016 at between 1.2 and 1.5 million,3,4 whereas STRATFOR (a geopolitical analysis firm) gave an estimate of 750,000.5

When the Mosul campaign began, OCHA described the worst case scenario as 1 million dislocated civilians (DCs), which would require the “largest and most complex” humanitarian operation undertaken anywhere in 2016.6 The rate of DC flow was also a concern. One NGO employee recalled: “When fighting broke out in Mosul in 2014, we had 100,000 people show up in one night at checkpoints.”7

The government of Iraq’s intent to retake Mosul in late 2016 was public knowledge months in advance.8 This enabled OCHA and partners to begin planning for humanitarian effects of offensive operations in Feb 2016.6,9 As a result, when operations began, DC camps were already in place with a combined capacity of 60,000 people, with planning or construction in progress for additional camps with a capacity of 250,000.6 Public knowledge of the impending offensive also presumably contributed to over 100,000 civilians leaving Mosul in the period between March 2016 and the start of operations.10

The ISF concept of operations regarding DC movement routes, means of transportation, security, and screening is difficult to discern from open source information. One DC reported that Kurdish Peshmerga escorted his family to a DC camp north of Mosul.11 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that the government of Iraq’s Ministry of Migration and Displacement

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(MoMD) was supporting DC movement and security. Some DCs quoted by IOM stated that once the DCs reached ISF troops, they were provided transportation to DC camps.12,13 Press reports have described DCs being transported to camps by ISF in trucks and busses.14,15 Some DCs reported traveling on foot for distances ranging from 5 km to 24 km.13,16

Security screening of DCs leaving Mosul appears to be standard. Screening sites are apparently located at intermediate locations en route to DC camps.17

IOs are providing support to screening sites, to include onward transportation to camps in some cases.18,19 The length of stay at a screening site varies. One DC family reported spending 5 hours at a screening site.20 Those who are detained for higher level screening stay at the screening site for 3 to 5 days. UN monitors criticized some ISF screening sites for having insufficient food, water, and clothing available.21

Some NGOs criticized ISF for not publicizing safe escape routes for DCs in advance of operations in Mosul. It appears that ISF has been designating DC routes, but this is being done on an ad hoc basis, with routes being identified based on current security conditions.22,23,24

IOs have made positive statements about ISF treatment of civilians. OCHA referred to what it calls the ISF’s “humanitarian concept of operations” which puts "civilian protection at the center of their battle plan."25 According to one UN official, elements of the ISF plan for protecting DCs include a prohibition on artillery strikes, a "stay put" policy, and provision of “humanitarian exit corridors.”26 Another UN official stated that the ISF’s humanitarian concept of operations "prioritises the protection of civilians in an unprecedented manner in both the planning and the conduct of the military operations, based on the lessons learned from mistakes of the previous liberation operations."21 OCHA attributed low humanitarian impact in the early stages of western Mosul operations to “continued adherence to the humanitarian concept of operations by the [ISF].”27

The primary DC camps intended to receive the first wave of DCs were set up at Qayyarah Jad'ah, Qayyarah airstrip and Haj Ali, about 50 miles south of Mosul.28 A second tier of DC camps was established about 30 miles east of Mosul.29 The MoMD appears to be leading a joint effort with IOs in development of DC plans, including camp site selection.30,31

Some of the DC camps are referred to by IOM as ‘emergency sites’ as opposed to camps. Emergency sites are different from camps in that they begin accepting DC occupants with only minimal support services in place, although services can be upgraded incrementally. The intent is to minimize construction time so the site can start accepting DCs as soon as possible. For simplicity this lesson groups emergency sites under the generic term ‘camps.’30

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From site selection to accepting its first DCs, it took approximately 2 months for IOs to construct a 3,000 tent camp at Al-Qayara.32,33 The need for mine clearance may have been a limiting factor in starting construction of some DC camps.30,34 ISF were involved in camp site verification, possibly to assist with mine clearance.30

As of 14 Nov 2016 more DCs had arrived at the eastern camps than at the southern camps, mainly having left the city through the eastern suburb of Gogachly. This seems to run counter to the IOs’ intent that the sites to the south would be the first line option for DCs. DC flow to the east probably occurred because the first urban areas of Mosul to be retaken were at the eastern edge of the city,35 creating a relatively safe exit route for DCs. It is not clear whether MoMD and IOs had advance information on the ISF scheme of maneuver, which might have allowed them to anticipate early DC flows to the east.

Various IOs made plans for assisting DCs in their respective sectors. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) / Health Cluster coordinated the positioning of health services assets and medication supplies in the areas surrounding Mosul, taking into account projected DC flow. They estimated that out of 700,000 projected DCs, 200,000 would require emergency medical treatment.36 A map outlining these DC flow projections and health services assets is available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ irq_mosul_displacement_a3_110816.pdf.

As of Jul 2016 the government of Iraq was advising civilians to leave Mosul.37

However, ISF conducted a leaflet drop on 16 Oct 2016, just before the start of operations, providing new guidance. The leaflets asked civilians to stay indoors and put white flags on their houses to indicate non-combatant status.22,38

ISIS actions incentivized civilians to stay in place. ISIS emplaced obstacles and IEDs, dug trenches, and warned civilians against leaving the city.22,39 Some DCs reported that ISIS was not permitting men to leave, and that women and children were being charged $400 each to leave.40 ISIS in some cases shot people attempting to escape.26

While DC flows have negative consequences for military operations and stability, a "stay put" policy also has a downside. In the case of operations in urban terrain against an adversary willing to use human shields, greater civilian presence increases the difficulty of avoiding civilian casualties, which diminishes tempo of offensive operations.5,41-44 In late November, the ISF Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) asked the government of Iraq to reverse the "stay put" policy and "to encourage civilians to leave the area, which would allow the CTS to be more aggressive in anti-ISIS operations, including its use of airstrikes."41

IO/NGOs appear to be operating fairly close to active combat operations, which would tend to reduce pressure on ISF to transport or escort DCs to reach camps

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and other resources. One NGO reports running a health clinic 12 miles outside of Mosul.45 On 14 Nov, OCHA reported: “A 10-bed trauma centre is being established approximately 15km east of Gogachly to manage the civilian casualties coming out of the city. The centre is semi-mobile and can be moved further into the city as it opens up to humanitarian actors in order to minimize the distance people injured in the crossfire have to travel to reach medical care.”18

The prompt return of DCs to retaken areas is beneficial in terms of freeing up DC camp capacity and in promoting stability. As ISF forces advance and secure portions of Mosul, DCs may return to homes in retaken areas while combat operations are ongoing in other parts of the city. To this end, ISF forces in eastern Mosul are being tasked with “rebuilding infrastructure and accommodating the return of displaced residents.”5

Limiting factors for return of DCs include both security conditions and lack of food, water, health services, etc. Security conditions also affect IO and NGO activities, which in turn delays the provision of essential services. IOs and NGOs depend on ISF to establish security, to include clearing retaken areas of unexploded ordnance (UXO). OCHA cites civil-military coordination as a “critical enabler” for humanitarian response in areas close to combat operations. As of late November, OCHA had led more than 20 missions to “newly-retaken areas to assess security conditions and establish humanitarian access, often just days after the conflict has subsided. Access missions pave the way for partners to transport emergency assistance to retaken areas in the form of ready-to-eat food, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health care.”23

OCHA noted an improvement in humanitarian access when ISF consolidated control over eastern Mosul in early January 2017.46 The Iraqi federal police had reassigned 3 police brigades to eastern Mosul on 12 December.5 This decision probably contributed to the improvement in security conditions that OCHA reported in January. Indirect fire (IDF) from ISIS controlled areas had limited IO/NGOs' access to retaken areas. OCHA reported a reduction in IDF in mid-January, which also contributed to increased aid delivery in eastern Mosul.47

The need for food aid in retaken areas has been mitigated by the rapid re-establishment of commercial markets selling food.47 Meeting water requirements has proven more difficult for IOs and NGOs. Improved security in eastern Mosul allowed UNICEF to scale up water tanker operations to deliver over 250,000 gallons per day in mid-January, but this was still not sufficient to make up for damage to water mains and pumping stations.47 Assessment of water treatment plants has been delayed by security concerns.48 By mid-February water truck deliveries had increased to over 600,000 gallons per day.49 Also in mid-February, one water treatment plant came online and began serving 70,000 residents; however, service ceased shortly thereafter when its generator was hit by IDF. As of mid-January, WHO reported that security conditions in eastern Mosul were a limiting factor in provision of health services inside the city.50

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Respiratory infections, diarrhea, and leishmaniasis have been the primary diseases circulating in DC camps.50 However, trauma patients have stressed health services more than any infectious disease outbreak has. In December 2016, DC health services were overwhelmed with trauma patients due to gunshot, improvised explosive device, and IDF wounds.51 Challenges in treating trauma patients included lack of trauma stabilization points near front lines, transportation to hospitals, and hospital capacity in the area.52,53 To adapt to the high volume of trauma patients, IOs and NGOs added several trauma stabilization points and field hospitals, including one field hospital located only 8 miles outside of Mosul.53,54 An ISF field hospital set up within Mosul was also overwhelmed with civilian trauma patients in December.55 The ISF’s ability to refer or transfer civilian patients to civilian health facilities may have been limited since all facilities in the area were struggling with the same challenges.

As of 24 Jan 2017 (at which point the ISF had effectively recaptured eastern Mosul),56 IOM estimated that out of 730,000 residents of eastern Mosul, 180,000 (25%) had dislocated, whereas 550,000 (75%) stayed in place.25 Another UN source estimated that out of a total 1,075,000 civilians, 190,000 (18%) had been dislocated and 885,000 (82%) stayed in place, noting that dislocation to date was much less severe than the worst case estimates.21 As of 12 Feb, out of a cumulative 217,764 people dislocated at any time over the course of the Mosul campaign, 57,462 had already returned to their homes.57

Soon after Mosul operations began, IOM created a Mosul-specific Displacement Tracking Matrix web page. The page provides detailed DC information in the form of GIS maps, charts, and raw data. As of 27 Feb, IOM counts almost 164,000 currently dislocated civilians, with 81% of them living in camps (as opposed to staying at a private residence). The IOM displacement timeline shows no sudden spikes in DC flow to this point. The OCHA SITREPs on Mosul operations provide another useful source of DC information. Each SITREP includes a map identifying DC concentrations and primary routes of DC flow. Here is a posted archive of Mosul SITREPs.

ISF recently began operations to retake western Mosul. As in eastern Mosul, ISF advise civilians to stay in place during the offensive.15 The estimated population of western Mosul is 750,000,58 and the UN’s high-end estimate for western Mosul dislocation is 400,000 people.15 This means up to twice as many DCs could leave western Mosul as left eastern Mosul during operations there.

Western Mosul has been cut off from outside supplies of food and medicine for over 2 months.27 This could mean that civilians will be in a worse state of health when they encounter ISF troops or when they attempt to escape on foot. The latest OCHA SITREP lists vacant DC camp capacity at 60,000 people, with expansion efforts ongoing. The MoMD and OCHA plan to transport the initial DCs from western Mosul “to camps in the east while new capacity is being added in the south.”5

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The Institute for the Study of War described civilian considerations for western Mosul operations as follows: “Evacuating residents from western Mosul will be challenging, whether the ISF directs Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to cross first into eastern Mosul towards the camps east of the city, against the grain of current advances, or towards camps west of the Tigris River. Evacuating residents will place an added burden on the ISF to police the IDPs flows. The ISF could elect, then, to operate while residents remain in place, as they largely did in eastern Mosul though it slowed its advances, and import humanitarian aid rather than take responsibility for IDPs flows. Any option will complicate urban operations.”58

Recommendation.

1. Civil Affairs (CA) forces should give IOs as much advance notice as security considerations permit, when future operations are expected to cause civilian dislocation, in order to allow IOs to plan for DC relief operations.

2. CA forces should advise commanders regarding potential impacts to military operations of DC flows, as well as impacts of civilians staying in place.

3. After an urban area is captured, CA forces should advise commanders regarding the level of security that will enable IOs and NGOs to enter and operate effectively.

Implications.

If IOs, NGOs, and the host nation civilian government cannot support DCs, forces deployed for offensive operations may unexpectedly be tasked with humanitarian assistance, thereby diverting resources from the primary mission.

Overreliance on "stay put" policies in urban areas might lead to high numbers of civilian casualties and/or degraded operations tempo.

If IOs/NGOs are delayed in entering a retaken area due to insecurity, DCs may be slow to return to their homes, with negative effects on DC camp space and host nation stability.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on ISF operations to liberate the city of Mosul from ISIS control, beginning in Oct 2016. For a full list of references and footnotes referenced in the lesson, see the lesson in SOLLIMS here.

Lesson Author: LCDR James LeFevre, MSC, USNR Environmental Health Officer, 3d Civil Affairs Group

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3. CONCLUSION The lessons in this Sampler highlight key themes, including: Identifying and increasing awareness of civil considerations

If civil considerations are not taken into account during military operations, there can be damaging consequences – as shown when forces were not prepared to handle civic administration in Iraq amidst debaathification. CA officers in this publication proposed various ways to address this prioritization of civil considerations, from changing the ratio of Active to Reserve Component CA in the Army to including CA planners from the very beginning of exercise planning, as in United Accord 2017.

Building understanding/communication with various stakeholders

As demonstrated by the 2016 RIMPAC exercise, taking courses on other agencies/organizations’ approaches to humanitarian assistance could improve civil-military responsiveness and effectiveness in the event of a disaster. As shown in Mogadishu, Somalia, establishing an Interagency Partnership Center provided an opportunity for building understanding of organizations. Also, as evident from ongoing operations in Mosul, communication with international organizations (IOs) about operations allowed IOs to prepare to respond to large-scale displacement.

As noted above, lessons in this SOLLIMS Sampler feature varied keen observations from CA personnel. Yet, they also raise complex questions, since CA forces focus on civil considerations while still operating as uniformed military personnel in support of military missions. This distinction can lead to grey areas which may concern other stakeholders whose primary mission is humanitarian, focusing on the dignity and well-being of those in the host nation. Some non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan, for example, claimed that “the involvement of coalition military Civil Affairs teams in village improvement projects blurred the distinction between combatants and relief workers, endangering their personnel,” (United States Institute of Peace (USIP)’s Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations, p. 104). As such, it is important not only to listen and learn from experiences of CA personnel – through the thought-provoking lessons included in this publication (and additional CA lessons listed on page 25) – but also to study other perspectives on CA, through resources found in the SOLLIMS CA Community of Practice (CoP) and in the Resources & References Annex (Annex B). 4. PKSOI Points of Contact Publication prepared by: Ms. Katrina Gehman, Lessons Learned Analyst (Ctr) Cover design: Mr. Chris Browne, Publications Coordinator PKSOI reviewer: Mr. Dave Mosinski, Lessons Learned Senior Analyst Contact Info: Mr. Dan French, Lessons Learned Branch Chief (717) 245-3031 // usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.sollims@mail.mil - - - - - - - - - - Publication approved by: COL Greg Dewitt, Director - - - - - - - - - -

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Annex A. Additional Civil Affairs Lessons in SOLLIMS [Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

Importance of Comprehensive CA Training (Lesson #2561) COL Jay Liddick, CA, U.S. Army War College Student

Failure to properly prepare CA personnel prior to deployment could place them in dangerous situations and increase the likelihood that they will not be fully utilized.

Day Time People versus Night Time People (Lesson #2570) COL John E. Stefula, CA, USAR, CA Operations Officer, Army War College, PKSOI

The timing of day for military interactions with populations affected conversational themes for CA teams in Baghdad, Iraq, during the surge (2007-2008).

Keys to Aligning Stability & Kinetic Operations… (Lesson #2567) LTC Daniel J. Keenaghan, Commander 450 CA BN (A)

CA Teams and intergovernmental partners may not find support during kinetic operations. Tools from JP 5-0, however, could improve collective understanding.

Pre-Crisis Host Nation Coordination (Lesson #2558) COL(R) Dennis J. Cahill, Deputy Director, CA Force Modernization, USAJFKSWCS/SOCoE

This lesson, based on an exercise scenario development workshop, underlines the importance of integrating CA planning and building networks in advance of crises.

Stab Ops Information Cell & Civil Information Network (Lesson #2564) COL(R) Dennis J. Cahill, Deputy Director, CA Force Modernization, USAJFKSWCS/SOCoE

CA forces provided civil information networks during CJTF-82 operations in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan, 2009-2010.

Just a Reminder of a Lesson Learned in CA Qualification (Lesson #2559) CPT Major Johnson, CA (MI), 450 CA BN (A)

This lesson serves as a reminder to consider 2nd and 3rd order effects of engaging younger populations. It draws from experiences in East Timor, Iraq, and Guatemala.

Civil Affairs Often Overlooked (Lesson #2566) SGT Tomas K. Martinak, USACAPOC (A) - CIM Cell, EUCOM Desk NCO

CA lacks “authority” in the eyes of many. CA personnel are often overlooked when it comes to supporting commands, operating, and attempting to do their jobs properly.

Civil Information Management for USG’s Syria Response Team (Lesson #2563) Ms. Katrina Gehman, Lessons Learned Analyst (Ctr), PKSOI

CA Soldiers from the 92nd CA Battalion formed a Knowledge Management Team to support the USG Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START) in Turkey.

Civil Affairs and Partnering in Colombia (Lesson #2560) Mr. David Mosinski, Lessons Learned Senior Analyst, PKSOI

CA personnel, as part of larger U.S. SOF engagement in Columbia, addressed Colombian security, governance, and development capacity during 2011-2014.

CA Team Supports U.S. Military Response to Haiti’s 2010 Earthquake (Lesson #2562) Ms. Katrina Gehman, Lessons Learned Analyst (Ctr), PKSOI

CA strengthened the U.S. military’s response to Haiti’s 2010 earthquake by establishing a humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) and providing medical assistance.

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Annex B. Civil Affairs Related RESOURCES & REFERENCES [Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access some of these items.]

Organizations / Links • The Civil Affairs Association • U.S. Army Civil Affairs Regiment • U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)

(USACAPOC(A)) • NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE) • UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): Humanitarian Civil-

Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) • U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): Office of Civilian-Military

Cooperation (CMC) Reports / Studies

• “The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces,” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), (Kathleen H. Hicks & Christine E. Wormuth, February 2009).

• “Civil Affairs: A Force For Engagement and Conflict Prevention,” PKSOI Paper Vol 2: 2015-16 Civil Affairs Issue Papers, (Edited by C. Holshek & J. Church, Jr., March 2016).

• Civil Affairs – Department of Defense Directive No. 2000.13, (11 March 2014). Historical Reports

• American Military Government of Occupied Germany: 1918-1920, (Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany / “Hunt Report”).

• “Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs / Military Government, 1775 – 1991,” USASOC, (Stanley Sandler, 1993).

• “Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors” (Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964). • “U.S. Army Civil Affairs” History Handbook, (USASOC History, 2016).

United Nations Guidance:

• UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS): Civil Affairs Handbook // UN Peacekeeping – Civil Affairs

U.S. Military Doctrine

• Army Field Manual: Civil Affairs Operations – FM 3-57 • Joint Publication: Civil-Military Operations – JP 3-57 • Army Techniques Publications: Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance – ATP 3-57.20 • Army Techniques Publications: Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance – ATP 3-57.30

Additional Perspectives

• Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations, (United States Institute of Peace (USIP))

• Dignity: Its Essential Role in Resolving Conflicts, (D. Hicks, 2011). • Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum (Alliance for

Peacebuilding (AfP) / Kroc Institute / Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC))

Civil Affairs Community of Practice (CoP) in SOLLIMS For additional resources (documents, links, news, lessons), visit the Civil Affairs CoP!

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Annex C. Organizational History & Structure of U.S. Army CA U.S. Army Civil Affairs originated in the U.S. military in the aftermath of WWI. Between 1918 and 1923, the U.S. Army occupied the German Rhineland, performing civil administration tasks. Lessons from this involvement led to the creation of a formal CA capacity for “Military Government” (known as such until 1959). Over the years, CA has undergone several structural changes, as described in the “U.S. Army Civil Affairs: History Handbook.” After WWII, Civil Affairs units participated in major conflicts such as the Korean War, Vietnam War, and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the Vietnam War, incremental steps were taken for CA to become a central part of Army Special Operations. In the post-Vietnam drawdown, most active duty CA units were disbanded. The majority of CA units remained in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), except for the active duty 96th CA Battalion at Fort Bragg, NC. The 96th became subordinate to U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), and all reserve units were assigned to what became the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). By 1993, all active and reserve CA were formally designated Army Special Operations Forces. The past decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has further shaped CA. In 2006, CA became an official Regular Branch of the U.S. Army. USACAPOC was reassigned to support the General Purpose Forces via the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). Special Operations via USASOC, however, retained the 96th CA Battalion. Personnel from the 96th were used to form four additional active CA Battalions (91st, 92nd, 97th, and 98th) under the new 95th CA Brigade. An additional CA Brigade with five battalions, the 85th, was created in 2011, to support the conventional forces under the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). Today, there are three main sections of CA, each supporting a different aspect of the Army. (Some are active, and others are reserve; some support special operations, and others support the conventional forces.) The 95th CA Brigade is active duty and continues to support Special Operations. The 85th CA is also active duty and supports the General Purpose Forces; however, it is currently in the process of being reduced to one battalion. USACAPOC continues to host the majority of CA units as reserves, supporting the General Purpose Forces.

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Annex D. Previously Published SOLLIMS Samplers (Available in SOLLIMS Library)

2016

Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Strategic Communication / Messaging in Peace & Stability Operations Stabilization and Transition Investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations Building Stable Governance Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

2015

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Concepts, Principles and Applications Foreign Humanitarian Assistance [Foreign Disaster Relief] Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students Security Sector Reform

2014

Reconstruction and Development Women, Peace and Security Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students Overcoming “Challenges & Spoilers” with “Unity & Resolve” Improving Host Nation Security through Police Forces

2013

Key Enablers for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Lessons on Stability Operations from USAWC Students Multinational Operations Leadership in Stability Operations: Understanding / Engaging the People Protection of Civilians

2012

Medical Assistance / Health Services Reconciliation Civ-Mil Cooperation Building Capacity

2011

Ministerial Advising Fighting Corruption Economic Stabilization

2010

Transition to Local Governance Rule of Law and Legitimacy Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping

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