JOURNALVolume 35

Issue 1, SupplementSummer 2017

FINAL REPORT ON PROJECT BOYLE

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FINAL REPORT ON PROJECT BOYLE THE ROYAL CORPS OF SIGNALS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

SUMMARY The Royal Corps of Signals (the Corps) runs the nervous system of the Army and much of UK Joint Forces. The 21st Century presents challenges for the Corps, the Army and for wider Defence. The Corps will need to consider changes in how it organises, educates, trains and operates to continue to be effective in supporting the Army and UK Joint Forces. During 2016 Project Boyle addressed the challenge by running four workshops and a Seminar with the aim of providing guidance about the sort of change that might be needed. AIM OF THIS REPORT This report is intended to guide the Implementation Team for Project Boyle by summarising the output of the four workshops and the seminar to inform the Implementation Plan. It offers choices for the actions that might be worth considering. It contains:

a. A summary of what the 21st Century Operating Environment (21COE) might mean for the Corps, with more detail at Annex A.

b. A summary of the Challenge to the Corps posed by 21COE, calling for a change in the way that the Corps addresses the two basic demands that it faces.

c. A draft Vision Statement which summarises the key characteristics needed by the Corps to meet the challenge.

d. At Annex B, a description of the new Corps to meet the challenge, in the form of six themes. Action on each theme is proposed in the form of objectives. The objectives will require selection, prioritisation, deeper definition and implementation.

e. At Annexes C-G, summary reports from each 2016 Boyle event. These annexes aim to give the implementation team insights into the thrusts of the debates at each event and to provide more background into the reasons for some of the proposals. It is important that the Implementation Team read them carefully: there is important background reasoning by workshop delegates in each of the annexes and appendices.

21 COE The 21st Century operating environment is already more demanding than that for the 20th Century. Continued rapid changes both in technology and in society will intensify demands on professionals in Defence and Security, particularly those concerned with the provision of information services. Issues include the following:

Sophisticated C4ISR and weapons are widely available to troublesome actors

Continuous cyber threats are intensive and increasing

Ambiguous, hybrid warfare is now conducted by both state and non-state actors

Society and technology are both changing rapidly, bringing both opportunities and threats

The move to the “Internet of Things” is already affecting management of the battlespace

Hierarchical military structures are meeting difficulties in keeping up with all this

Our ability to handle this is exacerbated by a shortage of skilled people nationwide.

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At the fourth (Commanding Officers’) workshop, delegates were asked to assess a list of factors describing aspects of the 21st Century OE and answer the question: “Which of these factors (or other factors not on the list) will most affect the way that the Corps should shape up to the 21st Century?”. Their responses are relevant to the final report, and were: Changing Nature of the Combat Environment. A summary of a view by Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb:

From a past dominated by complicated problems and Force on Force Warfare, to

A present dominated by complex problems and Asymmetric Warfare to

A future dominated by incomprehensible problems and faceless enemies Agility. Some opponents have IT and C4ISR systems as good as ours, and some can use them more effectively and upgrade them more easily. We must therefore promote innovation in the Corps and the Army and accept the inconvenience of this. This means moving beyond the lip service given to innovation in the past. We must be prepared to take risks to do this and ensure that they are understood by the whole supply chain; the Corps culture is risk averse and does not always encourage it. This must change. Adaptability, supported by Education. We will constantly meet demands for which we are not trained. Good basic and continual through-life education supporting the culture of innovation and creativity is needed. Our better soldiers seek this already. Close relations between the Corps, Army, Joint Forces, CDIO, ISS and industry are needed to ensure:

Streamlined processes to meet the challenges of 21COE.

Co-operative approaches to operational, technical and financial risk in the supply chain

Adaptability to respond to rapidly changing challenges and opportunities More detail on the assessment of 21 COE is at Annex A. CHALLENGE TO THE CORPS The issues faced by the Corps are more profound than (and certainly not limited to) mastering information services and applying technology intelligently to military operations. The former Commander Joint Forces Command (COMJFC) 1 has assessed that rapid changes in technology and in society are intensifying demands on professionals in Defence and Security. Work on FOE35 (Future Operating Environment 2035) makes similar points2. Work on the US Third Offset strategy points the same way.3 These initiatives emphasise that 21st Century operations will be dominated by the information battle. It is arguable that the conventional view of military operations as the application of force supported by information has been supplanted by one in which the political war, the information war, the intelligence war and the kinetic, physical war are on a continuum, one now dominated by information. A 21st Century force must therefore be highly competent at handling all aspects of information as a battle-winning capability: not merely the machinery, networks, infrastructure and applications

1 JFC Note: Warfare in the Information Age (WITIA) dated 4 Dec 2014 2 Future Operating Environment 2035: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484861/20151203-DCDC_FOE_35.pdf 3 http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies

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needed for its delivery but the way in which all this can be used most effectively to optimise the effectiveness of the force. See the diagram below.

Mode 1 emphasises competence and reliability in acting as a military Information Services Provider (ISP). This is the minimum level of competence acceptable for the new Corps, a necessary but not sufficient level of competence to meet the demands of 21 COE. The implications for the Corps are significant. From being the provider of communications networks we must move to greatly increased competence at two further levels, shown in the diagram above as Mode 1 and Mode 2. Mode 2 emphasises Corps mastery not only of the technology and service provision but of the way in which it can be used to enhance operational effectiveness and agility. This demands deep understanding of how the Army and Joint Forces work, how their components fit together and how operational effectiveness can be enhanced by a visionary use of information and technology. In this, the Corps is the key resource for the Army CIO. It must demonstrate its ability to provide high grade CIO support at all levels of the Army. This demands more structured use and development of competences already shown by some key officers and NCOs.

DRAFT OUTLINE VISION STATEMENT The Corps will support an agile, forward thinking 21st Century Army by:

Supporting and advising commanders on the use of information as a weapon system

Providing comprehensive information services To achieve this, it will maintain:

A professional and inclusive culture which attracts and retains the most capable people

An ability to follow and anticipate technical and social trends in the information world

Close professional relationships with sister services, OGD, Academia and Professional institutions

Excellent internal communications to ensure productive debate within the Corps

An ability to direct, conduct and support cyber operations

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The meat of the report is at Annex B, which is structured into the following themes. They aim to support the vision and aid implementation planning: 1. Competences 2. Education, Training and Professional Development 3. Culture and Relationships 4. Marketing and Communications 5. External Changes which would assist Improvement 6. Making Change Happen More detail on each theme is at Annex B. Project Boyle ran the following events, each of which informs this report: 1. Scoping workshop 20 Oct 15 2. Workshop 1: 1* & consultants 21 Apr 16 3. Workshop 2: Generation Y 9 Jun 16 4. Workshop 3: 1* & industry 5 Jul 16 5. Workshop 4: Commanding Officers 6 Oct 16 6. RSI Seminar: Stocktake 1 Dec 16 7. Handover to Corps and Army 31 Dec 16 The key points arising from each of the five main events (the four workshops and the seminar) are summarized at Annexes C to G. Many of the points made are repeated in more than one workshop, possibly emphasizing their importance as seen by delegates. It is important for any implementation manager to read and understand these annexes: they provide useful insights into the mood of the Corps and of some experienced and committed people who know us, see our potential and wish us well. Bill Robins ANNEXES: A. Notes on the 21ST Century Operating Environment (21COE) B. Corps Themes: Summaries and Objectives C. Key Points from Workshop 1 D. Key Points from Workshop 2 E. Key Points from Workshop 3 F. Key Points from Workshop 4 G. Key Points from Seminar H. Summary of Proposal for an Information Services Branch within Royal Signals

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ANNEX A

NOTES ON THE 21st CENTURY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

“Merely augmenting or accessorising our current organisation, process and capability will give UK marginal gains only. Those who adapt more boldly will accelerate away from us and in some cases this is already happening, as is evident in China’s use of Cyber and the use made by ISIS of social media.” Com JFC, WITIA Dec 14 General Factors 1. Commanders (not just their IT advisers) will try to dominate the Electromagnetic Environment

(EME) as critical terrain. 2. Cyber, both attack and defence will be a 24/7 activity on and off operations. 3. Platforms, HQs, sensors and individuals will be networked. CIS support to operations will demand

all the functionality and ease of use of the smartphone, apps and social media. 4. There is a need to match the pace of Defence C4ISR acquisition to that of technological changes

adopted by our opponents and by the private and commercial sector 5. Emphasis will increase on more effective use of Joint Forces and Allied Forces. 6. Unmanned operations will be used more widely in Land, at Sea and in the Air 7. Human Machine collaboration will exploit trusted relationships between people and machines,

leading to Manned and Unmanned Combat Teaming. Technology Factors 8. Processing power, data and connectivity will increasingly shape the way the world lives 9. Big Data analytics offer unprecedented opportunities for deeper insights and increases in

effectiveness and efficiency 10. This requires us to harness advances in visualisation and decision support to ensure we gain such

insights quickly and act on them 11. Self-teaching (learning machines) connected to IoT will increasingly be used. The management,

moral and legal issues associated with this call for deep professional understanding People and Cultural Factors 12. Social media will require constant care, attention and exploitation 13. The “Whole Force” approach: regular, reserve, government and commercial will be needed in

unison, to gain access to the skills needed. 14. A subset of this will be the use of R3I (Regular, Reserve, Retired and Industry) to improve the

intellectual reach of the Corps 15. There will be increased emphasis on understanding complex multi-factor issues, more than the

physical battle 16. Skill will be needed in complex system engineering to build and operate robust information

networks 17. Skills in ICS, Security and Cyber are scarce. Industry can offer more money and more attractive

working conditions than government. A strategy to handle this is needed. Overall 18. Rigid and hierarchical organisations may be less capable of exploiting these opportunities than

more agile opponents. The culture and skills of ICT professionals and their relationship to their managers and operational leaders may need a reset.

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ANNEX B

CORPS THEMES: SUMMARIES AND OBJECTIVES The six themes below attempt to give a rich description of the 21COE Corps needed by the Army and by Joint Forces. Each theme is supported by a checklist of points made at the workshops and the Seminar during 2016. The first cuts of possible objectives are suggested for each theme as suggested starters for an implementation plan. THEME 1: COMPETENCES SUMMARY The future Corps will be competent at:

Mode 2: operating as a professional CIO support organisation able to support and advise commanders on the use of information as a weapon system

Mode 1: operating as a military ISP4

Mode 2 competence calls for:

Full knowledge of how other arms and services work together, in much the same way as a good CIO knows very well how his company functions. The Corps role as a valued and respected adviser on the battle-winning aspects of information calls for new approaches to selection and career development for its leaders and potential leaders (see Theme 2 below)

The ability to advise on the use of IT to enhance process, efficiency and effectiveness in much the same way as a good management consultant optimises a commercial organisation. This calls for a new skills framework for some officers and SNCOs.

An ability to serve commanders on the same basis as other teeth and supporting arms commanders with the added competence of knowing how effective IX can become a battle-winning tool to transform the Army

Ability to direct cyber operations (OC and DC) Mode 1 competence calls for:

A broad range of skills across the MOD competency framework, below.

Access to deep ICS skills which may require special arrangements, provided by innovative relationships with industry, possibly on the lines of 254 Signal Squadron (ISGS). There may be a need to take this further by forming an Information Services Branch (ISB) in the Corps on the lines of the PQE skillset supporting the Sappers. See Annex B for an outline description of this requirement, should this course be chosen for implementation.

To get the most from a skilled and committed workforce, it will be necessary to offer more flexible career opportunities than those offered by rigid trade structures. This is discussed at Theme 2 below.

Ability to conduct cyber operations (OC and DC)

4 ISP: Information Services Provider

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Possible Objectives for Theme 1: Competences Mode 1 Competences

A defined framework for information level competences viewed against the MOD competency framework, below. It may be worth grouping competences into (eg) Applications Engineer, Infrastructure Engineer and Network Engineer. This option might usefully be considered by the Change Team.

Assess Competences against the SFIA matrix.

Develop a plan for competence in Cyber: OC and DC.

Develop clarity on how much we need “deep” ISP skills not normally called for by line units and a

plan of how we gain access to them

Develop a clear statement of what the Army and Joint Services can expect from us and when

Mode 2 Competences

Develop an understanding of the selection and training needed be effective as a Corps that delivers IX, with consultancy skills on delivering Information as a Weapon System

Develop a plan for selecting at an early stage Mode 2 officers who need intimate knowledge of how other arms and services work and how they work together for the Army as a whole

Develop a plan for: o More emphasis on early attachments to teeth arm units for officers with high potential o More formal management training within high grade commercial organisations o Competence in defending and exploiting information from home base to tactical edge o Competence in direction of Cyber operations (OC and DC)

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THEME 2: EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The future Corps will be dedicated to lifelong learning and self-motivated education, for all officers and most soldiers. Continual professional development (CPD) will be supported by close relationships with professional institutions. Maintaining the edge in technology competence will call for productive relations with commercial ICS providers and organisations competent in business and operational analysis, possibly involving personnel exchange. This will be supported by encouraging more people from industry on a larger scale than now to join as reservists. There may be scope for knowledge transfer in forming the proposed “Corps within the Corps”, the Information Services Branch outlined at Annex B. Each mode will require its own approach to lifelong learning. Possibilities include:

Mode 1: basic courses on the competences shown in the MOD diagram above, attachments to IT producers and ISPs

Mode 2: subaltern attachments to teeth and supporting arm units, more intensive courses in military and commercial management, attachments to CIO departments and to information intensive organisations (banks, insurance, retail, etc)

Possible Objectives for Theme 2: Education, Training and Professional Development

Establish distance-learning relationships (eg with Cranfield, BCS, IET and others)

Explore (with CDIO/ISS) relationships with selected firms to: o Enhance technology skills as ISP o Enhance consultancy skills as advisers on IX and Information as a Weapon System

Develop and consider options for access to deep technical skill when needed (PQE, ISB, etc)

Consider the most effective way of changing the current rigid trade structures to a competency framework based on aptitude

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THEME 3: CULTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS

The future Corps will be an adaptive, learning organisation, proactive and forward leaning. It will be well connected internally and enable innovative ideas to flow securely and quickly from its soldiers to its leaders and to and from external stakeholders.

It will also be well connected within the Defence world, with general and joint staffs and within the C4ISR and ICS community as well as with defence and ISP companies, academia and professional ICS organisations and think tanks. See Outline Stakeholder diagram above.

It will have its own ability to scan technical and operational horizons and act proactively to meet their challenges. It will be attractive to a tech-savvy teenage market, kids who want a challenge not just technically but intellectually and physically.

It will be proud of the vitally important part it plays in increasingly information centric warfare and of its ability to advise on Information as a Weapon System and on Cyber. At Mode 2 level it will be proud of its ability to use technology imaginatively to improve operational and management capability.

Finally, it will be aware of its value to UK Defence and its attractiveness to potential members by offering a unique combination of both intellectual and physical challenge.

Corps Offer to Generation Z. The Corps needs to understand the cultural shift from Generation X (now in their 40s) to Generation Y (now in their 30s) to Generation Z, now coming of age. This last generation are used to a sophisticated media and technology diet, respect authority only when they feel that it is deserved, want their voice heard and will walk away if bored. At Workshop 3, Andy Dobson suggested some ground rules for dealing particularly with Generation Z but pointed out that the rules apply to any decent organisation. They should be familiar to any good leader and may appear at first sight banal but are worth repeating:

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Do:

Provide people with a sense of belonging - and make them feel welcome.

Ensure people have interesting and challenging work, which gives them a sense that they are making a genuine contribution: an “Employee Value Proposition”

Ensure that they understand the organisation's mission and where they fit into it.

Give people as much autonomy as they can handle Don't:

Rely automatically on top-down leadership.

Use pejorative language, punish or ignore inconvenient or alternative views

Assume that people are going to give your organisation a long term commitment

Possible Objectives for Theme 3: Culture and Relationships

Complete Communication Strategy (to include validation of Stakeholder analysis)

Complete Strategy for Internal Communication (Corps Digital Strategy).

THEME 4: RECRUITMENT, MARKETING, RETENTION AND INSPIRATION

The Fashionable Corps to Join. The Corps should be a “cool place” to work: up to date technology must be available via streamlined process to inspire recruits to feel that they are valued members of a cutting-edge organisation. The mantra “Recruit and Retain” might be replaced by “Hire and Inspire”. Despite the attraction of better pay for technologists offered by industry, the Corps has much to offer them too: danger, excitement, the sense of doing important work for the nation, anti-terrorism, well-managed professional development and demanding technical jobs in demanding physical environments. The future Corps will capitalise on this. The secret of retention is inspiration. We can do so (especially with Generation Z) only if we excite them with the technology that they are given to work with. That will need changes to acquisition processes. DCIO’s initiatives are moving Defence the right way in this regard. The Corps still needs to work to engage with Generation Z. The RAF (Air HQ A6) has done useful work on this and could help. The key to much of this theme will be secure formal and informal communication, both internal and external to the Corps, using contemporary technology as part of the Corps Digital Strategy. The Corps family must learn to talk to itself. Juniors must feel that their voice is heard by the Corps decision makers. This will place resource demands on the Corps hierarchy as the Corps starts to converse with itself in a more dynamic and productive way. It will be important that ideas from officers’ and sergeants’ messes and from the JRC are considered and seen to be considered at Corps level. Possible Objectives for Theme 4: Recruitment, Marketing, Retention and Inspiration

Develop the Corps “brand” for Generation Z and support the recruiting drive

Ensure that the brand supports the Communication Strategy in Theme 3 above

Develop an approach for getting the best out of Generation Z

Complete implementation of the Corps digital strategy

Establish a regime to encourage productive debate within the Corps

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THEME 5: EXTERNAL CHANGES TO PROMOTE SUCCESS

Close relations with the newly innovative CDIO/ISS organisation will help to promote agility in acquisition processes and encourage early deployment of state of the art technology, accepting well-managed risk in doing so. If the lack of doctrine in C4ISR is to be countered and if the Corps is to be effective at operational and technology horizon scanning, it may need to promote the rebirth of a Doctrine Centre. This could be established at Corps, Army or at Joint Forces level. Possible Objectives for Theme 5: External Changes to Promote Success

Support CDIO efforts to promote agility in acquisition, possibly building on the concept of “permanent Beta systems”.

Develop a case with Army CIO for a C2DC/CSDC type centre to address future proofing the Army’s information capability

THEME 6: MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN The Boyle work now needs to be assessed and the parts to be taken forward must be identified and prioritised and the change resourced with money and SQEP. The initiative needs drive from the top (which it has) and adequate high grade dedicated management and resources (which it may not yet have). It may also benefit by creating a mentoring group to maintain an independent view of progress. Although the views of such a group may appear inconvenient to some executive managers, its advice may be worth hearing and may avoid later problems. The workshops suggested that the enemy of change is not active resistance but inertia and fatalism. In summary, the workshops considered the following to be needed: A Change Team. A dedicated change team (or Implementation Team) is needed to develop a plan, clarify priorities and drive these fundamental changes to the Corps culture, competences and approach. It will need strong, respected leadership which can generate the support of the entire Corps. Failure to do this properly will generate more cynicism and change fatigue as the initiative starts to falter. Adequate Resources at a time of Stringency. If the initiative to change the Corps in the way suggested here is to succeed, it needs adequate resource: without that, the Corps will be seen not to mean it. The Corps now needs to select the leader, probably at one star level, design the Team and fill it by early 2018. Governance and reporting arrangements are needed to ensure support and guidance. This could be done within the KINGS CROSS/MARBLE ARCH framework as long as it maintains momentum and agility and is not bogged down by the heavier initiatives. Mentors. A Mentoring Group may be helpful, some said vital. It would support the Change Team from outside the Corps. Its tasks could include:

Supporting and mentoring the Change Team and its leader

Validating plans for change

Helping the Change Team to stay abreast of outside developments

Advocacy within the Stakeholder Community when needed

Providing creative impatience by acting as a gadfly when initiatives get bogged down

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Possible Objectives for Theme 6: Making Change Happen

Army HQ and RHQ R Signals to assess resources needed and available

RSI to consolidate all change proposals from the five RSI Boyle events held in 2016

Corps and RSI to winnow, prioritise proposals and develop a first cut of Programme Plan

Corps to establish Implementation Team led at one star level by a thoughtful, respected and irreverent leader

Implementation Team to develop a programme plan. To include: o Updated Vision for 21COE Corps o Lines of activity based on Theme Objectives above, each with timelines, milestones,

leaders and risk analyses, supplemented by consolidated proposals from all events o Stakeholder analysis for internal and external engagement

Corps to establish high level Steering Group to guide the Change Team and the process

Corps to establish a Mentoring Group to keep the process honest

Team to develop a Communications Strategy for Change, serving the Corps and its stakeholders to ensure buy in from Corps and others at all stages of implementation

Team to develop an Operating Model for the new Corps

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ANNEX C SUMMARY POINTS FROM WORKSHOP 1: 1* & CONSULTANTS 21 APR 16

Culture and Competence The current culture of the Corps needs to change:

To develop the competences for full spectrum information support (See Fig 1 below)

To develop the skills and close relationships with staffs to deliver IX

From providing networks to directly fighting the information battle

To place more value on ICS and IS technical competence whilst not losing military or leadership skills

Fig 1: MOD Professionals in KIM, IT and IA Education, Training and Development The Corps must change its relationship with its officers and soldiers to:

Invest resources in lifelong learning

Emphasise the individual’s responsibility to continually update and learn

Learn from (eg) commerce and other agency approaches to development and training

Encourage more Corps people to gain chartered status with IET and BCS

Consider more two way exchanges with industry

Consider more formal mentoring arrangements for high potential people Marketing and Recruitment The Corps needs to better communicate and market itself by:

Adopting industry recognised competency frameworks and language

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Emphasising that the Corps is central to the demanding and influential roles of cyber and information exploitation

Considering a change to the strapline and maybe even the name of the Corps to reflect its 21st Century roles

Cyber

Cyber should be a Corps mainstream activity, using shared competences with ICS

Cyber demands a Defence wide approach, using a shared language

The Corps must use this shared language as effectively as the RAF do, when running candidates for Cyber appointments

The Why and What of the Corps

Delegates suggested alternative straplines for why the Corps exists and what it should do

These are listed at Appendix 1 to this Annex: they should now be considered by the RSI Communications Committee or the Boyle Implementation Team with a view to developing options for making the Corps Strapline more accurate and attractive

DISCUSSION OF ITEMS 1 AND 2

Culture Cultural issues were considered in the light of Mode 1 and Mode 2 thinking. The two modes (and Mode 0) are illustrated at Fig 2, below.

Fig 2 Modal Thinking

The demise of the SOinC(A) appointment may be the reason for a lack of a coherent vision for the Corps, something felt acutely by junior officers. Project Boyle may provide the impetus for change but does the Corps need to form a focus for keeping some core vision alive and updated? The general view was Yes.

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There was also a view that visionary and creative thinking (Mode 2 thinking) was not supported in the Corps and even (according to some) discouraged in our young people. The workshop took the view that this must change: a culture of creative thinking will be vital to foster innovation. This will be particularly important if the Corps develops the task to support IX, discussed in the Competences section below. Innovative thinking must not be developed at the expense of competent delivery of networks and information management, services which requires Mode 1 thinking. The Corps needs to be world-class at both modes. Britain and its Army have tended to view technical competence as a “kitchen-entrance” activity. This has led to some good officers playing up their combat potential and downplaying their engineering competence. But 21st Century operations will lead to ICS operators who are not at the top of their technical game being seen as unacceptable. At the moment, many junior officers believe that they will not be recognised by the Corps, let alone the by Army, for their technical ability. There is also some dissatisfaction with the provision of technical training for officers, and this needs more investigation. The Army has frequently demonstrated its ability to innovate fast in response to operational need when the stimulus is strong enough. As the need for comprehensive ICS delivery becomes more widely understood and valued, competent branches outside the Corps will undoubtedly make a play for it. Signallers who are unable or unwilling to handle the competences above will no longer be relevant or acceptable. Corps Competences The role of the CIO (and every R Signals Commander is a CIO at their respective level) is a combination of: a. Design and delivery of high quality, high availability and secure infrastructure

b. Design and provision of core information services c. Agile, responsive innovation in design and deployment of new business/operationally focussed

information services d. Finally, the most important area for the 21st Century: the Corps must be the recognised and

respected adviser and subject matter expert (SME) on the use, integration and synchronisation of information technology throughout the operational space. Gartner calls this “Operational Technology”. It encompasses every aspect of technology, including, in our case:

i. Automation of battlefield platforms and services ii. Development of some applications and algorithms, as a continuous service iii. Information Exploitation (IX) and use of data analytics to support it. iv. Integration of the military aspects of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the security and

assurance aspect of this (which will be profound) v. Visualisation and presentation skills, to make the information consumable.

To move to this demanding new set of roles, Royal Signals must develop competence beyond its current comfort zone of networks and become focused on decision support to commanders. Well run

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networks are still vital but this competence will not be sufficient: the Corps must support the Army and Joint Forces in all areas of ICS Competence. The Corps must develop skills in Enterprise Architecture, Information Governance and Information Architecture. Corps members (SMEs or professional information architects) must handle the tension between enabling agile reconfiguration and maintaining assured design and delivery. And more: IX must now become a key competence for the Corps. This will demand new relationships with functional staffs, J1-9 and G1-9, to whom the Corps will provide valued advisers to enable staffs to make the best use of their information. Skills are likely to extend to data analytics and to tailoring the presentation of complex and fast-changing information to busy and stressed people. The competences identified here apply equally across Defence and must be harmonised for Departmental and Operational use down to tactical level. A common language describing them should support all three armed services and government ICS. This calls for close collaboration with other services, with JFC and with CDIO. These competences mean that the Corps members could, if they get this right, be seen as “solution architects”, skilled advisers to staffs who also guide the delivery of information in exploitable formats. See also Marketing and Recruitment below The Corps needs to develop the innovative and commercial competences to improve and speed up the acquisition process. A particular skill will be to define dynamically changing requirements more effectively. Close links will be needed between the Corps and innovative companies in commerce and industry to stay abreast of how this is done commercially. This will also require building on the existing close links with JFC and CDIO. A more structured approach to the “Whole Force” idea will be needed as part of a full awareness in the Corps of the stakeholders (joint and national agencies, allies and commercial, professional and academic partners) with whom productive relationships will need constant nurturing. See Fig 3 below. The Corps must get better at communicating at all levels the operational consequences, benefits and risks of ICS related decisions at all levels of the service delivery model. It is arguable that the centrality of information as a contested operational domain in the 21st Century battlespace means that the competences discussed above provide direct support to mission threads as an integral part of the decision process, in the same way as EW should. All the above is far beyond the support function of providing networks. Emphasising this key work could be a powerful attraction to recruits who want to be at the centre of operational activity, providing the information weapon system and conducting the information battle with the commander. Education, Training and Development Career models should normally train generalists, at least initially. Specialism comes later. But there was a general perception at the workshop and in exchanges since the event, that some young Corps officers did not feel themselves fully competent SMEs in the taxonomy of skills needed for the 21st Century.

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As regards soldiers, current military recruitment is demand-led; but many smart firms have now moved to a supply-led model in which they attempt to attract high grade people with exciting challenges, seek to understand the nature and culture of the recruits they win over and offer education and training towards both the needs of the firm and the aspirations of the individual. This may or may not work for the Corps, but there is no doubt that we must put more effort into understanding the people we need and ensuring that they find their work satisfying and their personal development cared for. Lifelong learning and self-development must be the norm, as it is in the more enterprising parts of industry. Views differed on how this should be incentivised, but the workshop agreed that investment in career development worked best if matched to aptitude and interests. It is worth considering a model in which officers and NCOs know that they have to constantly “sell themselves” to the Corps and Army as relevant, up to date and competent in a changing market. To support this, the Corps needs to focus on technical education and life-long learning, maybe using a Virtual Learning Environment (VLE) or a Corps Knowledge Exchange. It is worth considering a more rigorous approach to belonging to the engineering profession, as in the RAF and REME: a more formal relationship with IET and BCS as regards chartered status may result in more officers/NCOs competent and more up to date with rapidly changing ICS delivery skills. Industry and Academic placements and exchanges could offer a lot of benefit. Careful targeting would be needed, towards areas of increasing military relevance, for example autonomy or data analytics. Mentoring, particularly of high potential individuals would be needed. Great care would also be needed in selecting mentors with the right skills and background. The strong links between regular and reserves could help here. The need to match acquisition speed and agility to the operational demand and the opportunities offered by the market requires serious attention to be paid to acquisition training for those officers appointed to ISS and to Capability appointments. All this will lead to a need for the Corps to maintain a network of supportive relationships along the lines of Fig 3.

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Fig 3 Possible Corps Stakeholders Marketing and Recruitment The Corps needs to better communicate and market what it does, both internally in Defence and into the nation, to attract high-grade recruits. The following should help:

Use of industry-recognised competence standards/frameworks

Use of industry-recognised language to describe what we do

Emphasis on the demanding, relevant, exciting and important nature of the work which the Corps does. This will be helped by an emphasis on the relevance of Cyber work, See below.

This will require close cooperation with the work on competency frameworks being developed by CDIO and in the other services. The Corps will need to influence the development of such frameworks to ensure that skills required to support the land battle are built in alongside the more standard service delivery skills demanded by the 21st COE. A starting point is to assure the Mode 1 service delivery skills that the Corps now needs to develop. (see Competences above) but the Mode 2 IX skills will need early attention too. The Corps needs to develop inventive ways of attracting clever people who could earn high salaries in industry. This could mean significantly different approaches to salaries and bonuses. But we have much to offer if we get this right: it could mean appealing to people who enjoy a technical challenge, who want recognition for their skills and who might enjoy doing good for the nation. The advent of direct staff support in applying data analytics and presentational support could be a powerful attractor for the right sort of person, one who must be at the centre of the action. GCHQ marketing was seen as exemplary in this regard and is well worth a look. One factor which may be worth re-examination is the non-trivial business of giving the Corps a name more accurate, relevant and exciting in its description of what the Corps does (or what it could aspire to do if Project Boyle gains momentum). The work on the Strapline at Annex C may help here.

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Cyber A vital point in marketing the Corps is that Information Technology is no longer just an enabler. IT gave birth to Cyber and is now where significant operations in future wars will be fought and where current wars are already being fought. Cyber needs to be a Corps mainstream activity. It should not be limited to a small cadre of “cyber-specialists”, although there are a few specialist areas that will need to be managed in cadres for reasons of security. Many cyber competences are shared with information and security competences in ICS. Cyber demands a pan-Defence approach, along with the use of a shared language. Royal Signals needs to better exploit this language when running its people to Joint Cyber posts and when recruiting. See Marketing and Recruitment above

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C

THE WHY AND THE WHAT OF THE CORPS

The workshop considered the description of the Corps on the Army website: “Royal Signals provide military commanders with their information requirements and the ability to command and control their forces” Most delegates found this description inadequate. Delegates were therefore asked to write down their own preferred description of Why we need a Royal Corps of Signals and What it should do. Their answers are below. Why do we need a Corps?

To deliver Land Environment Information Dominance

To provide combat advantage by enabling the Army to understand, decide, act and learn faster than the opposition

To enable the delivery of decision making advantage and full-spectrum joint effects

To ensure that the right information and communication environment is established and maintained to enable operations to be conducted

To provide commanders with the best information to make war-winning decisions

To enable decision superiority

To provide information services (C2, IT support and EW) to support the Army

Provide information to facilitate a commander’s decisions What should it do?

Store, assure, protect and supply information services across trusted networks

Deliver and innovate rich information and cyber services to enable combat advantage

Deliver information and cyber services to enable decision superiority over adversaries

Provide an agile and integrated cadre of information specialists who deliver and exploit global information services to enable commanders to make better and faster decisions

Provide the weapon system to deliver information warfare effects through exploiting and defending cyber/EMS through science, IT and communication engineering capabilities

Build trustworthy digital environments, solve information-related problems with agility

Dominate information and cyber-space to win conflicts by being technically able, highly flexible and determined to succeed

To meet the demand of 21st Century operations by exploiting global information services in a contested EME

Provide commanders with the end to end provision, continuous improvement and innovation of services to deliver the information requirements to support decision making needed to command and control UK forces

Provide rock-solid professional information services right up to the glass on the display Recommendation. The RSI Communications Committee should use this material to develop options for a new Corps strapline.

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ANNEX D SUMMARY POINTS FROM WORKSHOP 2: GENERATION Y OFFICERS AND SNCOS 9 JUN 16

ITEM 1: THE 21ST CENTURY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (21COE)

Ease of use of IT equipment for the military is a very important consideration, something that is dramatically enhanced through achieving continuity between domestic and professional ways of working. It would dramatically reduce our training burden and assist creativity and innovation. There were mixed views on this theme with the following rhetorical questions raised:

Do we (and can we) have the professional knowledge to deliver ICS services that truly reflect ease of use of the domestic experience?

Should we focus on providing maximum functionality and let organisations decide what was useful? Is there a danger that excess functionality distracts soldiers from their tasks? The delegates’ view was that the way in which society has embraced technology teaches us that people are more adaptable than we sometimes give them credit for and should not be artificially inhibited by limiting the functionality of equipment.

Defence needs the ability to innovate without being tied by commercial constraints (i.e. avoiding proprietary lock-in and seeking vendor agnostic solutions). This is very much the thinking behind CDIO’s Masters of Our Own Destiny (MooD) principle but it implies that we have to get a lot better at software and app development. The workshop agreed that there is a need to move from network delivery to being an organisation that has a key role to play in processing, exploiting, disseminating and assuring information. Delegates discussed Big Data: whether it was merely a fashion or whether it would have the impact suggested by its advocates. The conclusion to the discussion is that it may or may not be valid: ultimately what we need is a highly adaptive organisation that is able to assess and exploit new technologies as they become available. In contrast to this need, most groups took the view that Royal Signals has a reactive rather than a proactive culture. We tend to wait until change hits us. Delegates felt that in order to cope with the rate of change, it was important to have access to an organisation or even a virtual ‘think tank’ which was able to look over the horizon to emerging technological changes (and associated human factors). Editors’ View: This perhaps reinforces the requirement for a C2 (or Information Manoeuvre) Development Centre (as previously existed) but one which better integrates academics, intelligence agencies, military practitioners and industry across a range of disciplines with expertise ranging from the prosecution of military operations, intelligence work, deep technological understanding and a greater understanding of societal technology uptake trends. This function may be considered for designing into the proposed 2* Information Manoeuvre HQ. Delegates considered the issue of investing education and training in people who then promptly leave the service. Richard Branson’s view that organisations should “train well people enough so they can leave, treat them well enough so they don’t want to” was influential in persuading delegates that artificially reducing competences by limiting training in the hope of raising retention was a self-defeating idea when applied to a high-grade workforce. Accrediting professional qualifications and

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better communicating the relevance of military competences in the civilian arena was considered an important component of ‘attract’. In summary, we should make a public commitment to educate and train our people to a high level of competence to meet the challenges of the 21 Century. Delegates suspected that Google’s initiatives to automate dirty, dangerous and boring work could have significant implications for military operations as the internet of things (IoT) hit the battlespace. In passing, it was mentioned that the fashion to sell off government/military spectrum could be disastrous for those attempting to control a battlespace IoT, greedy for bandwidth. The challenge of determining the correct balance of deploying people forward and providing support via reachback was also discussed but with no clear conclusions being drawn. The key appeared to be able to make the right judgements in the context of a specific operation. ITEM 2a: PRELIMINARY BRIEF BY BRIG WILSON ON FUTURE TRADE STRUCTURES The proposed Future Trade Structures Model was generally well received by delegates. Delegates believed that we needed to clarify a unique selling point for Royal Signals as a profession. A common foundation trade might help to communicate this (akin to the Royal Engineers Combat Engineer). The term Digital Warfare Engineer was suggested as a starter. There was a feeling by some that a break from trade structures (relying wholly on modular education/training and effective competence recording within a more dynamic talent management model) was needed. It was recognised, however, that this latter proposition would introduce considerable assignment management challenges in ensuring that talent was placed into the right appointments. But there was really no alternative to doing this properly. Groups also considered that, if trade structures are retained, benefits may be realised by cross-training between trade groups. In addition, many delegates felt a need to have returns of service attached to many of the more attractive training modules. Some felt that the focus on modular training introduced a risk that people would focus on the acquisition of qualifications that were CV enhancing rather than of direct benefit to Defence. It was acknowledged that some form of management mechanism would need to be in place to ensure that Royal Signals ended up with a balance of competences driven by operational need. Delegates felt strongly that a selection mechanism based on GCSE qualifications had significant shortcomings and was not a robust measure of aptitude. There was a strong sense that (for a variety of reasons) many people do not give a true reflection of their potential during their secondary education. It was felt that IQ tests or generic assessments of potential for learning might prove more effective. The need for mechanisms to develop and retain specialists was discussed – particularly in relation to Project Turin and the PQE model. There was recognition that ultimately specialists are best managed within a single organisation, to enable them to better stay up to date. The Corps must use its ability to provide Technology Push solutions to the G3 Requirement Pull. We are classically bad at seeing operational opportunities enabled by technology and must be more proactive.

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Editors’ note: One potential area of development here is to make it routine for specialists/technologists to be present during the after-action reviews (AAR) of keynote exercises. During such AAR activity, operational constraints are often identified whose solution may lie in the more innovative application of information technology, a fact which the traditional AAR audience is unlikely to understand without technical and operational guidance from the Corps. The workshop made the points that:

We need to get better at talent spotting potential specialists and putting them in the right appointments.

We are in fierce competition with industry for specialists (in part this is the driver for Project Turin). Some delegates felt that there are areas where we can further exploit the reserve contract (via 254 (SGIS) Sig Sqn and 81 Sig Sqn for example) to bring in the right sort of specialist.

Editors’ note: Many specialist skills will be best grown and maintained in industry (for example data scientists). The challenge will be how we best engage such people on a routine and more enduring basis, given that they tend to be highly committed to their day jobs. It will also be important to ensure that the mainstream Corps understand their value and use them productively. ITEMS 2b, 3 AND 4: GROUP WORK AND PLENARY: KEY POINTS FOR A FUTURE CORPS Delegates made the point that the military is very bad at specifying its information needs and this frequently leaves the Corps with significant operational challenges. We need to be able to assist this process and to help to raise Defence agility in meeting evolving requirements which were wrong in the first place.

Editors’ notes: 1. This plays to the more general theme of needing to harmonise the information needs of the ‘6,

2 and 3’ communities to better effect. This matters more now as we move Royal Signals from being network/system providers, to a situation where cyberspace is an operational environment in which Royal Signals are digital information enablers, assurers, exploiters and information ‘warriors’, operating across the blurred lines of the CEMA landscape

2. It was also generally accepted (stressing the point above) that getting an ICS requirement right is difficult even for experts and that even if it is right at some stage, it will soon be wrong. So agility is a key feature of any CIO type organisation of the type that the Corps should aspire to be.

There was much discussion of “soldier first”, versus “tradesman first”, with most delegates concluding that the emphasis should be placed on the latter. Editors’ note: this could be a dangerously simplistic view if we are to meet the stresses of 21COE. RM and SF manage to be both soldiers and tradesmen. There was discussion about whether Royal Signals officers need to have more professional technical competences. The consensus was that they should, but that there were very real recruiting constraints: very limited numbers of STEM graduates at RMAS. The view that officers needed to focus more on the application of technology (rather than being pure technologists) was made, chiming with the above paragraph. There was a sense that the rapid development of technology will put a greater premium on technical officers and that education (provided in service), training and professional accreditation will become ever more important. This will be important when considered against the need to compete for Joint Appointments with many RAF officers (in particular) able to demonstrate Chartered Engineer status

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to selection boards. Better use and careful placement of technically qualified LE officers could help here. Editors’ Note: resolving this issue requires an understanding of the different roles conducted by Corps officers and SNCOs: the division of expertise into Engineers, Brokers and Guardians, advocated by the Chairman RSI in his recent editorial for the Journal could be relevant here. There was a view that soldiers too often seek to emulate RSMs/SSMs as opposed to supervisors. The Corps needs to internally market the supervisor grade more effectively. There was support for the idea for industry placements but also concerns over their impact on retention, as industry may selectively target our best people, overmatching us on remuneration. Returns of service will likely prove important but will need to be robust enough to withstand legal challenge. There was a strong sense that we need to have a mentoring system in place, perhaps using the specialist reserve to bring in industry people as mentors. This concept is being explored by 15 Sig Regt and 254 Sig Sqn. There was a view that we needed to create a system with more opportunity and responsibility at the more junior levels. At the moment we don’t use our junior people effectively, they get bored and leave. The relevance of the Corps’ name was questioned once more. Delegates suspect that our brand is confusing to potential recruits. This will apply more strongly if we move into Data and Information. Poor pay was highlighted as a reason for poor retention and recruiting. But pay alone was not the full story. The need to better sell the military ‘package’ (remuneration, pension etc) was highlighted. A number of attendees raised concerns regarding the Ethos of the Corps. They felt it to be less strong than other capbadges. Many felt that members of the Corps indentified themselves as Army officers/soldiers rather than Royal Signals officers/soldiers, something that, for many corps/regiments, is the other way round. This talks to the need (above) for not only moving into the higher realms of data and information but branding ourselves to have done so. The lack of G/J6 doctrine was felt to be a considerable constraint. The need for force development to be more requirement-focused also came up. There was a sense that we (in Defence) have a problem with effective requirement capture and that the Corps needs to play more of a role in informing requirement capture for services processing, exploiting and disseminating information. This will need careful coordination with HQ Army and CDIO/ISS. There was a sense that we are routinely misemploying Royal Signals Electricians – and that we need to review this trade alongside Installation Technicians. There was also support for moving the Communications Logistic Specialist trade to the RLC. There was recognition of the need gain more synergy between regulars and reservists. Our employment model needs to better integrate them and play to their respective strengths. There was a sense of the need for a balance between generalist and specialists across the spectrum, ranging from ‘pure technologists’ to those whose expertise lies in the application of technology. Again, Chairman RSI’s point about Engineers, Brokers and Guardians is relevant here.

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There was a strong sense that the policy that prevents medically unfit soldiers from qualifying for promotion (by completing Command, Leadership and Management training pre-requisites) is constraining our ability to exploit talent. More flexibility in valuing and rewarding specialist talent appears to be needed, beyond the considerable efforts already made. There was a strong sense that Royal Signals Policy Directive 6, which prevents promotion to WO2 ahead of the 16 year point (or exceptionally the 15 year point), is constraining our ability to exploit talent. There was a strong sense that the Corps pays insufficient attention to service and information assurance. This will no longer be acceptable in the Corps as it moves up the stack: assurance is a core skill for information specialists. Delegates believe that we need to have the competences and contractual freedom to develop/refine applications in house, using productive relations with industry to help us improve this capability. There was a good deal of discussion relating to the need to inculcate an innovative culture – with interest in Google’s idea of allowing their people to invest 10% of their time in developing their own ideas. There was discussion around incentives that could be applied across the Corps – including innovation competitions. It was suggested that there should be a ‘sandbox’ within each Royal Signals unit. Editor’s note: There is also potential here to develop Royal Signals ‘TED (Technology, Entertainment and Design)’ Talks that would assist in the promulgation of good ideas and knowledge management]. These are the activities of any healthy and lively organisation using technology A number of delegates outlined the potential benefits of sponsoring people through academies and universities – and engaging with educational/professional bodies more broadly (particularly the likes of the Women in Engineering Society – as a means of extending the recruitment base). UTCs were also discussed but we learned that the jury was out on whether the return on investment was sufficient. Attendance at technology expos was also beneficial in keeping abreast of developments There was a strong belief amongst delegates that through-career investment and education incentives for all types of CPD were critically important for effectiveness and retention. The Corps must make this easier for all. Delegates stressed that we must ensure that we give our people the opportunity to fail – as the most potent lessons are derived from failure and as a fear of failure prevents people from ‘pushing the envelope’. Too often communications failure is not tolerated for fear of compromising other training objectives. The Master concluded the discussion highlighting the example of a senior manager at Google who reflected that he would consider himself a failed leader if his team fully achieved all the objectives he set them. This resonated with the audience as a key point for the ethos of a future Corps. Beyond this, the point was made that we must become more of a learning organisation – ensuring that lessons are identified, communicated across the community of interest and ultimately learned – with a knowledge management archive used throughout. But this implies far better secure

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communication within this Corps (a Corps of professional communicators!) using up to date on-line technology. The letters page of the Journal would not do. There was a general discussion on how to get the best out of our people. There was some sense that we needed to work harder to make people feel valued and to recognise achievement – something that would serve to act as an incentive for high performance. The importance of promoting competition and hence excellence within and between organisations was also discussed, as was the need for empowerment at lower levels. There was a feeling amongst some that some training delivery could be devolved to Field Army units, though this was not discussed in detail. There was for example, no discussion of delivery standardisation challenges. But enhanced unit level training could be an inevitable part of life-long learning within units. Dispersed training of this type could take pressure off DSCIS. There was also a sense that better use could be made of learning credits, potentially beyond current ELC/SLC arrangements, to enhance training provision (or the attainment of military course training prerequisites). Enhanced career opportunities could be a powerful incentive here. This feeds into a talent management model based on KSE attainment, where assignments are more clearly determined on the back of specific competences (work that is already in train but which has some way to go to reach maturation).

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ANNEX E

SUMMARY POINTS FROM WORKSHOP 3: 1* AND INDUSTRY 5 JUL 16

FINDINGS OF ITEMS 1 AND 2 The results are presented under the following headings:

Theme 1: Culture, Competences and Relationships Theme 2: Education, Training and Professional Development Theme 3: Marketing, Recruitment, Retention and Inspiration Theme 4: External changes needed for optimum results from Project Boyle

Note: these themes have now been superseded by the themes selected for the Final Report

Theme 1: Culture, Competences and Relationships Service Provider or Thought Leader? Should Royal Signals focus only on ICS provision, leaving higher level issues like Information Manoeuvre and IX to others? Or should the Corps seize the opportunity to become professional leaders at these higher levels? a. Service Provider Only: even if the Corps limits itself to ICS provision, it will still need a significant

capability development programme. This will include the ability to move “up the ISO stack” to develop competence at the data, information and presentation levels without losing the ability to run networks.

b. Service Provider and Thought Leader on Information Manoeuvre: if we plan to move to this level, we will still need to deliver ICS as above, but we will also need to become the Army Subject Matter Experts (SME) at using and advising on information as a weapon system.

View taken by the Workshop. The Corps should be able to support the Army and Joint Forces in both ICS provision and in Thought Leadership. The remainder of this report attempts to provide a rich picture of a Corps that does both. Competences: the competences needed for this include: a. Driving Agile Change. Ability to drive agile change inside the Corps and to influence and support

the Army, MOD and CDIO in pursuing it externally. See “External Changes” below. b. Risk Management. The quest for agility may include the promotion and acceptance of immature

systems and services offering benefits but involving some risks: it may be acceptable to run innovative systems in “permanent beta” rather than wait too long for a technical maturity which offers unacceptable operational risk in the wait. See Theme 4, Acquisition Agility.

c. Enterprise Understanding. To drive agile change, the Corps must demonstrate comprehensive understanding of the military enterprise that it supports. Corps members must show:

i. Ability as information architects: this will (eg) include optimising information and intelligence flows and the ability to recommend/decide architecture choices for homebased versus deployed elements. This competence could be aided by the formation of the Mission Management Centre and Joint Information Services Operating Centre at Corsham and the FLC ISOCs in Maritime C5ISR SU, 15 Sig Regt and 90 SU.

ii. Enterprise wide perspectives in handling cyber security risks. This may extend under Defence Diplomacy to advising in a consultancy role or providing more direct support on cyber to host nations

d. Deep Understanding of ICS Technology: although there is an economic argument for deploying soldiers only to jobs that demand military expertise, this could be short sighted: some Corps

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people must maintain their exposure to best commercial practice to raise the game of deployed services.

e. Understanding a Current Model. 15 Signal Regiment may provide a useful model here, merging expertise from regular, reserve, civil service and commercial sources. The lesson appears to be to maintain:

i. A pool of military ICS expertise, Regular, Reserve, Civil Service and Industry. Don’t civilianise jobs without considering the need to feed selected soldiers with deep recent experience of commercial service delivery into operational formations, where they strengthen the skillsets of deployed mainstream Corps people, then move back to commercial appointments for more updating.

ii. An ability to breed Corps members who are able to take a system of systems grip, especially of deployed systems and services. This has been seen to be tricky when CONDO (or even Corps soldiers) are trained and authorised only to handle specific programmes, systems and services.

Two Main Competence Strands. See the Modes Diagram below. There may need to be two strands in the core competences, each demanding different types of people: a. Business/Operational Analyst, able to see opportunities to use information as a battle-winning

tool and to shape the information environment in a HQ to meet operational needs. This will require advocacy skills, business analysis skills, enterprise level understanding and the ability to take calculated risk. It demands Mode 2 Innovative Thinkers and Advocates

b. Commodity Service Supplier of Information and Communication Services (ICS) which are as rich as those available in the business environment. This demands reliable, delivery focused service and technology people, Mode 1 Delivery people.

Focus for Future Scanning and Planning. The Corps should have the capacity to horizon scan future technology and management trends to ensure that it remains an intelligent customer and supplier. Stakeholder engagement will be paramount in order to minimise internal resource requirements.

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Stakeholders could include RSI, industry, CHACR, DCDC, OGD, academia and learned societies. A first cut at a Stakeholder Map is shown below.

Confidence and Agility. A future focus should give the Corps more competence to be a helpful influence for change both in supporting user agility and in supporting the CDIO in achieving acquisition agility. The Fashionable Corps to Join. The Corps should be a “cool place” to work: up to date technology must be available via streamlined process to inspire recruits to feel that they are valued members of a cutting-edge organisation. The mantra “Recruit and Retain” might be replaced by “Hire and Inspire”. But more will be needed: see Theme 3, below. System of Systems and Architectural Skills. Competences will need to incorporate business and information architectural capability. System of System skillsets will be needed by those responsible for the entire service to a HQ from multiple systems and services Big Data Analytics. Data Analytics has the potential to be a key function at formation HQ levels and maybe below. It is not clear where the Corps should best operate in the spectrum of military functional data analysts and commercial deep data analysts or indeed whether it has a role at all here. Work in this field could call for skills in business analysis, data analytics and technology exploitation. The current RUSI Big Data Study may offer some guidance to Corps planners when it reports in Autumn 2016. Theme 2. Education, Training and Professional Development Good Educational Foundation followed by Lifelong Self-Driven Learning. The workshop agreed that early military and technology education should lay down a firm foundation of principles and most importantly try to ensure that Corps members adopt the habit of life-long learning and self-education. Professional development, education and training should offer the self-motivated a wider choice of skills, with more attention given to personal preferences and aptitude than current policy encourages.

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Competence Framework. Following Brig Wilson’s brief on Future Trade Structures and the outline Competence Framework, the workshop agreed that too rigid a division of trades was counter-productive and that a future Corps would be best advised to focus on competences. Wide Skillsets for Officers. Officer education and training will need reassessment to ensure that the Corps develops officers who are not only capable of competent field command but also capable of understanding the military enterprise, the innovative linking of business, operational and technology opportunities, advocacy and creative use of clever subordinates. It is worth noting that the best non-Corps generalist officers and functional specialists (our potential “customers”) are already making a point of learning how to handle IX, to understand Information Manoeuvre as a powerful tool and to use data analytics. The Corps should have the skillsets to be useful to such people if we aspire to lead at this level. Deeper Knowledge for Selected People. Deep technical knowledge may be needed by a relatively limited number of the Corps on the lines of the Sapper PQE stream. A proposal was made for a similar approach to PQE by forming an Information Services Branch (ISB) in the Corps, formed of officers and soldiers who spent most of their lives in commercial or high security IT or data analytics. They would be attracted to spend some time in uniform by the challenge of working in the testing environment of operations. However, not all delegates warmed to the idea: some thought that the skillsets of the ISB should be available throughout the Corps. Others took the view that technology moved to fast for career soldiers to maintain currency and that ISB type specialists would be needed. The proposal is outlined in more detail in Annex C. More study is needed. Theme 3: Communications, Marketing, Recruitment, Retention and Inspiration Employability in Defence Roles. The Corps needs to do more to promote its suitability for high profile roles, eg in Cyber, by ensuring that its candidates fulfil the professional development criteria for the roles, eg membership of IET or BCS. The RAF are masters at ensuring this and so are developing a strong set of professional cyber warriors. The Corps Offer. Once the Corps has decided where it wants to position itself in the various choices outlined by these workshops, it will need to make the case for change and to define itself in the context of other Army and Defence capabilities. It will be important that the rest of the Army knows what to expect from us. Unconventional Skills. Deeply technically trained people with no aspirations to command but who have vital cyber or ICS skills could feel encouraged to join us if they were clear that there is a credible reward mechanism geared to valued competence than to rank. This concept is linked to the ISB concept above and at Annex C. Better Stakeholder Management. The workshop took the view that the Corps is too insular. It should seek more productive and closer relationships with G and J staff branches, with other services and other nations. There is a fund of goodwill towards the Corps in other services and industry. The outline stakeholder map (see below) will need validation and a plan made to use the help of the stakeholders in shaping our future Better Internal Communications. Internal communications are vital to a Corps which prides itself on agility and the ability to handle rapid change. The Corps should consider acquiring a professional intra-Corps network. The resource issues (management, security and technical) will need care but the workshop took the view that a fast and secure method of intra-communication which was more

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responsive than the letters page of the RSI Journal would be needed if the Corps was to be a 21st Century cutting edge centre for Generation Z. Commercial Links. There needs to be a much closer relationship between the Corps and firms with skillsets valuable to military ICS and Cyber, maybe to the extent of promoting mutual exchanges. This could possibly be taken forward on the lines already developing in the Land Environment Industrial Engagement Strategy. Care will be needed with commercial sensitivities but the benefits to operational and technical competence could be significant. Work is now needed to develop the principles under which this can go forward. Risk. The Army rightly prides itself on its ability to assess and manage risk. But this skill appears to be discouraged in much of MOD. The Corps needs to promote the idea that well-managed risk taking is encouraged, particularly during training. This conforms to the philosophy promoted by CGS at the recent RUSI Land Warfare Conference. Corps Offer to Generation Z. The Corps needs to understand the cultural shift from Generation X (now in their 40s) to Generation Y (now in their 30s) to Generation Z, now coming of age. This last generation are used to a sophisticated media and technology diet, respect authority only when they feel that it is deserved, want their voice heard and will walk away if bored. Andy Dobson suggested some ground rules for dealing particularly with Generation Z but pointed out that the rules apply to any decent organisation. They should be familiar to any good leader and may appear at first sight banal but are worth repeating:

Do:

Provide people with a sense of belonging - and make them feel welcome.

Ensure people have interesting and challenging work, which gives them a sense that they are making a genuine contribution: an “Employee Value Proposition”

Ensure that they understand the organisation's mission and where they fit into it.

Give people as much autonomy as they can handle Don't:

Rely automatically on top-down leadership.

Use pejorative language, punish or ignore inconvenient or alternative views

Assume that people are going to give your organisation a long-term commitment Theme 4: External changes needed for optimum results from Project Boyle Acquisition Agility: CDIO is encouraging MOD culture and process to match the speed of change by the more agile of our potential opponents. If the Corps aspires to be the “cool organisation” to which competent and lively people wish to belong, it will need support from CDIO, a senior figure already dedicated to achieving such change. Lessons from GCHQ? There may be merit in examining the GCHQ model of agile change: it still appears to obey government rules but to gain faster responses than was possible previously or than MOD manages now. The key is to be able to innovate: this means accepting failure as a part of normal procedure, a concept promoted by CGS at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in Jun 16. Doctrine. The Workshop commented on the “doctrinal famine” surrounding C4ISR, Cyber, ICS and IX. Some high level approaches are possibly being developed by DCDC but there may be a case for the Corps to work with Army HQ and DCDC to develop a doctrinal framework for this area of competence.

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Commercial Issues. A more open minded approach to relationships with commercial concerns will need support from CDIO. These firms may be supplying or competing to supply the Army with systems and services but we may need to pursue a close relationship with some of them to share technical competences and make the Corps more fit for purpose. ITEM 3: RESOURCING AND MENTORING The workshop suggested that the enemy of change is not active resistance but inertia. Leadership. The changes envisaged could be profound. If we mean to make them, we need strong leadership from the top and at all levels of the Corps. The workshop took the view that the conditions now in place could not be better:

CGS is driving the Information Manoeuvre Initiative which demands a professional focus.

The Master is committed to the need for change and as DCGS is in a powerful position to support it.

The Army CIO, who works for him, is equally committed.

The CDIO has already set an agenda similar to that which the three RSI Boyle workshops suggest.

The other services see the Corps as a potentially powerful focus for ICS excellence whose potential is yet to be realised.

We have allies all round us, rooting for our success. Carpe diem! A Change Team. A dedicated change team is needed to develop a plan, clarify priorities and drive these fundamental changes to the Corps culture, competences and approach. It will need strong leadership and the support of the entire Corps. Failure to do this properly will generate more cynicism and change fatigue. Adequate Resources at a time of Stringency. If the initiative to change the Corps in the way suggested here is to succeed, it needs adequate resource: without that, the Corps will be seen not to mean it. The Corps now needs to select the leader, probably at 1* level, design the Team and fill it by early 2017. Governance and reporting arrangements are needed to ensure support and guidance. This could be done within the KINGS CROSS/MARBLE ARCH framework as long as it maintains momentum and agility and is not bogged down by the heavier initiatives. Mentors. A Mentoring Group may be helpful. Some delegates said that it was vital for success. It would support the Change Team from outside the Corps. Its tasks could include:

Supporting and mentoring the Change Team and its leader

Validating plans for change

Helping the Change Team to stay abreast of outside developments

Advocacy within the Stakeholder Community when needed

Providing creative impatience by acting as a gadfly when initiatives get bogged down

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ANNEX F SUMMARY POINTS FROM WORKSHOP 4: COMMANDING OFFICERS 6 OCT 16

RECORD OF POINTS MADE

ITEM 1: 21 COE Delegates were asked to assess a list of factors describing aspects of the 21st Century OE and answer the question: “Which of these factors (or other factors not on the list) will most affect the way that the Corps should shape up to the 21st Century?.” Responses were: Nature of combat environment now changing: From a past dominated by complicated problems and Force on Force Warfare, to a present dominated by complex problems and Asymmetric Warfare, to a future dominated by incomprehensible problems and faceless enemies. Agility. Some opponents have IT and C4ISR systems as good as ours and some can use them more effectively and upgrade them more easily. So we must promote innovation in the Corps and the Army, not just the lip service given in the past. We must be prepared to take risks to do this. The risks must be understood by the whole supply chain. And we must remember governance, integrity and security. Adaptability. We will constantly meet demands for which we are not trained. Good basic education and a culture of innovation and creativity is needed. Our better soldiers have this already: but the Corps culture is risk averse and does not always encourage it. This must change. Close relations between the Corps, Army, Joint Forces, CDIO, ISS and industry are needed to ensure: Streamlined processes to meet the challenges of 21COE. Co-operative approaches to operational, technical and financial risk in the supply chain Adaptability to respond to rapidly changing challenges and opportunities ITEM 2: THE CORPS TO MEET THE 21 COE CHALLENGE Delegates were asked to produce a rich description of the Corps which would meet the 21 COE challenge. The structure used is based on six themes. Groups 1 and 2 focussed on Themes 1 and 2, Groups 3 and 4 on Themes 3 and 4. All groups debated Themes 5 and 6. The themes chosen are: 1. Competences 2. Education, Training and Professional Development 3. Culture and Relationships 4. Marketing and Communication 5. External Changes needed to promote success 6. Making Change Happen Throughout the workshop, reference was made to the Gartner Modes Diagram, below. Note: the version here has been further developed for the Final Report. The current version is in the main body of this report.

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POINTS MADE ON THEMES 1 AND 2: COMPETENCES, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1. At the moment, our obsession with networks leads to our focus on Means (kit, systems) rather

than Ways (processes, methods of handling battle information) let alone Ends (commanders’ intent, innovative approaches stemming from a clear view of the military and government vision for any operation)

2. So the Army needs the Corps to take on higher levels of the ISO model and get into software, applications and presentation. But delivering networks is still a core task.

3. Need to be both (a) ISP and (b) Thought Leader on Information as a Weapon System: must be able to change gear as a Corps of experts between Modes 1 and 2. The key for Mode 2 is that it combines deep knowledge of what is technically feasible with understanding of the military context as seen by the commander or COS. Combination of both modes in the Corps will be very powerful.

4. Limiting Corps Mode 1 activity to military ISP was too restrictive. See the list of possible Corps activities at Annex B. These now need critical analysis in developing the vision.

5. The Corps and the Army as a whole must think more effectively about future developments in military information: either from its own think tank (RSI on steroids?) or via a revitalised Information Doctrine Centre for the Army as a whole, for which the Corps could take the lead role. It could be a renewed version of C2DC/CSDC. It may be worth considering a Joint approach to this requirement, based on DCDC.

6. Need to invest in people and mean it: this means accepting that even junior NCOs should take responsibility (with guidance) for the skills and competences that they want to develop

7. Competence based frameworks, based on SFIA, may be the way to help this happen. Use modular training more: people respond well to bespoke training that speaks to them

8. Put less initial emphasis on formal qualifications and more on aptitude (test for it) and on the job training: take the risk that some will fail.

9. Where qualifications are relevant, map them properly and stop making people do formal courses to achieve qualifications that they have reached previously in different structures.

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10. Enable selected Corps people to carry out attachments or courses on innovative stuff with industry leaders: some money will be wasted but the results could be powerful for the Corps

11. Allow soldiers to dip in and out of the Army and Industry throughout their careers 12. STEM qualified people are important and we need more. But GCHQ are also dealing with the lack

of UK STEM people by selecting carefully and educating non-STEM people with impressive results. The Corps should learn from this, maybe directly from GCHQ.

13. Some aspects of what we do are not core to Royal Signals: consider (eg) outsourcing stores management and drivers to RLC. Even some aspects of power supply could go to the Sappers. Then we can concentrate on ensuring that recruits do the jobs we promise.

14. Need frequent access by front line units to deep, professional IT skills in (eg) cloud, big data, security etc. ISB proposal is worth following up to gain access to deeper, continually updated IT skills. Another approach may be to use the RAMC method of access to specialist doctors by offering special commissions. And yet another is the US approach of uniformed specialist civilians. These are worth exploring. Whatever the solution, it would need to take into account that some of these people could be needed in combat areas: terms of service would have to reflect that.

15. Should we make a stronger play to recruit apprentices? Are we doing enough already? 16. “Train them so they can leave: treat them so well that they don’t want to” (Branson via Pope):

bear this principle in mind during implementation of Boyle 17. Already our JNCOs show that they are frequently capable of taking more responsibility than they

are given: maybe we need to do more to exploit this. Closing the decision loop low down is one aspect of agility and could lead to more job satisfaction.

18. Need to take a good look at how much we really need centralised training: it takes a lot of time and can be disruptive to units. Need consider more unit based and virtual training, more distance learning and more self -drive approaches. But must note that a strong sense of Corps cohesion is fostered by the YofS, Fof S and some officers’ courses. Must be careful not to lose this.

19. If we do go for more self-drive approaches to training, we will need a mentoring scheme to ensure that we don’t lose people by default and lack of nurture. A tutorial approach may be worth considering, giving a strong role to junior officers and SNCOs/WOs. But we need more than mentors: we need better HR in the widest sense.

20. We need to professionalize Army HR, to develop the HR skills to foster the 21 COE careers of the people we need in the Corps. More imagination, care and responsiveness needed.

21. This support in professional development needs a full professionalization of HR at APC and throughout the Corps, demonstrably devoted to developing the individual.

22. One key aspect of 21COE training is to develop a broad range of thinking skills from academia and from industry, to expand beyond the straightjacket of military thinking

23. Foster J/G 1-9 training to handle data across the range of Napoleonic branches but to cut to a better arrangement in time

24. A key competence for 21 COE is “military technical leadership”: it combines full knowledge of the technology, its operational uses, opportunities and implications, with the ability to see possibilities, take managed risks and inspire teams: as well as stretching the imagination of the commanders that we serve by offering innovative ways of using information.

25. Stop being parochial: fill E2 appointments even at the expense of E1 to ensure that we gain profile and experience outside the Corps

26. Careful consideration needed of the rules for Returns of Service: a number of good SNCOs are declining to go for Yeoman or Foreman rosters because of the restriction. No easy answer here but it may be possible to reduce Returns from 4 years to 2.

27. As a Corps, we need to do more to understand what the Army wants from us, what commanders and staffs (and units) requirements are. So we need to be better at the consultancy skill of asking the right questions as well as delivering the solutions.

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28. This last capability could be enhanced by developing more understanding how people under stress use information. (USMC have spent a lot of time on Wall Street learning this. Is there scope for us to spend time in the City?)

29. We need to be the thought leaders in working in denied environments: we are likely to meet such challenges soon, in spades.

30. The rigidity of the division between Supervisory and RD streams needs questioning: good people go to both streams and should be allowed to cross over and back.

POINTS MADE ON THEMES 3 AND 4: CULTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS, MARKETING AND COMMUNICATIONS 1. Must define the role of the Corps in terms that the public understand: create a professional

identity (a brand?) which makes sense to potential recruits, to the Nation, to Joint Forces and to the Army.

2. Brand is important: and must be grounded in the reality of everyday life in the Corps. If we fail to deliver what we sell, retention falls

3. Different aspects of the same brand should appeal to all our target audiences: 17 year olds will respond differently to a brand than experienced reservists with IT management skills.

4. Brand (Professional Identity) must be seen as a separate issue from the name of the Corps: if we have a strong brand, the name becomes less of a problem

5. Nevertheless, we need to consider whether some of our key terms are too arcane for potential recruits to understand. The problem is that they are at the heart of our culture: eg “Royal Signals”, “Yeoman” and “Foreman”. The key might be to concentrate at this stage on the real changes to be made and decide later how to dress them up.

6. We need to be seen by the Army as vital to support the planning stage of any operation: this is primarily a function of the personal qualities of our people as well as professional competence

7. Adaptability is vital and must meet the rate of commercial change. This calls for close relationships between Corps and ISS/CDIO, as well as with industry

8. The Corps offer (fascinating work, leading edge technology, professional development, useful qualifications, danger and excitement) needs to match reality: but that need not mean that signallers never do tedious jobs. We need to create a rich picture of life in the new Corps and to sell the whole package as a brand. The credibility issues here are important, particularly with a young workforce sometimes poor at coping with frustration or at being told to do unpalatable things.

9. Must develop a culture of more risk acceptance: that means understanding risk management in much the same way as a mountaineer or a parachutist understands it, but more: in a complex delivery chain we also need to understand just who is taking a particular risk. Is it operational, financial, technical etc?

10. With that comes the acceptance of a cult of experimentation, that a degree of failure is acceptable provided that managed risks have been taken and that failure is treated as a learning point

11. Close, mutually beneficial relationships with both Defence and IT industries needed. Exchanges both ways could be very useful to both.

12. Future industry exchanges should be at a lower level, possibly even JNCO in time. Rules against poaching will be needed but we have done this already with current exchanges.

13. Pay is an important factor, but only when a sense of being valued, of professional satisfaction and commitment to personal development starts to falter

14. Nevertheless, is there mileage in attempting to gain more freedom at Corps level to offer money as part of the incentive to the people we want to gain and retain?

15. A cultural change is needed in two apparently contradictory directions: a. We should be MORE tribal and prouder of the Corps than we are: we need to develop a proud

Regimental spirit, based on the unique skills we possess

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b. We should be LESS tribal internally: kick down the barriers between trades and regiments, go for a competence framework, become less rigid

16. Professional accreditation likely to be a key part of the sales package: and is vital to enable us to gain the ISS and Joint jobs. The RAF are good at seizing these jobs because of their serious approach to gaining formal qualifications.

17. Career management must improve and give soldiers the confidence that they are really being well managed to make best use of their talents and experience. APC must raise its game and be more professional and more responsive to individuals.

18. Stakeholder management of the new stakeholders in the R3I and joint communities will be vital. RSI could assist here.

19. Need clarity on overall responsibilities in the new information driven Army staffs. Eg, applications development responsibilities of Corps and of functional leads like Log and Int will need clarifying. Is this a job for the proposed Information Doctrine Centre?

20. USP for the Corps (and the Army as a whole) is the antithesis of current on-line life: we are not an atomised society but a tightly bonded group which relies on trust, self-reliance and commitment. This aspect of Corps life should be promoted.

THEME 5: EXTERNAL CHANGES NEEDED TO PROMOTE SUCCESS 1. Napoleonic staff structure may be too rigid for 21 COE: UK may need to re-examine the viability

of this J1-9 arrangement. 2. Need to be able to increase speed of delivery of SA. But if we succeed, decision making tempo will

also need to improve. 3. A doctrine centre for C2 should be re-established to pull all these issues together: they include

improving tempo, application development responsibilities between R Signals and functional areas, closer working J/G, 1,2,3,4,6 etc.

4. Need to promote stronger links between the Army and UK Society: a smaller, less visible, less operationally active Army will become invisible and lose its roots unless we work on this.

5. The acquisition process is already changing but could benefit from more change on the lines recommended in the RUSI Big Data report of Sep 16: more use of the “Permanent Beta” concept for wider uses than Cyber and Big Data

THEME 6: MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN The Forum was asked whether incremental or fundamental change was needed to make the Corps fit for purpose in 21COE. The majority believed that there was a need for fundamental change. However, a minority argued strongly that a more incremental approach would be effective and less risky. 1. Arguments for Fundamental, Project Driven, Focussed Change

a. 21 COE presents massive challenges: need a focussed approach to meeting them b. Design and implementation of a new approach must be quick to be credible c. Juniors need to see change and to know that the hierarchy are serious about it d. We are losing some of our best people and must implement a solution quickly

2. Arguments for Incremental Change in a Measured Way by Normal Staffing Process

a. The Corps is not “broken” so don’t “fix it” b. A rush to implement hasty solutions will make matters worse: do it carefully and get it right c. We don’t have the resources to run a formal change project effectively in the way that

industry would tackle it. d. Danger of over-hype, over promising if we go for a fundamental approach. Don’t raise

expectations.

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3. A Significant Majority went for the Fundamental Approach. The points below are largely based

on this approach: a. Need to develop a clear and agreed picture of the end state that we are aiming for b. Use a recognised model and stick to it (eg Kotter’s 8 steps for change) c. Need for Committed High Level Support (eg) by the Master, who needs to decide formally

whether radical change is necessary and by the Army CIO as a key driver. If it is and if we really mean this Boyle thing to happen it should:

i. Be seen to solve a problem that we all accept needs solving. Develop the 21 COE argument more clearly with drivers for change spelt out

ii. Be properly resourced: good people will be needed to drive it, causing pain by their loss to current business. It cannot be left to be treated as Business as Usual

iii. Be driven hard: it must have a well understood plan with clear phases and milestones where real deliverables are seen by everyone in the Corps to be achieved

iv. Be widely understood, with buy in throughout the Corps. This means relentless communication throughout, using online forums, direct communication and the chain of command. Everyone in the Corps must feel they own it. Failure here could mean half-hearted adoption, lack of understanding and running into pooh-traps that juniors could have foreseen

d. A final point made was that the reservist view will be vital to help the Corps reach the best balance of talents and skills and should be a formal part of the implementation process.

FINAL REMARKS Each delegate was asked for a single final point that they felt strongly about. The points made are below. 1. There is a need to make officers and soldiers feel valued and that RCMOs, HR and the APC all

needed to be boosted and made more professional. 2. The technical educational standards demanded of our soldiers were set at too high an entry level

and that there should be a shift in emphasis away from academic to aptitude. The attraction of military life should continue to be stressed.

3. Stakeholders both inside and outside the Corps should be assured a voice so that resistance to change was minimised. So understand who the stakeholders are and so who the Corps needs to cultivate throughout the change programme

4. The relationship with industry should be invested in and exploited more fully. 5. If change is going to happen it must be seismic or it will not happen. The situation we face is too

serious for any other approach 6. The boundaries of the Corps and the stakeholders that we touch need clarity. 7. The career offer must address the ‘do-say gap’ and retain credibility. Our people should be allowed

to do the job they were recruited for. 8. The lack of professional satisfaction must be addressed and this should include the equipment,

HR management and employment experience. 9. The Corps needs to stop being so humble and take on a bolder persona. We know more than the

J1-J6 community think and more than we give ourselves credit for. 10. The Corps should be prepared to take pain at E1 in order to win more influence with E2 places. 11. The Corps should develop itself as a virtual on-line think tank and engage in, debate and challenge

orthodoxy. Our on-line presence is comparatively weak. The likes of the Deane-Drummond prize should be discarded and a more digital alternative sought. If we are going to lead the Information initiative for 21COE, we had better improve our own on-line management

12. A plea for the Master of Signals to take a conscious decision for changed priorities and these to be coherent, with delegated authority to implement once the plan is running.

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13. Care should be taken that outside influences, inertia, bureaucracy and blocks are not allowed to erode the changes sought. It cannot be a completely fresh start (a brownfield site analogy) but that should not be a constraint.

14. Dedicated implementation teams are needed to take ownership of their business areas be they Royal Signals or Army business (with the necessary clarity of which is which).

15. The LE potential is now being used more effectively but the Corps could still do more: the LE component too needs CPD if it is to realise its potential

16. A comprehensive Communication Strategy needs to be devised to inform the Corps of the forthcoming changes: we should be prepared to allow the Corps to hold us to account and should, if anything, over-communicate. This will take effort, resources and imaginative technology.

17. A plea for a Mode 2 type change to be used to implement Boyle. “We are tired of incremental change and an appetite exists for a radical approach.”

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F

BRAINSTORM RESULT: WHAT IS THE CORPS PROUD TO DO? Candidate List of Skillsets to Consider 1. Military ISP: skills of commercial ISP but in stressed and denied environments 2. Information Manoeuvre Enabler 3. Information Exploitation Professional 4. Information Assurance Professional (incl Security, Integrity, Availability) 5. Information Superiority Advisor 6. Data Analytics 7. Information Process Analysis 8. Information Architecture 9. Communications Professional 10. Network Provision Notes: 1. As regards Modes 1 and 2 (See Themes 1 and 2 Report in main paper), important to note

that Mode 2 is not the only Mode requiring creativity:

Mode 1 will need creative expertise in consulting, analysis, requirements definition, solutions, architecture, infrastructure engineering, life support.

Mode 2 will require all of this and move into more innovation, cyber and information exploitation to information as a weapon system

2. The list of possible skills above now needs critical analysis and prioritisation as part of the developing vision programme

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ANNEX G

SUMMARY POINTS FROM SEMINAR 1 DEC 16: STOCKTAKE WITH CORPS, ARMY, JOINT SERVICES AND INDUSTRY

CORPS “CROWN JEWELS” Bruce Wynn asked if the Corps had a clear idea of what its “Crown Jewels”, ie its key competences would be in 5 years. The answer would lie in a combination of Mode 1 and Mode 2 skills with more detail being provided by working through the aspirations of Appendix 1 to Annex F of this Report. MODES 1 AND 2 The meeting agreed that Corps competence in the reliable ISP delivery implied in Mode 1 was a precondition for being regarded by the Army as worth listening to about the more risky and visionary aspects of Mode 2. But made the point that we cannot afford to wait until Mode 1 competence is achieved before moving strongly into Mode 2. The Corps must start on both modes simultaneously. Mode 1 and Mode 2 skills will attract different sorts of people although some individuals will be competent at both. Basic Mode 1 skills will be needed by all in the Corps. But identifying and developing Mode 2 skills will need care and attention. It should start now and is the responsibility of senior officers in the Corps. For starters, it was suggested that the right sort of SMEs (Small/Medium sized Enterprises) might provide a useful model to study Mode 2 skills and behaviour. Others pointed out that operational deployments inevitably brought productive Mode 2 skills and behaviours to the fore: the concept (promoted by the former CINCJFC) that we are constantly at war in the Cyber environment might help us to encourage more Mode 2 behaviour. COMPETENCES Some industry delegates made the point that the Corps view of skillsets and competences appeared to be dangerously out of date: for example, SQL was referred to in Corps documents as a currently needed skill. This indicated that the Corps was not keeping abreast of industry developments, notably in data. Delegates made the point that the real focus for skills in an ISP for both modes was in Data Level skills, handling big data, working with functional areas using it and developing creative and co-operative skills to fulfil an indispensable role as a key arm of the CIO. They also made the point that rate of change of technology and of social mores and behaviour meant that the Corps would be constantly reinventing itself and would need to cope with constant churn in both competences and equipment. Training regimes would have to handle this and accept more training direct with industry. Heavyweight approaches involving long courses would not work.

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Points on Competence made by Former Supervisors Nigel Cullen and other former supervisors made the points that

We are still tip-toing through the nettle patch instead of grasping it and ripping it out

There is rightly emphasis on the officers: but the people who pull the irons out of the fire are the soldiers.

The Implementation Plan needs to really focus on soldier competences with more regard to what is going on in industry: we won’t get another chance for a long time

There may be merit in going for a single trade of ICT Support until enough is known of the individuals to stream them out later into specialisations.

Corps soldiers should be able to do 3 things, in order: Know the System, Use the System, Abuse the System. Short cut to the last two at your peril!

Thus, the approach to Trade Groups and training needs to be the most radical element of implementation. There should be no sacred cows.

It was suggested that a White Paper written for 11 Signal Brigade may be helpful in guiding the implementation of Project Boyle. The title is “Future Delivery of Level 3 ICS Support”, Version 1.1 Feb 16.

The point was made that an enabler missing from the Vision statement is:

Take ownership of, and drive the development and implementation of the Doctrine around delivering Information Services on Operations. There are too many people/organisations out there that do not have a clue how they will force generate ICS and the enabling CIS when the next operation happens.

Competence to integrate and manage those services, owning the deployed architecture, and having the correct and rehearsed D&C should be the Corps Purpose.

Finally, Phil Whitehead, a former Supervisor working with Nigel Cullen, was moved to write a short personal analysis of what he believes to be wrong and what needs now to be done. Unusually for a report of this kind, the author of this report regards the Whitehead letter as so important that it is reproduced in full at the Appendix to this Annex. It is recommended that the Implementation Team take note of its points

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APPENDIX 1 TO

ANNEX G

A NOTE ON TRADES BY PHIL WHITEHEAD I attended the RSi Seminar in London last week on the outcomes of Project BOYLE. I found the seminar to be stimulating and it was heartening to hear that the consensus was quite clearly in favour of the need to change. The team have done a great job. I have been wrestling with the subject of Royal Signals trades in my mind for some time as it is a subject close to my heart. I left the Corps under a medical discharge but felt that I had unfinished business. I was fortunate enough to find work with C3IA and was subsequently placed into 1 Signal Brigade as the Technical Architect for the Magpie system. Here I encounter the full spectrum of Royal Signals business, from the soldiers that lay the line in ARRC Main, through the engineers that make the systems work all the way to the officers and staff to whom we provide service, but critically I can now view it from an industry based perspective. It seems to me that there are no longer trade divides in the Corps (even though that is the doctrine and the way the training regime works). Instead soldiers who are malleable and determined to succeed fit themselves into roles in which they were never intended (Operator SNCOs leading Level 3 Network Support teams), and also JNCOs taking the lead in an NER because they are simply the most qualified in the subjects required. These examples are positive ones, but there are many more negative examples, where individuals have had difficulty finding how they can add value due to a lack of skills or experience. I have therefore concluded that there are three broad categories of Royal Signals Soldier in the modern Corps:

1. Those that can, through intelligence, willingness and opportunity. 2. Those that could, if provided with the knowledge and opportunity. 3. Those that should, but are not motivated or suitably knowledgeable to do so.

In the first category above are those soldiers that, through lucky opportunities and personal motivation, have gained the correct knowledge and experience in a subject (a large part of which has been gained in their own time or through personal study). They are also fortunate enough to have found themselves in the correct role and unit with suitable management and leadership recognition to enable them to make a difference. In the second category are those who want to make a difference and strive to learn how to add to the main effort. They are prevented from fully succeeding due to poor leadership, a lack of sufficient education or a failing notion of the legacy trade structure (e.g. operators can’t do that!). With the removal of a few barriers and the smallest amount of investment in enabling knowledge, these soldiers will absolutely move themselves into category 1, to the benefit of the Corps. Category three above contains arguably 50% of the Corps. These are people who joined with the genuine ambition to succeed, but through a series of pigeon holing, bad management and apathetic assignments now find themselves unwilling to participate to their fullest in the delivery of effect. These people may have previously been in one of the above two categories, but have taken one too many knocks and may begin to form the opinion of ‘why should I bother’. There are no financial, promotional or other incentives in the Corps which genuinely work to motivate soldiers, in fact its almost a punishment to succeed. This fact, coupled with such a thriving STEM industry in this country is devastating for retention (I cite the recent wave of LE officers leaving as one example).

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As an anecdotal example, soldiers that are successfully selected for the FofS course become ineligible for promotion to SSgt until the end of the course, which has previously been 20 months or longer. This is despite them being in the top of their peer group. When finally promoted to SSgt at the end of the course they are then faced with the shocking outcome of PD6 which then prevents promotion until some arbitrary time in the future which is aligned across the MoD. This is the exact situation I found myself in prior to my discharge. As the youngest person on FofS course 78 by a clear margin, I achieved top student and was promoted to SSgt (FofS) on my 28th birthday (a coincidence only that my birthday was the last day of the course). Due to PD6 I then found myself facing 6 years of assignments with no opportunity to promote. This is despite the fact that after my first two year tour as an instructor at Blandford, I was given acting WO2 rank for three years! I don’t mention the above out of spite or any malice against the Corps, but out of disappointment as this kind of de-motivational policy is still having a massive impact, moving soldiers into category three every day. So then to some of my thoughts on solutions. The seminar hit several key areas that have been in my mind for a few years, but most disappointingly the key area which I have heard time and time again barely featured. There was a clear acknowledgement that the key to success lies in the fields of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM), but no mention as to how the Maths and Science components will be included. It is absolutely the requirement that the soldiers who deploy on operations need to be as flexible and capable as possible. The road to developing these soldiers does not lie in a long series of technology courses, as was undertaken in the burdensome preparation for Op HERRICK. The best chance of success lies in educating our soldiers in the founding principles which underpin engineering, leading to a deep comprehension and easy adaptation of the technology. It is widely recognised that training in current technology only permits a person to use that specific technology in the specific way that technology was taught. It is therefore rapidly out of date and rarely maintains relevance into the future. Foundation knowledge however never loses relevance, can always be added to and allows a person to derive conclusions and solutions from first principals on their own, without the need for continuous retraining. The method outlined by Al Long was close to correct. Conducting foundation training and unlocking Class 3 pay early is a definite boost and is a great start, but more must be done beyond the foundation training to truly give the soldiers the capability they will need to move forward into technology optimisation. Beyond foundation training (which must have a heavy dose of maths and science), I would propose a soldier led career path whereby they chose the modules which interest them (a key trait in category 1 people is their deep interest in the subject). This doesn’t have to be wholly outwith the Corp’s influence, and where there is a need for a specific type of individual, influence can be applied. It is critical to define now, the types of roles our soldiers are likely to need to undertake (these are not analogous to trades). From these roles we can then derive the types of skills a soldier needs. The skills pathway the soldier selects will make them suitable for several role types and depending upon the experience level required to conduct the job, or their career target (which ironically still fits our supervisor roster, with the addition of the clerk of works type) they can be placed into roles just outside their skill base, but with the aim to develop them (but critically, not just to fill a hole). The model displayed on the training slide developed by the Corps FofS(IS) seemed to colour code by group, types of skills together. This is a good idea. If a soldier, based on their career path shows an

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aptitude and interest in apps/coding/web technology, then they should also be encouraged to cover identity and access management and security and drive towards a FofS(IS) supervisory role for example. To get there they will need to gain much foundation knowledge in critical underpinning theory and scientific principals (such as computer architectures and machine code for example). Once some knowledge is gained, they must then be allowed to gain experience of some roles in the field. Layering knowledge and experience is the best way to achieve confident and reliable tradespeople, combining this with the soldier led, modular approach is, in my honest opinion, the best way to deliver the best and most agile minds to the field army. In all of the talk of theory there will still be those who ‘choose’ not to take it further. Not everyone likes academics, and within the Corps not everyone needs it. It will have to be clearly articulated to those choosing to select non-academic subjects that their career profile will be limited, but they still have great capability to become CLS or comms media specialists. Later down the line, if these soldiers feel their preferences have changed then additional theory (in the form of ITIL or project/facilities management) could lead them to the clerk of works roles described during the seminar. In order to structure the proposal above into something more manageable by the training establishment the soldiers can still attend residential training for a period of time. As many junior soldiers may not quite know what they would like to do early on in their careers, packages of skills most needed in the Corps could be put together for the post foundation-training element. 3-4 modules of skills based training such as service desk skills, basic IT support and basic infrastructure configurations (fibre, copper, wireless infrastructure plus switch hardware) are all generic skills useful in many environments. Another good component early on could simply be ‘how’ to manage their own career, for supervisors/SNCOs, career mentoring could be a valid module. I believe the above could be implementable and exceptionally useful for the Corps, without getting our soldiers locked in to technology led trade structures. There will always be a need for familiarisation with specific technology implementations (CCNA/P, Microsoft certifications etc.) but investment in those soldiers with the requisite knowledge and experience to gain from these courses can be better targeted for success. I have met many a soldier who has done a Sharepoint administrators course, but who has never had the need to administrate Sharepoint. And here lies the carrot, incentivisation of the academics and foundation material if you will. If soldiers show aptitude and willingness to learn and participate in their own development, certification in specific technologies (which can be costly as an individual) can be unlocked once they have achieved a predefined skills base and if the roles they occupy can draw benefit from the qualification (CCNA has a 2 year time limit, if a soldier is not in a networking role, then benefits may not be realised). This gives the soldiers a genuine feeling of payback for the effort (if the salary cannot meet that requirement fully in line with industry). The time-boundedness of industry courses holds another lesson for the Corps. Once a soldier is trained in a subject, how do we provide continual assessment and professional development? In the current model, if a soldier leaves training and undertakes no other form of course, they are still considered a tradesperson. Yet if a soldier leaves basic training, they are required to complete MATTs the following year to confirm their validity as a soldier. A component of the above could see the introduction of some form of compulsory Technical Annual Training Tests. These may be simply the completion of some distance learning modules in support of their skills pathway, but could equally be genuine reassessment of skills (17th edition is a good example for power based skills). Competency management is key to the proposal as is the APCs integration with it when placing soldiers where they are best suited. This also will clearly require roles and PIDs to be assessed to a much greater depth than they are right now to facilitate this placement. I accept there are significant

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changes in the proposal above which will need careful thought, but this is more down to the lack of imagination thus far in soldier training, rather than the grandness of this proposal. In summary, the above is my current thinking to date on the direction the Corps could take. I have formed this opinion from a highly relevant role, with the perspective of industry, but with the experience of 16 years service in the Corps and 3 years as an industry partner to the Corps. I hope that the vision I have presented above is coherent enough to add value to the outcomes of Project BOYLE, I thank you again for the seminar and for you time in reading this letter. Yours sincerely, Phil Whitehead BSc(Hons) iEng MIET Principal Consultant for C3IA Technical Architect for Magpie on behalf of 1 Signal Brigade

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ANNEX H

SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL FOR AN INFORMATION SERVICES BRANCH WITHIN ROYAL SIGNALS

The workshops identified concern about the Corps trying at the same time to be both broader (engaging with Joint, establishing better relations with OGD, commanders, academia, industry etc) and deeper (integrating apps, changing security profiles, doing data analytics, debugging operating system glitches etc). How can we train non-geniuses to do both?

One Idea to address the point above: develop an Information Services Branch, distinct, but not separate from the Corps

The Information Services Branch would do the “deeper” work above: o Provide support to main Corps units o Eg specifying, designing and installing formation HQ ops rooms o And doing much the same for deployed formation HQs o Work on short term, project based attachments o This would allow ISB people to stay professionally up to date o Need regular, frequent working with commercial ICS firms

Differences between ISB and main Corps: o ISB has a distinctive culture, like PQE in Sappers o Higher priority in ICS skills and lower on military o Promotions based on professional ability and qualifications o Leadership less top down than main Corps, works on empowered teams o Personal development more technical and commercially based

This would leave the mainstream Corps to do the wider, relationship based work. The idea is addressed more fully in an article by Capt Martin Crilly in the RSI Journal of Summer 2016. This is one of several ways of addressing this issue: for the time being, it may worth focussing on developing the model started by 254 Signal Squadron while other aspects of Boyle are finding their level.