ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 1

- Flora Pidoux

P u t i n ’ s r e c e n t e l e v e n - d a y

disappearance raised a lot of speculation

about his health and the future of Russia.

The Russian President reappeared and

everything went back to ‘normal’.

However, ‘normal’ has dramatically

changed over the past year. The new

normal is characterized by a high degree

of tension between Russia and the West,

epitomized by the economic sanctions

Russia is faced with, but above all by the

fact that territorial sovereignty has been

violated.

On March 18th, the Ukrainian

separatists and Moscow celebrated the

first anniversary of Crimea’s ‘return’ into

the Russian Federation. The past year has

reinforced Russia’s grasp on the separatist

region and highlighted the West’s

powerlessness in face of the situation. It

has also increased the fear of Ukraine’s

neighboring countries’, namely the Baltic

countries and Poland, as some fear they

are next in line for a Russian invasion.

This issue aims to analyze how and

why we have found ourselves in a

situation where the gap between Russia

and the West is growing everyday.

The Growing Gap Between Russia

And The West

Volume 5 - Issue 3 March 2015

Contents:

Is The Kremlin Heading For Cold War II?

Mr. Ofer Fridman analyzes Russia’s unique perception on war, which has been shaped

by the country’s unique geographical and historical characteristics.

The Gap Between Russia And The West

Mr. Tommy Alexander Lund gives recommendations from Georgia’s South-Ossetia

issue that could be applied to Ukraine when facing the current crisis.

From Europe To Eurasia: Russia’s Shifting Economic And

Political Focus

Ms. Catherine Lefèvre’s article focuses on each parties’ policies that keep pushing

them away from each other, namely the West’s sanctions against Russia and the latter’s

effort to build a strong Eurasian Economic Union to counteract the EU.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Russian President Vladimir Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, and

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, during peace talks in Minsk, Belarus, in February 2015 (Photo: Reuters)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 2

first time in Russian history that an agreement, which was

signed with another state, defined Russian domestic re-

forms, and, from the Russian perspective, where Moscow

accepted the US as an external referee for its internal re-

forms.

This policy started to change during the mid-1990s for

two main reasons. The first one was domestic. Internal

pro-Western decentralisation policies, formulated in an

attempt to be appreciated by the West, created economic

chaos, notions of separatism and the potential danger of

additional secessions. The second reason stemmed from

the Western reaction, or lack thereof, to the Russian at-

tempt to Westernise itself. According to Russian analysts,

the West showed little appreciation for Russia’s willing-

ness to conform to western principles and did not show

any desire for integration with an economically strug-

gling, politically unstable state that had been, until re-

cently, its number one enemy.

While the course of Russian foreign policy generally

preserved its pro-Western narratives, the main emphasis

of Moscow’s new doctrine changed in the second half of

the 1990s, from an unequivocal agreement, to political

bargaining. Utilising the political advantages of being the

only successor of the USSR, i.e., the biggest nuclear

power and a permanent member of the UN Security

Council, Moscow started to replace the ‘romanticism’ of

the early 1990s with a more pragmatic approach. The

Kremlin carefully began to demonstrate and defend its

interests. The best example of this transformation is Mos-

cow’s reaction to the Kosovo crisis. The Kremlin’s sup-

port of the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in 1995

and 1996 (mainly due to the fact that Russia was a part of

the solution) was replaced by a firm opposition to the

NATO intervention in 1999.

By Ofer Fridman

T he past year has probably been the most

challenging period in NATO-Russian rela-

tions since the end of the Cold War. The

escalation of the Ukrainian crisis and the following con-

frontation between the Kremlin and the West has trig-

gered many speculations about the possibility of a Sec-

ond Cold War. Western experts are puzzled by Russian

policy decision-makers, the Kremlin’s real intentions in

Ukraine and how far Moscow is willing to go in its rela-

tions with the West. This article discusses the evolution

of Russian foreign policy in the past twenty-five years

and some predispositions of Russian culture in an at-

tempt to establish a more constructive view of the real

motives behind the decisions taken by the Kremlin.

The Evolution Of Russian Foreign Policy And

The Ukrainian Crisis

The Cold War ended, similarly to other big wars of

the 20th century, with a clear winner and a clear loser.

While there were many countries and nations that con-

sidered themselves victors, Russia was the only nation

that was not only defeated in the Cold War, but also felt

defeated. Although NATO's tanks did not parade on the

Red Square – there was no need for it – the Russian

economy was destroyed, political instability and corrup-

tion tore the country apart, and most importantly the

Russian people felt deeply defeated, an entirely new

feeling for a nation that had never really lost a war.

In the early 1990s, this feeling led Russian political

decision-makers to believe that Russian domestic and

international success would result by becoming a part of

the West. The best example of Russian attempts to be

integrated with the West was the 1992 Charter for

American-Russian Partnership and Friendship. It was the

Is the Kremlin Heading for Cold War II?

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 3

Meanwhile, the Russian economy started to recover.

Building on rising oil and gas revenues, the Russian eco-

nomic growth of the first part of 2000s was unprecedent-

edly high and fast. This success had an immediate influence

on domestic public opinion that considered Putin as the

‘savior of the nation’, ‘restorer of order’, and ‘distributor of

wealth.’ Consequently, it was not surprising that on this

wave of economic success and domestic support, the Krem-

lin started to re-evaluate its position in global affairs.

Building on its economic success, the Kremlin was finally

able to reconsider its position regarding the West. The com-

bination of economic growth and the Soviet legacy in for-

eign policy transformed Russia back into one of the most

significant international players. It was the beginning of a

new period in Russian foreign affairs – a period of “Russian

Revitalisation” based on segregation from the West.

In 2008, Putin left the presidential office and was re-

placed by Medvedev. While the West naively interpreted

this move as a change of leadership, Russian political ana-

lysts had no doubt that Putin, formally the prime minister,

was in fact Russia’s top leader. Putin gave Medvedev a man-

date to pursue a more liberal foreign policy in an attempt to

improve the Kremlin’s relationships with the West – a sort

of scouting mission, to try to determine what was possible

to achieve with the United States and Europe.

Four years later, after understanding that Medvedev’s

liberal approach did not show any signs of success, Putin

decided to come back to office as President in 2012. Since

then, Putin has paid special attention to the implementation

of the “Russian Revitalisation” concept in foreign policy. It

was not an aggressive change but an amplification of several

major narratives that had underlain Russian foreign policy

since the mid-2000s.

The culmination of this aggressive approach is the crisis

in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s intervention in the conflict.

On the one hand, Russia’s support to the Ukrainian separa-

tists was a direct continuation of the Kremlin’s foreign pol-

icy course that has been undoubtedly designed by President

Putin. On the other hand, many Russian analysts claim

that Russian intervention clearly reflects the rising power

of Russian nationalism. In analysing the different trends in

Russian public opinion, it seems right to claim that the

Russian people support their government and their Presi-

dent, and are ready to pay the price of a Western reac-

tion. To understand this, it is important to focus on Rus-

sia’s cultural perspective on war, or, in other words, on

when the Russian people are ready to defend their inter-

ests and ultimately pay the price for them.

Russian Cultural Perspective On War And The

Ukrainian Crisis

Russia has always enjoyed the advantages of having

access to a massive territory. However the lack of natural

geographical borders left this enormous flatland unpro-

tected and exposed to invasions. This geographical vul-

nerability has had throughout history one the most signifi-

cant influences on the composition of the Russian charac-

ter. Geographically unprotected and placed between the

centres of two different civilisations (the Western and the

Asian) Russia had suffered repetitive invasions through its

history. In 1236, the Mongol Empire (the Golden Horde)

conquered most of Kievan Rus’ and established more

than 200 years of the Tatar-Mongol Yoke; in 1571,

the Crimean Khan Devlet I Giray raided the Tsardom of

Russia and set Moscow on fire; in 1610 the Polish

King Sigismund III occupied most of the western part of

the Tsardom, putting his son Wladyslaw IV Vasa on the

Russian throne (although the son never actually ruled); in

1812, Napoleon invaded Russia, defeating the Russian

army and conquering Moscow; and finally, in 1942, Ger-

man forces occupied most of the European part of the

USSR, besieging Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. This

ruthless military experience predetermined the Russian

mind to a defence without support, to rely only on their

own forces, distrust all allies and to eternally wait for the

danger of a new invasion or attack that can materialise at

any time.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 4

the historical southern part of Russia and 74% see Crimea

as Russian land. Building on their aforementioned histori-

cal and cultural predispositions, Russians are ready to

suffer the consequences of Western reactions, or at least

as long as they feel righteousness and trust their leader-

ship to lead them to victory regardless of the costs. They

are ready to endure reducing their spending and their

needs, but they are not ready to change their attitude to-

ward what they perceive as a just battle.

The Ukrainian Crisis – Implications For NATO

Some western experts see President Putin as pri-

marily responsible for the course of the Russian foreign

policy and the Russian intervention in Ukraine. The big

picture, however, is much more complicated. “Bringing

Crimea back home” was barely an act of pure Russian

imperialism or an attempt to rehabilitate Soviet influence

on a rebelling country.

On the one hand, it is easy to argue that Russia seeks

equality with the West, and as the West (especially the

U.S.) is not ready to give up its leading positions, the

Kremlin expedites confrontation. Based on the Russian

and Soviet Imperial legacy it is also easy to interpret Mos-

cow’s position as an attempt for a dramatic comeback to

the global arena. On the other hand, however, it is im-

portant to understand that in the Russian context, foreign

policy pursued by the Kremlin and the attempts of the

Russian leaders (Tsars, General Secretaries of the Com-

munist Party, or Presidents) to get the domestic support

required to stay in power, have always been intercon-

nected. History has shown that whenever the political

leadership executed foreign policy against the will of the

people, it always ended in a coup.

Russian people have always been ready to defend

their Fatherland facing a foreign enemy. From the 13th

century’s Tatar-Mongol Yoke, and through to Napoleon’s

and Hitler’s campaigns, the Russians demonstrated in-

credible levels of patriotism and readiness to fight against

In the Russian mind, Russian history is the history of

defence; accessible from all flanks, Russia was a kind of

a ‘sweet booty’ for the nomadic East, as well as for the

settled West. This territorial vulnerability has always

been an incentive that drove Russians to expand their

territory by conquest (Russian Empire or the USSR) or

by economic or political pressure (the Commonwealth

of Independent States or the Eurasian Custom Union),

thus protecting Central Russia – the historical heart of

the Russian state.

All the major wars that designed the Russian charac-

ter occurred on Russian territory, extensively involving

the Russian civilian population and encoding within the

Russian mind that war is a choice between fighting and

being destroyed. Obviously, the general Russian reac-

tion to war involves more universal merits, such as pro-

tection of the nation, of the home, religion, state, etc.;

but as a result of the historically established belief that

war is a people’s affair rather than a state’s – the most

fundamental reason for war in the Russian mentality is

the protection of one’s life and one’s family. While the

West fights to make the world better, Russia fights to

survive.

The notion of war is sunken deep within the Russian

character and its modern interpretation is not far from

the Russian traditional explanation of war, as described

above. The Russian historical narrative of war – protect-

ing one’s life and one’s family, fighting to survive rather

than to better the world – seems to be as concrete as

ever before at the beginning of the 21st century.

In the eyes of the Russian people, the Kremlin’s

intervention in Ukraine is considered to be a fully justi-

fied struggle, as it protects the Russian people and their

land. Different surveys, done by a Russian non-

governmental research organization, the “Levada Cen-

ter” (famous for its criticism of the Kremlin leadership),

show that 46% of Russians believe that Novorossiya is

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 5

power was overestimated for so long.

It seems, however, that this lesson has been forgot-

ten, as the main discourse between Western experts is

about the Kremlin’s political domestic weaknesses rather

than masterful political system that skilfully manipulates

the public opinion on the one hand, and knows to comply

with the emerging cultural trends on the other. While

the very relevant question in the title of this article is

whether the Kremlin is heading for a Cold War II, the

answer seems to be irrelevant. History proves that in the

wave of nationalism and patriotism, the Russian people,

led by a strong leader, demonstrate levels of endurance

and sacrifice that cannot be grasped by the Western mind

that has entirely different cultural predispositions and

interpretation of conflict.

From many perspectives, Russia is still an enigma.

Learning from history, however, it seems wise to prepare

for the worst, that is to say to overestimate Russia and

assume that the Kremlin is heading for a new Cold War,

rather than to base the decision-making process on the

assumption that Putin is weak. Too many times, during

the history, Russia surprised countries that were not pre-

pared for worst-case scenario, and NATO should learn

this lesson.

Ofer Fridman is a PhD Candidate and Sessional Lec-

ture at the University of Reading, UK.

D. Trenin, Russia’s Breakout from the Post-Cold War System: The Drivers of Putin’s Course, (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2014)

Bogaturov, ‘The three generations of the Russian Foreign Policy Doctrines’, Mezhdunarodnyye Protsessy, Volume 5, No. 1(3), January-February 2007, (Russian)

Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center), ‘The acces-sion of Crimea and the involvement of Russian volun-teers in the East-Ukrainian conflict’, 10.11.2014

the adversary and were ready to suffer the consequences of

protecting their country. While some western experts

claim that the intervention in Ukraine was explicitly used to

generate domestic political support, the opposite might be

true. As some Russian analysts claim, the Kremlin’s deci-

sion to take Crimea back was, in fact, an act intended to

avoid public unrest and redirect Russian rising nationalism.

As previously discussed, historical-cultural predisposi-

tions have led Russians to believe that the lives of their peo-

ple have to be protected at any cost. Putin knows that de-

spite any reservations about their national leaders, Russian

people will rally around their leaders for the duration of a

just struggle, and in exchange, they expect their leaders to

stand firm and lead them to victory. Putin has little choice

but to show himself as the straightest nationalist in Russia

(as he proudly proclaimed himself at the 2014 Valdai Dis-

cussion Club) and lead his people into the conflict that they

are ready to be a part of.

While many western experts interpret Putin’s interven-

tion in Ukraine as an attempt to recruit the masses in times

of domestic political vulnerability, the West, in general and

NATO in particular, should not underestimate neither

Putin’s grip on power, nor the credit and support that the

Russian people give him. Putin did not reinvent Russian

nationalism but he turned himself into its leader. Undoubt-

edly, one of the real reasons behind Russian intervention in

Ukraine is Putin’s personal ambitions, but the cultural and

historical based willpower of the Russian people is the en-

gine that empowered Putin to act - willpower that even

Putin has to comply with.

NATO decision makers who assess Russia in light of the

Ukrainian crisis, should remember that the Cold War was

won only due to a 40 year-long military and political over-

estimation of the USSR power, especially Russian domestic

politics. The fall of the USSR was a complete surprise for

the West that could not grasp the weakness of the Soviet

leadership in the late 1990s – leadership, whose grip on

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 6

By Tommy Alexander Lund

T here was a sign of relief in the corri-

dors of the European Commission

when the results from the Moldovan

parliamentary election were announced in Novem-

ber last year. The pro-European bloc managed to get

a majority in the parliament, which ensured that the

Association Agreement they had signed in June 2014

with the European Union would be pushed further.

For Russia, it was another reminder that the

countries that were once in the geo-political sphere

of the Kremlin were getting further and further away

from its influence. It also emphasized that the only

country to the West of Russia that had not signed an

Association Agreement was Ukraine. From Putin’s

perspective, if Kiev signed such an agreement with

the EU, it would definitely put an end to his dream

of holding the same influence in world politics as the

Soviet Union once did, but more importantly, it por-

trayed Russia as a weak regional power.

This paper argues that the best solution for

Ukraine lies neither with NATO nor Russia. The EU

and NATO must continue their efforts to build up

economic and political relationships with Ukraine

without fully incorporating them into their organiza-

tions. This paper tries to understand Russian motiva-

tions from the perspective of the last 10 years and

focuses on Georgia’s experience in regards to Rus-

sian aggression.

A Need To Understand Russia

When the Soviet Union was dissolved, Russia was

on the brink of an economic collapse. The transition

to market economy created a hyperinflation that

wiped out personal savings and led to the financial crisis

of 1998. The scars from this period still seem to influ-

ence the ambition of Russia today. Until the economic

sanctions imposed by the western world started in

March 2014, Russia experienced an average 7% GDP

growth from 2000-2008, and poverty decreased from

30% of the population to 14% in the same period.

Putin managed to use economic resources to force

countries like Armenia and Kazakhstan away from the

negotiation table with the EU to direct them towards

the Kremlin-controlled Eurasian Economic Union

(EEU). Putin himself saw the Eurasian Economic Un-

ion as a direct opponent to the European Union. How-

ever, the future of the EEU is unsure now that the eco-

nomic incentives Moscow offered have shrunk due to

the financial sanctions imposed by the West following

the annexation of Crimea and the collapse of oil prices.

The illusion of democracy is vital for Russia, as the

country wants to be seen as a modern country that re-

spect international principles, and therefore be consid-

ered as a global leader. The western world has accepted

Moscow’s undemocratic practices as the only alterna-

tive to the chaos of the unregulated and corrupted Rus-

sia of the 90´s. Despite the clear anti-democratic ten-

dencies that Russia has gone under with Putin, his popu-

larity is still on the high end of the chart, without any

indication that this will change anytime soon. It hit its

peak in August and has only shown a slight downfall

even though the economic structure and stability is de-

scribed as “second to only Venezuela” on the negative end

of the CNBC chart on potential for long-term economic

growth. Some of the reason for the President’s popular-

ity can be attributed to the stability he established in the

The Gap between Russia and the West

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 7

short time after he ascended to the presidency. Combined

with the drastically increased standards of living for the

average Russian citizen in the years after Yeltsin, Putin is

seen as the man who could lead the country back to the

world stage as a noticeable actor. Although Russia is now

facing an economic downturn, the situation is still far from

what it was right after the Cold War, and many Russians

are grateful for that.

The Russian President was also successful as an interna-

tional diplomat. When the US was on the brink of a new

armed conflict with Syria following the use of chemical

weapons by Bashar al-Assad’s regime, it was Putin who

offered a solution to the conflict. The events and Russia’s

implication in finding a

“solution” forced the interna-

tional community to accept

that Russia was a global actor

to reckon with. According to

Time, it was “the first time in a

generation that Russia managed to

pull such a diplomatic maneuver.”

Putin made his country

stronger and more influential

as time went by. Before the crisis in Ukraine, there was no

sign that could suggest that Russia would not expand its

role as a global and influential actor. So why did Putin

gamble away his political prestige and a strong economic

growth to destabilize Ukraine?

Russian Expansion

The annexation of Crimea was, for Russia, a demon-

stration of power which also acted as a test to see how the

West would react. As a result, the relationship with both

the US and the EU sunk to a new low, and the Western

governments imposed sanctions that badly hurt the Rus-

sian economy. In response, Russia increased the nationalis-

tic and anti-Western rhetoric to unite the country under

the leadership of Vladimir Putin. The annexation of

Crimea led many observers to believe that a funda-

mental paradigm shift was happening, from politics

based on a state driven foreign policy to one based on

ethno-nationalist ideas. However, the relationship

between Russia and Ukraine was on the edge long

before the Maidan revolts, as illustrated by the years

of political tensions following the Orange Revolution

in Ukraine in 2004. The appeasement of the situation

under the Ukrainian president Yanukovych led the

international community to hope for regional stabil-

ity.

The signing of the controversial Kharkiv Pact be-

tween Kiev and Moscow in 2010 gave Russia a lease

on the Black Sea bases in

Crimea until 2042. In re-

turn, Ukraine got a heavily

discounted price on Rus-

sian natural gas from Gaz-

prom. Despite the im-

provement in relationships

between the former two

Soviet countries following

the election of a pro-Russian government, underlying

tensions remained. While the Kremlin had the ambi-

tion to include Ukraine in the Eurasian Customs Un-

ion, Yanukovych said no, knowing it would close the

door for a future membership in both NATO and the

EU. In the events that led to the Maidan protests,

Russia offered further discounts on energy prices and

much larger financial aid than the EU could offer. As a

result, Yanukovych announced his decision to post-

pone a further cooperation agreement with the EU.

The situation escalated and Yanukovych fled in the

midst of the protest. The Kremlin blamed the West

for illegally deposing a democratically elected govern-

ment and refused to recognize the new government.

Former Presidents Dimitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych

signing the Kharkiv Pact 21 April 2010 (Photo: Kremlin.ru)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 8

Since 1991 each government that has led Ukraine

has stated that the country is a part of the European

continent and that the country’s future identity is

European. However, the implementation of this pol-

icy has been delayed by factors such as corruption,

irrational decision-making and international meddling

from outside actors. The economic situation of

Ukraine in 2013 gave Yanukovych no choice than to

accept the economic and political terms demanded by

Putin. Before Maidan protests started, the situation in

Ukraine was dire. Foreign debt had reached 77% of

GDP and foreign reserves had fallen by 30%. Mykola

Azarov, the Former Ukrainian Prime Minister, called

the IMF’s demands for an EU

financial package was “the

straw that broke the camel´s

back”. A look from a financial

and economic perspective tell

us that Ukraine was backed

into a corner, and did not want

to go through the same eco-

nomical slimming diet that

Greece endured. Lubomyr

Hadja, a history professor at Harvard, explained the

following events as a different view on what the trade

agreement stood for. While the politicians saw it as an

economic agreement that would take sovereignty

away from Ukraine, the demonstrators of Maidan

Square saw it as a political agreement that committed

Ukraine to adhere to certain European values and

principles, an opportunity for them to fight corrup-

tion.

For Russia, the Maidan riots was not just loss of

control of Ukraine, it was a diplomatic humiliation

that could not go unnoticed. While Russia just pas-

sively grumbled under the Orange Revolution, they

now saw the Maidan events as direct provocation. For

Russia, the expansion of western influence into Rus-

sia’s traditional sphere of influence had gone too far.

As they did in 2008 in South Ossetia, Russia felt that

they had justification to invade another country.

The Lesson From South-Ossetia

The cases of the war in Georgia in 2008 and

Ukraine in 2014 are noticeably similar. First, both

Georgia and Ukraine have pushed forward with mem-

bership in both NATO and the EU. In 2013, Mikheil

Saakashvili stated in a meeting with US Secretary of

State John Kerry that Georgia´s survival was depend-

ent on further integration within Western institu-

tions. Both countries were denied membership at the

NATO summit in Bucharest

in 2008, just five months

before the start of the South

Ossetia war. Second, in both

instances Russia justified its

aggression with the reason of

protecting Russian speakers

and citizens.

Even though the similarities

and parallels to the South Ossetia war are numerous,

there are some important differences. While Georgia

was in direct military confrontation with Russia,

Ukraine is still officially in a state of civil conflict

where Russian denies direct involvement with mili-

tary forces. In addition attention on Ukraine is much

higher because of its direct borders with NATO and

EU member states.

The South-Ossetia war also showed that even

though Russia could claim a victory, their ability to

meddle in Georgia has been less than expected. Geor-

gia did not join EEU and now has closer ties to the EU

than ever before. As of the third quarter of 2014,

their economic growth was 5, 6%. Georgia has shown

A referendum poster in Crimea

(Photo: Zurab Kurtsikidze/EPA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 9

that making a deal with Russia is not synonymous with

giving the Kremlin control of the country. An example

Ukraine can learn from in the future.

Balancing The Diplomacy

The lack of commitment from the Ukrainian govern-

ment to reform did not go without consequences. Crimea

is now under Russian control and populated by a majority

of pro-Russian inhabitants; the industrial stronghold in

the South-East is under control by separatists and the re-

sources Ukraine sits on are used to wage a war against

separatists. For many other European countries, the situa-

tion is worrying. The dilemma of having Russia as an ally

and having access to Russian gas and energy is vital for

countries like Poland and Ger-

many, however putting the secu-

rity of the EU and NATO’s closest

members at risk is not acceptable.

Ukraine has become the main

reason for the gap between the

West and Russia over the past

year. As previously discussed,

Ukraine is an independent country

that does not desire to be subjected to Russian interests.

Even the pro-Russian former President Victor

Yanukovitch declined to engage his country into the Eura-

sian Custom Union, and it was only when his back was

against the wall that he agreed to discontinue the partner-

ship with the EU.

Ukraine is however still not ready for a fully commit-

ted relationship with the EU, in any shape or form. The

future road for the country is to take advice from the

West and take the time to build up the social and cultural

infrastructure needed to reach European standards, a

strategy proven successful in many cases.

The relationship between Russia, the EU and Ukraine

is very complicated. Looking from the rise of anti-

Western sentiment and nationalism in Russia, it is rea-

sonable to believe that a normalization of diplomatic

relations between the West and the heir of the USSR is

over. There will still be Russian flights over the Baltic

and submarines down the Norwegian coast. The nor-

malization period of the 90´s and early 2000’s is over.

Now is the time to admit that Russia and the West are

competing for the same international market. This

does not mean that there should be a new Iron Curtain

in Europe. The factories in the east of Ukraine are still

of vital importance to Russia since it produces goods

that are vital for its military, and the majority of East-

ern Ukrainians identify themselves as Russian.

The situation in Ukraine forms only part of a larger

picture. However it can be ex-

pected that there will be no going

back to normal political relations

between Russia, Ukraine and the

West. Neither Ukraine nor the

EU can afford to let Russia take

more Ukrainian territory and

incorporate it into the federation.

The fear that it will promote a

pro-Russia uprising in the pro-Russian regions of the

Baltics and Moldova is real. Ukraine has signaled that it

is willing to cede a good deal of autonomy to its east-

ern regions, but not give away the sovereignty to Rus-

sia. Ukraine is not a healthy country. Corruption and

heavy bureaucratic red tape is still affecting the effi-

ciency of the country. To survive they will need heavy

economic help from either the West or Russia. This is

difficult since especially Germany is hesitant to put

Ukraine on the same economic restrictions as Greece

as it could destabilize Ukraine further. Russia on the

other hand is losing money on maintaining control over

Crimea. A solution is desirable for both sides economi-

cally, but the terms must meet the high expectations of

Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko at the Peace

talks in Minsk in September 2014. (Photo: Roland Oliphant. The Telegraph.)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 10

each side of the negotiation table.

Conclusion

Shall Ukraine prosper, a middle ground should be

found somewhere between the EU and Russia. It is in

the West’s interest to recognize that Russia’s fears of

NATO are real; a simple look at the map will tell that

including Ukraine into NATO would change the

power balance. When the inclusion of Ukraine into

the EU would defeat Russia politically, an inclusion

into NATO would be seen as a direct threat against

their territorial integrity. With NATO off the table,

Europe will have a stronger hand for Ukraine in fu-

ture negotiations with Russia.

The best path Ukraine can take is to learn from

Georgia. The latter has shown that close relations

with the European Union are still possible even after a

direct conflict with Russia. The biggest problem with

Ukraine is it internal governmental structure. The

focus on long term planning and institution building is

vital for the future of Ukraine. As long as resources go

to military build-up, Ukraine will be deadlocked in a

vacuum between East and West. Ukraine has no other

choices than to find the middle-road.

Tommy Alexander Lund recently concluded a

Master’s Degree in Social Science with specialization

in Political marketing at Copenhagen Business School.

Mr. Lund has previously worked as military officer in

the Norwegian Navy and written several articles

about political and diplomatic culture in Europe.

Vladimir Putin statement viewed on 25.02.2015 http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3- US department of State: Status on Russia. Viewed on

26.02.2015: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160474.pdf The Atlantic: Russian Ruble crashes. Viewed on 25.02.2015 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/12/putin-man-year-russia-ruble/383809/ Friedrich ebert stiftung. The future of EU-Ukraine Rela-tions. Viewed 25.02.2015 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10608.pdf Harvard. The conflict in Ukraine: a Historical Perspective. Viewed 19.02.2015 http://www.summer.harvard.edu/blog-news-events/conflict-ukraine-historical-perspective Time Magazine: Russia celebrates a Triumph for Putin after clinching Syria deal. Viewed on 21.02.2015 http://world.time.com/2013/09/16/russia-celebrates-a-triumph-for-putin-after-clinching-syria-deal/ Stratfor: Baltic concerned about large Russian minority. Viewed on 21.02.2015 https://www.stratfor.com/image/baltic-states-concerned-about-large-russian-minority Tsygankov Andrei: Vladimir Putin´s last stand: the sources of Russia´s Ukraine policy. 12 December 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1005903 The Guardian: Let Georgia be a lesson for what will hap-pen to Ukraine. Viewed on 28.February 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/14/georgia-lesson-for-ukraine-crimea-referendum-trick Forbes: The invasion of Crimea is hurting Russias other exclave. Viewed on 27.02.2015 http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/06/the-invasion-of-crimea-is-hurting-russias-other-exclave/ London School of economics and political science: EU-Russian relations have been further strained by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine’s decision to sign agreements with the EU. Viewed on 22.02.2015 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/07/03/eu-russian-relations-have-been-further-strained-by-georgia-moldova-and-ukraines-decision-to-sign-agreements-with-the-eu/ Oxford institute for Energy Studies: The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe.March 2009. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG29-TheImpactoftheRussiaUkrainianCrisisinSouthEasternEurope-AleksandarKovacevic-2009.pdf H Haukkala. 2014. From cooperative to contested Europe? The conflict in Ukraine as a culimination of a long-term crisis in EU-Russia relations http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782804.2014.1001822#.VPcm-2MsE9U

A Łoskot-Strachota, G Zachmann. 2014. Rebalancing the EU-Russia-Ukraine gas relationship http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/106321 Korosteleva, Elena (2014) Moldova’s Values Survey: Widening a European Dialogue in Moldova. Project report. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/39201/

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 11

By Catherine Lefèvre

T he events of 2014 in Ukraine were funda-

mental in changing the dynamics between

Russia and the West as their relationship

reached its lowest point since the disintegration of the

Soviet Union. It is no secret that Russia’s relationship

with the West had already begun to cool down by mid-

2000, but the current situation would be best described as

icy. However, whilst the Ukraine crisis and subsequent

annexation of Crimea have driven a wedge between Rus-

sia and the West, another more

long-term development may yet

push the two further apart, espe-

cially if the West persists in its

current policy of sanctions and

exclusion.

How, When and Why Did

Russia Distance Itself From

The West?

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991

and as many former Soviet countries began to move to-

wards the West, Russia was presented with a new geopo-

litical landscape. As a result, it also endeavored to move

closer to and integrate with the West.

Moscow began to cooperate with NATO and develop

good relations with the US under the leadership of Boris

Yeltsin. This culminated under Bill Clinton, who success-

fully pushed for the addition of Russia to the G-7 in the

late 1990’s, despite protest from Germany and the United

Kingdom.

However, these attempts at integration were ulti

mately unsuccessful. There are a number of reasons and

theories as to why, but many argue that despite Russia’s

efforts, the West was simply unwilling to fully integrate

with Russia. Any integration it had achieved happened for

primarily political or strategic reasons, not out of the

West’s desire to include Russia or integrate with it.

Despite this, in his first term as President, Vladimir

Putin seemed to be welcoming integration with the West.

After the NATO airstrikes on Serbia in March 1999, Rus-

sia had suspended its relations

with the organization, but after

Putin became the acting presi-

dent of Russia in early 2000 he

resumed Russia’s relations with

NATO.

After the events of Sep-

tember 11th 2001, Russia and

the West once again began to converge as Russia formed a

new alliance with the US, renewed its relations with the

EU and NATO, and supported the US war on terror.

During this period, Putin also proposed a deal to the US

through which they would accept its global leadership in

return for being recognized as a major player in charge of

the former Soviet sphere of influence.

However, this offer was rejected by the US in 2001 as

it was not prepared to allow Russia to reign freely over

the recently independent former Soviet countries. After

this, Russia tried a new tactic and sided with the Euro-

pean countries that had opposed the US-led invasion of

Iraq in 2003. It hoped that by partnering with Germany

and France it would counterbalance the US and the UK

From Europe To Eurasia: Russia’s Shifting

Economic And Political Focus

G8 Nation Leaders, Italy 2009 (Photo: g8Italia2009)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 12

and would be offered to join the West by siding with

Europe. But despite having previously enjoyed good

relations with France, Germany and the US govern-

ment under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s

hopes did not materialize and the country was left out

in the cold.

Also in 2003, the EU developed its European

Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which focused on coun-

tries located in the shared neighborhood between it-

self and Russia. Through the ENP, Europe began to

expand further east towards Central and Eastern

Europe with the aim of promoting peace and stability

in these neighboring countries, many of which were

formerly part of Russia’s sphere of influence. With

the US and Europe promoting governmental changes

and Western values in these countries, Russia felt

threatened.

As the ENP was being launched, Vladimir Putin

was reelected for a second presidential term from

2004–2008. In contrast to his previously pro-West

agenda, Putin had adopted a more assertive foreign

policy agenda and opted to make Russia an independ-

ent power, distanced from the West.

For the first time since the break-up of the Soviet

Union, Russia’s relationship with both the US and

Europe had deteriorated simultaneously between

2003-2005.

The New Quietly Emerging Sphere Of Influence:

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)

With Russia feeling increasingly excluded and fur-

ther distancing itself from the West, it dramatically

increased its focus on its immediate neighborhood,

ultimately culminating in the creation of the Eurasian

Economic Union (EEU).

The EEU is not the first Russian attempt at pro-

moting integration and good relations in the former

Soviet region. Immediately after the break-up of the

Soviet Union, CIS was formed and over the proceed-

ing decade many other initiatives were set up to pro-

mote economic integration such as a free trade agree-

ment and the Eurasian Economic Community

(EurAsEC) in 2000.

Later in 2007, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan

signed an agreement to set up a Eurasian Customs

Union (ECU) in another effort to promote Eurasian

economic integration. The three founding countries

later expanded on the ECU framework through the

introduction of a common customs tariff launched in

2010. The following year they introduced a common

customs territory plan that removed border checks

and controls between participating countries.

Subsequently, all three countries decided to con-

tinue the expansion of the ECU, paving the way for

continued economic integration and the creation of a

single Eurasian market supported by an economic un-

ion. In late 2011, Moscow, Minsk and Astana signed a

treaty that aimed at the creation of a new economic

union based on the model of the EU, and established

the Eurasian Commission and the Single Economic

Space (SES). Russia in particular considered the crea-

tion of an economic union to be a priority.

In the meantime, the EU continued to expand fur-

ther East until it reached Ukraine, a country located

strategically between the European Union and Russia,

and considered by many to be the cradle of Russian

civilization. Both entities made an offer to Ukraine to

join their union, instigating an intense and divisive

power struggle within Ukraine. Despite the general

public opinion in Ukraine showing favour towards the

EU, in November 2013 the then Ukrainian president

Viktor Yanukovych decided to move closer towards

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 13

Russia instead of signing an association agreement with

the EU, plunging the country into widespread protests.

The crisis in Ukraine progressed rapidly as protests

escalated all over the country. President Yanukovych was

ousted in February 2014, and in March Crimea voted in a

Russian-supported referendum considered illegitimate by

the West and Ukraine, to join Russia. The same month,

the EU and the US decided to impose sanctions on Russia

ranging from travel bans to the freezing of assets belong-

ing to officials that had enabled the Crimean referendum.

In May 2014 the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and

Belarus signed a treaty to officially establish the Eurasian

Economic Union (EEU). In doing

so, they committed to guarantee-

ing the free movement of people,

capital, goods and services and to

working together to coordinate

economic policy in areas such as

agriculture, energy, transport and

industry.

With many accusing Russia of

acting as an agent provocateur in

Ukraine, annexing Crimea and

moving further away from the West through the EEU,

many commentators at this time were proclaiming the

highest tensions between Russia and the West since the

end of the Cold War.

However, the worst was still yet to come. In July

2014 Russia’s relationship with the West suffered another

blow with the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17

above Eastern Ukraine, territory under the control of pro

-Russian separatists.

This event led to yet more sanctions being imposed on

Russia by the EU and the US in an effort to weaken its

economy. The sanctions focused on the energy, finance

and armament sectors; US citizens were prevented

from trading with three Russian banks, the EU limited

Russian institutions from accessing its markets, Russia

had its access to sensitive technologies restricted and a

trade embargo on weapons imposed. In retaliation,

Russia limited its imports of Western produce and

meat.

These sanctions have had the desired detrimental

effect on the Russian economy: they have made Russia

highly dependent on its oil exports and with oil prices

dropping to their lowest level in years, and with infla-

tion on the rise causing the value of the Ruble to drop

by over 40%, the Russian economy has begun to stag-

nate. Indeed, after these latest

sanctions, Russia experienced

its first negative growth since

2009, and further sanctions

could easily put its economy

into recession. However, these

sanctions also have a negative

effect on the economy of the

West as business and exports

with Russia become increas-

ingly limited.

However, despite the sanctions and the ongoing

crisis in Ukraine, Russia launched its EEU project on

the 1st of January 2015. The first member to join the

EEU outside of the three founding members was Ar-

menia who became a member on the second of January

2015, having signed an agreement in October 2014.

The second will be Kyrgyzstan in May 2015, after sign-

ing up in December 2014, and other countries have

expressed an interest in doing business with the EEU.

In February 2015 the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah

al-Sisi declared in Cairo that Egypt will establish a free

trade zone with the EEU. Negotiations between India

Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh Presi-dent Nursultan Nazarbayev and Russian President Vladimir

Putin sign the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union on May 30th 2014 (Photo: Internationalbite.com)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 14

and the EEU are also in progress.

Western Sanctions Side Effects

Although primarily focused on targeting Russia, the

Western sanctions have also had the side effect of causing

disagreements over trade between EEU members. In con-

tradiction to the EEU’s free movement of goods, Russia

banned the importation of certain goods from Belarus in

2014 to prevent it from reselling EU goods to Russia, and

similarly prevented food exports from Belarus to Kazakh-

stan by not allowing it to transit through Russian terri-

tory.

The EEU And The EU

The EEU is by far the most sophisticated type of cus-

toms union achieved in the post-Soviet space and the fur-

thest it has come in terms of full economic integration.

After the addition of Kyrgyzstan, the EEU will have a

population of over 175 million people and cover 15 per-

cent of the world’s land mass. Whilst these statistics are

impressive, they are also concerning for some, especially

the EU who worry that the EEU is simply another at-

tempt by Russia to reassert its influence and power over

the post-Soviet sphere. Since the birth of the ECU, the

EU has been cautious in its approach, maintaining only

certain contacts and a monitoring role. The EU’s primary

concern with the Customs Union, and subsequently the

Eurasian Economic Union, is the effect it has on its rela-

tions with Russia. Through the ECU Russia has insisted

on working at only supranational level – that is ECU to

EU – rather than on a country-by-country basis.

The EU was hesitant to do so given that it considered

the ECU to be fundamentally flawed in its design, offer-

ing little in the way of true free trade, and its suspicion

that is was also simply a tool for Russia to reassert itself in

the post-Soviet space. This suspicion is understandable

given Russia’s disregard for sovereignty as illustrated in

the Ukraine and Crimea crises.

However, just as with the sanctions, the EU’s

stance on the ECU and EEU may work against it in the

long term; cooperation with the EEU could potentially

aid both institutions, politically and economically and

therefore help reduce the gap between Russia and the

West.

Indeed, in recent months the EU has softened its

approach to the EEU, even going so far as to consider

Russia’s proposal to formalize relations between itself

and the EEU through the creation of a Free Trade

Area. However, many commentators attribute this

softer approach by the EU to be in response to the im-

mediate need to appease Russia in an attempt to ease

tensions in Ukraine, as opposed to an effort to truly

engage politically and economically with the EEU.

Conclusion & Recommendations

The growing gap between Russia and the West can-

not be blamed solely on Russia; through successive

exclusion, the West has to shoulder some of the blame

for the current state of East–West relations. If this

situation is to be reversed, the West, specifically the

EU, needs to start cooperating with the EEU in order

to bridge the gap in their relations. Whilst the EU has

so far taken some steps towards this, there is still a long

way to go, and given the current sanctions any dialogue

will be difficult. The EU’s hesitance is understandable

given recent events and its reservations about the

EEU’s precursor, the Eurasian Customs Union. How-

ever, if both organizations cooperate, even only on a

basic level, it could substantially help to improve not

only their relationship but East-West relations in gen-

eral.

Catherine Lefèvre holds a bachelors degree in Inter-

national Relations and masters degree in Public Policy.

She currently works as a director at the policy institute

About the author

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 3 15

she co-founded in 2013, Global Public Policy Watch

(GPPW.org). She has previously worked as a re-

searcher in London and Glasgow in the UK and as an

intern at the Kosovar Center for Security Studies

(KCSS) in Pristine, Kosovo. She regularly partici-

pates in EU security events and publishes articles on

Eurasian and Central Asian security issues.

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Bibliography

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