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International Strategic Studies, Islamabad.
ADVISORY BOARD
Dr. Naeem Ahmed Salik, Senior Research Fellow CISS
Dr. Adil Sultan, Ph.D Qauid-e-Azam University
Dr. Tahir Amin, VC, Bahauddin Zakariya University
Dr. Shabana Fayyaz, Assistant Professor, Qauid-e-Azam University
Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad
Dr. Salma Shaheen, Independent Analyst, United Kingdom
Dr. Christine M. Leah, Ph.D, Australian National University
Dr. Walter Anderson, Senior Adjunct Professor, John Hopkins University
Dr. Rizwan Zeb, Independent Analyst, Australia
EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor in Chief Ambassador (Rtd) Ali Sarwar Naqvi
Editor Col. (Rtd) Iftikhar Uddin Hasan
Associate Editor Ms. Saima Aman Sial
Assistant Editor Ms. Maryam Zubair
IT Support Shahid Wasim Malik
www.ciss.org.pk
@CISSOrg1
Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS)
Center for Interna�onal Strategic StudiesCenter for Interna�onal Strategic StudiesIslamabadIslamabad
Center for Interna�onal Strategic StudiesIslamabad
Quarterly Journal ofCenter for International Strategic Studies
Vol-VI, No.1March, 2018
4 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
PAGE
ARTICLES:
i
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities Muhammad Sarmad Zia
1
ii
The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response Riaz Khokhar
23
iii
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan Samran Ali
50
iv
Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches Afeera Firdous
70
BOOK REVIEWS:
i Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma-Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations
95
ii The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry
between India and Pakistan 99
iii Chris Ogden ed. New South Asian Security: Six
Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security 104
CONTENTS
1 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:
Challenges and Opportunities
Muhammad Sarmad Zia
Introduction
A country’s foreign policy is the lens through which it sees the rest
of the world. It is of crucial significance in correctly reflecting its
ambitions, goals and apprehensions vis-à-vis its neighborhood as
well as the regional and the international milieu. In order to
maintain cordial and balanced relations in the international arena,
states employ several different tactics and methods. In the course
of achieving this, states face many hardships. In this paper,
Pakistan’s foreign policy will be analyzed to lay out the challenges
it is facing currently and also the opportunities that are present for
Pakistan to explore.
It is a well-known fact that Pakistan’s foreign policy has undergone
changes several times over the last few decades. Both military
dictators and democratic leaders have shaped the country’s foreign
policy according to their governing styles, thought processes,
political influences and their understanding of the country’s
security imperatives. Meanwhile, the external factors such as
evolving regional, geo-political and global environment have played
an equally critical role in shaping the foreign policy of Pakistan in
different eras. Pakistan’s foreign policy at any given time is a
resultant of both these factors.
In achieving its foreign policy milestones, Pakistan has faced many
challenges and experienced pressure from global and regional
powers. The geo-political factors interplay with national
imperatives, which leads to a bargain between the two, and
adjustment of both domestic and foreign policy.
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A country’s foreign policy draws its strength from its domestic
power potential, more commonly known as its national power.1 The
elements that combine to forge national power can vary from a
country to country and are dependent on how the policy makers
utilize them. Pakistan’s strength lies in its geography, human
resource, natural resources, military, technological base, and high
morale of the population amongst others. Pakistan is situated in one
of the most important regions of contemporary world and can be
considered as a crossing point of world’s major energy routes and
economic linkages.2 Pakistan’s founder, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad
Ali Jinnah appreciated Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance and in
an interview to an American journalist in Septmeber 1947, he said,
“Pakistan is the pivot of the world, placed on the frontier on which
the future position of the world revolves.“3 Moreover, the situation
in Afghanistan, China’s interest in Pakistan, the rising strategic
importance of the Indian Ocean Region and Indo-Pak nuclear
stability-instability paradox mark Pakistan’s importance in the
international arena.
It is important to discuss the current situation in Pakistan – in light
of the evolving geo-strategic environment – to understand the
contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy which are constantly being re-
examined, re-organized, refined and redefined.4 Pakistan played an
instrumental role against Soviet Union in Afghan War during 1980’s
and again in US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, which resulted
in the reconfiguration of power quotient of stakeholders in
Afghanistan. Moreover, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001
precipitated grave destabilization inside Pakistan. The current
democratic situation in Pakistan is a result of the threats emanating
from many different sources which include several non-state
actors. The aftermath of the war in Afghanistan and India’s use of
non-state actors5 inside Pakistan has resulted in Pakistan
incorporating an internal security model and a security setup that
requires a strong injection of human resource and capital.
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For Pakistan, fostering a strong economic and security relationship
with a more powerful country is vital to its stability. Any
compromise on the security of the state, internal or external, is out
of question for any government in the country. Pakistan’s economic
and strategic imperatives are based on its national interest and
whilst in the current day and age no country can progress in
isolation, the essence of any policy is to ensure that it benefits the
state itself. Pakistan’s relations, bi-lateral or multi-lateral with
other states, are based on how they can promote the Pakistani state.
Pakistan’s internal and external security, cordial relations with all
states, economic development human development, protection of
overseas Pakistanis and projection of its soft image are some of the
imperatives of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Quaid-e-Azam’s vision of
Pakistan’s foreign policy was laid out in these words,
Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill
towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish
aggressive designs against any country or nation. We
believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national
and international dealings and are prepared to make our
utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and
prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will
never be found lacking in extending its material and moral
support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the
world, and in upholding the principles of the United
Nations Charter.6
The official text on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website
lays out the objectives of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy as:
Promotion Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate,
and democratic Islamic country.
Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world,
especially major powers and immediate neighbours.
Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests,
including Kashmir.
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation
with international community.
Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad.
Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for
regional and international cooperation.7
The current government of Pakistan has actively been trying to
achieve these objectives through its different ministries and
departments – all over the country; and embassies and offices – all
over the world. Although there is much work to be done and many
goals yet to be achieved, there are many milestones that Pakistan
has achieved over the years.
Decision-making in Pakistan
In the years since its inception, the decision-making process vis-à-
vis foreign policy in Pakistan has undergone several changes. The
military dictators, at least in the early years, it can be argued, used
the rational decision-making model8 which circumvented the
bureaucracy and other legs of the decision-making process. Since
the government was headed by a single person along with a small
group of close aides, the role of other power centers or offices
remained low. On the other hand, the civilian governments tend to
arrive at decisions using up different models such as the
organizational model or the governmental politics model.
Nonetheless, even in democratic set-ups, the rational actor model
(RAM) is often used to help explain the decisions. The tussle
between different ministries, power centers and political parties
has been a major challenge in Pakistan which can be explained
through the organizational model.
In the last ten years, Pakistan is leaning towards an increasingly
democratic set-up which is the first step in bringing in a foreign
policy decision-making based on democratic values. The decision-
making is a product of bargain and negotiation between internal
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factors which include the political leadership, foreign ministry,
military, and influential moulders of public opinion; and the
external factors such as evolving geo-strategic environment, global
economic trends, relations with a certain state or group of states
and harmonization with the requirements set by international
organizations.
With the third democratic government poised to set in after the
2018 elections, it is also likely that the institutions responsible for
policy making will gain strength. This will have a two-pronged
effect; one, that it would strengthen the democratic system, and
two, it will foment an environment where decision-making
becomes independent of personalities and instead draws strength
from the institutional set-up.9 Currently the Foreign Office, Prime
Minister’s office and military play an important role in shaping up
the country’s foreign policy as all three offices have different angles
and vantage points to assess the domestic and geo-political
environments.
Regards to important foreign policy and national security matters,
the Former Director General Inter-Services Intelligence Maj.
General Ashraf Jahangir Qazi notes that the security agencies,
primarily ISI in Pakistan, have a major impact on the formulation of
foreign policy through briefing to the Prime Minister and cabinet;
wherein regular reports to foreign office and communication
between numerous levels of ISI and Foreign Affairs both at home
and abroad – and input given to Joint Staff Head Quarters, Defence
Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet play a vital role.10
This information is provided to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
which has the primary responsibility of formulating policies and
keeping in view the foreign policy options based on various factors
and in accordance with changing environment and requirements.
The next step in the process is the policy draft being forwarded to
the Cabinet of the Prime Minister which may approve or reject a
policy recommendation. From here, if approved, it goes back to the
Ministry of Foreign affairs which then supervises its execution and
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
implementation. The core intelligence input into the decision-
making and formulation of foreign policy is provided by the
intelligence agencies, and primarily by the ISI which conveys this
information formally by three means:
1. Briefing to the Cabinet by DG ISI.
2. Regular reports to foreign office and interaction between
various echelons of ISI and MOFA (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) both at home and abroad.
3. Briefing at JSHQ which the DG ISI gives to all the service
chiefs. Similarly, DG ISI gives his input to Defence Council
and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Apart from this,
informally the Prime Minister may ask for a paper on any
topic to be formulated by the Intelligence or the Foreign
Office can require any information from ISI.11
In 2014, DCC was reconstituted into Cabinet Committee on National
Security (CCNS) to focus on national security policies of the
state.12 It is headed by the Prime Minister, and its members include
the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Finance,
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chiefs of Staff of
Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force. The committee meets to discuss
national security and foreign policy challenges and uses the input
from all concerned parts of the government. Upon the formation of
CCNS, Prime Minister Khaqan Abbasi’s office laid out its objectives
as,
The Committee will focus on the national security agenda
with the aim to formulate a national security policy that will
become the guiding framework for its subsidiary policies –
defence policy, foreign policy, internal security policy, and
other policies affecting national security.13
In the process of decision-making it is critical to understand that
Pakistan has a highly sensitized public ready to react to any
adventurous foreign policy action that goes against the generally
accepted norms and public opinion. Therefore, it is a difficult task
7 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
to drift away in a major way from the status-quo policies vis-à-vis
certain states. For instance, Pakistanis have an affinity towards
Muslim states, especially in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia and
UAE particularly. The Pakistani government enjoys brotherly
relations with both states; however, Pakistan decided to remain
neutral in the Saudi-led intervention Yemen against Iranian back
Houthis in 201514 owing to its national security issues as well the
problems associated with the intervention itself.15 This irked the
majority of Pakistani public who fervently support Saudi Arabia’s
regime owing to its status as custodian of the two most holy places
in the Islamic world. Similarly, Pakistan’s relations with China are
sacrosanct in both official and public domains. Therefore, the
foreign office must exercise extra caution with regards to devising
policies for these countries.
Overview of International Strategic Environment
A look at the international strategic milieu is a necessary
constituent of a discussion of the foreign policy of Pakistan. It would
be helpful in understanding how the relations and events are
unfolding in the neighboring, regional and global regions. The
interplay of regional and global power politics is also a factor and
determinant in shaping the foreign policy of a state. Pakistan’s
position in the world in terms of its geography, geo-political
position, military might, economic position and relations with other
states are some of the elements that determine how it is seen in the
world as well as affected by any transformations at regional and
global level. A complement to this phenomenon is also the interest
of different states in a region or a particular state.
It is important to see how Pakistan’s relationship with US – a global
power – and China, an economic powerhouse is shaping up. There
are a few changing trends in the international system which directly
affect Pakistan. A growing Indo-US relationship, the evolving
situation in Afghanistan, and the overarching US-China and US-
8 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
Russia relationships are both directly and indirectly impact to how
Pakistan pursues its foreign policy.
It can be seen that the US has an increasing tilt towards India. After
signing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal in 2008,16 there is a visible
alignment of goals by both states in South Asia and Indo-Pacific
region. While the US might seek to maintain its influence in South
Asia by empowering India and countering China, Indian objectives,
however lie beyond South Asia to attain global rather than just
regional relevance. The US policy in Afghanistan and its support to
India’s increasing economic activity in Afghanistan indicate the
shift in US’ Pakistan policy. President Trump’s South Asia policy,17
again, lays out how its priorities in South Asia have evolved and the
overall strategic goals that the US seeks to achieve.
The overall strategic environment is developing in the way that the
US sees China’s rise in terms of its economy and military revamping
as a threat to its global dominance.18 It is also true that the US
appreciates that China is beyond US’ control and China’s
maneuvering, in complete contrast to that of the Soviet Union, has
allowed it to cultivate economic, military and social links in many of
its neighboring states which give it the space to exercise its muscle.
China’s One-Belt, One-Road Project, despite its apparent economic
outlook is also seen as a status-quo challenge to the US. China’s
ambitious connectivity project circumvents any design to contain
the country in anyway. Pak-China Economic Corridor becomes a
factor of concerns for the US and India, as both view it as an effort
to decrease US’ influence in South Asia and other regions
constraining Indian space from expanding its influence. The US has
always been wary of Pak-China close relations19 and does not want
China to be dominating the economic and political sphere in South
Asia.
With Russia’s entry into the global power politics, the US and its
allies have termed it as a revisionist state. In the wake of the conflict
in Syria, Russia has taken the forefront and challenged the military
9 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
might of the US and its allies’ to keep Syria’s president Bashar-ul-
Assad in power.20 A growing Russo-China nexus can also be seen
with many joint economic projects worth billions of dollars. Both
states decided to trade in their own currencies, which will lessen
dollar’s importance. In South Asia’s context, as relations between
India and US climb new highs, the relations between Pakistan and
Russia also have witnessed a landmark change in energy and
military domains.
While it is fairly reasonable to infer that Russia’s warming up to
Pakistan is linked to Russia trying to diversify the market for its oil
and gas companies, defence production and securing new allies, it
also signifies Pakistan’s position in the regional context. Currently,
Pakistan and Russia also have a convergence of interests in
Afghanistan.
Challenges for Pakistan’s foreign policy
Pakistan is currently at a juncture where policy-making and its
implementation face immense challenges from both within and
without the government system. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has
capable officials, who are well-versed in both diplomatic relations
and crisis management, therefore, unwarranted, and excessive
political interference may impede efficient policy implementation
process. On the other hand, incapable political supervision is also
responsible for many issues at the national and international levels.
While the bureaucracy performs its daily duties and is headed by
the foreign secretary who is a career diplomat, the political head of
the ministry is the foreign minister who is responsible for the
state's diplomacy. However, from 2013 to 2017, Pakistan did not
have a Foreign Minister – the Prime Minister himself tended to
Foreign Ministry business, which was an added responsibility for
the country’s leader.21 This approach had several problems, some
of which include a passive foreign policy stance at many forums
where the foreign minister’s direct and personal involvement on
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
these occasions would have created greater impact.22 It was also the
first time a democratically elected government had completed its
tenure and transition of power had taken place to another
democratically elected government. It was a time for Pakistan to
celebrate and promote this newly achieved success by appointing a
minister who could project Pakistan’s soft-image all over the world.
Currently, Pakistan is facing an internal strife coupled with
aggression from two of its four bordering states i.e. India and
Afghanistan, and border force skirmishes with Iran. The internal
dynamics of the country in terms of its economy and human
development are also a downward trend. Pakistan’s position in the
global arena is in recent years losing its importance and has only
been in the lime-light for all the wrong reasons. Despite meeting the
same criterion as India on the Nuclear Supplier’s Group, Pakistan’s
attempt to join the multilateral forum has failed to garner much
support from the West. Moreover, Pakistan being put on the
watchlist of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which is an
intergovernmental body responsible for understanding terrorist
financing risks, developing global standards, and evaluating
countries' compliance is yet another failure on the foreign policy
front.23 Pakistan had previously been on the list until 2015,24
however, the placement on it once again is a cause for concern for
Pakistani experts on foreign policy and international law. It also
underlines how Pakistan is losing ground at the international
negotiation tables.25
Moreover, it brings out a very important aspect of alliances and
their limitations in international relations. Whilst Pakistan and
China refer to each other as their iron-brother and each state
supports the other at international and regional level, in the case of
FATF, China too had to retract itself from voting in favor of
Pakistan.26 Similarly, Saudi Arabia, with which Pakistan enjoys
brotherly relations, also pulled its support.27 Such foreign policy
failures have immense ramifications for the country’s struggling
financial markets and are bound to hurt the economic stability.
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As the regional geo-strategic environment seems to be developing,
a few points must be kept in mind. First and foremost, Pakistan is
losing its importance vis-à-vis India at many international forums.
Moreover, due to India’s economic success, a well drafted foreign
policy and an efficient highly visible overseas diaspora, it has
succeeded in sidelining Pakistan. While it is true that India’s rising
importance is attributed to other factors such as the US seeking to
contain China through India, it has also been immensely successful
in setting up its own narrative. One example of acceptance by the
global media and governments of India’s version is the ‘surgical
strikes’ episode in 2016.28 While Pakistan invited the international
media to conduct an independent survey of the area that India had
claimed to have carried out the so called surgical strikes in, the
Indian government refused to provide any proofs of these strikes.
India’s blatant refusal to allow the international media to verify
Indian claims did not turn the West’s view in Pakistan’s favor either.
It also undermines a core objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy – the
issue of Kashmir. Pakistan wants to resolve the issue amicably as
per the wishes of the people of Kashmir, however the Indian
government has increasingly been employing military means to
subjugate the protesting Kashmiri youth that does not want
Kashmir’s future to be linked to India.29 India’s use of Public Safety
Act (PSA) and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has
been instrumental in state-wide protests against Indian
aggression.30 The use of pellet guns which resulted in hundreds of
people getting blinded, injured and killed,31 and using Kashmiris as
human shields by the Indian Army32 have caused world-wide
protests against India’s tyranny in Kashmir.33 Nonetheless, India
has convinced the western countries that uprisings are instigated
by Pakistan which uses non-state actors to arm rebels against the
government.34
As the US interests in the region evolve, Pakistan will find it
increasingly difficult to deal with them. The growing Indo-US nexus
will pose several more challenges for Pakistan amid China’s rise and
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
the competition for power in the Indian Ocean Region. Pakistan’s
low economic growth and internal destabilization with sectarian,
ethnic and political strife are only limiting the state’s options at the
international level.
Opportunities for Pakistan
In the current geo-political and geo-economic situation, Pakistan is
fortunate to be at the crossroads where it can benefit from China’s
rise in both these dimensions. Pakistan’s status as the flagship
project in China’s Belt and Road Initiative also known as One-Belt
One Road (B&R/OBOR) bestows upon Pakistan immense
opportunities. With an investment and loan facility being afforded
to Pakistan by China in the form of Pak-China Economic Corridor
(CPEC), it can bring in many opportunities for economic growth and
internal economic consolidation in the long run. There is an
immense break for Pakistani traders, farmers, and industrialists to
use this upcoming avenue to reach out to new and diverse markets
for their goods. At the government level, the trade route can be used
to boost economic relations with central Asian, African, and
European states as Pakistan provides the shortest route to China to
China to reach Europe and Aftrica.35 By making Pakistan an
economic hub,36 the country’s image can be changed from a
hardliner and extremist state to one of economic connectivity and
development.
As the project materializes and progresses, it will make Pakistan an
investment center. At this point, Pakistan needs to ensure it fosters
an environment feasible for economic activity and regional
connectivity by improving its security situation. It must be
appreciated that China’s resilience regarding this project is based
on all-weather friendship with Pakistan as well as the benefits
China hopes to reap from the CPEC initiative. However, other states
would not indulge or follow suit if they get the impression that the
security situation of the country has not improved. Pakistani armed
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
forces have worked tirelessly in the last decade to fight terrorists
and has major successes to its credit. Operations against the
militants are on going and most of the country is peaceful, barring
a few occasional cases. This picture of peaceful Pakistan has to be
disseminated to the rest of the world. Pakistan’s diplomacy at the
regonial and international level can play a major role in promoting
this change.
It is pertinent that Pakistan makes use of this opportunity. At a time
when Pakistan is struggling to maintain its alliance with the US
amidst changing geo-political environment, fighting off terrorism
and militancy inside the country,37 finding it difficult to keep a
steady economic growth annually and facing international criticism
on many fronts,38 it is imperative that Pakistan does not forego the
benefits of CPEC.
Similarly, the US long-term plan regarding Afghanistan can also
provide Pakistan with more cards to play with on the table. It is
mainly up to the United States to find a solution to the Afghan war
and stabilize the country. Pakistan should play whatever role it can
in achieving this goal but remain continually engaged with the US.
Whilst Pakistan has been a strong proponent of dialogue with the
Taliban39, the Afghan authorities did not agree on the prospect of
such talks. However, in a recent development, the Afghan
government40 has asked to hold dialogue with Taliban to resolve
the issues. Pakistan, as before, can play a crucial role in facilitating
these talks to help bring the conflict to an end. While it is difficult to
postulate what the US endgame in Afghanistan is, Pakistan can reset
its course more clearly once the peace-talks conclude. It will
provide Pakistan with the leverage it needs in Pak-US relations and
work well in Pakistan’s interests.
In the wake of India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan in 2016 post Uri
attacks in Kashmir, the situation for Pakistan had changed
cataclysmically. In the words of India’s Prime Minister Narendra
Modi, “We will isolate you. I will work for that.” Such rhetoric
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
emanating from none other than the Indian Prime Minister was
serious for Pakistan to consider as it were essentially to translate
into action. At the United National General Assembly in 2016 and
2017, India articulated its objectives of getting Pakistan labelled as
a terrorist state. India’s External Minister, Sushma Swaraj directed
accusations at Pakistan of financing terrorism in South Asia.41
Naturally, this pushed Pakistan to defend itself against the charge-
sheet presented by India and garner international support in its
favor. Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations,
Maleeha Lodhi responded to India’s allegations and reminded the
United Nations that it was in fact India that had illegally occupied
Kashmir42 and that the UN resolution on Kashmir required due
diligence as India’s incessant human rights violations in Kashmir
could no longer go unnoticed. Her speech included emphasis on the
Kashmir issue in the following words,
We’ll make sure that the international community knows
where we are, and how the people of Kashmir look towards
the UN to fulfil its long-standing obligations. This is an issue
the PM would obviously raise with the Secretary-General. It
is also an issue which we have been raising over the years —
whenever we get an opportunity to speak about the right to
self-determination.43
The use of UNGA forum to raise and discuss the Kashmir issue is
important because of the indifferent attitude India has adopted
pertaining to the issue of Kashmir. India’s nonchalant attitude
regarding Kashmir and not agreeing to hold dialogues with
Pakistan over it makes it even more crucial to bring it out on a global
stage. With a well-researched and organized campaign based on
facts, Pakistan can draft a working plan to advocate Kashmir case at
the international forums. This will not only dispel misinformation
regarding the issue but also educate other states about the
atrocities being committed in the disputed region by India.
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
On the other hand, Russia’s warming up to Pakistan has to be
figured in both the success story for Pakistan as well as an
appreciation of the evolving geo-political alliances in the region. In
2014, Russia lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan44 which is a
landmark change in the relations between the Cold War
adversaries. Opening up a consulate in Peshawar,45 Russia’s
military exercises with Pakistan army inside Pakistan,46 and a visit
to North and South Waziristan signify the beginning of a new era of
friendship.47 On the economic side, Russia has showed interest in
improving economic ties with Pakistan.48 With regards to foreign
policy, Russia abstained from naming Pakistan at the BRICs summit
in India and defended Pakistan against the Trump strategy in South
Asia.49 Russia has also said that it is not opposed to Pakistan joining
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which provides Pakistan with
yet another international ally and supporter in its bid to become an
NSG member.50
The improvement in Pak-Iran relations came amid top level visits
by Iran’s Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Pakistan in
201651 followed by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar
Bajwa’s visit to Iran in 2017.52 It offers a renewed opportunity to
both Pakistan and Iran. The border skirmishes and rumors of rift
between Iran and Pakistan was put to rest by Iranian Foreign
Minister’s 3-day visit to Pakistan in March 2018.53 His visit signifies
the importance of Pak-Iran relations. As the Indian financed
Chahbahar portis being developed,54 its purported status as a rival
to CPEC was a cause for concern for Pakistan. However, Iran
dismissed Chahbahar as a rival to Gawadar and instead showed
interest in joining CPEC.55
Pakistan’s decision to remain neutral in Yemen War, while a
principled stance based on resolving internal security matters first,
also resonated well in the Iranian decision-making echelons.
Nonetheless, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a defence agreement
wherein Pakistan has deployed a contingent of its forces in the
Kingdom for training and advice missions.56 It also means that Pak-
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
Saudi relations do not translate into a zero-sum game for Pak-Iran
relations.
With the Iranian nuclear agreement also known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conducted in 2015,57 some
of the economic sanctions were lifted off Iran with more to be lifted
as Iran achieves the milestones stipulated in the agreement. This
development can benefit Pak-Iran relations with regards to the
Iran-Pakistan pipeline, previously withheld due to international
sanctions on Iran as well as political hurdles, which will help
ameliorate Pakistan’s energy situation. With sanctions lifted off,
Iran’s improving economy will also provide space for an increased
trade between the two states. Moreover, an improved relation with
Iran means Pakistan will have another ally on regional and
international forums.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s foreign policy is currently going through a change owing
to many internal and external factors. It is a mix of Pakistan’s
security imperatives, national requirements, and international
commitments. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s foreign policy is based on
the evolving regional and international geo-strategic environments.
As any country in a globally integrated system, Pakistan’s foreign
policy cannot function without taking into account regional and
international policy direction. It is important to appreciate
Pakistan’s status as a mid-range power with limited resources as
well. Similarly, Pakistan’s internal situation and its role in War on
Terror has been a major factor in further limiting its resources.
Nonetheless, there are many components of foreign policy making
which can be improved upon and help foment a better policy.
Pakistan’s decision-making apparatus requires both focus and
personnel trained to understand the theoretical and practical sides
of the foreign policy. It is vital that history is used a guiding principal
17 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
to avoid past mistakes. In the process of decision-making,
consideration must be given to the challenges that every
opportunity brings with it so that contingency plans can be
prepared. It is also important that long-term policies are not
tampered with. Continuity and consistency of policies will help
Pakistan’s credibility in the international realm.
The list of internal and external challenges being faced by Pakistan
are numerous. The internal destabilization inside Pakistan financed
by India and routed through Afghanistan needs to be checked. At
the same time, Pakistan must actively advocate its case regarding
the matter of non-state actors being sponsored by India inside
Balochistan and FATA region.
As India’s increasingly powerful lobby in the US Congress has
convinced the US that Pakistan is harboring non-state actors used
to hurt US interests and developments in Afghanistan and terrorize
India, it is crucial for Pakistan to be vigilant of further US actions
against Pakistan. Aside from this, Pakistan must vindicate itself
through diplomacy and provision of proof that it is rooting out all
types and kinds of militants.
Moreover, while it is important to check and monitor India’s foreign
policy closely, Pakistan’s policy needs to be independent of what
India seeks to achieve. It is very important to analyze the
imperatives of Pakistan’s foreign policy considering what Pakistan
can accomplish with a policy that is designed to achieve specific
objectives. Generally, Pakistan’s actions at the international forums
are seen either as a response or in retaliation to India’s statements
and actions. This results in Pakistan’s viewpoint or bid being
ignored by major powers and international bodies. In order to
achieve better results Pakistan needs to be more proactive at the
international level.
Similarly, Indo-Afghan relations aimed at sidelining Pakistan also
do not serve Pakistan’s interests. Pakistan has played a positive role
in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan and provided land and
18 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
sea routes to the US military to combat insurgent groups over the
years. Moreover, despite Pakistan’s role in peacebuilding efforts
through facilitating talks with Taliban in the past in Afghanistan,
both Afghanistan and the US ignore Pakistan’s sacrifices and efforts.
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Pakistan has both capacity and
ability to improve its image, relations, and position in the global
arena. With new elections due in few months a new government
will be formed in the center. The new incumbents in the office will
likely pay more attention to achieving Pakistan’s foreign policy
goals to help it regain its rightful place internationally.
Muhammad Sarmad Zia is a
Research Assistant at CISS
Endnotes
1 M. Ishaq, “A National Conference on Elements of National Power,” Ministry of
Planning Development and Reform. http://pc.gov.pk/uploads/pub/4th-CPEC-Paper-
Conference-on-EoNP-2.pdf
2 Ibid.
3 Margaret Bourke-White, A Report on the New India, Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1949
4 Shaheen A. Gillani, “Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan”, Pakistan
Institute of Legislative and Development and Transparency, 2004.
5 Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement, DAWN, 30th
March, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786
6 M. K. Akbar, Pakistan Today (Mittal Publications: 1997) p. 57
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, Foreign Policy, 2012-2013
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=Foreign%20Policy
19 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
8 Tulasi R Kafle, “Making a Difference: Allison’s Three Models of Foreign Policy
Analysis," Foreign Policy Analysis (2011).
http://www.academia.edu/592889/Making_a_Difference_Allisons_Three_Models_of
_Foreign_Policy_Analysis
9 Ibid.
10 PILDAT, Short course on Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative
Governance Project, Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan, April 12 - 15, 2004.
http://www.millat.com/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/democracy/1/fp_proceedings_04_2004.pdf
11 Ibid.
12 DCC to be reconstituted as Committee on National Security, Dawn News, 22nd
August, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/1037613
13 Prime Minister’s Office Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Prime Minister chairs
meeting of Defense committee of the cabinet (dcc), Press release, 22nd August, 2013.
http://pmo.gov.pk/press_release_detailes.php?pr_id=88
14 Dan Roberts and Kareem Shaheen. "Saudi Arabia Launches Yemen Air Strikes as
Alliance Builds Against Houthi Rebels." The Guardian, 25th March, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-begins-airstrikes-
against-houthi-in-yemen,
15 Abdul Basit, “Pakistan & the Yemen war: perils of joining the Saudi-led
coalition." RSIS, 8th April, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/CO15084.pdf
16 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan. "The US-India nuclear deal." Council on Foreign
Relations, Introduced in the joint statement released by President Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005, the deal lifts a three-decade U.S.
moratorium on nuclear trade with India. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-
nuclear-deal
17 Complete text of Donald Trump speech on strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,
The News, 29th April, 2018, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/225202-Complete-
text-of-Donald-Trump-speech-on-strategy-in-Afghanistan-and-South-Asia
18 Bates Gill and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China's Rise: Diverging US-EU Perceptions
and Approaches (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005)
19 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Military and Security Matters, by Thomas L.
Hughes, Washington, D.C.: 2003,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-1.pdf fbi-
honest.html (accessed April 10, 2018).
20 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
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20 Ilan Goldenberg and Julie Smith, U.S-Russia Competition in the Middle East is
Back and the Trump Administration needs a strategy to deal with it, Foreign Policy
News, 7th March, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/07/u-s-russia-competition-
in-the-middle-east-is-back/
21 “Missing Foreign Minister,” Dawn News, 21st July, 2015.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1195337
22 Durdana Najam, “Without Foreign Minister Pakistan Fails on Diplomatic Fronts,”
Daily Times, 3rd June, 2016. https://dailytimes.com.pk/78188/without-foreign-
minister-pakistan-fails-on-diplomatic-fronts/
23“List of Countries on FATF List,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#Pakistan,
also see, “FATF removes Pakistan from list of terror financiers.”
https://www.dawn.com/news/1166306
24 Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan to go on FATF Terror Financing List in June,” The
Express Tribune, 29th April,2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1643185/1-pakistan-
go-fatf-terror-financing-list-june/
25 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Defeat in UN body Prompts Introspection,” Dawn News, 1st
November, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1216769
26 Umair Jamal, “Why did China pull support for Pakistan at the Financial Action
Task Force,” The Diplomat, 26th February, 2018.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/why-did-china-pull-support-for-pakistan-at-the-
financial-action-task-force/
27 Ibid.
28 Nitin.A.Gokhale, “The Inside Story of India’s 2016 Surgical Strikes,” The
Diplomat, 23rd September, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-inside-story-
of-indias-2016-surgical-strikes/
29 Gauri Chatterjee, “BJP doesn't get it: Kashmiri youth want azadi, even if it means
moving to Pak,” First post, 29th April, 2018. http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-
doesnt-understand-kashmiri-youth-they-want-freedom-even-if-that-means-going-
with-pakistan-2955118.html
30 “India: Repeal Armed Forces Special Powers Act,” Human Rights Watch, 19th
October, 2011. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/19/india-repeal-armed-forces-
special-powers-act
31 Amnesty International. (2015). Losing Sight in Kashmir: The Impact of Pallet
Firing Shotguns. Amnesty International Publications.
https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/losing-sight-in-kashmir-the-impact-of-pellet-
firing-shotguns/
21 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
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32 Padmapriya Govindarajan, “A Human Shield in Kashmir Raises Questions about
Indian Army Overreach,” The Diplomat, 26th April, 2017.
https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/a-human-shield-in-kashmir-raises-questions-about-
indian-army-overreach/
33 Amnesty International. (2015). Denied: Failures in Accountability for Human
Rights Violations by Security Force Personnel in Jammu and Kashmir. Amnesty
International Publications. https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/denied-failures-in-
accountability-for-human-rights-violations-by-security-force-personnel-in-jammu-
and-kashmir/
34 Tariq Naqash, “2 civilians killed, 5 injured by Indian shelling across LoC: AJK
official,” Dawn News, 20th January, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1384154
35 Zahid Chaudhry, “CPEC shortest route for Gulf to access China: Sartaj,” Pakistan
Observer, 14th December, 2016. https://pakobserver.net/cpec-shortest-route-for-gulf-
to-access-china-sartaj/
36 Mushahid Hussain, “CPEC to Make Pakistan Hub of Regional Connectivity,”
Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation, 14 November, 2017
37 Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2017, PIPS, vol.10
(1) Jan-June 2018. https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/sr2017-overview.pdf
38 Noor Zahid, Pakistan Faces Rising Criticism Over Inability to Curb Extremism,
VOA News, 21st September, 2016
39 “Kayyani Supports Dialogue with Taliban,” The Express Tribune, 12th October,
2013. https://tribune.com.pk/story/617120/kayani-supports-dialogue-with-taliban/
40 Hamid Shalizi and James Mackenzie, “Afghanistan's Ghani offers talks with
Taliban 'without preconditions',” Reuters, 28th February, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-offers-
talks-with-taliban-without-preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J0
41 Muhammad Zulqarnain Zulfi, “We created institutions of excellence, Pakistan
created terror factories: Sushma at UN General Assembly,” The Times of India, 23rd
September,2017. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/we-created-institutions-
of-excellence-pakistan-created-terror-factories-sushma-at-un-general-
assembly/articleshow/60809354.cms
42 Zoya Anwar, Kashmir issue an obligation for Pakistan to Kashmiris: Maleeha
Lodhi, The News, 16th September, 2017. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/230319-
Kashmir-issue-an-obligation-for-Pakistan-to-Kashmiris-Maleeha-Lodhi
43 Ibid.
44 “Russia lifts arms embargo to Pakistan: report,” Dawn News, 2nd June, 2017.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1110131
22 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities
45“Russia Opens Honorary Consulate in Peshawar,” The Express Tribune, 20th
February, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1639895/1-russia-opens-honourary-
consulate-peshawar/
46 “DRUZBA2017: Pakistan, Russia hold Anti-Terror Exercise,” The Express
Tribune, 25th September, 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russia-
begin-military-drills/
47 “Russian Military Delegations Visit North, South Waziristan,” Dawn News, 30TH
March, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1323792
48 “Moscow, Islamabad Eye Greater Economic Co-operation,” Dawn News, 20TH
February, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1390568
49 Polina Tikhonova, “China and Russia Defend Pakistan Against Trump’s Strategy,”
Value Walk, 28th April, 2018. https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/08/china-russia-
trumps-pakistan-strategy/
50 “Russia Support Pakistan’s bid to join elite Nuclear Trading Club,” The Express
Tribune, 15th December, 2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1584950/1-russia-
supports-pakistans-bid-join-elite-nuclear-trading-club/
51 Javid Hussain, “Iranian President’s visit to Pakistan,” The Nation, 29th March,
2016. https://nation.com.pk/29-Mar-2016/iranian-president-s-visit-to-pakistan
52 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan Determined to Expand Ties with Iran: Bajwa,” Dawn
News, 7th November, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1368817
53 “Iran’s Foreign Minister Arrives in Pakistan to Enhance Trade Ties,” Dawn News,
11th March, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1394616
54 Kamlendra Kanwar, “Iran inaugurates extension to Chabahar Port: Project is
India's counterpoise to increasing Chinese control of sea lanes,” First Post, 29th
April, 2018. https://www.firstpost.com/world/iran-inaugurates-extension-to-
chabahar-port-project-is-indias-counterpoise-to-increasing-chinese-control-of-sea-
lanes-4241035.html
55 Syed Sammer Abbas, “Iran wants to be part of CPEC, says Rouhani,” Dawn News,
22nd September, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1285404
56 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Army says troops being sent to Saudi Arabia,” Dawn News,
16th February, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1389722
57 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details, BBC News,” 13th October, 2017.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655
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CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
The US-India Strategic Partnership:
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
Riaz Khokhar
Introduction
The US-India strategic partnership is considered the watershed
moment in the bilateral relationship between India and the United
States1. It is underpinned by the historic civil-nuclear agreement as
well as defence agreements for transfer of “high-end [military
hardware]” 2 to India. Moreover, joint naval exercises of the US and
India in the Indo-Pacific, including Indian demand for a liaison in
the Arabian Sea, have potentially expanded India-Pakistan’s
geostrategic competition from land to sea3. For Pakistan, the US’
civil nuclear deal distorted the uniform criteria governing the
nuclear export control regime. Pakistan has proposed a criteria-
based approach to civil-nuclear trade and the NSG membership.
The growing transfer of advanced military technology and dual-use
nuclear material to India has created strategic instability in South
Asia’s volatile region. Therefore, in order to restore the strategic
balance, Pakistan has taken a two-pronged approach. Besides
further strengthening its ties with China, Pakistan is also expanding
its defence relations and increasing cooperation in
counterterrorism efforts with Russian Federation. Simultaneously,
Pakistan has been working on its nuclear capability and adjusting
its nuclear doctrine with a view to maintain its deterrence against
India.
Apart from that, India is actively engaged in its efforts for
diplomatically isolating Pakistan by projecting it as a state sponsor
of terrorism. India’s latest military doctrine has made its nuclear
policy ambiguous, and its threats of surgical strikes have
destabilized the South Asian region. In this context, Pakistan’s
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foreign policy response has been both pragmatic and balanced. In
order to cope with the challenge of diplomatic isolation, Pakistan is
intensively working on improving bilateral economic and security
ties with regional countries. It has maintained its strong relations
with some Gulf countries and pursued a neutral approach in the
Saudi-Iran rivalry. Moreover, Pakistan’s high-level engagement
with Afghanistan, Central Asian republics and other regional
countries signifies Pakistan’s active diplomacy to ward off Indian
efforts aimed at its isolation. In this context, Pakistan has become
part of many regional economic and security agreements such as
TAPI, CPEC, and SCO, which would promote regional economic
integration and harmony of interests among member states.
This paper analyses strategic imbalance created by the US-India
strategic partnership in the South Asian region, and Pakistan’s
foreign policy initiatives to restore the balance in the region.
US-India Strategic Partnership
During the Cold War, US and India could not become allies due to
Jawaharlal Nehru’s nonalignment policy and preference for
strategic autonomy and the US’ anti-Communist ideology. Strobe
Talbot, the US diplomat, considered “incompatible obsessions”—
India’s with Pakistan and America’s with the Soviet Union—as the
main hurdles to US-India cooperation in that era.4 Resolution of
such a “palpable difficulty” in the US-India bilateral relationship
was the main agenda of Talbot-Singh dialogues held after the 1998
nuclear tests. The focus of the dialogue, between Strobe Talbot and
Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh, expanded from nuclear
proliferation issues to involve broad challenges such as nature of
the international system, counter-terrorism, climate change and
developing strategic cooperation5. US President G.W. Bush sought
to remove the bottlenecks in the US-India relationship and
therefore started extensive diplomatic engagement with the Indian
government. Most importantly, he signed the civil-nuclear deal with
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India, which is considered the major breakthrough in their bilateral
relations.
Civil-Nuclear Deal
US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh agreed in 2005 to enter into a civil nuclear cooperation
initiative. The agreement initiated the process of cooperating
with India in civil-nuclear trade and bring it in consonance with
the international non-proliferation standards. It was indeed a
complex process as it needed amending several US’ laws
governing nuclear cooperation. Therefore, it took them three
years to formally enter into an agreement. As a prerequisite for
the civil-nuclear trade, India agreed to separate its civilian and
military facilities in 2006. An amendment was made in the US’
1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA) in 2006. The amended law is
known as Henry J. Hyde Act. It exempted India from the
requirements of the US AEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), which ban nuclear trade with a non-NPT member state.
US President could provide an exemption to a country signatory
to the proposed agreement. The US and India concluded an
agreement in 2007, known as the 123 agreement, which
stipulated terms and conditions for the civil-nuclear cooperation
between the US and India. On August 1, 2008, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved the safeguard
agreements and the inspection plan with India. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) approved the Indo-US civil nuclear deal
in September 2008. Finally, the US Congress approved the 123
agreement in October 2008.6
Critics of the 123 agreement point out that it not only undermined
the rationale against nuclear proliferation but also contributed to
strategic instability in South Asia.7 The civil nuclear deal enabled
India to receive dual-use nuclear technology, including materials
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and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or
reprocess plutonium—materials necessary for making an atom
bomb.8 Furthermore, Bush and subsequently Obama
administration actively worked to get India an NSG membership
but the move was blocked by China, which instead demanded
that the NSG membership should not be country-specific, but
criteria-based.
Defence and Security Cooperation Between US and India
In the rapidly changing geostrategic dynamics in the post-9/11
period, the United States considered India, in the US envoy to India
Kenneth Juster’s words, as “the net provider of security and stability
in South Asia”.9 The agreement signed between President Bush and
Indian prime minister Vajpayee, called Next Steps in Strategic
Partnership (NSSP), in January 2004 and the Obama
administration’s $10 billion deal with India in 2010 elevated
their bilateral strategic cooperation to new heights. President
Obama declared it as the “defining partnership of the twenty-
first century.”10
Also, the ten-year agreement of Defense and Trade Technology
Initiative (DTTI) in 2012 provided much impetus to India’s
defence indigenization process. In June 2016, the US Congress
passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the
FY17, which recognised India as a “Major Defense Partner”.11
Traditionally, India’s top suppliers of arms have been Russia and
Israel. At present, the US is the second largest defence exporter
to India, only after Russia. India’s defence imports from the US,
nearly $300 million a decade and a half ago, have reached $15
billion in the 2008-2017 period.12 The United States sold 22
Predator Guardian drones in June 2017, making India the first
non-NATO partner to acquire this advanced technology.13 Other
advanced defence sales to India included P-8 maritime patrol
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aircraft, C-130 and C-17 transport aircraft, M777 howitzers, and
Apache and Chinook helicopters.
The export of the highly advanced defence technology has been
made after India’s signing of the Logistic Security Agreement
with some modifications, including rechristening it as the
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in
August 2016. Thus, the modified version of LEMOA stipulated
mutual use of bases on a “case-by-case” basis, not permanently,
and that the logistical support would not be obligatory on the
other party.14 Moreover, India has also agreed to sign another
agreement, namely Communication and Information Security
Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), which they renamed as
Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement
(COMCASA). This agreement allows the “high-end secure
communication network to be installed on platforms being sold
to India”, as well as, “enabling an interoperable environment for
[US-India militaries] to conduct joint operations” using the
similar communication network.15
However, some challenges remain with respect to the success of
these agreements. One, Indian defence establishment is
reluctant to give ‘access to US personnel for periodic inspection
of the communication system’, terming it as intrusive. Two, it
would be difficult for India to integrate its Russian origin
military equipment on the US platforms.16 Besides, India’s
possible purchase of $6 billion missile defence system, S-400
Triumf systems, from Russia may raise some concerns in the US’
policy circles as the US imposes sanctions on the future defence
acquisitions from Russia.17
The recent move by the United States to place Indian defence
attaché in its Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) at
Bahrain is considered a “path-breaking” development in their
bilateral defence cooperation. As such, the naval gamut of the
NAVCm, ENT—Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and the
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Arabian Sea—resonates with Indian strategic objectives in the
Arabian Sea.18
India’s naval power is further strengthened by its investments in
naval ports of Chabahar in Iran and Dumq in Oman, Assumption
Islands in Seychelles, Agalega in Mauritius, and its own Andaman
and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The US also possesses
naval and military base at Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean
Territory. With their bilateral agreement of LEMOA [and
COMCASA] in place, the US and India could jointly or reciprocally
use each other’s naval bases [and share defence and communication
network].19 Australia’s investments in naval ports at Cocos and
Christmas islands further add value to the maritime defence
network of the US and its allies.20 The inclusion of Japan in the
maritime framework of port facilities in the Indo-Pacific Ocean
supports the four countries’ stance of free and open seas.
The Quadrilateral Group, referred to as Quad, is formed by the US,
India, Japan and Australia to conduct naval exercises in the Indo-
Pacific Ocean region. In the Malabar Exercises of 2017, the US, India
and Japan participated in the maritime exercises. Australia, as part
of the Quad, was also invited to participate, but it showed its
reluctance to join. According to its officials, it did not seek to
provoke China in the prevailing geostrategic environment.21
Recently, India hosted navies from 16 countries on March 6,
2018, for biennial Milan22 exercises at the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands23 at the juncture of the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman
Sea.24
India and the United States have also been engaged in coordinating
bilateral counter-terrorism efforts. They launched the first ever US-
India Counter Terrorism Designation Dialogue in December 2017.
It constitutes sharing of information, designations of terrorists,
combatting financial crimes and networks, and disrupting and
dismantling terrorist camps both regionally and globally25.
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According to India’s 2017 Joint Armed Forces Doctrine, India’s shift
from Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) to Credible Deterrence
has inherent ambiguities with regard to changes in its nuclear
policy.26 Indian state officials, including Shiv Shankar Menon,
former national security advisor and Manohar Parrikar, the former
defence minister, have questioned the operational effectiveness of
the No First Use doctrine. They maintain that in a war situation, NFU
would be the first casualty.27 In this context, India’s incorporation
of ‘surgical strikes’ as a retaliatory policy instrument has validated
Pakistan’s suspicion vis-à-vis India’s conventional military strikes
inside Pakistan’s territory. According to Khalid Banuri, Former
Director General Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA)
the changes in Indian nuclear posturing has signified full spectrum
of the conflict, including coercive diplomacy, economic
strangulation, and diplomatic isolation of Pakistan.28
India has made efforts for destabilizing Pakistan through state-
sponsored terrorism and through Afghanistan. Pakistan’s capture
of India’s serving navy commander Kulbhushan Jadhav and his
confessions testify about India’s terrorist and sabotage activities
inside Pakistan’s Balochistan province and metropolitan cities.
Apart from causing security instability, India has also tried to
economically isolate Pakistan. India withdrew from participating in
the 2016 SAARC Summit in Islamabad29 as well as influenced some
other regional countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh and
Bhutan, to join its boycott of the conference.30 Beyond that, India
has sought to promote the BIMSTEC—Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation as an
alternative to the SAARC framework for regional cooperation. It
invited all the BIMSTEC members to join the BRICS summit in
2016.31 In the same spirit, India has used the 2008-Mumbai attacks
as a sticking point to portray Pakistan as a state sponsor of
terrorism. India’s foreign minister Sushma Swaraj, in her 2018 UN
speech criticised Pakistan for the cross-border terrorism,32
disregarding India’s own oppressive policies in Kashmir.
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Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
The foremost concerns of Pakistan with reference to the US-India
strategic partnership are as follows. One, growing transfer of arms
disturbs balance of power between India and Pakistan. Two, giving
India a larger role in Afghanistan increases insecurity of Pakistan.
Three, the US overlooks India’s human rights violation in Kashmir,
which in turn emboldens India’s oppressive regime. Four, as a
result of India’s testing of submarine based nuclear missiles, such
as Arihant, Indo-Pak rivalry has shifted from land to sea.
First, the issue of US-India civil-nuclear trade and transfer of
advance defence equipment in the region. Pakistan neither
possesses the resources nor appears to have an intention to lock its
horns in an arms race with India. Pakistan has raised its concerns
at the UN General Assembly on various occasions against “growing
transfer of conventional armaments especially in volatile
regions”.33 In South Asia’s volatile environment, one state’s
excessive military spending has the potential to disturb the delicate
strategic balance, causing damage to peace and stability in the
region. As regards the US’ strategic partnership with India, Pakistan
has argued against the double standards in the sale of nuclear fuel
and conventional arms in South Asia. Destabilized South Asia would
remain a hindrance in the maintenance of peace in the region.
Pakistan’s foreign secretary Tehmina Janjua conveyed these
concerns to the UN General Assembly’s Disarmament and
International Security Committee in October 2016. She also added
that the US’ civil-nuclear and dual-use defence technology deals
with India only serve US’ myopic commercial and strategic
interests, ignoring the long-term goal of security and stability.34
Pakistan considers the India-specific amendment in NSG regime
not only as a discrimination against it but also a distortion of the
criteria governing the civil-nuclear trade.35 Instead, Pakistan has
sought the civil-nuclear trade or the NSG membership based on
uniform criteria. In the US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Joint
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Statement in March 2016, the US “acknowledged Pakistan’s
ongoing efforts to harmonise its strategic trade controls with
those of multilateral export control regimes”.36 It also noted its
appreciation for Pakistan’s active engagement with IAEA
through participating in the nuclear security summits as well as
hosting IAEA’s training activities in the country.37
The US administration, however, demanded certain concessions
from Pakistan in exchange for the NSG membership. These
concessions constitute Pakistan’s limiting nuclear weapons and
delivery system to the necessary levels that deter a nuclear
attack from India. Two, ending further development of tactical
nuclear weapons; and, three, not developing a missile that can
hit targets beyond the Indian territory.38 Pakistan argues that it
considers itself a dependent variable in the nuclear dynamic,
while India is the independent variable39 and its nuclear
development is directly proportional to India’s. Moreover,
Pakistan’s short-range missile system is aimed at deterring India
from conducting border incursion under its Cold Start strategy.
Besides constant negotiations on civil-nuclear trade, Pakistan has a
long history of defence relationship with the US. The last phase of
their bilateral defence cooperation began in 2001 after the 9/11
incident. Since then, their relationship has progressed
intermittently. After Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war
against terror, the United States provided both civilian and military
assistance in exchange for Pakistan’s logistical, military and
intelligence cooperation.
However, after routing Al-Qaeda and establishing a new
government set-up in Afghanistan, the US lost focus on Afghanistan
and got involved in Iraq. The US again shifted its attention to
countering Chinese threat in Asia and engaged with India and other
like-minded states. Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban exploited
America’s inconsistent policies and waged an insurgency in
Afghanistan.40
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In Pakistan also, local militants resorted to nation-wide violence
after the 2007 Red Mosque incident. Since then, Pakistan was
involved in countering domestic terrorism. Therefore, it could not
simultaneously take military action against the Afghan insurgents
that targeted the US and Afghan forces in Afghanistan and at the
same time fight Pakistani Taliban (TTP), who targeted civilians and
military installations. The US did not understand Pakistan’s
compulsions and stressed on it to deal with the forces inimical to its
interests in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, after the successful military
operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, Pakistan destroyed and dismantled
organized presence of terrorists in the country, including those
located in the tribal territory along the Pakistan border with
Afghanistan.41 Taliban located in these areas were believed to be
conducting across the border strikes in Afghanistan.
Contemporarily, the US administration has supported the
incumbent Afghan government’s recent peace offers to the Afghan
Taliban for a political settlement. Besides, it also noted Pakistan’s
meaningful role in partnering with the US in facilitating peace
efforts in Afghanistan.42 Yet, the United States continues to level
allegations of the presence of terrorists’ sanctuaries and suspended
military assistance to Pakistan.
China-Pakistan Defense and Economic Cooperation
Since the US had refused to provide Pakistan with advanced
defence technology in the past on several occasions, as is evident
from its repeated suspension of the sale of F16s, Pakistan turned
to China for help. Chinese cooperation in the defence sector of
Pakistan is manifest in Pakistan’s imports of over 55% of
Chinese arms in the 2008-12 period.43 The imports increased to
70% between 2012 and 2017, following the decline of US
defence exports to Pakistan in the same period, according to the
recent SIPRI report.44
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The hallmark of their joint defence cooperation has been the
coproduction of JF-17 thunder jetfighter aircraft (aka FC-1
Xiaolong/Fierce Dragon) by Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Industrial
Corporation and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex.45 Some
scholars, critical of Pakistan’s missile development, claim that
China also helped Pakistan produce solid fuel short-ranged
Shaheen-I [and medium-ranged Shaheen-II46] ballistic
missile[s]. The development of these missiles were carried out
in National Defense Complex (NDC), a ballistic missile
manufacturing facility.47 Since 2008, it remains a focal point for
Pakistan’s missile development programs. To its credit is the
developing of redesigns of several models, including Hatf-
2/Abdali, Hatf-3 Ghaznavi, Hatf-4/Shaheen-I, and Hatf-
6/Shaheen-II missiles, which were first built by SUPARCO and
PAEC. The NDC also produced the first land-attack cruise missile,
Hatf-7/Babur.48
China agreed to sell eight nuclear-capable submarines to
Pakistan in 2016, half of which would be co-produced at Karachi
Shipyard Engineering Work. Besides, the critics also claim that
China has been helping Pakistan in the production of indigenous
drones.49 One of the indigenously built armed drone, Burraq,
reportedly struck a Taliban stronghold in Shawwal valley killing
three terrorists.50
Another feature of Pakistan-China relationship is their joint
military exercises. Pakistan-China counter-terrorism operations
started in the 1990s in the face of rising threat from Uighur
terrorists. Besides, PAF and Chinese PLA have also been engaged
in yearly exercises known as Shaheen.51 One of the important
objectives of China-Pakistan counter-terrorism operations has
been to protect Chinese workforce and projects being carried
out under CPEC.52
Until recently, the engagement in economic areas was considered
the weakest link in the strong relationship between Pakistan and
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China.53 However, after the inauguration of China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is going to change. The sixty-billion-
dollar project aims at infrastructural development, energy
generation and developing transport communication systems.54
Once all the projects under the CPEC are completed, it has the
potential to make Pakistan economically integrated with other
regional countries. The Early Harvest Projects like power plants,
roads construction and transport projects are to be completed in
2018. However, the real challenges come with reference to the
development of industries, railway networks, and the long-term
financial arrangements between the two countries. Costing of the
projects and their repayment arrangements,55 including the
possibility of massive debt-burden on Pakistan, are some of the
critical challenges facing the CPEC.
CPEC has attracted the interest of several regional countries like
Iran, Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian republics. Iranian
ambassador to Pakistan Mehdi Honardoost termed it as a project of
peace and tranquillity in the region, besides of course regional
integration.56 Hence, he urged other regional countries also to join
the project.
Pak-Russia Cooperation
Through most of the Cold War period, Pakistan and Russia
remained unfriendly due to divergent security interests in the
region. However, changing geostrategic realities led to adjustments
in their foreign policies. Growing threat of Islamic State (IS) and
issues of terrorism and drug-trafficking in the region have led
Russia to expand its political, security and economic ties with
regional countries.57 Pakistan fits well in this new framework as it
also shares similar concerns and seeks to expand its defence
relationship with Russia. As a result, both the countries have
engaged in multilateral frameworks for regional security and
stability. Pakistan and Russia are part of multilateral security
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cooperation arrangements such as Dushanbe Four, Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO),58 and Moscow Conference on
International Security (MCIS). The seventh session of MCIS was
held on 4-5 April 2018. Under security cooperation arrangements.
Participating countries shared their experiences in countering
militant threats, preventing illicit drug-trafficking, and bringing
about peace and stability in Afghanistan.59
In November 2014, the first time in forty-five years, Russian
Defense Minister, Sergei Shoygu, visited Pakistan and signed a
defence agreement.60 Following the signing of the agreement,
Pakistan purchased four Mi-35 combat helicopters worth $153
million in August 2017 and plans further purchases as well. They
are also negotiating the sale of Su-35 and Su-37 combat aircraft.61
Moreover, in October 2015, Pakistan and Russia signed a $2 billion
deal for the construction of North-South (Lahore-Karachi) gas
pipeline.62 Russia has also signalled its support for Pakistan’s stance
on membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is indeed a great
leap forward from its previous stance. A Russian diplomat, Pavel
Didkovski, in a recent seminar, titled Disarmament, Non-
Proliferation and Strategic Stability, held in Islamabad in December
2017, appreciated Pakistan’s effective nuclear export control
regimes and unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.
Furthermore, he expressed his country’s support for the criteria-
based membership in the NSG for the non-NPT nuclear states.63
Another important feature of their growing ties is their joint
military exercises in Russia’s North Caucasus in September 2016,
known as Druzhbha (Russian: friendship).64 Russia was also part of
Pakistan’s Aman-17 international naval exercises in the Arabian
Sea in February 2017.65 The objective of these exercises is to
coordinate training and assistance in countering terrorism in the
region. In a recent meeting, the Pak-Russia defence ministers met
in Moscow in March 2018 and shared their concerns regarding the
Islamic State’s growing presence in Afghanistan and reaffirmed
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their commitment to continue cooperation against terrorism in the
region.66
Restoring Strategic Balance through Nuclear Deterrence
Pakistan began its military nuclear program after India conducted
a nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan realized that neither could it match
India’s conventional superiority nor could it depend on external
military help in a future crisis. Now, with India becoming a nuclear
weapons state, Pakistan should be overpowered. Therefore,
developing strategic deterrence became a priority with it to
overcome the conventional imbalance with India as well as to
provide deterrence against India’s nuclear weapon.
The growth of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons depends on its
production capacity and, more importantly, the growth of India’s
nuclear arsenal and build-up of its conventional power.67 To date,
Pakistan’s most mature nuclear weapon delivery system is air-
based. Along with it, Pakistan has also developed land-based and
sea-based nuclear weapon system of ballistic and cruise missiles.68
The launch of submarine-based cruise missile—Babur-III—has
completed Pakistan’s nuclear triad, and has given it the second
strike capability.69 Pakistan’s nuclear policy is embedded in the
country’s security policy. Salient features of the policy are follows.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is the determinant of strategic
stability in South Asia.
Pakistan’s short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons are
aimed at offsetting India’s conventional military power.
Pakistan is committed to developing Full Spectrum
Deterrence (FSD) in line with its Credible Minimum
Deterrence policy. The objective of Full Spectrum
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Deterrence is to checkmate both nuclear attacks of India and
its military intrusion in Pakistan’s territory.
Pakistan is also committed to Strategic Restraint Regime as
well as composite dialogue for resolving all outstanding
issues with India.70
Pakistan’s Relationship with its Neighbouring Countries
Besides maintaining and growing a strategic and economic
relationship with major powers, Pakistan has also been engaged in
security and economic cooperation with regional countries.
Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan continues to be
undermined by allegations of cross-border terrorism and
prevalence of mistrust. However, intensive engagement by both the
countries bilaterally as well as multilaterally has the potential to
produce positive results. Agreements like the APTTA and
Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity
(APAPPS) encompass a broad framework for structural
engagement in many areas of mutual concern. These areas include
counterterrorism, border management, preventing drug-
trafficking, refugees’ repatriation, peace and reconciliation and
economic development.
The multilateral agreements such as CASA and TAPI can also prove
helpful in boosting bilateral economic trade. Additionally,
translating cultural links and geographic proximity into economic
synergies would also assist in expanding transit facilities and
trade71. For this, revision of the APTTA—that formerly helped boost
the bilateral trade and is in limbo since 2016—is long overdue.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s digitization and systematic regulation of
border crossings will help not only smooth movement of people and
goods but also help in reducing illegal trade. Afghanistan’s
participation in the CPEC and the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) could
play a positive role in improving bilateral ties.
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Pakistan became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in June 2017. The SCO membership and the
operationalization of the Gwadar port have enhanced Pakistan’s
significance for the CARs as the country provides them with natural
overland routes and connectivity to the Arabian Sea.72 For
improving economic engagement, there have been frequent
reciprocal visits from leaders of Pakistan and Central Asian
republics—Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. These states, being land-locked, can use Pakistani
ports for their trade with Gulf countries and can help Pakistan meet
its energy requirements.
In this context, the Central-Asia-South-Asia (CASA)-1000 is
important. It is a $1.2 billion, 750km long electricity transmission
line, which would help Pakistan import electricity from Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan through Afghanistan. Total energy transmitted by
the project would be 1,300 MW, of which 300MW would go to
Afghanistan and 1,000MW would be supplied to Pakistan. Recently,
the $8 billion, 1,840 km TAPI gas pipeline project was also launched
on February 23, 2018. Pakistan and India would each receive 1.325
billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) gas and Afghanistan would receive
0.5 bcfd under the project.73 It is pertinent to note that India does
not have an overland trade route to Central Asia and that it costs
India twice to send its goods to C. Asia through the Chabahar port.74
Pakistan has also maintained security and economic cooperation
with other regional countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka and the
Maldives. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi became the first prime minister of
Pakistan, in over two decades, to make an official visit to Nepal on
March 5, 2018. Though Pakistan has had diplomatic meetings and
engagements with Nepal at multilateral forums, the recent visit of
Pakistan’s PM to Nepal marked a strategic dimension. As Nepal
currently possesses the chairmanship of the SAARC, the Pakistani
PM urged Sharma Oli, the newly elected prime minister of Nepal, to
convene the SAARC summit in Islamabad. In addition, Pakistan also
encouraged Nepal to be part of the Chinese BRI and informed him
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of the importance of CPEC and its role in regional economic
integration.75
Pakistan invited Sri Lankan president as the chief guest on its
Republic day on 23rd March 2018. Sri Lankan President Maithripala
Sirisena also supported Pakistan’s bid to host the SAARC summit.
Besides, he also thanked Pakistani PM for Pakistan’s support at the
UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) as a “true friend and a
brother” in its turbulent times.76 A trade exhibition held in Sri Lanka
under the rubric of The Pakistan Single Country Exhibit in January
2018. It is expected that the exhibition would help boost bilateral
trade between the two countries.77
Pakistan also shares with the Maldives a sustainable partnership in
the economy, tourism, education, climate change, and countering
terrorism. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives were engaged in
trilateral military exercises, Eagle Dash-1, in 2016. Pakistan
provided training to and shared its experience with the armies of
both the countries in counterterrorism operations.78 Pakistan’s
army chief, General Bajwa was the first highest foreign dignitary to
visit the Maldives79 after the country’s lifting of 45-days-emergency
on 22nd March 2018.
Pakistan’s Relationship with Gulf Countries
Pakistan’s relationship with the Gulf countries forms a strategic as
well as the economic basis. Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen
relations with the Gulf countries also constitute a bulwark against
India’s efforts for raising its security and economic profile in the
Middle East.80 India’s ability to expand its security relations beyond
the safety of sea lanes, through which it imports oil from the Gulf, is
limited. Its strong relations with Iran and Israel simultaneously
have also led to its low-security profile in the Middle East.81
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Pakistan has balanced its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In the purview of security threats from neighbouring rebel forces to
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan deployed its troops to protect the Kingdom’s
territorial integrity and for the security of the holy places. It has also
made it clear, at the same time, that Pakistan’s forces would not be
available against another Muslim state.82 Iran’s foreign minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif acknowledged that just as Iran’s relations
with India are not against Pakistan; Iran understood that Pakistan’s
relations with Saudi Arabia were not against it.83 Meanwhile, in
order to concretize their bilateral relationship, both Iran and
Pakistan have also conducted joint counterterrorism exercises and
have worked for strengthening border security management.
Added to Pakistan’s strategic relationship are its strong economic
ties with Gulf countries. According to Pakistan’s Economic Survey,
of the total nine million overseas employees 54.8 percent work in
the Middle East. The remittances they send annually on average
since 2011 amount to nearly $20 billion.84 Pakistan’s major trading
partners in the Middle East are UAE and Saudi Arabia. In the FY
2016-17, Pakistan’s total imports from the UAE amounted to $5.84
billion, $1.95 billion from Saudi Arabia, and $864 million from
Qatar. To these countries, Pakistan exported goods and services
worth $852 million, $300 million, and $42.6 million, respectively.85
Apart from Arab Gulf countries, Pakistan’s trade volume with Iran
reached $1.5 billion in the FY 17, while both the countries have
made a commitment to increase it to $5 billion in FY 21. For this to
happen, they will have to work together for “establishing banking
channels, holding trade exhibitions, and addressing tariff and non-
tariff barriers”.86 On a recent visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad
Zarif to Pakistan, both the countries pledged to deepen economic
connectivity through benefitting from the complementarities of the
Gwadar and Chabahar.87
In addition, Pakistan and Iran have also been working to finalise the
Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, which is facing tremendous challenges.
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These challenges constituted the United States’ sanctions on Iran
and the resulting reluctance of Pakistani banks to establish their
branches in Iran.88 However, even after lifting of the US sanctions,
Pakistan has not been able to work on the pipeline, due to its
financial constraints.
Conclusion
In sum, Pakistan has not objected to the US’ strategic partnership
with India. What concerns Pakistan the most is that the US is
pursuing discriminatory policies in providing India with high-end,
dual-use defence technology. The increasing acquisition of military
power through such advanced defence weaponry has made India
aggressive in its relationship with Pakistan. Thus, exploiting its
strategic partnership with the US, India has actively worked to
diplomatically isolate Pakistan through both projecting Pakistan as
a state sponsor of terrorism and refusing to engage with Pakistan in
regional economic organizations such as the SAARC. Pakistan, on
the other hand, has responded in equal measure, to counter India’s
hostile policies against it. Through the acquisition of advanced
conventional weapon systems as well as developing full-spectrum
deterrence at the strategic and operational level, Pakistan has
successfully counterbalanced India’s nuclear threat and
conventional superiority. In addition, Pakistan has also made
efforts for availing itself the most of its geo-strategic importance in
the region by pursuing intensive economic and security
engagement. Pakistan’s balancing act in the Saudi-Iran rivalry,
including strengthening its ties with the Gulf countries, testifies to
Pakistan’s pragmatic diplomacy. Moreover, its rigorous efforts for
stabilizing its relationship with Afghanistan would achieve two
ends: one, stability in Afghanistan is in parallel to stability in
Pakistan; two, it will help improve trade and transit not only with
Afghanistan but also with Central Asian states. Toward these ends,
initiation of such economic projects as CASA, TAPI, APAPPS and
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CPEC and potential revitalization of APTTA would play a concrete
role. Successful execution of these projects, along with Pakistan’s
continuous high-level engagement with regional countries for
economic and security cooperation, would certainly bring about
peace, prosperity and stability in the region.
Riaz Khokhar is a
Research Assistant at CISS
Endnotes
1 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on
Foreign Relations, November 5, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-
nuclear-deal
2 Cara Abercrombie, “Removing Barriers to US-India Defense Trade,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January 10, 2018,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/10/removing-barriers-to-u.s.-india-defense-
trade-pub-75206
3 Shishir Gupta, “Soon, India defence attache at the US navy Bahrain command,”
Hindustan Times, March 21, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/soon-india-defence-attache-at-us-navy-bahrain-command/story-
iTGPB5sLbOlod11MlprWjI.html
4 Strobe Talbot, “Engaging India,” New York Times, November 28, 2006,
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/28/books/chapters/engaging-india.html
5 Stephen P. Cohen, India and America: An Emerging Relationship (Kyoto, Japan: A
Paper presented to the Conference on Nation-State System and Transactional Forces
in South Asia, December 2000),
https://www.scribd.com/document/174805839/India-and-America-An-Emerging-
Relationship-Stephen-Cohen
6 “Fact Sheet: US India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” US Department of
State (Archive), October 15, 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm ;
“Fact Sheet & Briefs, The US Atomic Energy Act Session 123 At Glance,” Arms
Control Association, February 2018 (updated),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123 ; Prashant Hosur, “The
Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement,” International Journal, (Spring 2010): 435-
43
The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
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CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
448.; “Timeline: Twists and Turns in the India-US Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, October
2, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-usa-nuclear-timeline/timeline-
twists-and-turns-in-the-india-u-s-nuclear-deal-idUSTRE4912HG20081002
7 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on
Foreign Relations, November 5, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-
nuclear-deal
8 Ibid.
9 “Remarks by Kenneth I. Juster US Ambassador to India, US-India Relations:
Building a Durable Partnership for the 21st Century,” US Embassy and Consulates in
India, January 11, 2018, https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-relations-building-
durable-partnership-21st-century/
10 Shivaji Kumar, “How Obama Revived US-Indian Relations,” The National
Interest, June 6, 2016, How Obama Revived US-Indian Relations
11 “Remarks by Kenneth I. Juster US Ambassador to India, US-India Relations:
Building a Durable Partnership for the 21st Century,” US Embassy and Consulates in
India, January 11, 2018, https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-relations-building-
durable-partnership-21st-century/
12 Maria Abi-Habib, “India is Close to Buying a Russian Missile System, Despite US
Sanctions,” The New York Times, April 5, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/world/asia/india-russia-s-400-missiles.html
13 Ibid.
14 Varghese K. George, “India, US sign military logistics pact,” The Hindu, October
18, 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-
logistics-pact/article14598282.ece
15 Pranab Dhal Samanta and ET Bureau, “India, US to reopen talks on Comcasa,”
The Economic Times, March 27, 2018,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-to-reopen-talks-on-
comcasa/articleshow/63474835.cms
16 Ibid.
17 Maria Abi-Habib, “India is Close to Buying a Russian Missile System, Despite US
Sanctions,” The New York Times, April 5, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/world/asia/india-russia-s-400-missiles.html
18 Gupta, “Soon.”
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19 Ankit Panda, “India Gains Access to Oman’s Duqm Port, Putting the Indian Ocean
Geopolitical Contest in the Spotlight,” The Diplomat, February 14, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/india-gains-access-to-omans-duqm-port-putting-
the-indian-ocean-geopolitical-contest-in-the-spotlight/
20 David Brewster, “Cocos and Christmas Islands: building Australia’s strategic role
in the Indian Ocean,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 13, no. 2, (February 24,
2017): 155-173.
21 Ankit Panda, “India Australia Hold First Two-Plus-Two Foreign and Defense
Secretaries Meeting,” The Diplomat, December 13, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/india-australia-hold-first-two-plus-two-foreign-and-
defense-secretaries-meeting/
22 Milan is a Hindi word for ‘Tryst’ or ‘meeting’. It signified meeting of world navies
in India for naval exercises.
23 Pakistan’s Shaheen-III ballistic missile can reach these Indian islands,
according to General Kidwai.
24 “Multilateral naval exercise begins in Andamans,” The Times of India, March 6,
2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/multi-lateral-naval-exercise-begins-
in-andamans/articleshow/63191024.cms
25 “Joint Statement on the First U.S.-India Counterterrorism Designations Dialogue,”
US Department of State, December 19, 2017,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276679.htm
26 Khalid Banuri, “Panel Discussion on Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine 2017: A
Critical Appraisal”, Islamabad Policy Research institute, February 28, 2018; Sanjana
Gogna, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons and the Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” IDSA,
September 11, 2017, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-and-
the-indian-nuclear-doctrine_sgogna_110917
27 Rama Lakshmi, “India’s defense minister questions its no first-use nuclear
policy—then says it’s his personal opinion,” The Washington post, November 10,
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/10/indias-
defense-minister-questions-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-then-says-its-his-personal-
opinion/?utm_term=.d91f3e76613a
28 Ibid.
29 “India pulls out of Pakistan-hosted 19th SAARC summit,” Dawn, September 27,
2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1286460
30 Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan seeks bigger SAARC to counter India’s influence,” Dawn,
October 12, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1289685
45
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31 Betwa Sharma, “How India’s Diplomatic Isolation of Pakistan Goes beyond
SAARC,” The Huffington Post, October 3, 2016,
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/10/03/how-indias-diplomatic-isolation-of-
pakistan-goes-beyond-saarc_a_21484380/
32 “Text of Sushma Swaraj’s speech at U.N. General Assembly,” The Hindu,
September 25, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/text-of-sushma-
swaraj-speech-at-un-general-assembly/article19746157.ece
33 “Pakistan neither wants, nor engaged in arms race in South Asia: envoy,” DAWN,
October 21, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1291383
34 Ibid.
35 Tariq Osman Hyder, “US-India Nuclear Deal and Pakistan The Years Ahead,”
Policy Perspectives 10, no. 2, (2013)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909310?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
36 “U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement,” U.S. Embassy, March 1, 2016,
https://pk.usembassy.gov/u-s-pakistan-strategic-dialogue-joint-statement/
37 Ibid.
38 Jonas Schneider, “A Nuclear Deal for Pakistan?” CSS Analysis, no. 187, March
2016, 3.
39 Firouz, Caren, and Reuters, Sartaj Aziz on Pakistan’s Foreign and Security Policy,
(Council on Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2016)
40 Markey, “No Exit.”
41 “Haqqani network sanctuaries completely destroyed in Pakistan,” Aaj Shahzeb
Khanzada Kay Sath, Geo News, January 5, 2018)
https://www.geo.tv/latest/175493-unorganised-presence-of-haqqanis-possible-
destroyed-sanctuaries-khawaja-asif ; and, Karman Yousaf, “No safe haven’:
Pakistan rejects US report on Taliban, Haqqani network”, The Express Tribune, July
20, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1462534/no-safe-haven-pakistan-rejects-us-
report-taliban-haqqani-network/
42 “Senior U.S. Official from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
Ambassador Alice Wells visits Pakistan,” News and Events, US Embassy and
Consulates in Pakistan, April 3, 2018, https://pk.usembassy.gov/pr-04032018/
43 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: C.
Hurst & Co., 2015), 93-100.
46
The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
Response
CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
44 “Asia and the Middle East lead rising trend in arms imports, US exports grow
significantly, says SIPRI,” New and Events, SIPRI, March 12, 2018,
https://www.sipri.org/news/press-release/2018/asia-and-middle-east-lead-rising-
trend-arms-imports-us-exports-grow-significantly-says-sipri
45 Jonah Blank, “Pakistan and China’s Almost Alliance,” The RAND Blog, October
16, 2015, 3.
46 Ibid.
47 Lisa Curtis, “China’s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan,” The
Heritage Foundation, May 26, 2009, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinas-
military-and-security-relationship-pakistan
48 “National Defense Complex,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 27, 2011,
http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/634/
49 Dr. Ahmad Rashid Malik, “The Growing Pakistan-China Defense Cooperation,”
ISSI Issue Brief, October 7, 2016, 2.
50 “Pakistani armed drone kills in first attack,” Time of Israel, September 7, 2015,
https://www.timesofisrael.com/pakistani-armed-drone-kills-in-first-attack/
51 Blank, “Pakistan.”
52 Malik, “The Growing.”
53 Small, “The China.”
54 “CPEC Significance/Potential, China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Official
website CPEC, accessed April 15, 2018, http://cpec.gov.pk/significance-potential/4)
55 Ibid.
56 Inamullah Khattak, “Afghanistan desires role in CPEC, says Afghan envoy,” Daily
Dawn, October 14, 2016; Fuad Shahbazov, “Will the China Pakistan Economic
Corridor be a gateway to Central Asia?,” The Diplomat, May 25,2017); Imtiaz
Ahmad, “Russia to join China Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Hindustan Times,
November 26, 2016); The Newspaper’s Staff Reporter, “Iran keen to join CPEC,
says envoy,” Dawn, January 27, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1311031
57 Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, “Russia and Pakistan: Shared
Challenges and Common Opportunities,” Carnegie Moscow Center, May 2014, 1.
58 Ibid.
47
The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
Response
CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
59 “MCIS, VII Moscow Conference on International Security,” Ministry of Defense
of the Russian Federation, MCIS, accessed on April 8,2018,
http://eng.mil.ru/en/mcis/index.htm; Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan says ‘Geostrategic
Reasons Bring it Closer to Russia’,” Voice of America, April 4, 2018,
https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-says-geostrategic-reasons-bring-it-closer-
russia/4332017.html
60 Kashif Hussain, “What Russia’s Changing Role in South Asia means for
Pakistan,” The Diplomat, January 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/what-
russias-changing-role-in-south-asia-means-for-pakistan/
61 Ibid.
62 Almas Haider Naqvi and Yasir Masood, “Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Relations:
Discernible Trends and Future,” ISSI, No.4, 2017, 12.
63 “Russia supports Pakistan’s bid to join elite nuclear trading club,” The Express
Tribune, December 15, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1584950/1-russia-
supports-pakistans-bid-join-elite-nuclear-trading-club/; Sib Kaifee, “Russia signals
support for Pakistan’s NSG candidature,” Arab News, December 18, 2017,
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1210756/world
64 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Russia begin ‘Friendship 2017’ joint Anti-Terror Drill,”
Voice of America, September 25, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-russia-
friendship-joint-anti-terror-drill/4043265.html
65 Hussain, “What Russia’s.”
66 “Pakistan, Russia concerned over growing IS threat,” Dawn, March 22, 2018,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1396785
67 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2016,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 31, 2016,
https://thebulletin.org/2016/november/pakistani-nuclear-forces-201610118
68 Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, “Trends in World Nuclear Forces,
2017,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2017, 7.
69 “Press Release, No PR-125/2018-ISPR,” ISPR, March 29, 2018,
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=4660
70 Kile, “Trends in World.”
71 Fahd Humayun, “Pak-Afghan Trade Relations, Looking Ahead,” Jinnah institute,
The Afghanistan Essays, 2018, 5-7.
72 Rizwan Zeb, “Pakistan in the SCO: Challenges and Prospects,” The CACI
Analytical Articles, February 8, 2018,
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13496-pakistan-in-
the-sco-challenges-and-prospects.html
48
The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
Response
CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
73 Mir Sherbaz Khetran, “TAPI: A Recipe for greater Regional Cooperation,” ISSI,
Issue Brief, March 19, 2018, 2.
74 Munir Akram, “The New Great Game,” DAWN Opinion, June 12, 2016,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1264242
75 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “Why Was the Pakistani Prime Minister in Nepal?,” The
Diplomat, March 10, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/why-was-the-pakistani-
prime-minister-in-nepal/
76 “Sri Lanka keen to enhance trade with Pakistan,” The Nation, December 20, 2017,
https://nation.com.pk/20-Dec-2017/sri-lanka-keen-to-enhance-trade-with-pakistan;
Naveed Siddiqui, “Sri Lanka backs Pakistan’s bid to host SAARC summit: Foreign
Office,” Dawn, October 18, 2007, https://www.dawn.com/news/1364642
77 “Pakistan’s Single Country Exhibition-2018 opens in Colombo from Jan 12-14,”
Colombo Page, January 8, 2018,
http://www.colombopage.com/archive_18A/Jan08_1515422634CH.php
78 “COAS visits NCTC Pabbi for trilateral exercise, Eagle Dash-1,” The Nation,
February 4, 2016, https://nation.com.pk/04-Feb-2016/coas-visits-nctc-pabbi-for-
trilateral-exercise-eagle-dash-1; Mateen Haider, “Pakistan, Maldives sign four
MoUs,” DAWN, May 7, 2015.
79 “Pakistan army chief arrives in Maldives,” Maldives Independnent, March 31,
2018, http://maldivesindependent.com/politics/pakistan-army-chief-arrives-in-
maldives-137000
80 Abhijit SIngh, “India’s Middle Eastern Naval Diplomacy,” Middle East Institute,
July 27, 2017, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/indias-middle-eastern-naval-
diplomacy
81 Ibid.
82 Huma Yusuf, “Pakistan in the Middle East: A Cautious Balance,” The Diplomat,
October 4, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/pakistan-in-the-middle-east-a-
cautious-balance/
83 Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Friend of My Enemy,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, April 5, 2018,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/05/friend-of-my-enemy-pub-7600
84 “Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-17,” Government of Pakistan, Ministry of
Finance; and, Riazul Haq, “Pakistani workforce in Middle East facing the worst
despite giving the best,” The Express Tribune, October 31,2016,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1215631/workforce-middle-east-facing-worst-despite-
giving-best
49
The US-India Strategic Partnership: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Response
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85Asad Hashim and Alia Chughtai, “Pakistan’s ties with the Gulf countries,”
Aljazeera, June 9, 2017,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/pakistan-ties-gulf-countries-
170609141743286.html
86 Saleem Shahid, “Diplomats call for boosting Pakistan-Iran trade,” DAWN,
February 12, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1388902
87 “Pakistan, Iran vow to enhance bilateral trade to $5b,” SAMAA, March 13, 2018,
https://www.samaa.tv/economy/2018/03/pakistan-iran-vow-enhance-bilateral-trade-
5b/
88 “Iran-Pakistan Trade hampered by Absence of banking Channels,” Financial
Tribune, January 27, 2018, https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-
economy/80788/iran-pakistan-trade-hampered-by-absence-of-banking-channels
50 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
Samran Ali
Introduction
China is growing from a regional to a global power. According to the
power transition theory, the rise of China places it in a natural
competition with the United States both economically and
militarily. China’s economic interests stretch from its immediate
neighborhood to other continents. It is also working on reviving the
Old Silk trade route, which covers its western regions, and Central
and South Asia. It is also investing heavily in these regions. States’
economic interests go alongside with their political interests. The
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, and other
economic ventures would, therefore, allow China to use soft power
to shape the public opinion in several regions.
China’s growing economic and political interests pose security
challenges for it as well, which in turn demand a proactive foreign
policy. The rivalry between the US and China is growing amid the
US policy of Pivot to Asia and the alliance between Chinese regional
rivals and the US. These factors are urging China to take measures
for safeguarding its interests in the region and beyond. Although
the US under President Trump has withdrawn from Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), its strategic objectives and policies in the region,
crafted in the last few decades, have not changed i.e. ‘Japan as
keystone,’ ‘India as counterweight’ and the regional alliance of
democratic countries.
Violence in Afghanistan can have ripple effects on the Chinese
internal security, particularly on the western region Xinjiang, which
has a majority of ethnic Uyghur Muslim population. The Situation in
Afghanistan has remained volatile from Afghan Jihad to never-
ending War on Terror. Extremist ideologies were nurtured and
51 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
exported to neighboring Pakistan, Turkmenistan and the other
Central Asian Republics (CARs) in the past. East Turkestan Islamic
Moment (ETIM) has been involved in violent acts in the past. It is
feared that if extremists come to power again in Afghanistan, their
ideologies and terrorist activities may get a boost and the security
situation in the region may become even more precarious.
Presence of US troops in Afghanistan has also generated a
paradoxical situation. The troops' presence aims at bringing peace
and stability in Afghanistan but the US boots on the ground are also
a politically destabilizing factor. The Taliban, fighting against the US
troops, consider them occupation forces which must be ousted from
the Afghan soil.
Since Afghan soil became a playing field for competing interests of
global and regional powers1 in the 1980s and subsequent
internecine fight for power in the 19990s, Afghanistan’s security
situation has been worsening except for the period when Taliban
were in power there. The solution to the Afghan problem has
become as complex as Afghan history of internal fights. A number
of Afghanistan’s neighbors and some major powers now have
stakes in Afghanistan. This paper will analyze the Chinese rationale
and approach towards Afghanistan situation and possible
implications of Chinese policy for regional peace and stability,
particularly how it would impact Pakistan.
Evolving Afghan Geo-Political Situation
The 19th Century’s Great Game between the Russian and British
Empire was about the distrust and deep suspicion of each other’s
intentions in the region. The Russians were fearful of the British
making inroads in Central Asia and the British were concerned
about the security of India. Today power contest is between the US
and China and to lesser extents between the US and Russia.
Pakistan, India, Iran, and others are playing subsidiary roles.2
52 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
President Trump’s National Security Strategy regards Russia and
China as ‘key challenge’ affecting the US global standing and terms
them ‘revisionist’ states.3 The US interests in Central Asia are
mostly strategic. It aims to isolate the Central Asian Republics
(CARs) against Russian and Chinese influence. China and Russia see
US’ interests in CARs as standing challenge to their security
interests.4 The influence and footprint of China are, however,
growing in Central Asia with its increasing investments and trade
in the region.5 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is also
working to enhance cooperation among its member states. In
Afghanistan, divergent interests of several powers are becoming
increasingly visible. The convergence of Russian, Chinese and
Pakistani interests in Afghanistan have placed them on one side of
the spectrum and the US and India on the other.
The US has not been successful in achieving its objective of wiping
Taliban out of Afghanistan and establishing a central government
which is capable of governing the whole country. The security
situation in Afghanistan has further deteriorated after withdrawal
of ISAF forces in 2014. According to Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), militants are expanding their
control and influence into other territories while the influence of
the government is decreasing.6 Political polarization has also
increased in past few years. Now there are more groups fighting in
Afghanistan than in 2001, when the US entered Afghanistan. ISIS
fighters are also reportedly moving there after facing defeat in Syria
and Iraq. According to UN Secretary-General’s Report, the present
situation remains volatile as Afghan Taliban and Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) showed a
continued capacity to inflict mass casualties in Afghanistan.7
The US-Afghanistan Security Partnership Agreement, which
entered into force on January 1, 2015, provides authorization for
presence and actions of United States security forces in Afghanistan.
Under the agreement, when deemed necessary, the US forces could
also take part in security operations in Afghanistan. There is also no
53 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
exact timeline given for complete US forces withdrawal from
Afghanistan, creating more ambiguity. President Trump, initially a
critic of the war in Afghanistan, changed his stance after taking over
the Presidential office. His Administration, in fact, took a tougher
stance against the Taliban and came up with its New Afghan
Strategy. This strategy allowed deployment of additional troops in
Afghanistan, encouraged greater Indian role in Afghanistan and
holds Pakistan responsible for not taking actions against Afghan
Taliban as well as allegedly providing them safe havens.8 The new
strategy does not lay emphasis on the political and governance
problems in Afghanistan. This strategy also indicates that Trump
Administration is trying to seek a military solution of the Afghan
problem.
There are chances that Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will
lose control of several peripheral areas if the US troops are
withdrawn totally from Afghanistan.9 The withdrawal will create a
power vacuum which may be filled by either Afghan Taliban gaining
power and control of the whole of Afghanistan or would lead to total
turmoil.10 The latter situation is likely to become similar to 1990s
when political elites and warlords were engaged in fighting each
other. This chaos may not be confined only to Afghanistan, it has the
potential to undermine the peace and security of its neighbors in
South and Central Asia including China and particularly Pakistan.
The chaotic Afghanistan situation provided conducive conditions
for Tahrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, militants from Uzbekistan and
Uygurs from Western China, and more recently the presence of ISIS
is likely to pose a whole new level of threat to the region.11
Chinese Interests and Policies in Afghanistan
China had kept a low profile in Afghanistan in the past. It had,
however, maintained secret contacts with some groups to restrain
them from working against the Chinese interests. These included
the flow of extremism into the Chinese Western region and security
54 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
of Chinese Companies operating in Afghanistan.12 China’s low-key
position has also not challenged the US political leadership role in
Afghanistan.13 But, as China is growing both economically and
politically, it is taking more interest in regional and global affairs.
Afghanistan as a neighbor of China holds more significance for the
former today than in the past. It has become an area of interest for
the Chinese foreign policy as it considers a peaceful Afghanistan a
key to stability in the region. Chinese actions in Afghanistan are also
partly motivated by the realization that China as a major power has
a responsibility in maintaining regional peace and security.14
President Trump during his state visit to China in November 2017,
also discussed Afghanistan’s future and the threat of terrorism with
President Xi, indicating the importance of Chinese role in
Afghanistan. China’s permanent representative to the United
Nations, Ma Zhaoxu at the Security Council Debate on Afghanistan
said, “Peace and stability in Afghanistan have a direct bearing on the
well-being of the Afghan people, as well as on security, stability, and
prosperity in the region.”15 He also termed Afghanistan as an
important country in the context of Belt and Road Initiative and that
the international community must provide firm support to achieve
peace and security in Afghanistan.16
Interests of Afghanistan are also converging with that of China. For
Afghanistan, Beijing can help meet two of its major needs.
Afghanistan needs resources for reconstruction and secondly, to
play a role in influencing Pakistan17 to take steps against Afghan
Taliban, allegedly operating from their bases in Pakistan.
Peace and Stability in Afghanistan
As mentioned earlier, Chinese main concerns are peace and
stability in Afghanistan. There are two major reasons driving
China’s concerns. One is the internal insurgency in Afghanistan and
the other presence of US troops in the war-torn country. The
55 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
stalemate between Taliban fighters and US troops deployed there
have left the Chinese with fewer choices in Afghanistan.
According to Director of Center for Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Studies, Fudan University, Zhao Huasheng, Xinjiang’s
stability is the “starting point” for China’s Afghanistan policy.18
There is a constant fear of the support to extremists in Western
China from Afghanistan. The Xinjiang region of China is home to
more than 8 million Muslims in which anti-Han sentiments have
grown among the Uyghurs since the 1990s. They complain of
discrimination and marginalization of their community in the
overall development of China.19 Some experts see the Uyghur issue
as an internal Chinese security problem, but for some it is seen in
the context of global jihad as it has a religious dimension and
Uyghurs have reported contacts with external militant groups.20
Majority of the Uyghurs harboring anti-China sentiments are
organized under the ETIM umbrella. The ETIM has ties with Al-
Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and reportedly IS which is expanding its
presence in Afghanistan.21 Presence of potent militant groups in
China’s neighborhood is worrisome for it. IS aspires to establish a
global network of jihad,22 and poses a greater threat to China than
militants adhering to any other ideology. In late February 2017, IS
released a video featuring a man from Xinjiang vowing to carry out
terrorist attacks in China.23
The presence of US troops and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan
is another factor that adds to China’s security concerns. When US’
forces entered Afghanistan in 2001, China viewed this development
as a US military base right next to Chinese western border.24 Former
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has termed the US military
presence not only to fight Taliban but also to keep an eye on its
major adversaries in the region.25 China also thinks the US will not
exit Afghanistan completely, as it would be perceived as its defeat
and a major embarrassment internationally. It also realizes that the
US will maintain its military presence in Afghanistan as long as it
remains unstable. China also fears that US withdrawal may result in
56 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
a civil war within Afghanistan, which is not in its interests. China,
therefore, doesn’t object to US’ presence under current
circumstances, but it doesn't want the extended US military
presence in its neighborhood.26
Paradoxically US presence in Afghanistan is also a major factor
contributing to instability in Afghanistan. Taliban regard the US
forces as occupation forces, which provides them with a legitimate
reason to fight against them as well as garner support of the other
Afghans. The absence of a withdrawal timeline and increase in US
forces in Afghanistan has also cast doubts on US objectives in
Afghanistan. The suspicions were also echoed by the Iranian
Foreign Minister Dr. Javad Zarif, the other neighbor of Afghanistan,
on his visit to Pakistan. He stated that the US was not interested in
bringing peace in Afghanistan and security of the region. He
stressed on cooperation among regional countries for peace.
In continuation of its troublesome policies, the US has also sought
to increase Indian influence and role in Afghanistan.27 Trump
termed India as "a key security and economic partner of the United
States" and said that developing a strategic partnership with India
was a "critical part of the South Asia strategy for America". India,
however, has declined to send its troops to Afghanistan and
emphasized on the economic and infrastructure development in
line with Chinese policy on Afghanistan. China, in larger geopolitical
context, would not want Afghanistan with a support base for
extremists, go under the Indian influence.
Other threats posed to China by insatiability in Afghanistan include
the flow of drugs into China from Afghanistan. According to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), opium
production in Afghanistan in 2016 increased by 43% to 4800 tons
from 3300 tons in 2015.28 Much of the drugs emanating from
Afghanistan find their way into China through Central Asia. In order
to control the drug trafficking, China has proposed an anti-drug task
force working under SCO.
57 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
China Reconnecting with the World
At a time when policies of protectionism are bring favored by the
countries in the West, China is connecting with the world with trade
and cooperation to further its economic objectives. The primary
policy tools for China have been its trade and investment in
different world regions. President Xi Jingping is working to revive
the Old Silk Road under the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the
vast territories in Europe and Asia with trade, infrastructure, and
cultural links.29
China wants to expand the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), that comes under BRI, to Afghanistan. The project involves
the construction of two highways and railways connecting
Afghanistan with Pakistan.30 CPEC, China believes, will connect
Afghanistan with Pakistan and China economically and help
stabilize Afghan economy. The route will be further extended to
Central Asia. The appointment of the new Chinese ambassador to
Afghanistan was indicative of Afghan inclusion in CPEC. His
experience as the director of Silk Road Fund established under BRI
made him preferred choice for this. According to Liu Zongyi, a
senior fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies,
“The appointment of Liu [as new Chinese ambassador to
Afghanistan] is a carefully considered one. He was raised in Xinjiang
and has experience in South Asia.” He also said, “China is
spearheading economic cooperation and development for regional
security, especially around its neighbors.”31
Chinese Diplomatic Efforts
The situation in Afghanistan is clear, if China takes sides in
Afghanistan among the fighting factions, it will offend the other
groups that are not supported. Preferred policy tool for China,
therefore, is through the pursuit of a diplomatic and political
solution for the Afghan problem. In its strategy for peace and
58 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
stability, Afghanistan aims to achieve five major goals. It includes an
Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process, capacity building of
Afghanistan to take responsibility of its own affairs, facilitating the
reconciliation process with Taliban, supporting Afghanistan
development and reconstruction process and lastly supporting
Afghanistan in developing external relations based on mutual
respect.32
A flurry of diplomatic activities, involving a number of states in
Afghanistan's neighborhood was witnessed after the unveiling of
new the US-Afghan Strategy-2017. Quadrilateral Coordination
Group (QCG) met in October 2017 in Oman. Russia hosted the SCO-
Afghan Contact group meeting at the foreign ministerial level in the
same month and China was host to Afghan and Pakistani foreign
ministers for trilateral discussions. Kabul Process Conference also
took place in February 2018. China is part of all these initiatives
aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan. China also appointed veteran
diplomat Sun Yuxi as a special envoy to Afghanistan.
Unlike other powers, China never entered Afghanistan militarily.
Due to this China enjoys a non-controversial and a cleaner image
among the Afghan people and militant groups. It also enjoys the
trust of the central government in Afghanistan. With no historical
baggage and a clean image, China is ideally suited to play the role of
an honest broker for peace in Afghanistan. The Kabul Process is one
such initiative. Kabul Peace Process works within the Chinese
vision of Afghanistan peacebuilding as the process is Afghan-owned
and Afghan-led aimed at taking forward a focused intra-Afghan
dialogue on peace. Many regional and extra-regional powers
participate in these talks. United Nations Organizations, European
Union, and NATO also back this process. Two meetings of Kabul
Process have been held so far. In the latest meeting, Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani offered talks to Taliban with no pre-
conditions in a major policy shift.33 The offer involved an office for
Taliban in Kabul, Afghan passports for Taliban, resettlement for
militants’ families and assistance in removal of top Taliban leaders
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China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
names from international terrorist blacklists. Chinese Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson welcomed this development and offered to
play a role in the reconciliation process.34 But the signals from the
US don’t augur well for the peace process. President Trump’s new
national security adviser, John Bolton, has stated that in face of
growing Taliban, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda threats, the US can't
walk away from the war in Afghanistan.35
According to experts, China has developed contacts with Taliban
over the years and has held meetings with them in both Pakistan
and China. It is preparing to deal with whatever political forces
emerge in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.36 China, after
trilateral discussions on Afghanistan with Pakistan and Russia in
December 2016, favored the removal of Taliban from UN sanctions
list for strengthening peace dialogue between insurgents and the
Afghan government.37
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Afghanistan
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can provide an
important regional forum to seek a solution for Afghan conflict. SCO
evolved side by side with the Afghan War on Terror after 9/11.
Afghanistan was granted an observer status in the organization in
2012. SCO-Afghan Contact Group was established in 2005 to further
the communication between Afghanistan and SCO members. SCO is
opposed to the use of military means and external intervention in
Afghan conflict and stresses on internal reconciliation by
encouraging all political factions to engage in negotiations. It is
opposed to the presence of external forces in Afghanistan saying it
will jeopardize regional security.38
SCO is still evolving and developing its framework.39 Among other
factors behind limited SCO role in the regional security sphere is the
parallel Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) dominated
by Russia. CSTO is clear in its sole objective of the provision of
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China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
security to member states, unlike the SCO which has multiple sets
of aims and objectives ranging from security to culture and tourism.
CSTO has a Collective Rapid Reaction Force whereas SCO does not
have any.40
Russian President’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov,
said in an interview that in face of the possible threat of terrorism
from Afghanistan, Russia is taking steps with other member states
of CSTO to increase the readiness of the post-Soviet security bloc
and is also working with Afghanistan-SCO Contact Group in this
regard.41 Both SCO and CSTO had signed an agreement to broaden
mutual cooperation on security, crimes, and drug trafficking.
Meanwhile, the presence of US and NATO is also a factor in limited
SCO role in Afghanistan. China itself has mostly relied on US and
NATO when it came to the provision of security to Chinese
investments and interests. But China believes that to curb violence
and extremism, the economic and social developments are more
viable options.
The recent induction of Pakistan and India in SCO may also hinder
its capacity for dealing with Afghan conflict as objectives of these
states vis-à-vis Afghanistan are divergent. Pakistan and India
became the full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) in June 2017. After getting the permanent membership of the
SCO, both the countries will get more engaged in the Central Asian
affairs.
No Hard Power Option
Most of the experts agree on the point that Chinese will not get
militarily involved in Afghanistan. They term Chinese military
involvement in Afghanistan amounting to inviting trouble42 owing
to its proximity to restive Xinjiang province. Chinese Defence
Ministry recently denied reports of building a military post for
Afghan National Forces and termed the news groundless. It said
61 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
China and Afghanistan had normal security cooperation and that
China is supporting Afghanistan in improving defense and counter-
terrorism efforts.43 China focuses on the capacity building of the
Afghan forces so that they can effectively deal with the militants and
enforce government’s writ. It provided Afghanistan with military
aid for the first time in June 2016 which included logistic equipment
and weapons. Details of the supplies, however, were kept secret.44
General Fang Fenghui, the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA on
his visit to Afghanistan said China would provide $72 million worth
of military aid to the host country. China is also strengthening its
security on the border with Afghanistan. It is building a 75 km road
up to 10 km of the border, a supply depot and mobile
communication center for rapid movement of its military in the
region.45
Implications for Pakistan
Pakistan’s interests complement the Chinese interests in
Afghanistan, mainly stabilizing the internal situation in
Afghanistan. Pakistan and China both face the threat of terrorism
from Afghanistan. Afghan soil has been used by militants for
subversive activities in Pakistan for decades and China fears the
same for itself. Both want a central government, capable of
effectively governing the whole of Afghan territory and bringing
peace and stability in the country. Alignment of Pakistani interests
with Russian Federation and China has helped Pakistan in the
diplomatic arena. When the US blamed Pakistan for lies and deceit,
China praised Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang said, “Pakistan has made great
efforts and sacrifices for combating terrorism and made prominent
contributions to the cause of international counterterrorism, and
the international community should fully recognize this.”46
Pakistan experienced extremism and a strong wave of terrorism
after 9/11 and start of the US War on Terror. According to Pakistan
62 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
government figures War on Terror has caused 123 billion US
Dollars loss to Pakistani economy besides the loss of 50,000
civilians and 6,000 military personal’s lives.47 Pakistan today
perceives genuine threats from inside Afghanistan.
In face of security challenges from Afghanistan, Pakistan has finally
begun fencing of its border with Afghanistan, which it had been
planning to do for a very long time. Once completed fencing will
help improve security in the peripheral border areas. According to
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) General Zubair
Hayat, two hundred thousand Pakistani security forces are
deployed on the western borders.48 The stable situation on western
borders will also lower the need for resources and number of
security personnel there. These resources can be diverted to other
defense and social needs.
Pakistan has also offered assistance and training to Afghan security
forces but met with a cold response. Only six Afghan cadets arrived
in Pakistan for training for the first time in 2015.49 Afghanistan has
yet to respond to Pakistani offer of a bilateral strategic cooperation
agreement, made by then COAS Raheel Sharif in 2011, and offer to
equip one of the brigades of Afghan National Army.
The increased Chinese involvement will help Pak-Afghan relations
which are dominated by mutual mistrust. The Afghan government
has been under US and Indian influence and adhere to mostly
western narrative about Pakistan. Increased Chinese involvement
in Afghanistan can help remove some mistrust between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. China in this regard has tried to address
the mistrust by holding trilateral talks with Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The first round of Trilateral Strategic Dialogue of
China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan was held in Kabul in February
2015. They discussed regional situation and trilateral practical
cooperation.50 China also hosted the 1st China-Afghanistan-
Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue in December 2017. The goals
63 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
of the dialogue included helping Pakistan and Afghanistan improve
and develop their mutual relationship.51
Strategically, for Pakistan, China can act as the balancing factor vis-
à-vis US and India in Afghanistan. Both China and Pakistan want a
limited Indian role and influence in Afghanistan. India is using
Afghan territory to support the TTP and Baloch insurgents against
Pakistan. The major part of Indian funded development projects in
Afghanistan is undertaken in its eastern provinces bordering
Pakistan. Pakistan believes that the Indian agents in the disguise of
officials working on these projects are involved in planning,
organizing and supporting militancy in Pakistan’s Balochistan
Province. Taking the training of Afghan security forces as an
example of Indian influence, India had trained up to two thousand
Afghan soldiers in its military academies in 2013,52 and one
thousand more were in training in 2014.
Pakistan wants to reach out to Central Asian Republics (CARs) for
enhancement of mutual economic and trade relations. CARs have
huge potential for trade growth with Pakistan. They have combined
population of 66 million and gross domestic product of 206 billion
US Dollars. However, Pakistan trade volume with CARs is much less
than its potential. Pakistan traded US $89 million worth goods in
2014 with Tajikistan and US $24 million with Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan is the most feasible land route for reaching out to
Central Asia.53 CASA-1000 energy project is currently under
construction, but its viability also depends on the security situation
in Afghanistan as it passes through several Afghan provinces
including Kunduz and Nangarhar with substantial militant
presence. Chinese aim to extend CPEC into Afghanistan and Central
Asia. If it is realized, CPEC will connect CARs to Pakistani ports,
making Afghanistan a land bridge and greatly benefit CARs,
Afghanistan and Pakistan economically.
The prosperity brought economic cooperation and CPEC can make
conducive conditions in Afghanistan for those Afghan refugees
64 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
living in Pakistan to return to their home country. Pakistan is
currently host to 1.3 million registered and about 0.6 million
unregistered Afghan refugees.54 Pakistan wants repatriation of
these refugees to Afghanistan with dignity. But Afghanistan and the
US call internal Afghan situation not yet suited for the return of
these refugees.55
Conclusion
The study of China’s policy towards Afghanistan shows that the
Chinese role is increasing in Afghanistan due to security and
economic reasons. The security situation in Afghanistan has a direct
impact on the Chinese internal security, and its economic plans in
Afghanistan and in its neighborhood. The IS growing footprints in
Afghanistan and US plans staying for the long term in Afghanistan
are also adding to Chinese concerns. Amid these concerns, China
and other stakeholders in the region are working hard strive for
peace and stability in Afghanistan. China and other Afghan
neighbors like Pakistan and Russia want a political and diplomatic
solution to the Afghan problem. If Taliban show their willingness to
become a part of the peace process, it would give a major boost to
achieving peace in Afghanistan. The US on its part can facilitate the
peace process in best interests of the region by negotiating its exit
from Afghanistan.
Indications, so far, however, are that the US wants a military
solution of the Afghan problem. The United States is keeping its
forces in Afghanistan at least "until the end of 2024 and beyond"
under the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). It is increasing its air
campaigns and troops deployment under Trump’s new strategy.
However, the United States military have not had a major success
against Taliban. Taliban have maintained their fighting capacity and
demonstrated it by capturing provincial capital Kunduz in 2015 and
recently bombings in the heart of Kabul. They have also made US
withdrawal from Afghanistan a pre-condition for peace
65 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
negotiations to take place. A political settlement of Afghan remains
the most viable option.
With regards to implications of China's Afghan policy for Pakistan if
the Chinese influence and diplomatic clout over Afghanistan are
exploited well by Pakistan it can further Pakistani interests in
Afghanistan. China is making diplomatic efforts for eradicating
mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. China wants friendly
Pak-Afghan relations to decrease the challenges posed to CPEC
from militants based in Afghanistan. The overall involvement of
China into Afghanistan can have a positive outcome for Afghanistan
and the region.
Samran Ali is a
Research Assistant at CISS
Endnotes
1 Riaz Muhammad Khan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and
Resistance to Modernity, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 162.
2 Munir Akram, “The new Great Game,” Dawn, June 12, 2016,
https://www.dawn.com/news/1264242
3 “President Donald J. Trump Announces a National Security Strategy to Advance
America’s Interests,” White House, December 18, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
announces-national-security-strategy-advance-americas-interests/
4 Stephen J. Blank, “US Interests in Central Asia and Challenges to Them,” March
2007.
66 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
5 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronksi, “U.S. Policy Toward Central
Asia 3.0,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 2016,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-
62556
6 United States Congress, Quarterly Report, Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), (30 January 2018)
7 United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation in Afghanistan and its
Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of Secretary-General,
A/72/651 (15 December 2017)
8 “Full Transcript: Donald Trump Announces His Afghanistan Policy”, The Atlantic,
Aug 21, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/full-transcript-
donald-trump-announces-his-afghanistan-policy/537552/
9 Sean Mann and Stephen Watts, “Afghanistan after the Drawdown,” Brookings, July
6, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/07/06/afghanistan-after-the-
drawdown/
10 Sandra Destradi, Nadine Godehardt and Alexander Frank, “The ISAF Withdrawal
from Afghanistan: Perceptions and Reactions of Regional Powers.” GIGA Focus
Global 2012, 10,
11 Harleen Gambhir, "ISIS in Afghanistan." Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of
War (2015): 6.
12 Jingdong Yuan, “China and Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” in New
South Asian Security, ed. Chris Ogden, (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2016), p. 79.
13 Zhao Huasheng, China, and Afghanistan: China's Interests, Stances, and
Perspectives, A Report of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies Russia and Eurasia Program,
March 2012
14 Zhao Huasheng, “What is behind China’s Growing Attention to Afghanistan,”
Carnegie, March 08, 2015, http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/08/what-is-behind-
china-s-growing-attention-to-afghanistan.
15 “Statement by Ambassador MA Zhaoxu at the Security Council Debate on
Afghanistan,” China’s Permanent Mission to United Nation, March 08, 2018,
http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1542996.htm
16 Ibid.
17 Jingdong Yuan, “China and Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” p.77.
18 Ibid.
67 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
19 “Xinjiang Territory Profile,” BBC, November 2016 17, 2018,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974
20 Shamil Shams, “Why China's Uighurs are joining jihadists in Afghanistan,” DW,
July 24, 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/why-chinas-uighurs-are-joining-jihadists-in-
afghanistan/a-18605630
21 Ibid.
22 Harleen Gambhir, "ISIS in Afghanistan."
23 “ISIL video threatens China with 'rivers of bloodshed',” Aljazeera, March 1, 2017,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/isil-video-threatens-china-rivers-
bloodshed-170301103927503.html
24 Wang Jin, The US Withdrawal, and One Belt One Road: Chinese Concerns and
Challenges in Afghanistan," Strategic Assessment 19, No. 3 (October 2016)
25 Pamela Constable, “Hamid Karzai’s dark theories are gaining traction in
Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hamid-karzais-dark-theories-
are-gaining-traction-in-afghanistan/2018/02/13/31df39e0-0e19-11e8-998c-
96deb18cca19_story.html?utm_term=.7d39e041e87f
26 Richard Ghiasy, “Why Afghanistan’s Stability is so Important to China?” South
China Morning Post, May 22, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/2095156/opinion-why-afghanistans-stability-so-important-china
27 “President Unveils New Afghanistan, South Asia Strategy,” US Department of
Defence, August 21, 2017,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1284964/president-unveils-new-
afghanistan-south-asia-strategy/
28 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016 –
Executive Summary, (United Nations 2016)
29 China Power Team, "How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China’s
interests?" China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/
30 Saibal Dasgupta, “China Trying to Extend Belt Plan to Afghanistan to Expand
Influence,” Voice of America, May 08, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-
trying-to-extend-belt-plan-to-afghanistan/3842278.html
31 Teddy Ng and Laura Zhou, “Beijing sends in new envoy in a sign it wants a bigger
role for Afghanistan in ‘New Silk Road',” South China Morning Post, February 02,
2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2131819/beijing-
sends-new-envoy-sign-it-wants-bigger-role
68 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
32 Zhao Huasheng, “China and Afghanistan.”
33 Hamid Shalizi and James Mackenzie, ”Afghanistan’s Ghani offers talks with
Taliban 'without preconditions',” Reuters, February 28, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban/afghanistans-ghani-offers-
talks-with-taliban-without-preconditions-idUSKCN1GC0J0
34 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference, March
1, 2018,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t153
8767.shtml
35 “Americans frustrated as military still in Afghanistan: US NSA John Bolton,”
Tribune, March 24, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1668234/9-americans-
frustrated-us-military-still-afghanistan-us-nsa-john-bolton/
36 Andrew Small, “Why Is China Talking to the Taliban?” Foreign Policy, June 21,
2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/
37 “Russia, China favor taking Taliban off UN sanctions list,” Tribune, December 28,
2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1277084/russia-china-favour-taking-taliban-off-
un-sanctions-list/
38 Zhao Huasheng, “China and Afghanistan.”
39 Sartaj Aziz, “Concluding Address,” in proceedings of SCO Role in Regional
Stability Prospects of its Expansion, Islamabad 2013, IPRI
40 Raj Kumar Sharma, “SCO’s Role in Afghanistan: Prospects and Challenges,”
Mainstream, VOL LIII No 24, June 6, 2015,
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article5721.html
41 “Russia puts Post-Soviet security bloc on alert over likely terror threat from
Afghanistan,” TASS, February 9, http://tass.com/politics/989170
42 Dirk van der Kley, “China’s Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,” Analysis, October
2014.
43 "China denies plan to build a military base in Afghanistan," Reuters, January 25,
2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-afghanistan/china-denies-plan-to-
build-military-base-in-afghanistan-idUSKBN1FE196
44 Franz J. Marty, “The curious case of Chinese troops on Afghan soil,” The Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 03, 2017,
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13424-the-curious-
case-of-chinese-troops-on-afghan-soil.html
45 Jingdong Yuan, “China and Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities,” p. 82.
69 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
China’s Afghanistan Policy: Implications for Pakistan
46 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang's Regular Press Conference on
January 2, 2018,”
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t152
3228.shtml
47 “Pakistan lost over 50,000 civilians in the war on terror,” Tribune, January 3,
2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1599831/1-pakistan-lost-50000-civilians-war-
terror/
48 “General Hayat says no outside or military solution to Afghan problems,” Geo,
September 09, 2017, https://www.geo.tv/latest/157281-pakistan-fought-worlds-
biggest-battle-against-terrorism-cjcs-mahmood
49 “Pakistan trains Afghan army cadets,” BBC, accessed on February 6, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31164119
50 First Round of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Held in
Kabul,” MFA, February 10, 2015,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1236606.shtml
51 “The 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Dialogue Convenes,”
MFA, December 26, 2017,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1522541.shtml
52 “Afghanistan sends India a weapons wish-list ahead of NATO withdrawal,” Daily
Mail, November 20, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-
2510786/Afghanistan-sends-India-weapons-wish-list-ahead-NATO-
withdrawal.html#ixzz59cIN5pUI
53 Riaz Muhammad Khan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
54 “Extension in Afghan refugees’ stay beyond June 2018 unlikely,” Tribune,
January 9, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1603798/1-extension-afghan-refugees-
stay-beyond-june-2018-unlikely/
55 “Afghan refugees: US averse to Pakistan’s repatriation plan,” Tribune, February 2,
2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1624340/1-afghan-refugeesus-averse-pakistans-
repatriation-plan/
70 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches
Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy:
Comparative Approaches
Afeera Firdous
Introduction
Contemporary period has evidenced such swift advancements in
computer technologies that the era is described as the Digital Age.
The most astonishing change that the digital age brought, is the
development and advancement of interdependent, interconnected,
and globalized network of computer and communication devices. In
the twenty-first century, this network of networks has transformed
into a global interactive platform for joint activities, and the trading
of information and ideas by people globally.1 In recent years,
cyberspace expanded practically exponentially. It offers a stage for
innovation and well-being, and provides ways to further
advancements. Along with the positives, there are also some
negatives of this new technology. With the global scope of a light or
unregulated digital infrastructure, there are great risks which affect
nation-states, private organizations, and personal rights of an
individual. Today, many states almost completely depend on
cyberspace in regard to education, health, communications, energy,
transport, infrastructure, financial services and military forces
movements.
Cyber operations are increasingly being used by states to
accomplish their political, economic, and military objectives.
Unfortunately, non-state actors are also resorting to cyber
operations for their nefarious purposes. The enhanced scope and
incidence of cyber-attacks as a political tool forms an extremely
dangerous trend in international relations. Vulnerable data systems
are attractive targets for other states and non-state actors. As the
dependence on information and communication technologies (ICT)
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has increased with the sophisticated methods, the tendency of
cyber-attacks has also transformed from small-scale intrusions and
financial breaches to highly organized state-sponsored attacks. To
be able to protect from the threat posed to vulnerable data on
cyberspace, states take multiple initiatives such as formulating legal
frameworks to regulate cyber use, but most significant is the
articulation of a policy framework to develop nation’s approach
against such threats.
Threat Scenario and Significance of National Policy
Framework
Cyber threat has changed in its nature, scope and scale in the past
few years. There are some examples of use of cyber deterrence like
Stuxnet which put back Iran’s nuclear program by several years,
cyber compellence such as hacking of Sony Picture Entertainment
(SPE), influence on political outcomes such as alleged Russian
hackers’ involvement in US Presidential elections and world-wide
cyber ransomware attacks like Petya, NonPetya and WannaCry
when billions of dollars were paid as ransom globally. The Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has maintained a list
of significant global cyber incidents since 2006.2 This list consists of
three hundred and thirteen incidents, focusing on cyber-attacks on
governments, defense and high-tech companies, or economic
crimes and each incident resulted in the losses of more than a
million dollars. There are a few recent examples of cyber incidents
which pose dire consequences for national security.
Speaking at a public event in Islamabad, Chief Technical Advisor of
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Mr. Tariq Malik3
related an example of cyber compellence that few years back Saudi
Arabia started working on an agreement with AirBus to buy
aircraft. When the agreement got finalized, country A (he
intentionally did not name the country) hacked all the data related
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to agreement between Saudi Arabia and AirBus. Country A
informed the Saudi officials that agreement data had been hacked.
The hacked data revealed that some of the Saudi officials were
involved in taking commission/bribe in the agreement. Then,
country A proposed to Saudi officials that whether Saudi Arabia
needed to cancel the agreement with AirBus and buy aircraft from
Boeing or country A will share the data with AirBus and French
government. Saudi Arabia, thus, was left with no option but to
cancel the agreement with AirBus and sign an agreement with the
Boeing.
An Indian journalist, Rachna Khaira, associated with The Tribune
newspaper reported that, in January 2018, an anonymous agent on
WhatsApp had sold Aadhar4 data to her for only $7.84 (Rs.500).5
The hacking of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIAI)
and its Aadhar system provided the access to the personal data of
more than one billion Indian citizens. After a month, the news of
Chinese cyber espionage against African Union (AU) emerged.
French daily, Le Monde, published a report that China had tapped
confidential data of IT networks of African Union headquarters,
which was built by Chinese investor, for five years from 2012 to
2017.6 In February 2018, another incident happened when
Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games website went offline for more
than twelve hours. The US intelligence officials claimed that few
hundred computers had been hacked by Russian hackers during the
Olympic opening ceremony which not only effected its website but
also interrupted wifi service and televisions at the Olympic
stadium.7 US officials termed this attack as false-flag operation
while saying that the Russian hackers did so, trying to make it
appear as though the intrusion was conducted by North Korea.
In March 2018, New York Times reported that 2017’s cyber-attacks
on the Saudi petrochemical companies were not aimed to destroy
data or fold the operations of the plants, but were intended to
disrupt the company’s operational procedures and trigger an
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Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches
explosion to cause physical damage.8 Cybersecurity researchers
fear that the attackers could repeat it in other parts of the world,
since different countries, all over the world, depend on the same
American-engineered computer systems that were compromised in
Saudi petrochemical plant. During the Russian Presidential
elections in March 2018, Russia’s Central Election Commission
reported that there was a cyber-attack on commission’s website on
the election day, which targeted its information center.9 In the same
month, another scandal came to press about personal data leak of
Facebook to Cambridge Analytica.10 Christopher Wylie, who
assisted a Cambridge University academic to obtain the data, said
that Cambridge Analytica collected millions of Facebook profiles of
US voters and used them to build a powerful software program to
predict and influence choices at the ballot box.11 This software
program was not only used by Donald Trump’s election team but
also for winning Brexit campaign in UK.
The FBI assesses that only US losses from cybercrime in 2016
exceeded $1.3 billion,12 and some industry experts predict such
losses could cost the global economy $6 trillion by 2021.13 In 2008,
cyber threat was not even a part of US worldwide threat assessment
report, but in 2018, Worldwide Threat Assessment report of the US
intelligence community considered cyber threat as top threat to US
and its allies, leaving fear of WMD and terrorism behind.14 Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) also acknowledged that the potential
of surprise and risk in the cyber domain will increase in the next
year and beyond.15
The answer to the question ‘What is Cyber Security Policy and why
it is important?’ is a bit intricate. US Department of Homeland
Security has defined cyber security policy “it includes strategy,
policy, and standards with regards to the security of and operations
in cyberspace. It encompasses the full range of threat reduction,
vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement,
incident response, and recovery policies and activities, including
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computer network operations, information assurance, law
enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they
relate to the security and stability of the global information and
communications infrastructure”.16
Policy making is most important of all components of a state’s
security framework, for it lays the goals and over all objectives that
a state desire to pursue. The strategy, on the other hand, allows the
state to mobilize its resources and potential for accomplishment of
those objectives. States usually have separate policy and strategy
for achieving the overall objectives such as foreign policy, defense
policy and economic policy etc. Cyberspace has emerged as a
serious threat for national security of the state. As Ola Hjalmarsson
states that within the framework of the securitization theory17,
some concepts are important: a securitizing player is a title given to
the actor who evokes the sense of securitization, the referent entity
is the object which is considered as it is needed to be securitized by
the securitizing actor, the spectators or audience is the populace
which requires to be persuaded of the weakness of the referred
entity, and the requisite of outstanding steps to guard it so that the
process of securitization becomes a success.18 Modern states
perceive certain activities in cyberspace as potential threat,
therefore a national cyber security policy is all the more significant
to preserve national interests in cyberspace.
Comparative approaches in Cybersecurity Policies
The inherent vulnerable nature and weakness of cyberspace and
increasing number of cyber-attacks constantly threaten the
security and economy of states, as well as the daily life of citizens.
More than fifty countries have framed their cyber security
policies/strategies to mitigate the serious cyber security threats
faced by their nations. A national cyber security policy/strategy is
not only designed to protect national cyberspace from vindictive
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cyber threats, but due to diverse and unpredictable threat
landscape, significant variations can be rooted in the preventive,
defensive, and offensive approaches implemented by different
nations.19
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)20 categorizes
countries’ efforts with regards to cybersecurity on five parameters
i.e. legal, technical, organizational, capacity building and
cooperation. In 2017, ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI)
ranked Singapore at the first place, with regards to its efforts in
cyber security, ahead of US, UK, Russia, France, Estonia, Canada and
Israel.21 Top ten ranking countries are shown in Table 1.
ITU Ranking Country
1 Singapore
2 US
3 Malaysia
4 Oman
5 Estonia
6 Mauritius
7 Australia
8 Georgia, France
9 Canada
10 Russian Federation
Table. 1 ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index 2017
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Different countries have also included action plans in their cyber
security policies/strategies. The US, UK, France, Netherlands and
Germany have specifically acknowledged dual aspects of cyber
security like cyber offense and cyber defense.22 All the national
cyber security strategies, however, have similar objectives of
protecting the cyberspace against potential threats and enhancing
cyber resilience. Countries have taken into account their peculiar
cyber threat landscape, socio-political conditions, security trends,
traditions, level of awareness while developing their cyber security
approaches.23 The formulation of cyber security policy/strategy
effort gained serious attention after 2008 when from simple
breaches state-sponsored cyber-attacks such as an incident in
Estonia in 2007 came to notice.24 The US had, though, published its
first cyber security strategy draft in 2003, before the cyber-attacks
became so common.25 Publication and revision of national cyber
security policies/strategies of different countries are given in Table
2.
Countries Year Policy/Strategy Issued
US Strategy 2003
Strategy Review 2009
Policy 2011
Strategy for critical infrastructure 2014
Dept. of Defence’s Strategy 2015
UK Strategy 2009
Strategy Review 2011
Australia Strategy 2009
Canada Strategy 2010
Action Plan for Strategy 2013
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Estonia Strategy 2008
Strategy Review 2014
France Strategy 2011
Germany Strategy 2011
Japan Strategy 2013
India Strategy 2013
Saudi Arabia Strategy 2013
Table 2. Timeline of Cyber Security Strategies
United States
Countries such as UK, US, Estonia, Netherlands, and Czech Republic
have frequently published updated drafts of their cyber security
strategies, but the US is the only country which has regularly
reviewed and updated its cyber security strategy. The most recent
document on cyber security strategy26 was published by US
Department of Defence in April 2015. In the document, US has
defined its strategic goals as follows:
Form and sustain ready forces and capabilities to conduct
cyberspace operations.
Build defence for DoD networks, protect data, and lessen
vulnerabilities to DoD missions.
Be prepared to defend the US homeland and US vital
interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of
significant consequence.
Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use
those options to control conflict escalation and to shape the
conflict environment at all stages.
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Build and maintain robust international alliances and
partnerships to deter shared threats and increase
international security and stability.
The document also describes the central role of DoD’s Cyber
Mission Force (CMF) which was approved in 2012. It stated that
after being operational, CMF will consist of 6200 military/defence,
civilian and contractor support personnel from all military
departments. CMF comprised cyber operators organized into 133
teams and sub-teams such as Cyber Protection Force, National
Mission Force, and Combat Mission Force etc. DoD cyber strategy
mentioned all types of cyber offenders like China, Iran, North Korea;
and non-state actors such as Islamic State (IS) etc as potential
source of threat for the US.
India
India announced its first national Cyber Security Policy27 in 2013,
against the backdrop of Snowden’s revelations about NSA
surveillance program.28 India’s cyber security policy charted key
areas of focus such as building protected cyber ecosystem,
producing assurance framework, creating mechanisms for security
threat early warning, vulnerability management and response to
security threats, secure e-governance mechanism and resilient
critical information infrastructure, promote R&D and cyber
security awareness, develop human workforce, and integrate
public-private partnership. Some significant cyber policy objectives
of India are as follows:
Build a strong regulatory framework for securing
cyberspace ecosystem.
Build a 24 x 7 apparatuses on national and sectoral level for
tracking down strategic information about dangers to ICT
infrastructure and crafting response.
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Establish a 24 x 7 National Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Center (NCIIPC).
Build a force of 500,000 professionals trained in cyber
security till 2018 through capacity building programs.
Develop effective public private partnerships and
collaborative engagements through technical and
operational cooperation and contribution for enhancing the
security of cyberspace.
Build global cooperation by promoting shared
understanding and leveraging relationships for furthering
the cause of security of cyberspace.
Arun Sukumar, the head of the Cyber Security and Internet
Governance Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF)29
India, called it “a statement of first principles” rather than a
comprehensive framework.30 Though, India’s cyber security policy
is not a detailed document but it could work as a working draft to
start with. In 2014, India established National Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Center.31 On the other hand, India
projected to build a force of 5,00,000 cyber professionals within five
years but it could not meet the numbers as envisioned.32 National
cyber security policy also outlined necessity of a nodal agency to
coordinate all the matters related to cyber security within the
country. In 2017, India IT Ministry setup a National Cyber
Coordination Center (NCCC) to examine the country’s online traffic
to identify threats.33 Indian government has also made operational
Botnet and Malware Cleaning Center to detect malicious software
in devices of citizens and clean them.34
Pakistan’s Efforts in Formulating National Cybersecurity
Policy
Countries, around the world are deploying online services and
Pakistan is also developing IT services and integrating it to different
sectors. Microsoft’s most recent Security Intelligence Report (SIR)
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showed Pakistan amongst the states which are most at risk of
malicious software attacks.35 National Database and Registration
Authority (NADRA) maintains a centralized national ID database of
Pakistan, which is shared among banks, passport offices, Election
Commission of Pakistan (ECP), mobile networks and Federal
Investigation Agency etc. NADRA is the only organization which
registers and stores the information about the population.
According to Threat Track Security 2014 report, NADRA is on the
top ranking organizations in the world because of use of state of the
art technologies for its services.36
Use of IT is the most effective means for improving governments
delivery systems in the contemporary era. E-governance helps to
improve by increasing efficiency of the services provision and
enables government organizations to offer timely services to the
citizens. Some of Pakistan’s e-government components are Federal
Board of Revenue (FBR); Excise, Taxation and Norcotics
departments; Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, Punjab and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Service; Punjab Metrobus Authority;
Civil Aviation System; and Federal Public Service Commission
(FPSC). Pakistan also has some online business and financial
services such as online banking transaction facilities, mobile
banking, mobile and postal money transfer services, Pakistan Stock
Exchange etc. NADRA could be an attractive target for cyber-
attackers to block or sabotage its essential services, hack personal
confidential information and use them for their illegal purposes. In
December 2012, Turkish hackers had claimed to have accessed the
NADRA system and the Federal Investigation Agency’s (FIA)
servers, potentially acquiring personal data of millions of
Pakistanis.37 Later in 2015, NADRA officials admitted that its critical
database has gone through serious hack attempts originating from
US, India and Israel.38 In 2013, several cyber-attacks on the Election
Commission of Pakistan website were foiled but the website itself
was shut down to avoid further attacks.39 Apart from these
examples, cyber-attacks by Indian and Pakistani hackers, on one
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Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches
another, have become common practice such as ahead of each
other’s independence days40 and after the announcement of
Kulbhushan Jadhav’s death penalty.41
Pakistan has not, yet, devised a cybersecurity policy/strategy.
There are, however, some significant measures taken by Senate of
Pakistan in this direction. In July 2013, Senate Committee of
Defence, in collaboration with Pakistan Information Security
Association (PISA), organized a policy seminar on the topic of
“Defending Pakistan through Cyber Security Strategy”.42 Chairman
Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production, Mushahid
Hussain Syed announced 7-point Action Plan for Cyber Secure
Pakistan, as follows:
Cyber security threat should be accepted and recognized as
new, emerging national security threat by the Government
of Pakistan, similar to the threats like terrorism and military
aggression.
Relevant legislation should be done to preserve, protect and
promote Pakistan’s cyber security, drafting for which has
already begun. The bills will be presented in Parliament for
Cyber Security.
Establishment of a National Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT).
Establishing a Cyber-Security Task Force with affiliation
with Ministry of Defence, Ministry of IT, Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Information and
security organizations plus relevant and leading IT
professionals to formulate Cyber Security Strategy for
Pakistan.
Under the office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee, an Inter-Services Cyber Command should be
established to coordinate cyber security and cyber defence
for the Pakistan Armed Forces.
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Within the framework of SAARC, Pakistan should take the
initiative to initiate talks among the member states
particularly with India to establish acceptable norms of
behavior in cyber security domain among the SAARC
countries so that these countries are not engaged in cyber
warfare against each other.
Soon, the Senate Defence Committee, in cooperation with
the Pakistan Information Security Association (PISA), will
have a special media workshop to promote awareness
among the public and educate opinion leaders on the issue
of cyber security.
Mr. Amar Jaffri, former Additional Secretery FIA and Head of
Pakistan Information Security Association, informed in an
interview with the author that Chairman Senate Committee of
Defence and Defence Production, Mushahid Hussain Syed, had
formulated a group of experts Cyber Security Task Force in 2014.
Mr. Jaffri, himself headed the task force which was tasked to
formulate cyber security policy/strategy and legal framework. A
forty-member team comprising experts from the government,
armed force, FIA, police, intelligence community, business,
academia, IT and cyber security specialists etc, met for eighteen
months and drafted four policy documents. The documents
included cyber security laws, cyber security policy, cyber security
strategy, and draft of national cyber emergency response team.
Senator Mushahid had presented all the draft documents to Senate
for approval.
In March 2014, the Minister of State for Interior Balighur Rehman
also acknowledged that a cyber-security strategy was being devised
to counter cyber-attacks.43 Later in April, Mr. Mushahid Hussain
Syed presented a private member bill, on National Cyber Security
Council Act.44 The purpose of the bill was to launch a high level
policy research institution to conduct research and analysis on
policy matters related to cyber security. Proposed council would
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support individuals, private companies and government branches
in capacity building; formulate policy and strategies; assist the
government, academia and IT professionals; help in taking
collaborative measures with other countries and international
organizations; and help in developing and maturing legal
frameworks in cyber domain.
The bill had clearly specified functions and powers of the National
Cyber Security Council. Some of the functions are as follow:
Formulate national cyber security policy45 and strategy.46
Monitor cyber security legislative framework and
recommend improvements in legislations.47
Recommend policies and regulatory means of
standardization, harmonization and accreditation with
regards to critical information infrastructure.48
Coordinate with other states and international entities on
implementation of policies, legislations and initiatives.49
Facilitate communications between government and
private sector, academia and cyber security experts on
issues relevant to cyber security.50
Establish an advisory group to provide operational,
technical, policy and industry advisory inputs on strategic
plans.51
Develop ten or twenty year vision with regards to cyber
security52
Conduct research on upcoming cyber threats and promote
general awareness.53
While chairing a meeting of national-level cyber security response
committee, Minister of State for Information Technology, Anusha
Rahman stressed the need to devise a comprehensive cyber
security policy, using a multi-stakeholder model.54 She also
underlined the need for a holistic approach and a coordinated effort
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to ensure the security of the data right from the cell phone of an
individual to the government ICT data/information.
In April 2017, Ministry of Information Technology and Telecom
(MoITT) released the first draft of Digital Pakistan Policy.55 Digital
Policy/IT Policy lays emphasis on four sectors for the application of
policy requirements to address and improve country’s position in
governance, entrepreneurship, knowledge capital, accessibility,
demand stimulation, and ICT skills. These areas are:
Sectoral digitalization.
Cross-sector cooperative measures.
IT sector sustainability.
Entrepreneurship and innovation.
According to MoITT, this policy will serve as the foundation for the
establishment of a holistic Digital Ecosystem in the country with
advance concepts and components for rapid delivery of next
generation IT services, applications and content.56
Way Ahead
With the cyber perpetrators gaining strength day by day, cyber-
attacks methods are continuously evolving at a faster pace. No
nation can, therefore, stay completely secure from cyber-attacks.
Pakistan needs to focus on developing a comprehensive cyber
security policy at a rapid pace. There are some features which must
be part of Pakistan’s cyber security policy:
Maintain and support a secure and resilient cyberspace.
Safeguarded critical national cyber assets and
infrastructures.
Development of a robust cybersecurity regulatory,
legislative, and assurance framework.
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Establishment of National Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) / Cyber Security Incidental Response Team
(CSIRT).
Cyber security awareness campaigns for common users.
Development and improvement of indigenous cyber
security technologies and services.
Protection of the online rights of netizens.
Support of public-private collaboration.
Encouragement of international cooperation in cyber
security domain mainly with the neighboring and regional
countries.
Cyber security is quite a vast domain. Since there are no commonly
understood definitions of cyber security key terms, Pakistan needs
to define term such as cyber security and cyberspace explicitly. In
the last few years, besides terrorism, and natural hazards etc.,
cyber-attacks, cyber espionage and cyber terrorism have also
become a global menace. A comparative analysis reveals that
countries have now realized the importance of cyber security and,
therefore, regard it as one of the top-tier national security issues.57
Different countries have allocated specific budgets for cyber
security measures. According to publically available data, UK
spends £1.9bn,58 India Rs. 110 crore,59 and US with highest annual
cyber security spending up to $19 billion.60 Pakistan also needs to
prioritize to allocate sufficient funds, in the annual, budget for cyber
security projects. In the cyber domain, the criticality of an
infrastructure is defined by the services and core values that it
provides and the digital information it processes, stores and
transmits. The choice of critical sectors or infrastructure by any
country is highly impacted by the country-specific peculiar
conditions and traditions, cyber threat perception, sociopolitical
factors, and geographical conditions. Pakistan also needs to clearly
define its critical assets or infrastructure in its national cyber
security policy in different areas such as telecommunication and
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ICT, banking and finance, government and particular e-services, like
electricity and water supply, health services, transportation,
emergency and rescue services, and national security services like
the police and armed forces etc.
Some countries have established inter-departmental cyber security
response capabilities i.e. they have distributed the task of cyber
security amongst multiple existing organizations working under
various governmental departments.61 The establishment of these
organizations within the government is greatly influenced by cyber
threat perception, resource allocation, defense etc. Pakistan also
needs to decide whether it is going to follow the example of France
and Estonia to create a new coordinating body to deal with cyber
threats or it is going to adopt inter-departmental cyber security
response capabilities. For a country to effectively deter targeted
cyber threats and incidents, it is essential to have technical teams
that efficiently disseminate threat information to the concerned
authorities and provide cyber protection and resilience capabilities.
Various forms of such teams include Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERTs), Computer Security Incident Response
Team (CSIRT) and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISAC). The government needs to establish a national CERT on the
priority basis. Table 3. shows some countries who have established
their CERTs earlier.
Country CERT Established
Australia 2010
Canada 2003
Estonia 2006
France 2008
Germany 2012
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India 2004
Israel 2014
Japan 1996
Malaysia 1997
Saudi Arabia 2006
Turkey 2007
UK 2014
US 2003
Table 3. CERTs establishing year of various countries
Pakistan needs to emphasize on cyber security capacity building
initiatives e.g. training, awareness, R&D programs etc mentioned in
the draft cyber security document. Whether on national or
international levels, cyber security requires multi-stakeholder
approach for effectively tackling cyber issues and increasing cyber
resilience. Because of the global nature of cyberspace, apart from
intra-nation cooperation (public, private sectors, ISP’s etc), intra-
state and international collaboration are also required. Pakistan is
now part of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which
provides good opportunities to collaborate with other countries or
international organizations. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
has special focus on cyber security issues. It holds annual cyber
drills. Pakistan needs to initiate collaborative measures to get
assistance of friendly countries to develop cyber security policy,
strategy and national CERT. India has recently approved an Armed
Forces Cyber Division,62 Pakistan also needs to focus on building its
tri-services cyber capabilities.
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Conclusion
In the contemporary international world, internet has played
vibrant role in bringing global connectivity. But, on the other hand,
exploitative cyberspace operations have increased the arena of
security threats for nation states, both in civilian and military
domains. Cyber intrusions have drastically increased in the recent
years, which causes economic loss of billions of dollars annually, as
the cybersecurity experts predict that offensive cyber operations
could cause loss of trillions of dollars to the global economy in the
next decade. Cybersecurity experts also acknowledge that the
potential of risk in cyberspace will escalate in coming years rather
that deceasing.
The increased number of offensive cyber operations, by states and
non-state actors, have made the policy makers around the world
conscious of the need to think about solutions for changing threat
environment in cyber domain. Countries across the world have
recognized the potential threats in cyberspace.
Keeping in mind the dire consequences of any such attack on
Pakistan, government must take timely steps to counter cyber risks.
Apart from government, private companies and organizations also
need to prioritize and focus on protecting their systems and data,
and make regular risk assessments. It is needed to make well-
judged investments in cyber defense capabilities to secure the
systems and accomplish national objectives. It is high time to
understand that countering and diminishing the cyber threat needs
a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan. Few baby-
steps have already been taken by the government, but a lot more is
needed to be done to secure country’s cyberspace.
Afeera Firdous is a
Research Assistant at CISS
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Endnotes
1 US policy documents characterize the Internet as a “network of networks.” See
Department of Homeland Security, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted
and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, DC:
Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2009, 8)
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fin
al_0.pdf.
2 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Significant Cyber Incidents,”
https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-
program/other-projects-cybersecurity, accessed on March 13, 2018.
3 Mr. Tariq Malik is former Chief Technology Officer at GHQ and he also has been
former Chairman of NADRA.
4 Aadhar Data is compilation of data-set of Indian citizens, containing their personal
information such as name, DoB (age), contact details (address, mob no, e-mail),
fingerprints, and facial photograph. 5 Rachna Khaira, “Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar
details,” The Tribune, January 3, 2018, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-
500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html.
6 Shannon Tiezzi, “If China Bugged the AU Headquarters, What African Countries
Should Be Worried?,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/if-china-bugged-the-au-headquarters-what-african-
countries-should-be-worried/.
(Original Report) Joan Tilouine, “A Addis-Abeba, le siège de l’Union africaine
espionné par Pékin,” Le Monde, January 26, 2018,
https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-
union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html.
7 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian spies hacked the Olympics and tried to make it look
like North Korea did it, U.S. officials say,” The Washington Post, February 24, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-spies-hacked-the-
olympics-and-tried-to-make-it-look-like-north-korea-did-it-us-officials-
say/2018/02/24/44b5468e-18f2-11e8-92c9-
376b4fe57ff7_story.html?utm_term=.30076f78c8fb.
8 Nichole Perlroth and Clifford Krauss, “A cyber-attack in Saudi Arabia had a deadly
goal. Experts fear another try.,” New York Times, March 15, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-
cyberattacks.html.
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Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches
9 “Russian Central Election Commission comes under cyberattack,” RT, March 18,
2018, https://www.rt.com/news/421622-russian-election-under-cyber-attack/.
10 Cambridge Analytica is London-based data analysis and political consulting firm
which worked with Donald Trump’s election campaign team for 2016 US
Presidential Elections.
11 Carole Candwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Revealed: 50 million
Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach,” The
Guardian, March 17, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election.
12 Greg Masters, “Loss from cybercrime exceeded $1.3B in 2016, FBI report,” SC
Magazine, June 26, 2017, https://www.scmagazine.com/loss-from-cybercrime-
exceeded-13b-in-2016-fbi-report/article/671047/.
13 Steve Morgan, “Cybersecurity Ventures predicts cybercrime damages will cost the
world $6 trillion annually by 2021,” Cybersecurity Ventures, October 16, 2017,
https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/.
14 Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community,” DNI, February 13, 2018,
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---
Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
15 Jim Garamone, “Cyber Tops List of Threats to U.S., Director of National
Intelligence Says,” US department of Defence, February 13, 2018,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1440838/cyber-tops-list-of-threats-to-
us-director-of-national-intelligence-says/.
16 Department of Homeland Security, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted
and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, DC:
Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2009, 5)
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_fin
al_0.pdf.
17 In 1998, Loe Waever formally presented the theory of Securitization for the very
first time in his article titled as “Security the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a
Word”, later Rita Taureck has defined the term Securitization as: The security actor,
confirming that a particular reference object is at risk in its existence, claims the right
to emergency actions to ensure the preservation of the reference object.
18 Ola Hjalmarsson, Securitization of Cyberspace (Sweden: Lund University Press,
2013),
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3357990&fileOI
d=3357996.
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19 Narmeen Shafqat and Ashraf Masood, “Comparative Analysis of Various National
Cyber Security Strategies,” International Journal of Computer Science and
Information Science 14, no. 1 (January 2016): 129-136,
https://www.academia.edu/21451805/Comparative_Analysis_of_Various_National_
Cyber_Security_Strategies.
20 International Telecommunications Union is United Nations’ specialized agency for
information and communication technologies.
21 International Telecommunication Union, “Global Cybersecurity Index,” 2017,
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E.pdf.
22 Myriam Dunn, “A Comparative Analysis of Cyber Security Initiatives
Worldwide,” International Telecommunication Union, June 2005,
https://www.itu.int/osg/spu/cybersecurity/docs/Background_Paper_Comparative_An
alysis_Cybersecurity_Initiatives_Worldwide.pdf.
23 Martti Lehto, “The Way, Mean, and Ends in Cyber Security Strategy,” in
Proceedings of 12th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ed.
Rauno Kuusisto and Erkki Kurkinen (UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing
International ltd., 2013), 182-190.
24 Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia,” The
Guardian, May 17, 2007,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.
25 US CERT, “The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” February 2013,
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf,
accessed on March 15, 2018.
26 US Department of Defence, “Department of Defence Cyber Strategy,” April 2015,
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf, accessed on March
15, 2018.
27 Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, “National Cyber
Security Policy-2013,”
http://164.100.94.102/writereaddata/files/downloads/National_cyber_security_policy
-2013%281%29.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2018.
28 “Amid spying saga, India unveils cyber security policy,” Gadget Now, July 13,
2018, https://www.gadgetsnow.com/enterprise-it/security/Amid-spying-saga-India-
unveils-cyber-security-policy/articleshow/20885499.cms?referral=PM.
29 Observer Research Foundation is Mumbai based think tank, focuses on
international security issues.
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30 Arun Mohan Sukumar, “Upgrading India’s cyber security architecture,” The
Hindu, March 9, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/upgrading-
indias-cyber-security-architecture/article8328770.ece.
31 Saikat Datta, “Defending India’s critical information infrastructure: The
Development and role of NCIIPC,” Internet Democracy Project,
https://internetdemocracy.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Saikat-Datta-Internet-
Democracy-Project-Defending-Indias-CII.pdf, accessed on March 15, 2018.
32 Kaushik Deka, “The new battlefield is online: Is India Prepared?,” India Today,
September 3, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cyber-crime-cyber-attack-
malware-cyber-security/1/1037598.html.
33 “Cyber Coordination Center made operation: IT Ministry,” The Indian Express,
August 9, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cyber-coordination-centre-
made-operational-it-mininstry-4789272/.
34 Ibed.
35 “Pakistan, Bangladesh at high risk of cyber-attacks,” Pakistan Today, October 26,
2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/10/26/pakistan-bangladesh-at-high-
risk-of-cyber-attacks/.
36 Jawad Awan and Shahzad Memon, “Threats of Cyber Security and Challenges for
Pakistan,” in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cyber Warfare
and Security, ed. Tanya Zlateva and Virginia A. Greiman (Boston: Academia
Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2016), 425-30.
37 Farooq Baloch, “Cyber Vandalism: Turkish Hackers claims gaining access to
NADRA and FIA servers,” The Express Tribune, December 15, 2012,
https://tribune.com.pk/story/480044/cyber-vandalism-turkish-hacker-claims-gaining-
access-to-nadra-fia-servers/.
38 Aamir Ataa, “NADRA faces serious hacking attacksfrom United States and India,”
ProPakistani, 2015, https://propakistani.pk/2014/11/13/nadra-faces-serious-hacking-
attacks-united-states-india/ or
https://www.express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1102523545&Issu
e=NP_LHE&Date=20141113.
39 “Cyber-attack on Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) website,” Teleco Alert,
March 31, 2013, https://www.telecoalert.com/cyber-attacks-on-the-election-
commission-of-pakistan-ecp-website/.
40 Shashank Shekhar, “India, Pakistan at war on cyberspace ahead of Independence
Day,” Business Today, August 4, 2017,
https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-and-pakistan-at-war-
on-cyber-space-ahead-of-independence-day/story/257753.html.
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41 “Surgical cyber-STRIKE! Hackers take down 30 Pakistan sites to avenge
Kulbhushan Jadhav's death penalty,” Daily Mail, April 24, 2017,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-4441462/Surgical-cyber-
STRIKE-Hackers-attack-30-Pakistan-sites.html.
42 APP, “Senate Committee proposes 7-point action plan for Cyber Secure Pakistan,”
Dawn, July 8, 2013, https://www.dawn.com/news/1023706; or
Senate of Pakistan, “Senate Report on Pakistan’s first-ever Cyber Security Strategy
Work Plan,” August-September 2013,
http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1378101374_113.pdf.
43 Mateen Haider, “Pakistan formulating cyber security strategy,” Dawn, March 7,
2014, https://www.dawn.com/news/1091640.
44 Senate of Pakistan, “National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014,” April 14, 2014,
http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1397624997_197.pdf.
45 Section 5. (2)(a) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
46 Section 5. (2)(b) and (c) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
47 Section 5. (2)(g) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
48 Section 5. (2)(i) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
49 Section 5. (2)(j) and (n) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
50 Section 5. (2)(k) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
51 Section 5. (2)(l) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
52 Section 5. (2)(q) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
53 Section 5. (2)(o) and (p) of National Cyber Security Council Act, 2014.
54 “Anusha urges a comprehensive cyber security policy,” Pakistan Press
Foundation, July 9, 2014, https://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/anusha-urges-
comprehensive-cyber-security-policy/.
55 “Digital Pakistan Policy,” MoITT, April 2017, http://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Digital-Pakistan-Policy-2017.pdf, accessed on April 6,
2018.
56 Aamir Aata, “MoIT Releases Digital Pakistan Policy 2017,” ProPakistani, April
2017, https://propakistani.pk/2017/04/08/moit-releases-digital-pakistan-policy-2017/.
57 Narmeen Shafqat and Ashraf Masood, “Comparative Analysis of Various National
Cyber Security Strategies,” International Journal of Computer Science and
Information Science 14, no. 1 (January 2016): 129-136,
https://www.academia.edu/21451805/Comparative_Analysis_of_Various_National_
Cyber_Security_Strategies.
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Formulation of Pakistan’s Cyber Security Policy: Comparative Approaches
58 Tracey Caldwell, “The UK's £1.9bn cyber-security spend – getting the priorities
right,” Science Direct, March 2017,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361372317300246.
59 “Budget 2018: Government to focus more on improving cybersecurity,” Money
Control, February 1, 2018,
https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/budget-2018-government-
to-focus-more-on-improving-cybersecurity-2495175.html.
60 “Proposed budget of the U.S. government for cyber security in FY 2016-2017 (in
billion U.S. dollars),” Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/675399/us-
government-spending-cyber-security/, accessed on March 16, 2018.
61 Narmeen Shafqat and Ashraf Masood, “Comparative Analysis of Various National
Cyber Security Strategies,” International Journal of Computer Science and
Information Science 14, no. 1 (January 2016): 129-136,
https://www.academia.edu/21451805/Comparative_Analysis_of_Various_National_
Cyber_Security_Strategies.
62 “Joint Doctrine: Indian Armed Forces,” Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff
Ministry of Defence, April 2017, http://bharatshakti.in/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Joint_Doctrine_Indian_Armed_Forces.pdf.
95 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
AFEERA FIRDOUS: Book Review
Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity
Dilemma-Hacking, Trust and Fear
Between Nations (London: C.
Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.,
2016) 289.
Ben Buchanan is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard University’s
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He specializes in
relations between cybersecurity and statecraft. Ben has taken the
traditional concept of security dilemma and has given a detailed
account of its application to inter-state relations in the realm of
cyberspace. The book, The Cybersecurity Dilemma-Hacking, Trust
and Fear Between Nations, has eight chapters. Each chapter deals
with a particular aspect of author’s thesis on the subject, and a
conclusion which sums up the discussions in the book. Chapter one
explains the Realist approach of international relations; anarchy,
absolute power, and security. These concepts originated in ancient
Greece, and explain the concepts of threat, misperception and
misinterpretation; and how they lead to security dilemma. This
chapter also discusses the application of a traditional concept
(security dilemma) in a new domain (cyberspace) and sets the tone
for discussion in the subsequent chapters. The author refers to
Michael Herman, a British signals officer and scholar, who for the
first time applied the concept of security dilemma beyond
development and deployment of military capabilities. Ben further
expanded Herman’s idea and applied it to foreign intelligence cyber
operations. Chapter two and three explore the operational
processes of network intrusion and defense. The author has named
these ‘Intrusion Model’ and ‘Network Defense Model’. He raises the
question regarding the broad effects of states intruding into the
networks of other states not just to enhance offensive competences
but also to build their own defenses. The author goes on to
distinguish between the offensive and defensive goals which can
Book Review By
AFEERA FIRDOUS
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motivate a state to intrusions. While discussing potential defensive
and offensive network intrusions and many risks attached to them,
he states that the main theme of the book as:
To assure their own cybersecurity, states will sometime
intrude into the strategically important networks of other
states and will threaten – often unintentionally – the
security of those other states, risking escalation and
undermining stability.
Chapter four argues how network intrusion can threaten other
states and create fear among them, leading them to misperception
or misinterpretation of the intent and change the conditions of
conflict. Ben differentiates between two types of network
intrusions; cyber exploitation and cyber-attacks; and explains their
effects on the outlook of states’ policies in different ways. Chapter
five examines the variables of the security dilemma by applying
classic mitigator logic on cyberspace and concludes that
cybersecurity dilemma remains a challenge to conflict mitigation.
Chapter six elucidates the importance of status quo and information
distribution. The author, in this context, states that inequity in
information distribution raises the severity of cybersecurity
dilemma. This chapter also discusses the application of
international law in cyberspace but the author has overlooked the
fact that obedience of international law by states is not obligatory
but voluntary. A discussion on this important factor would have
added value to the examination of the subject. Chapter seven details
the limitations, and objections and the future of cybersecurity
dilemma. The author identifies three objections; first, difficulty of
attribution of the offence; second, no network intrusion reaches the
level of existential threat; and third, cyber capabilities are unevenly
distributed. The chapter concludes that cybersecurity dilemma is
likely to grow more compelling in coming days. Ben states that
cyber threat is not an existential threat for the states, he, however,
has failed to answer the question if an intruder state gets access to
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other state’s strategic and critical national infrastructure including
launching codes of nuclear weapons through intrusion or attack
then what kind of response could be expected? In chapter eight, Ben
argues that advancing of bilateral trust between states can avoid
cybersecurity dilemma, but in realist world, achieving bilateral
trust in international relations is nearly impossible; for instance,
NSA’s leaked documents have shown that US has spied upon the e-
mails of its close allies’ leadership; the German Chancellor and the
Mexican President.
While concluding, the author charts out five dangers in which
cybersecurity dilemma can cause substantial damage. First,
cybersecurity has the potential to enhance tension and conflict not
just in an actual situation but also in anticipation of a crisis, which
means an insecure state is more likely to adopt offensive posture
for deterrence. Second, threat prompts insecurity and tends to
escalate tension. Third, the misinterpretation of intruder’s
intention can increase the cybersecurity dilemma. Fourth, the
potential danger is that two pressures - the immediate need for
bettering offensive capability and the need for better defensive
security and resilience – force states into conflicting situations.
Fifth, the cybersecurity dilemma can entice policy makers into
potentially damaging duplicity. The fundamental basis of
cybersecurity dilemma like traditional understanding of the
concept is fear and escalation dynamics: fear that causes the
dilemma and escalation that the dilemma brings about.
One major criticism on the book is that the discussion revolves
around only one actor: the state, although non-state actors are
increasingly becoming important players in network intrusions.
The author also suggests deterrence and mitigation efforts as a
partial way out of the problem, but doesn’t explain how deterrence
will work in cybersecurity domain if the intruder or attacker
happens to be a non-state actor, who is irrational and has little stake
in keeping peace and stability within a state, regionally or beyond?
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Secondly, the author’s account of defensive intrusion and
unintentional risks to other states’ security raise compelling
question regarding the criteria against which a state’s intrusion
may be regarded defensive in nature, while the author, himself,
admits that it is a difficult task to discriminate between defensive
and offensive network intrusion. The author also terms defensive-
minded network intrusion as intelligence efforts, not invasions,
which is a critically weak argument.
The study is drawn on the leaked documents of Edward Snowden,
former NSA contractor; case studies of cyber operations in few
previous years, and interviews from former officials and policy
makers. The book maintains that international relations and policy
are germane to cyber world as they are to the physical.
The book is a good read for international relations scholars with a
non-technical background. It gives an inclusive understanding of
cyber operations and how different kinds of cyber intrusions work.
Afeera Firdous is a
Research Assistant at CISS
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Dilip Hiro, The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry between India and Pakistan (Nation Books: 2015) pp.503
“The Indian fixation on cross-border terrorism paralleled
Pakistan’s insistence on treating Kashmir as the core
problem…India…missed the logical point that terrorism stemmed
from…the Kashmir dispute...the cause had to precede the result”,
writes Dilip Hiro, the author.
The book ‘The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry between
India and Pakistan” is divided into 20 chapters, encompassing
Hindu-Muslim/Indo-Pak rivalry since the British rule/Partition to
date. The author’s perspective more often than not supports India’s
stance on Indo-Pak bilateral issues such as terrorism and ‘Kashmir
insurgency’. His repeated comparison of political systems of India
and Pakistan in many ways reflects his preference for Indian
political system.
The book’s title, the Longest August, stems from the communal
bloodbath in August 1947 and the ensuing Indo-Pak rivalry,
including three wars, possibility of nuclear Armageddon, terrorist
activities and fomenting rebellion in the rival state.
Three landmark events, according to the author, precipitated
India’s partition—all due to the Indian Congress: Jinnah’s leaving
Congress after Nehru Report annulled the separation of Muslim
electorates; Congress’ rejection of Jinnah’s proposal for forming
coalition-ministries in Bombay and UP after 1937 elections; and,
Nehru’s acceptance of Cabinet Mission Plan only to change his
stance later on regarding ‘Grouping’ and Jinnah’s subsequent
withdrawal of his earlier acceptance of it.
Book Review By
RIAZ KHOKHAR
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Comparing Gandhi with Jinnah, the author portrays Gandhi’s
greatness in his tactically innovative political moves to achieve his
objectives: non-cooperation/civil-disobedience movement and
moral coercion through fasting/hunger-strike. It stood in sharp
contrast to Jinnah’s constitutionalism and avoidance of street
politics. However, according to the author, Jinnah, who spurned
Gandhi for mixing religion with politics during the Khilafat
Movement, had presided over a party whose candidates appealed
to Muslims’ religious sentiments in the 1945-46 elections.
Moreover, Jinnah also allegedly resorted to extra-constitutional
methods with reference to the Direct Action Day that resulted in
communal violence in India. It is indeed the author’s deliberate
disregard for the fact that Congress’ hostile policies had compelled
Jinnah to change his tactics.
About the wars between India and Pakistan, the author makes some
contestable remarks. For example, the 1965 war, according to Hiro,
was a failure of Pakistan to change the status-quo in Kashmir. By so
stating, the author ignores the Kashmir dispute as an international
issue and India’s illegitimate claims over it in the face of UN
Resolution for a plebiscite. Moreover, his subscription to the Indian
argument that in 1971 War Pakistan’s Two Nation Theory had
collapsed does not match the fact that Bangladesh did not
reintegrate into India. It became a separate Muslim state. It further
strengthens the Two-Nation Theory. Furthermore, he considers
Pakistan’s support of the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s and terrorist
incidents in India as a tit-for-tat to India’s sabotage activities in
Afghanistan and its state oppression in Kashmir. An unbiased
approach, however, would reveal that Kashmir struggle or Sikh
insurgency is, in fact, largely due to India’s own oppressive policies
in the state. Above all, his support of the much-touted claim that
Pakistan is involved in the terrorist incidents in Afghanistan is
based on outdated information. Latest BBC report about Taliban’s
controlling a major portion of Afghanistan and their self-financing
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through drug-and-opium-smuggling invalidates the allegation of
Pakistan’s financing them or providing safe haven to them.
What the author also misses to highlight is that Pakistan has been a
victim, and not sponsor, of terrorism. What he accentuates, instead,
is that India is the victim of terrorism and Kashmiri freedom
struggle is an insurgency against the Indian state. He, however, does
mention in the chapter on Afghanistan, the Indian involvement in
provoking secessionist sentiments in Balochistan and perpetrating
terrorism across Pakistan.
As for the solution of the Kashmir dispute, the Shimla agreement,
according to the author, has been a touchstone of all bilateral
dialogues over Kashmir issue since 1972. Of all the available
solutions, in author’s views, Musharraf’s formula stood out
reflecting an adjustment to the contemporary geostrategic
scenario. His four-point agenda stipulated Pakistan’s giving up its
claim to Indian-administered Kashmir if people from both regions
had freedom of movement through open borders, and
recommended a phased withdrawal of troops from both sides of the
LoC. But, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 transformed the
foundations of resolution of the Kashmir issue. From then onwards,
India’s primary focus on resolving terrorism issue would override
the Kashmir dispute.
In the last few chapters, the author mentions the Afghanistan
conundrum as another flashpoint between India and Pakistan.
Kautilya’s quotation, “a ruler with the contiguous territory is a rival.
The ruler next to the adjoining is to be deemed a friend” explains
India’s policy regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the author’s
perspective. India’s efforts at building security and economic
partnership with Afghanistan, including development aid and soft
power of its Bollywood movies and soap operas have played a
significant role in attracting popular perception in its favour. Apart
from that, Bush administration’s efforts to coopt Northern Alliance
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in Karzai’s administration, disregarding its earlier promise with
Musharraf against it, only tilted the balance in India’s favour in
Afghanistan. Added to these factors is the joining of hands by Indian
RAW and Afghan NDS for promoting sabotage and terrorist
activities in Pakistan, as reported by Boston-based Christian Science
Monitor—the author highlighted.
The author labels Indo-Pak competition in Afghanistan as a zero-
sum game. Yet, he alludes towards a gap in Pakistan’s soft
diplomacy in Afghanistan, as Pakistani dramas, student
scholarships and development assistance can effectively help build
a positive imprint on young Afghan minds.
In conclusion, according to the author, the things that unite the
otherwise rival nations are cricket, movies/dramas, people to
people contacts and the bilateral trade. At the end of the last
chapter, the author recommends that in order to end the Longest
August (unflinching rivalry) between the two neighbours,
movement of goods and people can play a pivotal role in bringing
about “prosperity underpinned by peaceful coexistence”.
Dilip Hiro was born in Sindh (province of current Pakistan) during
British Raj and then had moved to India after partition. He received
education in India, Britain and the U.S. and is settled in London since
mid-60s. He is not only an author but also a journalist, commentator
and an expert on Asian geopolitical affairs. He has authored a total
of thirty-four books, the magnum opuses include Inside India Today,
Inside Central Asia, War Without End, and Apocalyptic Realm:
Jihadists in South Asia. He also frequently writes in The Guardian,
New York Times, Washington Post, Yale Global, TomDispatch,
Observer, and The Nation.
The book is well-referenced, written in a narrative form, in an easily
understandable language, and offers a detailed account of Hindu-
Muslims antagonism under British Raj and the ensuing Indo-Pak
rivalry after the Partition. It would be helpful for students, teachers
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and researchers who are studying or writing on Pak-India
relationship, in the perspective of the fundamental issues
confronting the two states.
Riaz Khokhar is a Research Assistant at CISS
104 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
SAMRAN ALI : Book Review
Chris Ogden ed. New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2016)
New South Asian Security: Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional
Security is an edited volume on South Asian security by Chris Ogden.
Six chapters are written by eminent scholars with an introduction
by the editor. They include discussion of different aspects of
bilateral relations of the South Asian states. Separate chapters cover
the bilateral relations between China-India, Pakistan-Afghanistan,
India-Pakistan, China-Afghanistan, China-Pakistan and India-
Afghanistan. The book’s introduction explains the its approach to
understanding South Asian security problems. Chris Ogden takes a
new approach to understand the security dynamics and challenges
in South Asia. It pursues the constructivists ideas of identity and
norms and eschews comparison with liberal ideas of economic
cooperation, multilateralism and to some extent the realist ideas of
treating ‘states as identical black boxes’. Instead of discussing
specific issues, such as nuclear deterrence, security, terrorism and
external perspectives on these issues, the author takes the region
as ‘co-dependent entity.’ Relations between the regional powers
China, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are discussed as factors that
impact the regional security. These four countries are further
placed on the rise and fall spectrum i.e. China and India are dubbed
as rising powers and Pakistan and Afghanistan as failing states. It
tries to show through a state focused and state driven approaches,
that ‘security in South Asia is highly inter-connected and co-
dependent in terms of provenance and orientation’ and focuses on
interaction among these four states through the interplay of norms
under political, physical and security dimensions.
Book Review By
SAMRAN ALI
105 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
SAMRAN ALI : Book Review
The first chapter, by David Scott discusses the norms, perceptions
and how geo-politics plays out in the China-India relations, finds
norms convergence between the two adversaries as both subscribe
to respect for state sovereignty, principles of peaceful coexistence
as well as global institutions at which states are represented. Both
the states have shown clear intent of cooperating on the issues of
stability of Sea Lines of Communication, climate change and
international economic framework. But China and India have
competing political objectives as well as national psyches driven by
‘Hindutva’ and ‘China Dream’ respectively. Also, at the regional
level, geo-politics comes into play and hence the divergence, be it
the border issue or Pak-China relations. However, Scott’s focus on
India’s security concerns due to its geographical proximity with
China appears exaggerated. He highlights threat posed to India by
Chinese military developments and cooperation with regional
states. The norm of trade is a converging point between India and
China. Both are taking their economic cooperation further. But
presently balance of trade is largely in China’s favor.
The second chapter is on the Pakistan and Afghanistan, which the
author terms cousin rivalry. Michael Semple in this chapter, points
out that there is a ‘far higher degree of convergence in the publicly
articulated norms than two states’ practice.’ Historically, Afghan
policy towards Pakistan is rooted in the contested Durand Line,
Pakhtunistan issue and support to armed groups operating in both
countries. During the initial decades after partition, Pakistan’s
policy towards Afghanistan had been ‘defensive.’ The security,
diplomatic, administrative, political and economic measures by
Pakistan took many decades to tackle the Pakhtunistan issue.
Pakistan shifted from ‘close frontier policy’ to ‘forward policy’ in
dealing with threats from Afghanistan. Semple argues that Afghan
Saur revolution had weakened Afghanistan, while Pakistan grew
both politically and militarily during this period, enabling the later
to influence events in the former. Therefore, the Taliban were ‘least
bad alternative to Pakistan’. He rightly points out India as a
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significant element in Pak-Afghan bilateral relations and links
lasting progress in their bilateral relations only when ‘Pakistan sees
no threats from Indo-Afghan relationship.’
The third chapter by Runa Das argues that ‘Pakistan-India’s
historically driven norms have created a political-ideological
context, within which have unfolded the re-construction of
Pakistan-India’s security affairs.’ She divides Indo-Pak relations
into five phases. The first phase marked India and Pakistan as geo-
culturally/politically (Secular vs Islamic) ‘incompatible states’ thus
defined their ‘mutual insecurity profiles.’ Indian Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions (PNE) and later nuclear pursuit by Pakistan, in the
backdrop of 1971 War, dominated and directed the later phases of
India-Pakistan relations. The 1998 nuclear tests by both South
Asian states led to further consolidating their norms of Self/Other
national identities. Post-testing period led expansion of nuclear
weapons and institutionalization of Indo-Pak nuclear doctrines.
9/11 ushered a new phase in Pakistan’s relations with India, which
is termed as ‘no peace no war’. The future directions of Indo-
Pakistan security relations will depend on how both use ‘US-China
cards.’
In fourth chapter, Jingdong Yuan discusses the once limited but now
growing China-Afghan relations. Uncertainty in Afghanistan and
opportunities for development bring both China and Afghanistan
together. China fears militancy from Afghanistan spilling to its
Xinjiang region and threats to its investments which it has made in
Afghanistan in the last few years. The norms of non-interference
and peaceful coexistence dictate the Chinese policy towards
Afghanistan. China has rejected any military options in Afghanistan
and instead focuses on the dialogue and social development. It has
made contacts with several militant groups within Afghanistan, in
author’s opinion, to influence them to join the national
reconciliation process. After a long war and ISAF withdrawal, Kabul
is seeking a ‘foreign policy that balances between major powers but,
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sees a greater role for China.’ Similarly, China’s Afghanistan policy
is showing signs of adjustments from ‘caution to greater
involvement.’
Andrew Small in the fifth chapter, points out that there are not
many normative associations between Pakistan-China ties. Both
differ in political systems, international status and cultural mores.
Despite these divergence, their relationship has been resilient,
reliable and consistent. The existence of a common rival in India has
created a ‘bond and pattern of cooperation’ which is itself a
‘powerful norm.’ He goes on to argue that as Beijing is well on the
road to becoming a great military and economic power, it finds in
Pakistan the most ‘trusted partner.’ Historically the Sino-Indian
1962 War and Indo-Pakistani 1965 War played a major role in
cementing this ‘all weather friendship’. India’s war with China made
India wake up to the possibility of a two-front war in future. It also
led Pakistan and China to resolve their border issues in 1963.
During 1971 War China provided military and economic aid to
Pakistan. The other areas of cooperation have been in the field of
the peaceful use of nuclear technology and dealing with threats of
extremism in China’s Xinjiang province. China still relies heavily on
Pakistan for political settlement in Afghanistan and stability in
South Asia.
In the sixth and final chapter, Avinash Paliwal and Harsh V. Pant
search normative sources of Indo-Afghan bilateral relationship.
They identify ‘democracy, tolerance and territorial integrity’ as a
base for stable Indo-Afghan relations. However Indian engagement
in Afghanistan also elicits ‘great game’ analogy which seeks
‘material interests, managing security threats and waging proxy
war against Pakistan.’ Both India and Pakistan inherited British
security legacies along with their borders with China and
Afghanistan respectively. India develop a non-intrusive vision on
Afghanistan, which was opposite to Pakistan’s view on Afghanistan
(discussed in second chapter). In the initial years after its
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independence, India supported 'socialist ideologies’ and enjoyed
warm ties with socialist groups in Afghanistan. Today India enjoys
strong relationship with Kabul mainly because it supported the
Northern-Alliance, who have hold on power in Kabul now, during
the Jihad against the Russian Forces. Kabul also seeks Indian
‘political and psychological support’ due to ‘political convergences.’
The authors also mention cultural affinity an area of convergence
between them, but this assertion would not be supported if closely
scrutinized. Afghans have greater affinity with Pakhtuns living in
Pakistan.
In concluding part, it is argued that it is the ‘norm of trade and
development’ that is desired by all regional states including
Afghanistan and Pakistan. But there are ‘more negative strains
permeating their bilateral relations.’ these include border issues
and activities of non-state actors. India and China, in author’s
opinion, ought to determine their own strategies as both are best
placed to promote stability in their neighborhood. Chris proposes a
‘Council of Neighbors’ framework for stabilizing Afghanistan.
Alternatively, SCO can also act as a suitable platform for regional
cooperation.
Although, the authors have tried to cover all aspects in detail, but
few things require more discussion. In first chapter, David Scott
discussion of Indo-US strategic partnership appears superficial.
Without taking into account the deeper implications of US influence
in the region, the discussion of Chinese and Indian security relations
is less fulfilling. In the sixth chapter the Indian role in Afghanistan
is largely discussed under the norms of democracy and non-
interference, ignoring Indian role in supporting insurgents
operating from Afghanistan against Pakistan. As far the labeling
Pakistan as failing state is concerned, the book was written and
researched before 2016, since then much has changed in Pakistan.
It has overcome the challenges of terrorism and instability to a great
extent in the last three years. Overall, the book is a good addition to
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literature on bilateral relations between six countries and an
important contribution to understanding norms and identities
factoring these relations. The reader gets the sense of history,
future trajectory, commonalities and differences of their bilateral
relations. The language of the book is academic and scholarly and
sometimes complex.
Samran Ali is a Research Assistant at CISS
110 CISS Insight Vol.VI No.1
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