voidable marriages

Isabel Guidote Persons and Family Relations – E.A. Pangalanan 1

B. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

1. GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT

Family Code of the Philippines

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-‐one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-‐one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-‐transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)

Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:

(1) Non-‐disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;

(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-‐one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-‐one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Articles 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage. (87a)

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)

Revised Penal Code Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty


already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-‐principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-‐mentioned crimes.

Presidential Decree No. 612 (The Insurance Code)

Sec. 11. The insured shall have the right to change the beneficiary he designated in the policy, unless he has expressly waived this right in said policy.

Moe v. Dinkins (1981) 533 F. Supp. 623 P: Maria Moe, Raoul Roe, Ricardo Roe (infant), all other persons similarly situated R: David Dinkins (City Clerk of NYC), all town/city clerks of NY, David Axelrod (NY State Commissioner of Health) • Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the NY Domestic Relations Law

o Sec. 15.2: Males 16-‐18 and females 14-‐18 – written consent of both parents o Sec. 15.3: Females 14-‐16 – judicial approval of the marriage + above

• Raoul was 18 and Maria, 15 when they instituted this action o 1978: Maria’s pregnancy o 1979, April: Moved in together

• Mrs. Moe refused to consent to their marriage – continue receiving welfare benefits for Maria

• Marriage will cement their relationship; their child will not have the stigma of illegitimacy

û The statute unlawfully deprives the petitioners of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

o State concerned with the unique position of minors o Constitutional rights ≠ adults

1. Vulnerability 2. Inability to make decisions 3. Importance of parental role in child-‐rearing

o Rational Basis Test ü Compelling state interest

§ Protection from immature decision-‐making, promote welfare, prevent unstable marriages

§ Right of parents to act in what they perceive to be their children’s best interests

ü Means employed § Statute merely delays marriage § Minors whose parents consent to the marriage are not

barred from getting married § Illegitimate character of child – an incidental consequence,

temporary, may be legitimized by a subsequent marriage • HELD: Constitutional. Plaintiffs are not irretrievably foreclosed from marrying. No

constitutional rights are offended.

Katipunan v. Tenorio (1937) 38 O.G. 172 P: Marcos Katipunan R: Rita Tenorio • Petitioner filed for annulment on the basis of respondent’s mental incapacity; Ursula Paz

(mother of respondent) was appointed as guardian ad litem • P & R were married in 1919. R suffered a mental ailment in 1926.

o She was brought to the San Lazaro Hospital, then the government’s psychiatric hospital

• Children David and Jose currently under the care of P’s sister, Leonora Katipunan • Counterclaim:

o Children’s status would be reduced to that of natural children o She would be unjustly and inhumanely abandoned o She has no means to support herself o Monthly pension of P300, attorney’s fees of P500

• Decision of the Trial Court: dismissed with costs against plaintiff • CA: determine WoN R was mentally sound at the time of the marriage

o Sec. 10, G.O. No. 68 – Sec. 30, Act No. 3613 – party’s mental incapacity must have existed at the time of the marriage

o Burden of proof on the one making the allegation Petitioner Respondent û Married after four days of

courtship û Faustina de la Cruz: R uttered

incoherent words

ü R’s mother: making love for two years

ü Faustina was expecting, she found delight in hearing them

o Additional testimonies in favor of R: § P admitted that he only noticed R’s insanity several days after their

marriage § Testimonies of Magdalena Santiago and P’s mother show that she

was mentally sound at the time of the marriage § P & R cohabited continuously for more than 7 years § P admitted to R’s lucid intervals § No evidence was adduced to show that between 1919 and 1926, she

was already suffering from insanity • HELD: Petition dismissed. Insanity after marriage is not a ground for its annulment.

Suntay v. Cojuanco-‐Suntay (1998) 300 SCRA 760 P: Federico Suntay R: Isabel Cojuanco-‐Suntay • Federico and Cristina Aguinaldoà Emilio and Isabel Cojuancoà Isabel Cojuanco-‐Suntay

o Emilio and Isabel were married in 1958, later annulled in 1967 o Emilio died in 1979 o Cristina died in 1990, no will


• Emilio and Isabel’s annulment (CFI, Rizal) o Pending criminal case (parricide) o Emilio sought custody of children o Judgement rendered in his favor (decree of annulment) o Ratio of CFI:

§ Schizophrenia § Bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong § Art. 85(3), CC: either party of unsound mind, at the time of marriage § Emilio’s schizo dated back to 1955

• Respondent’s petition before the RTC Bulacan o Issuance of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Cristina o Legitimate grandchildà appointed as administratix

• Petitioner’s opposition: o He is the surviving spouse o Respondent has been alienated from family > 30 years o He has been managing their conjugal properties o Art. 992, CC: illegitimate children have to right to succeed by right of

representation o Motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration denied

û Motion to dismiss was timely filed o Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure: motion to dismiss should be filed

before answer o Filed two years after presentation of evidence by R

û Dispositive portion of decision—“NULL and VOID” = void marriage o Ambiguity in the decision is reconcilable o Clearly stated that the legal basis is Art. 85 of the CC which refers to voidable

marriages û R is an illegitimate child

o Since the marriage was voidable, children born prior to the decree of annulment are considered legitimate (Art. 89(2), CC)

o ANNULMENT (voidable marriages) = subsists but ceases to have legal effect upon termination through a court order

o NULLITY (void marriages) = acknowledges the fact that there was never a marriage

û Disposition controls WoN R’s parents’ marriage was void or voidable o No conflict between body and disposition o Rule only applies when the disposition is definite, clear, and unequivocal o There is a need to harmonize the whole body of the decision

• HELD: R is a legitimate grandchild and may invoke her successional right of representation in her grandmother’s estate. The court does not pass upon WoN the letters of administration should be granted in her favor.

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat (1941) 72 Phil 19 P: Godofredo Buccat R: Luida Mangonon de Buccat

• P and R met in March 1938, they were married in September and November of that year • After 89 days of living together as husband and wife, R gave birth • P petitioned for annulment in 1939, claiming that he was defrauded into thinking that R

was a virgin at the time he married her • CFI Baguio rendered judgment in favor of R û Marriage should be annulled on the grounds of fraud

o It is improbable that the petitioner was unaware of his wife’s pregnancy o P is a law student (assumes that he knows what the valid grounds for

annulment are) o Marriage is a sacred institution; for it to be annulled he must be able to prove

the presence of a valid ground • HELD: Judgment affirmed. Not a valid ground for annulment.

Aquino v. Delizo (1960) 109 Phil 21 P: Fernando Aquino R: Conchita Delizo • P filed for annulment against R before CFI Rizal, dismissed (1955)

o Based on the ground of fraud (concealment of pregnancy by another man) o They were married on December 27, 1954 o She gave birth in April 1955 (four months later) o CFI: no birth certificate was shown to prove that the child was born within 180

days after the marriage o Petition to reopen the case was denied

• CA o Trial court erred in denying the motion to present additional evidence o It was not impossible for P & R to have had sex before their marriage o P did not notice the pregnancy = UNBELIEVABLE o 1959: Motion for Reconsideration

§ Evidence (birth certificates, affidavits) proving paternity of R’s children (Cesar Aquino, her brother-‐in-‐law and P’s brother)

§ Motion denied • Buccat v. Buccat does not apply to the present case

o R is four months pregnant in the present case o She is ‘naturally plump’ or FAT; P might not have been able to tell that she was

pregnant • On CA’s claim that they could’ve had sex too—purely conjectural, no support • HELD: Assailed decision is set aside. Case remanded for new trial.

Anaya v. Palaroan (1970) 36 SCRA 97 P: Aurora Anaya R: Fernando Palaroan


• R filed for annulment against P (CFI Manila, 1954) o His consent was allegedly obtained through force and intimidation o Case dismissed, but P’s counterclaim granted o During negotiations, P revealed that he had a pre-‐marital relationship with a

close relative of his • P filed for annulment R (Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Manila, 1966)

o P’s allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage o She also claimed that R married her in an attempt to evade marrying his close

relative û R’s non-‐disclosure of his pre-‐marital relationship constitutes fraud and is therefore a

valid ground for annulment o Art. 85, CC contemplates the various grounds for annulment o Art. 86 thereof specifically enumerates the fraud to be considered in the

application of Art. 85 o If the legislators intended for it to apply to all kinds of fraud, they would not

have included Art. 86 o Congress therefore, intended to exclude all other kinds of fraud as grounds for

annulment (“No other misrepresentation or deceit x x x shall constitute fraud as will give grounds for action of the annulment of marriage”)

û R’s negligence of marital duties (cohabitation) is a valid ground for annulment o This is a separate allegation raised only in P’s reply o P is not permitted to amend her complaint in a reply o She should have discovered it within four years after the marriage—declared

barred • HELD: Judgment appealed from is affirmed, there being no error committed by the CA.

Ruiz v. Atienza (1941) 40 O.G. 1903 P: Jose Ruiz R: Pelagia Atienza • P filed for annulment against R (CFI Manila, 1938)

o P alleged that he was forced into wedlock § R had just given birth to their baby § R’s father, Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (R’s cousin-‐in-‐law) and

three others visited him at his house § ‘After some discussion,’ he was convinced to marry R

o Dramatization by his counsel: § Mr. Atienza threatened P with a balisong § Atty. Villavicencio told him he would be rejected admission to the

bar as many others have been on the basis of immorality § Atty. Villavicencio promised his safety if P went with them

û Mr. Atienza threatened P’s life, he was therefore forced and intimidated into marrying R o P made a statement that he is already married o Jose Atienza: “So you mean to fool my daughter?!” o No showing of any balisong o Not sufficiently established that his life was threatened

o Only a 1 ½ inch knife was found by the policeman û Atty. Villavicencio threatened to obstruct P’s admission to the Bar

o It is not such a duress as to constitute a reason for annulling the marriage o A man cannot invoke the invalidity of a marriage on the grounds of duress to

avoid prosecution for seduction or bastardy û Atty. Villavicencio threatened P’s safety by telling him he would be safe IF he went with

them o It cannot be concluded that the opposite would be true if he didn’t o He was not kidnapped!!

§ There were other people there (it was a boarding house) § He could have asked the policeman for help

• Evidence does not warrant a pronouncement that P’s consent to the marriage was obtained through force or intimidation

• Sec. 30, Act. No. 3613 considers the above as valid ground for annulment, if the force or intimidation employed is within the contemplation of Art. 1267 of the Civil Code

• HELD: Judgment affirmed. Neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.

Jimenez v. Republic (1960) 109 Phil 273 P: Joel Jimenez R: Remedios Cañizares, Republic of the Philippines (Intervenor) • P filed an action for annulment of his marriage to R (CIF Zamboanga, 1955)

o They couldn’t have sex because her vagina was too small o It existed at the time of their marriage and still continues to exist o Court ordered for her to be examined, R didn’t show up o Deemed as lack of interestà Judgment will be rendered in favor of P o Marriage was annulled on 11 April 1957

• City attorney filed a motion for reconsideration (15 days later) o R’s impotency has not been sufficiently established (she refused) o Court should have:

§ Held her in contempt § Compelled her to undergo the exam

o Assailed decree will set a dangerous precedent – couples who want to get annulments will just allege the impotency of one of the parties

o Motion was denied û P’s testimony was sufficient to prove R’s impotency and is therefore a valid ground for

annulment o R’s indifference to the suit is merely a presumption o She may just be embarrassed or ashamed to undergo the exam unless she is

compelled to by the court o The presumption is in favor of potency

• HELD: Decree appealed from is set aside. Case remanded. P’s testimony not sufficient to prove R’s incapability of engaging in sexual intercourse.


Sarao v. Guevara (1940) 40 O.G. 15 Supp. 263 P: Sarao R: Pilar Guevara • P filed for annulment against R on the grounds of impotency (CFI Laguna)

o Case was dismissed • P & R married on 3 June 1936

o Afternoon: he tried to have sex with her o Evening: he tried to have sex with her AGAIN

§ The opening of her vagina was too large for his penis § She complained of pains

• R’s ovaries and uterus were surgically removed on 7 August 1936 o Rendered R incapable of procreation o Did not incapacitate her for copulation o P lost all desire to engage in carnal knowledge with her

• Par. F, Sec. 30, Act No. 3613: Marriage may be annulled if either party was at the time of the marriage, incapable of entering into the marriage state, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable

û Incapable of entering into the married state = incapacity to procreate o American jurisprudence: IMPOTENCY does not refer to the incapacity to

PROCREATE, but the incapacity to COPULATE o The defect (inability to copulate) must be permanent and lasting

û R was impotent at the time of the marriage o Existence of a fibrous tissue did not render her incapable of copulation or even

of procreation o Sterile ≠ unfit for sex

ü The marriage was not consummated because of P’s own voluntary desistance o First experience unpleasantà wala nang gana! o No more diseaseà wala pa ring gana!

û Consent to the marriage was procured through fraud o Non-‐disclosure of disease to P not a grounds for fraud

§ Not alleged in the complaint § Not proved at the trial

• HELD: Judgment affirmed

2. MARRIAGE WHEN ONE SPOUSE IS ABSENT

Family Code of the Philippines

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-‐founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of

death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:

(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)

Revised Penal Code

Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally


dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Jones v. Hortigüela (1937) 64 Phil 179 P: Angelita Jones R: Felix Hortigüela • P seeks to invalidate her mother’s marriage to R for the purposes of assuming sole

ownership of her late mother’s intestate estate • 1914, Dec.: Marciana Escaño married Arthur Jones (1914), they had one child (Angelita

Jones) • 1918, 10 Jan.: Arthur left for abroad and was never heard from again • 1919, 25 Oct.: Arthur judicially declared an absentee (subject to Art. 186, CC; six months

after publication) • 1920, 23 Apr.: taking effect of the declaration of absence • 1927, 6 May: Marciana married Respondent Felix Hortigüela • P alleges:

o Declaration of absence made on 23 Apr. 1920 and not 25 Oct. 1919 o 7 years would not have elapsed by 6 May 1927 o Marriage between her mother and R is void o She is therefore her mother’s sole heir for purposes of succession

• Par. 2, Sec. III G.O. No. 68: for purposes of remarriage, all that is required is: o Absence for 7 years o No knowledge that the spouse is still alive o General presumption of death

• Civil Marriage Law does not require judicial declaration of a spouse as absent o Arthur’s absence can be counted from 10 Jan. 1918 o This would have made him absent for >9 years o Marriage between Marciana Escaño and R is lawful and valid

• Sec. 23, No. 24, Code of Civil Procedure: a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead

• Consequences of the valid marriage between Marciana and Felix: o Right to inherit in usufruct in both testate and intestate succession o R is a valid heir (in addition to Angelita) o His appointment as administrator of the estate is lawful (P was a minor then)

• HELD: Appealed order reversed o Order approving final account and the project of partition UPHELD o Appointment of Angelita’s husband as administrator DENIED o Order relative to the declaration of heirs UPHELD o Order relative to administrator’s fees UPHELD o Determination of paraphernal and conjugal property HELD AS UNWARRANTED

(left to the parties)

SSS v. de Bailon (2006)

485 SCRA 376 P: Social Security System R: Teresita Jarque Vda. de Bailon • Clemente G. Bailon was said to have married thrice:

1. Alice P. Diazà 25 Apr. 1955 2. Elisa Jayona (cohabited)à 1958

o Cecilia o Norma

3. Teresita Jarqueà 8 Aug. 1983 • He died on 30 Jan. 1998 (SSS Member, Retiree Pensioner since ’94)

o Funeral benefits claimed by R – P12,000 o Additional claim for death benefits claimed by R

• Cecilia and Norma contested the granting of benefits o Their mother was allegedly married to Clemente o They paid for the hospital and funeral expenses o Alice is still alive and she never even disappeared in the first place

• The Social Service Commission (SSC) declared R as just a common-‐law wife, therefore not entitled to any benefits

o The declaration of presumptive death of Alice was fraudulently obtained o Their marriage was never dissolved o Alice is the rightful beneficiary of Clemente’s pension

• CA reversed SSC decision o SSC cannot re-‐evaluate RTC’s findings (on the declaration of presumptive

death) o Art. 87, CC: only a competent court can nullify a marriage o SSS does not have the authority to declare the second marriage void

• Under the CC, no judicial declaration is required for the purpose of remarriage o Remarriage when one spouse is presumed to be dead is merely voidable o Terminated by final judgment of annulment o Art. 87(2), CC: action for annulmentà only during the lifetime of any one of

the parties û The reappearance of the missing Alice renders Clemente’s marriage to R void

o Art. 42, FC: marriage terminated upon recording of the affidavit of reappearance with due notice to the subsequent spouse

o No steps taken to annul the subsequent marriage o Presumption of death continues until marriage is terminated by law

§ Therefore, presumption is also towards the validity of the second marriage

§ Tolentino: burden is on the person invalidating the second marriage to prove that the first marriage is still subsisting

û The marriage between R and Clemente can still be assailed o Cannot be collaterally attacked o Action must be made during the lifetime of the parties o Upon Clemente’s death, the marriage was made good ab initio

• HELD: Petition denied. R is the rightful dependent spouse-‐beneficiary of Bailon.


Valdez v. Republic (2009) 598 SCRA 646 P: Angelita Valdez R: Republic of the Philippines • P married Sofio Polborosa on 11 Jan. 1971

o She gave birth to a daughter, Nancy on 13 Dec. 1971 o He left their home in March 1972; was not heard from for three years o Showed up at P’s parents’ house, they agreed to separate

• P contracted a subsequent marriage with Virgilio Reyes on 20 Jun. 1985 o She believed Sofio was already dead o He was denied naturalization as a US citizen because of the subsisting

marriage between P and Sofio • P filed for the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio (RTC Tarlac, 29 Mar. 2007)

o P admitted she did not try to find her husband o Nancy was likewise prevented for looking for her dad o RTC denied the petition for non-‐compliance with Art. 41, FC

§ Not able to prove the well-‐founded belief § Must be the result of proper and honest-‐to-‐goodness inquiries and

efforts • P moved for reconsideration (10 Dec. 2007)

o Marriage in 1971; CC must be the governing law o Arts. 834 & 390, CC governed the declaration of absence and presumption of

deathà not expressly repealed by the Family Code • Intervention of the OSG

o Art. 41 of the FC should not apply because it was not yet in existence when P contracted her second marriage with Virgilio

o Art. 390, CC was not repealed by Art. 41, FC § Art. 256, FC: no retroactivity if its application will impair vested

rights ü The RTC erred in applying the FC provision (Art. 41), holding that there was a need for a

declaration of presumptive death o Both marriages were celebrated under the CC o Art. 83, CC merely requires absence for seven years for the spouse to be

presumed dead (Art. 390, CC) o Sofio presumed dead starting October 1982

ü The declaration of presumptive death cannot be made the subject of an independent special proceeding

o The presumption of death is established by law, a judicial announcement serves as a prima facie presumption

§ Unnecessary § Disputable

o Petitions for judicial declarations of presumptive death were not entertained under the CC because such proceedings are not authorized by law

ü Art. 41, FC cannot be retroactively applied o It will invalidate a marriage that was valid when it was contracted

• HELD: Petition dismissed

o A judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be granted under the CC, the same is established by operation of law

o There being no legal impediment to P’s subsequent marriage to Virgilio at the time it was contracted, their marriage is VALID

3. EFFECTS OF PENDING ACTION/DECREE

Family Code of the Philippines Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n)

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)


Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

Civil Code of the Philippines Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Yu v. Yu (2006) 484 SCRA 485 P: Eric Jonathan Yu R: Caroline T. Yu • (A) 2002, Jan. 11: P filed for habeas corpus before the CA

o R unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their child, Bianca o Sole custody

• (B) 2002, Mar. 3: R filed for annulment before the Pasig RTC o Dissolution of absolute community of property o Sole custody

• 2002, Mar. 21: P awarded sole custody, case still bending • 2002, Apr. 18: An Interim Visitation Agreement (IVA) was entered into

o R moved to modify the agreement o P opposed, saying that P’s filing for annulment before the Pasig RTC

constituted forum shopping o R modified her petition with the RTC insofar as the custody aspect is

concerned, and she later had the case dismissed • (C) 2003, Jun. 12: P filed for annulment before the Pasig RTC

o Dissolution of absolute community of property o Sole custody

• 2003, Jul. 3: (A) was dismissed for being moot and academic • (D) 2003, Jul. 24: R filed for habeas corpus before the Pasay RTC

o Enforcement of IVA o Sole custody

• Both Pasay and Pasig RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the issue of Bianca’s custody ü The elements of litis pendentia have been established in the present case

o Identity of parties o Identity of rights asserted and reliefs sought, relief founded on the same facts o Judgment rendered in the pending case would amount to res judicata in the

other ü The Pasig RTC lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the custody issue

o Art. 49, FC: pending actions for annulmentà court provides for custody o Art. 50, FC: final judgment of annulmentà provides for custody unless the

matter has been previously adjudicated o By filing (C), P automatically submitted the custody issue to the jurisdiction of

the Pasig RTC § Sec. 21, Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: Court decides custody of children (pursuant to Arts. 50, 51, FC) (1) when a final judgment has been rendered, and (2) upon motion of either party

ü The case pending before the Pasig RTC (C) is the appropriate venue to litigate the custody of Bianca

o A separate action for custody was not necessary since it was deemed pleaded by the action for annulment

o The express provisions in the FC make the annulment case before the Pasig RTC the appropriate case

o The pending habeas corpus case (D) before the Pasay RTC must be dismissed to avoid multiplicity of suits

• HELD: Petition dismissed. CA decision reversed. Pending habeas corpus case (D) before the Pasay RTC set aside. Further proceedings in annulment case (C) before Pasig RTC

4. JURISDICTION

Tamano v. Ortiz (1998) 291 SCRA 584 P: Estrellita Tamano R: Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano, Adib A. Tamano, CA • Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano allegedly contracted two marriages:

o With R, which remained subsisting until his death in 1994 o With P, on 2 June 1993

• R filed for the declaration of nullity of Sen. Tamano’s marriage with P (23 Nov. 1994) o Bigamous o Misrepresented themselves as divorced and single

• P questioned the jurisdiction of the QC RTC o They were allegedly married under civil and Muslim rites o The fact that they were married under Muslim was only raised in the Motion

for Reconsideration


§ Court’s jurisdiction can only be made to depend on allegations in the COMPLAINT

û The jurisdiction of Shari’a courts is exclusive, the marriage being solemnized under Muslim laws

o Art. 13(2), P.D. No. 1083: marriages not solemnized in accordance with Muslim laws shall be governed by the CC

o Since the marriage in question was also celebrated under the CC, the QC RTC has proper jurisdiction

o Exclusive jurisdiction of Shari’a courtsà for marriages celebrated ONLY under Muslim rites

o Exclusive jurisdiction of RTCsà for marriages celebrated BOTH under Muslim AND civil rites

§ Par. 6, Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129: exclusive jurisdiction over cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of other courts

• HELD: Petition denied. CA and RTC decisions affirmed. Case remanded to court a quo for further proceedings

voidable marriages

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