vivarium - vol. 27, nos. 1-2, 1989
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Vivarium
Volume 27
1989
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CONTENTS
OF VOLUME
XXVII
1989)
L.M.
De
Rijk
Semantics nd
Metaphysics
n
Gilbert
of
Poitiers 1
JolBiard Les
sophismes
u savoir:Albert e
Saxe entre
ean
Buridan t Guillaume
Heytesbury
36
Miriam liav-Feldon
Grand
Designs
ThePeace Plans
of
he
Late
Renaissance 51
Reviews 77
Joseph
.
Buijs
Attributes
f
Action n Maimonides 85
C.H.
Kneepkens
The
Quaestiones rammaticalesf
he
MS
Oxford, orpus
Christi
ollege
250
AnEdition
f
heThird
Collection
103
L.A.
Kennedy
The
Fifteenth
entury
nd Divine
Absolute ower 125
Reviews
153
BooksReceived
162
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Vivarium
XVII,
1
(1989)
Semantics
nd
Metaphysics
n Gilbert
f
Poitiers
A Chapter of Twelfth-Century Platonism (2)*
L. M. DE
RIJ
2 Gilbert's
View of Transcendent
Reality
Gilbert's world consists
of
quite
a lot of
singular
subsistent
bjectswhich owe their
being
and
'being-a-something'
to a collection of
forms,
both subsistential
nd
accidental.
Well,
God has
created this
world afterwhat
in
the
Platonic traditionwas called the
'exemplary
Forms'. For
Gilbert,
creation and concretion
re
two
complementary
notions
which
play
an
important
role in his
ontology.
Creation
is the
reception
of a total form r
collection
of
subsisten
iae;
it is
also
called
generation.
As a natural
process
it
amounts to
'beginning
to be-of-a-
certain-kind'.1
2.1
Creation and
Concretion
Creation
and
generation
primarily
oncern
the
substantial
or
total)
form
collection
of subsistentiaewhereas the
accidental forms
'acciden-
tia'
in
Porretan
usage)
come
into
being qua
as
many adaptations
to
the
subsistentiae.
Nielsen seems
to be
wrong
to
oppose
concretion
gainst
creation
and generation)
in such a
way
that
concretion would
only
relate
to the
coming
into
existence
(generation)
of accidental
forms.
To
my
mind, creation and concretion are
materially
he same
(as
far
as
the created world is concerned. There* is
a
formal
difference
between
the
two,
however:
creatio'
refers o
the
production
resulting
fromGod's
activity
'causation
out of
nothing'),
whereas
'concretio'
refers o the
process
by
which
participated
formsbecome embodied in
matter.
Here
are
some of the basic texts:
*
Part
1)
is found
n this
ournal,
6
1988),
73-112.
1 I preferhis o Nielsen's enderingp. 69): "begins obelongo a genus",where
alicuiuss
ignored
nd,
more
mportantly,genus'
s taken n ts
xtensional
ather
than ts ntensionalense.
1
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Heb.
199,19-20:
mnia
naturalia onmodo
reata
edetiam oncretaunt.
All naturai
hings
re
not
nly
reated ut lso
solidified
'enmattered'].
Trin.7,56-9:multa untuevocanturforme',t orporumiguret liaque n ub-
sistentibusreationeeu
oncretione
iunt;
uibus
d
cui
nsunt,
ut
liquid
st ut li-
quid
sse
octrine
rdine emonstratur.
There re
many
hings
hich
re called
forms',
uch
s
bodily
igures
nd other
things
hich
riginate
n
subsistente
y
creationr
concretion;
things
due to
which hat
n which
hey
nhere
ither
is-a-something'
r s
demonstrated
o be-a-
something'
hrough
n
orderly
earned
rgument.
Ibid.
8,87-8:
... ERIS
FIGURAM
que,
cum
apis
olvitur
alore,
n
pso
reatur.
....
the
hape
f
bronze,
hich
riginates
n a stone
when
he atters
dissolved
y
heat.
Eut.
255,74-256,78:
enerado
amque
st
ngressus
n substantiam.
deoque
uic-
quid
per
reationem
ncipit
licuius
eneris
sse,
d
recte icitur
generari'.
uod
uti-
que
omnibus
emporalibus
tqueperpetuis
onvenit.
ec enim mnia
on
emper
fuerunt.
deoquequicquid
ecundum
uodlibet enus
unt,
sc.
hec
omnia]
er
generationem
ocesse
ceperunt.
Generation
s ndeed
he irst
tep
n the oad o
ubstance. ence
whatever,
ue
to
creation,
egins
obe of
ome
eneric
ature,
s
truly
aid to
be
generated'.
his t
least
appens
o ll
temporal
nd
perpetualhings,
or llthese avenot
lways
een.
Therefore,
hatever
hey
re
ndof
whatever
enus, hey
ad
begun
obe this
enus
througheneration.
Trin.
4,54-6:
reatio
amque
ubsistentiamnesse acit
tcui
nest
b
ea
aliquid
it.
Concretio ero
idem ubsistentieaturas
osterions
ationis
ccommodai
t,
cui
cum ll
nsunt,
implex
on it.
For
creationauses subsistential
orm o
nhere
in
something
so that
hat n
whicht
nheres
is-a-something'
ue to t
viz.
hat
orm].
oncretion,
n
the
ther
hand,
ccommodateshe ame
ubsistentialorm ith
ome atures
f
econdary
ank
so that hat
n which
hey
nhere
ogether
ith hat form> is not
n
incomposite.
It
should be noted in
this
connection that the nature
osterions
ationis
mentioned above are not necessarily accidental forms,as Nielsen
seems to assume. This'
may
be
gathered
from Trin.
89,18-9
where
Gilbert
speaks
of
"
posterions
rationis naturas
aliquas
vel
e
componentes
vel
sibi
adiacentes":
it is
quite
clear in
this context
that
by
'nature
componentes'
Gilbert
means
subsistential forms. In
fact,
by
our
author
explicitly
peaks
of the concretionf
genus
and
difference,
s
well
as
of the creation f
accidents:
Trin.
44,79-81:
mne ubsistens
ultorum
uibus
st,
dest
eneris
t
diferentie
t
accidentis,
oncretione
ubsistit.
Each
subsistent
ubsists
ue to
the
oncretionf themultitudefconstituents
y
which
t
s,
viz.
genus,
ifferentiand accident.
2
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bid.
8,87-8:
... FIGURAM
que
... creaur
...
the
igure
hich... is created.
Ibid.
1,18,8-9;
ccidentia sive
n
eis creata
ive xtrinsecusffixaint.
the ccidents,hetherreatednthem rmerelyttachedto them>fromutside.
Similarly,
at
Trin.
84,73
where
he
says
that
th
immanent forms
never
go
without the matter
they
are embodied
in,
Gilbert uses the
term
concretione
or the
concretion of all
kinds of
forms
in
matter,
including
the
subsistential
forms. For the
text,
see
below,
p.
12.
Finally,
at Eut.
292,23-4
Gilbert
speaks
of
the
creation
f accidents:
"et
preter
has
[sc.
subsistentias]
lle etiam
que
in
eodem
creantur
x habitu
coniunctorum",
where
qualities
and
quantities
are meant
see
292,27-
8). For the text see our thirdsectionbelow (3.21).
The
terms
creation' and
'
concretion are
used
in
connection
both
with
subsistential
and accidental forms.
They
indicate the
embodi-
ment
of
forms
hroughparticipation
r the
diffusion
f
Perfect
Being,
so
to
speak.
This
brings
us to
a number
of
items
all in some
way
related to the
origin
and actuad
rise
of
natural bodies.
2.2
Esse
and
essentia
As we have alreadyseen in our first ection 1.1-1.4), a thing'ssub-
sistentia
r id
quo
s
also called
its esse.
As far as
natural bodies are
con-
cerned,
that nature
s their sse
Eut.
242,3-5;
quoted
above,
part
one,
p.
107).
This esse s not the
substance
or
the id
quod)
tself
ut that
by
whichthe atter s
{Heb.
196,242),
although
t is true
that the esse ome-
times s
called 'substentia'
(i.e.
in
a
broader
sense,
standing
for sub-
sistential
form;
see
above,
part
one,
p.
80).
The esse f
natural bodies
arises from heir
form(s):
"... naturalibus
quorum
omnium
esse ex forma
est"
{Trin.
89,6);
cfr.
ibid.
82,1-4,
quoted below, p. 8. In naturalbodies we findmore thanone subsisten-
tia.
Accordingly,
here s
a
multiplicity
f
esse.
This
multitude allows
Gilbert to
speak
of
whatever
mode of
being'
{quodlibet
sse)
of
subsis-
tent
things Trin.
82,1-2).
At
Trin.
I,
cap.
40 he
exemplifies
this for
man
(as opposed
to
God).
If
someone
when
speaking
about
somebody
says
he is a
man',
he chooses
only
one
mode of
being
(the
subsisten-
tial
one,
to
be
sure)
from
the whole
collection of
the
modes of
being
of that man:
2 Cf. Trin.5,80-2:Est gituromo orpus on b eo exquo ipse onstatorpore,
sed
ab illius
orporis
sse. stet
demhomo
piritus
on b
eo ex
quo ipse
onstat
spiritu,
ed
ab
illius
piritus
sse11
3
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Trin.
123,30-7:
.. cum
de
aliquo
dicitur:est
homo'
..
is
qui predicatur
sse
HOMO,
quamvis
it
homo,
NON tarnen ST
INTEGRE
hoc
IPSUM
quod
predicatur
OMO.
Idest:
nontotum3
uo
est
redicatur
sse
quod
est n
eo
quod
diciturssehomo. edquihocdealiquodicit, lurimauibusdempse st eipso
adhuc
icenda
idest ualitates
uibus
st
qualis,
t
quantitates
uibus
st
uantus)
reliquit.
...
When ne
says
f
omebody:
be
is a
man'
..,
although
e who
s
predicated
o
be a man < indeed is
a
man,
he is
not
imply
nd
entirelyust
that
which
s
predicated'called'),
man'.
mean o
say:
n
that e
s said
to
be
a
manhe s
not
said o
be
all
that
which
e s
through
he
omplete
sse
y
which e
s.
Whoever
ays
this bout
omebody,
till
eaves
uite
lot f
modes
f
being y
which he
ameman
is unsaid
f
him,
iz. the
ualities
y
which
e
s
such-and-such,
nd the
uantities
by
which
e
s of
certain
ize.
Similarly, f a man is ust, he is a man byone ofhis subsistential orms
and
just
by
another:
4
'aliud est
id
quo
est
homo,
aliud
id
quo
est
iustus"
(Trin. 124,69);
cf.
ibid.
81,80-1.
Of
course,
something's
esse
id quo
est)
and the
thing
tself
id quod
est)
are
mutually
related:
Eut.
278,8-279,12:
..
etesse
t d
quod
st
uiusdam
orsortiiatione
ine e
esse
non
possunt,
t
corporalitas
t
corpus;
ctu
namque orporalitas
ichil stnisi it n
cor-
pore,
t
corpus
on
st
quod
vocatur
isi
n
pso
it
orporalitasue
est
eius
sse.
and
being'
nd thatwhich
s',
e.g.
'being orporeal'
nd
body',
annot
o
withoutachother,wingo certainartnership;being orporeal'ndeedsactuallynothingnlesst nheresn a body,nd bodys notwhat t s called
viz. body]
unless
being
orporeal',
hich
s its
sse,
s
present
n
t.
However,
there s
yet
a
distinction
o
be
made
between
the two.
This
distinction s
very mportant
nd
elucidated
by
Gilbert
n
many
ways.
First
of all he
mentions
it
in
his
exposition
of the
famous
second
Theorem
of
De
hebdomadibus
Heb.
193,51-195,6;
see
above,
part
one
p.
76
and 81
ff.).
Moreover,
the
distinction
omes
up
in
his
extensive
discussion of
natura'
(see
ibid.,
p.
106
ff.).
At
Trin.
92,90
ff.
Gilbert
argues that esse nd idquodest re genericallydifferent,s well as con-
ceptually:
"
esse vero et id
quod
est
nec
eiusdem
generis
nec
eiusdem
sunt
rationis"
(Eut.
293,57-8).
To be
sure,
the ontic
value of the
different
orms
subsistential
or
accidental)
is
not identical either.
Unlike the
subsistentiae
he accidental
forms re
not the esseof the
subsistent
hings
s
is
patently
lear
from
Eut.
260,94-5,
quoted
ibid.,
p.
110 and Heb.
209,91
ff.
quoted
ibid.
p.
103:
esse of
accidents is
merely
desse
sc.
subsistentiis),
ather
han
inesse
sc.
subsistentibus).
3
Unlike
ring prefer
he
eading
totum)
f
MS Zwettl
53 o hat
toto)
f
he
ther
MSS.
4
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Of
course,
the
widest
divergence
on
this score
is that
between
the
subsistentiae
nd
their
companions,
i.e.
the accidents
(quantity
and
quality)
on
the
one
hand,
and
the
'accessories'
subsumed
under the
heading
'status' on the other. n Trin.
123,55
125,17,
thevera ssendi
ratio
or
vere
ssendi ensus of the former s
set
alongside
the
quedam
extrinsecusollatio
f
the latter
123,55;
124,60;
125,1;
126,45; 135,2;
136,22).
As
may
be
expected,
what
is
elsewhere
called
status
see
ibid.
p.
104
ff.)
s
associated
with
the sensus ollationis
136,29-30).
When
discussing participatio
nd
habitus
we
will
come across these notions
again.
'Essentia'
is seldom used
by
Gilbert
to indicate
created essences
see
e.g. at Eut. 278,84). Essences occurring n natural bodies {nativa) re
usually
designated
by
the term substantia'
(in
its
secondary
sense,
of
course;
see
part
one,
p. 80).
So
'substantiae' stands
for
subsistentiae
particulariter
ubstantes',
as
is
explicitly
aid
at
Eut.
279,31-2:
Eut.
78,7-279,14:
ttende
uod,
um
uperius
ixeritssentiasunc icit ubstantias
in
particularibus
sse.
Quia
namque
t esse t
d
quod
st
uiusdamonsortii
atione
sine e
essenon
possunt
...
[see
above,
p.
4]....,
recte,
upposito
uolibet
orum
duorum
ominum
hocest
essentia' el
substantia'),
ensus
llius
ue
sequitur
ic-
tionis d eorum
viz. nominum]
uodlibet
ut
consequenter
ut
accidentaliter
redditur4.
Note hat e Boethius]irstaid essences' nd now ayssubstances'o bepresent
in
the
articulars.
or ince
uetoa certain
artnership,being'
nd that
which
s'
cannot o without
achother
...
see
bove,
.
4],
< therefore
whichever
f he wo
terms
viz.
essence'
r
substance')
s
put
s the
ubject
f
he
roposition,
he ense
of
he
redicate
erm5s construedith
ither
ne
of hem
n
terms
f
ither
atural
or
ncidental
elatedness.
Ibid.
279,29-33:
ttende
uod,
cum
prius
ixerit essentien
particularibus
ub-
stant",
einde
x
eodem
ensu
substantien
particularibusapiunt
ubstantiam",
nunc
dem
olens
ntelligi
it "subsistentias
articulariter
ubstantes",
um
amen
aliud
it
ssentia,
liud
ubsistentia,
liud
ubstantia.
Note hat,whereas e saidbefore:essences ubsistnparticulars",nd nextwhen
meaning
he
ame
had"substancesbtain heir
tate f ubstance
n
particulars",
e
now
wanting
s
tounderstandhe
ame)
peaks
f subsistentiae
ubsistingarticu-
larly",
and
that>
even
hough
essence',
subsistentia'nd
substance're not
quite
he ame
hing.
4
For
the connexio
onsequentialis
s.
accidentalis'
istinction,
ee Eut.
346,61
f.
and
L.
M. de
Rijk,
Gilbert
e
Poitiers:es
vues
mantiques
t
mtaphysiques
in: Gilberte
Poitierst es
ontemporains.
ux
rigines
e
a
ogica
odernorum.ctes u
septimeym-
posium
uropen
'histoiree
la
logique
t de la
smantique
divales. entre
d'Etudesuprieurese civilisationdivaleePoitiers,oitiers7-22 uin 985,
dits
ar
JeanJolivet
t Alain
de
Libera,
Napoli
1987,
147-171
sp.
p.
164-8.
5
litt,of
the erm
hat
ollows',
.e. 'is
in
second
osition'.
5
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9/169
In
point
of
fact
Essentia'
is
commonly
used to
stand for
God's
Being(ness)6.
Well,
whenever the term
is used to
designate
God's
Nature itrunsparallelto subsistentia' as used inthe case of creatures.
This
may
be
gathered
from
passages
such as the
following
ne:
Trin.
66,1-167,17:
anifestumst GITUR
quod
horum RIUM est
UNA
tantum
SUBSTANTIA,
ue
grece uidem sya
icitur,
atine
ero,
icut
ictum
st,
ubstantia
vel ubsistentia
el,
ut
expressius
icatur,
ssentia.
It
is
obvious, herefore,
hat
fthe hree ivine ersons
heres
ust
one
substance
which
s called
usya'
n
Greek,
nd
n
Latin,
s
hasbeen
aid,
substantia'
r
sub-
sistentia'
r,
to
put
t
more
xpressly
viz.
when
peaking
bout
God]
essentia'.
2.3 Formaand Idea
Small
wonder that
in the Platonic
ontology
ike Gilbert's doctrine
of
being
undoubtedly
s,
the
notion
of forma' is of
paramount impor-
tance.
The term
s used
to refer o
both God's
Being
as well
as all
kinds
of
being
occurring
n our world:
Trin.
9,5-6:
Quod
formam
ivinam ocaverat
sc.
Boethius]
sse
mnium,
stendit
non bhorrere
naturalibus
uorum
mnium
sse x forma
st;
cf. bid.
8,76-8.
BycallingheDivine orm he sse f llthingsoethiushowed hat he ormers
not
t
complete
ariance
ith
atural
hings
hich ll
owetheir
sse o their orm.
In
his
commentary
on
De hebdomadibus ilbert follows
Boethius
in
using
the
term
orma
ssendi o
mean esse.
Heb.
196,34;
cf.
193,49).
The
foregoing
discussion
has made
it
quite
clear
that
the
subsistentiae
id
quo
or
ea
quibus
in fact re forms
see
above,
part
one,
p.
76).
'Forma'
is
a term
which has
many
different enses
and
so
is
'materia',
as
Gilbert
argues
at the
beginning
of the
long
exposition
on
matter nd
form
n his
commentary
on
Boethius'
De Trinitate
80,62-3).
God
is
called the Prima Forma:
Trin.
1,90-3:
Forma'
uoque
multipliciter
icitur.
amessentia
ei,
quo opifice
est
uicquid
st
liquid
t
quicquid
st sse
nde
llud
st
liquid
tomne
uod
sic nest
ei
quod
est
liquid
t
ei
quod
est
sse
adsit,
rima ormaicitur.
'Form',
oo,
s
said n
manyways.
or
he ssence
f
God,
n virtue f
whom
s the
Creator
1)
whatever
is-a-something',
nd
2)
whatevers
that
ind
f
being
hrough
6 Seee.g. Trin.1,17-20; 9,15; 1,90; 2,16; 6,10; 7,49; 7,63; 0,26-9; 9,4-5;
109,18; 12,32-3;
13,41-5; 20,59;
166,1-167,2;
69,70-4.
s
God
is una
olitaria
essentia
Trin.
20,72),
n his ases
essens
=
'
subsistens'see
Trin.
13,50-6;
66,88.
6
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which he
former
is-a-something',
nd
3)
whatevernheres
n
that
which
is-a-
something'
uch
hat t
ccompanics
hat sse1
s,
s called
Primary
orm';
f.
7,63
88,75
nd
89,5-6.
It is clear fromGilbert'swords that God's Essence, called
'Primary
Form' is the
cause of
all
natural
bodies,
including
their
ontic consti-
tuents.
Indeed,
God
is
said to be the Creator
(Cause)
of
(a)
the id
quod
having
some
determinate,
mperfect
eing:
'quicquid
est
aliqui
(b)
the
'being'
out
of
which
that
id
quod
is some
determinate
thing;
hereby
ts
subsistentiae
re
meant
(c)
all
kinds of
being
that nhere
n
the id
quod
n
such
a
way
that
they
accompany (one of) the subsistentiaehereby, of course, the
'accidents'
quantity
and
quality
are
meant whose mode
of
being
is
often
described as
an
adesse
Next
the
four
elementary
bodies,
fire, air,
water
and
earth,
are
dis-
cussed.
(For
the
next
passages,
cf.
Calcidius,
In
Timaeum latonis
nrs
302-3
=
pp.
276,12-277,8
and
345,21
ff.
d.
Waszink).
They,
too
are
entitled o the name
'forma',
as
they
re
no
longer
formlessmatterbut
consist of
primary
matter
as
informed
by
an
intelligible
pecies:
Ibid.
1,94-82,100:
uatuor
uoque
incere
ubstantie,
dest
gnis,
er,
qua,
terra,
non uidemue n ilvamutuamoncretionemabere redictaunt,ed ueex silva
et
ntelligibili
pecie
unt,
quibus
emum
ematerie
ensiles
gnee,
eree,
quatiles,
terree
educte
unt,
orporum
cilicet
ue
nutriculemnia
ontinentis
uscipit
inus
exemplaria
eorundem
orporum
dee
rece,
atine
ero
orme
ognominate
unt.
Also
he
our
enuine
ubstances,
iz.
fire,ir,water,
arth I
mean,
ot
hose hich
were aidbeforeo
havemutual
oncretion
n
primordial
atter,
utrather
hose
which onsist
f
primordial
atter
nd an
intelligible
pecies,
ut
of
which
inally
those
ieces
f
fiery,
ery,watery
r
eartly
matter
re
deduced,
hat s
to
say,
he
exemplary
lements
f bodieswhich he
ap
of
the
all-containing
ostermother
bears
,
in
Greek
hey
re
called he
ideai' and
n
Latin
he formae'
f
those
odies.
In a third ense 'forma' is used to
signify
ll thosemodes of
being
which are
elsewhere
called subsistentiae
see
above,
part
one,
p.
82):
7
ei
quod
estesse' is
merely
paraphrasis
or
he
dative ase of
the
gerund
sse
(equivalent
oGreek
i
inai).
t cannot
e stressed
oo
ftenhat he
ormula
d
quod
est
receding
specialtechnical)
erm erves
o set ff he atter.
.g.
"id
quod
est
'ambulare'
on
st
dem
uod
currere'
means
'to
walk' s
not he ame s
'to
run'
or id
quod
est mbulare'
may
tand
or
heword
concept,
otion)
fwalk-
ing.
n
such
ases,
Latin
grammar
equires
uch
paraphrases
n
genitive
r
dative
case.
So the amous
ormula
in
eo
quod
st sse'
certainly
oes
not
mean
omething
mysteriousikeinthatwhichsbeing'let loneinthatwhicheing s')butust in
(its)
being' 'in
essendo',
s is the
sage
f
he
aterMiddle
Ages).
The
correct
iew
is
foundn
Nielsen,
.
50. See alsoL. M.
de
Rijk,
rticle
uoted
elow,
.
16,
n.
16.
7
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Ibid.
2,1-4:
llud tiam
uorumlibet
ubsistentium
uodlibet
sse x
quo
unumquod-
que
eorum
st
liquid
et
quod
eorum
ue
sibi
dsunt
rcdictum
st sse
materia,
eorundem
ubsistentium
icitur
forma';
t
corporalitas
mnium
orporum
sc.
diciturorma.
Also
very
mode
f
being
f
very
ubsistent
hatsoever,
uetowhich ach
of hem
'is-a-something'
nd
which,
s we have
said,
s the
matterf those
hings
hich
accompany
t,
s
called 'form'
f
hose
ubsistentsn
the ame
way
s
being
or-
poreal'
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[i.e.
this
mode f
being]
n
them,
y
no means
llows hem
obe
simple.
nd
hese
two re
only
amed
matter',
ut he lements
hich
re the
sse f he ubsistents
arecalled
othmatter'
nd
form',
et istinctively:they
recalled the
matter
of hatwhichccompanieshem nd theform' f hose hings hich ueto them'
are-a-something'
Next
Gilbert
comes to
distinguish
two
kinds
of
'forma
simplex',
a
Form
without
matter,
that
is,
(
=
God)
and the
exemplary
Forms. In
God,
of
course,
no
composition
or adesse an
be found
since
He is his
Being):
Trin.
2,15-9:
imiliterormarum
lia
nullius
materiet deo
simplex,
t
Opificis
essentia
ua Ipse
vere st.
Neque
nim
psa
ex multisssentiis
onstat
eque
lli n
Opifice
dsunt
liqua quorum pifex
el
psa
esse vel dici
possint
liqua
ratione
materia.
Likewise
f he ormsheres one
ompletely
mmaterial
nd, herefore,
imple,
uch
as the ssencef he
Maker
y
which e
truly
s. For his essence doesnot
onsist
of a multitudef essences or do certain
hings ccompany
t in the
Maker,
speculation,
hich,
ranscending
ll
natural
odies,
ixests
gaze
upon
heir
rinciple
tself
either
heir
Maker
hankso whom
hey
re,
r the
exemplary
orm
rom hich
hey
re
deduced,
rthe
hyl
matter)
n
which
hey
re
located),
s
called
intellectual'
ar
xcellence.
Earlier on these forms were called
corporumxemplaria81,97-82,100
quoted
above,
p.
7)
and
sensiliumdee
83,34,
quoted
above,
p.
10).
They
are also
considered to inhere in the
four
elements,
though
definitely
ot as their
matter';
rather
hey
re
present
n
the
elements
as exemplaria.ndeed, theyare of a pure nature:
Trin.
9,2-10:
Nam tsi
ontingat
t inesse' icatur
ut
epe
n
theologicis
cripturis
dicitur ivinitasnesse
atri ut dee
lementis),
non amen
t
materie.
ivinitas
enim nPatre icitur
sseut
ssentia
nEo
qui
vere
st
et dee nelementis
t
xemplaria
inhis
ue
sunt
arundem
magines.
am
neque
dee nelementis
eque
sia
nPatre
create
ubsistentieunt
uibus
n
ipsis
ccidentiaoncretaint
uorum
x
earum
causis
psa
int,
t
x effectulle
icantur,
aterie.
taque
nec
Pater
liquorum
ror-
sus
nec lementa
x
deis
materieunt
ccidentium.
deoque
neque
sia
nequeydee
cognominantur
materie'.
For
lthough
t
may
happen
hat
t
viz.
he
mmaterial,
ranscendent
orm]
s said
to inheren' e.g. ntheologicalreatisesivinitysoftenaid o nheren he ather,
orthe
xemplary
ormsnthe
lements),they
re>
not,
owever
said to
nhere
in
them>
as their
matter.
or
Divinity
s
said to be
present
n
theFather
s
the
Essence
n
Him
who
ruly
j;
and theforms
n
the lements
uaexemplars
n that
which
s likenesses
fthese
orms.
orneither
he
xemplary
orms
resent
n
the
elementsor he sia nthe
ather
re
reated
ubsistentiaeith
hichhe ccidents
in
them
ould
oalesce
uch
hat
hey
hemselves,
wing
o
he auses
f he
ccidents,
[viz.
the
ubsistentiae],
ould
e thematerial
ubstratesf hose
ccidents,
ndthe
subsistentiae,
y
denomination
b
effectu,
ould e called
o. Hence
eitherhe ather
is the
ccidentf
nything
hatsoever
or re
he lements
ade ut f
he
xemplary
Forms
he
matterf
ccidents.
herefore
eithersianor he
xemplary
orms
re
named
matter'.
In
his
commentary
n De Trinitate ilbert
oins
Boethius
in
preserving
the
name 'forma' for the transcendent
Forms,
and
referring
o the
14
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immanentforms
y
'
icones or
'imagines1
See
99,12 ff.,
where the
pro-
duction of the
bodily
world
is
pictured:
Ibid.99,12-100,23. EQUE ENIM ESSET vero nomine ORMA SED potius
IMAGO.
Recte
utique.
EX HIS ENIM
FORMIS
QUE
SUNT
PRETER
M
ATERIAM,
dest x incerisubstantiis
igne
cilicettaere t
qua
et
terra)
non
utique
is
ue
n
yle
mutuam
abent
oncretionemed
ue
sunt x ilva
t
ntelligibili
specie,
ue
suntdee
ensilium
ISTE FORME
QUE
SUNT
IN
MATERIA ET
ei
quod
est esse
materie
dvenientes,
ORPUS
EFFICIUNT,
quadam
exempli
b
exempli
uo onformativaeductioneENERUNT. Ac
per
hoc lle incereidee'
(idest
xemplares)
t veronomineforme' ocantur.
AM
CETERAS
QUE
IN
CORPORIBUS
SUNT VOCANTES
FORMAS'
hoc
nomine
BUTIMUR
DUM
non
ydee
ed
ydearum
INT
icones,
dest MAGINES.
Quod
utique
nomen is
melius
onvenit.
For t the ranscendentorm]would ot rulye a form utratheromeikeness.
This s
correctly
aid
by
Boethius.
or theforms hich re
enmatterednd which
joining
material
eing, roduce
he
ody,
ave,
y
deduction hich
makes he am-
ple
esemblets
xemplar,
riginated
rom
hose orms hichre
without
atter,
iz.
the
enuine
ubstances
fire,
amely,
ir,
water nd
arth)
nd
ertainly
ot romhe
oneswhich
ome
ogether
oalescing
n
matter,
utratherhe nes
which onsistf
primordial
atter
nd n
ntelligiblepecieswhich
re
he
xemplars
f he
ensible
bodies).
ence hese
enuine
deae
viz.
exemplars)
re lso
ruly
amed
forms'.
or
when
alling
he
ther
orms hichre
present
n
bodies,
forms' e buse
hat ame
as
they
re not deae utratherheircones
i.e.
likenesses,
name
which,
or
ure,
better
uits
hem.
In the commentaryon De hebdomadibushe process is described in
similar terms:
Heb
195,0-7:
T
VERO
id
QUOD
EST,
ACCEPTA in
se
FORMA
ESSENDI,
idest
a
quam
abstractimntellectus
oncipit
ubsistentia
que
acceptio
icitur
'generano'),
ST
ATQUE
materie
que grece yle' dicitur)
ormeque
uius
que
grece ysiosis' ocatur)
oncursu,
pifice
lia
forma
ue
nominatur
ysia',
uxta
exemplar
llius
uod15
icitur
ydea', ycon
hocest
llius
xemplarisxemplum
t
imago)
ONSISTIT
ut
orpusoquod
t sse
orporalitatem
abet
st
orpus
t
homo
eoquod
humanitatem.
Howeverhat
whichs
as soon s ithas
receivedhe
orm
hich
ives
t
being
i.e.
the ubsistentiahich he ntellectbstractivelyonceivesf), receptionhichs
called
generation'
is
and,
after he oncourse
f
matter
which
s
called
yle'
n
Greek),
nd ts
orm,
which
scalled
ysiosis'
n
Greek),
ue o he
ction f he orm
named
ysia',
afterhe
xemplar
f hat
form>
[viz.
he
ysia],
which
exemplar
s called
idea',
comes nto xistences
ycon'
.e. a
sample
nd
ikenessf
that
xemplary
orm.
.g.
because
body
as
corporality
s
its
being
t
is-a-body',
and because
t
has manhoodt is-a-man'.
15
quod
s the
eading
ound
n
two atherad
manuscripts.
owever,
would
refer
it
tothe sual
eadingue
I
understandhe ext s
follows:
uxta
xemplar
llius
sc.
forme
ue
nominatur
sia]
uod
sc.
exemplar]
icitur
dea'.
The
usual
eadingue
musteadtothencorrectiew hat he ormas called oth sia ndydeaunlessne
takes
ue
o tand or
uod y
o
called
attractio',ut,
o
my
nowledge,
ilbert ever
uses uch
highly
classical'
onstruction).
15
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3 The
Ontological
Structure
of
Natural
Bodies
In the
previous
two sections
the
constituents f
the natural
bodies were
discussed as well as theirprinciples,God, theexemplaryForms(idee)
and
primordial
matter.
Now,
we have to consider the basic
process
through
which all
sublunary
being (all
'creatural
being'
if
you like)
comes into existence.
Here
the
pivotal
notions
are
'participado'
and
'habitus'.
3.1
Participatio
nd
habitus
Gilbert
distinguishes
between
two kinds of
participatio
viz.
partak-
ing
of esse nd
partaking
of esse
liquid.
He deals with them whencom-
mentingupon
the sixthTheorem
of
De
hebdomadibus"Omne
quod
est,
participt
eo
quod
est esse
6
ut
sit,
lio vero
participai
ut
aliquid
sit":
Heb.
198,96-199,6:
upra
n
regula
ertia,
qua
dictumst
'quod
st,
articipare
li-
quo potest")
articipationem
icebat
d
quod
st um uo sse liudhabere
uiddam.
Unde
n
quarta perte
icebat:'Id
quod
st,
habere
liquid
reterquam
uod
psum
est
potest".
n
quo
(etiam
t
n o
quod
n
tertielausula
onebat
icens:
'est utem
aliquid
cum sse
usceperit",
t nfine
ecunde
ubiungens
quod
est,
ccepta
ssendi
forma,
st")
patenter
stendit
uoniam
abere
psum
sse
articipatio
st.
In the hird ulewhichuns: thatwhichs canparticipatensomethinglse")he
called to have
omething
lse
together
ith ts
wn
being'
participation.
ence
n
the ourthulehe
clearly
tated:
thatwhichs
can
possess
omething
esides hat
it s itself'.
By
that
(and
also
by
thatwhich e stated t the nd
of
he hird ule
when
aying:
it
is-a-something
hen
thas
acquired eing"
nd
by dding,
t the
endofthe econd
ule;
that
whichs is as soon s it has
receivedhe orm hich
provides
eing")
he
patently
howed hat he
possession
f
being-itself
s
par-
ticipation.
Next Gilbert
explains
the sixth theorem:
Ibid.
199,7-16:
MNE
QUOD
EST,
scilicetmne
ubsistens,
ARTICIPAT
EO
QUOD EST eius17SSE,non uidem t o sit liquided d hoc antum T eo SIT.
16
'participt
o
quod
est sse
=
'partakes
n
esse'
ratherhan he
rather
lumsy)
'partakes
n that
whichs ts
sse1;
ee
above,
.
7,
n.
7.
However,
ilbert
eems o
take heformula
n
the atter
ay;
ee
199,7-8.
n
top
of
that,
s all Mediaeval
authors ilbert
eads:
Omne
uod
st tc." For
he
correct)
missionf st
y
ome
of
ur
MSS,
seeL. M. de
Rijk,
OnBoethius'
otion
f
eing:
Chapter
f
oethianeman-
ticsin: Norman retzmann
ed.),
Meaning
nd
Reference
n
Medieval
hilosophy.
tudies
in
Memory
f
JanPinborg.
ynthese
istorical
ibrary.
exts nd Studies
n
the
History
f
Logic
nd
Philosophy,
ds. N.
KretzmannndG. Nuchelmans.ol.
32.
Dordrechttc.
988,1-29.
17
n
Boethius'
tatement
participt
o
uod
st
sse
=
"participates
n
Being")
where
idquodst sse sundoubtedlyheLatin araphrasisfGreeko inaiseealso L. M.
de
Rijk,
rticle
uoted
bove,
.
15)
Gilbert
ost
emarkably
akes he nfinitivesse
tomean
thing's
roper
sse,
ather
han he
ource f
Being
which
hingsartake
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Cum odem
ERO idem
ubsistens
uodam
LIO
PARTICIPAT
UT
eo SIT
ALI-
QUID.
Sed illa
participatio
ua
eo
quod
est sse
articipai,
atura
rior
st,
ltera
vero
osterior.
nde
nfert:C
PER
HOC.
Quasi: quia
videliceton
potest
sse li-
quid.isi rius aturaliterit ID QUOD EST (sicut ictumst)PARTICIPAT EO
QUOD
EST ESSEUT SIT. ESTVEROnaturaliterrius T deinde ARTICIPET
ALIO
QUOLIBET
quo aliquid
it.
Everything
hat
s,
.e.
every
ubsistent,
ossesses
ts
eing
s a
share17,
ot n
order
to
therebybe-a-something'
ut
ust
to be.
Together
ith
his
being',
owever,
he
same ubsistent
articipates
n
something
lse
n
order o
therebye-a-something'.
But hat
articipationy
whicht
participates
n
being'
s
naturallyrior
o he ther
one. From his e
nfers:
hence
meaning:
ince
thing
pparently
annot
be-a-
something'
nless,
y
natural
riority,
t
s)
thatwhich
s
as
was
aid)
participates
in
being'
n order o
be, ut,
by
natural
riority,
t s in
order o
additionallyar-
ticipate
n
anything
lsewhatsoever
wing
o
which
t
is-a-something'.
Some pages later on this s furtherxplained. What is possesses some
nature
by
which t
is,
and
some nature
by
which t
is-a-something
Well
this
possessing
a
nature' is
participation.
As forthis
nature,
we
have
to
distinguish
between
'primary
nature'
and
'secondary
nature'.
A
thing's
'Primary
nature'
is
only
preceded by
the Primordial Cause
(God)
and
is called
generalissima
ubsistentia.
thing's
'secondary
nature' is the
companion
{comes)
f the
primary
one which
also con-
tains the cause
of
the
former
secondarily
to its
First
Cause,
of
course).
The
secondary
nature, then,
belongs
to the
potency
of
the
primarynature. As is
easily
seen, the subsistentiae are to be taken as the
primary
nature,
the so-called 'accidents'
as the
secondary
nature.
Accordingly,
twofold
participation
may
be
distinguished:
Heb.
08,64-209,81
Ad
quod
dicimus
uod participado'
sicut
t
n
his
ue premisse
sunt
egulisignificatumst), luribus
icitur odis.
um
enim
ubsistens
n se ali-
quid
utnaturam
ua
sit el
liquid
it
habet,
icitur
uod
psum
a natura
articipt.
Natura ero
ue, quoniam
nest
ubsistenti,
iciturb eo
participan,
lia
ta
prima
est tnullam
re
e
quam equatur
isi
rimordialem
abeat
ausam;
t a
que
omni
subsistenti
nest
eneralissima
ubsistentia.
lia
huius
rime
uodammodo
omes st
et,post ausam rimordialem,llam uoque tacausam abet t ad potentiamius
ipsapertineat
t
proprietate,ua
sine a non sse
possit,
dhereat...
[this
natura'
is a
collectiveame
f ll
differentiae
nd ubaltern
enera;
or he
ext,
ee
part
ne,
p.
106]
He
omnes
on
modo abitu
lio
uo
nherentubsistenti
erum
tiamlio
quo generibus
ius
predictaotestatetqueproprietate
dherent,
icuntur
haberi'.
Ac
per
hoc
duplici
atione
articipantur.
We
reply
hat
as
has lso
been ndicated
n
the
reviousules)
participation'
s used
in
many
enses.
orwhen
subsistentas
omething
n t s the
nature ue
towhich
it s or
s-a-something
it s
said
to
participate
n that ature. he
nature, owever,
which,
ince t nheresn the
ubsistents said to be
participated
n
by
t,
s
either
in.Hencemy ranslationpossessestsbeings a shareviz. nBeing tself).r are
we
to
ake ius sse orefer
othe
pecial
dealForm
n
which ach
hing articipates?
I
doubt t.
17
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21/169
primary
o such
n
extent
hat t
has no
other
ause
preceding
t
but
he
rimordial
cause
for
t
s themost
eneric
ubsistentia
nhering
n
each
ubsistent);
r t
s,
so
to
speak,
he
ompanion
fthis
rimary
ature
nd
has,
econd o the
primordial
cause lso his primaryature as its ause, o uch nextent,ndeed,hattper-tains
o he atter'
potency
nd
dhereso t n
being property
ithout hicht an-
not e
...
All
hese
atures
re aid obe
had' not
nly
y
hemode
f
having'
ue
towhich
hey
nhere
n the ubsistentut
lso
by
hemode f
having'
ue
to
which
they
dhere o the
generai.e.
genericubsistentiae]
hrough
he foresaid
otency
and
property.
ence t s in
a
twofoldense hat
hey
re
partaken
n.
The second kind of
participation
s
dealt
with at Heb.
198,97-8:
"par-
ticipationem
dicebat id
quod
est cum uo essealiud
habere
uiddavrC
However,
since
by partaking
n
any
of
these modes
of
being
(the
generalis
ubsistentia
nd all subaltern
modes,
including
the differential
subsistentiaethe generation or corruption, n case of the absence of
participation)
of
a
body
is
involved,
the inherence of such
subsistentiae
is to be viewed as
taking place
'by
substance' rather
than
by par-
ticipation':
Ibid.
209,82-5:
uoniam
amen arum ccessioneubsistens
n
quo
habent
ieri,
generatur
t decessione
orrumpitur,
on am
participatione
uam
ubstantia
sicut
genera psa quibus
dsunt
el
species
e
quibus
unt)
ubsistentinesse icuntur.
However,
ince t s a
result
f heirdditionhat he ubsistentn which
hey
ome
into xistences
generated
nd
by
their
ithdrawal
t
passes
way, hey
re said
to
bepresentnthe ubsistentssentiallyatherhan yparticipationjust s the enera
themselves
hich
hey
ccompany
r the
pecies oncerned).
For
that
reason,
this
improper
sort of
participation
is
opposed
against
the
true
participation
occurring
n the case of accidentia. he
accidents
are
properly
aid of their
subsistent)
ubstrates ecundum
ar-
ticipationem
they
are not said
secundum
e,
idest
amquam
sse.
{Trin.
209,86-210,95,
quoted
ibid.,
p.
103).
Gilbert often
distinguishes
between the
generic,
differential nd
specific
modes of
being
on
the
one
hand,
and that of
the
accidentia on
the other
by referring
o their
diverse
ways
of
participation.
See Trin.
117,78-83
and
118,95 ff.;
see
ibid.
p.
84.
Next,
the
distinction
etween esse x ubstantia
nd
esse x
participatione
is defined
in
terms
of
'be-ing'
and
'having something
n
addition
to
this
be-ing' respectively:
Ibid.
210,16-20:
uod
enim liud sitex
participatione
sse
aliudvero x ubstantia
manifeste
ocuit
n
tertia
egula
icens
fit
articipatio
um
liquid
am
s'
et n
quarta
biait: id
quod
st
abere
liquid reterquamuod
psum
st
potest",
t
n
fine
exte,
um e omni
uod
st
oquens,
ixit: est ero t
participet
lio
quolibet".
That
being y participation'
s
differentrom
being y
essence'
oethius
learly
taught
n the hird ule
y aying:
participation
s effectedhen
omething
lready
18
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is"
and
n
the
ourth
ule
y
aying:
that
whichscan
possessomething
lsebesides
what
t
s
tself',
nd at the ndof he ixth ulewhere
peaking
f
ll
that
which
s
he said:
"but t s n order
o
participate
n
anything
lsewhatsoever".
This view of
participation
is quite understandablyalso found in
Gilbert's
comment
on the fourth xiom:
Ibid.
96,39-43:
regula uodammodorccedentis
ensum
xplanat.
deo
namque
id
quod
st
articipareliquo
dictum
st
uoniam
D
ipsum
UOD
EST,
POTEST
HABERE
ALIQUID
PRETER
QUAM
illud it
QUOD
IPSUM
quod
est
EST,
idest
reteruam
it sse
quo ipsum
st.Ut
corpus
reter
orporalitatem
um
psa
qua
est
orporalitate
abet olorem.
This
rule
xplains
he
meaning
f he
revious
ne,
we
might
ay.
For hatwhich
s
is
said
o
participate
n
something
lsefor he
ery
eason
hat
what
s can
possess
somethinglsebesideshat hichhe hingtselfs, .e. besides hemode fbeing ueto whicht s.
E.g.
besidests
orporalitybody
also> has colour
ogether
ith
the
very
orporality
ue to
whicht
s.
So,
again,
participation
n
the
proper
sense of
the
word is associated
with the
so-called accidentia.
A
similar
ine
of
though
s found some
pages
further
n.
Unlike
the
mode of
being
described
earlier
as esse
x
ubstantia
participation
s now
identifiedwith accidentalis
articipatio
Trin.
215,27-8);
see also
210,6.
So
much for
participation
s far
as
subsistentiae
nd
formae
ccidentales
(in Porretansense) are concerned. What about the seven remaining
Aristotelian
categories?
In
dealing
with
these
categories
our
author
never
speaks
of
'participatio'18,
but
of some
sort
of
'having':
Ibid.
124,87-125,94:
ELIQUA
VERO
septem
generum
ccidentia
in
the
Aristotelian
ense,
o
be
sure]NEQUE
DE
DEO
NEQUE
DE
CETERIS
vera
essendi atione
REDICANTUR.
NAM
UBI,
idest
ocus,
POTEST
quidem
PREDICARI
VEL DE
HOMINE
VEL
DE
DEO;
DE
HOMINE
UT cumdieimus
"homo st N
FORO",
DE
DEO UT
cum
ieimus
Deus
est
UBIQUE".
SED
ITA
dicitur elhomo
sse n foro el Deus esse
ubique
UT,
quamvis
n
predicando
a
dicatur
est',
NON tamen
ta
dicatur
UASI
IPSA
RES
DE
QUA
DICITUR SIT
ID,
idest abeat
sse
o,
QUOD
PREDIOATUR.
The
remaining
even
ccidental
ategories
re
neither
redicated
fGod
nor
f
he
other
hings
n a
truly
ssential
ay.
For,
t s
true, Where',
.e.
place,
may
be
predicated
f man
r
of
God
of
man,
.g.
when
we
ay:
a man s on the
orum',
ofGod
when
aying
.g.
God
s
everywhere')
but man s
said
o
be on
the
orum
or
God tobe
everywhere
n
such
way
hat
lthough
n
using
hose
redicates
ne
18
There
may
e
doubts
onccrning
ilbert's
se
of
he erm
participatio
xtrinseca'.
At
Trin.
23,57-9
t
seems o be used
s an
equivalent
fwhat
lsewhere
s called
'accidental
articipation',
.e.
participation
f
ccidentalorms'.
owever,
t
88,68-
9
it
s
rather
sed s
a
general
erm
overing
ll
modes f
being
which
re
different
fromhe ubstantialode fbeing roperoGod,such hatxtrinsecaeems o bea
pejorative
pitheton
f ll
kinds f
participation
as opposed
o
PSUM
ESSE),
rather
than restrictive
ttribute.
19
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says
ii' it is not meant
s
if the
thing
tself
hich s
spoken
f
s that
which s
predicated,
.e. owes
ts
being
o thatwhichs
predicated.
This leads us to say a fewwords on the related notion of 'habitus'.
Properly
peaking,
habitus19 s
materially
dentical
with
participatio.
The formal
difference etween the two is
that
participation
refers o
the
transcendent orm
partaken
n
(which
is indicated
by
the ablative
case),
whereas
habere r habitus
re rather concerned
with
the share
something
has'
('possesses')
due to
some
act
of
partaking.
So
both the
participation
of esse
impliciter
nd
the
participation
of
some
esse
liquid
in
addition
to the esse
impliciter
s called 'habitus':
Heb.
199,4-6:
trumquegitur
abitm
videlicet
t
quo
habetur
psum
sse t
quo
aliud liquidumpso buno olo,destbeoquod st),nhac exta egulamanifeste
'participationem'ppellat.
In
this ixth ule
e
clearly
alls
bothmodes
f
having'viz.
both he ne
by
which
one
single
hing
i.e.
'that
which
s') possessesust be-ing'
s well
s
thatmode
y
which,
ogether
ith t
i.e.
be-ing']
t has
somethinglse) participation'.
Accordingly
habere' and
'habitus'
also
occur elsewhere
n
the
same
broad sense:
Ibid.
08,65-209,67:
umenim ubsistens
n
e
aliquid
t
naturam
ua
sit
el
liquid
sit
habet,
icitur
uod psum
a
natura
articipt.
For
when
subsistent
as
something
n
it
as thenature ue to whicht s
or
s-a-
something
it s
said
to
participate
n
that ature.
Ibid.
09,79-81:
e omnes onmodohabitu
lio ...
dicuntur
aberi.
ee
above,
.
17.
Eut.
93,67-8:
n hoc
gitur
no
d
uod
st abet
sse
uo
st t
a
que psum
sse
uoquo
modo
cquuntur.
In
this
ingle hing,
he d
quod ossesses
he sse
y
whicht s
as
well s
thatwhich
in
whatever
ay
s
subsequent
o
this sse.
This broad sense of 'habere' clearlyexpresses a mutual relationship
since that which
has,
'is had'
at
the same time.
So
the id
quod
estnot
only
has some
things
but is
also 'had'
by
them:
their
diversity
s
deduced from this feature:
Ibid.
93,68-294,72:
psum
uoque
sse t
ea
que
psum equuntur,
abent
d
quod
st
de
quo
vere
icantur.
ue
nisi iversa
ssent,
abere
aberique
on
possent.
ichil
enim mnino el esse n se velhabere
e
potest
aliquo
modo
ibi
oniungi.
19
Of
course,
we are
not
concerned ere
with
he
Aristotelian
ategory
f habere
(echein, (as at Irin.163,18) or hehabitushichsopposedodispositioneing oth
of
hem
ust
one ense f
uality
see
Arist.,
ateg.
,8b
26
ff;
his ense s found
.g.
at
Trin.
7,22).
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Also his
sse
nd
thatwhichs
subsequent
o t
possess
he
d
quod
fwhich
hey
re
truly
aid.
Well,
f
hey
ere otdiverse
hings,
hey
ould
not
possess
nd
be
pos-
sessed,
or
bsolutely
othing
an
be
present
n
tselfr
possess
tselfor e connected
with tselfn someway r another.
However,
unlike
participado',
the term
habitus'
('habere')
is also
used
to indicate
an
object's having
some feature
designated
by
one of
the
remaining
seven
Aristotelian
categories,
which
Gilbert
usually
refers
to
by
the collective
name 'extrinsecus affixa'
(see
part
one,
p. 101):
Trin.
29,13-5:
etera ero
ue
quolibet
modo
ibi nvicem
dunantur,
cilicet el
intrinseco
oncretionis
el xtrnsecouiuslibet
ppositionis
abitu...
The other
hings,owever,
hichn
anyway
reunited
ith ne
nother,
.e. either
bythe ntrinsic ode fhaving'whichs concretionrby hextrinsicodefhaving
whichonsists
n
ny
uxtaposition
hatsoever
Eut.
281,84-5:
..
QUIBUSDAM que
in se vel
extrinsecus
ffixa
abere
icuntur
A
CCIDENTIBUS.
Cf.
bid.
82,2-3.
....
certainccidents hich
hey
re
said
o have n themselvesr
diverse,
ince lato s
whateveris
mind,
in
he rder
f
nature,
s,
but
his
mind
s notwhateverlato s. And
onceptuallyhey
are
ompletely
ifferent,
ince
lato onsists
f
mind ndhisminds one
fhis
on-
stituents.
owever,
hey
renot n
every
espect
wo
because,
ue to
the
imilarity
of ertainlements
he
ne fwhichs
said f
Plato,
he ther
f
his
mind,
ou
annot
assignwhat hetwoparts roperlyre.Well, his s rightlyalled 'unity', ot
a
'union'.
herefore,
f
omebody
onceivesf
omething
mong
he atural
things
hichs distinct
rom hat
nity,
t
happens yanalogy
hat,
part
romll
consideration
f
imilarity
nd
dissimilarity,
e
opposes
o
t,
lso
by
he
ingularity
of ts
nature,
ome
ther
nity
hich
s
different
from
t>;
e.g.
to
this
man
here
hat
therman
r
that tone.
It>
also
many
subsistentsrecalled one
andthe
ame
hing',
ot ue
the
ingularity
f ne
nature ut ather
n
virtuef
he nion
f
many
natures
whichrises
because
f
their
imilarity.ccording
o this
union
, indeed,
plurality
f
men
is
called
one
r
the amemanand
a
plurality
fanimalsone
r
the
amenimal*
Ibid.
55,2-7;
uantitates
t
qualitates
ecundum
uas
equalia'
t
similia'
icuntur,
non deodiverseuntsicut otestastvilitasecundumuas lledominus',ste ero
'servus'
icuntur),
ed
quodammodo
num
unt;
on
uidem
a
que
ex
ingularitate
est
unitate,
ed ea
que
ex
proportione
omparatur
nione.
32
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The
quantities
nd
qualities
n virtue
f
which
hey
viz.
created
hings]
re called
'equal
or
similar',
re
not
ll that iverse
e.g.
the
position ower
nd
vileness
est d
quod
est
homo'
hoc uer-
bum
est
sustinetur
b
hoc nominatiuo
homo'
et remouetur ndefinite
esse id
quod
est
Socrate,
quod
uerum est
quia1
'homo'
non est Socrates'.
Cum
autem dicitur Socratesst d
quod
non
sthomo'
est
sustinetur b
hoc
nomine
quod
refert
d,
et remouetur
[/.
60vb
ab eo
quod
Socratem esse
hominem.
Quod
fal-
sum
est,
quia
Socrates
est id
quod
est
homo.
l)
quod
..
quia]
scripsiuia
...
quod
MS
QVAESTIO
IVa
Questio
est cum
participium
diciatur
nomini
substantiuo ntransitiue
et
cum
possit
poni
substantiue in
neutro
genere, quare
non
dicatur
adiectiuum.
soLVTio.
Sicut
species
primitiua
et
deriuatiua
dicuntur
in
respectu
ideo
quia
ubi non
est
primitiuum,
non
oportet
queri
deriuatiua
-
unde cum omne participium it in deriuatione,superfluum ssetque-
rere cuius
speciei
sit
-
,
sic cum
substantiuum t adiectiuum
dicantur
in
respectu nullumque
participium
sit
substantiuum,
non est
dicen-
dum
quod aliquod
sit
adiectiuum sicut
neque
pronomen.
Nullum
enim
pronomen
in
eo
quod pronomen
est,
est
adiectiuum.
QVAESTIO
Va
Qvis
VOCATVR
ste?
Hac questione queriturde re nominis uel uerbi.
Non
uerbi;
ergo
de re
nominis;
ergo
de
substantia uel
proprietate
111
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substantie.
Si
de
proprietate,
rgo
conuenienter
potest
ei
reddi nomen
adiectiuum.
Item.
Hic fit
questio
de
qualitate;
aliquod
nomen conuenienter
potest
ei
responden;
ergo
illud
potest
illam
qualitatem
determinare;
ergo
sumitur
ab
aliqua
proprietate.
Item.
In hac
interrogatione
onitur
hoc
interrogatiuum
ubstantie
quis
quod
est
tantum
interrogatiuum
ubstantie;
ergo
uel
inproprie
ponitur
uel
querit
de substantia.
Item. Hic
'quis
est steV
queritur
de substantia et hic
'quis
uocatur
isteV
queritur
de
qualitate.
Hoc nomen
quis
est tantum
nterrogatiuum
substantie. In prima ponitur proprie; ergo in secunda inproprie.
Item.
Hoc
nomen
potest
querere
de
substantiaet
qualitate
et
quan-
titate;
et
est
nomen substantie et nec
qualitatis
nec
quantitatis.
Quando
querit
de
substantia,
proprie ponitur
et
quando
de
quanti-
tate,
inproprie
ponitur; ergo
quando
de
qualitate, inproprie.
Item. In hac
interrogatione
ueritur
de
qualitate;
ergo
non
oportet
nomen substantiuum ei
responden.
Item.
Si
hac
interrogatione ueritur
de
substantia,
ergo
potest
ei
pronomen responden.
Item. Questio est de substantia; ergo illudquod respondetur,debet
cercius
significare
uam quod ponitur
in
interrogatione.
Propter
huiusmodi dicimus
quoniam neque
de substantia
neque
de
qualitate
queritur,
sed de
propria
qualitate. Propria
uero
qualitas
non
est
qualitas.
QVAESTIO
Via
Queri potest
utrum
in hac
constructione
vis
videt
socratem?
quis
supponat
locutioni. Dicimus
quoniam
sic
est,
sed
interrogatiue,
dest
hoc modo ut
querat
de
supposito.
Nec
quis
bi uere
supponit,
sed
quasi
ficte:
quendam
modum
loquendi, quando
est
interrogatiuum.
t hec
interrogatio
ult
sibi
talem
responsionem,
ut certificetur e
supposito
pertinente
d
illum,
ut
(quis
uidet ocratem?
irgilius
uel
aliquid
tale. Et
tale
suppositum significai uis quod
ad
substantiam
proprie pertinet,
ut
quale
ad
qualitatem.
Contra hoc obicitur.
In
hac constructione
ponitur
uerbum transi-
tiuum et in usu transeundi; et hic nominatiuus construitur um hoc
uerbo uidet
ntransitiue,
obliquus
transitiue;
ergo persona
significata
112
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116/169
nominatiuo ostenditur
agere
per
uerbum
in
personam
significatam
obliquo; ergo agituel transituel eius ostensio estfalsa. Instantian hoc'
Socrates on
egitVirgilium
et
in
omnibus
imperatiuis
et
interrogatiuis
et
optatiuis
orationibus.
In
omnibus enim
istis
non
fit
ransitio
e
per-
sona
ad
personam.
Concedi
tarnen
potest quod
hec constructio
quis
uidet ocratemV it
transitiua.
Nil
tamen
ostenditur
ransirnec
transit
tiam,
immo
que-
ritur
quis
agat.
Sicut dicitur
predicatiua
propositio
non
tantum ea in
qua
aliquid
predicatur
de
aliquo
sed
in
qua
etiam
aliquid
remouetur,
sic
non
dicitur lia
constructiotantum
transitiua
n
qua
fit
transitio,
sed etiam ilia in qua ostenditurnon transiruel in qua aliquis modus
loquendi
transitiue
ponitur,
ut
lfac
gnem'
'
utinam
egerem irgilium
QVAESTIO
Vila
De
pluralibus
quoque
distributiuorum
querendum
est
que
eorum
nominatiuis
pronominum
iungantur
et
que
non. Nam
bene
dicitur
1
omnia
sta
sunt
lba
sed non
'
omnia storum1isi
per
subauditionem.
Econuerso bene dicitur lquelibetstorumet non 4quelibetsta'
Quia
nominatiuus
ste,
scilicet
sta,
plura
simul
quasi
collectiue
sup-
ponit.
Sed tamen ad
notandum
quod
eorum
cuilibet conuenit
predica-
tum,
addimus omnia
quod
distributionis im habet.
Vnde non
dicam
omnia
sta
unt
uatuor
nisi
quodlibet
eorum
esset
quatuor,
quia
colli-
git
et
distribuii. Sed
quelibet
magis
distribuit
t
minus
colligit.
Et
ideo
magis exigit genitiuum,
qui
distributionis
roprius
est,
quam
plur-
lem
nominatiuum,
qui semper
colligit.
Queri
etiam solet
utrum
congrue
dicatur
alter stius
t
llius
et
lquili-bet stius t llorum'
Quod
ex eo
uidebitur,
quod
sicut
pro
'isticurrun
dicimus
"iste t
Ule
urrun
similiter
ro
istorumidetur
posse
dici
c
istius
et
illius alter
per
conceptionem.
Nec
inuenies in aliis
instantiam,
ut
'
miseret
storum
similiter
istius
t illius'
Licet autem
non
irrationabiliter
ici
posse
uideatur,
auferendum
tamen
est
quoniam
contra usum est.
Vel si ratio
reddenda:
quia
rpu-
gnt singularitas
distributioni.
Dicimus enim
'
omnis
homo
egi
non
tamen
omnis
steuel
alius
quia
rpugnt
iste um omnis.
Et
tamen
in
aliis bene
dicitur