visual argument reconsidered: 'objective' theory and a

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Visual Argument Reconsidered: 'Objective' Theoryand a Classical Rhetorical ApproachDaniel RichardsClemson University, [email protected]

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VisualArgumentReconsidered:“Objective”TheoryandaClassical

RhetoricalApproach

AThesisPresentedto

theGraduateSchoolofClemsonUniversity

InPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegree

MasterofArtsProfessionalCommunication

byDanielThomasRichards

May2009

Acceptedby:Dr.StevenB.Katz,CommitteeChair

Dr.SusanHilligossDr.TharonHoward

ii

Abstract

Visualargumentisarelativelynewdisciplinewithinthefieldofvisual

rhetorics.Consequently,visualrhetoricianshavepresentednewtheoriesof

visualargumentationwithoutfullyconsideringthepossibilitiesofexisting

textualmethodologiesasexplanatorytools—especiallyclassicalrhetorical

devices.Thisthesispresentsamethodologyforexaminingandcreatingvisual

argumentsbasedontheconceptsoftopoiandfiguresofspeech.Icontendthat

theseclassicalrhetoricaldevisesembodyan“objective”understandingofvisual

communicationthatshowsonewayofbridgingtheempiricism/rationalism

debateinepistemology.Bydemonstratingthatknowledgecomesfromthe

necessaryinterplayofperceptionandconception,Iattempttoshowthattopoi

andfigurescreatevisualargumentsbymeansofconceptualizationbasedon

informationgatheredfromanobjectivereality—aprocessthatmimicstheactof

cognitionand,therefore,providesawide‑reachingcommunicativemethodology.

iii

Acknowledgments

IwouldliketothankDr.SteveKatzforinspiringmetostartthisanalysis

duringmyfirstsemesteringraduateschool—aswellasDrs.SusanHilligossand

TharonHowardforalltheirhelpinshapingthisthesis.Withoutthiscommittee

pushingmetorefinemystubbornideas,mythesiswouldbeanemptyshellof

whatitistoday.

Aspecialthanksto“TeamTufte,”MikeH.andChristinaD.,forindulging

mypassionforbeautifuldesignandrationalargument.

Thanksalsotomymotherforsupportingmydecisiontopursuea

graduatedegreeandforherendlesslove—andtotherestofmyfamilyfortheir

wordsofencouragement.

Andthankstomyfriendsandcolleaguesfordealingwithmyrantsabout

truth,reality,andpolitics.WithoutthemI’dbejustanotherrhetoricianwalking

aroundaimlessly,talkingtomyself.

iv

TableofContents

Page

TitlePage.................................................................................................................... iAbstract ..................................................................................................................... iiAcknowledgements................................................................................................. iiiListofFigures .......................................................................................................... viPreface ..................................................................................................................... viiChapter I. Thenew,oldparagone:Anintroductiontotheperception/ conceptiondebateanditsimplicationsforvisualargument .........1 Implicationsforvisualcommunication............................................6 Problemswithperceptualtheoryforvisualcommunication.........9 Problemswithconceptualtheoryforvisualcommunication ......14 Onewayofbridgingtheperception/conceptiongap ...................20 Thepurposeofthisthesis................................................................24 Structureandorganization..............................................................25 II. Paintingthecompletepicture:Areviewofrelevantliterature..........26 Definingimage:Awordisworth1000images(orviceversa) ....26 Perceptualtheoriesofvisualcommunication................................29 Conceptualtheoriesofvisualcommunication ..............................34 Definingargumentandpersuasion................................................39 Definingvisualargument................................................................46

v

TableofContents(Continued)Page

III. Areturntoclassicalrhetoric:Topoi,figuresofspeech, andthe“objective”bridge...............................................................54 Topoiandfiguresofspeech—pastandpresent..............................56 Amethodologyforexaminingvisualtopoiandfigures................62

IV. “Making”theargument:Analysesofvisualtopoiandfigures ..........64 Thetopoianalyses.............................................................................66 Relationshipsbetweentopoi ............................................................75 Rhetoricalimplicationsforvisualtopoi ..........................................76 Thefiguresofspeechanalyses........................................................79 Relationshipsbetweenfiguresofspeech .......................................83 Rhetoricalimplicationsforvisualfiguresofspeech .....................85 V. Concludingremarks:Implicationsof“objective”theory, futureresearch,andthelongroadaheadforvisualargument....87 Suggestionsforfutureresearch ......................................................90 Implicationsandfinalwords ..........................................................94WorksCited .............................................................................................................96MediaCited ...........................................................................................................106

vi

ListofFigures

FigurePage

1 ApaintingfromtheChauvetCave ......................................................27 A “Baby/Cigarette:SecondhandSmoke&Kids”....................................67 B “LLowBirth:SecondhandSmoke&Kids”.........................................69 C “Needlepoint:SecondhandSmoke&Kids”........................................73

vii

Preface

Thescopeofthisthesisisnotasbroadasthefirstchapterandliterature

reviewmightmakeitseem.Thediscussionofepistemologicalphilosophycomes

notfromadesiretosettleadebatethousandsofyearsoldbutashistoricaland

ideologicalcontextforthealternativephilosophyonwhichmyanalytical

methodologyisbased.Idonotintendthediscussionofempiricismand

rationalismtobeanoverarchingargumentagainsteitherphilosophyintheir

entirety.NordoIclaimthattheirentiretyishereindiscussed.Acompletesurvey

ofepistemologicalphilosophyishardlysuitableforadissertationletalonea

master’sthesis.Thetheoriesdiscussedinthisthesisshouldbeconsidereda

generalizationoftheavailableliteratureandnotanall‑encompassing

examination.

Nonetheless,Ithoughtitwasimportanttoincludethisgeneraldiscussion

ofepistemologytobegintoshowthephilosophicalrootsofthequestion,“Can

imagesmakearguments?”Earlyoninmyacademiccareer,Inoticedtwovery

generalanswerstothisquestionintheliteratureIwasreading—eitheritwas

assertedthatargumentsweresolelytextualconceptsorthatanypersuasive

elementinanimagecouldbeconsideredargumentative.Iwasnotsatisfiedwith

viii

eitheranswerperhapsbecauseIdidnotseethescholarsaddressingthe

epistemologicalissuesfromwhichtheirargumentsappearedtoderive.Itseemed

tomethatthequestionofwhetherornotvisualscanargueisnecessarily

epistemological—sinceanswering“yes,”asmanyscholarshave,begsthe

question,“Onwhatgroundscanweclaimtoknowavisualargument?”

Forme,itseemedthatanymethodologyforexaminingvisual

argumentationhadtofollowfromanepistemologythatallowedforsuchclaims.

WhenIbeganreviewingtheepistemologicalliteraturethatappearedtobethe

genesisofthesecompetingclaimsaboutvisualarguments,Ifoundseveralissues

withtwoprominenttheories—empiricismandrationalism—thatseemedatleast

problematicforcreatingatheoryandmethodologyofvisualargumentation.I

wanttoclarifythatmydiscussionofempiricismandrationalismisnotintended

tosuggestthatthesearetheonlyepistemologicalphilosophiesonwhichvisual

argumenttheorieshavebeenbased.NordoIclaimthattheissuesaddressedin

thisthesisareuniversallyproblematicforthephilosophiesingeneral.Iaddress

onlytheissuesthatIseeforvisualargumentandonlyastheyrelatetovisual

argument.Ichosetoexamineempiricismandrationalismbecauseitappearedto

methatagreatdealofvisualrhetoricaltheorycouldfindtheirepistemological

rootsinthem.

ix

Additionally,thealternativephilosophypresented—called“objective”

theory1throughout—isintendedtoshowonlyonealternativefordiscussing

visualargument—basedontheproblemsIseewithmethodologiesgroundedin

empiricismorrationalism.ThetheoryandmethodologyIpresentshouldnotbe

consideredasanargumentforaone,“true”wayofexaminingvisualargument.

Ultimately,Iacknowledgethatthisthesisonlyexaminesasmallportion

ofvisualrhetoricaltheoriesinrelationtowhatIseeastheirepistemological

roots.Futurestudiesmightexaminedifferenttheoriesanddifferent

relationships,perhapsprovidingevenmoremethodsforexplainingandcreating

visualarguments.

1ThoughbasedontheepistemologicalphilosophyofAynRand,creatorofObjectivism,thetheoryasitappliesinthisthesiscannotbecalledObjectivisttheorysinceitleansmoretowardadeductivemethodologythananinductiveprocess.Therefore,Iusetheterm“objective”theoryinthisessaynotonlytodistinguishitfromconceptualandperceptualtheoriesbutalsotoshowthatitisinfluencedbyObjectivistphilosophywithoutbeingdirectlyidentifiedassuch.

CHAPTERONE

Thenew,oldparagone:Anintroductiontotheperception/conceptiondebate

anditsimplicationsforvisualargument

Wordsandimagesseeminevitablytobecomeimplicatedina“warofsigns”(whatLeonardocalledaparagone)inwhichthestakesarethingslikenature,truth,reality,andthehumanspirit.

W.J.T.Mitchell,1987Iconology:Image,Text,Ideology

Oneofthemostimportantandlongestlastingdebatesinphilosophical

historyconcernsthenatureofknowledge.Indeed,anentirebranchof

philosophy,epistemology,isdedicatedtothetopicwiththousandsofscholars

addingtheirvoicetotheconversation.Rhetoricians,too,datingbacktotheir

Sophistroots,haveconcernedthemselveswithwhatisandwhatisnotepistemic,

howwecanknow,andwhetherornotourknowledgematters.Mostly,

philosophersandrhetoricianshavebeenarguingoverepistemicmethodology—

thequestionofequalvalidity.Thatis,aretheremultiple,validwaysof

understandingrealityandmeaning(Boghossian2)?Epistemologyhasbeen

2

significantlyinfluencedbytwoopposingclaimsonthequestion:1)that

knowledgeisaposteriori—afterexperiencingreality—or2)thatknowledgeisa

priori—beforeexperiencingreality(Peikoff46).Theformer,knownhereinas

perceptualtheory,suggeststhatobjectsinrealityhavemeaningindependentof

theviewerthatissimplyintheobject,andthelatter,knownhereinasconceptual

theory,suggeststhatobjectshavenomeaningexceptthatwhichtheviewer

appliestothem.Historically,thedebateisknownasempiricismv.rationalism

and,asPeterMarkiesuccinctlystates,“concernstheextenttowhichweare

dependentuponsenseexperienceinourefforttogainknowledge”(Markie).

Tosaysimplythattherehavebeentwosidestothestudyofepistemology,

however,wouldbeagraveinjusticetofield—nordoesitproperlyexpressthe

extenttowhichbothperceptualandconceptualtheorieshavebeendiscussed

anddebated.Indeed,thenuancedversionsofthesephilosophieshaveprovided

thousandsoftextswithnumerousopinions,producingamultitudeof

epistemologicaltheoriesandmethodologies.Itwouldbeimpossibletoreview

evenafractionofepistemologicaltheoryinthisthesis.Instead,Ichosetolimit

myexaminationtoperceptualandconceptualtheoriesparticularlybecausethey

appeartohavebeenquiteinfluentialonthestudyofvisualrhetorics—and

especiallyvisualargument.Nonetheless,thisoverviewofperceptualand

3

conceptualtheoriesisonlymeanttogivehistoricalandphilosophicalcontextfor

thediscussionofepistemologicallyasitrelatestovisualargument.Itcannotbe

consideredanexhaustiveexamination.

Perceptualists—orempiricists—maytracetheiroriginsasfarbackas

Aristotle,whosescientifictheoriesheldexperienceastheoriginatingfactorinall

knowledge.ForAristotle,allknowledgehadtobedemonstrated—thatis,

deduced“withpremisesrevealingthecausalstructuresoftheworld”(Shields).

Theonlyknowledgethatcannotbedemonstratedisan“immediatepremise”

(Shields)—alsoknownasanaxiom,definedasknowledgevalidatedbytheactof

perception(Peikoff8).FromAristotle’spremise,perceptualistslikeJohnLocke,

DavidHume,andA.J.Ayerscontinuedtoarguethatreason,devoidofsensory

content,hadnowayofprovidingus“superior”knowledgeofreality(Markie).

Therefore,thesenses,notthemind,aretheultimatesourceofknowledge.

Oneempiricistwhoseworkisespeciallyrelevanttovisualcommunication

anddeservingofspecialnoteisRudolphArnheim.InVisualThinking,Arnheim

addressestheissuesofperceptionandcognitiveactivity,arguingthathis

predecessorsincorrectlyseparatethetwofaculties.Hecontendsthat“cognitive

operationscalledthinkingarenottheprivilegeofmentalprocessesaboveand

beyondperceptionbuttheessentialingredientsofperceptionitself”(13).For

4

Arnheim,perceptioniscognition.Hearguesforwhathecalls“intelligent”

perception.Hestates,“Visualperception…isnotapassiverecordingofstimulus

materialbutanactiveconcernofthemind.Thesenseofsightoperates

selectively”(37).Atfirstglance,itmayseemdifficulttoclassifyArnheimasan

empiricist.Indeed,hisparticularversionofempiricismattemptstotranscendthe

debatebyeliminatingthedichotomy.Perhapsitisbest,then,toacknowledge

Arnheim’sempiricism,sinceheacknowledgesthatallknowledgeoriginateswith

perception,buttoclassifyitasaspecialcaseworthyofadditionalexamination.It

willbecomeclearwhenIdiscussproblemswithperceptualismthatArnheim’s

theoryinparticularcomplicatesandenrichesthedebate.

Itmightseemthatconceptualtheoriesformedasaresponseto

empiricism,but,infact,conceptualists—orrationalists—maytracetheiroriginas

farbackasPlato.MarkieexplainsthatPlatobelievedthat“whatweknowby

reasonalone,aPlatonicform,say,issuperiorinanimportantmetaphysicalway,

e.g.unchanging,eternal,perfect,ahigherdegreeofbeing,towhatareawareof

throughsenseexperience”(Markie).ForPlato,whatweexperiencedthrough

perceptionwasmerelya“shadow”ofreality.Heexpressedhisviewpoint

famouslyintheallegoryofthecave,retoldherebyAllanSilverman:

5

Seatedprisoners,chainedsothattheycannotmovetheirheads,

stareatacavewallonwhichareprojectedimages.Theseimages

arecastfromcarvedfiguresilluminatedbyafireandcarriedby

peopleonaparapetaboveandbehindtheprisoners.Aprisoneris

loosedfromhischains.Firstheseesthecarvedimagesandthefire.

Thenheisledoutofthecaveinto“real”world.Blindedbythelight

ofthesun,hecannotlookatthetrees,rocksandanimalsaround

him,butinsteadlooksattheshadowsandreflections(inwater)cast

bythoseobjects.Ashebecomesacclimatized,heturnshisgazeto

thoseobjectsandfinally,fullyacclimatized,helookstothesource

ofillumination,thesunitself.(Silverman)

Thisacclimation,andhowweeventuallycomprehend“reality,”comesnot

throughagreaterunderstandingofsenseperceptionbutthroughphilosophy

andreason.ImmanuelKantlaterbuiltonPlato’snotionofformsbyarguing,in

ProlegomenatoAnyFutureMetaphysics,thathumanshave“sensoryintuition”that

allowsusto“intuitthingsapriori”(Kant34).Hecontendsthatconceptssuchas

timeandspacearenotlearnedthroughsensoryexperiencebutinourmindsat

birth,allowingustointuitmorecomplexconceptslikegeometryandpure

mathematics(Kant34‑35).PaulK.Feyerabendfamouslyaffirmsapriori

6

knowledgeinhisarticle,“ScienceWithoutExperience,”forTheJournalof

Philosophy.Hewrites,“Knowledgecanenterourbrainwithouttouchingour

senses.Andsomeknowledgeresidesintheindividualbrainwithouteverhaving

enteredit.Norisobservationalknowledgethemostreliableknowledgewe

possess”(Feyerabend794).Hegoesontodenounceempiricism—thedominant

scientificphilosophyforhundredsofyears(794).

Implicationsforvisualcommunication

Anytheoreticaldisciplinethatconsidersitsmethodologiesepistemicmust

dealwiththeperception/conceptiondebate.Rhetoricisnoexception.Perhaps

withoutevenrealizingitsinfluence,rhetorichasadoptedtheperception/

conceptiondichotomyandreifiedit—not,onthesurface,asastrugglebetween

realityandthemindbutasastrugglebetweentextandimage.Thedivide,

thoughunfortunate,seemstooccurbecauseofourreluctancetoreconcile

empiricismandrationalism.Mitchellexplains,“Theparagoneordebateofpoetry

andpaintingisneverjustacontestbetweentwokindsofsigns,butastruggle

betweenbodyandsoul,worldandmind,natureandculture”(49).AsIwill

demonstrateintheliteraturereview,rhetoricians,becauseoftheinfluenceofthe

7

perception/conceptiondilemmaanddebatepriortoit2,havecreatedabodyof

theoreticalknowledgethatseparateswhatweknowabouttextualrhetoricsfrom

whatweknowaboutvisualrhetorics.AsMitchellwarned,wordsandimages

havebecomemixedupintheheateddebateoverknowledgeandtruth.Icontend

thatasaresultofthisarbitraryseparation,visualrhetoricians—pushedwhole‑

heartedlybysomephilosophers—haveinadvertentlycreatedanewdichotomy

betweenargumentandpersuasionthatlimitsthediscussionoftheoneofthe

neweststudiesofvisualcommunication:visualargument.

Beforemovingon,though,IwouldliketoclarifythatIdonotmeanto

suggestthattextandimagesoperateexactlythesameway.Thereare,

undoubtedly,amyriadwaysthattextandimagescommunicatedifferently,but

thatdoesnotmeanweshoulddiscounttheirsimilarities.DonisDondiswrites,in

herseminalbook,APrimerofVisualLiteracy,“Languageisameansofexpression

andcommunicationand,therefore,isaparallelsystemtovisualcommunication.

Wecannotslavishlycopythemethodsthatareusedtoteachreadingand

writing,butwecanobserveandacknowledgethem”(Dondis182‑3).Indeed,itis

neithermydesiretopromotetheoriesthatsimplymimicexistingtextual

methodologiesnortopresentanalternativethatignoresthem.MoresoIam 2Iamreferringheretothepre‑AristotelianargumentsaboutrhetoricbestexemplifiedbyGorgias’EncomiumofHelenandthecounter‑argumentsbyIsocratesinAgainsttheSophists.

8

searchingforwhatMaryHocksandMichelleKendrickcall“hybridization”of

thetextual/visualcultures,theunificationoftheoriesinsteadofseparation(4).By

integratingtheoriesfromdifferentsub‑genresofrhetoricandphilosophy,the

studyofvisualargumentwillhopefullyfollowthesamepathasthegeneral

studyofvisualrhetoricsbybecomingan“indiscipline”withfewideological

boundaries(HillandHelmers21).CarolynHandanotesthatvisualrhetorics

drawsscholars“fromfieldsasdiverseasarthistory,design,philosophy,…

graphicarts…ethnography,culturalstudies,typography,andarchitecture,to

namejustafew”(3).Todenycertainaspectsofvisualrhetoricsinregardsto

specificsub‑genres—likevisualargument—wouldstiflearelativelynewand

developingdiscipline,keepingitfromitsfulltheoreticalandpracticalpotential.

Thisnotionmeansincludingexistingtextualtheoriesaswell.

AsIwillshowinmyliteraturereview,itisimperativethatrhetoricians

findmultiplewaystorejointextandimageinordertobetterunderstandthe

conceptofvisualargumentandanswerthecriticismsofsomeofourbiggest

opponents.Butbeforewelookatonewayofbypassingthisperceptionv.

conceptionroadblock,wemustproperlyconsiderpotentialproblemsthatboth

perceptualandconceptualtheoriesposeforforvisualargument.

9

Problemswithperceptualtheoryforvisualcommunication

Whileperceptualcommunicationtheoryprovidesseveralinteresting

avenuestodiscussvisualrhetorics,italsopresentssomeseemingly

insurmountablehurdlesforvisualargumentation.Appliedtoavisualargument,

perceptualtheoryaskstheviewertoexamineargumentsbasedonasortofvisual

alphabet.Itsuggeststhatifwelearnthemeaninginherentincertainlines,

shapes,colors,etc.thenwemightsuccessfullycommunicateourmeaning.A

visualalphabet,though,wouldbeimmense—eachnuancedshadesofcolor,line

thickness,andcompositionaddingnewmeaningsadinfinitum.Thisapproach

posesanevenbiggerproblemforinterculturalcommunication.Ifthevisual

alphabetforonelanguageseemsimmense,itbecomesinfinitelymoresowhen

consideringthousands,ifnotmillions,ofdistinctculturesandsub‑cultures.

Nonetheless,evenifitwaspossibletocatalogvisualmeaninginthatway,

mostperceptualtheoriesalonecouldfullysupportacompletetheoryofvisual

argumentationsincetheyseem,oncloserexamination,tobeaformofnaïve

realism—theideathatthevalidationofoursensescomesfromthefactthat

objectshavean“essence”independentofourperception(Peikoff48).Inother

words,realitybecomesasortof“whatyouseeiswhatyouget”experience.This

theoryisproblematicinafewways.Foremost,whenIexamineatable,Idonot

10

perceivethatitismadeupofatomicparticles.DoesthatmeanIamnotseeing

thepurestformofreality?Itwouldappearthatfromthelensofperceptual

theorytherearemultipletables:Thetableasperceivedbyhumansensesandthe

tableasperceivedbyanyaidtohumansenses.

AgainitseemsprudenttoexamineArnheim’sempiricismsincehistheory

doesnotfalterunderthepreviouscritiques.ForArnheim,theactofcognition

occurssimultaneouslywithperception.Theyare,infact,onefacultyinsteadof

two.Hewrites,“Thereisnobasicdifference…betweenwhathappenswhena

personlooksattheworlddirectlyandwhenhesitswithhiseyesclosedand

‘thinks’”(13).AlthoughArnheimpresentsimportantargumentsforvisual

communicationhistheoryseemsproblematicforvisualcommunicationintwo

ways:the“intelligence”ofsensesandtheideaofabstractingfromabstraction.

Arnheim’sargumentappearstorestonhisnotionofintelligent

perception.Henotes,however,thattheideaofsensoryorganshaving

intelligenceseems“risky”andperhapsevencounterintuitive.Hearguesthat,

perhaps,adifferentunderstandingofintelligenceseemsappropriateforhis

undertaking.Itmaybebesttoquotehimatlengthhere:

Itmaybepermissibletosay,forexample,thattheuseof

informationabouttheenvironmentmakesformoreintelligent

11

conductthandoestotalinsensitivity.Inthissimplestsense,an

inbuilttropismbywhichaninsectseeksoravoidslighthas

somethingincommonwithapersonwhowatchfullyobservesthe

happeningsintheworldaroundhim.Thevigilanceofalively

humanmindisthelatestdisplayofthestruggleforsurvivalthat

madeprimitiveorganismsresponsivetochangesinthe

environment.(17‑18)

Hegoesontoarguethatthis“intelligence”derivesnotfrom“cognitionfor

cognition’ssake”butasanevolutionarytoolforsurvival(19).Inthissense,

sensoryperceptionlearnstofocus,notice,orbackgroundentitiesasameansof

keepingtheperceiveralive—afascinatinglycomplexmethodofproblemsolving

forwhatseemsatfirsttobearudimentarybiologicalprocess(25).

Yettheintelligentperceptiontheoryposesaninterestingepistemological

problem.Ifperceptioniscognitionthentheconceptshumansformnecessarily

affecthowtheyperceive—sinceArnheimclaimstobespeakingaboutonefaculty

withanarbitrarysplit.Arnheimconcedesthispointoutright,stating,“Our

thoughtsinfluencewhatwesee,andviceversa”(15).Thispointcallsinto

questionthevalidityofoursensesasepistemicorgans.Ifourperceptionsare

transformedbytheconceptstheythemselvescreate,thenitappearsdifficultto

12

trustfutureperceptualdataasbeingrepresentativeofaconsistent,objective

reality.Withoutmakingthepointmetaphysical,itseemssufficienttosaythat

perceptualdatainfluencedbypreviousperceptualdata—bothintermsofactual

perceptionandinterpretation,sinceArnheim’stheorydoesnotallowfora

separationofthetwo—doesnotholdtoastandardofvaliditynecessaryfora

completetheoryofvisualargumentation.Thatis,ifperceptioniscognitionand

thedataperceivedisnecessarilyinfluencedbytheactofperception,onwhat

groundscouldarhetorclaimtomakeavisualargument?Anyreferentsusedby

therhetorcouldimmediatelybecalledintoquestionasaproductoftherhetor’s

perceptualexperiences.Thispositionseemstoleavelittleroomforarhetorto

saythathisorclaimsaboutanargumentaremoreorlessvalidthananyothers.

Inadditiontotheproblemwithintelligentperception,Arnheim’stheory

posesaninterestingproblemfortheideaofabstractingfromanabstraction.That

is,derivingoneabstractconceptbymeansofconceptualizingandintegrating

oneormoredifferentabstractconcepts.Arnheimdefinesabstractionas“theart

ofdrawingessentialsfromagivenkindofentity”(173).Forhim,abstraction

happensonthestructurallevel(174)withperceptionactingtoidentifycommon

traitswithingivenentities(178).Ultimately,theseabstractionsleadtoaconcept,

13

whichhesuggestsisnotsomuchafixed,universalattributebut“akindof

highspotwithinasweepofcontinuoustransformations”(178).

Thisideaofabstractionleadsmetowonderaboutabstractideasbasedon

abstractideas.Inotherwords,Arnheim’sexplanationofabstractconceptsbased

onfirsthandperceptionseemsreasonableenough,buthisperceptionas

cognitiontheoryseemsinsufficienttoexplainhowconceptsarederivedfrom

otherconceptsandnotfromimmediateexperientialknowledge.Forexample,

humansperceivingatablemayabstractitsstructuralelementsandcreatethe

concept“table”asareferenttoallentitiesofthissort.Theydothesameforthe

concept“chair.”Eveniftheystoretheseconceptsintheirmemory,itseems

impossibleinArnheim’sviewforhumanstoeverdeveloptheconceptof

“furniture.”Thisconceptisaspecialrelationshipthatcannotnecessarilybe

observed.Evenifhumansviewachairandatabletogether,theycannotobserve

thecategoricalrelationshipimplicitintheconcept“furniture.”Theycould

observe/abstractspatialrelationshipslike“behind,”“nextto,”or“infrontof,”

butthecategoricalrelationshiprepresentedby“furniture”cannotbepointedto

inreality.Itcanonlybeunderstoodbyabstractingtheabstractionsbasedonthe

perceptualdatapresentedbyobservingatableandachair.Thisdouble

abstractionisonelevelremovedfromdirectperceptionand,therefore,seems

14

implausibleunderArnheim’stheoryofperceptionascognition.Similarly,in

“ThePsycho‑EpistemologyofArt,”Randpointsoutthatconceptualunitssucha

light‑yearsareabstractionsbeyondtherealmofperception.Humansareonly

abletodealwithsuchconceptsbymeansofreasonandconceptualfaculties(17).

Again,Iwanttomakeclearthatperceptualtheoriesprovideanexcellent

baseforepistemologicalexaminations—especiallytheworkofRudolph

Arnheim.Thisthesisissympathetictotheideathatallknowledgeoriginateswith

thesenses.Empiricistswererighttoarguethattheconceptualfacultieswould

havenothingtoconceptualizewithoutsensoryexperiences,butsimplybecause

dataaboutrealitycomesfromthesensesdoesmeanthatthesensesthemselves

areepistemic.Therefore,itappearsthatperceptualtheoryonitsowndoesnot

provideanadequatebasisforatheoryofvisualargumentsinceitdownplaysor

evendiscountstheroleofconceptualfacultiesandtheirabilitytoabstractfrom

abstractions.

Problemswithconceptualtheoryforvisualcommunication

Conceptualists’critiqueofperception,thoughmostlyvalid,necessarily

leadstoconstructivism—theideathatrealityisunknowableapartfromsociety

orlanguage(ThrallsandBlyler3)—inoneformoranother.Constructivists

15

contendthatindividualsandgroupscreatereality,knowledge,andmeaning

throughlanguageandideology.CharlotteThrallsandNancyRoundyBlyer

clarifythetheoryintheiressay,“TheSocialPerspectiveandProfessional

Communication:DiversityandDirectionsinResearch,”bystating,

“Communicationsareinvestedwithmeaningonlythroughtheinteractionsof

writersandreadersin[specificsocial]groups.Inshort,sociallymediated

meaning—or,touseanalternateterm,interpretation—iscentraltothesocial

perspective”(4).Theycontendthatbecausewecannotknowobjective

characteristicsofreality,theonlymeansofknowledgeiswhatweagreeupon(4).

Itisimportanttonotethatconstructivismgoesbeyondacknowledgingthatthat

arecertainhumancreationsthatarenotfoundinnature—e.g.government,dress

codes,datingrituals,etc.ConstructivistslikeThomasKuhn,GregMyers,Bruno

Latour,andSteveWoolgararguethatevenscientific“facts”aresocially

constructed(Kuhn170‑171;Myers627;LatourandWoolgar21,40).Itis

important,therefore,todistinguishbetweenfact‑constructivismandlanguage‑

constructivism.Theformerclaimsthatweliterallybuildourexistenceby

agreeingonscientificprinciplesandlawsofreality,makingobjectivetruth

impossible.Thelatterclaimsthatevenifthereisanobjectiverealityitis

unknowableapartfromlanguage,makingknowingobjectivetruthimpossible.

16

Thereseemtobesomeissueswithconstructivismthataredifficulttoovercome

foracomprehensivetheoryofvisualargumentation.

Inhisbook,FearofKnowledge:AgainstRelativismandConstructivism,Paul

Boghossianposesthreemajorproblemswithfact‑constructivism.Foremostis

whathecallstheproblemof“causation.”Hestatesthatmanyfactswediscuss

predateourexistence—fossilsforexample—soitseemsimpossibletohave

constructedtheirexistence(38).Similarly,hissecondcritiquepointsoutthat

someconcepts,likeelectrons,aredefinedasbeingindependentofus.Howcould

wehaveconstructedtheentitiesthatconstructus,entitiesthatare,bydefinition,

independentofus(39)?Finally,Boghossianpresentswhathecalls“theproblem

ofdisagreement”(39).Heposesahypotheticalwhereintwocommunities

constructtwofactsthatcontradicteachother.Itwouldseemthatinthisexample,

iffact‑constructivismwastrue,theconstructionwouldviolateoftheLawof

Non‑Contradiction.Thatis,“Necessarily:ItisnotthecaseboththatPandthat

not‑P”(40‑41).

Whiletheargumentmightbemadethatallformsofconstructivism

necessarilyleadtofact‑constructivism,itisnotfairtootherrationalist

philosophiestosimplyaddresstheirargumentsbywhatmightbeseenasthe

mostnaïveversionofconstructivism.Indeed,socialconstructivistsconcerned

17

withhowlanguageinfluencesourperceptionsmightconcedethatrealityexists

independentlyofthemind,butitwouldbeimpossibletoknowrealitydirectly

sinceourthoughtsaremediatedbylanguage.Socialconstructioninthissense

doesnotmeanaliteralconstructionofrealitybuttheconstructionofan

understandingofrealitybasedontherelativeneeds,interests,andideologiesof

agivenculture(Boghossian17).Underthistheory,discussionsaboutwhatwe

“know”aremoresodiscussionsaboutthesocial,culturalfactorsthatguideour

beliefs.Consequently,theremaybemultiplewaysof“knowing”reality.The

argumentbecomesaboutknowingthe“objective”characteristicsofanobjectand

notaboutthemetaphysicalexistence—oressence—oftheobject.

Likewithempiricism,thisthesisissympathetictosomerationalistideas—

namelythatlanguageisanintegralpartofunderstandingreality.Similarly,to

claimthatthecharacteristicsofanobjectareunknowableapartfromlanguageis

true,butconstructivistsappeartodiscountthecreationoflanguageasitrelatesto

thosecharacteristicsinreality.Forexample,theideaofscientificmeasurementis

oftencitedasanexampleofsocialconstructioninscience.InEngineering

Writing/WritingEngineering,DorothyA.Winsorexplains,“Textualmediationof

knowledgeisdifficultforengineerstoacceptbecausetheyseemthemselvesas

workingdirectlyonphysicalobjects”(59).Winsorcallsintoquestionthe

18

reliabilityoflabinstrumentsusedbyengineers—liketemperaturegauges—since

theseitemsareprovidingarbitraryunits,derivedbyotherhumans,asameans

of“inscribing”theinformationinauseful,language‑basedform(60).

Again,Winsor’sclaimthatmeasurementsaremadeintermsofsocially

constructedunitsisnotunderdisputebutonlyinthemostarbitraryofways

Randcontends,“Itmakesnodifferencewhetheronemeasureslengthintermsof

feetormeters;thestandardprovidesonlytheformofnotation,notthesubstance

northeresultoftheprocessofmeasuring”(Introduction7).Thatis,specificterms

maybelinguisticallyarbitrary,buttheirreferentisnotmetaphysicallyarbitrary.

Forinstance,thisnecessityoflanguagestilldoesnotdenoteanarbitraryreferent

fortheconcept“atom”sinceitisabstractedfromperceptualknowledge.Though

itisimpossibletopointtoanatomwithoutadditionallyscientificequipment,it

doesnotfollowthattheword“atom”andtheconcept“atom”doesnothavea

concretereferentinreality.3Tostatethisargumentdifferently,wordsare,indeed,

vitalforconceptualizationbutonlybecausetheyallowusawaytoabstractfrom

concretereferencesinanobjectivereality.

3Engineerswouldsimplyneedtoshowtheprogressionofperceptualevidencethatledthemto“atom.”Inthismanner,engineersareshowing“proof”of“atom.”Peikoffdefinesproofas“thederivationofaconclusionfromantecedentknowledge”(8).

19

Thiscounter‑argumenthasimplicationsforconstructivists’definitionof

knowledge.Winsorstates,“Knowledgemaybedefinedasthatwhichmost

peopleinadiscoursecommunityareconvincedof”(60).Winsor’sdefinition

makessensegrantedtheconstructivistviewoflanguageasshapingperception,

butsincelanguagenecessarilyreferstosomethinginrealitythenknowledge

becomesindependentofagreement.Afactofthematterisafactofthematter

whetherornotpeopleareconvincedofit.Alawofphysics,forexample,either

appliestorealityoritdoesnot.Planesdonotflybecauseweagreeonthe

principlesofaerodynamics;weagreeontheprinciplesofaerodynamicsbecause

planesfly.Knowledgeisnecessarilyanintegrationofconceptsbasedon

perceptualdata(Rand,Introduction35).

Inordertohypothesizeatheoryofvisualargumentthathasabasisin

realityanddefinitestandardsfordeterminingvalidity,itseemsproblematicto

relyonconceptualtheoryalone.What,then,aresomealternativesfor

understandingvisualargumentationifnotthroughperceptualorconceptual

theoriesindependently?4

4Iwishtoreiteratethatitisnotmyintenttoinvalidatethesetheoriesoutright.Eachepistemologicaltheoryprovidesasubstantialcontributiontothefieldsofphilosophyandrhetoricandholdsexplanatorypowerfornuancedaspectsofvisualrhetoricsandevenforsomeaspectsofvisualargument.Indeed,whatIcontendisthatnoperceptualorconceptualtheoryisfullyadequatetoexplainandprovideamethodologyortheoryforvisualarguments.

20

Onewayofbridgingtheperception/conceptiongap

Aswithmanydichotomies,theperception/conceptionsplitonlyleaves

philosophersandrhetoricianswithmorequestions.Separately,theyprovide

importantpiecestoacomplexpuzzle,butitwilltakeadifferentapproachto

constructandcomprehendthegreaterpicture.Giventhesetwoepistemological

theoriesasindividualentities,itseemsasifwe’reforcedtoconcedethatsensory

experienceistheonlyepistemicfacultyorthatthesensesareinvalidorthatall

constructedconceptsholdequalvalidity.Oneapproachforvisualargument

theoryistoexploredifferentwaysofbridgingthegapbetweenourperception

andconceptionofrealityasmanyphilosophieshaveattemptedtodo.The

methodexaminedherepresentsjustonemorealternativeforexamining

connectionsbetweenempiricismandrationalism.

Dondisseemstohaveanticipatedtheproblemofbridgingperceptionand

conceptionforvisualscholars.Shewrites,“Inthepursuitofvisualliteracywe

mustconcernourselveswith…thestructuralforcesthatexistintheinteractive

relationshipbetweenthevisualstimuliandthehumanorganismfunctionally,

bothphysicallyandpsychologically;thecharacterofthevisualelements;andthe

formingpowerofthetechniques”(17).Dondisasksscholarstoconcern

themselvesbothwithreality—theexternal“stimuli”thatareperceivedbythe

21

sensoryorgans—andwiththehumanmind—intermsofpsychologicaland

conceptual“techniques.”ItseemstomethatDondismakesagoodpoint.

Meaningmakingdoesnotoccurindependentlyoneithertheperceptualor

conceptuallevel.Knowingrealityisnecessarilyinterplaybetweenthesensesand

themind.Peikoffexplainsthisprincipleusingthenotionofcolor.Hewrites:

Suchaquality…isnotadreamorhallucination;itisnot“inthe

mind”apartfromtheobject;itisman’sformofgraspingtheobject.

Noristhequality“intheobject”apartfromman;itisman’sformof

graspingtheobject.[…]Sinceitistheproductofan

interaction…betweentwoentities,objectandapparatus,itcannot

beidentifiedexclusivelywitheither.(46)

Thisconceptof“object‑as‑perceived”supportstheprincipleoftabularasa—that

humansarebornwithoutaprioriknowledge—and,therefore,doesnotfallvictim

tothecounter‑argumentsagainstconceptualtheory.Theobject‑as‑perceived

conceptrecognizesthatthehumanfacultyofperceptiondoesnotpresuppose

conceptualknowledgejustasthehumanfacultyofconceptiondoesnot

presupposeknowledgeofperceptualknowledge.Inheressay,“KantVersus

Sullivan,”Randwrites,“Conceptsaretheproductsofamentalprocessthat

integratesandorganizestheevidenceprovidedbyman’ssenses”(121).But,at

22

thesametime,wehavethecapacitytoknowrealitythroughabstraction,the

abilitygiventousbyourrationalfaculties(Peikoff48).Randexplainsthis

processandinheressay,“TheObjectivstEthics.”Itseemsimportanttoquoteher

atsomelength:

Man’ssenseorgansfunctionautomatically;man’sbrainintegrates

hissensedataintoperceptsautomatically;buttheprocessof

integratingperceptsintoconcepts—theprocessofabstractionand

ofconcept‑formation—isnotautomatic.

Theprocessofconcept‑formation…consistsofamethodofusing

one’sconsciousness,bestdesignatedbytheterm

“conceptualizing.”Itisnotapassivestateofregisteringrandom

impressions.Itisanactivelysustainedprocessofidentifyingone’s

impressionsinconceptualterms,ofintegratingeveryeventand

everyobservationintoaconceptualcontext,ofgrasping

relationships,differences,similaritiesinone’sperceptualmaterial

andofabstractingthemintonewconcepts,ofdrawinginferences,

ofmakingdeductions,ofreachingconclusions,ofaskingnew

questionsanddiscoveringnewanswersandexpandingone’s

23

knowledgeintoanever‑growingsum.Thefacultythatdirectsthis

process,thefacultythatworksbymeansofconcepts,is:reason.

Theprocessisthinking.(20)

Randbestdemonstratestheobject‑as‑perceivedprinciple—known

hereafteras“objective”5theory—andtheprocessofconceptformationbyciting

thecognitivedevelopmentofHelenKeller,awomanbornblind,deaf,andmute.

Randpointsout,inherargumentagainstFeyerabend’sfamousarticle,that

knowledgedidnotjust“enter”Keller’smindapartfromhersenses.Kellercould

notfunctiononthemostbasiclevel,letalonedevelopenoughtheoretical

knowledgetoabstractscience(“KantVersusSullivan”123).Onlybylearningto

connectthephysicalsensationoftouchingwatertotheconceptofwater—

throughlettersdrawnonherhand—wasKellerabletosuccessfullyabstract

otherconceptsandeventuallylearntocommunicate(“KantVersusSullivan”

124).Itwasnecessarilytheinteractionofrealityandlanguage,sensesandreason,

perceptionandconceptionthatallowedKellertounderstandherselfandthe

world.Theintegrationofthesensoryexperienceoftouchingwaterandthe

abstractconceptof“water”ledKellertoknowledge.Neitherperceptionalone

norconceptionalonegaveherawayknowingreality. 5Unlessotherwiseexplicitlystated,throughoutthisthesistheterm“objective”inquotesreferstothealternativeepistemologyphilosophyandmethodologybeingdiscussedinthissection.

24

Thepurposeofthisthesis

Leonardo’sparagone,towhichMitchellreferred,wasbetweenpainting

andpoetry,thequestionofwhichmediumbetterpresentedreality.Theparagone

modernrhetoriciansfacehasanewname—textversusimage—butrepresentsa

similar“dilemma”withstakesequallyashigh.Consequently,visualargument

presentsaparticularlydifficultchallengeforvisualrhetoricians.Though

rhetoricianstypicallyacceptthatvisualsareargumentative—theword

“argument”beingequivalentwith“persuasion”—philosophers,logicians,and

argumentscholarsgenerallyseeargumentasatext‑onlyphenomenon.

Therefore,thisthesishopestoservetwomainpurposes.Foremost,Ihope

toelevatethestatusofvisualargumentsbyshowingthatargumentationin

imagesoccursinasimilarmannertotext.Thispointshould,consequently,ease

theunnecessaryandwideninggapbetweenargumentandpersuasion—i.e.,logic

andemotion,philosophyandrhetoric.Additionally,Iwanttoshowthatexisting

rhetoricalprinciplestraditionallyreservedfortextualcommunicationcanplaya

valuableroleinunderstandingvisualcommunication—especially

argumentation—ifexaminedthroughan“objective”lenslikethealternative

philosophysuggestedherein.Bycombiningthisepistemologicalapproachwith

classicalrhetoric,Ihopetoprovideonemorepossiblemethodologyfor

25

explaininghowimagesmightmakesarguments.Thisattemptismywayof

showingthepositiveeffectsofintegratingdifferentdisciplines,revisitingsub‑

genreswithinonefield,andexploringnewusesforexistingtheoriesand

practicesinvisualcommunication.

Structureandorganization

Thenextchapterevaluatesimportantliteratureonvisualcommunication,

focusingonexistingperceptualandconceptualtheoriesofmeaningmaking.

Additionally,Ireviewtheargument/persuasiondebateinanattempttoreconcile

thetwoandeventuallydiscussthemajorargumentsaboutvisual

communication.Myliteraturereviewendswithadiscussionofthenecessary

criteriaforanimagetobeconsideredargumentative.

Fromthosecriteria,Imoveontodiscusstheclassicalrhetoricalprinciples

oftopoiandfiguresofspeechhistoricallyandhowtheycanbeusedasmodern,

“objective”methodologicaltoolsforanalyzingvisualarguments.Anapplied

analysisfollowsthissectionwithimplicationsandacallforfutureempiricaland

theoreticalresearchtobringperceptionandconceptionschoolsclosertogetherin

thefieldofvisualcommunication.

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CHAPTERTWO

Paintingthecompletepicture:Areviewofrelevantliterature

Thereissomuchtobesaidaboutvisualrhetorics,visualcommunication,

andvisualargumentationthatitseemsalmostimpossibletobeginwriting—to

findanadequatestartingpointamonganearlyinfinitepaletteofrelevantand

importantliterature.PerhapsmoreimportantthanwhereorwithwhomIstartis

howIstart.Thecommondenominatorofvisualrhetorics,visualcommunication,

andvisualargumentseemssimplytobethevisualelement.Letmebegin,then,

withadefinitionof“image”andwhatitmeans“toimage.”

Definingimage:Awordisworth1000images(orviceversa)

TensofthousandsofyearsbeforetheinventionofPHOTOSHOP,ink,or

evenpaper,humanswithwhomyouorIwouldhaveseeminglylittleincommon

cautiouslyenteredwhatwenowcallChauvetCaveintheArdèchevalleyin

SouthernFrance.Figure1onthenextpageshowsoneofthehundredsofcave

paintingsfromChauvet—aprideoflionshuntingbison.Radiocarbondating

estimatestheoriginofsomeoftheoldestpaintingsaround30,000B.C.withmore

27

developingoverthenext5,000years(Clottes).TheChauvetpaintings

demonstrateaseeminglyremarkableunderstandingofcompositionaltechnique.

Iimaginetheartistobservingthefascinatingritualofthelionessesmeticulously

stalkingthensavagelyevisceratingtheirbisonprey.

Theartist(s)mayhavebeenfascinatedbytheviolence,deeplysaddened

byarealizationofthefleetingnatureoflife,oranynumberofmotivatingfactors.

Regardless,heorshetooksome“interest”intheevent,enough,infact,tocreate

acatalystforhispainting.GuntherKressandTheovanLeeuwencontendin

Figure1–ApaintingfromtheChauvetCaveintheArdèchevalleyinSouthernFrance.Itisestimatedtooriginatefromroughly30,000B.C.

28

ReadingImages:TheGrammarofVisualDesignthat“interestisthesourceofthe

selectionofwhatisseenasthecriterialaspectoftheobject,andthiscriterial

aspectisthenregardedasadequatelyrepresentativeoftheobjectinagiven

context”(7).Inotherwords,theartistcouldnotrecreatetheoccurrencequa

occurrence.Heorshecouldonlyshareitbyoral,aural,orvisual“imaging.”

KressandvanLeeuwenexplain,“Communicationrequiresthatparticipants

maketheirmessagesmaximallyunderstandableinaparticularcontext.They

thereforechooseformsofexpressionwhichtheybelievetobemaximally

transparenttootherparticipants”(13).Beforetheartistdecidedonaninterest,he

orshehadtoperformoneofthemostbasichumanactions:perception.

“Primarily,theactofseeinginvolvesaresponsetolight,”writesDondis.

“Whatlightrevealsandoffersusisthesubstancebywhichmanfashionsand

deviseswhatherecognizesandidentifiesintheenvironment,namelyallthe

othervisualelements:line,color,shape,direction,texture,scale,dimension,

motion”(21).Theseelementsarethepalettefromwhichtheartistchooseshisor

her“representation”—thatis,thechoiceofwordsandimagesused“to

understand,describe,anddefinetheworldasweseeit”(SturkenandCartwright

12).Bywhatmeansdoestheartistchooseinterest?Andhowdoesheorshe

develop,conjure,find,orotherwiseinvoke/evokeelementstofulfillthechosen

29

representation?Herewefindourselvesbackatthedebateofperceptionversus

conception.Let’snowexaminehowvisualscholarshaveansweredthequestion:

Bywhatmeansdowecreatevisualmessagesand,ultimately,visualarguments?

Perceptualtheoriesofvisualcommunication

Generallyspeaking,perceptualtheorists6tendtofocusmainlyonthe

appliedartofvisualrhetorics.Thatis,theyencompasswhatIwouldcalla

“handbooktradition”ofmeaningmaking.Theyoftenconcernthemselveswith

graphicdesign—print,web,video—anddonotwriteheavilytheoreticalworks.

Theirbooksandarticlesareoftenfilledwithanalyticalbreakdownsofimages’

“parts,”attemptingtoexplainhowcertainlinesdictatecertainmeaningsorhow

colorscorrespondwithemotions.Perceptualtheoriststendtoarguethatby

memorizingthecomponentsofvisualdesign,thereaderalsosynthesizesthe

abilitytocommunicatewiththosecomponents.Nonetheless,whetherthese

theoristsclaimtofindmeaninginlines,shapes,orcompositionalrelationship,

theyfinditintheperceived.

6IshouldclarifytheworksIaddressinthefollowingsectionsshouldnotbeconsideredexhaustiveexamplesoftheirrepresentativescholar’swork.EllenLupton,forinstance,haswrittenmanytheoreticalworksworthyofconsiderationthatIsimplydidnothavethetimeorspacetoinclude.Generallyspeaking,Iincludedmoremethodologicaltextsif,likeLupton,theauthor’sepistemologicalphilosophywasalreadydiscussedviaotherauthorsinthefirstchapter.

30

JimKrause,forinstance,contendsthatallgraphicdesignismadeupof

components,composition,andconcept.Components,hesays,aretheelementsof

design.Theyincludeicons,photographs,type,textures,backgrounds,and

shapes(Krause10).Composition,then,isthearrangementofsuchelements,and

conceptisthe“theme”ormessageoftheoveralldesign(10).Therestofhisbook,

DesignBasicsIndex,isdedicatedtoexplainingthethreepartsandhowthey

communicate.Similarly,RobinWilliams,authorofTheNon‑Designer’sDesign

Book,explainshowthedesignprinciplesofcontrast,repetition,alignment,and

proximitycanevokevisualpathos,relationships,ethos,andunityrespectively

(13).KrauseandWilliams’sargumentis,essentially,thatprinciplesand

componentshaveinherentmeaningthattheviewercomprehendsthroughthe

actofseeing—andthattheseprinciplesandcomponentscanbeeasilytaught.

PaulZelanskiandMaryPatFisher,bothprolificauthorsofdesigntheory,

addresstherhetoricalnatureofdesigncomponentsintheirbook,Design

PrinciplesandProblems.Forinstance,theywrite,“Thewayalineisdrawnout

fromapointgiveitacertaincharacter,auniqueexpressivequality”(62).They

continue,displayingdrawingsofseveraltypesoflinesandassociatingthestroke

withanemotionalresponse—horizontalmeanscalmness,widemeansbold,etc.

(63).Laterinthebook,theyexaminehowvalue—thedegreeoflightnessor

31

darknessonasurface(189)—canhaveanemotionalaffectontheviewer.Light

value,accordingtoZelanskiandFisher,evokefeelingsofhappinesswhileblack

isnormallyassociatedwithsadness(209–211).Infact,theyhavesomuchtosay

aboutcoloringeneralthattheydedicateanentirebook,Color,tothediscussion

ofthatonecomponent.Theywrite,“Colorisperhapsthemostpowerfultoolat

theartist’sdisposal.Itaffectsouremotionsbeyondthoughtandcanconveyany

mood,fromdelighttodespair.Itcanbesubtleordramatic,captureattentionor

stimulatedesire”(11).Theauthorschallengethereaderstolearnabouttheuses

ofcolorthroughexperience,nothingthatanexactsciencemaybeimpossiblebut

thatthebestcoloreducationcomesfromperceivinghowcolorsworkinmany

differentimages(13).

Typography,too,servesasacrucialcomponentinrecentvisualdesign

theories.InThinkingwithType,forinstance,EllenLuptonprovidesadetailed

accountofeffectivetypography,addressingissuesofstructureaswellas

concept.Interestingly,shedefendstheimportanceoftypographyandtextby

diminishingthecommunicativenatureofothervisuals.Shewrites,“Textcan

oftenprovideamorespecificandunderstandablecuethanapicture.Iconsdon’t

actuallysimplifytranslationofcontentintomultiplelanguages,becausethey

requireexplanationinmultiplelanguages”(74).Nonetheless,shesomewhat

32

redeemsthepowerofvisuals—inconjunctionwithtext—inalaterchapter,

stating:

Universaldesignsystemscannolongerbedismissedasthe

irrelevantmusingsofasmall,localizeddesigncommunity.A

secondmodernismhasemerged,reinvigoratingtheutopiansearch

foruniversalformsthatmarkedthebirthofdesignasadiscourse

andadisciplinenearlyacenturyearlier.(134)

Luptonrefers,perhaps,toinformationdesignscholarslikeEdwardTufte,

WilliamLidwell,KritinaHolden,JillButler,JimKrause,PaulZelanski,andMary

PatFisherallofwhombelievethatprinciplesofdesign,aswellastheir

communicativeabilities,cantranscendtimeandculturalboundaries(Tufte;

Lidwelletal.;Krause;ZelanskiandFisher).

KevinLaGrandeurtakesamuchdifferentapproachinhisessay,onethat

nearstheboundariesofperceptualtheory.Headvocatesforaclassical

interpretationofimagesinhisessay,“DigitalImagesandClassicalPersuasion,”

arguingthat“classicalnotionsprovideuswithexcellent,codifiedwaystothink

aboutthepersuasiveefficacyofimagesandwordsasinterdependentand

interactivethings”(119).Hethenusestheconceptsofethos,pathos,andlogosto

evaluativethepersuasiveimpactofdigitalimages(125).Histheoryisperceptual

33

sinceitfindsrhetoricalmeaningintheimage—bymeansofAristotelian

appeals—butthemeaningLaGrandeursuggestsismuchmorecomplexthanthe

meaningsuggestedbyKrause,Williams,etc.

Itseemsmuchmoredifficultto“find”anemotionlikeloveready‑madein

avisualargument,anditalmostseemscounter‑intuitivesinceloveisan

emotionalrelationshipbetweentwopeople.Howcouldthatspecificrelationship

beintheimage?Unlessauthorshavespecificcontextforeachoftheirviewers,it

seemsimpossiblethatimagescouldcommunicatecomplexrelationalmessages

suchastheonessuggestedbyLaGrandeur.Hereweseetheproblemwith

perceptualtheoriesforvisualargumentation:complexityanduniversality.

Intermsofvisualargumentation,itwouldbeimpossibleforapurely

perceptualtheorytoaccountforthenumberofnuancedelementsthatcould

affectthepremisesandconclusions.Additionally,itseemsunproductiveto

dismisscontextualinfluences—betheysocietal,cultural,personal,or

physiological—forthesakeofuniversality.7Theseissuesbothposeproblemsfor

possiblecriteriaforvisualargument.How,then,dorhetoricaltheoristsaccount

7Idonothaveenoughspacetoexplorethequestion,“Isuniversalvisualcommunicationpossible?”Forthesakeofmythesis,Isimplyacknowledgethatgiventheproblemswithbothperceptualandconceptualtheories,itisatleastimpracticaltoargueforuniversalvisualcommunicationatthistime.Formorein‑depthexaminationsofthisissue,IwouldsuggestCharlesKostelnick’sarticle“CulturalAdaptationandInformationDesign:TwoContrastingViews”andEdwardTufte’sbookEnvisioningInformation.

34

fortheimportantroleofcontextinvisualcommunicationandargumentation?

Manytheoristswhohaveshiedawayfromanysortofnaïverealismhaveturned

tosomesortofconceptualtheoryinhopesthatrationalismcanproperlyexplain

howweobtainor,rather,createmeaninginimages.

Conceptualtheoriesofvisualcommunication

Inresponsetotheproblemsofperceptualtheory,visualconceptualists

haveattemptedtodemonstratethatmeaningcomesfromsomewhereotherthan

theperceivedimage.Anincreasingbodyofliteraturesuggeststhatmeaning

comesfromthesocialconstructionsofvariousgroupsandcultures.Forthese

scholars,meaningandknowledgeisdeterminedbyconsensusratherthanby

strictrationalityoradherencetologicalrules.Onmorerareoccasions,conceptual

visualtheoriescontendthatmeaningcomesfromtheindividual,stemmingfrom

eachperson’suniquelifeexperiences.Regardless,conceptualtheoryholdsthat

meaning—whetherindividualorsocial—isappliedtoanimageratherthantaken

fromanimage.

CaraA.Finnegan,forexample,notesthe“naturalisticenthymeme”

presentedbyphotographsandinterpretedbyviewers(Finnegan135).Finnegan

usestheclassicalrhetoricalconceptofenthymemetoanalyzephotographs’

35

argumentativepotential.Shecontendsthatphotographsrequiretheviewerto

“fillintheblanks”aboutthreearguments:thattherepresentationoftheworldis

real,thattheeventinthepictureisoccurringinfrontofthecameraduringa

specifictimeataspecificplace,andthatthephotographerhasnotinterfered

withcapturedimage(143).

In“FromAnalysistoDesign:VisualCommunicationintheTeachingof

Writing,”DianaGeorgediscussesthedisconnectbetweenvisualcommunication

andeducation.Shedoessobyexamininganassignmentinwhichherstudents

wereaskedtomakeavisualargumentinresponsetoAdamHochschild’sKing

Leopold’sGhost,anovelaboutcolonialAfrica(George11‑12).Throughher

examination,shehopestoaddresswhatsheseesasthesubjugationofvisual

rhetoricasan“attendanttotheverbal”andbringmorevisualcommunication,as

itsownliteracy,totheclassroom(13‑14).Bydoingso,Georgeassertsthatwe

makevisualmeaningsimilartothewaywemaketextualmeaning—andthatit

waseasierforstudentstounderstandvisualargumentbyrelatingittotext.To

explainherdefinitionofvisualargument,shecallsontheideaofvisualparody:

“Visualparody,likeverbalparody,doesmakeanovertclaim,assertion,or

propositionthatdrawsparticularlyoncomparison,juxtaposition,and

intertextualitytooffertheassertiontoanaudienceforacceptance”(29).

36

Nonetheless,visualarguments,shecontends,donotnecessarilyhavetobe

parody.Shenotes,likeBlair,thatmanyvisualscanassertapointandsupport

thatpointwithvisualreasons(29).Inwhatseemstobeaslightconcessionto

Blair,Georgeacknowledgesthatvisualargumentsmustbeprimarilyvisual,

thoughshedoesnotwanttoruleoutthepossibilityofincludingtext(30).

EvaR.BrumbergerwroteaseriesofarticlesforTechnicalCommunication

thatdealtdirectlywiththeargumentativenatureoftypography.In“ThePersona

ofTypefaceandText,”shestudiesexactlywhatthetitlesuggests,the

personalitiesattributedtoparticularpassagesoftextandhowthosepersonalities

areaffectedbycompetingfontpersonalities.Sheconcludesthatheranalytical,

experimentalstudyoftherhetoricalimpactoftypographyshowsadirect

correlationbetweenfontandpersonaandtextandpersona,thoughshenotes

thatthisparticularstudysimplysetsuparticlestocome(Brumberger221).

Indeed,herstudyof“TheAwarenessandImpactofTypefaceAppropriateness”

contends,“Participantsinthestudyhadstrongopinionsaboutthe

appropriatenessofparticulartypefacesforparticulartextpassages,andthey

wereawareoftypefacetextmismatches”(“Appropriateness”230).Sheconcludes

inherfinalarticle,“EffectsonReadingTime,ReadingComprehension,and

PerceptionsofEthos,”thatherstudiesseemtosuggestastronginteraction

37

betweenthereaderandthetypographicalpersonalityexudedbyanindividual

font.Thisexchange,shewrites,isnotabsolute.Thatis,typewillnotconsistently

representthesamepersona.Instead,likemostvisuals,typographymustbe

consideredwithintextualandargumentativecontext(“Effects”22).

CharlesKostelnickandMichaelHassett,inShapingInformation,contend

thatsuchrhetoricalcontextscomefromwhattheycall“socialconventions”They

write,“Weinterpretdesignwithouraccumulatedknowledgeofconventional

forms…andwedrawontheseexperiencestointerpretnewforms(12).Theygo

ontocontendthatwe,asvisualcommunicators,relyheavilyonsocialcodesand

socialgroupstohelpusdeterminethemeaningofourimages—likethe

specializedlanguageofacardiologistversusabrainsurgeon(30‑31).

InReadingImages:TheGrammarofVisualDesign,GuntherKressandTheo

vanLeeuwenattempttoreconcileavisualgrammarwithconceptualisttheory.

Theycontendthatmeaningcomesfrominterpretingtheperceivedthroughthe

lensofyourculturalexperienceandideologies.Theywrite:

Visualstructuresdonotsimplyreproducethestructuresof

“reality”.Onthecontrary,theyproduceimagesofrealitywhichare

boundupwiththeinterestsofthesocialinstitutionswithinwhich

theimagesareproduced,circulatedandread.(44)

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Althoughthistheorymaycomeclosetoabridgebetweenconceptionand

perception,itdoesnotseementirelyadequatebecauseitputsideological

conditionsonthesenses.Sensescannotbeideologicalaccordingtothe

“objective”theoryarguedforinthisthesis.Theyareneutralfacultiesthatdeliver

theeffectsofobjectsonahuman’sbodytohisorherbrainforconceptualization

(Peikoff47).

Conceptualtheory,likeitsperceptualcounterpart,providesanumberof

interestingandusefulwaysoflookingatvisualcommunication—especially

whenweconsiderhowdifferingandsometimesoppressiveideologiesinfluence

ourunderstandingofvisualculture.Butconceptualtheorycannotgiveusan

adequatemethodologyforexaminingandexplainingvisualargumentanymore

thanperceptualtheory.Conceptualtheoryseemstoaskustobackgroundwhat

weseeinfavorofwhatwefeel,think,construct,orgenerallyagreeupon.It

assertsthatourperceptionsarelesshelpfulindeterminingthemeaningofa

visualmessagebecauseitdownplaysthevalidityofperception.EvenKressand

vanLeeuwen,whosetheoryseemsclosesttoaworkingbridgebetween

perceptionandconception,maketheargumentthatarerepresentationsare

necessarilyinfluencedbyideology(47).Forconceptualtheorists,theactof

39

perceivingisnotapassiveprocessdirectedbyourconsciousness.Instead,itis

theactoffilteringinformationthroughthelensesofideology.

Itseemsthatconceptualtheoryonitsownmaynotprovideanadequate

startingplacetodeterminevisualarguments.Usingconceptualtheory,itwould

beimpossibletoactuallydetermineameaningfulargument.The

“argumentative”imagecould,infact,haveanunlimitednumberofpremises

andconclusionssinceitsargumentisbasednotonanyconnectionwithwhatis

actuallyperceivedbutonwhattheindividualorthesocietyagreesisperceived.

Thisapproachwouldleadtoanynumberof“arguments”imposedonanimage

andwouldrequirethatweacceptallasvalid—therebyeliminatingany

meaningfulappealstologos.

Definingargumentandpersuasion

Thislastpointbegsthequestion:Ofwhatimportanceislogostoan

argument?Subsequently,canimagesbeargumentswithoutlogic?Itnow

appearsthattheperception/conceptiondichotomynecessarilycreatesan

argumentversuspersuasiondebate.Ifthereisonlydirectexperiential

knowledge,thenhumansshouldonlyconcernthemselveswithfacts,statistics,

andlogicalappeals.Contrarily,ifknowledgeonlyoriginatesfromwithinan

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individualorgroup,thenthereisnotruthexceptwhatweconvinceotherpeople

of—throughthemostexpedientmeasuresavailable.Itbecomesimperativethat

thisdebatereceivesattentionifthereisanyhopeofreconcilingit—with

“objective”theoryorotherwise—orignoringit.Considerthishypotheticalasa

startingpointfordiscussingthedifferencesbetweenargumentandpersuasion:

Whileleisurelywalkingtowork,astrangeraccostsyouandasksfor

money.“Mycarjustbrokedown,”hesays,pointingtoanearbyparkinglot.“I

needtwoquartersforthepayphone.Canyousparesomechange?”Whetheror

notyouprovidehimwithfiftycents,yourecognizethathisappealislogically

constructed.Youapologizeandwalkaway.Hepleads,“Iwasjustonmyway

frompickingmydaughterupfromthehospital,andIforgotmywalletathome.

Please,ifyoucouldjustsparefiftycents,mywife,daughter,andIwouldbe

grateful.”Havingnoticedthathisappealtologosdidnotsucceed,thestranger

makesanappealtoethosbyshowingthatheisacaringfatherand,

simultaneously,appealstopathos.Reluctantly,yougiveinandhandthestranger

twoquarters,persuadedbyhistrifectaofrhetoricaltactics.

Butwerehisappealstoethos,pathos,andlogosarguments?Certainly,his

originallogicalappealwasargumentative,atleastinthetraditionalsense.He

presentedpremises,aconclusion,andgaveyoutheopportunitytorefuteor

41

outrightrejecthisclaim.Butwerehisadditionalappealsargumentativeorjust

persuasive?Isthereadifference?

Letmefurtherillustratethepointbyamendingthehypotheticalsituation.

Insteadofgivingthestrangerfiftycents,youagainrejecthisplea.Thistime,

insteadofpresentingmorediscourse,themanpullsoutagunanddemandsthat

youhandoveryourwallet.Fearfulforyourlife,yougivethemanyourwallet

andheleaveswithoutharmingyou.Inthisamendedinstance,Ibelieveitisfair

tosaythatyouwerepersuadedtosurrenderyourwalletnotbyanargumentbut

bypsychologicalforce.Themandidnotharmyou,butwecanonlyassumethat

hewouldhaveifyouhadnotcomplied.

Thisscenariomakesitdifficulttodenythatthereseemtobedifferences

betweenargumentandpersuasion.Inordertounderstandandreconcilethose

differences,it’simportanttofirstexaminetheformalcriteriafortraditional

argumentation.Knowingwhatargumentispresentsabettersenseofwhat

argumentisnot.InArguingWell,JohnShandcontends,simply,thatanargument

iscomprisedofreasonsforabelief(conclusion)derivedfrompremises(9).D.Q.

McInerywouldconcur,breakingargumentsdownintotwoimportantelements:

premisesandconclusions(47).Finally,inthisintroductionhisbook,ARulebook

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forArguments,AnthonyWestonclarifiesthatargumentsdonotmerelystatefacts.

“Argumentsareattemptstosupportcertainviewswithreason,”hewrites(xi).

J.AnthonyBlair,ananalyticphilosopher,providesoneofthefirstmajor

discussionsofvisualargumentsin“Thepossibilityandactualityofvisual

arguments”bydefiningtraditionalargumentsandaskingifvisualarguments

satisfythecriteria.Hisdiscussionoftraditionalargumentativecriteriaprovides

aninterestingclarificationfordifferentiatingbetweenargumentandpersuasion.

ParaphrasingD.J.O’Keefe,argumentationscholar,Blairsaysthat“forsomething

tocountasanargument,wehavetobeabletosaywhattheclaimisandwhat

thereasonsare,andwehavetobeabletosaysoclearlyenoughthattheclaimsor

reasonscanbeacceptedorrejected”(347).EvenusingBlair’sdefinition,the

armedrobberyscenariosatisfiesthefirsttwocriteriaifweunderstandthegunas

enthymeme.Theclaimisovertlystatedbytherobber—“handoveryour

wallet”—andthepremisesseemclear(thoughnotovertlystated):Ifyoudon’t

handoveryourwallet,Iwillkillyouand“beingdead”isnotadesirablestateof

being.

Nonetheless,accountingforBlair’sthirdcriterionseemsimpossible

consideringtheconsequencesfornotcomplyingwiththerobber.Certainly,you

are“free”torejecttheclaiminthesamesensethatyouare“free”toassassinate

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thepresidentorstealacarorrunaredlight.Theconsequenceforrejectingthe

claiminthissituation,though,mayleadtotheendoffuturefreechoices.Inthat

sense,itseemsthatmostphilosophicalschools—except,perhaps,some

existentialsects—wouldsaythatyouarenotfreetorejecttheclaimsincedoing

socouldpotentiallyendyourfreedom—anddoingsowouldbedetrimentalto

yourselfinterest.

Blair’sthirdcriterionis,infact,thecruxofalmostmostargumentative

scholarship,anditremainsacontentiouspointintherhetoricalcommunity—as

itshouldbe.Thenecessityoffreechoiceinargumentcallsintoquestiontwoof

thethreerhetoricalappealsasargumentativedevices:ethosandpathos.Mindyou,

itisnotjustargumentationscholarsandphilosophersthatpointtotheproblems

withethosandpathos,thoughtheydotheirfairshare.Rhetoriciansattemptingto

definepersuasionhavedoneanexcellentjobatstirringupcontroversy

themselves.

CharlesHill,citingChaimPerelmanandLucieOlbrechts‑Tyteca,argues

thattheultimategoalofarhetoristofilltheconsciousnessofanaudience

member,pushingotherargumentsalmostliterallyoutofthemind(29).Hill

writes:

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Therhetor’shopeisthat[rhetoricalpresence]willpromptthe

audiencememberstoaccepthisorherclaimbasedononeortwo

piecesofpowerful,vividevidence,andnotstoptothinkabout

issuessuchastherelevanceoractualimportanceoftheevidence,

oraboutwhatotherargumentsandopinionsshouldbebrought

intotheequationandweightedbeforemakingadecision.(29)

Hill’sdefinitionleaveslittleroomforfreechoiceonpurpose.Ithaslongbeen

generallyconsideredthatsomefeelings,especiallyemotions,arejusttoo

powerfultoovercomebyreasonedthought.Logiciansevenconsiderappealsto

emotionandappealstopopularity—amongotherassociatedappeals—tobe

logicalfallacies,inadequateforrationaldebate.

Itisnotastretchorevenmuchofaconcessiontosaythatrhetorical

appeals—logosincluded—aresometimesusedtonefariousends.More

importantly,rhetoriciansshouldbeforthcomingaboutdistinguishinggood

persuasionfrombad—especiallytoprevent“weaponsintothehandsof

madmen”(Cicero45).Ifweconcedethisminorpoint—thatrhetoriccanbeused

tosubvertlogicinsteadofsupportorworkalongsideit—thenwehave

effectivelyansweredamajorcritiquewhilesimultaneouslydistinguishing

persuasionfromargumentationandpersuasionfrom“bad”persuasion.Idonot

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wishtointroduceanewtermheresinceIbelievethereisaconceptthatbest

representswhatImeanby“bad”persuasion:propaganda.Specifically,Ireferto

AnthonyPratkanisandElliotAronson’sdefinition,whichexactlymirrorsthe

thoughtsIhadabout“bad”persuasion.InAgeofPropaganda:TheEverydayUse

andAbuseofPersuasion,theywrite:

Thewordpropagandahassinceevolvedtomeanmass

“suggestion”or“influence”throughthemanipulationofsymbols

andthepsychologyoftheindividual.Propagandainvolvesthe

dexteroususeofimages,slogans,andsymbolsthatplayonour

prejudicesandemotions;itisthecommunicationofapointofview

withtheultimategoalofhavingtherecipientoftheappealcometo

“voluntarily”acceptthepositionasifitwerehisown.(Aronson

andPratkanis11)

Inotherwords,theviewerisnotnecessarilypersuadedbythelogical

reasoning—which,ifanyexists,isoftenbasedonfallaciousfacts—orbynon‑

deceitfulappealstoemotionandcharacter.Itispersuasionbypurposeful

manipulation.

Thereseems,then,tobeadistinctdifferencebetweenwhatImaycall

“argument”andwhatImaycall“persuasion.”Butthisdistinctiondoesnot

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requireadichotomy.Havingargumentandpersuasiondonotmakeeither

categorymutuallyexclusive.Forthesakeofthisexamination,itwasimportantto

notethatthedifferenceexistsandaddressasimplewaytoeasethetension

betweenthem.Itseemsthatvisualscancommunicatepersuasively—whichwas

notsomethingunderdebatebutimportanttonotenonetheless—but,usingthe

strictestdefinitions,canvisualscommunicateasarguments?Severalscholars

haveattemptedtoanswerthisquestionfrommanydifferentperspectives.

Definingvisualargument

Ibegin,again,withJ.AnthonyBlairandhistreatmentofvisual

arguments.Blairfirstwondersifvisualscanmakeargumentsinthetraditional

senseoftheterm.Heponders,“Byanalogy,knowingwhatasymphonyistells

usthatsymphoniesareauditory,notvisual;soa‘visualsymphony’mustbea

metaphor.Arevisualargumentslikevisualsymphonies”(Blair345)?Blairclaims

thatvisualarguments,inordertobetrulyvisual,mustbeonlyvisual(347).With

thesetwonecessarycriteria—thatvisualargumentsmustfollowtraditionalrules

ofargumentwhileremainingcompletelyvisual—Blairadmits,withwhatseems

toberesistance,thatvisualargumentsarepossiblethoughnotasprevalentas

scholarspreviouslyexpected(348‑353).

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Furthermore,henotes,“Whatmakesvisualmessagesinfluential…isnot

anyargumentativefunctiontheymayperform,buttheunconscious

identificationstheyinvoke”(357).Hisfinalcaution,onethatseemstobethecrux

ofhisargument,isnottodistinguishanypersuasivedeviceasanargument.

Doingso,hesays,relegatesalmostanymind‑changingacttothecategoryof

argument—e.g.brainwashing,behaviormodificationviasurgery,etc.(359).He

concludes:

ThemainpointthatIdrawfromthesereflectionsisthatvisual

argumentsarenotdistinctinessencefromverbalarguments.The

argumentisalwaysapropositionalentity,merelyexpressed

differentlyinthetwocases.Thereforevisualargumentsarenota

particularlyexcitingconceptualnovelty;theydonotconstitutea

radicallydifferentrealmofargumentation.(362)

Attheendofhisarticle,hedoesconcedethatvisualargumentshave“great

advantages”—emotionalpower,mainly—buttheyare“gainedatthecostofa

lossofclarityandprecision,whichmaynotalwaysbeapriceworthpaying”

(362).Herewesee,again,areturntothenotionthatemotiondoesnotconstitute

argument,areoccurringthemeworthnoting.

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InthesameissueofArgumentationandAdvocacythatcontainsBlair’s

article,DavidFlemingcritiquesvisualargumentsevenmoreharshly,asserting

thatatraditionaldefinitionofargumentdoesnotallowforvisualsatall.For

Fleming,anargumentisnecessarily“reasonable.”Thatis,itmustprovide

evidence(premises)andsupportforaclaim.Itmustalsoberefutable.Images,

claimFleming,cannotsatisfythesecriteria(Fleming).

RandallA.LakeandBarbaraA.PickeringtakeissuewithFleming’s

secondclaim,definingtheproblemofvisualrefutationasoneofpropositions.

Theyarguethatimagescanrefuteinthreeuniqueways:“dissection,inwhichan

imageis‘brokendown’discursively…substitution,inwhichoneimageis

replacedwithinalargervisualframebyadifferentimagewithanopposing

polarity…andtransformation,inwhichanimageisrecontextualizedinanew

visualframe”(emphasisadded)(81–82).WhileLakeandPickering’saccount

doesnot“vindicate”thevisualargument,theirrefutationtheory,alongwith

Blair’sreluctantconcession,providesastartingpointfortheirpossibility.

AdvertisingscholarLindaM.Scottseemsevenmoreoptimisticaboutthe

possibilityofvisualargument.Sheclaimsthatvisuals,inordertobeconsidered

rhetorical,mustinvent,arrange,anddeliveradistinct,symbolicargumentusing

almostunlimitedmeans—oratleastnotlimitedtopurelyvisualdevicesasBlair

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contends(Scott253).Discussingtheimplicationsofthesecharacteristics,she

writes,“Thisnewapproachtovisuals,therefore,wouldrecastpicturesas

informationinsymbolicform—asmessagesthatmustbeprocessedcognitively

bymeansofcomplexcombinationsoflearnedpictorialschemataandthatdonot

necessarilybearananalogytonature”(253).Sheexaminesthreelipstickads—

oneseeminglybasedinreality,onemetaphorical,andoneabstract—and

concludesthattheads,despitetheirdifferencesinapproach,requiretheviewer

tofillinargumentativeandexperientialgaps—animportantobservationthat

providesapossibleanalyticalapproachdiscussedinthenextsection(256).

In“TowardaTheoryofVisualArgument,”DavidS.BirdsellandLeo

GroarkeattempttorefuteBlair’sconcludingremarkthatvisualsarenaturally

ambiguousorlessprecisethantext/speech.AccordingtoBirdsellandGroarke,

visualscanbejustasambiguousastheirverbalandspokencounterparts;

however,theynotethatthe“inherentindeterminacyoflanguage”causesequally

asmanyinterpretiveproblems.Theycitethejudicialinterpretationofhistorical

documentsliketheConstitutionasanexample(BirdsellandGroarke2).

Similarly,theyexaminethesupposedambiguityofvisualargumentonthebasis

ofcontention—thatvisualsdonotmakespecificclaimsand,therefore,remain

ambiguous.Justliketext,theyargue,visualsmaybeinterpretedinmany

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differentwaysonmanydifferentlevels,butthatmakesthemnomore

ambiguousthantraditionalarguments;it’sallaboutcontext(3–7).Finally,the

authorsdealwithBlair’sclaimthatvisualsarenormallymorepersuasivethan

argumentative.UsinganexamplefromBlair’sessay,theywrite:

Theattempttoconvinceadietertoeatapieceofcakebyholdingit

underhisorhernoseisnot,itseems[accordingtoBlair],an

argument.Orisit?Whynottaketheholdingofthecakeinfrontof

thedieter’snosetobeaparticularlyforcefulwayofexpressingthe

argumentthat“Eatingthiscakewouldbewonderful,thereforeyou

shouldforgetyourdietandeatit”?(8)

Ofcourse,BirdsellandGroarkeadmitthattheirintroductioncanneither

adequatelyrefutethecriticismsagainstvisualargumentnorplaceitwithin

appropriatepracticalcontext.Theycallonfuturescholarstodoso(9–10).

Inashortsectionofhisarticle,“BuildingVisualCommunicationTheory

byBorrowingfromRhetoric,”KeithKenney,scholarofphotojournalism,

conciselyexaminesthemajorcritiquesofvisualargumentandprovidesa

counter‑argumentforeach—bycitingrecentscholarshiponthetopic,alotof

whichhasbeendiscussedherein.Whilehisrefutationsareintriguing,forthe

sakeofbrevity,Iwillonlyexaminehisconclusions,whichseemmorepertinent

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tothisdiscussion.Foremost,heclaimsthatvisualsmustgiveusthechoice

betweentwoormorepossibleactions/itemsinordertobeconsidered

argumentative(Kenney326).Furthermore,hewrites,“Visualsmustalso:(1)

providereasonsforchoosingonewayoranother;(2)counterotherarguments,

perhapsviasubstitutionortransformation;and(3)causeustochangeourbeliefs

ortoact”(326).Kenneyoffersthevisualrhetoricscommunityitsfirstlistof

criteriathatseembothplausibleanduniquetovisualarguments.

In“TheRhetoricofVisualArguments,”J.AnthonyBlairupdatesand

significantlychangeshisoriginalcriteriaforvisualarguments.Notably,he

concedesthatvisuals,liketheirverbalandtextualcounterparts,areneither

necessarilyvaguenordevoidoftruthvalue,thetwobiggestcriticismsfromhis

previousessay(“TheRhetoricofVisualArguments”46–47).Additionally,Blair

suggestsaverysimpletesttodetermineifavisualisanargumentormerely

persuasivebysimplyrestatingthesupposedvisualargumentinverbalform(49).

Finally,henotesthatvisualargumentsarenaturallyenthymematic,lettingthe

viewerfillintheargumentativegaps(52).

Takingtheseargumentsintoconsideration,itseemsplausible,ifnot

certain,thatimagescanmakearguments—thoughperhapsnotaseasilyaswe

wouldliketobelieve.Forthesakeofthisexamination,though,it’simportantto

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narrowthecriteriaforwhatconstitutesvisualargumentation.Doingso

necessarilylimitswhatIcancallavisualargument,butitalsohelpsfocusthe

discussion.Forexample,Iconcedethatvisualscommunicateinawidevarietyof

ways—bothtraditionally“persuasive”andtraditionally“argumentative”—but

forthesakeofbrevity,Iwillconcernmyselfonlywiththetraditionally

argumentativeaspects.Thatis,Inarrowmydefinitionofvisualargumentto

includeprimarilyappealstologosintermsofstructureandcontent.Ethosand

pathosmaybeconsideredforcontextualization,butforthemostpartIwillonly

belookingatlogicalstructuring,relationships,andcontent.Withthiscriterionin

mind,Iconsidervisualargumentstohavethefollowingcharacteristics,

developedfromtheargumentationscholarshipalreadypresented:

1. Thevisualmusthavediscernablepremises.

2. Thevisualmusthaveadiscernableconclusion.

3. Thepremisesandconclusionsmayfunctionindependentlyofthetext

orasacounterparttoit.

4. Thepremisesandconclusionsmaybearrangedinanynumberof

ways,but,justliketextualarguments,theymustbeabletobe

reformulatedinawaythatmakeslogicalsense—beitsyllogistically,

enthymematically,orotherwise.

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Understandingthecharacteristicsofvisualargument/persuasion,though

crucial,doesnotnecessarilyprovideuswithamethodologyforanalyzingthe

waysvisualsargue/persuade.It’simperativetounderstandhowimagesmake

meaninginordertounderstandhowtheyargue.Twomethodologicaltoolsthat

havebeenlargelyoverlookedaretopoiandfiguresofspeech—rhetorical

principlestypicallyassociatedwithtext.Inthenextchapter,Idescribetheusesof

topoiandfiguresofspeechhistorically,examinetheirpotentialas“objective”

methodologicaltools,anddescribehowIwillusetheminmyanalyses.

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CHAPTERTHREE

Areturntoclassicalrhetoric:Topoi,figuresofspeech,andthe“objective”bridge

InShapingInformation:TheRhetoricofVisualConventions,Charles

KostelnickandMichaelHassettwrite,“Tofunctionasalanguagethatuserscan

reliablymakemeaningwith,visuallanguagemustembodycodesthatnormalize

itspracticesamongboththedesignerswhodeployitandthereaderswho

interpretit”(KostelnickandHassettI).Theygoontosay,though,thatvisuals

mustbemetontheir“ownterms,”thattalkingaboutvisualsintermsofverbal

communicationisnothelpfultocreatingthisnewcodification(I).AsIalready

mentioned,Idonotnecessarilyagreethatdifferentiatingthevisualandthe

verbalishelpfultovisualstudy,buttheauthorsdotouchonaninteresting

conceptwiththecodificationofimagesasameansformakingthem“readable.”

ThisiscertainlywhatKressandVanLeeuwenwereattemptingtodoonagrand,

conceptuallevelfromasocialsemioticsperspective.Andwhilethesesortsof

perceptualtheoriesareimportant,asI’vealreadypointedout,theycanleadtoan

infinitenumberofvisual“grammars”oralphabets.

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Theoristsfrommanydisciplineshaveattemptedtoexplainmeaning

making.Fromsemiotics(Peirce,Sassure,Sebeok),tolinguistics(Sapir,Chomsky,

Bloomfield),toliterarytheorieslikereader‑response(Fish,Gombrich,Jauss),and

beyond,thetheoreticaltoolstodeciphercommunicationarevast.Anynumberof

thesetheorieswouldprovideanabundanceofnewinformationforvisual

communication.Nonetheless,Icontendthatexistingprinciplesofclassical

rhetoriccanprovideawealthoftheoreticalinformationtohelpusexamine

visualargumentationfroman“objective”viewpoint.Ifindexploringthe

rhetoricaltoolsinourtheoreticalarsenalequallyasvaluableascomingupwitha

newtheoryorapplyingtheoriesfromanotherdiscipline.Therefore,thetwo

rhetoricalprinciplesIwanttoexploreinthisthesisaretopoiandfiguresof

speech.Ineithercontendthatthesearetheonlyclassicalrhetoricaltoolsthat

needreexaminationforvisualargumentnorthattheyarethebest.Ichosetopoi

andfiguresofspeechbecause,asIwillshow,theyseemtobeexamplesof

concepts—understoodintermsof“objective”theory—thatmayhavea

propensityforcommunicatingacrossvastlydifferentaudiences—thoughIdare

notsayuniversally.

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Topoiandfiguresofspeech—pastandpresent

Aristotlefirstmentionstopoi—alsoknownas“commontopics”—in“Book

II”ofhistreatise,Rhetoric.Havingexploredthespecialtopics,headdresseswhat

hecalls“theargumentscommontoalloratory”(129).ForAristotle,thesetopoi

providefamiliarplacesfororatorstobegintheirarguments,placestheaudience

canalsounderstandwithoutnecessarilybeingfamiliarwiththesubjectmatter.

Inhisclassictextbook,ClassicalRhetoricfortheModernStudent,P.J.Corbett

clarifiestheimportanceoftopoibycomparingthemtoachecklist.Hewrites,

“Theterm‘checklist’suggeststhatonegoesthroughthelistoftopics,onebyone,

askingoneselfwhetherthisparticulartopicwillturnupanymaterialforthe

developmentofone’ssubject”(96).HegoesontosaythatQuintilianhopedhis

studentswouldeventuallyinternalizethetopics,abletorecallthatthemoment

theysynthesizeanargument(Corbett96).

Indeed,thecommontopics—whichincludedefinition,comparison,cause

andeffect,possibleandimpossible,pastandfuturefact,authority,etc.—are

alreadysoconceptuallyfamiliartomostpeoplethattheymakeexcellenttoolsfor

persuasionandargumentation.SharonBracciBlinnandMaryGarretteven

contendthattheAristoteliantopoi“functionasirreducibleconceptsfromwhich

reasoningproceeds”(94).Theimplicationforthisconclusion,whichtheyback

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withcognitivepsychologicalresearch,isthattopoimayserveasacross‑cultural,

universalmethodforexaminingpersuasionandargumentationstrategies(95).

Similarly,J.P.Zompettiarguesthatargumentationscholarsshouldreturntheir

attentiontotopoibutinadifferentway—bystudying“whattopoicanactuallybe

usedfor”(15).ForZompetti,theyareagreatwaytohelprhetoricians,especially

students,begindevelopingargumentsandfindingpersuasivemeans(25).

Finally,andperhapsmostimportantly,ChaimPerelmanandLucieOlbrechts‑

Tytecadiscusstheimportanceoftopoiintheirclassicbook,TheNewRhetoric:A

TreatiseonArgumentation.Theyspendagreatdealoftimediscussingtopics

becauseoftheirperceiveduniversalapplicationandappeal—makingthem

incrediblyusefultorhetorsofallexperiencelevelsandbackgrounds(85).

Whiletopoiseemtohaveawideapplicationthatmakesthemgreat

rhetoricaltools,figuresofspeech,too,haveacompellingappeal.Quintilian

mighthavebestaddressedthemeaningoftheterm“figuresofspeech”whenhe

wrote:“Letthedefinitionofafigure…beaformofspeechartfullyvariedfrom

commonusage”(Corbett425).Indeed,Corbettexplainsthatfigurescanbe

considered“gracesoflanguage”or“dressingofthought”or“embellishment”

(424).Butthesewerenottheonlywaysthatclassicalrhetoriciansviewedfigures.

Aristotle,forinstance,sawfiguresasanexcellenttoprovideclearnesstothe

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rhetorsandthoughtandhelpstheaudienceunderstandtheargumentquickly

andhappily(Corbett424).InOntheSublime,Longinusdescribesthepurposeof

figuresbyasking,“Whatthenistheeffectofrhetoricalvisualization?”He

answers:“Thereismuchitcandotobringurgencyandpassionintoourwords;

butitiswhenitiscloselyinvolvedwithfactualargumentsthatitenslavesthe

heareraswellaspersuadinghim”(357).

Liketopoi,figuresofspeech—includingantithesis,anastrophe,ellipsis,

alliteration,andmanyothers—haveafamiliarityaboutthem,infunctionifnotin

name,thatmaketheiruseallthemorepowerfulandappealingforrhetors.A

1993studyofPeoplemagazineadsbyEdwardF.McQuarrieandDavidGlen

Mickdemonstratedthatevenasmallsamplingofadsshowedapropensityfor

usingfiguresofspeech.Ofthe154adsanalyzed,86percent,or132ads,

containedoneormorefiguresofspeechintheirheadlinesorsub‑heads

(McQuarrieandMick310).Similarly,CraigandCarolKallendorfarguethat

businesscommunicationhasbenefitedgreatlyfromfiguresofspeech,citing

numerousexamplesinsuccessfulcompanyslogansandmottos(36‑37).They

contendthatfigureshaveapropensityforbuildingethosthroughandimageand

eveningmakinglogicalargumentsthroughstructuringandorganization(41‑42).

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Itseemsapparentthattopoiandfiguresofspeechhavegreatpersuasive

andevenargumentativepotentialintheirexpectedtextualuse,buthowmight

rhetoriciansincorporatethemvisually?Twoscholarshavedoneresearchinthe

areaofvisualfiguresofspeech.RobertHorn,in“RhetoricalDevicesandTight

Integration,”providesexamplesofvisualsynecdoche,metonymy,and

metaphor,notingthatvisualmetaphorsareespecially“richandexpressive

tools”(Horn373).Likewise,JeanneFahnestocknoticesseveralimportant

occurrencesofvisualfiguresofspeechinherbook,RhetoricalFiguresinScience.In

oneinstance,scientistsusedvisualploche,repetition,toarguethatavirion

remainsthesameasitentersandleavesacell(Fahnestock166).Additionally,she

pointsouttheuseofvisualpolyptoton,repetitionwithchange,inastudyof

hummingbirdstoshowthatanewspecieshadbeendiscovered—when

comparedtopreviouslydiscoveredbirds(175).Shecontendsthatthepurposeof

thesefigures,whethertextualorvisual,istoargueinvisiblyandsoftenthe

potential“shock”inherentinanyclaim.Thatis,thevisualsarecomparable

representationsofthetextualarguments,butcanbemorepersuasivesincethe

audienceislessadeptatarguingagainstthem.Shewrites,“Makingaclaimless

surprisingandthereforemoreconvincingispreciselytheworkofafigureof

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argument,illustratingonceagainthattherearepervasiveconnectionsbetween

linguisticstructureandargumentativestructure”(161).

Allofthisinformationleadsuptothequestion:Whydotopoiandfigures

ofspeechseemtohavesuchwide‑reachingcommunicativeability?Foremost,

theytendtoprovideasenseoffamiliaritythatmakestheaudiencemore

comfortablewiththeargument.Theserhetoricalstrategiesbringacertainethos

thatmakesthemmorecredibleaudiences.Moreimportantly,though,topoiand

figuresarenotconcernedprimarilywitheitherthecontentofanargumentorits

structure.Itseemsthattheserhetoricalstrategiesexemplifythe“objective”

notionofaconcept,definedintermsof“objective”theoryasa“mental

integrationoftwoormoreunitswhichareisolatedaccordingtoaspecific

characteristic(s)andunitedbyaspecificdefinition”(Rand,Introduction10).

Underthisdefinition,aunitreferredtobyaconceptmusthaveattributesthat

existinsomequantitybutthatmayexistinanyquantity(Rand,Introduction11).

Thatis,topoiandfiguresofspeechneednotprovidespecificargumentative

information,buttheyarecontingentonthecontentandcontextprovidedbythe

rhetor.

Forexample,decidingtouseametaphordoesnottellmewhattosayor

evenaspecificstructureforhowtosayit.Theconceptofmetaphordenotesa

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certainlogicalstructuring,buttellsmenothingelseapriori.Thesuccessofthe

metaphordependsontherelationshipbetweenthecontentanditsstructure.

Generallyspeaking,metaphorstakeasimpleXisYform—suchas,“Loveisa

river.”Nevertheless,simplyplugginginappropriatenounsdoesnotguaranteea

persuasiveorargumentativemetaphor.Thesuccessnecessarilydependson

interplaybetweencontentwithitsappropriatestructureandthecontextinwhich

itwillbeused—i.e.,betweentherealityoftheconstruedandthemindofthe

audience.Thespecificqualitiesofametaphormustexistinsomewaybutthey

mayexistinanyway—asdeterminedbytherhetor.Inthatsense,topoiand

figuresseemtodemonstrate,ratheraccurately,the“objective”theoryofvisual

communicationpresentedinthisthesis.Sincetheseclassicalrhetoricaldevices

appeartoserveasillustrationsof“objective”concepts,itseemsappropriatethat

theircommunicativeabilityisfarreaching.Theyaremethodologicalexamplesof

thehumanthoughtprocess—afacultythatis,hopefully,veryfamiliartomany

audiences.

Idonotcontendthattopoiandfiguresofspeecharetheonlyrhetorical

elementsthatseemtofunctionasexamplesof“objective”conceptsnordoI

contendthattheymaybethebestexamples.Indeed,thereareprobablymany

moredevicesthatwouldexemplifythisnotion—perhapsevenbetterthantopoi

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andfigures.Nonetheless,thechoicetoexaminetopoiandfiguresultimatelycame

downtopersonalinterestandlimitationsontime.

Amethodologyforexaminingvisualtopoiandfigures

UsingdefinitionsandexplanationscollectedquiteeffectivelyinEdward

Corbett’sbook,ClassicalRhetoricfortheModernStudent,Iexaminethevisual

representationsoftopoiandfiguresofspeechinthreenon‑profit,anti‑smoking

ads.Inordertosuccessfullydoso,ImustfirstperformwhatSonjaK.Foss

describesasadeductivemethodofrhetoricizingthevisual.In“Framingthe

StudyofVisualRhetoric:TowardaTransformationofRhetoricalTheory,”Foss

explainsthatthisapproach“suggestswhichaspectsofrhetoricaltheoryapplyto

boththevisualandtheverbal,thusmarkingareasofstudywhereattentionto

thevisualislikelytobelessproductivebecause,inthoseareas,verbalandvisual

rhetoricarefunctioningsimilarly”(311).

ThoughbasedonHornandFahnestock’sinnovativework,myanalysis

differsfromtheirexaminationsinseveraldistinctways.Foremost,Iaddress

visualrepresentationoftopoiinadditiontofiguresofspeechasmymainsubject,

andthusdedicatemoretimetodiscussingthem.Furthermore,Fahnestock

identifiesvisualfiguresbutonlyasasidenoteonthetopicoffiguresinscientific

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rhetoric.Horn,ontheotherhand,directlyaddressesvisualrepresentationsbut

spendsonlytwopagespresentingthem—mainlybypresentingexamples.

Additionally,Horncreateshisexampleswhilethisexaminationfindsthemin

existingvisuals.ThesedistinctionsareinnowaymeanttodiminishHornand

Fahnestock’sfindings,onlytodemonstratewheremystudyfitsintothe

conversation.

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CHAPTERFOUR

“Making”theargument:Analysesofvisualtopoiandfigures

Sincemostadvertisementsinherentlymakearguments,attempting,on

somelevel,topersuadetheiraudiencetobuyaproduct,support/stopsupporting

acause,orotherwiseactinacertainway,theyseemtobeanidealmediumfor

examplesofvisualargument.Indeed,manyprintandwebadvertisementsuse

visualelements,ofteninadditiontotext,todrawattentiontotheadandenhance

theargument.Non‑profitads,especially,seemtoprovideexcellentresourcesfor

thistypeofexaminationsincetheyprimarily“sell”messages/ideologies/waysof

thinkinginsteadoftangibleproducts.Thischapterexaminesthreenon‑profit

magazineadvertisementsthatwarnagainstthedangersofsecondhandsmoke.

TheyaresponsoredbytheAmericanLegacyFoundationanddistributedbythe

AdCouncil,“aprivate,non‑profitorganizationthatmarshalsvolunteertalent

fromtheadvertisingandcommunicationsindustries…todelivercritical

messagestotheAmericanpublic”(“AboutAdCouncil”).Thoughaconsistent

messagelinkstheads,theycomefromthreedistinctcampaigns,eachcampaign

withmultiplevariationsofthesamedesign.Ichosethreevaryingcampaigns

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insteadofthreepostersfromthesamecampaigninordertoanalyzethevisual

argumentativerelationshipsbetweenthem.

ButbeforeIcanaddmyvoicetotheconversation,Ineedtoclarifytwo

morethingsaboutthisexaminationandtheimagesbeingexamined:(1)the

extenttowhichIshouldincludethetextinmyanalysesand(2)theargumentsas

IseetheminordertounderstandhowIthinkthey’rebeingrepresentedvisually.

Theaccompanyingtextineachadvertisementseemstoplayanimportant

partinunderstandingtheargumentsbeingmade,especiallywhenfirst

consideringthepurposeoftheads.Sinceitismygoaltoexaminevisual

representationsoftheargumentandnottogarnertheargumentfromthevisuals,

itseemsprudenttousethetexttodoso.Therefore,Ipurposelychoseadswith

varyingamountsoftextforthisanalysis.Therelationshipoftexttoimageand

imagetotextshouldhelptodeterminemythirdpremiseforvisualarguments—

thatthepremisesandconclusionsofthevisualargumenteitherfunction

independentlyoftextoractasastrongsupplementtoit.Thatbeingsaid,Ilimit

textualanalysistotheminimumnecessarytounderstandtheads’

argumentation.Itwouldseemcounter‑productivetoexaminethetopoiand

figuresofspeechwithinthetextinsteadofusingthetextasargumentative

context.

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Withthatpurposeinmind,itisimportantthatIdiscusswhatarguments

thefiguresseemtomake.FiguresAandBappeartofocusmoreonsmoking

duringpregnancy,itseffects,andhowtogethelpquittingsmoking.Theirtexts

havesimilarmessages,length,andimages.Thesetwoadsseemtomakethe

argumentthatsmokingwhilepregnantcanhavedevastatingeffectsonababy

beforeandafterbirth.Contrarily,FigureCseemstofocusontheeffectsof

secondhandsmoke—thefirsttimetheterm“secondhandsmoke”isactually

mentioned—onchildrenandotherfamilymembers;itdoesnotmention

pregnancy.

Thetopoianalyses

FIGUREA–Thisadvertisementcontains,perhaps,themostobvious

visualtopoiofalltheads.Thereseemstobeavisualcomparisonbetweenthe

babyandthecigarette.Itmaybeavisualrepresentationofsimilarity,definedby

Corbettas“thelikenessoftwoormorethings”(103),intermsofgeometricangle

onthepage,relative“small”size,andcolor—thewhiteofthecigaretteshaft

comparedtothewhiteofthebaby’sclothesandthetanofthecigarettefilter

comparedtothebaby’sheadandhands.

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FigureA–“Baby/Cigarette:SecondhandSmoke&Kids”

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Therepetitionof,“Seemssmallbuthasahugeimpact,”suggeststhe

beginningofananalogy.8Corbettwrites,“Analogyarguesthatiftwothingsare

alikeinoneortwocharacteristics,theyareprobablyalikeinanother

characteristic”(103).Itwouldseemthatthevisualanalogyofangle,size,and

colorsetsupthetextualanalogyofsimilarinfluenceonamotherandbaby’s

lives—babytothemotherandsmokingtothebaby.Theadstates,“Justlikea

newbabycanhaveatremendouseffectonyourlife,evenafewcigarettesaday

whilepregnantcanhaveaneffectonyourbaby.”

Althoughthevisualanalogysupportstheclaimofsimilarinfluence,the

adseemstoimplythattheinfluences,thoughequallygreat,areofdifferent

kinds—thattheimpactofthebabyisgoodandtheimpactofthecigaretteisbad.

Thiscomparisonofdifferencehighlights,asCorbettsuggests,thecontrast

betweenthetwodissimilarthings(106).Sincetheaddoesnotseemtoimplythat

theinfluencesarebothgoodorbad,Icannotclassifytheirdifferenceasoneof

degree(Corbett108).Theinfluenceproducedbysmokingduringpregnancyis

illustratedbythecauseandeffectargumentslocatedinthetextualpartofthead.

8KressandvanLeeuwenprovideaninterestingwaytoconceptualizetheanalogy.Theynotethatcertainvisualrelationshipsmimiclogicalstructuringintext.Theycontendthatvectors,forinstance,playtheroleofactionverbs(46).Inthebabyandcigaretteimages,manyofthevisualelementssignifyananalogy—size,angle,andcolorspecifically.Thesedistinctions,ofcourse,dependheavilyoncontextualinformationwhether—cultural,societal,etc.

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FigureB–“LisforLowBirthweight:SecondhandSmoke&Kids”

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FIGUREB–Unlikethevisualsinthepreviousfigure,thesevisualsmaybe

morethancontextfortheargument;theymaybeavisualrepresentationofthe

argumentitself.Considerthefirstlineoftheaccompanyingtext,whichseemsto

betheprimaryargument,“Smokingwhileyou’repregnantcanincreasethe

chancesofyourbabybeingbornsmallerthanheshouldbeandnotbeingableto

gohomewithyoufromthehospitalrightaway.”Iftheviewerssharean

understandingoftheculturalelementsembeddedinthedrawing9,thiscauseand

effectargumentcanstandbyitself.Thesmokingcigarettesliterallyoutweighthe

baby,tippingthescaleintheirfavor.10Addingmorecigaretteswould,logically,

tipthescalefurther.Ofcourse,addingmorecigarettesonarealscalewouldnot

makethebabyweighless,sotosupplementthepoint,thevisualdepictsthebaby

asbeingnearlythesamephysicalsizeasthecigarettes.Smoking,inthisvisual,

seemstohavedecreasedthephysicalsizeofthebaby—and,asaresult,the

cigarettesoutweightheinfant.

9It’simportanttonotethattheimagecanonlystandasanargumentwithinacertaincontext—namelytheculturalcontextofthedangersofsmoking.Noargument,whethervisualortext,canexistoutsideofcontext,andconcedingthatthisvisualargumentrequirescontextdoesnotmeanthatvisualscannotargue.Itwasnevermyintenttoshowthatvisualargumentshaveamethodologythatmakethemuniversallyapplicable,andIhopeIhavenotdoneso.10Itmaybethatthescaleitself,outsideofthespecificcontextofsmoking,mayactasavisualargumentforcauseandeffectingeneral—thatis,iftheaudiencesharestheunderstandingofhowascaleworks.Icannotmakethisclaimhere,though,sincethescaleimageisnecessarilyintertwinedwiththeanti‑smokingcontext.

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Onasmaller,almostunnoticeablelevel,theaddesignmightbesettingup

avisualcontrarybetweensmokingandbaby.Contraryterms,accordingto

Corbett,“involveoppositeorincompatiblethingsofthesamekind”(116).In

accordancewiththisdefinition,theadsetscigaretteandbabyascontrariesnot

throughdirectstatementbutthroughaclevervisualanalogy.Foremost,the

cigarettessmolderinababyblueashtrayandthebabyrestsinlightpinkbundle.

Thetwocolors,typicallyassociatedwithmaleandfemalerespectively,workas

contraries.Justascoldisthecontraryofhot,orloudofquiet,blue—atleastin

Westernculture—signifiesthecontraryofpink—moresomale(blue)andfemale

(pink).Similarly,theimageofthescalesetsupitsowncontrarysystem

supportedbythetextualargument.Intheadvertisement’sscale,eitherthe

cigarettesoutweighthebabyorthebabyoutweighsthecigarettes.Balancedoes

notseemtobeanoption.Thetextneverreferstoasituationinwhichtheamount

ofsmokingisdirectlyrelatedtothechancesofababybeingbornpremature.It

seemstosuggestthatifyousmokeatall,thechanceswillincrease.

Additionally,theadiscarefulnottoconcludethatquittingsmokingwill

eliminatethechanceofprematurebirth.Theadstates,“Decidingnottosmoke

whilepregnantisthefirststepyoucantaketoincreasethelikelihoodthatyour

babywillbebornstrongandhealthy.”Thesetwomessages—thatsmoking“can

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increasethechancesofyourbabybeingbornsmaller”andthatquittingsmoking

“helpsreducethechancesofprematuredelivery”—seemtoexemplifywhatwe

canknowaboutcontrariesapriori:“(1)Ifoneofthepropositionsistrue,theother

isfalse…(2)Ifoneofthepropositionsisfalse,theotheroneisnotnecessarily

true”(Corbett117).Inotherwords,ifyousmoke,thechancesforpremature

deliveryincrease,butifyoudonotsmoke,youmaystilldeliverprematurely.

FIGUREC–Inthisadvertisement,Iobservethefirstoutrightuseof

testimony,atopicthatgathersitsargumentativematerialnotfromthediscussed

questionbutfromoutsideofthediscussion(Corbett124).Inthiscase,the

externalsourceisamaxim,ageneralstatement“abouthumanactions,about

thingsthataretobechosenoravoidedinhumanaction”(Corbett129).

AccordingtoCorbett,maximsarealsonecessarilyuniversalandoftenseemself‑

evident(129).Thisparticularmaxim,embeddedinaneedlepointsampler,states,

“Thankyoufornotpassinggasinourhome.”Thestatement,whilenot

necessarilywrittenintheformofamaxim,impliesauniversaltruthabout

humanaction.Inmaximform,thesamplermightsay,“Acourteouspersonnever

passesgasinsomeoneelse’shome.”Inthiscase,wecanassumethat“passing

gas”isanunderstoodtermforsmoking.

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FigureC–“Needlepoint:SecondhandSmoke&Kids”

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Thatbeingsaid,Inoticeasecond,seeminglymorepowerfultopoiatwork

withinthemaxim:definition.Corbettseemstoacknowledgetheimportanceof

definitionwhenheputsitfirstamongthecommontopicsandgivesitthelongest

explanation.Inthisinstance,theaddefinessecondhandsmokeas“passinggas”

nottoclarifytheissuebeingdiscussedbuttopresentanargumentagainstit—a

sub‑topicofdefinitionthatCorbettcalls“genus”(99).Torewritethestatementin

definitionalform,itmightstate,“Smokingispassinggas.”Thesamplerseemsto

beplayingonthecolloquialdefinitionfor“passinggas”whilethetextrefersto

literaldeadlygases“likehydrogencyanide”thatitwarns“canbeespecially

harmfultoyourkidssweetkids.”

Imentionthesetextualelementsonlytodrawattentiontothesampler

itselfasvisualargument.Theinvocationoftheimageofthesamplernecessarily

bringswithittheculturalcontextofthegenre.Onlyiftheaudiencehassome

context—referencedenthymematically—willtheyunderstandthesignificanceof

themaxim‑likeinformationprovidedbyit.Evendevoidoftext,thecultural

contextof“samplerasgenre”wouldprovidetheviewerssomebasisfor

knowingthetypeofargument—thattheargumentwillbepresentedintheform

ofa“folksy”truism.Consequently,thesamplergenreasksthereadertoconsider

whoauthoredtheinformationandinwhatsituation.Thesampleritself,then,

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seemstobeanexampleofauthority,asub‑topicoftestimonythatrelieson

expertopiniontohelpmakeapoint(Corbett124).Whiletheauthorsofthe

samplersmaynotbe“experts”inamodernsense,Corbettexplainsthatbefore

theageoftechnologyfactscouldnotbereadilyverified,soitwasimperativethat

declarationsoftruthcarriedalsocarriedtheethosofthespeaker(125).Thisvisual

topoiasksthereadertoconsidertheauthor’sprejudices,assumptions,and

ultimateknowledgeonthesubjectathand(Corbett125)—eventhoughthe

subjectseemsdifficulttodetermineoutsidethecontextprovidedbythetext.

Relationshipsbetweentopoi

ThelogosfortheAdCouncil,AmericanLegacyFoundation,andGreat

StartBabiesmaybethemostvisiblerelationshipbetweenthefigures.Thesetiny

symbolsatthebottomofeachadcouldbeseenasappealstoauthority.Sincethe

advertisementsdonotusemanyothersub‑topicsoftestimonylikestatistics,law,

orprecedents,theseappealstoauthority—stampsofapprovalbyauthoritative,

noblegroups—seemtobeimportantfactorsfortheaudiencetodeterminethe

truthvalueoftheclaimsbeingmade.Uponcloserinspection,theadsseemto

supplementtheexternalauthoritybypresentingtheargumentsthemselvesas

authority.Theydosointwoways:(1)byappealingtothemaxim‑like

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assumptionthatsecondhandsmokeisunhealthyand(2)byrelyingonthenon‑

profitstatusoftheirdistributor,AdCouncil,topresenttheimageofaltruistic

authority—atestimonial,ofsorts,thatcallsonthedistributor’sethostoconvince

theaudience(Corbett126).

Inadditiontothecommonalitiesamongtheadvertisements,Iwouldlike

tonoteoneofthemajordifferences—sincedifferenceisasub‑topicof

comparison.Interestingly,causeandeffectargumentsexistineachad,butthey

aretreatedquitedifferently.FigureAusesthevisualstosetupthecauseand

effectargumentinthetextthroughanalogy.ThevisualsinFigureB,ontheother

hand,actuallydepictthecauseandeffectargument,whichisrestatedinthetext.

Contrarily,FigureCvisualsdonotseemtodealwiththetextualcauseandeffect

argumentatall—excepttoinvokeadefinitionforsmokingthatrelatestothe

textualargumentaboutdeadlygases.Iwillevaluatethisvisualdiversityinmy

conclusion.

Rhetoricalimplicationsforvisualtopoi

Thevisualtopoiintheseadsseemtoactmainlyassupplementstothe

textualarguments.Itwouldappearthatmostofthevisualscouldnotstandas

argumentsontheirownwithoutasignificantamountofcontexttoputthemin

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logicalperspective.Whetherthesespecificimagesweredesignedassupplements

orwhetherimagesingeneralhaveadifficulttimemakingindependentlogical

assertions,Idonotknow.Nonetheless,thisexaminationhasuncoveredwhat

appearstobeonecounterexampletothistrend.TheimagesinFigureBmightbe

abletostandasindependentargumentswithoutthecontext‑givingtext.

Assumingasharedcommunityandculturalcodes,assuggestedbyKostelnick

andHassett,theimageofthetiltingscaleandminiaturebabyseemtoembody

enoughofthenecessarycharacteristicsofacauseandeffectargumenttoexist

successfullyoutsideofthetextualsupplement.Theimageofthescaleincontext

withtheanti‑smokingmessageseemstosuggestaconceptualrelationship

betweenthestructureofthecauseandeffectargumentandtheelementsthat

evokeit.Inotherwords,thereislogicalinterplaybetweenwhatviewersknow

aboutcauseandeffectrelationshipsandthevisualelementsusedtorepresent

thecauseandeffectrelationshipofsmokingtolowbirthweight.Thisfindinghas

potentiallywide‑reachingimplicationsthatIwilldiscussmoreinmyconclusion.

Ithinkitisalsoimportanttoaddressthetopicsthatwerenotreadily

apparentintheadvertisementsthat,justconsideringmypersonalexperience

withnewspaperads,Iexpectedtobepresent.Noneoftheadvertisements,for

instance,usedstatisticstostrengthentheirarguments,nordidtheyusepersonal

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testimonyfromparentsofchildrenaffectedbysecondhandsmoke—either

throughtestimonialorprecedent,theuseofpastexamplestomakeajudgment

aboutthefuture(Corbett131).Additionally,thoughperhapsnotsurprisingly,I

didnotfindaninstanceofantecedentandconsequenceorargumentby

circumstance—thoughthislackofexampledoesnotmeantheyarenotpresent.

Regardless,whataretheimplicationsofthesemissingtopoi?

Foremost,itdoesnotfollowthatbecausethesetopoimaybemissingfrom

thesespecificadsthattheycannotberepresentedvisually.Justaswritten

argumentsdonotnecessarilycontaineverylogicaltopic,visualargumentsdo

notnecessarilycontainthemeither.Thisadcampaigndoesnotseemtolend

itselftoargumentsmadeviathemissingtopoi.Itmaybethatstatistics,for

instance,havebecomesuchaclichétopicthattheyhavelosttheirappeal,

especiallyinadvertisementsdealingwithsecondhandsmoke.Ithasalmost

becomecommonknowledgethatsmokingandsecondhandsmokearebadfor

you,sotheadsdonotneedaddressthisissuethroughtestimonialorprecedent.

Concerningthelackofantecedent/consequenceandargumentsbycircumstance,

theirabsencesimplyseemstoimplythattheads’author(s)didnothaveaneed

forsucharguments.Icannotthinkofaspecificreasonwhytheycouldnotbe

representedvisuallyiftherewasneedtodoso.

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Finally,itseemsimportanttonotethatthetopoiofauthorityplacesa

significantpartinvisualargument.Althoughtheauthorityisreferenced

enthymematically—whetherbasedonexternalethoslikethelogosorcultural

contextlikethesamplerinFigureC—itstillseemsasifvisualshaveacertain

propensityfordrawingattentiontotheintegrityoftheircreator(s).

Havingconsideredthewaysinwhichtopoimaybevisuallyrepresented,I

nowturntovisualfiguresofspeechandtheirrhetoricalimplications.

Thefiguresofspeechanalyses

FIGUREA–Inthisdesign,theadjacentimagesofsleepingbabyand

cigaretteseemtocreatea“similarityofstructure”thatCorbettdefinesas

“parallelism”(428).Indeed,thetext,“Seemssmallbuthasahugeimpact,”

accompaniesbothvisuals,establishingaseeminglyunmistakablestructural

unitymuchlikethetopoiofsimilaritydiscussedintheprevioussection.Moreso

thanparallel,though,theadappearstocreate“isocolon,”aformofparallelism

resultingwhen“parallelelementsaresimilarnotonlyinstructurebutinlength

(thatis,thesamenumberofwords,eventhesamenumberofsyllables)”(Corbett

429).Thebottomparagraphfostersthisideaofparallelism,stating,“Justlikea

newbabycanhaveatremendouseffectonyourlife,evenafewcigarettesaday

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whilepregnantcanhaveaneffectonyourbaby.”Babyandcigaretteseem

parallelintheirequallyimportantinfluence—again,babytothemotherand

smokingtothebaby.

Uponfurtherreview,however,itappearsthattheconcurrentimagesand

textmovebeyondisocolon,usingtheparallelstructuretosetup“antithesis,”

thatis“thejuxtapositionofcontrastingideas,ofteninparallelstructure”(Corbett

429).Theadvertisement’sargumentdoesnotlenditselftomerelyestablishinga

parallelrelationshipbetweenbabyandcigarette.Consequently,whilethe

isocolonicstructuredemonstratesasimilarityofinfluenceonthemotherand

child,itfurthermoresuggestsdissimilarityofimportance—thus,antithesis.The

dissimilaritysetsupthenegativemedicalimpactsofsmokinglistedinthe

paragraph,and,moreover,showstheimportanceofthebabyincontrasttothe

cigarette.Subsequently,theimageofthesinglecigaretteseemstorepresentthe

entireactofsmoking,afigureofspeechknownas“synecdoche”wherein“apart

standsforthewhole”(Corbett445).

FIGUREB–Moresothantheothertwodesigns,theoverallappearanceof

FigureB—asifitwastakenfromachild’salphabetbook—seemstoinvoke

parallelismwithdocumentsandinformationoutsideofitself,askingthe

audiencetorecallfamiliarstructuralconceptsinordertounderstandthegiven

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visuals.Thisellipsis‑likeparallelism—“ellipsis”meaningthe“deliberate

omissionofawordorofwordswhicharereadilyimpliedbythecontext”

(Corbett433)—seemstorequiretheaudiencetoassociatetheadvertisement’s

structurewithexternalchildren’sbooks.Subsequently,thisparallelismsetsup

thecartoonscale—otherwiseknownasabalance—andresultingantithesis,the

babyononeendandanashtrayontheother.

Inthisdesign,though,theantithesisseemstoactinaccordancewith

anotherfigureofspeech:“anastrophe”orthe“inversionofthenaturalorusual

wordorder”(Corbett431).Justaswordshavea“natural”order,itseemsimages

doaswell—atleastintermsofperceivedimportance.Thecartoonscaleleans

heavilytowardtheashtray,seeminglygivingthecigarettesaweightedvalue.It

wouldappearthattheusualorder,bothphysicallyinpoundsandethicallyin

importance,wouldtipthescaletowardthebaby.

Indeed,theaccompanyingparagraphseemstoplayonthisideaofthe

cigarettes“outweighing”thebaby,stating,“Smokingwhilepregnantcan

increasethechancesofyourbabybeingbornsmallerthanheshould

be…Decidingnottosmokewhilepregnantisthefirststepyoucantaketo

increasethelikelihoodthatyourbabywillbebornstrongandhealthy”

(emphasismine).Consideringthetext,theimageofthe“small”babyseemstobe

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a“syllepsis”pun,thatis“awordunderstooddifferentlyinrelationtotwoor

moreotherwords,whichitmodifiesorgoverns”(Corbett448).Inthisinstance,

thetextseemstomaketheimageapun—onweight—andnotviceversa.

FIGUREC–Needlepointsamplersoftenhaveawittysaying,wordof

advice,orgeneralruleofthumb,andthesamplerinFigureCisnoexception.

Thesamplerreads,“Thankyoufornotpassinggasinourhome.”Inthiscase,the

wordsmaybeinterpretedasa“maxim.”InTheRhetoricalTradition,editors

PatriciaBizzellandBruceHerzbergdefinemaxims,inAristotelianterms,as

appealstoexampletomakeanargument(172).Usingthatdefinition,thismaxim

mayactasafigureofspeech,enhancingtheoveralleffectivenessofthevisual

argument.Itappealstoadvicetheaudiencemayalreadyknow—“wastenot,

wantnot”forexample.Furthermore,theterm“passinggas,”introducedbythe

maxim,couldactasasyllepsispun,onthetypeofgas;considerthebottomof

thead,whichstates,“Secondhandsmokecontainsdeadlygaseslikehydrogen

cyanide…”Itwouldalsoseemthateventheword“gas”inthesampler

representsthelargeractofsmokingandmaybecalledsynecdoche.Thesethree

figuresinconjunctionmayacttoenhancethevisualargumentmoresothanany

couldonitsown.

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Justvisuallyspeaking,FigureCappearstocontaintwomajorfigures.

Foremost,thevisualelementsleaveoutanydefinitivereferencetosmokingor

cigarettes.Thisellipsisrequirestheaudiencetoreadthetextinorderto

understandthevisual.Withoutthatparagraphtogivecontext,thevisualmay

actuallydetractfromtheargument.Additionally,theneedlepointhouseand

treestowardthebottomofthesamplerbreakupthemaxim,actingas

“parenthesis”byinsertinga“unitinapositionthatinterruptsthenormal

syntacticalflowofthesentence”(431).Thisbreakinflowseeminglygives

emphasistothefirstpartofthetext(Thankyoufornotpassinggas)—whichis

alsoinlargertypethanthelatter—andallowsthesecondpart(inourhome)only

asanafterthought,afigurethatcallsattentiontoimportanceofnot“passinggas”

atallletalone“inourhome.”

Relationshipsbetweenfiguresofspeech

Itappearsthat,forthemostpart,thedesignscanstandalone,effectively

makingargumentswithouthelpfromtheothers.Thatbeingsaid,severalfigures

doseemtopermeatethepageboundaries.Perhapsoneofthemorenoticeable

figuresoccurswiththebabiesinFiguresAandB.AlthoughthebabyinFigureA

comesfromastockimageofarealbaby,thebabyinFigureBisacartoon.The

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changeininfants,whetherfromAtoBorBtoA,representsa“repetitionof

wordsderivedfromthesameroot,”avisual“polyptoton”(Corbett443).

Similarly,thoughperhapslessnoticeably,thebabiesinAandBmakeanother

derivationinFigureC.WhereasFiguresAandBspeakofandshowinfants,

FigureCmentions“kidssweetkids”initsparagraph.FromAandBtoC,the

babieschangetokids,and,accordingly,theargumentchangesaswell.

Thischangeinargumentmayalsobeinterpretedasa“climax”intheads,

the“arrangementofwordsphrases,orclausesinanorderofincreasing

importance”(Corbett441).Granted,theadvertisementshavenogiven

arrangementandmaybeviewedoutofmyorderofanalysis.Nonetheless,

viewedinanA,B,Csequence—apossiblerandomviewingpattern—FigureC

mayseemtobetheclimacticadoftheseries,notonlyintermsofsubjectage

(“kid”versus“baby)butalsoaccordingtotheseeminglymoresophisticated

argument—i.e.,itisnotanargumentagainstsmokingingeneral,butagainst

smokingaroundothers.

Finally,eachad,inasimilarmanner,demonstrates“litotes,”or“the

deliberateuseofunderstatement”(Corbett452),toenhancetheargument—

possiblythemostdramaticandeffectiverelationshipbetweenthem.Ineach

instance,thevisualsseemtodownplaytheseverityofsecondhandsmoke,often

85

throughpassiveimagesorvisualpuns,toaddshockvaluetotheparagraphs’

listsofrisks:“prematuredelivery,”“SIDS,”andcigaretteingredientslike

“hydrogencyanide.”

Rhetoricalimplicationsforvisualfiguresofspeech

Admittedly,theinstancesofvisualfiguresofspeechseemtoonumerous

tohereindiscussindividually,butseveralmajorfiguresdeserveextended

examinationoftheirrhetoricalimplications.Foremost,Ishallbeginwithmylast

observationinthe“FiguresofSpeechAnalyses”section:theuseoflitotesineach

advertisement.Iamnaturallywearyofadvertisements,andIwouldimaginethat

ageneralaudiencemaybeequallyascautious—caveatemptor.Consequently,

advertisersmustfindsomewaytolowereveryone’sguard,toeasetheaudience

intoconsideringtheadvertisement.Indeed,theuseoflitotesintheseadsmay

enticetheaudience,summonedbytheclevernessoftheads,to“stayawhile”

andbecompelledbythevisuallyenhancedargumentsathand.

Theuseofellipsisinthevisualsisanotherfigurethatdeservesfurther

exploration.Uponfirstglance,itappearsthatthevisualsuseellipsisonlytoget

theaudiencetoreadthetext—sincewithoutitsomevisualsmakesnosense.

Consider,though,Finnegan’snotionofnaturalisticenthymeme,“that

86

photographicimages…carrywiththemaprofoundlyinfluentialbutoften

unrecognizedargumentativesource:theirperceivedrelationshiptonature”

(Finnegan135).Finnegancontendsthatherargumentappliessolelyto

photographsbecause,ifnothingelse,theyalwaysmakeanargumentabouttheir

ownrealism(143)—i.e.,theaudiencemustdecideifthephotographisan

accuraterepresentationofreality.WhileFinneganmayarguethathernaturalistic

enthymemeonlyappliestophotographs,thevisualsintheseadsseemtomake

anargumentabouttheirownrealismaswell.Iftheaudiencedoesnotbelievethe

visualsaretruerepresentations—whethertheyarephotographsorcartoons—

thentheywillprobablydiscountthemessageoutright.Thisenthymematic

principleseemstorelatedirectlytoanad’sethos.Visualsseemtocallonthe

viewers’previousexperiences,culturalbackground,andothercontextual

informationtohelpfulfilltheconceptbeingshown.Thisinterplaybetween

imageandviewerscreatestheinteractionnecessaryforvisualcommunicationto

occur—whetherornotthecommunicationisargumentative—assuggestedby

“objective”theory.Nevertheless,thewaysinwhichvisualsuse/areenthymemes,

likemanyelementsofvisualargument,deservemoreresearchanddiscussion

thanIcanprovidehere.

87

CHAPTERFIVE

Concludingremarks:Implicationsof“objective”theory,futureresearch,

andthelongroadaheadforvisualargument

Interestingly,thoughtheoveralldesigns—textandvisuals—andthetext

alonemayactasindividual,argument‑makingentities,mostofthevisuals

viewedwithoutthetextdonotseemtohavethisrhetoricalprowess.Mostofthe

visuals,takenoffthepageandmadesolitary,appeartobeunabletoactinan

argumentativemanner;thevisualellipsisemployedtocreateanenthymemeand

gettheaudiencetoreadthetextalso,unfortunately,removessignificantcontext.

Inthismanner,mostimagesdonotcreateastrongenoughconceptual

relationshipbetweenthecontextandtheargumentativestructuretostandalone

asargumentativeelements.

Thebabyandashtrayscalecartoon,consideredwithinthecontextoftopoi

andfiguresofspeech,seemstobetheonlyvisualthatcanargueonitsown.Even

thissinglecase,though,seemstoreaffirmtheimportanceandvalidityofvisuals.

Itprovidesapossibleexampleofacompletelyvisualargument,anexamplethat,

88

forme,elevatesthestatusofvisualsfromaccompanyingrhetoricalmaterialto

potentiallyindependentdevicesworthyofequalrhetoricalrankandstudy.

Nonetheless,eventhevisualsthatseemrhetoricallyreliantontheaccompanying

textsprovideargumentativeenhancements.Theyincludenotonlynearly

invisiblestylisticargumentsbutalsodistractionfromrhetoricalflawsor

ineffectivetextualarguments(Fahnestock175).Consequently,visual

representation—becauseitdoesnotshowcasetextualclueslike“if…then”

statements,forexample—maybeaneffectivewaytomaskanargumentand,

thus,maketheaudiencemoreopentopersuasion.Indeed,itseemstobevisual

topoiandvisualfigures’invisibilitythatmakesthemsuchpowerfulrhetorical

toolsforenhancinganargument—eveniftheyhavedifficultyontheirown.

Whenanargumentcanembeditselfsowellwithinthecontextthatitvirtually

disappears,“thesignsofspecialauthorialintentiondiminish”(Fahnestock158).

Thisdiminished“authorialintention”maybeespeciallyhandyforadvertisers

andanequallypowerfultoolforrhetoricians,professionalcommunicators,and

othersinterestedinvisualargument.

Inundertakingthisstudyofvisualtopoiandfiguresofspeech,Iwantedto

observehowarguments,logicalstructureandstyle,manifestthemselvesvisually

andhowthosevisualswereusedwithinanargumentativecontext—likean

89

advertisement.Ifnothingelse,theseadsseemtoillustratethediversewaysin

whichavisualmaysupport,embody,oractinadditiontoastrongargument.It

seemsthatevenargumentsascomplexasanalogy(FigureA)andcauseand

effect(FigureB)canbevisuallyrepresented.Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,that

visualsshouldreplacetextorthattheyare,insomeway,superiortoatextual

argument.Visualrepresentations,too,havetheirlimitations.Iamnotwillingto

saythatthepurelyvisualargumentwouldbeequallyaseffectiveasthetextand

imagescombinedoreventhetextalone—sinceIhavenoevidencetosupportthis

notion—butitwouldseemthatwell‑constructed,purposefulvisualshavesome

argumentativeeffectiveness.Reasoningoutthepossibilitiesoffindingmeaning

andargumentationinimageryfallsunderthepurviewoftheory—asanexample

ofourconceptualfaculties.Byintegratingwhatisknownaboutepistemology,

argumentation,persuasion,visualcommunication,topoiandfiguresofspeech,it

appearspossibletotheorizeaboutnewavenuesforvisualargumentation.

Nonetheless,thevalidityofthistheorywillbetestedbothbythe

conceptualizationsofothertheoristsaswellas,Ihope,theperceptual

observationsofempiricists.Thisthesis,especially,lendsitselftoempirical

testing—acombinationofperceptualandconceptualknowledge.

90

Suggestionsforfutureresearch

Thereisstillalottodiscussaboutvisualarguments:visualenthymemes,

theroleofellipsis,theroleoftypography,etc.Itwouldbefascinating,for

instance,todoasortof“usabilitytest”onthevisualsfromtheseads—orany

visualarguments,actually—andseewhattheviewersdecidearethearguments.

Thistypeofempiricalresearchcouldpotentiallycorroborateordebunk

topoi/figureanalyseslikethisoneand,possibly,assesstheeffectivenessofpurely

visualarguments.Fromthestandpointof“objective”theory,itwouldseem

possibletouseempiricalresearchinanattempttodeterminewhereexactly

meaningmakinghappens—i.e.,moretowardtheperceptuallevelormore

towardtheconceptuallevel.

Withtimeasamajorconsideration,Icouldnotimplementafull‑scale,

quantitativeempiricalstudyforthisthesis.Itwouldseemprudent,though,to

suggestempiricalstudiesforfutureconsideration.Perhapsthebestwayto

initiallyapproachthistopicempiricallywouldbethroughaqualitativecase

studyofthreetofiveinterviewees—somethingsmallandmanageable.For

instance,in“ACognitiveProcessTheoryofWriting,”LindaFlowerandJohnR.

91

Hayesuseatalk‑aloud11protocoltoassessthewritingprocessofawriterin

action.Thatis,theyaskedparticipantstocomposeanarticleabouttheirjobfor

readersofSeventeenmagazine.Duringtheentireprocess,FlowerandHayes

askedtheparticipantsto“thinkoutloud”—i.e.,talkaboutwhattheiressayand

thechoicestheymade.Thisinteractionhelpedtheresearchersdrawconclusions

aboutthewritingprocessesoftheirparticipants(FlowerandHayes368).A

similarprocedurecouldbeusedtoaddresstheconstructvalidityofmy

conclusionsfromtherhetoricalanalysesandperformwhatFosscallsan

“inductive,artifact‑basedapproach”(312).Fossdescribesthismethodasastudy

that“beginswiththecharacteristicsofartifactsandbuildsrhetoricaltheoryon

thebasisofthosecharacteristics,[offering]themostopportunitiesforrhetorical

expansion”(312).SimilartothestudyinFloweretal,participantsmighttalk

aloudastheyviewtheimagesIanalyzed,describinghowspecificelements

presentamessageorifamessageispresentedatall.Thismethodologycould

helpdemonstratetheconnectionbetweenperceptionandconceptionbyshowing

howviewersconnectwhattheyseewithwhattheythinkiscommunicated.This

sortofapproachwouldbeespeciallywhenanalyzingconceptsliketopoiand

11Dr.TharonHowardsuggestedtheterm“talk‑aloud”insteadof“think‑aloud”sinceitmoreaccuratelydescribeswhattheparticipantsareactuallydoing.

92

figuresofspeechtoseeiftheyareaswidelyapplicabletoargumentasthey

appeartobe.12

Anotherempiricalmethodologythatmightyieldinterestingresultsabout

visualargumentationcomesfromBillBuxton’sbook,SketchingUserExperiences.

Buxtonexplainsthatparticipantsoftencannotexpressthemselvesaccurately

whenaskedtodiscussadesignbecausetheyfeelrestrainedbythediscourseand

embarrassedbytheirlackofvocabulary—designvocabularyespecially.

Providingparticipantswithasmanyavailablemeansofcommunicationas

possiblegivesthemmultipleopportunitiesto“tell”theresearcherwhatthey

mean(Buxton393‑94).Inhisgivenexample,heaskedparticipantstodrawan

idealthermostat.Theresultsofthesketchesallowedhimtosalvagewhathe

thoughtwasabadhypothesis,which,instead,turnedouttobepoor

communicationbetweenparticipantandobserver(393).

Icanimagineascenarioinwhichparticipantsareaskedtoconsider

themselvesdesignersforananti‑smokingcampaign.Theymightbeinstructedto

designanadvertisementthatpersuadespeoplenottosmoke.Duringtheentire

12Iconcedethatthismethoddrawsuponaconstructivistapproachthatmightseemcounter‑intuitivetothemethodologypresentedinthisthesis.Nonetheless,Ithinkthissortofempiricalworkprovidesagoodstartingpointforfutureinductivestudies.Idonotclaimthatthissortoftalk‑aloudprotocolprovidessufficientevidenceforatheoryofvisualargument.NordoIclaimthatcasestudiesofthissortgivestrongenoughresultstomakecausalrelationshipsaboutvisualargumentation.Theysimplyprovidepossiblestartingpoints.

93

process,theywouldbeencouragedtotalkaloud—inveryrelaxedterms—about

thedesignchoicestheyweremaking.Thissortofstudywouldprovideawealth

ofinformationaboutwhatparticipantsconceiveasargumentativeelements

comparedtotheonesIperceivedinmyanalyses.

EventhoughIdonothavetimetocompleteanempiricalexamination,I

specificallywantedtonotetheimportanceofthismethodologyforvisual

rhetoricswithinthecontextof“objective”theory.Currently,thereislittle

empiricalresearchbeingconductedinacademiaaboutvisualcommunication

andespeciallyvisualargumentation.Idonotmeantodiscounttheworkthatis

beingdone,butitseemsasifthedisciplineisripefornewscholarship,new

theories,andnewmethodologies—especiallywhenapproachingtheempirical

researchfroman“object‑as‑perceived”philosophy.Certainly,themethodology

and“objective”principlepresentedhereinareonlytwoofthemultitudesof

visualcommunicationpracticesandtheoriesthatneedempiricaltesting,but

“objective”theorylendsitselfnicelytoempiricalverification.Itisatheorythat

hasnodependencyonanyonerealmofknowledge—sinceitnecessarily

advocatesaninteraction.Therefore,itseemstoprovideamultitudeofavenues

toexploredifferentargumentativestrategieswithindifferentcontexts—bethey

cultural,interpersonal,etc.—withoutlimitingtheresearchtoanyonespecific

94

meaning—exceptthatwhichisreachedthroughreasonedperception.Personally,

Ilookforwardtoconductingmoreempiricalexaminationsofvisualargument

methodologiesinthenearfuture.

Implicationsandfinalwords

Thereseemstobeanunnervingtrendinthevisualrhetoricsdiscourse

community—onethatadmonishestextforitsoppressivegriponcommunication

and,asaresult,seekstoabandonexistingtheoryasawayofexplainingvisual

communication.InavisualstudiesfeatureforAfterimagemediamagazine,

ProfessorJohannaDruckerwrotethatournewmedia‑richsocietyis“primedfor

aparadigmshift”awayfromaneraoftextualityandintoaneraofvisuality—if

onlywehadthetrainerstodoso(Drucker).UnlikeDrucker,Idon’tbelievethat

“Textisdead”inapseudo‑Nietzschiansense.Idoconcedethatvisualsarea

uniqueformofcommunication,deservingofseparate,intensivestudy.

Nonetheless,Ibelievewecanlearnfromexistingtheory—especiallyclassical

rhetoricaltheory—onourwaytoestablishingacomprehensivestudy(and

language)of/forvisualrhetorics.Indeed,thisthesisexaminestheapplicabilityof

traditionalrhetoricalprinciples,classicalargumentativestrategy,andanew

approachtovisualcommunicationtheorytohelpexplaintheconceptofvisual

95

argument—anintroductorystudythatmayhelpestablishacomprehensive

visualmethodologyandprovidegreaterexplanatorypowerforvisual

rhetoricians.

Theundeniabletrendinmoderncommunicationistowardthevisual.This

observationiscertainlynotmeanttodiminishtheimportanceoftheverbaland

writtenword.Indeed,theconvergenceofmediastillplaysasignificantand

constantpartinourmediarichlives.Regardless,astheprevalenceofvisuals

increasesandtheintegrationofrhetoricsoccurs,professionalcommunicators

needtheoreticalandpracticaltoolstostayacademicallycurrentandcompetitive

inthejobmarket.Thetheoriesandmethodologiesdiscussedhereinshouldbe

analyzedingreaterdetailinfuturetheoreticalandempiricalstudies.Hopefully

thisstudyshowsthat,asrhetoricalstrategies,theyarejustafewoftheimportant

toolsthatvisualcommunicatorsneedtounderstandandbeabletoapply.Ialso

hopethatthisdemonstratesthatvisualshaverhetoricalpowersonceconsidered

solelytextualandthatthosepowers,renderedvisually,canbeequallyoreven

moreeffectivethantheirtextualcounterparts.

96

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